Professional Documents
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774 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
No.L28196.November9,1967.
No.L28224.November9,1967.
775
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 775
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officersandemployeesoftheGovernmentwouldbeentitledtodemandfrom
them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before
dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their
commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested
in their respective offices, position or employments. One can imagine the
great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of
thedefactodoctrine.
Same Same Title of de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.
Thetitleofadefactoofficercannotbeassailedcollaterally.Itmaynotbe
contestedexceptdirectly,byquowarrantoproceedings.
Same Same Validity of acts of de facto officer cannot be assailed
collaterally.Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
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groundthatheismerelyadefactoofficer.Andthereasonsareobvious:(1)
itwouldbeanindirectinquiryintothetitletotheofficeand(2)theactsofa
defactoofficer,ifwithinthecompetenceofhisoffice,arevalid,insofaras
thepublicisconcerned.
Same Construction of terms Meaning of the term or.The term
orhas,oftentimes,beenheldtomeanandorviceversa,whenthespirit
orcontextofthelawwarrantsit.
Same Power of Congress to approve resolutions amending the
Constitution.ThereisnothingintheConstitutionorinthehistorythereof
that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the
contestedresolutions,orofthesameCongresstopassthesameindifferent
sessions or different days of the same Congressional session. Neither has
anyplausiblereasonbeenadvancedtojustifythedenialofauthoritytoadopt
saidresolutionsonthesameday.
SameMeaning of term election in Art. XI, Constitution,There is
inthisprovisionnothingtoindicatethattheelectionthereinreferredtoisa
special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratificationinspecialelectionsmerelyshowsthatCongressdeemeditbestto
dosounderthecircumstancesthenobtaining.Itdoesnotnegateitsauthority
tosubmitproposedamendmentsforratificationingeneralelections.
SameLegislation cannot be nullified for failure of certain sectors to
discuss it sufficiently.A legislation cannot be nullified by reason of the
failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its
constitutionality or unconstitutionally depends upon no other factor than
thoseexistingatthetimeoftheenactmentthereof,unaffectedbytheactsor
omissions of law enforcing to agencies, particularly those that take place
subsequentlytothepassageorapprovalofthelaw.
SamePublicknowledgeofproposedamendments.Acon
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
siderableportionofthepeoplemaynotknowhowover160oftheproposed
maximumofrepresentativedistrictsareactuallyapportionedbyRBHNo.1
among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that
they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
reading thereof may tend, in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision
thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated may
enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed
amendmentspostedinpublicplaces,thecopieskeptinthepollingplacesand
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the text of the contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the
ballotstheywilluse.
Same Judicial power to nullify executive or legislative acts, not
violative of principle of separation of powers.The system of checks and
balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive
orofCongresstranscendingtheconfinessetforthinthefundamentallawis
not in derogation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme
withinitsownsphere.
Same Determination of conditions for submission of amendments to
peoplepurelylegislative.Thedeterminationoftheconditionsunderwhich
the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a
matterwhichfallswithinthelegislativesphere.
MAKALINTAL,J.,concurring:
ConstitutionallawRep.Act4913Mannerprescribedinlawsufficient
to have amendments submitted for ratification by people.The manner
prescribed in Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act 4913 is sufficient for the
purpose of having the proposed amendments submitted to the people for
theirratification,asenjoinedinSection1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution.
SameDefect is in implementation.The defect is not intrinsic in the
law,butinitsimplementation.Thesamemannerofsubmittingtheproposed
amendments to the people for ratification may, in a different setting, be
sufficient for the purpose. The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a
law may not be made to depend willynilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions.
SameRequisite for declaring law unconstitutional.For a law to be
struck down as unconstitutional, it must be so by reason of some
irreconcilableconflictbetweenitandtheConstitution.Otherwisealawmay
be either valid or invalid, according to circumstances not found in its
provisions, such as the zeal with which they are carried out. The criterion
wouldbetoobroadandrelative,anddependentuponindividualopinionsthat
atbestaresubjective.Whatonemayregardassufficientcompliancewiththe
requirementofsubmissiontothepeople,withinthecontextofthesamelaw,
maynotbesotoanother.
779
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simplyofanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeople
fortheirratification.
BENGZON,J.,concurring:
ConstitutionallawValidityofRep.Act1493Jurisdictionofthecourt.
Since observance of constitutional provisions on the procedure for
amendingtheConstitutionisconcerned,theissueiscognizablebythisCourt
underitspowerstoreviewanActofCongresstodetermineitsconformityto
the fundamental law. For though the Constitution leaves Congress free to
propose whatever constitutional amendment it deems fit, so that the
substanceorcontentof said proposed amendment is a matter of policy and
wisdomandthusapoliticalquestion,theConstitutionneverthelessimposes
requisites as to the manner or procedure of proposing such amendments,
e.g.,thethreefourthsvoterequirement.Saidprocedureormanner,therefore,
far from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy and
wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all questions
bearing on whether Congress in proposing amendments followed the
procedurerequiredbytheConstitution,isperforcejusticiable,itnotbeinga
matterofpolicyorwisdom.
SameSpecialelectionnotrequiredtoratifyconstitutionalamendment.
To join the ratification of the proposed amendments with an election for
candidates to public office, that is to make it concurrent with such election,
doesnotrenderitanylessanelectionatwhichtheproposedamendmentsare
submitted to the people for their ratification. No prohibition being found in
theplaintermsoftheConstitution,noneshouldbeinferred.Hadtheframers
of the Constitution thought of requiring a special election for the purpose
onlyoftheproposedamendments,theycouldhavesaidso,byqualifyingthe
phrasewithsomewordsuchasspecialorsolelyorexclusively.They
didnot.
Same Validity of Rep. Act 4913 3/4 vote not required.Congress
validly enacted Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner
of submitting the proposed amendments to the people for their ratification,
since it does not propose amendments in the sense referred to by Section
1,ArticleXVoftheConstitution,butmerelyprovidesforhowandwhenthe
amendments, already proposed, are going to be voted upon, the same does
notneedthe3/4voteinjointsessionrequiredinSection1,ArticleXVofthe
Constitution.
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processclauseoftheConstitution.ThepublicationintheOfficialGazetteat
least20daysbeforetheelection,thepostingofnoticesinpublicbuildingnot
later than October 14, 1967, to remain posted until after the elections, the
placing of copies of the proposed amendments in the polling places, aside
from printing the same at the back of the ballot, provide sufficient
opportunity to the voters to cast an intelligent vote on the proposal. Due
process refers only to providing fair opportunity it does not guarantee that
the opportunity given will in fact be availed of that is the lookout of the
voter and the responsibility of the citizen. As long as fair and reasonable
opportunity to be informed is given, and it is, the due process cause is not
infringed.Nonprintingoftheprovisionstobeamendedastheynowstand,
and the printing of the full proposed amendments at the back of the ballot
instead of the substance thereof at the face of the ballot, do not deprive the
voteroffairopportunitytobeinformed.
Same Effect of failure of Congress to pass valid redistricting law.
ThefailureofCongresstopassavalidredistrictinglawsincethetimethe
above provision (Art. VI, Sec. 5, Const.) was adopted, does not render the
present districting illegal or unconstitutional. For the Constitution itself
provides for its continuance in such case, rendering legal and de jure the
statusquo.
FERNANDO,J.,concurringwiththeChiefJustice:
SANCHEZ,J.,dissenting:
ConstitutionallawAmendmentsMeaningofphrasesubmittedtothe
peoplefortheirratification.Thewordssubmittedtothepeoplefortheir
ratification, if construed in the light of the nature of the Constitutiona
fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an expression
of their sovereign willis that it can only be amended by the people
expressing themselves according to the procedures ordained by the
Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people
fortheirblessingorspurning.Thepeoplearenottobemererubberstamps.
Theyarenottovoteblindly.
781
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
uniformpastpractices.TheConstitutionhasbeenamendedthricein1939,
1940 and 1947. In each case the amendments were embodied in resolutions
adopted by the Legislature, which thereafter fixed the dates at which the
proposedamendmentsweretoberatifiedorrejected.Theseplebisciteshave
been referred to either as an election or general election. At no time,
however, was the vote for amendments of the Constitution held
simultaneouslywiththeelectionofofficials,nationalorlocal.
REYES,J.B.L.,J.,concurringwithJusticeSanchez:
ORIGINALACTIONintheSupremeCourt.Prohibitionwith
preliminaryinjunction.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.No.28196:
RamonA.Gonzalesinhisownbehalf.
JuanT.Davidasamicuscuriae
SolicitorGeneralforrespondents.No.28224:
SalvadorAranetaforpetitioner.
SolicitorGeneralforrespondent.
CONCEPCION,C.J.:
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 783
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Themainfactsarenotdisputed.OnMarch16,1967,theSenateand
theHouseofRepresentativespassedthefollowingresolutions:
1. R.B.H.(ResolutionofBothHouses)No.1,proposingthat
Section5,ArticleVI,oftheConstitutionofthePhilippines,
beamendedsoastoincreasethemembershipoftheHouse
ofRepresentativesfromamaximumof120,asprovidedin
the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportionedamongtheseveralprovincesasnearlyasmay
be according to the number of their respective inhabitants,
althougheachprovinceshallhave,atleast,one(1)member
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November,
1971and
3. R.B.H.No.3,proposingthatSection16,ArticleVI,ofthe
sameConstitution,beamendedsoastoauthorizeSenators
and members of the House of Representatives to become
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,
withoutforfeitingtheirrespectiveseatsinCongress.
784
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
atthegeneralelectionswhichshallbeheldonNovember14,1967.
The petition in L28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the
hearingthereof,onOctober28,1967,theSolicitorGeneralappeared
onbehalfofrespondents.Moreover,Atty.JuanT.Davidandcounsel
for the Philippine Constitution Associationhereinafter referred to
as the PHILCONSAwere allowed to argue as amicicuriae. Said
counselforthePHILCONSA,Dr.SalvadorAraneta,likewiseprayed
that the decision in this case be deferred until after a substantially
identicalcasebroughtbysaidorganizationbeforetheCommission
1
onElections, whichwasexpectedtodecideitanytime,andwhose
decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Courthad
been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision
ontheidenticalissuesraisedinbothcases.Infact,onOctober31,
1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R.
No. L28224, for review 2
by certiorari of the resolution of the
CommissiononElections dismissing the petition therein. The two
(2)casesweredeemedsubmittedfordecisiononNovember8,1967,
uponthefilingoftheanswerofrespondent,thememorandumofthe
petitionerandthereplymemorandumofrespondentinL28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L28196, is admittedly a
Filipinocitizen,ataxpayer,andavoter.Heclaimstohaveinstituted
case L28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and
theSolicitorGeneralhavefiledananswerdenyingthetruthofthis
allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial
wouldappeartobeaperfunctoryone.Infact,atthehearingofcase
L28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a
judicialdeterminationof
________________
1UrgingthelattertorefrainfromimplementingRepublicActNo.4913andfrom
submittingtoaplebisciteinthegeneralelectionstobeheldonNovember14,1967,
theConstitutionalamendmentsproposedintheaforementionedR.B.H.Nos.1and3.
2DatedOctober30,1967.
785
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themeritsoftheissuesraisedinsaidcase.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L28224, is admittedly a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines,andacivic,nonprofitandnonpartisanorganizationthe
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objectiveofwhichistoupholdtheruleoflawinthePhilippinesand
to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from
whateversource.DespitehisaforementionedstatementinL28196,
in his answer in L28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of L28224, upon
the ground that3 the same is merely political as held in Mabanag
vs.LopezVito. SenatorArturoM.Tolentino,whoappearedbefore
the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the
PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before this
Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the
Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the
petition,ortopassuponthelegalityofthecompositionoftheHouse
ofRepresentativesb)thatthepetition,ifgranted,would,ineffect,
render inoperational the legislative department and c) that the
failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law xxx does
not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of
Representativeselectedthereafter,norofrenderingitsactsnulland
void.
JURISDICTION
4
AsearlyasAngaravs.ElectoralCommission, thisCourtspeaking
through one of the leading members of the Constitutional
Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr.
Jose P. Laureldeclared that the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
amongtheintegralorconstituentunitsthereof.
5
ItistruethatinMabanagvs.LopezVito, thisCourt
_______________
378Phil.1.
463Phil.139,157.
5Supra.
786
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
characterizingtheissuesubmittedtheretoasapoliticalone,declined
to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes
cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the
Constitutionwhich was being submitted to the people for
ratificationsatisfied the threefourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened,
6
however,bySuanesvs.ChiefAccountantoftheSenate
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6
however,bySuanesvs.ChiefAccountantoftheSenate
7 8
Avelinovs.
Cuenco, 9Taada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs. Commission on
Elections. Inthefirst,weheldthattheofficersandemployeesofthe
SenateElectoralTribunalareunderitssupervisionandcontrol,not
of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter in the
second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators
necessaryforaquorumintheSenateinthethird,wenullifiedthe
election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest
numberofvotesinsaidchamber,purportingtoactonbehalfofthe
partyhavingthesecondlargestnumberofvotestherein,oftwo(2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and in the fourth, we
declaredunconstitutionalanactofCongresspurportingtoapportion
the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon
the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be
possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province.
Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that
the issues therein raised were political questions the determination
ofwhichisbeyondjudicialreview.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not 10included in the general grant of
legislativepowerstoCongress. Itispartoftheinherentpowersof
the peopleas11
the repository of sovereignty in a republican state,
suchasours to
________________
681Phil.818.
7L2851,March4and14,1949.
8L10520,February28,1957.
9118684,September14,1961.
10Section1,Art.VI,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.
11Section1,Art.II,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.
787
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 787
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
make,and,hence,toamendtheirownFundamentalLaw.Congress
may propose amendments to the Constitution
12
merely because the
same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representativesact,notasmembersofCongress,butascomponent
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution,
13
unlike the people, when performing the same function. for their
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authoritydoesnotemanatefromtheConstitutiontheyarethevery
sourceofallpowersofgovernment,includingtheConstitutionitself.
Since,whenproposing,asaconstituentassembly,amendmentsto
the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority
fromtheFundamentalLaw,itfollows,necessarily,thattheydonot
havethefinalsayonwhetherornottheiractsarewithinorbeyond
constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
sameatnaught,contrarytothebasictenetthatoursisagovernment
oflaws,notofmen,andtotherigidnatureofourConstitution.Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that,
14
the Constitution expressly
confers upon the 15
Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despitetheeminentlypoliticalcharacteroftreaty
makingpower.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress
acting as a constituent assemblyviolates the Constitution
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial
review,and,totheextentthatthisviewmaybeinconsistentwiththe
16
standtakeninMabanagvs.LopezVito, thelattershouldbedeemed
modifiedaccordingly.TheMembersoftheCourtareunanimouson
thispoint.
THEMERITS
Section1ofArticleXVoftheConstitution,asamended,reads:
_______________
12Section1,Art.XV,ConstitutionofthePhilippines.
13OfamendingtheConstitution.
14And,inferentially,tolowercourts.
15Sec.2(1),Art.VIIIoftheConstitution.
16Supra.
788
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
TheCongressinjointsessionassembledbyavoteofthreefourthsofallthe
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
conventionforthatpurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionat
whichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.
membersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvoting
separately is necessary. And, such amendments shall be valid as
partoftheConstitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
peoplefortheirratification.
Inthecasesatbar,itisconcededthattheR.B.H.Nos.1and3
havebeenapprovedbyavoteofthreefourthsofallthemembersof
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately.
This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and
voidbecause:
789
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 789
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
LegalityofCongressandLegal
StatusoftheCongressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution,whichprovides:
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inhabitants,buteachprovinceshallhaveatleastoneMember.TheCongress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of
every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have
been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and
compactterritory.
______________
17Approved,June17,1961.
18Maciasvs.CommissiononElections,supra.
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Theprovisiondoesnotsupporttheviewthat,upontheexpirationof
the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to
make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies
necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the
representativedistrictsexistingatthetimeoftheexpirationofsaid
period.
It is argued that the abovequoted provision refers only to the
elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment
hadtobemadenecessarilybeforethefirstelectionstobeheldafter
the inauguration
19
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in
1938. The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had
been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it
wouldbemade.Thosewhodraftedandadoptedthe
________________
791
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 791
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Constitutionin1935couldbecertain,therefore,thatthethreeyear
period,aftertheearliestpossibleenumeration,wouldexpireafterthe
electionsin1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those on the legislative department, were
amendedin1940,byestablishingabicameralCongress,thosewho
drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the
provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment
ofthedistrictsforrepresentatives,musthaveknownthatthethree
yearperiodthereforwouldexpireaftertheelectionsscheduledtobe
heldandactuallyheldin1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and
ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the
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792
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______________
20Section1,ArticleIXoftheConstitution.
793
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1957 793
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
partiestoasuitbeingheardbeforeJudgeCapistranoobjectedtohis
continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had
reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection
couldnotbeentertained,becausetheJudgewasatleast,adefacto
Judge,
______________
21LinoLunavs.RodriguezandDelosAngeles,37Phil,p.192NacionalistaParty
vs. De Vera,35 Phil., 126:Codilla vs. Martinez, L14569, November 23, 1960. See,
also.Statevs.Carrol,38Conn.499Wilcoxvs.Smith,5Wendell[N.Y.]23121Am.
Dec,213Sheehan'sCase,122Mass.,44523Am.Rep.,323.
22Torresvs.Ribo,81Phil.50.
23NacionalistaPartyvs.DeVera,supra.
24Peoplevs.RogelioGabitanan,43O.G.3211.
2553Phil.866.
794
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
AlternativesAvailable
toCongress
Atty.JuanT.David,asamicuscuriae,maintainsthatCongressmay
eitherproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionorcallaconvention
forthatpurpose,butitcannotdoboth,atthesametime.Thistheory
isbaseduponthefactthatthetwo(2)alternativesareconnectedin
the Constitution by the disjunctive or. Such basis is, however, a
weak one, in the absence of other circumstancesand none has
brought to our attentionsupporting the conclusion drawn by the
amicus curiae. In fact, the term or has, oftentimes, been held to
mean and,
26
or viceversa, when the spirit or context of the law
warrantsit.
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________________
2650Am.Jur.,Sec.282,pp.267268,citingHeckathornv.Heckathorn,284Mich.
677, 280 NW 79, citing RCL Robson v. Cantwell, 143 SC 104, 141 SE 180, citing
RCLGeigerv.Kobilka,26Wash171,66P423,Am.St.Rep.733andmanyothers.
795
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 795
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
RB.H.Nos.1and3.Moreover,theamendmentsproposedunderR.
B.H.Nos.1and3,willbesubmittedforratificationseveralyears
beforethosethatmaybeproposedbytheconstitutionalconvention
called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions
werepassedonthesamedate,theyweretakenupandputtoavote
separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not
passedatthesametime.
Inanyevent,wedonotfind,eitherintheConstitution,orinthe
historythereof,anythingthatwouldnegatetheauthorityofdifferent
Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same
Congresstopassthesameindifferentsessionsordifferentdaysof
the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible
reasonbeenadvancedtojustifythedenialofauthoritytoadoptsaid
resolutionsonthesameday.
Counselask:SinceCongresshasdecidedtocallaconstitutional
conventiontoproposeamendments,whynotletthewholethingbe
submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some
specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said
convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded,
butthesameimpugnsthewisdomoftheactiontakenbyCongress,
notitsauthoritytotakeit.Oneseemingpurposethereofistopermit
Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the
constitutionalconventionandparticipateintheproceedingstherein,
withoutforfeitingtheirseatsinCongress.Whetherornotthisshould
bedoneisapoliticalquestion,notsubjecttoreviewbythecourtsof
justice.
Onthisquestionthereisnodisagreementamongthemembersof
theCourt.
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MayConstitutionalAmendments
BeSubmittedforRatification
inaGeneralElection?
ArticleXVoftheConstitutionprovides:
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
WouldtheSubmissionnowoftheContested
AmendmentstothePeopleViolatethe
SpiritoftheConstitution?
ItshouldbenotedthatthecontestedResolutionswereapprovedon
March16,1967,sothat,byNovember14,1967,ourcitizenryshall
have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the
amendmentsinquestion.Thenagain,Section2ofRepublicActNo.
4913provides:
798
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Wearenotpreparedtosaythattheforegoingmeasuresarepalpably
inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that
proposals for amendment be submitted to the people for their
ratification,andthatsaidmeasuresaremanifestlyinsufficient,from
a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendment
soughttobemade.
Theseweresubstantiallythesamemeansavailedoftoinformthe
people of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the
originalConstitutiondowntotheParityAmendment.Thus,referring
totheoriginalConstitution,Section1ofActNo.4200,provides:
SaidConstitution,withtheOrdinanceappendedthereto,shallbepublished
in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive
issuesatleastfifteendayspriortosaidelection,andaprintedcopyofsaid
Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office
building and in each polling place not later than the twentysecond day of
April, nineteen hundred and thirtyfive, and shall remain posted therein
continually until after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of
the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in
Spanish,shallbekeptateachpollingplaceavailableforexamina
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SaidArticleVoftheConstitutionshallbepublishedintheOfficialGazette,
in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days
priortosaidelection,andthesaidArticleVshallbepostedinaconspicuous
place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling
place not later than the twentysecond day of April, nineteen and thirty
seven,andshallremainpostedthereincontinuallyuntilafterthetermination
oftheplebiscite.AtleasttencopiesofsaidArticleVoftheConstitution,in
English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for
examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined
bytheSecretaryoftheInterior,shallalsobekeptineachpollingplace.
AsregardstheParityAmendment,Section2ofRepublicActNo.73
istotheeffectthat:
800
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intheprincipalnativelanguages,asmaybedeterminedbytheCommission
onElections,shallalsobekeptineachpollingplace.
Themaindifferencebetweenthepresentsituationandthatobtaining
inconnectionwiththeformerproposalsdoesnotarisefromthelaw
enactedtherefor.Thedifferencespringsfromthecircumstancethat
themajorpoliticalpartieshadtakensidesonpreviousamendments
to the Constitutionexcept, perhaps, the womans suffrageand,
consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite
took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not
seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested
and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the
current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have
taken placeon a rather limited scaleon the latest proposals for
amendment,havebeendueprincipallytotheinitiativeofafewcivic
organizationsandsomemilitantmembersofourcitizenrywhohave
voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be
nullifiedbyreasonofthefailureofcertainsectorsofthecommunity
to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionally
dependsuponnootherfactorsthanthoseexistingatthetimeofthe
enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law
enforcingagencies,particularlythosethattakeplacesubsequentlyto
thepassageorapprovalofthelaw.
Referringparticularlytothecontestedproposalsforamendment,
the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the
submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14,
1967,dependsintheviewofthosewhoconcurinthisopinion,and
who,insofarasthisphaseofthecase,constitutetheminorityupon
whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to
fairlyapprisethepeopleofthegist,themainideaorthesubstanceof
saidproposals,whichisunderR.B.H.No.1theincreaseofthe
maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from
120to180,andunderR.B.H.No.3theauthoritygiventothe
members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional
Conventionand,ifelectedthereto,
801
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 801
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
besubmittedtothepeopleisconcededlyamatterwhichfallswithin
the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily
shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
RepublicActNo.4913.Presumably,itcouldhavedonesomething
better to enlighten the people on the subjectmatter thereof. But,
then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond
improvement.Otherwise,nolegislationwouldbeconstitutionaland
valid.Six(6)MembersofthisCourtbelieve,however,saidActand
R.B.H.Nos.1and3violatethespiritoftheConstitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
mustbe,astheyarehereby,dismissed,andthewritsthereinprayed
for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered,
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MakalintalandBengzon,J.P.,JJ.,concur.
Fernando,J,concursfullywiththeaboveopinion,addinga
fewwordsonthequestionofjurisdiction.
Sanchez,J.,rendersaseparateopinion.
Reyes,DizonandAngeles,JJ.,concurintheresultreached
intheseparateopinionofJusticeSanchez.
ZaldivarandCastro,JJ.,concurintheseparateopinionof
JusticeSanchez.,
MAKALINTAL,J.,concurring:
IconcurintheforegoingopinionoftheChiefJustice.Iwouldmake
some additional observations in connection with my concurrence.
Sections2and4ofRepublicA.tNo.4913provide:
SEC.2.Theamendmentsshallbepublishedinthreeconsecutiveissuesof
theOfficialGazetteatleasttwentydayspriortotheelection.Aprintedcopy
thereofshallbepostedinaconspicuousplaceineverymunicipality,cityand
provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October
fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixtyseven, and shall remain posted therein
untilaftertheelection.Atleastfivecopiesofthesaidamendmentsshallbe
kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualifiedelectorsduring
803
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 803
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
xxxxxx
SEC.4.Theballotswhichshallbeusedintheelectionfortheapproval
ofsaidamendmentsshallbeprintedinEnglishandPilipinoandshallbein
the size and form prescribed by the Commission on Elections: Provided,
however, That at the back of said ballot there shall be printed in full
Resolutions of both Houses of Congress Numbered One and Three, both
adopted on March sixteen, nineteen hundred and sixtyseven, proposing the
amendments:Provided,further.Thatthequestionnaireappearingontheface
oftheballotshallbeasfollows:
AreyouinfavoroftheproposedamendmenttoSectionfiveofArticleVI
ofourConstitutionprintedatthebackofthisballot?
AreyouinfavoroftheproposedamendmenttosectionsixteenofArticle
VIofourConstitutionprintedatthebackofthisballot?
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To vote for the approval of the proposed amendments, the voter shall
writethewordyesoritsequivalentinPilipinoorinthelocaldialectinthe
blank space after each question to vote for the rejection thereof, he shall
writethewordNooritsequivalentinPilipinoorinthelocaldialect.
804
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
notbeentirelyfocusedontheproposedamendments,suchthatthere
is a failure to properly submit them for ratification within the
intendment of the Constitution. If that is so, then the defect is not
intrinsic in the law but in its implementation. The same manner of
submitting the proposed amendments to the people for ratification
may,inadifferentsetting,besufficientforthepurpose.YetIcannot
conceive that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a law
may be made to depend willynilly on factors not inherent in its
provisions.Foralawtobestruckdownasunconstitutionalitmust
be so by reason of some irreconcilable conflict between it and the
Constitution. Otherwise a law may be either valid or invalid,
according to circumstances not found in its provisions, such as the
zealwithwhichtheyarecarriedout.TosuchathesisIcannotagree.
Thecriterionwouldbetoobroadandrelative,anddependentupon
individualopinionsthatatbestaresubjective.Whatonemayregard
as sufficient compliance with the requirement of submission to the
people,withinthecontextofthesamelaw,maynotbesotoanother.
The question is susceptible of as many views as there are viewers
andIdonotthinkthisCourtwouldbejustifiedinsayingthatitsown
view on the matter is the correct one, to the exclusion of the
opinionsofothers.
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Ontheotherhand,Irejecttheargumentthattheratificationmust
necessarily be in a special election or plebiscite called for that
purpose alone. While such procedure is highly to be preferred, the
Constitutionspeakssimplyofanelectionatwhichtheamendments
are submitted to the people for their ratification, and I do not
subscribe to the restrictive interpretation that the petitioners would
placeonthisprovision,namely,thatitmeansonlyaspecialelection.
BENGZON,J.P.,J.,concurring:
Itisthegloryofourinstitutionsthattheyarefoundeduponlaw,that
no one can exercise any authority over the rights and interests of
othersexceptpursuanttoand
805
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 805
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
1
in the manner authorized by law. Based upon this principle,
petitioners Ramon A. Gonzales and Philippine Constitution
Association(PHILCONSA)cometothisCourtinseparatepetitions.
PetitionerGonzales,astaxpayer,voterandcitizen,andallegedly
in representation thru class suit of all citizens of this country, filed
this suit for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the
CommissiononElections,DirectorofPrintingandAuditorGeneral
from implementing and/or complying with Republic Act 4913,
assailingsaidlawasunconstitutional.
Petitioner PHILCONSA, as a civic, nonprofit and nonpartisan
corporation, assails the constitutionality not only of Republic Act
4913butalsoofResolutionsofBothHousesNos.1and3ofMarch
16,1967.
RepublicAct4913,effectiveJune17,1967,isanActsubmitting
to the Filipino people for approval the amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Congress of the
Philippines in Resolutions of Both Houses Numbered 1 and 3,
adopted on March 16, 1967. Said Republic Act fixes the date and
manneroftheelectionatwhichtheaforesaidproposedamendments
shall be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said
election. Resolutions of Both Houses Nos. 1 and 3 propose two
amendmentstotheConstitution:thefirst,toamendSec5,Art.VI,
by increasing the maximum membership of the House of
Representativesfrom120to180,apportioning160ofsaid180seats
and eliminating the provision that Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration the second, to amend Sec. 16, Art. VI, by allowing
Senators and Representatives to be delegates to a constitutional
conventionwithoutforfeitingtheirseats.
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Sincebothpetitionsrelatetotheproposedamendments,theyare
consideredtogetherherein.
Specifically and briefly, petitioner Gonzales objections are as
follows: (1) Republic Act 4913 violates Sec. 1, Art. XV of the
Constitutioninsubmittingtheproposed
______________
1UnitedStatesv.SanJacintoTinCo.,125U.S.273.
806
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
807
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 807
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Sec.1.TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourths
ofallthemembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvoting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
conventionforthatpurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionto
whichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.
_______________
2Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139,1958,JusticeLaurel,ponente.
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
1 and 3 already did that. If, on the other hand, it means, or also
means, to provide for how, when, and by what means the
amendments shall be submitted to the people for approval, then it
does,
AcarefulreadingofSec.1,Art.XVshowsthatthefirstsenseis
the one intended. Said Section has two sentences: in the first, it
requires the 3/4 voting in joint session, for Congress to propose
amendments. And then in the second sentence, it provides that
such amendments xxx shall be submitted to the people for their
ratification. This clearly indicates that by the term propose
amendmentsinthefirstsentenceismeanttoframethesubstanceor
the content or the WHATelement of the amendments for it is this
and this alone that is submitted to the people for their ratification.
The details of when the election shall be held for approval or
rejectionoftheproposedamendments,orthemannerofholdingit,
are not submitted for ratification to form part of the Constitution.
Stated differently, the plain language of Section 1, Art. XV, shows
thattheactofproposingamendmentsisdistinctfromalbeitrelated
tothat of submitting the amendments to the people for their
ratificationandthatthe3/4votingrequirementappliesonlytothe
firststep,nottothesecondone.
It follows that the submission of proposed amendments can be
donethruanordinarystatutepassedbyCongress.TheConstitution
does not expressly state by whom the submission shall be
undertakentheruleisthatapowernotlodgedelsewhereunderthe
Constitutionisdeemedtoresidewiththelegislativebody,underthe
doctrine of residuary powers. Congress therefore validly enacted
Republic Act 4913 to fix the details of the date and manner of
submitting the proposed amendments to the people for their
ratification. Since it does not propose amendments in the sense
referred to by Sec. 1, Art. XV of the Constitution, but merely
providesforhowandwhentheamendments,alreadyproposed,are
goingtobevotedupon,thesamedoesnotneedthe3/4voteinjoint
sessionrequiredinSec.1,Art.XVoftheConstitution.Furthermore,
RepublicAct4913isanappropriationmeasure.
809
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 809
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
ingoftheprovisionswerealsotobeprintedontheballot.Thesame
however is a matter of policy. As long as the method adopted
provides sufficiently reasonable chance to intelligently vote on the
amendments,andIthinkitdoesinthiscase,itisnotconstitutionally
defective.
Petitioner Gonzales other arguments touch on the merits or
wisdom of the proposed amendments. These are for the people in
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theirsovereigncapacitytodecide,notforthisCourt.
Two arguments were further advanced: first, that Congress
cannotbothcallaconventionandproposeamendmentssecond,that
thepresentCongressisadefactoone,sincenoapportionmentlaw
wasadoptedwithinthreeyearsfromthelastcensusof1960,sothat
the Representatives elected in 1961 are de facto officers only. Not
beingdejure,theycannotproposeamendments,itisargued.
Astothefirstpoint,Sec.1ofArt.XVstatesthatCongressmay
propose amendments or call a convention for that purpose. The
termor,however,isfrequentlyusedashavingthesamemeaning
asandparticularlyinpermissive,affirmativesentencessothatthe
interpretationofthewordorasandintheConstitutioninsuch
use will not change its meaning (Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v.
Goodenough, 32 So. 404, 411, 108 La, 442). And it should be
pointedoutthattheresolutionsproposingamendments(R.B.H.Nos.
1and3)aredifferentfromthatcallingforaconvention(R.B.H.No.
2), Surely, if Congress deems it better or wise to amend the
Constitutionbeforeaconventioncalledforiselected,itshouldnot
befetteredfromdoingso.Forourpurposesinthiscase,sufficeitto
notethattheConstitutiondoesnotprohibititfromdoingso.
Astothesecondargument,itisalsotruethatSec.5ofArt.VIof
the Constitution provides in part that The Congress shall by law
makeanapportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. It however further states in the
nextsentence:Untilsuchapportionmentshallhavebeen
811
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 811
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
made,theHouseofRepresentativesshallhavethesamenumberof
MembersasthatfixedbylawfortheNationalAssembly,whoshall
be elected by the qualified electors from the present assembly
districts. The failure of Congress, therefore, to pass a valid
redistricting law since the time the above provision was adopted,
doesnotrenderthepresentdistrictingillegalorunconstitutional.For
the Constitution itself provides for its continuance in such case,
renderinglegalanddejurethestatusquo.
For the above reasons, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4913, and fully concur with the opinion of the Chief
Justice.
FERNANDO,J.,concurring:
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______________
1103Phil.1051(1957),
278Phil.1(1947).
3307US433(1939).
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
iscomfortinthethoughtthattheviewthatthenprevailedwasitself
a product of the times. It could very well be that considering the
circumstancesexistingin1947aswellastheparticularamendment
sought to be incorporated in the Constitution, the parity rights
ordinance,thebetterpartofwisdominviewofthegraveeconomic
situation then confronting the country would be to avoid the
existence of any obstacle to its being submitted for ratification.
Moreover, the Republic being less than a year old, American
SupremeCourtopinionsonconstitutionalquestionswereinvariably
accorded uncritical acceptance. Thus the approach followed by
JusticeTuasonisnotdifficulttounderstand.Itmaybesaidthatthere
is less propensity now, which is all to the good, for this Court to
accordthatmuchdeferencetoconstitutionalviewscomingfromthat
quarter.
NoristhismodeofviewingtheopinionofJusticeTuasontodo
injusticetohismemory.Forashestatedinanothermajoropinionin
4
Araneta v. Dinglasan, in ascertaining the meaning to be given the
EmergencyPowers
_______________
484Phil.368(1940).
813
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 813
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
5
Act, oneshouldnotignorewhatwouldensueifaparticularmodeof
constructionwerefollowed.Ashesoemphaticallystated,Wetesta
6
rulebyitsresults.
The consequences of a judicial veto on the then proposed
amendment on the economic survival of the country, an erroneous
appraisalitturnedoutlater,constitutedaneffectiveargumentforits
submission.Whynotthenconsiderthequestionpoliticalandletthe
people decide? That assumption could have been indulged in. It
could very well be the inarticulate major premise. For many it did
bearthestampofjudicialstatesmanship.
The opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion renders crystalclear
whyasofthisdateandintheforeseeablefuturejudicialinquiryto
assure the utmost compliance with the constitutional requirement
wouldbeamoreappropriateresponse.
SANCHEZ,J.,inseparateopinion:
Rightattheoutset,thewriterexpresseshisdeepappreciationtoMr.
Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro for
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________________
5CommonwealthActNo.671(1941).
6Aranetav.Dinglasan,supra,atp.376.
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
1
tobemembersoftheConstitutionalConvention tobeconvened,
as provided in another resolutionResolution No. 2.
Parenthetically, two of these proposed amendments to the
Constitution(Resolutions1and3)aretobesubmittedtothepeople
fortheirratificationnextNovember14,1967.ResolutionNo.2just
adverted to calls for a constitutional convention also to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The delegates thereto are to be
electedonthesecondTuesdayofNovember1970theconventionto
sitonJune1,1971andtheamendmentsproposedbytheconvention
tobesubmittedtothepeoplethereafterfortheirratification.
Ofimportancenowaretheproposedamendmentsincreasingthe
number of members of the House of Representatives under
ResolutionNo.1,andthatinResolutionNo.3whichgivesSenators
and Congressmen the right to sit as members of the constitutional
conventiontobeconvenedonJune1,1971.Because,thesearethe
two amendments to be submitted to the people in the general
elections soon to be held on November 14, 1967, upon the
provisionsofSection1,RepublicAct4913,whichreads:
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Republic Act 4913 projects the basic angle of the problem thrust
upon usthe manner in which the amendments proposed by
Congressjustadvertedtoaretobebroughttothepeoplesattention.
First, to the controlling constitutional precept. In order that
proposed amendments to the Constitution may become effective,
Section 1, Article XV thereof commands that such amendments
mustbeapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionat
whichtheamendments
________________
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VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 815
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
aresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.2Theaccentison
two words complementing each other, namely, submitted and
ratification.
1. We are forced to take a long hard look at the core of the
problemfacingus.Andthis,becausetheamendmentssubmittedare
transcendental and encompassing. The ceiling of the number of
Congressmen is sought to be elevated from 120 to 180 members
and Senators and Congressmen may run in constitutional
conventionswithoutforfeitingtheirseats.Thesecertainlyaffectthe
peopleasawhole.TheincreaseinthenumberofCongressmenhas
itsproportionalincreaseinthepeoplestaxburdens.Theymaynot
look at this with favor, what with the constitutional provision
(Section 5, Article VI) that Congress shall by law make an
apportionment, without the necessity of disturbing the present
constitutionally provided number of Congressmen. People in
QuezonCity,forinstance,maybalkatthespecificapportionmentof
the 160 seats set forth in Resolution No. 1, and ask for a
Congressman of their own, on the theory of equal representation.
And then, people may question the propriety of permitting the
increased 180 Congressmen from taking part in the forthcoming
constitutional convention and future conventions for fear that they
maydominateitsproceedings.Theymayentertainthebeliefthat,if
at all, increase in the number of Congressmen should be a proper
topicfordeliberationinaconstitutionalconventionwhich,anyway,
will soon take place. They probably would ask: Why the hurry?
Theseponderablesrequirethepeoplesclosescrutiny.
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2Italicssupplied.
816
816 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Andso,ourapproachtotheproblemofthemechanicsofsubmission
forratificationofamendmentsisthatreasoningonthebasis of the
spiritoftheConstitutionisjustasimportantasreasoningbyastrict
adherencetothephraseologythereof.Weunderscorethis,becauseit
is within the realm of possibility that a Constitution may be
overhauled. Supposing threefourths of the Constitution is to be
amended. Or, the proposal is to eliminate the allimportant Bill of
Rightsinitsentirety.Webelieveittobebeyonddebatethatinsome
such situations the amendments ought to call for a constitutional
conventionlatherthanalegislativeproposal.Andyet,nothingthere
isinthebooksorintheConstitutionitselfwhichwouldrequiresuch
amendmentstobeadoptedbyaconstitutionalconvention.Andthen,
too, the spirit of the supreme enactment, we are sure, forbids that
proposalsthereforbeinitiatedbyCongressandthereafterpresented
tothepeoplefortheirratification.
In the context just adverted to, we take the view that the words
submitted to the people for their ratification, if construed in the
lightofthenatureoftheConstitutionafundamentalcharterthatis
legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign
willis that it can only be amended by the people expressing
themselvesaccordingtotheprocedureordainedbytheConstitution.
Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for
their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber
stamps.Theyarenottovoteblindly.Theymustbeaffordedample
opportunitytomullovertheoriginalprovisions,comparethemwith
the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of
extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word
submitted can only mean that the government, within its
maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform very
citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed
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amendmentsandthemeaning,natureandeffectsthereof.Bythis,we
arenottobeunderstoodassayingthat,ifonecitizenor100citizens
or1,000citizenscannotbereached,
817
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 817
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
x x x The great men who builded the structure of our state in this respect
had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley, who
has said A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary
excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and
steadinessitmustyieldtothethoughtofthepeoplenottothewhimofthe
people, or the thought evolved the excitement or hot blood, but the sober
secondthought,whichalone,ifthegovernmentistobesafe,canbeallowed
efficiency,xxxChangesingovernmentaretobefearedunlessthebenefitis
certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake and disorder a state.
Good does not necessarily succeed3evil another evil may succeed and a
worse.Am.LawRev.1889,p.311
3.Terselyput,theissuebeforeusfunnelsdowntothisproposition:
Ifthepeoplearenotsufficientlyinformedoftheamendmentstobe
voted upon, to conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their
willinagenuinemanner,canitbesaidthatinaccordancewiththe
constitutional mandate, the amendments are submitted to the
peoplefortheirratification?OuranswerisNo.
WeexamineRepublicAct4913,approvedonJune17,1967the
statute that submits to the people the constitutional amendments
proposedbyCongressinResolutions1and3.Section2oftheAct
providesthemannerofpropagationofthenatureoftheamendments
throughoutthecountry.TherearefivepartsinsaidSection2,viz:
________________
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3Ellinghamvs.Dye,99N.E.pp.4,15italicssupplied.
818
818 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
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819
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 819
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
820
820 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
effortstotheelectionofofficialstheconstitutionalamendmentscut
noicewiththem.Thetruthisthatevenintheballotitself,thespace
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_________________
4Ellinghamvs.Dye,supra,atp.17italicssupplied.
821
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 821
Gonzalesvs,CommissiononElections
For the reasons given, our vote is that Republic Act 4913 must be
strickendownasinviolationoftheConstitution.
ZaldivarandCastro,JJ.,concur.Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon and
Angeles, JJ., concur in the result herein reached in a separate
opinion.
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REYES,J.B.L.,J.,concurring:
822
822 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
ANNOTATION
JUDICIALDEFERENCETOPOLITICALQUESTIONS
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_______________
1Taadavs.Cuenco,L10520,Feb.28,1957Mabanag,etal.v.LopezVito,etal.,
L1123,Mar.5,1947Climaco,etal.v.Macadaeg,etal.,L19440&L19447,Apr.18,
1962.
2Morfev.Mutuc,L20387,Jan.31,1968Sumulongv.CommissiononElections,et
al., 73 Phil. 288 (1941) Avelino v. Cuenco, L2821, Mar. 4 & 14, 1949 Cf. also
DissentingOpinionofJusticeConcepcion(nowChiefJustice)inAytonav.Castillo,et
al.,L19313,Jan.20,1962.
3 Gonzales v. Hechanova, L21897, Oct. 22, 1963 Arnault v. Nazareno, L3920
(1950).
4 Mabanag, et al. v. Lopez Vito, supra. As distinguished from the judicial, the
6Taadav.Cuenco,Id.InreMcConnaleghy,119N.W.408.
823
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 823
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Withinthecontextofpoliticalquestionsarebroadprinciplestothe
effectthatunderourformofGovernment:Thejudicialdepartment
hasnopowertoreviseeventhemostarbitraryandunfairactionof
the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuanceofthepowercommittedexclusivelytothatdepartmentby
7
the Constitution . The legal or constitutional duties of the Chief
Executivearepolitical,andthatheisonlyaccountableforthemto 8
his country, and to his own conscience in a political manner .
However,underthedoctrinethatthejudicialdepartmentistheonly
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several9 departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof the judiciary is
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empoweredtodeterminethelimitationswhichthelawplaces
10
upon
all official actions. Corollarily, the principle that the manner in
which discretionary powers are exercised is not subject to judicial
review,doesnotapplywheretheissueinvolvedistheexistenceand
11
extentofthosediscretionarypowers.
DeterminationofJurisdictioninPoliticalControversies.
When the issue is a political one which comes within the
exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the
Governmenttodecide,thejudicialdepartmentorSupremeCourthas
nopowertodeterminewhetherornottheactoftheLegislatureor
Chief Executive is against the Constitution. What determines the
jurisdictionofthecourtsinsuchcaseistheissueinvolved,andnot
12
thelaworconstitutionalprovisionwhichmaybeapplied .
PARTICULARQUESTIONSHELDTOBEPOLITICAL
WhetherImputationofBriberyConstitutesDisorderly
_______________
7Osmea,Jr.v.Pendatun,etal.,L17144,Oct.28,1960,citingCliffordv.French,
146Cal.604,69L.R.A.556.
8Severinov.GovernorGeneral,16Phil.366(1910),citingHawkinsv.Governor,1
Ark.570,33Am.Dec.346.
9Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139,157.
10Tanadav.Cuenco,Id.
11Id.SeealsoLacsonv.Roque,L6225(1953)Joverv.Borra,L6782,Jul.25,1953.
12ConcurringOpinionofJusticeFeriainMabanagv.LopezVito,supra.
824
824 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
thenegative,themainpurposeofthepetitionthereinbeingtoforce
upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the
CommissiononAppointmentsonehalfofthemembersofwhichis
to be elected by each House on the basis 14
of proportional
representation of the political parties therein . The issue there
dependedmainlyontheterminationofthepoliticalalignmentofthe
members of the Senate at the time of said organization and of the
necessityoradvisabilityofeffectingsaidreorganization,whichisa
15
politicalquestion .
________________
13Osmea,Jr.v.Pendatun,etal.,Id.
14Cabili,etal.v.Francisco,etal.,L2438,May8,1951.
15Ibid.TheCabilicasewasdecidedupontheauthorityofAlejandrinov.Quezon,
46Phil.83(1924)andVerav.Avelino,77Phil.192(1946).IntheAlejandrinocase,the
SupremeCourtheldthatinviewoftheseparationofpowers,ithadnojurisdictionto
compel the Senate to reinstate an appointiveSenator who was, by resolution of the
Senate,suspendedfromofficefor12monthsbecausehehadassaultedanothermember
ofthatBodyforcertainphrasesthelatterhadutteredinthecourseofadebate.This
ruling may now be considered obsolete because at the time the Alejandrino case
arose, the legislature had only those powers which were granted to it by the Jones
LawwhereasnowtheCongresshadthefulllegislativepowersandprerogativesofa
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrinocase,theCourtreachedtheconclusionthattheJonesLawdid
825
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 825
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
TheCourtcannotpassuponthecorrectnessoftheinterpretationof
theonedayperiodwithinwhicharesolutionoftheCommissionon
Appointments may be reconsidered, as prescribed in the Rules of
that body, because the matter concerns its internal
16
business which
cannotbemadethesubjectofjudicialinquiry .
Issue of Suspension of Operation of Law.The task of
suspendingtheoperationofalawallegedtobeunconstitutionalisa
matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with the
official acts, not only of the duly elected representatives
17
of the
people,butalsoofthehighestmagistrateoftheland .
Inquiry Regarding the Wisdom, Justice, or Advisability of
ParticularLaw.Thewisdomoradvisabilityofaparticularstatute
isnotaquestionforthecourtstodeterminethatisquestionforthe
legislaturetodetermine.TheCourtsmayormaynotagreewiththe
legislature upon the wisdom or necessity of the law. Their
disagreement,however,furnishesnobasisforpronouncingastatute
illegal.Iftheparticularstatuteiswithintheconstitutionalpowerof
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_________________
notgivetheSenatethepoweritthenexercisedthepowerofsuspensionforone
year.Whereasnow,theCongresshastheinherentlegislativeprerogativeofsuspension
whichtheConstitutiondidnotimpair.Cf.Osmea,Jr.v.Pendatun,Id.Further,under
ourConstitutionSenatorsandCongressmenareelective,notappointiveofficials.
IntheVeracase,theCourtheldthatithadnojurisdictiontosetasidethePendatun
resolution ordering that petitioners Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be seated as
membersoftheSenate,thesamematterbeingapoliticalquestion.HeretheSupreme
Courtdeclaredthat"thejudiciaryisnottherepositoryofremediesforallpoliticalor
socialevils."
16Advinculav.CommissiononAppointments,L19823,Aug.31,1962.
17SocialSecuritySystemv.Bayona,L13555,May30,1962.
18Angarav.ElectoralCommission,63Phil.139(1936)U.S.v.TeYu,24 Phil. 1
(1912)Morfev.Mutuc,etal.,L20387,Jan.31,1968.
826
826 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
remedyagainstunwiselegislationisanappealnottotheCourt,but 19
to the people who elected the members of the legislative body .
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom 20
of the
actiontaken,maybethebasisfordeclaringastatuteinvalid .
Upontheotherhand,however,ifthestatutecoverssubjectsnot
authorized by the Constitution, then the Courts are not only
authorizedbutarejustifiedinpronouncingthesameillegalandvoid, 21
nomatterhowwiseorbeneficientsuchlegislationmayseem'tobe.
Whether Public Interests Demand Creation of Municipalities.
ThecreationofMunicipalitiesisnotanadministrativefunction,but
onewhichisessentiallyandeminentlylegislativeincharacter.The
question whether or not public interest demands the exercise 22
of
suchpowerispurelyalegislativequestionorapoliticalquestion .
QuestiononPoliciesEnunciatedinPreambleandinDeclaration
of Principles of Constitution.Whether a legislative enactment of
Congress or the specific deed of any other department tallies with
the policies enunciated in the Preamble and in the Declaration of
PrinciplesoftheConstitutionisamatterofopinionwhichcannotbe
controlled by judicial pronouncements and belongs to those broad
questions,essentiallypoliticalincharacter,uponwhichopinionmust
be crystallized
23
and, when elections come, will be decided by the
people.
Thetrueofficeofapreambleistoexpoundthenatureandextent
andapplicationofthepowersactuallyconferredbytheConstitution,
24
and not substantially to create them It cannot be regarded as the
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24
and not substantially to create them . It cannot be regarded as the
sourceofanysubstantivepower
________________
19Sumulongv.CommissiononElections,etal.,73Phil.288(1941).
20U.S.v.TeYu,supra.Seefootnotesnos.18and21.
21IbidMutuc,etal.,L20387,supraGonzalesv.Comelec,L28196,Nov.9,1967.
22Pelaezv.AuditorGeneral,L23825,Dec.14,1965.
23ConcurringOpinionofJusticePerfectoinCustodiovPresidentoftheSenate,L
117,Nov.7,1945.
24StoryontheConstitution,VolI,Sec.462.
827
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 827
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
conferredonthegovernmentoranyofitsdepartment.Nopowercan
be exercised by the State unless, apart from the preamble, it be
foundinsomeexpressdelegationofpowerorinsomepowertobe
25
properlyimpliedtherefrom .
Issues Affecting Exercise of Executive Power to Appoint and to
WithdrawAppointments.Mostifnotallappointmentsmadebythe
Presidenthavetwoaspects,namely,thelegalandthepolitical.The
first refers to his authority to make the appointments. The second
dealswiththewisdomintheexerciseofsuchauthority,aswellasits
propriety.Whetheragivenvacancyornumberofvacanciesshould
befilled,orwhoamongseveralqualifiedpersonsshallbechosen,or
whetheragivenappointmentornumberofappointmentswillfavor
the political party to whom the power of appointment belongs and
will injure the interest of a rival political party and to what extent,
are essentially and typically political matters. Hence, the question
whethercertainappointmentsshouldbesanctionedorturneddown
by reason of the improper, immoral, or malevolent motives with
which said matters were handled is, likewise, clearly political, and
assuch,itsdeterminationbelongs,nottothecourtsofjustice(Vera
v.Avelino,77Phil.192,20516C.J.S.689690,Willoughbyonthe
Constitution, Vol. III, 13261327), but to the political organ
establishedpreciselytocheckpossibleabusesintheexerciseofthe
26
appointingpowertheCommissiononAppointments.
The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the
President,uponwhichnolimitationsmaybeimposedbyCongress,
exceptthoseresultingfromtheneedofsecuringtheconcurrenceof
the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the
limited legislative power
27
to prescribe the qualifications to a given
appointive office. However, where the Commission on
Appointments that will consider the Presidential appointees is
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_______________
25Jacobsonv.Massachusetts,197U.S.11.
26OpinionofJusticeConcepcion(nowChiefJustice),withwhomJusticeBarrera
agreed,inAytonav.Castillo,Id.
27Manalangv.Quitoriano,L6898,Apr.30,1954.
828
828 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
______________
28Aytonav.Castillo,Id.
29 Guevara v. Inocentes, L25577, Mar. 16, 1966. In the Guevara case, the legal
issueposedistheeffectoftheadjournmentofaspecialsessionofCongressuponad
interimappointmentsmadepriorthereto.
30ConcurringOpinionofChiefJusticeConcepcioninGuevarav.Inocentes,supra.
ThequestionraisedintheAytonacasewaswhetheranincomingPresidentcould,
before Congress had met in regular or special session, validly withdraw ad interim
appointments made by the outgoing President, in order that the Commission on
Appointmentscouldnotact,evenifitwantedto,onsaidappointments.Thisquestion
wasdecidedintheaffirmative.
IndecliningtodisregardthePresident'sAdministrativeOrderNo.2(withdrawing
the ad interim appointments of the outgoing President) in the Aytona case, the
Supreme Court considered the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the 350
appointments,ofwhichthereinpetitionerAytonawereone,inthenightofDecember
29,1961,suchasthescrambleinMalacanangofcandidatesforpositionstryingto
get their written appointments or having such appointments changed to more
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convenient places the fact that such mass appointments were issued a few hours
beforetheinaugurationofthenewPresident.Thus,afterobservingthattheappointing
Presidentcouldnothaveexercisedthecarenecessarytoinsurethatsaidappointments
wouldbeapprovedbyaCommissiononAppointmentsdifferentfromthatexistingat
thetimeoftheappoint
829
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9.1967 829
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
________________
ments,theSupremeCourtdeclaredthatsuchactlendsforcetothecontention
thattheseappointmentsfallbeyondtheintentandspiritoftheconstitutionalprovision
granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments. Such
circumstances were therein found to fit the exceptional circumstances justifying
revocation of said appointments. But the Supreme Court, realizing the danger of
overstretching the effect of that decision beyond the extreme and extraordinary
circumstancesparticularlyattendingthecase,wiselystatedthat:
The filling up of vacancies in important positions if few, and so spaced as to afford some
assuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentandthe
appointee'squalification,mayundoubtedlybepermitted.
ThecaseofHerrerav.Liwag,etal,L20079,Sept.30,1963,comessquarelywithin
theabovequalificationintheAytonaruling.
31Gonzalesv.Enrile,etal.,L22730,May24,1967.
3255O.G.8641.
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33Rep.ActNo.2260,Sec.29.
830
830 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
DeterminationofExigencyRequiringSuspensionofWritofHabeas
Corpus.OurSupremeCourtrefusedtointerferewiththedecision
oftheGovernorGeneralinsuspendingthewritofhabeascorpusfor
such a step would constitute an encroachment of the discretionary
34
powerandauthorityofanindependentanddistinctdepartment . It
wasthereobservedandheldthattheauthoritytodecidewhetherthe
exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the writ of habeas
corpusbelongstotheGovernorGeneralandhisdecisionisfinaland
conclusiveuponthecourts.Thesamepronouncementwasmadein
35
Montenegrovs.Castaneda .
IssueRegardingPowertoCallSpecialElection.TheSupreme
Court denied a petition for mandamus filed against the Governor
Generaltocompelhimtocallaspecialelectionforthepurposeof
electing a municipal president in the town of Silay stating in
support of the denial, that the GovernorGeneral is invested with
certainpoliticalpowers,intheexerciseofwhichheistousehisown
discretion36 and is accountable only to his country in his political
character.
QuestionPertainingtoExaminationofGovernmentVouchers.
37
In an earlier case which involved another petition for mandamus
filed by some elected members of the Philippine Legislature, to
direct the officials of the executive and legislative departments to
permit the petitioners to examine the vouchers showing the
expenditures of the Independence Commission, the Court held
that if the GovernorGeneral should deem it important and
advisabletoexhibitthevoucherstothepetitionersortothepublicin
order that the taxpayers might know in what manner their
contributionstotheGovernmentareexpended,thatisaquestionfor
himtodecide.Itispurelyapolitical
________________
34Barcelonv.Baker,5Phil.87(1905).
35L4221,48O.G.3391(1952).SeeArt.VII,Sec.10(2),PhilippineConstitution.
36 Severino v. GovernorGeneral, et al., 16 Phil. 366 (1910) Cf. also Sec. 22,
RevisedElectionCode,reCallofSpecialElectionsbythePresident.
37Abueva,etal.v.Wood,etal.,45Phil.612(1924).
831
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 831
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Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
______________
38Sec.24,Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution.
39Forbes,etal.v.Tiaco,etal.,16Phil.534(1910).
40InrePatterson,1Phil.23AngBengv.CommissionerofImmigration,L9621,
Jan.30,1957TanSinv.DeportationBoard,L11511,Nov.18,1958.
41Cf.Sec.69,Rev.Adm.CodeExecutiveOrderNo.455(1951).
42 Forbes, et al. v. Tiaco, et al., supra Cf. Sec. 10 (2), Art. VII, Philippine
Constitution.
43Untalv.ChiefofStaff,etc.,84Phil.586(1949).
832
832 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
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PARTICULARQUESTIONSHELDTOBE
JUSTICEABLE:
Validity of Apportionment Act.Even if an apportionment law
improves existing conditions, its validity or constitutionality is a
justiceable question. Thus, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional an Act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
groundofdisproportionofrepresentationwhichiscontrarytothe
constitutionalprovisionthattheonehundredtwentyMembersofthe
House of Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as44may be according to the number of their
respectiveinhabitants. Citing American precedents, the Supreme
Court ruled that: The constitutionality of a legislative
apportionmentactisajudicialquestion,andnotonewhichthecourt
cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question the
passageofapportionmentactsisnotsoexclusivelywithinthepower
of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it
thefactthattheactionmayhaveapoliticaleffect,andinthatsense
affect a political object, does not make the question involved in a
suit to declare the unconstitutionality of an apportionment act
political instead of judicial the constitutionality of a statute
forming a delegate district or apportioning delegates for the House
ofRepresentativesisajudicialquestionforthecourts,althoughthe
statute is an exercise of political power and the mere impact of
the suit upon the 45political situation does not render it political
insteadofjudicial.
Validity of Proceedings in Senate Electoral Tribunal.The
questionwhethertheelectionoftwoSenators,bythe
________________
44Maciasv.CommissiononElections,etal.,L18684,Sept14,1961Cf. Sec. 5,
Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution
45Ibid
833
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 833
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
______________
46Taada,etal.v.Cuenco,etal.,L10520,Feb.28,1957.
47Cf.Sec.11,Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution.
48Suanesv.ChiefAccountantoftheSenate,81Phil.818(1948).
49Morrerov.Bocar,37O.G.445.
50L1123,Mar.5,1947.
834
834 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
51
stitution, suffice to satisfy the
52
requirement of the latter, such
question being a political
53
one. Quoting with approval the case of
Coleman v. Miller and the opinion of Justice Black, the Court
further ruled that, the efficacy of ratification x x x of a proposed
amendmenttotheConstitutionisapoliticalquestionandhencenot
justiceable that if ratification of an amendment is a political
question,aproposalwhichleadstoratificationhastobeapolitical
question and that the amending process itself is political in its
entirety,fromsubmissionuntilanamendmentbecomespartofthe
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interferenceatanypoint.
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3/16/2017 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATEDVOLUME021
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51Cf.Sec.1,Art.XV,PhilippineConstitution.
52Mabanag,etal.v.LopezVito,etal.,supra.
53122A.L.R.625.
54L2851,Mar.4,1949.
55Gonzalesv.CommissiononElections,supra.
56Cf.Taiiadav.Cuenco,Id.
57L117,Nov.7,194542O.G.No.6,p.1243.
835
VOL.21,NOVEMBER9,1967 835
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
_______________
58L23326,Dec.18,1965.
59Cf.Sec.14,Art.VI,PhilippineConstitution.
60L2554,Oct.4,1966.
836
836 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
lawenactedpriorthereto.Hemaynotdefeatlegislativeenactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the
same through an executive63
agreement, providing for the very act
prohibitedbysaidlaws.
RecountofVotesCastforPresidentorVicePresident.Prior to
the approval of Republic Act No. 1793, a defeated candidate for
presidentorvicepresident,whobelievedthathewasthecandidate
who obtained the largest number of votes for either office despite
theproclamationbyCongressofanothercandidateasthepresident
elect or vicepresidentelect, had no legal right to demand by
electionprotestarecountofthevotescastfortheofficeconcerned,
to establish his rights thereto. As a consequence, controversies or
disputesonthismatterwerenotjusti
______________
61SeeProvinceofTayabasv.Perez,56Phil.257(1931)Rodriguezv.Treas.ofthe
Philippines and Barredo v. Commission on Elections, L3055 & L3056, Aug. 26,
1949Pascualv.SecretaryofPublicWorks,etc.,L10405,Dec.29,1960Gonzalesv.
Hechanova, 60 O.G. 802 (1963) Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez,
supra Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, supra Iloilo Palay & Corn
PlantersAss'nv.Feliciano,etal.,L24022,Mar.3,1965.
62SeeRepublicActNos.2207and3452.
63Gonzalesv.Hechanova,L21897,Oct.22,1963.
837
VOL.21,NOVEMBER10,1967 837
Remotiguevs.Osmena,Jr.
64
ciable. RepublicAct1793,whichcreatedthePresidentialElectoral
Tribunal, has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal
righttocontestjudiciallytheelectionofthePresidentelectorVice
Presidentelect and to demand a65recount of the votes cast for the
office involved in the litigation. And by providing that the said
Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of the Chief
Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court, said
legislation has conferred upon such Court 66
an additional original
jurisdiction of an exclusive character. Atty. DOMINGO .
LUCENARIO.
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