SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDEZ AND

RONALD MUNOZ, Petitioners, v. MORENO GENEROSO AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the
decision1 dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA G.R. SP No. 91541.

The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez,
and Ronald Munoz's (petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.cralawred

The Antecedent Facts

The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation
ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street,
Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso
reside.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batasan Hills Police Station) to report the
incident.4 Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOI Primitivo Monsalve (SPO1 Monsalve) dispatched
SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02 Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. 5 SP02
Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson and Airman Ruel
Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation 6 and they saw
Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers
to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest proceeding,
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. 10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder allegedly
committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 20th day of February, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by
then and there stabbing one Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said
accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by
reason of some cause/s or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant
was able to parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation 12 on the
ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They
also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the
denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Assailed CA Decision

On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. 17 The CA ruled
that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a
command. The arresting officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of Atty.
Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest so that an
inquest proceeding was called for as a consequence. Thus, the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.

The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based,
pursuant to Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had sufficiently
explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 17,
2008;18 hence, the present petition.cralawred

The Issues

The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A

WARRANT.cralawred

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE
MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.cralawred

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH
IT WAS BASED.

The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No arrest warrant was ever issued;
they went to the police station only as a response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the
Affidavit of Arrest, which actually used the word "invited."

The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under the terms of Rule 112, Section
7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually
arrived at the crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid warrantless arrest as they
had no personal knowledge that the petitioners were the authors of the crime.

The petitioners additionally argue that the RTC's Order denying the Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not properly issued.cralawred

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The criminal proceedings
against the petitioners should now proceed.

It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach this Court for its resolution.
The thought is very tempting that the motion was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the
use of Rule 65 petition has been abused.

But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated by fully examining in this case
the legalities surrounding warrantless warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for
the guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and the present case presents
to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins, development and the current applicable interpretation.

I. Brief history on warrantless arrests

The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of 1902 19 and the 1935,20 197321 and
198722 Constitutions all protect the right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure." 23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke 24 and The Great
Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215. 25 The Magna Carta Libertatum
limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties 26 under the
feudal vassals' threat of civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later
became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 28 It
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 29 of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him,
but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not
deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right. 30 [Emphasis supplied]

In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision does
not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures without judicial warrant, but only those that are
unreasonable.32 With regard to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity of warrantless arrests. The
Court based these rulings on the common law of America and England that, according to the Court, were
not different from the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests based on
the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines. 35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of Act No. 183, or the Charter of
Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of
Manila was concerned.

In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of any provisions under statutes
or local ordinances, a police officer who held similar functions as those of the officers established under
the common law of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in the
Philippines.

The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on warrantless arrest were based on
common sense and reason.40 It further held that warrantless arrest found support under the then
Administrative Code41 which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the prevention of
public offenses.

In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and 3043 of the Provisional Law for
the Application of the Penal Code which were provisions taken from the Spanish Law.

These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which
states that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section S(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) - the provision applicable in the present case.
This provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its
interpretation in our jurisprudence.

We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable American and Philippine
jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its appropriate present application.

II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113

A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English common law principle on
warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule
28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which provided
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to be detained, persons whom
there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as
well as of their agents, to arrest:

First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27. Second. A person charged with a
crime for which the code provides a penalty greater than that of confinamiento.

Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty less than that of
conjinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of the case would warrant the presumption that he
would fail to appear when summoned by the judicial authorities.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a defendant who gives sufficient
bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be
presumed will appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.

Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph may be arrested,
although no formal complaint has been filed against him, provided the following circumstances are
present:
First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful act, amounting
to a crime had been committed.

Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the person arrested
participated in the commission of such unlawful act or crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 37 of the Charter of Manila, which provided that
certain officials, including police officers may, within the territory defined in the law, pursue and
arrest without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace.

In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace. officer may arrest persons walking
in the street at night when there is reasonable ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although
there is no proof of a felony having been committed.

The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there was a probable cause for an
arrest without a warrant. The Court defined probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing
that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another
requirement. Once these conditions are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested
person turned out to be innocent.

Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of Court, it was not necessary for
the arresting officer to first have knowledge that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary
was the presence of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained
participated in it. In addition, it was also established under the old court rulings that the phrase
"reasonable suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless arrest would be
invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its breach. 48chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In The U.S. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a Chinaman because the arresting
person did not state in what way the Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or
circumstance which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.

It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of the rules on warrantless
arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable
cause) that a crime was committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of the arresting officer.
However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this discretion.

B. The 1940 Rules of Court

(Restricting the arresting officer's
determination of probable cause)

Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code were substantially
incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of Court as follows: 50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant -When lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence;

(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940
Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the
warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion)
applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has
committed it.

However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual
commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable
suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has
committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's
discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.

C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was re-worded
and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under
the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the
offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the
arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information
indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.

D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the
incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section
S(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word
"just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should
be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

It is clear that the present rules have objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting
officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed
the crime. According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based on mere suspicion or
hearsay.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below, starting with the element of
probable cause, followed by the elements that the offense has just been committed, and the arresting
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed the
crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of ''probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant on how the arresting officer
shall proceed on the facts and circumstances, within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining
whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable
cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a warrant although such arrests must be reasonable.
According to State v. Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.

The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that the Fourth Amendment
limited the circumstances under which warrantless arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not
whether there was a warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to "reasonable cause" and
"reasonable grounds."55chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough investigation
and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a
probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where
a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a warrantless arrest is
based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.56chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment. Probable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of
everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a pragmatic question to be
determined in each case in light of the particular circumstances and the particular offense involved.
57
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the information in his possession, his
fair inferences therefrom, including his observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of
showing probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general suspicion. Probable
cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as well as personal knowledge. Thus, the
arresting officer may rely on information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the context of Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Abelita III v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113

of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held
for trial.60 In Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.

In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause as to the guilt of the
respondent was based on the submitted documents of the complainant, the respondent and his
witnesses.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

Hence, before i suing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence
submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked
to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he
personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable cause 63 to issue a warrant of arrest.

In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual
facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest

The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 64 or an actual belief or reasonable
ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is invariable for the officer
arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial,
as the case may be.

However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable cause,"
within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts
and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same standard of a
reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon
which they must determine probable cause.

Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of
probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested
has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the
evidence submitted by the parties.

In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or available
information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of determining probable cause in
warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its determination in these instances. The Court held that one
should not expect too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning
of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in
haste on his own belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. 67chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:

The crime has just been committed/personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it

We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as our jurisprudence shows that
these were usually taken together in the Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests
that were made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8, 1994. It was only
on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the
supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and
Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be
said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be
arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a
threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to
arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only
information that the police officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It
cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.

In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of
the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements because he was
arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the
arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense. They
became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.

In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim and only on
the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.

In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six (6) days after the commission of the crime was held
invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had shot the victim. The
information upon which the police acted came from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the
shooting; one stated that the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That
information did not constitute "personal knowledge."

In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same day was held valid. In this
case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts which he personally gathered in the course of his
investigation, indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.

In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.

In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers received
information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting
officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as the
man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless arrest.
In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to the scene of
the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after the
shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death
of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was
held valid.

In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen immediately responded
to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of
whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the group saw the
policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court held that the arrest was valid.

In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio dispatch was then
given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio
message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated the report about the
robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them in conducting a search of the nearby area
where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the complainants, he
was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.

In Doria,79 the Court held that Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident.
SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who was
implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita
III and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to
go with him to the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III
agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him
up as he was about to run towards his house.

The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as Abelita III opened
the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the
firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part
of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Based on these discussions, it appears that the Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has
just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of the case.

However, we note that the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.

The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, 80
"circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain to
events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at
the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he
could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene
of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the
required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This
required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers
would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation.

The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to
the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to
external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of immediacy imposed
under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's
determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. The same provision adds
another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of
circumstances before the police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.

In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present for a
valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's
exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and
circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause
objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional
mandate against unreasonable arrests.

Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has
the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners?

We rule in the affirmative.

III. Application of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure in the
present case: there was a valid warrantless arrest

We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has misapprehended the facts in its
decision.81 From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless
arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that the determination of the facts in the present case is
purely limited to the resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the petitioners.

Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15a.m. on February 20, 2005, the date that the alleged
crime was committed, the petitioners were brought in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station.
The police blotter stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005, along
Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners already inside the police station, would connote that the arrest took place less than one hour
from the time of the occurrence of the crime. Hence, . the CA finding that the arrest took place two (2)
hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.

The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when they arrived at the scene of
the crime is corroborated by the petitioners' admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from
petitioner Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas, 83 although they asserted that they did it in self-
defense against Atty. Generoso.

Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Certificate84 that was issued by
East Avenue Medical Center on the same date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty.
Generoso that was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following findings:
"Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right midclavicular line periorbital
hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth
digit, right hand; Abrasion on area of 7th rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L peripheral area, no
visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr. Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of
contusion hematoma, periorbital L., and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.

To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso
of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour
after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling
and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.87chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally
observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time
of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances
were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal
knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the present case saw Atty. Generoso in
his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled
him; however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners agreed to go with the
police officers.

This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did not flee but voluntarily
went with the police officers. More than this, the petitioners in the present case even admitted to have
been involved in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what transpired.

In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent upon the courts to consider if
the police officers have complied with the requirements set under Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police officer's personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the propriety of the determination of probable cause that
the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl Monsalve immediately
dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render personal assistance to the victim. 90 This fact alone
negates the petitioners' argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a crime had
been committed the police immediately responded and had personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed.

To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.

Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where it took place, its occasion,
the personal circumstances of the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the
immediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the inquest proceeding
that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate under the circumstances.

IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is

construed to mean as an authoritative command

After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue
is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 91 Thus, application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the
other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is
necessary.92chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier could not but have the
intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty. Generoso's account. SP02 Javier did not need to
apply violent physical restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of actual force would only be an
alternative if the petitioners had exhibited resistance.

To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending policemen have acquired personal
knowledge of the incidents of the crime, including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as
the perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in connection with a
particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the
charges against them before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for
investigation.94chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V. The Order denying the motion for

preliminary investigation is valid

In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the RTC Order denying the petitioners'
urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article
VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."

We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving
the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary
matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary
incidents leading up to the triaL

Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required
to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings,
which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it
correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision
dated January 21, 2008 and the resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion.

Endnotes:

1
Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, and concurred in by Associate Justice Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam; rollo, pp. 36-46.
2
Id. at 48.
3
According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt of the PNP
Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page No. 250; RTC records,
attached to the CA records, p. 72.
4
Id. at 5.
5
Affidavit of Arrest, id. at 6.
6
As shown by the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt of the PNP
Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of2005, Entry No. 324, Page No. 250; id. at 72.
7
Rollo, p. 37.
8
RTC records, p. 6.
9
Rollo, p. 75.
10
ld. at 37.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 37-38.
14
The pertinent matters state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Considering the opposition and issues raised by the prosecution, the Court is not persuaded by the
evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and
convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to
pursue and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case.

ACCORDINGLY, the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation filed by the accused is
DENIED.
15
Rollo, p. 38.
16
Id.
17
Supra note 1.
18
Supra note 2.
19
Section 5 of The Philippine Bill of 1902. That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.
20
Section 1(3), Article III- The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
21
Section 3, Article IV - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
22
Section 2, Article III - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
23
Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p. 82.
24
Entitled THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, cited generally by Thomas Y. Davies,
Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and
the Original Meaning of Due Process, University of Tennessee College of Law Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, April23, 2008.
25
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna Carta. last accessed October 10, 2014.
26
Id.
27
Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless
Arrest Standards and the Original Meaning of Due Process, University of Tennessee College of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, April 23, 2008.
28
Id at 45.
29
Wrongfully dispossessed.
30
Supra note 27.
31
278 Fed. 650.
32
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Malasugui, G.R. No. L-44335, 63 Phil. 221,226 (1936).
33
Finkelman, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 2006 Ed., p. 82.
34
The United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853, 856 (1917).
35
The United States v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472,474-480 (1909).
36
4 Phil. 317, 323-324 (1905).
37
In The United States v. Fortaleza, the Court cited Section 37 ctf Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila), which
designates certain officials, including police officers, as "peace officers" expressly provides that within
the territory defined in the Act they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person has
committed, or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested
without warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within
his view."
38
11 Phil. 193, 197 (1908).
39
Supra note 34, at 856.
40
Id. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory
as the capture of criminals and the officer should not wait the commission of the crime. This rule is
supported by the necessities of life.
41
Sec. 2204, 1916 ed.; Sec. 2258, 1917 ed.
42
Supra note 35, at 477-479.
43
Section 37 (a) If the number of barrios in a municipality is less than or equal to the number of
councilors the council shall put each of its members in immediate charge of a barrio or part of a barrio, so
that each barrio shall be under the direction of one or more councilors.

(b) If the number of barrios exceeds the number of councilors, including the vice-president, the council
shall group the barrios into as many districts as there are councilors, and shall place each councilor in
charge of one such district. Each councilor shall be empowered to appoint one lieutenant in each barrio or
part of barrio which comes under his immediate supervision. A lieutenant of barrio shall serve without
compensation and shall report directly to the councilor appointing him.

Sec. 38. (a) Each councilor shall keep the people of his barrio or barrios informed as to the acts of the
council, or other governmental measures which directly concern them, by means of suitable notices
posted in a public and conspicuous place in each barrio. He shall serve in the council as the representative
of the people of his barrio or barrios and shall bring their special needs to the attention of that body.

(b) He shall further promptly inform the president of any unusual or untoward event occurring within the
barrios assigned to him.

(c) He is authorized to use as a symbol of office a cane with silver head, plated ferule and black cord and
tassels.
44
Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462,479 (1997).
45
Supra note 35, at 477-478.
46
Supra note 34, at 856.
47
60 III. 361 [1871].
48
Supra note 34, at 854-855.
49
G.R. No. L-6909, 21 Phil. 514-516 (1912).
50
Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration in Sayo v. The Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 875 (1948).
51
Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Book IV, 2007 Edition, citing Feria, Philippine Legal Studies, Series
No.2, p. 375.
52
5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S Ct. 1371.
53
111SC174, 97, SE 62, 3 ALR 1500, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 689.
54
361 U.S. 98, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 80S Ct. 168, cited in 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 688.
55
5 Am Jur 2d, p. 690, citing United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937) and Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
56
5 Am Jur 2d, pp. 691-692, citing Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F. 2d 1336; Be Vier v.
Hucal, (CA7 Ill) 806 F. 2d 123; Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560; Martin v.
Eaton, 140 Vt 134, 436 A. 2d 751; Warren v. Dwyer, 906 F. 2d 70; State v. Kendall, 794 P. 2d 114; People
v. Villiard, 679 P. 2d 593; State v. Tarica, 59 Wash App 368, 798 P. 2d 296; Hill v. California, 401 U.S.
797; United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A. 2d 700.
57
5 Am Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 LEd 2d 484, 91 S Ct 1106; United
States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986; People v. Exum, 382 Ill 204, 47 N. E. 2d 56; Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403
S.W. 2d 705; Gaudio v. State, 1 Md App 455, 230 A. 2d 700.
58
5 Am Jur 2d, pp. 692, citing Thompson v. State (Del Sup) 539 A. 2d 1052; Ricks v. State, 82 Md. App.
369, 571 A. 2d 887, cert gr 320 Md 3505, 578 A. 2d 778 and affd 322 Md 183, 586 A. 2d 740; People v.
Tracy, 186 Mich App 171,46. N.W. 2d 457; State v. Leonard (Utah App) 825 P. 2d 664, 177 Utah Adv
Rep 49, cert den (Utah) 843 P. 2d 1042.
59
G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 220, 227.
60
Paderanga v. Drilon et al., 273 Phil. 290,296 (1991).
61
32 Phil. 363,365 (1915).
62
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
63
People v. CA, 361 Phil. 401,413 (1999).
64
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010,626 SCRA 633,642.
65
Supra note 59.
66
Supra note 34.
67
Id.
68
G.R. No. 131492, September 29,2000,341 SCRA 388.
69
G.R. L-68995, September 4, 1986, 144 SCRA 1.
70
365 Phil. 292, 312 (1999).
71
268 Phil. 571, 576 (1990).
72
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992,206 SCRA 138, 150.
73
G.R. No. 94533, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 772, 775, 778.
74
G.R. No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993,219 SCRA 756,761.
75
341 Phil. 526, 534, 543 (1997).
76
346 Phil. 847, 853-854 (1997).
77
232 Phil. 406 (1994).
78
G.R. No. 123123, August 19, 1999, 232 SCRA 412-413.
79
Supra note 59.
80
Fifth Edition, p. 220.
81
New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005).
82
According to the Certification of the Batasan Hills Police Station as regards the excerpt of the PNP
Complaint at PNP Complaint Volume 19, Series of 2005, Entry No. 324, Page No. 250; RTC records, p.
72.
83
Rollo, pp. 73-74.
84
Issued by the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Charlton S. Sibal, M.D.; RTC records, p. 7.
85
Joey Pestilos then resided at Block 1, Lot 6, Don Primitivo Extension, Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City;
Dwight Macapanas then resided at No. 24 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Miguel Gaces
then resided at No. 13, Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Jerry Fernandez resided at No. 16,
Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; Ronald Mufioz then resided at No. 15, Kasiyahan St.,
Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City; RTC records, p. 4.

86 Atty. Generoso then resided at No. 16 Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City per the ferral
letter of the Police Inspector to the City Prosecutor, dated February 20, 2005; id.
87
Rollo, p. 75.
88
Supra note 76.
89
G.R. No. 144497, June 29,2004,433 SCRA 139.
90
Rollo, p. 40.
91
Rule 113, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.
92
Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November 9, 1993, 227 SCRA 627, 637-638; see also
People v. Milado, 462 Phil. 411, 417 (2003).
93
The pertinent portion of the Affidavit of Arrest states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That, immediately we proceeded at the said place and upon arrival complainant appeared complained and
pointed to the undersigned to suspects [Joey] Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces[,] Jerry
Fernandez and Ronald Munoz at (sic) those who mauled him.

That, I informed all the suspects of the charges imputed [against] them by complainant Atty. Generoso
then invited them to Batasan Police Station for Investigation x x x" (Emphasis ours)
94
Rollo, p. 41.
95
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
96
SEC. 3. Resolution of motion. -After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I regret that I cannot bring myself to agree that the warrantless arrest was valid.

To review, the facts as established are as follows:

Both petitioners and respondent are residents of Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City.1chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On February 20, 2005, at around 3:00 to 3:15 a.m., petitioners Joey M. Pestilos (Pestilos), Dwight
Macapanas (Macapanas), Miguel Gaces (Gaces), Jerry Hernandez (Hernandez), and Ronald Muoz
(Muoz), and respondent Atty. Moreno Generoso (Atty. Generoso) were waiting for the water supply on
Kasiyahan Street. Pestilos and Macapanas got into an altercation with Atty. Generoso that involved
physical violence. Immediately after the incident, Pestilos and Macapanas went to the barangay hall to
seek help from the local barangay officials. 2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At the barangay hall, Pestilos reported the incident and wanted to have it inscribed in the barangay blotter.
The barangay tanod advised them to secure a medical certificate first before Pestilos and Macapanas
could register their complaint in the barangay blotter. 3 Pestilos and Macapanas requested the barangay
tanod to accompany them on their way back to their residences on Kasiyahan Street, to avoid further
trouble.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At around 5:30 a.m., Pestilos and Macapanas arrived with the barangay tanod on Kasiyahan Street. By
then, officers from Batasan Hills Police Station were present. Atty. Generoso pointed to Pestilos and
Macapanas as perpetrators of his alleged mauling. 5 The two began complaining about Atty. Generosos
attack against them. The police officers, led by SPO2 Dominador Javier (SPO2 Javier), brought Pestilos,
Macapanas, and Atty. Generoso to the police station. The other petitioners, Gaces, Hernandez, and
Muoz, were brought by Pestilos and Macapanas to act as their witnesses.

Macapanas left the police station for a while to get a medical certificate from the East Avenue Medical
Center, as advised by the barangay tanod earlier. 6 Meanwhile, at the police station, Atty. Generoso filed
charges against all petitioners (Pestilos, Macapanas, Gaces, Hernandez, and Muoz) for frustrated
murder.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Macapanas also filed charges against Atty. Generoso for slight physical injuries. 8 The police officers in
the Batasan Hills Police Station rendered reports for both charges. In addition to the reports, SPO2 Javier
executed an affidavit of arrest with respect to petitioners. 9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

At the Office of the Prosecutor, the prosecutor subjected all the petitioners to inquest, while the complaint
against Atty. Generoso was treated as a case subject to preliminary
investigation.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Two days after the incident, the prosecutor filed an information against petitioners for attempted
murder.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Before arraignment, petitioners filed an urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation. However, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, denied the motion. 12 They filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the motion was denied.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On appeal via Rule 65, the Court of Appeals sustained the order of the Regional Trial
Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated April 17,
2008.15 They came to this court via a petition for review on certiorari. They argue that they are entitled to
preliminary investigation. Subjecting them to inquest proceedings was irregular because they were not
properly arrested. Assuming that their decision to go to the police station was an arrest, the arrest was
invalid because it was not made in compliance with the rule on warrantless arrests.

I vote that the petition be granted. Petitioners are entitled to a preliminary investigation because the
warrantless arrest was not valid.

The right of a person to his or her liberties in the form of protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures enjoys a high degree of protection. 16 The Constitution only allows for reasonable searches and
seizures. As a general rule, courts decide whether there is probable cause to issue a search warrant or
warrant of arrest. In People v. Burgos,17 this court stated that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his
liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule.
We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so
often violated and so deserving of full protection. 18 (Emphasis supplied).

The limited circumstances for the conduct of reasonable warrantless arrests are enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 12, Section 7.

This case does not fall under the first and third exceptions. The question is whether this falls under the
special circumstances of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

The elements of a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) are the following: (1) the offense
has just been committed; (2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and
(3) these facts and circumstances give rise to probable cause that the person to be arrested has committed
the offense.

The first element requires that there are facts leading to a conclusion that an offense has been committed.
Being based on objectivity, the first element requires the occurrence of facts that, when taken together,
constitutes the commission of an offense.

If we accepted the version of Atty. Generoso, it appears that he was a victim of an attack from petitioners.
The facts that he narrated may, thus, constitute the possible offenses of physical injuries or even attempted
or frustrated homicide or murder. The offense should be evaluated from the facts and circumstances as it
appeared to the person making the warrantless arrest.

The element that the offense had just been committed was introduced in the 1985 revision of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. This element must be read in relation to the general requirement that a warrant of
arrest must be procured to ensure a more impartial determination of the existence of facts and
circumstances. This element, however, acknowledges the necessities of law enforcement. At times, the
police officer arrives at the scene of the crime after the crime just happened and there are facts and
circumstances such as the sudden flight of a person or the wielding of a weapon by a person near the
incident that reasonably lead the police officer to believe that the person is the perpetrator. In such
cases, to ensure that the right person can be put within the jurisdiction of a court, the rules allow a valid
warrantless arrest.

This necessity is wanting in this case. Petitioners themselves, together with a barangay tanod, voluntarily
went to the police station. They did so after they had gone to the barangay hall to report the incident and
had their own complaints entered into the barangay blotter.

There was no urgency to arrest petitioners. They were not planning to flee. They voluntarily presented
themselves as complainants against private respondent. For reasons not clear in the record, they were
subjected to a warrantless arrest and then to inquest. Private respondent, on the other hand, was allowed
to be a respondent in a preliminary investigation. He was not arrested.
Several cases qualified the time element of just been committed to range from three (3) hours 19 to 14
days.20 This is not the correct approach.

In Re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Laurente C. Ilagan21 and Umil v. Ramos,22 cited by the majority, were
decided under the dark days of Martial Law. The dissents in those cases were clarion calls for the
protection of our liberties.

Former Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his dissent in In Re Ilagan, was of the opinion that just been
committed connotes immediacy in point of time.23 Former Associate Justice Florenz Regalado24
emphasized the requirement of immediacy:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required
by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by reason of such
recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or
reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured.
The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. 25

In the same case, Associate Justice Florentino Feliciano illustrated how a hot pursuit warrantless arrest
should be made:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained
under this subsection: 1) the offense must have just been committed when the arresting officer arrived
in the scene; and 2) the officer must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first requirement imports that the
effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on
the ground, dead of a gunshot wound; or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab
wounds. The arresting officer may not have seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and
therefore the offense can not be said to have been committed in [his] presence. The requirement of
personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge
must have been obtained directly from sense perception by the arresting officer. That requirement
would exclude information conveyed by another person, no matter what his reputation for truth and
reliability might be. Thus, where the arresting officer comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a
person running away with a knife from where the victim is sprawled on the ground, he has personal
knowledge of facts which rendered it highly probable that the person fleeing was the doer of the criminal
deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his own senses some act which directly
connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of a crime which has just been
committed.26 (Emphasis supplied)

The second element under Rule 113, Section 5(b) is that the arresting officer has personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances. Personal knowledge is derived from the [persons] own
perception.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the other hand, information not of personal knowledge is hearsay. Hearsay is evidence not of what
the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others. 28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The arresting officers must obtain personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that lead to the
conclusion that an offense has just been committed. They must also perceive facts and circumstances that
would substantiate the probable liability of the person. The accused is usually identified when he or she is
seen fleeing the scene because the act of fleeing suggests the attempt to evade authority. A person in
possession of a weapon could also be perceived as the one liable for an offense.

There must be a reasonable amount of facts short of seeing the entire offense being committed. A
collection of facts, on the other hand, is a set of circumstances. If the arresting officer saw facts and
circumstances indicating that an offense has just been committed and the person is probably liable for that
offense, a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b). If the arresting officer saw the
offense being committed, then the warrantless arrest will be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a), not
under subsection (b).

Facts or circumstances relating to the nature of the offense cannot substitute for personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances relating to the liability of the person who probably committed the offense. One
pertains to the object and the other the method of perception.

SPO2 Javier had personal knowledge of the injuries of private respondent. This is only personal
knowledge with respect to the offense, not yet as to the identity of the perpetrators.

On the other hand, the information obtained by the police officers when private respondent pointed to
petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime was hearsay. Private respondents act of pointing to petitioners
communicated that petitioners committed the mauling. It becomes hearsay on the part of the police
officers who did not see petitioners mauling private respondent. The only personal knowledge obtained by
the police officers was that private respondent pointed to petitioners.

According to petitioners, they returned to the crime scene and saw the police officers. They also informed
the police officers that private respondent attacked them. That is another hearsay received by the police
officers at the crime scene.

The police officers perceived limited facts while investigating at the crime scene. These limited facts do
not provide sufficient bases for the liability of anyone at the scene. No one was reported holding a
weapon allegedly used against private respondent. None of the petitioners fled at the sight of the police
officers.

There were only facts relating to the offense, such as the sight of an injured private respondent. This fact
cannot substitute for the personal knowledge of facts and circumstances relating to the liability of
petitioners.

Parenthetically, the police officers also had hearsay knowledge that private respondent was the perpetrator
against petitioners. For reasons not clear in the records, however, the police officers preferred not to arrest
him.

The third element requires that these facts and circumstances must lead to the conclusion that there is
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed the offense. Rule 113, Section 5(b)
requires that probable cause or actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion must be supported by
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that, when taken together, builds the suspicion that an
individual committed the offense.

The plurality in the phrasing suggests that there should be more than one fact or circumstance. In People
v. Cogaed,29 we ruled that for there to be a genuine reason to execute a warrantless arrest or search,
there should be more than one suspicious circumstance to infer that there was criminal
activity.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In most cases that found the validity of the warrantless arrest, there was the presence of more than one
circumstance that formed part of the personal knowledge of the police officers.

In People v. Jayson,31 police officers were summoned immediately to the crime scene. They found the
victim, and saw the accused fleeing. These are two facts that show that the offense was committed and
that the person arrested was probably responsible because he attempted to escape.

In People v. Tonog,32 there was a murder. Police officers at the crime scene saw the following: the body of
the victim and a motorcab that was driven by Tonog that day. Tonog voluntarily went to the police station,
and one of the police officers noticed that he had blood splatters on his jeans. All three facts and
circumstances were observed by the police officers during the arrest, thereby building the probable cause
that Tonog committed the murder.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On the other hand, this court ruled that there are instances when there is no personal knowledge of the
police officers; hence, there is no valid warrantless arrest.

In People v. Burgos,34 a source informed the police officers that Ruben Burgos was engaged in subversive
activities. This court held that the report was not enough to enact a warrantless arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(b), especially since there were no facts personally known to the police officers that a crime was
committed.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman,35 the National Bureau of Investigation officers arrested two students identified
by witnesses as the perpetrators of a killing during a fraternity rumble. The arrest was made without a
warrant, and this court declared the warrantless arrest invalid.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) did not apply in People v. Briones36 where the accused was arrested after one
eyewitness had identified him as the murderer. This court declared that the warrantless arrest was invalid
because the police officer who effected the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. It is [the] eyewitness . . . who had such
personal knowledge.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Jurisprudence often repeats the doctrine summarized in Umil v. Ramos:38chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 39 (Citations omitted)

The confusion with this treatment is that it qualifies personal knowledge with probable cause, not the
other way around. The rule states that probable cause . . . [is] based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances.40 It does not state personal knowledge of facts based on probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. The import of the text is that reasonable suspicion and probable cause is built by personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances. Personal knowledge is the method of perceiving facts. Probable
cause is the conclusion of all the facts so perceived.

Flight of the accused is often a sign that there is probable cause that he or she committed the offense.
When he or she attempts to escape from authorities, the authorities must act immediately because not
doing so might compromise the investigation.

If there is no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances on the part of the police officers, a
warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) will be unreasonable because there is nothing to base
probable cause on that the accused committed the offense.

Here, there was no flight of the accused. On the contrary, petitioners returned to the crime scene 41 because
they felt that they were the victims, not the perpetrators.

The police officers were still investigating the matter when petitioners were brought to the police station.
The circumstances of the situation did not call for an exception to the rule requiring a warrant of arrest.
The statement made by private respondent on the identity of his perpetrators, as communicated to the
police, could have been reduced to an affidavit used to support an application for a warrant of arrest. The
statements made by petitioners were other pieces of evidence to be considered for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.

The police officers were not threatened by the immediate flight of the alleged perpetrators who believed
that they also have a right to vindicate since they were cooperating with the police. All facts point to the
reasonability of obtaining a warrant of arrest. There was no exigency to cause the warrantless arrest of
petitioners.

It bears stressing that petitioners went with the police officers in their capacity as complainants against
private respondent. They did not know that they were already being arrested. To their mind, the police
officers just wanted to continue the investigation at the police station. This is shown by the police report
dated February 20, 2005 regarding the complaint of petitioner Macapanas against private respondent Atty.
Generoso. In this report, petitioner Macapanas was the complainant, and private respondent Atty.
Generoso was the accused. To wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is worthy to mentioned [sic] that complainant voluntarily [sic] appeared to this Station wherein he was
identified by complainant at [sic] the one who punched him(,) which also causing [sic] him to be bitten
(by) a dog thereat.42

The existence of two police reports for two separate crimes committed during one incident one with
petitioners as accused43 and the other with private respondent as accused 44 proves that at the time that
petitioners were taken into custody, the police officers were still uncertain about what happened. This
negates the presence of probable cause, required by Rule 113, Section 5(b).

Probable cause must exist at the time of the warrantless arrest. Otherwise, any form of uncertainty should
be resolved through the exercise of judicial caution.

When the police officers became more convinced that private respondents version was more believable
than petitioners, the police officers should have applied for a warrant of arrest. SPO2 Javier expedited
procedure when he executed an affidavit of arrest. He made it appear that there was a valid warrantless
arrest, instead of applying for a warrant of arrest. This is unacceptable in our Constitution.

Strict standards should be imposed on law enforcement. It is said that the prosecution can bring the full
resources of the state to bear on winning. Imposing a heavy burden of proof on the prosecution
diminishes this advantage.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Relaxing our standards in taking individuals under custody enhances the advantage of the prosecution, to
the detriment of the individual. Compared to the state, the accused does not have the resources to question
the legitimacy of an arrest. Some of them do not even know that they are already being arrested. Many
arrested individuals may not even be able to afford lawyers until the public attorney steps in during
custodial investigation or, worse, during arraignment. By then, the accused would have already been
deprived of his or her liberty.

The circumstances of this case require the vigilance of this court in protecting the neglected rights of
petitioners. Petitioners were just in their 20s when the altercation occurred. Pestilos was a student,
Macapanas and Muoz were unemployed, Gaces was a driver, and Fernandez was a printing press
operator. Petitioners have been certified as indigents. 46 They are of limited means. At the time that they
were trying to vindicate their rights at the police station, they did not have counsel.

On the other hand, it is easier for the police officers to be persuaded by private respondent, a member of
the bar who is fully aware of his constitutional rights. The police officers became more inclined to believe
his story because he is a lawyer, while petitioners were all non-lawyers.

Petitioners were not expected to know that a detention was an arrest. The affidavit of arrest stated that
SPO2 Javier informed all the suspects of the charges imputed against them by complainant Atty.
Generoso.47 To an ordinary citizen, they were just complaints. An invitation is really just an invitation for
petitioners. They did not go to the police station because they were being arrested.

With the absence of a valid warrantless arrest, petitioners are entitled to preliminary investigation.
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding the purpose of which is to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 48 The right to preliminary
investigation is statutory in character.49 Being mandated by statute, a preliminary investigation becomes
part of the constitutional due process rights accorded to the accused. 50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Under Rule 112, a preliminary investigation is required if an offense has a penalty of at least four (4)
years, two (2) months, and one (1) day. However, under Section 6 of the same rules, a preliminary
investigation is no longer necessary if the person accused was arrested lawfully without a warrant. If there
was a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5, inquest proceedings are required.

Based on the Manual for Prosecutors, inquests are conducted by a public prosecutor assigned as an
Inquest Officer. An inquest is conducted only at the police stations or headquarters of the Philippine
National Police, unless otherwise directed. 51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Here, petitioners alleged that they were brought from Batasan Hills Police Station to the Office of the
Prosecutor. At the Office of the Prosecutor, it was decided that petitioners would be subjected to inquest,
while respondent would undergo preliminary investigation. This irregularly conducted inquest aggravates
the fact that petitioners were subjected to an inquest despite lack of a valid warrantless arrest.

Considering that petitioners were not arrested in accordance with the strict guidelines of our Constitution
and the Rules of Court, petitioners statutory right to preliminary investigation is mandatory.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be GRANTED.

Endnotes:
1
Rollo, p. 51.
2
Id. at 69.
3
Id. at 9 and 49.
4
Id. at 49.
5
RTC records, p. 6, as stated in the affidavit of arrest.
6
Rollo, p. 50.
7
Id. at 158.
8
Id. at 51.
9
RTC records, p. 6.
10
CA rollo, pp. 98-100, and RTC records, p. 2.
11
RTC records, pp. 12.
12
Id. at 59. The order was dated March 16, 2005 rendered by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal.
13
Rollo, p. 67.
14
Id. at 3546. The decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 91541 dated January 21, 2008 was penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E.
Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now member of this court) and Noel G. Tijam of the Fifth
Division of the Court of Appeals.
15
Rollo, pp. 4748.
16
Const., art. III, sec. 2.
17
228 Phil. 1 (1986) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division].
18
Id. at 15.
19
People v. Gerente, G.R. Nos. 9584748, March 10, 1993, 219 SCRA 756 (1993) [Per J. Grio- Aquino, First Division].
20
Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
21
223 Phil. 561 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
22
279 Phil. 266 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
23
J. Teehankee, dissenting opinion in In Re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Laurente C. Ilagan, 223 Phil. 561, 622 (1985) [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
24
Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
25
J. Regalado, dissenting opinion in Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266, 312 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
26
J. Feliciano, dissenting opinion in Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266, 325326 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
27
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 36.
28
People v. Manhuyod, 352 Phil. 866, 880 (1998) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
29
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014 < http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/200334.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
30
Id.
31
346 Phil. 847 (1997) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
32
G.R. No. 144497, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 139 [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
33
The issue of warrantless arrest was not ruled upon in this case. However, Posadas v. Ombudsman, 395 Phil. 601 (2000) [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division] used this case to show the circumstances surrounding the warrantless arrest that led to the arrests
validity.
34
228 Phil. 1 (1986) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Second Division].
35
395 Phil. 601 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
36
279 Phil. 776 (1991) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
37
Id. at 787.
38
279 Phil. 266 (1991) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
39
Id. at 295296.
40
RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, sec. 5(b).
41
Rollo, p. 49. In the joint-affidavit of the barangay officials, they stated that petitioners requested them to accompany [Pestilos
and Macapanas] to their place for fear that Atty. Generoso might still be looking for them. To avoid further trouble, we brought
them back to Kasiyahan Street on board the Barangay vehicle.
42
Id. at 51.
43
Id. at 158.
44
Id. at 51.
45
R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, 450 (2004).
46
RTC records, pp. 1721.
47
Id. at 6.
48
RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, sec. 1.
49
Marinas v. Siochi, 191 Phil. 698, 718 (1981) [Per J. Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
50
Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil. 557, 576 (1998) [Per J. Kapunan, Third Division].
51
Manual for Prosecutors, part II, sec. 2, last paragraph.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174774

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias
Botong, and RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias
Mac-Mac,
Promulgated:
Accused-Appellants.

August 31, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1[1] dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01733, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2[2] dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court
of Appeals found accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes (Reyes) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation to Section 16 of Article III, of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon them
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:

On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession,
sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug
commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, in its Resolution
dated March 3, 2000, found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together with Emmanuel de
Claro, for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the preliminary investigation in so

1 [1]Rollo, pp. 4-13; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate
Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.

2 [2] CA rollo, pp. 43-53; penned by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.

far as Lantion-Tom was concerned. The criminal information against accused-appellants and Emmanuel
de Claro, filed with the RTC, reads:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES
y SANTOS @ BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and
EMMANUEL DE CLARO y ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF
SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO SEC. 16 ART. III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED,
committed in the manner herein narrated as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of

Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, commit to sell, deliver,
distribute and/or transport a carton of ten (10) heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with the following
grams, to wit: 99.2, 94.9, 99.6, 93.5, 98.3, 99.5, 99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4
grams or a total of 980.9 grams, which substance when submitted for
drug examination, were found positive to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license and prescription.3[3]

On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-
Tom, insisting on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said
trial court granted in an Order4[4] dated March 15, 2000.

After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated April 3,
2000, recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and
Emmanuel de Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-
Tom. The Office of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events presented by the
parties during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except accused-appellant Reyes who did
not participate in the proceedings), which it summarized as follows:

3 [3] Records, Vol. I, p. 1.

4[4] Id. at 65.

 In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the
Intelligence and Investigation of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the National
Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims that on 17 February 2000 a confidential
informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the
parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they were dispatched to
verify the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00 p.m. after meeting with
the confidential agent, they strategically positioned themselves at the vicinity parking
area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on
board a white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a.
Botong, on board a red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent Reyes
subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes calling accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro through his
cellular phone; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro
then proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car where respondent Lantion-Tom was
waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a
plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the
accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted having in their
possession illegal drugs; that the recovered items containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed
transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with a total weight of 980.9 grams
turned positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug.

In his Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay, accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes

claims that on 17 February 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City,
together with a neighbor, one Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to pay
his indebtedness; that while looking for a parking space, several men with firearms
suddenly appeared, with one shouting, buksan mo ang pintuan ng sasakyan at kung hindi
babasagin ko ito; that he and Marlon David were forced out of their vehicle with one of
the armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart, asking where the said
bag allegedly containing shabu came from; that accused/respondent [Rolando] delos
Reyes answered hindi ko alam, that he and Marlon David were blindfolded when forcibly
taken to the groups vehicle and continuously asked who the source of the shabu was, with
respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes replying, hindi ko alam at wala akong
kinalaman diyan; that Marlon David was separated from accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes and later released on 18 February 2000; that when accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes blindfold was removed, he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

xxxx

To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he was

arrested in Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop Bar and
Restaurant in Mandaluyong City, respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claros spouse
submitted a certified true xerox copy of barangay blotter of Barangay Manggahan, Pasig
City, reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000 made by Mrs. Delos Reyes, on the incident
reported to by Marlon David thus:
 BLOTTER

Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng.

Virginia Delos Reyes, upang ipagbigay alam ang pagkawala ng kanyang
asawa na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa 17 ng Pebrero taong
dalawang libo (2000) na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si Marlon David,
ay hinuli ng mga hindi kilalang lalaki sa Buenas Market, Manggahan,
Pasig City nais niyang alamin kung ang nasabing insidente ay
coordinated dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng Barangay.

(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes

Nagpapahayag

The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia] Delos
Reyes of the incident upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another witness, one Joel
Navarro, claims having seen the actual incident confirming the events as narrated to by
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and Marlon David.

Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife, respondent

Lantion-Tom, submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly denying the charges and
claiming that they were at the Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk to respondent
Lantion-Toms accountant Ms. Daisy Milan regarding the Mayors Permit, Business
Location Clearance issued by the Office of the Barangay Captain, insurance documents,
BIR Certificate of Registration of her business; that they were with accused/respondent
[Emmanuel] de Claros brother, Roberto and a friend, James, with the two remaining
outside the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to accompany Ms. Milan, while
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was left inside; that after Ms. Milan left,
respondent Lantion-Tom was suddenly surrounded by men who introduced themselves as
police officers and were arresting them for being the source of shabu in a drug deal; that
all of them, accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro, Roberto and James were likewise
arrested and continuously questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they were
taken to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further
investigation; that Roberto and James were released the following day. Both respondents
maintain that the allegations of the arresting officers as to the circumstances on the
alleged drug deal leading to their arrest are unfounded and purely fabricated.

During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the

arresting officers manifested that they are going to submit reply-affidavit on 29 March
2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was submitted.5[5]

The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers failed to refute
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, as

5 [5] Id. at 103-109.

corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn statements
(Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City Prosecutor also observed that
Lantion-Tom was merely in the company of the other respondents without performing any overt act
showing her to be part of the illicit transaction and her drug test revealed negative results. On the other
hand, it considered the conflicting claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he was illegally arrested and
that the drug deal was a mere fabrication) and the arresting officers (i.e., that Emmanuel de Claro was the
seller/pusher in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his vehicle) would be best ventilated during
the trial on the merits.

In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with
leave of court to admit amended information.

In its Order6[6] dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecutions motion. Contrary to the
finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against
accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well.

Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000, 7[7] while Emmanuel de Claro was
arraigned on July 12, 2000.8[8] All three pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 3 Virgilio
Santiago,9[9] Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo Lectura,10[10] PO3 Angel Yumul,11[11] and SPO1

6[6] Id. at 110.

7[7] Id. at 262.

8[8] Id. at 349.

9[9] TSN, July 12, 2000 and August 23, 2000.

10[10] TSN, August 23, 2000.

11[11] TSN, December 13, 2000.

Benjamin David,12[12] members of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) who apprehended and/or investigated the case
against accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and P/Insp. Benjamin Cruto, Jr.13
[13] (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom
on February 17. 2000. He testified that at around 10:30 a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold Aguilar,
received information from a confidential informant regarding an illegal drug deal that would take place
between Botong and Mac-Mac at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in Madaluyong City. Botong and
Mac-Mac were identified during the investigation as accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes,
respectively.

As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was organized by Major
Aguilar, composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1 Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3 Elmer
Corbe, PO3 Marcelo Arcancia, Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3 Edwin dela Cruz.
At around 1:00 p.m. of the same day, the police team was dispatched, using four vehicles, to the location
of the drug deal and upon arrival, they waited for the confidential informant to arrive. When the
confidential informant arrived at around 3:30 p.m., he told the police team that the drug deal would
possibly take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and that the suspects would utilize a red Toyota
Corolla with plate number TRP-868 and a white Toyota Corolla with plate number ULF-706. The police
team then positioned their cars strategically in such a way that they could see the vehicles coming from
St. Francis Street and EDSA.

PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the suspected vehicles arrived, both
stopping along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked to each
other. The confidential informant recognized the driver of the white Toyota car as Mac-Mac and the driver

12[12] TSN, February 21, 2001.

13[13] TSN, June 8, 2000.

of the red Toyota car as Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a call on his cellular phone and then
proceeded inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. Inside the restaurant, Botong talked
to another person, who was identified during the investigation as Emmanuel de Claro alias Cocoy. PO3
Santiago was about three to five meters away. Thereafter, Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant
and approached a car parked right outside. The person at the back seat of the car, later on identified as
Lantion-Tom, handed to Cocoy a white plastic bag containing a box. Cocoy gave the bag to Botong, who,
in turn, handed the same bag to Mac-Mac. In the meantime, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant.

PO3 Santiago related that their team leader sensed that the drug deal had already been
consummated, so the police team immediately effected the arrest of the suspected drug dealers. PO3
Santiago and PO3 Yumul arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura and the remaining police
team members arrested Botong and Mac-Mac. The plastic bag containing the box was seized from Mac-
Mac. The arrested suspects were brought to the police office for investigation. The plastic bag, the box,
and the 10 heat-sealed sachets of white crystalline substance inside the box, were marked for
identification and physical examination at the police office.

According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents of each of the 10 heat-
sealed sachets yielded positive test results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Santiago
then signed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together with the other arresting police
officers, namely, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes, and PO3 Nelson Gene Javier.

On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the
plastic bag and that he did not even see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From PO3
Santiagos position, he could not conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal drug deal as he had
no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the other arresting officers just
relied on the information relayed by the confidential informant. Also, the police team did not recover any
money from the arrested suspects. The confidential informant merely informed the police the following
morning that the money for the illegal drugs was already deposited in the bank. The police, however,
failed to make further queries from the confidential informant about the bank.
 SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a confidential informant
about an illegal drug deal involving Cocoy, Botong, and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City on February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was designated as the leader of the team that will
bust said illegal drug deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lecturas team proceeded to the subject location.

The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lecturas team at around 3:30 p.m. SPO1
Lectura conducted a short briefing then positioned his team strategically within the vicinity. The
confidential informant told the police team that the drug deal would take place between 6:00 p.m. and
11:00 p.m. At around 10:00 p.m., the confidential informant identified the suspected drug dealers Botong
and Mac-Mac, who were arriving in two cars. After conversing for a moment with Mac-Mac, Botong
went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant to talk to Cocoy. Botong and Cocoy then went outside the restaurant
and approached another car. Cocoy took a white plastic bag from the car, which he handed to Botong.
Thereafter, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant, while [Botong] proceeded to his car near [Mac-Mac].
SPO1 Lectura was positioned at the other lane of the road, approximately 10 to 15 meters away from the
suspects. At that moment, SPO1 Lectura sensed that the drug deal had been consummated, so he decided
to already arrest the suspects. SPO1 Lectura arrested Mac-Mac, from whom he seized the white plastic
bag. PO3 Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3 Santiago apprehended Cocoy. The police
team brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation.

SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat-
sealed plastic sachets inside. In front of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1 David marked the said articles with his
initials. After physical and chemical examinations revealed that the contents of the sachets were shabu,
SPO1 Lectura signed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon David was with Botong
when the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the police also arrested Marlon David. Marlon
David was brought to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other arrested suspects, for
verification, and was released the following day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted that during the preliminary
investigation, he and PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Javier, answered that it was PO3 Santiago who
seized the shabu from Mac-Mac; but SPO1 Lectura explained that what the investigating prosecutor
actually asked during preliminary investigation was who saw where the shabu came from and that he
signed the minutes of the preliminary investigation without reading the same. SPO1 Lectura maintained
that it was he who recovered the shabu from Mac-Mac. Lastly, SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team
heavily relied on the information given by the confidential informant in identifying the suspects in the
illegal drug deal, who were eventually arrested.

PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that of PO3 Santiago and SPO1
Lectura. On February 17, 2000, he was assigned at the Intelligence Investigation Division of the RMG
based in Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Fuentes,
PO3 Padpad, and several other police officers at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City,
conducting surveillance operation regarding the tipped-off illegal drug deal. He was with SPO1 Lectura
and PO3 Padpad in the car parked in front of Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and
their confidential informant were in another car also parked along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3
Santiago, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Corbe were in the car stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant.
PO3 Yumul could not recall where the other members of the team were located.

At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in separate cars, stopping in
front of Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-Mac alighted from their cars and talked to each other. At that
time, PO3 Yumul was about five meters away from the two suspects. Moments later, Botong called
someone on his cellular phone, and then went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind.
PO3 Yumul followed Botong inside the restaurant and saw the latter talking to Cocoy. PO3 Yumul though
did not hear the conversation between Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and Cocoy went out of the
restaurant and approached a parked car. From his position about three meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the
passenger at the back seat of the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the window and handing over a white plastic
bag with carton inside to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the plastic bag to Botong. Cocoy then returned inside
the restaurant and [Botong] went back to [Mac-Mac]. PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside the restaurant. A
few minutes later, PO3 Santiago also went inside the restaurant informing PO3 Yumul that they would be
arresting Cocoy, and that Botong and Mac-Mac were already arrested outside the restaurant. PO3
Santiago, assisted by PO3 Yumul, approached Cocoy and arrested him. The police team proceeded to the
police office with all the arrested suspects for further investigation. PO3 Yumul, however, failed to join
the other arresting officers in signing the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the RMG at
Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned to the instant case following the arrests of accused-
appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for inquest to the Office of the
City Prosecutor.

SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from SPO1 Lectura a plastic bag
containing a box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu inside. SPO1 Lectura told SPO1 David
that the articles were seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1 David marked his initials BSD on the
confiscated articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination of the
specimens. SPO1 David disclosed that he prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of the arresting officers.

The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Insp.
Cruto was the forensic chemist who conducted the physical, chemical, and confirmatory examinations of
the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the RMG-NCRPO on February 18, 2000.

P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents of each sachet,
revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each; two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet, 99.2
grams; two sachets, 98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9 grams; and one sachet,
93.5 grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative sample from each plastic sachet and proceeded with
his chemical and confirmatory examinations. The contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets all tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. P/Insp. Cruto recorded the
result of the examinations in his Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000. 14[14]

14[14] Records, Vol. II, pp. 659-660.

 The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence: the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest15[15] dated February 18, 2000 signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia,
PO3 Dela Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura; 16[16] the 10 heat-
sealed plastic sachets recovered from the possession of accused-appellants; 17[17] the PNP-RMG Request
for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets; 18[18] the PNP Crime
Laboratory Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which revealed that the
contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets positively tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride; 19[19]
and the Letter (Referral of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor) 20[20] dated February 18, 2000.
The RTC admitted all the aforementioned evidence for the prosecution in its Order 21[21] dated March 1,
2001.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon David,22[22] accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes,23[23] Emmanuel de Claro,24[24] Roberto de Claro,25[25] and Mary
Jane Lantion-Tom.26[26] Accused-appellant Reyes did not testify.

15[15] Id. at 656-658.

16[16] Id. at 663.

17[17] Exhibits D-2 to D-11.

18[18] Records, Vol. II, pp. 661-662.

19[19] Id. at 659-660.

20[20] Id. at 664-665.

21[21] Id. at 652.

22[22] TSN, April 25, 2001 and May 23, 2001.

23[23] TSN, July 31, 2001 and September 5, 2001.

24[24] TSN, December 12, 2001 and March 6, 2002.

25[25] TSN, March 13, 2002.

26[26] TSN, July 31, 2002.

 Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student of Rizal High School in
Pasig City. He recalled that on February 17, 2000, at about 1:00 p.m., he accompanied accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes, whom he referred to as Kuya Botong, to the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, to
collect some money.

While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were inside their car at the
parking area of said market, another car suddenly arrived, from which an armed male passenger alighted
and approached them. Four other armed men followed and poked their guns at accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men, in civilian attire, were carrying an SM plastic shopping
bag and questioned accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes if he knew the owner of said plastic bag.
Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic bag. Marlon David was
also asked and he answered that he knew nothing about the plastic bag.

Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police officers, pulled accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes from the driver seat of the latters car, transferred him and Marlon David to
the back seat of said car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed men sat in the front seats of the
car, while one of them sat at the back, beside accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David.
The armed men drove the car around (paikot-ikot). The armed men then separated accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes from Marlon David. They ordered Marlon David to alight from the car and transfer
to another vehicle. While in the other car, the armed men boxed and mauled Marlon David to force him to
admit to be the source of the plastic bag. Each question was accompanied with one punch. Marlon David
remained blindfolded until they arrived at the police camp in Bicutan, Taguig, where he again saw
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon David was released the following morning, leaving
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes behind at the police camp. Marlon David went home and told
Virginia delos Reyes, the wife of accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, about the incident.
 Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any person with the name Mac-
Mac. Marlon David additionally relayed that he was told by accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes that
the latter was likewise mauled by the armed men.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar account of the incident that
took place at 1:00 p.m. on February 17, 2000, while he and Marlon David were at the Buenas Market in
Cainta, Rizal. Their car was surrounded by four armed men. The armed men poked their guns at him and
Marlon David, shouting at them to open the car doors. He lowered the car window and the armed men
opened the car door. The armed men forced him and Marlon David to get down from the front seats of the
car and to transfer to the back seat, blindfolded them, and asked them who were the owners of the SM
plastic bag. After they left Buenas Market, he noticed that they were just driving around. The car stopped
only when Marlon David was taken out and transferred to another car. It was already late in the evening
when the car finally stopped. He then realized, after his blindfold had been removed, that he was at Camp
Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the police that he was selling or
delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted that he was not arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant in
Mandaluyong City, rather, he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal. Accused-appellant
Reyes or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed him money. He and accused-appellant Reyes agreed to meet
at Buenas Market for the settlement of the latters loan, but the meeting did not take place because the
armed men arrived. He further claimed that he only met Emmanuel de Claro at Camp Bagong Diwa in
Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de Claro before that time, and he found out the latters name
only when they were already detained at the Mandaluyong City Jail.

Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at around 10:00 a.m., he was
at the Department of Trade and Industry in Buendia, Makati City, with his common-law wife Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom to follow up their application for business permit. At around 1:00 p.m., they had lunch at
Glorietta. Emmanuel de Claro was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-Tom passed by the house of
his brother Roberto de Claro to request the latter to drive for them. James, Roberto de Claros friend, also
went with them.
 The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because his own car was in the auto
shop. Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, Roberto de Claro, and James first went to Las Pias City to check
on Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop. From there, they proceeded to Libertad in Pasay City and ate
dinner at the Duty Free Philippines. Afterwards, the group made their way to Mandaluyong City where
Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with Daisy Milan (Milan), her accountant. Emmanuel de
Claro and Lantion-Tom met Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant located at Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City. Milan and Lantion-Tom discussed matters pertaining to the business permit.
Emmanuel de Claro stepped outside the restaurant for a moment to smoke a cigarette, then, returned
inside to wait for the meeting between Lantion-Tom and Milan to finish. After their meeting, Lantion-
Tom walked Milan outside the restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro waited for Lantion-Tom inside.

Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and introduced themselves as
police officers. They warned Emmanuel de Claro not to make a scene and just go with them peacefully.
Emmanuel de Claro obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant and was forced to get into a waiting
car. For about three hours inside the car, he was punched, handcuffed, blindfolded, and told to bow down
his head. He was likewise being forced to admit something about the shabu, but he denied knowing
anything about it. He heard from the radio inside the car that the police officers were waiting for another
car. After three hours of traveling, the car finally stopped and when his blindfold was removed, he learned
that they were already at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for almost an hour, until he was
called into another room where he met his co-accused for the first time. He later saw Lantion-Tom at the
office of one of the police officers. They were interrogated by the police and being forced to admit that
the drugs being shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer but their plea was ignored. The
police told Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom that somebody should be held responsible for the shabu
so they were made to choose whether both of them or only one of them would be charged. Emmanuel de
Claro was compelled to choose the latter option.
 Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claros testimony. On February 17, 2000, Roberto
de Claro was at home playing video games when his brother Emmanuel de Claro and the latters wife,
Lantion-Tom, arrived and requested him to drive their car because Emmanuel was not feeling well.
James, Roberto de Claros friend, rode with them. They first went to Las Pias City to check on Emmanuel
de Claros car at the auto shop, then they proceeded to Libertad, Pasay City, where they had dinner at Duty
Free Philippines. They next drove to Whistle Stop Restaurant at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to
meet Ms. Milan. Only Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom went inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro
and James stayed in the car.

Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and Ms. Milan walking towards them. As the
two women were approaching, armed men suddenly appeared, surrounded their car, and pointed guns at
them. Roberto de Claro got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery (hold-up) was taking place. The armed
men knocked at the car window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro opened the window, then the door of the
car. Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom were made to sit at the back seat of the car. Two of the
armed men sat on the front seats of the car, while one sat at the back with Roberto de Claro, James, and
Lantion-Tom. The armed men introduced themselves as police officers.

Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo) Roberto de Claro, James, and
Lantion-Tom, all the while ordering them to keep their heads bowed down. The police officers drove the
car for two hours, stopping at a gas station for about five minutes. At this moment, Roberto de Claro was
able to raise his head but was immediately told to bow down his head again. Roberto de Claro also heard
from the police officers radio that they were still waiting for somebody. They travelled again for quite a
long time and stopped in a dark place. The police officers took Roberto de Claros wallet containing
P7,000.00 cash. Early in the following morning, they arrived at the police station where Roberto de Claro
saw his brother Emmanuel de Claro once more. They stayed in one room until Roberto de Claro and
James were released by the police the next day.

When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the defense agreed to consider her
Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000 and Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000 as her direct
examination.
 On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among those arrested on February
17, 2000 at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in an
illegal drug deal. At the time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de Claro, and
James. She was also brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was interrogated without a
lawyer. She was shown a box containing shabu which she had never seen before. Lantion-Tom insisted
that she was in Mandaluyong City to meet her accountant, Milan, regarding her application for a business
permit. Lantion-Tom pointed out that the charge against her was eventually dismissed.

The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de Claros Counter Affidavit
dated March 23, 2000,27[27] Lantion-Toms Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000, 28[28] Emmanuel de
Claro and Lantion-Toms Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000, 29[29] Roberto de Claros Witness
Affidavit dated March 29, 2000, 30[30] Marlon Davids Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,31[31]
Virginia delos Reyes Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,32[32] Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated March 14, 2000,33[33] accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes Sinumpaang Kontra Salaysay dated
March 14, 2000,34[34] and a Barangay Blotter dated February 19, 2000 by Virginia delos Reyes. 35[35] The
RTC admitted all these documentary evidence for the defense in its Order 36[36] dated September 13,
2002.

27[27] Records, Vol. II, pp. 888-911.

28[28] Id. at 917-920.

29[29] Id. at 912-913.

30[30] Id. at 914-916.

31[31] Id. at 922-923.

32[32] Id. at 924-925.

33[33] Id. at 926.

34[34] Id. at 927-929.

35[35] Id. at 930.

36[36] Id. at 934.

 In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel de
Claro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and decreed:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for unlawfully possessing/selling, delivering,
transporting and distributing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu,
a regulated drug, without lawful authority in violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III
in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 each and the costs of suit.

Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and seized from
the accused during the aforesaid operation are forfeited and confiscated in favor of the
government shall be turned over to the PDEA pursuant to law for proper disposal without
delay.37[37]

Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal 38[38] on October 23, 2003. Accused-appellants
Roberto delos Reyes and Reyes each filed his notice of appeal 39[39] on October 29, 2003 and December
30, 2003, respectively.

Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his notice of appeal, 40[40]
instead, filing before the RTC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings
Pursuant [to] Section 24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court 41[41] on October 30, 2003, and a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration42[42] on November 3, 2003. Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to review its
judgment of conviction based on the following grounds:

37[37] CA rollo, p. 53.

38[38] Records, Vol. III, p. 1083.

39[39] Id. at 1095 and 1194.

40[40] Id. at 1104-1105.

41[41] Id. at 1097-1103.

42[42] Id. at 1115-1137.

 I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
ACCUSED DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP IS A MERE ALIBI AND HAS THUS
ERRED IN ADOPTING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ALL
THE THREE (3) ACCUSED WERE PICKED-UP AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA
SHANGRI-LA PLAZA HOTEL.

II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT

THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LAWFUL SINCE THE ACCUSED
WERE CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE (3) ACCUSED IN THE
ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SALE,
DELIVERY AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE PROHIBITED DRUG.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH

ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION ON THE BASIS MAINLY OF A
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF LACK OF IMPROPER MOTIVE ON THE
PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.

V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE

TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT ACCUSED EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS
NOT AFFORDED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION.43[43]

Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was engaging in an illegal
drug deal, levied against him by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul was
suspicious, if not incredible. Emmanuel de Claro pointed out that although these police officers testified
that Lantion-Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of shabu,
the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges against Lantion-Tom. Emmanuel de Claro also strongly
argued that the prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported alibi that he, his wife, and his brother
went to Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet his wifes accountant, so they could attend to
several documents pertaining to a business permit. Emmanuel de Claro further insisted that the RTC
should have highly regarded accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes testimony which directly
contradicted the police officers statements.

43[43] Id. at 1121-1122.

 In its Order44[44] dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted Emmanuel de Claros motion to
withdraw his notice of appeal and required the prosecution to comment to his motions for reconsideration.

The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition 45[45] on December 19, 2003, objecting to
Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration and maintaining that its police-witnesses categorical,
consistent, and straight-forward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de Claro.

In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC, in its Order 46[46]
dated January 12, 2004, acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly admitted
that it erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense. Thus, the RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is hereby

GRANTED and a new one entered, ACQUITTING him of the crime charged.
Consequently, his immediate release from detention is hereby ordered unless he is
detained for other cause or causes.47[47]

Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants, the RTC forwarded
the complete records of the case to us on March 29, 2004, and we gave due course to the said appeals in
our Resolution48[48] dated June 21, 2004.

44[44] Id. at 1162.

45[45] Id. at 1181-1183.

46[46] Id. at 1198-1208.

47[47] Id. at 1208.

48[48] CA rollo, pp. 69-70.

 Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellants Brief 49[49] on September 15, 2004,
while accused-appellant Reyes filed his Appellants Brief 50[50] on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,51[51] we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.52[52] Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed before the appellate court its Consolidated Brief 53[53] on January 21, 2005.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the conviction of accused-
appellants, and merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua. According to the appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than accused-
appellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption that the police
officers regularly performed their official duties.

The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our Resolution 54[54] dated January 31, 2007,
we required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellants
Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes filed their manifestations 55[55] on March 14, 2007, April 10, 2007, and
April 13, 2007, respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already filed before the Court of
Appeals.

49[49] Id. at 82-100.

50[50] Id. at 127-140.

51[51] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

52[52] CA rollo, pp. 160-A and B.

53[53] Id. at 179-211.

54[54] Rollo, p. 11.

55[55] Id. at 16-23.

 In his Appellants Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes assigned the following errors of
the RTC:

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE

CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY AS TO THE PLACE OF THE ARREST IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE] TESTIMONIES OF

PO3 VIRGILIO SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.

III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE

PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY
CATEGORIZE[D] AS WEAK WHEN THE COURT A QUO GRANTED BAIL
TO THE ACCUSED.56[56]

Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellants Brief:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS

ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES AS
UNLAWFUL.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS

VALID, ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE
CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425.57[57]

Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against them by
the police is a complete fabrication and frame-up. Accused-appellants called attention to the material
inconsistencies in the prosecutions evidence. PO3 Santiago testified during direct examination that
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes handed the plastic bag with box inside to accused-appellant
Reyes, but he admitted during cross-examination that he did not see such transfer. The prosecution was
unable to present any evidence to prove the source of the plastic bag containing the box with sachets of

56[56] CA rollo, p. 83.

57[57] Id. at 129.

shabu, and the money paid as consideration for the illegal drugs. The prosecution likewise failed to rebut
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes straightforward, coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated by
Marlon David, that he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la
Plaza in Mandaluyong City.

Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions version of the arrests of the
suspects and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were effected in violation of accused-appellants
fundamental rights. The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional
circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested
without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not because of any apparent
criminal activity. A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure
incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants, maintaining

that:

I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE

PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAVE ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF
APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS

VALID SINCE IT FALLS SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF
THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN

SUFFICE TO CONVICT APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

V. MERE DENIAL AND HULIDAP, WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT

EXCULPATE APPELLANTS FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF

OFFICIAL DUTY UNDER SECTION 3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT HAD NOT BEEN OVERCOME BY DEFENSE
EVIDENCE.
 VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY
OF WITNESSES COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION. 58
[58]

Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers statements, as pointed out by
accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect the weight of their testimonies; while accused-appellants
defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus, should be looked upon with
disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for the illegal drug deal, since
consideration is not an element of the crime charged.

Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a crime
or in flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of distributing, without
legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of
February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers enjoy
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the
facts surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Lantion-
Tom from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the Office of the

58[58] Id. at 184-185.

City Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding probable cause
against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. 59[59]

Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its Decision 60[60] dated
September 23, 2003, the RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting
on Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order 61[61] dated January 12,
2004, totally reversed itself and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight to
the evidence presented by the defense.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de
Claro by the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime
charged. Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its
assailed decision that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts assessment is
entitled to great weight.62[62]

Guided by the settled rule that where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to meet
the test of moral certainty, 63[63] we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its subsequent
Order64[64] dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in keeping with
the evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were presented against

59[59] Records, Vol. I, p. 107.

60[60] CA rollo, pp. 43-53.

61[61] Id. at 69-70.

62[62] Rollo, p. 8.

63[63] People v. Mariano, 412 Phil. 252, 258 (2001).

64[64] Records, Vol. III, pp. 1198-1208.

Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to convict the former, then it is
also insufficient to convict the latter.

Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
are unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly
observed that:

Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the insistence
by the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or reassessment of the
evidence by the prosecution be considered, this court has decided to revisit the evidence
put forward by the prosecution through the crucible of a severe testing by taking a more
than casual consideration of every circumstance of the case.

It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that
of the defense are diametrically opposed to each other. While this court had already made
its conclusion that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura
and PO3 Yumul are given full faith and credit and reject the frame-up and alibi story of
the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro], nonetheless, upon reassessment of the same it
appears that the court erred.

In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses,

all of them police officers, with regard to the material facts of how the crime was
allegedly committed engenders doubt as to their credibility. Firstly, the court noted that
these police officers gave identical testimonies of the events that happened from the
moment they arrived at 2 oclock in the afternoon until the arrest of the accused at
10:30 oclock in the evening at the EDSA Shangri-La premises. This uniform account
given by these witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material
circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought-out and
prefabricated story. Because of the close camaraderie of these witnesses who belong
to the same police force it is not difficult for them to make the same story.
Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which shows only too clearly that they
testified uniformly only as to material facts but have not given the particulars and
the details having relation with the principal facts. While they testified that they
were at Shangri-La from 2 in the afternoon to 10 in the evening, they were not able
to tell the court how their group positioned strategically at the premises without
being noticed by their target. They could not also gave (sic) an explanation how their
confidential informant was able to obtain information regarding the drug deal that
was supposed to take place on that date involving several personalities. Except for
their bare allegation that they have that information regarding the drug deal they
were not able to present any proof of such report, say, entry in their logbook of such
confidential report and a spot report. Even their operation is not recorded as no
documentary evidence was presented. Worth remembering in this regard is People v.
Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, where it is said that: . . . [i]t often happens with fabricated stories
that minute particulars have not been thought of. It has also been said that an honest
 witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot
be safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case incomplete,
but throws doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness may be
honest, but his testimony is not reliable.65[65] (Emphasis supplied.)

There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements following
accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC. The police officers attested in their Joint
Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that upon sensing suspicious transactions being undertaken
thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and introduced themselves as
Police Officers and after that, subject persons deliberately admitted that they have in their possession
illegal drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned arresting officers thus they were
placed under arrest.66[66] Yet, during trial before the RTC, the police officers uniformly testified that they
brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom to the police office after arresting the
four suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention at all of the suspects purported admission.

We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement
even when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu.
This seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.

In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their

defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes
testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate themselves for
possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids testimony and Navarros
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, and Roberto de
Claro consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan, Lantion-Toms accountant,
regarding documents for a business permit (photocopies of the said documents were presented during
trial); and that they were illegally arrested without warrant and forced to admit criminal liability for

65[65] Id. at 1200-1201.

66[66] Records, Vol. II, p. 657.

possession of shabu. These pieces of evidence are overwhelmingly adequate to overthrow the
presumption of regularity in the performance by the arresting police officers of their official duties and
raise reasonable doubt in accused-appellants favor.

Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on the
night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their arrests,
resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3, paragraph
2 of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus:

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)
 The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in
violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations. 67[67]

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the
law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.
As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners). 68[68]

In People v. Molina,69[69] we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto arrests preceding
the search and seizure that were held illegal, to wit:

In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto
arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in
People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of

67[67]People v. Molina, 404 Phil. 797, 808 (2001).

68[68] Id. at 808-809.

69[69] Id.
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable

information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v.
Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was
no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension."

Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting
from side to side . . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street at 11:30 in
the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative
of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers']
presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause is
gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.

Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner
was attempting to commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda
and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that
come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the
Court said:

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.

It went on to state that

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct

which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that
his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us
incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner
and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating
any commotion or trouble . . .
 Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was
visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to
the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to
Yu.

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must

concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.70
[70] (Emphases supplied.)

Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify the
in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the arrests.

A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal
that they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug
deal was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Without any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to another a
white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude that the box
contained shabu and sensed that an illegal drug deal took place.

SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows:

Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?

A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir.

Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?

A: Yes, sir.

70[70] Id. at 809-812.

Q: What did you do after briefing?
A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of the subject, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the vicinity of
Shangri-La Plaza, what happened next, if any?
A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified by the
informant that they were the personalities involved.

xxxx

Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next?

A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir.

xxxx

Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?

A: No, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong?

A: Through our informant, sir.

Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next?

A: According to my other companion he talked to another person then after that they
went out, sir.

xxxx

Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant?

A: One (1) minute, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you say they who is the companion?

A: Cocoy, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next after they went out to the car?

A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car and handed to
Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car?
A: White plastic bag, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir.
 Q: With the bag?
A: No, it was left with Botong, sir.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted him.

xxxx

Q: What did you do?

A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir.

xxxx

Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos Reyes?

A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.

Q: How about De Claro?

A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?

A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir.71[71] (Emphases
supplied.)

PO3 Santiagos testimony also did not offer much justification for the warrantless arrest of
accused-appellants and search of their persons:

Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to the place
where blue Mazda car was parked, what happened next?
A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a white plastic
bag with a box inside to Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy], sir. Then, Emmanuel
de Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando Delos Reyes [Botong], sir.

Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy] from inside
that Mazda car?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?

A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.

71[71] TSN, August 23, 2000, pp. 31-38.

xxxx

Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what happened
after that?
A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De Claro [Cocoy]
returned back inside the said restaurant, sir.

Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?

A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.

Q: After that what happened next?

A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with box
inside to Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been consummated, we
apprehended them, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that particular
place and time?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.

Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?

A: No, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a drug deal?
A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there will be a
drug-deal, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what did you do?

A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.

Q: At your office, what else did you do?

A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for laboratory
examination was made and other pertaining papers regarding the arrest of the
accused.

Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that confiscated evidence
that you are saying?
A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white crystalline
substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.

Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?

A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were confiscated from
Mac-Mac?
 A: They were placed inside the box, sir.72[72] (Emphases supplied.)

PO3 Yumuls narration of events was not any different from those of SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago:

Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?

A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.

Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the confidential
informant?
A: The identities of the persons, sir.

Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet the
confidential informant at the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?
A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived together with
their car, sir.

xxxx

Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you the
information?
A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically positioned
ourselves in the place where the drug-deal will occur, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of EDSA Shangri-
La Plaza and Whistle Stop restaurant, what happened next after that?
A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .

Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?

A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.

Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived?

A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir.

xxxx

72[72] TSN, July 12, 2000, pp. 15-20.

Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any?
A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then, what happened next, if any?

A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.

Q: When you say nag-usap sila to whom are you referring?

A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other?
A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir.

Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?

A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also what was the
subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.

Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation with each other?
A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop?

A: He talked to somebody inside, sir.

xxxx

Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.

Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside the Whistle
Stop?
A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them went to the side
of Whistle Stop in front of the blue car, sir.

xxxx
Q: What did you do then?
A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir.

Q: And then what happened next, if any?

A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir.

xxxx

Q: And who received that item or article from the car?

A: Cocoy, sir.

xxxx

Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed to Cocoy the
white plastic bag?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was that person?

A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir.

xxxx

Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed to Cocoy, what
did you do?
A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then they walked in
different direction, Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Stop and then Botong
went back to Mac-Mac, sir.

xxxx

Q: And then what happened next after that?

A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do then?

A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago went
inside and told me that we will going to get them, sir.

Q: Why are you going to get them?

A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop, Mac-Mac
and Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?

A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3 Santiago
to avoid commotion, sir.

Q: Then what did you do next after that?

A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.
 Q: And then what did you do, if any?
A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the office, sir.73
[73] (Emphases supplied.)

Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and
searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro
momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside
being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and
finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative
of a felonious enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the
suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the
suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that
the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to
confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized
from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or
circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that
accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.

Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity
of the shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants.

In People v. Sy Chua,74[74] we questioned whether the shabu seized from the accused was the
same one presented at the trial because of the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the place where it
was taken, to wit:

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from

accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The

73[73] TSN, December 13, 2000, pp. 6-21.

74[74] 444 Phil. 757 (2003).

 record shows that the initial field test where the items seized were identified as shabu,
was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of Angeles City. The items were therefore
not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v. Casimiro, we struck down
with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since they were
not marked at the place where they were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item
as marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but
only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether
the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by
them to the crime laboratory.75[75] (Emphases supplied.)

In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the
RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white plastic
bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding to the
police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination 76[76] that he saw the shabu for
the first time at the police office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted that the shabu was marked
by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of
accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from accused-
appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is excluded in evidence as
fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-
appellants is inevitable.

75[75] Id. at 776-777.

76 [76]Q:This afternoon you are going to tell this court that the first time that
you saw Exhibits D-1 to D-10, the alleged shabu, was inside your office,
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Youre under oath that the first time you [saw] this was in your office,
correct?
A: Yes, sir. (TSN, December 13, 2000, p. 33.)
 As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua77[77]:

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply
validate, much more cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of
accused-appellant. Neither can the presumption of regularity of performance of function
be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In People v. Nubla, we clearly stated
that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty

cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant's conviction
because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a mere presumption.
Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded
as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen.
But it should not undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the
Constitution. The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers
are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the constitution and the rights it guarantees should be
paramount in their minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply
because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets
him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. 78[78]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and
Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED
forthwith released from custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.

SO ORDERED.

77[77] Supra at note 74.

78[78] Id. at 776-777.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Chairperson
 LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
 RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

MIGUEL E. COLORADO, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1658

Complainant, [Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1014-MTJ]

Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

 Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO, and

JUDGE RICARDO M. AGAPITO, NACHURA, JJ.

Municipal Circuit Trial Court,

Laur, Nueva Ecija, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 3, 2007

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Before us is a sworn letter-complaint79[1] dated January 31, 2001 of Miguel E. Colorado

(complainant) charging Judge Ricardo M. Agapito (respondent), Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Laur, Nueva Ecija, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority
relative to Criminal Case Nos. 3461-G and 3462-G, entitled People v. Miguel Colorado, with
Grave Slander and Grave Threats.

79[1]Rollo, pp. 1-3.

 Complainant alleges: He is the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases. The cases
were directly filed with the court without first passing the Office of the Barangay Chairman,
although he and private complainants are permanent residents of Barangay Bagong Sikat,
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. Respondent ignored the glaring deficiency in private complainants filing
of the cases without attaching the requisite certifications to file action from the barangay. On the
date the two cases were filed, respondent immediately issued two warrants for his arrest. He was
arrested on a Friday and languished in the municipal jail for two days and two nights. He posted
bail and filed a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the case, but the same was not acted
upon. He received an envelope from the court with nothing inside and found out later that the
same was supposed to be a notice of hearing; thus, he was ordered arrested in view of his non-
appearance in court.

On February 22, 2001, respondent compulsorily retired from the judiciary.

In a 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2001, respondent was directed to file his comment on
the complaint. A 1st Tracer dated October 17, 2001 was sent to respondent giving him a non-
extendible period of five days to file his comment. However, the said tracer was returned
unserved due to respondents retirement from the judiciary. Another Tracer dated July 30, 2002
was sent to respondent in his residential address giving him a chance to file his comment, but
none was filed.

Acting on the complaint, the Court, in its Resolution of March 24, 2003, required
respondent to manifest whether he was willing to submit the administrative matter against him
for resolution without his comment. Respondent failed to comply with the Court Resolution.
Thus, in the Resolution of January 26, 2005, the Court ordered respondent to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to manifest and to comply
with the Resolution of March 24, 2003. Still, respondent failed to comply with the Resolution of
January 26, 2005. In the Resolution of August 24, 2005, the Court imposed upon respondent a
fine of P1,000.00 and deemed respondent to have waived the filing of a comment on the
complaint.

In the Agenda Report80[2] dated October 12, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found respondent guilty as charged and recommended that he be fined in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

80[2]Id. at 46-48.
 On November 8, 2005, respondent paid the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on him in the
Resolution of August 24, 2005 and submitted his Comment on the complaint.

In his Comment81[3] dated October 31, 2005, respondent denied the allegations
contained in the complaint reasoning that he acted in good faith and within the scope of his
duties. He further contends: Based on Administrative Circular No. 140-93, the crimes committed
by the accused are not within the Katarungan Pambarangay Law because the imposable penalty
exceeds one year. Both cases are within the original jurisdiction of the court and, finding a
probable cause against the accused, the court issued the warrant of arrest. There is no law or
circular issued by this Court that a court cannot issue a warrant of arrest on Friday. If the accused
was not able to post bail on time, it is not his fault or of the court. The motion for inhibition filed
by complainant must be set for hearing. But in spite of several settings to hear the motion,
complainant failed to appear. In the hearing of both cases, complainant failed to appear in court;
thus, the assistant provincial prosecutor moved for the arrest of the complainant. At the hearing
of November 17, 2000 and January 5, 2001, complainant failed to appear in court, and orders of
arrest were issued against him, but said orders were reconsidered by the court. In spite of all the
orders of the court for the arrest of complainant, none of the orders were implemented. Neither
was the accused arrested and detained in jail. And if the complainant received an envelope from
the MCTC of Laur without content, complainant should have immediately informed the court of
the said circumstance so that proper action may be done on the employee in charge of the
mailing of notices.

In the Resolution of March 29, 2006, the Court referred back the instant administrative
matter to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a letter82[4] dated November 21, 2005, respondent requested the Court that his
retirement benefits be released subject to the withholding of P20,000.00 pending resolution of
the present complaint.

81[3]Id. at 50-53.

82[4]Id. at 62.
 In the Resolution83[5] of June 28, 2006, the Court granted the partial release of
respondent's compulsory retirement benefits and withheld therefrom the amount of P20,000.00 to
answer for whatever liability respondent may incur in the present administrative case.

In the Agenda Report dated August 30, 2006, the OCA submitted its evaluation and
recommendation, to wit:

The charges against respondent judge are summarized as follows:

1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case
in view of the absence of the requisite certificate to file action issued by
the Barangay as a mandatory requirement of the Katarungan
Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.

2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a

Friday to ensure complainants incarceration for two days.

3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases
and for failure to act on the motion for inhibition.

4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants

appearance in court by sending an envelope, with a supposed notice of
hearing but with nothing inside.

xxxx

Respondent judge argued that under Administrative Circular No. 14-93

dated August 3, 1993 issued by this Court as Guidelines for the Implementation of
the Barangay Conciliation Procedure, based on the Local Government Code of
1991, R.A. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1992, one of the exceptions to
the coverage of the circular is Offense[s] for which the law prescribes a maximum
penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00). Considering that the offenses for which accused was charged have

83[5]id. at 67.
corresponding penalties of more than one year there is no need for a certification
to file action from the Barangay.

There was likewise no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of warrant

of arrest. The subject criminal cases were within the original jurisdiction of the
MTC and after finding probable cause against the accused, respondent issued the
questioned warrant of arrest. Respondent pointed out that there is no law or
circular issued by the Honorable Court prohibiting the issuance of a warrant of
arrest on Friday.

With regard to the charge of grave abuse of discretion relative to the

motion for inhibition, respondent submitted that there should be a hearing on the
motion before it could be acted upon. But in spite of the several settings of said
motion the complainant as accused failed to appear.

Respondent contended that if it were true that complainant received an

envelope from the MCTC of Laur, Nueva Ecija, without any contents, he should
have immediately informed the court about it so that the proper action could have
been done.

Lastly, respondent invited the Courts attention to the fact that complainant
was also accused of Grave Slander by Darlito Urbano and Violeta Urbano which
case were docketed as Criminal Case No. 3648-G and 3649-G, MCTC Laur-
Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. It is argued that this shows the character of Miguel
Colorado.

After careful evaluation of the record of the case, the undersigned finds
merit in the neglect of respondent judge to resolve the pending issue of the motion
for inhibition which was not acted upon up to the time of his compulsory
retirement from the service.

It should be noted that respondent never gave any valid justification for
the delay in the filing of his comment. It seems that he believed that the mere
payment of the fine obliterated the charge of contumacious refusal to obey the
order of this Court. Respondent's conduct cannot be left unnoticed by the Court.
Judges are the visible representations of law and justice, from whom the people
draw the will and inclination to obey the law (Moroo v. Lomeda, 316 Phil. 103,
July 14, 1995) How can the respondent judge expect others to respect the law
when he himself cannot obey orders as simple as the show-cause resolution?
{Longboan v. Hon. Polig (A.M. No. R-704-RTJ, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 557)
cited in the case of Bonifacio Guintu v. Judge Aunario L. Lucero, A.M. No. MTJ-
93-794, August 23, 1996}.

In a catena of cases this Court has unhesitatingly imposed the penalty of

dismissal on those who have persistently failed to comply with orders requiring
 them either to file comment or to show cause and comply. Respondent's belated
filing of his comment cannot cure or obliterate[d] his shortcomings with this
Court. The fact remains that he ignored the lawful directive of the Court and in
fact offered no valid justification or excuse for it. This Court could have imposed
the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of all of respondent's retirement benefit had
it not been for this Courts compassion in allowing him to retire with the mere
retention of P20,000.00. Respondents comment should not have been received in
the first place as the same was already considered waived pursuant to the
Resolution of the Honorable Court dated 24 August 2005.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully

recommends to the Honorable Court that:

1. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, former judge of MCTC, Laur, Nueva Ecija

be found guilty of gross neglect for failure to act on the motion for
inhibition filed by accused-complainant and for his failure to promptly
comply with the lawful order of Court and not offering a valid excuse
therefor and should be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000); and

2. The withheld amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) shall be

considered the payment of the fine.84[6]

We agree in toto with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No.

03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Members of the
Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which took
effect on November 3, 2003.

Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or

criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we
issued said Resolution, which provides:

84[6]Id. at 71-73.
 2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement
of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later
than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is
not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the
release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be
withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring judge or justice to

be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint
must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the
judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before
such filing; and (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent.

In the present case, the first two requisites are present. The sworn letter-
complaint was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on January 31,
2001. The respondent retired compulsorily from the service barely three weeks
after or on February 22, 2001; and the ground for disciplinary action alleged to
have been committed by the respondent occurred five months before the
respondents separation from the service.
 As to the third requirement, although the first and second charges against
respondent are outrightly without merit as aptly found by the OCA, the complaint
that respondent failed to act on his motion for inhibition and intentionally
prevented complainant from appearing in a scheduled hearing was not prima
facie shown to be without merit; nor was the filing thereof shown to be intended
merely to harass the respondent.85[7] Thus, the OCA correctly proceeded with the
administrative case against respondent.

Moreover, the fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated
from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its
disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallo v. Cordero,86
[8] citing Zarate v. Judge Romanillos:87[9]

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during
the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty,
he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.

85 [7] See Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 27, 2004; 423 SCRA 219, 345.

86[8]315 Phil. 210, 220 (1995).

87[9] 312 Phil. 679 (1995).

 We now go to the four charges against respondent.

1. Gross Ignorance of the law for his failure to remand or dismiss the case in view of the
absence of the requisite certificate to file action issued by the barangay as a mandatory
requirement of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law and the Local Government Code.

As we earlier stated, the Court finds that the OCA is correct in not finding
respondent administratively liable therefor. Complainant is charged with grave
slander, the maximum penalty for which is 2 years and 4 months under Article 358
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, respondent is not guilty of gross ignorance of the
law in taking jurisdiction over said criminal case, considering that prior recourse to
barangay conciliation is not required where the law provides a maximum penalty
of imprisonment exceeding one year.
 2. Grave abuse of authority for the issuance of a warrant of arrest on a Friday to ensure
complainants incarceration for two days.

Complainant faults respondent for having been arrested on a Friday,

causing him to languish in jail for two days and two nights. Respondent cannot be
held administratively liable for this particular matter.

Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
an arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night.

It is of no moment that the warrant of arrest was issued by respondent on a Friday,

because it is clear from the foregoing that an arrest may be made on any day regardless of what
day the warrant of arrest was issued. Nowhere in the Rules or in our jurisprudence can we find
that a warrant of arrest issued on a Friday is prohibited.

Granting that complainant was arrested on a Friday, he was not without recourse, as he
could have posted bail for his temporary liberty in view of Supreme Court Circular No. 95-
9688[10] dated December 5, 1996, providing for a skeletal force on a Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m. primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters. And on Saturday

88 [10] 6. Duty during weekends and holidays. - All Executive Judges, whether in single
sala courts or multiple sala stations shall assign, by rotation, Metropolitan Trial Judges,
Municipal Trial Judges and Municipal Circuit Judges within their respective territorial
areas to be on duty on Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. assisted by a skeletal force,
also on rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.

On Saturday afternoons, Sundays and non-working holidays, any Judge may act
on bailable offenses conformably with the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court.

All Executive Judges, whether in single sala or multiple sala shall remain on duty
on Saturday mornings.
afternoons, Sundays and non-working holidays, any judge may act on bailable offenses. Thus,
we agree with the OCA that respondent did not commit grave abuse of authority for issuing the
warrant of arrest on a Friday, the same not being prohibited by law.

3. Grave abuse of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of the cases and for
failure to act on the motion for inhibition.

While there is no evidence in support of the claim that respondent committed grave abuse
of authority and bias in continuing the hearing of cases, we find respondent liable for failure to
act upon complainants motion for inhibition.

As borne by the records, complainant filed his motion for respondent's inhibition
sometime in September 2000 but up to the time of respondents compulsory retirement from the
judiciary on February 22, 2001, the same remained unacted upon. Verily, the undue delay of
respondent by five months in resolving the pending incident before his court erodes the peoples
faith in the judiciary and the same is tantamount to gross inefficiency. Respondents explanation
that despite the fact that the motion was set for hearing several times, complainant repeatedly
failed to appear thereat, is untenable. Respondent must know that he may act motu proprio on
the motion for inhibition without requiring the attendance of complainant. A judge, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, may disqualify himself from sitting on a case for just or valid
reasons.89[11]

Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,90
[12] mandates judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. Similarly, Supreme Court Circular No. 13
dated July 1, 1987 directs judges to observe unscrupulously the periods prescribed by the
Constitution in the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted to their court.

89[11]RULES OF COURT, Rule 137, Sec. 1(b).

90[12]A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, June 1, 2004.

 In Visbal v. Buban,91[13] the Court held that failure to decide cases and other matters
within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate.92[14] Delay in resolving motions and
incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the
Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.93[15] Further, such
delay constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. As a trial judge, respondent is a frontline official of the judiciary and should at
all times act with efficiency and with probity.94[16] Undue delay in the disposition of cases and
motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and unnecessarily
blemishes its stature.95[17]

4. An intention on the part of respondent to prevent complainants appearance in court by

sending an envelope, with a supposed notice of hearing but with nothing inside.

Suffice it to be stated that in the absence of evidence to show that the sending of an
empty envelope to complainant was malicious on the part of respondent, he cannot be held liable
therefor.

Section 9 (1) and 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, classifies gross neglect or undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious
charge which carries any of the following sanctions: suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. We adopt the recommendation of the OCA that
respondent should be imposed a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.96[18]

91[13]443 Phil. 705 (2003).

92[14]Id. at 708.

93[15]Id. at 708.

94[16]Id. at 709.

95[17] Gonzales v. Hidalgo, 449 Phil. 336, 340 (2003).

96 [18]Imbang v. Del Rosario, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1515, November 19, 2004; 443 SCRA 79,
85; Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 3,
5, 7, 60 and 61, Baguio City, 467 Phil. 18, 19 (2004).
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ricardo M. Agapito guilty of gross
neglect and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). The withheld
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.0) from respondents retirement benefits is
considered as payment of the fine.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice