COBBEN - The Nature of The Self - Recognition in The Form of Right and Morality (Quellen Und Studien Zur Philosophie) (2009)

Paul Cobben
The Nature of the Self

Quellen und Studien
zur Philosophie
Herausgegeben von
Jens Halfwassen, Dominik Perler,
Michael Quante
Band 91
Walter de Gruyter Berlin New York

The Nature of the Self
Recognition in the Form
of Right and Morality
by
Paul Cobben
Walter de Gruyter Berlin New York

Printed on acid-free paper which falls within
the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.
ISBN 978-3-11-021987-6
ISSN 0344-8142
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cobben, Paul.
The nature of the self : recognition in the form of right and morality /
by Paul Cobben.
p. cm. (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, ISSN 0344-8142 ;
Bd. 91)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978-3-11-021987-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Self (Philosophy). 2. Mind and body. 3. Recognition (Philo-
sophy). 4. Ethics. I. Title.
BD450.C57 2009
126dc22
2009004216
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Contents
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and
Morality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 1 The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body . . . . 12

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The immediate unity of mind and body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside
world . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Self-consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible? 28
Self-consciousness and the legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Violence, power and the legal status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion . . . . . . . . . 37
The Lord/Bondsman relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation . . . . . . . . 44
The Unhappy Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
The mind/ body unity as an historical reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Chapter 2 The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self . . . . . . 60

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
The polis as the unity of the Human and Divine Law . . . . . . 61
The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in
the public domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
The polis as a harmonic unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Repression of the deed: the living work of art . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art . . . . 71
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The Roman Empire as the result of the Greek World . . . . . . . 79
Chapter 3 The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self 81

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
VI Contents
The Fall of the Roman Empire and the experience of the person 81
The genesis of the moral individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
The Embodiment of the pure Being in the real Individual: the
self-conscious reality of the Unhappy Consciousness . . . . . . . . 87
The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world . . 89
The realization of the moral individual in the objective world:
the process of culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
The absolute Freedom: the second self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Chapter 4 The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self Explicit 100
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: the
Rousseauian Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
The inner contradiction of the Napoleonic Law: the Kantian
Reflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
The sublation of the inner contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
The Hegelian reflection on the Napoleonic Law: Conscience as
the origin of the third self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
The development of Conscience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
a. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats
Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
b. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats
Self-consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Conscience that becomes aware of itself as Unhappy
Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
The meaning of the absolute Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Chapter 5 Honneths Criticism of Hegels Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . 118

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
The Phenomenology of Spirit and the question of The
Nature of the Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
The relation of mind and body as the primordial form of
recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
The development of freedom from the inside perspective . . . . 121
The transition from a monological into a dialogical approach . 122
The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical
relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Absolute Spirit and metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Contents VII
Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism . . . . . . . . . . 131
Honneths project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit
and the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Chapter 6 The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaboration

of the Phenomenologys project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . 137
The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self . . . . . 139
Morality as the formal notion of the second self . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Conscience as the formal unity of right and morality . . . . . . . 142
Conscience in the Philosophy of Right vis--vis conscience in
the Phenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
The formal unity of the three forms of the self following from
The actualization of the Human Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Chapter 7 The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self . 150
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
The species life of animals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the form
of freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
The social organism of the family vis--vis the conceptual
framework of the Philosophy of Right and the
Phenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
The education of the children in the family of the revised
Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
a. The socialization of the child in the contingent tradition of
the family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
b. The process in which the child develops awareness of the
contingence of the family tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person in
Confrontation with Jrgen Habermass Reception of the Stages
of Moral Consciousness developed by Lawrence Kohlberg . . . 166
Chapter 8 The Civil Society: Developing the Institutional House of

the Second Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
VIII Contents
The development of the second self s embodiment in the

Philosophy of Right: civil society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
The process of Culture in Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Culture in the socialized production System as part of the
System of Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moral
subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Criticism of the development of civil society in the light of the
Phenomenology of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
The revised concept of Culture in Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
The free market and the exclusion of individuals . . . . . . . . . . . 198
The market and the moral subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
The market and the good life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Retrospection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Chapter 9 The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self . . . . . . . 211

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
The development of the third self s embodiment in the
Philosophy of Right: the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Criticizing the state of the Philosophy of Right in the light of
The revision of the citizen and the Monarch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
The development of the third self as the presupposition of the
revised state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
The Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
The political cooperation between nation states . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Author index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Subject index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of
Right and Morality
Introduction
This book is about the nature of the human self; i. e., it is not focussed on
sources that contributed to a specific historical reception of the self 1, but
rather, aims at a systematic, conceptual development of the self. However,
it is not self-evident that the human self has a nature, nor that this nature
can be systematically developed. Moreover, the turn of phrase nature of
the self is ambiguous: It can concern a nature that is opposed to culture,
or a nature that expresses an essence that transcends variations in time,
i. e., a logical nature.
The first option, the nature of the human self that is opposed to cul-
ture, is the position that is represented by the gene-theory. The gene-
theory conceives of the human self as a living organism that is comparable
with other living organisms. In this context, the conception of the human
self coincides with the insight into the specific human genes. This ap-
proach, like all scientific theories, does not satisfy as a philosophical con-
ception of the nature of the self. The scientific framework of the gene-
theory, i. e., the framework that defines the meaning of a living organism,
is not, itself, subject of the gene-theory: The theory is not self-referential,
it cannot explain its own existence, but is, rather, presupposed to what is
accepted as existence. Since the scientific practice cannot be excluded
from the nature of the human self, the problem has to be solved of
how the living organism can be combined with the ability to conceptu-
alize itself as a living organism. In other words, the philosophical concep-
tion of the nature of the self has to solve the mind/body problem: How
can the human self be understood as the unity of mind and body without
reducing the mind to the body, or vice versa?
In Chapter 1, Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit 2 is introduced as a sys-
tematic philosophical attempt to develop the unity between mind and
1 Therefore, this book is not meant as a replacement of Charles Taylors Sources of

the Self, (Harvard University Press, 2005) but rather, as its completion.
2 Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford, 1977.
2 The Nature of the Self. Recognition in the form of Right and Morality
body (preserving, as well, the own nature of the mind as the body). To
conceptualize the immediate unity between mind and body, Hegel
makes use of the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman relation: The lord
represents the mind that also has a body; the bondsman represents the
body that also has a mind. In this way, the mind/body problem is refor-
mulated as the problem of how to contemplate the adequate unity of lord
and bondsman.
The transformation of mind/body into lordship/bondsman is not just
a matter of changing terms. The transformation incorporates the Aristo-
telian insight that the adequate unity between mind and body can only be
conceived of at the level of society. For Aristotle, the human self, the an-
imal rationale, essentially is a social self, a self that lives in the framework
of a state. This is reflected in the metaphor of the lordship/bondsman re-
lation that makes it clear that the body of the mind essentially is a social
organism. A mind that also has a body is a mind that is objectified in a
social organism. Conversely, the body that also has a mind is a body that
is part of a social organism. In this respect, lordship and bondsman are
Hegels translation of the Aristotelian logos and state.
Hegel, however, transcends the Aristotelian conceptual framework
when the relation between lord and bondsman is understood as a relation
of recognition.3 By this move he combines the social (communitarian)
freedom of Aristotle with the subjective (libertarian) freedom of Kant.4
If the lord is recognized by the bondsman, he not only represents the
unity of the social organism (the lord represents the law of the state
that is actualized by the actions of the bondsman), but also the subjective
freedom of the bondsman (the bondsman is free insofar as he is the lord
of his body: He recognizes this freedom in the lord of the social organ-
ism, i. e., he recognizes this lord as the objective reality of his own free-
dom).
The basic idea of recognition follows from the observation that it is
impossible to conceive of the unity of mind and body at the level of the
3 Paul Ricoeur remarks in the introduction of his book, The Course of Recognition:
My investigation arose from a sense of perplexity having to do with the semantic
status of the very term recognition on the plane of philosophical discourse. It is a
fact that no theory of recognition worthy of the name exists in the way that one
or more theories of knowledge exist. (Preface, p. ix) In fact, Hegels Phenomen-
ology of Spirit is a systematic theory of recognition.
4 Cf. Williams (1997): My thesis is that the concept of recognition is crucial to
Hegels project of mediating modern individualist subjective freedom (Kant)
and classical ethical substance (Plato, Aristotle). (p. 114/5).
Introduction 3
individual. If the mind is understood as the autonomy of the individual,

this autonomy gets lost when the individual is also a corporeal individual.
The individual remains dependent on his body; the death of the body
implies the death of the entire individual. The autonomy of the mind
is only thinkable at a social level, i. e., as the law (logos) of the social or-
ganism. The lord represents the autonomy of an immortal individual: the
individual that is institutionalized as a social organism. In himself, the in-
dividual is not autonomous, i. e., he is not the lord of his body. But
insofar as the individual can recognize his individual mind/body relation
in the social mind/body relation, i. e., as the lord that represents the au-
tonomy of the social organism that is actualized by the actions of the
bondsmen, his autonomy is no longer an illusion.
The lordship/bondsman relation is the elementary model of the free
society. The lord represents the human autonomy, the human capability
to transcend the (instinctual) laws of nature and replace them by the
human law of the state. The bondsman represents the citizens who actu-
alize the human autonomy by observing the human law as it positively
appears. Therefore, the lordship/bondsman model combines two forms
of recognition. The first form I will call the horizontal recognition that
concerns the relation between the citizens. This first form of recognition
is, in principle, symmetrical: In their observation of the same law, the
citizens are free and equal. The horizontal recognition stands for the di-
mension of right. The second form I will call the vertical recognition
that concerns the relation of the citizens to the lord, i. e., to the represen-
tation of their autonomy. This relation, in principle, is a-symmetrical be-
cause it is the relation in which the citizens, as corporeal individuals, are
related to their absolute essence (that will be developed as their con-
science). The vertical recognition stands for the dimension of morality,
the dimension in which the citizens are absolutely unequal: In this di-
mension, they are non-exchangeable, unique individuals. Therefore, the
lordship/ bondsman relation is the elementary model of the unity of
right and morality, the unity of horizontal and vertical recognition.
The immediate form of the lordship/bondsman relation is not inad-
equate because the relation between lord and bondsman is a-symmetrical
(the vertical recognition is fundamentally a-symmetric) but rather, because
it is still characterized by a discrepancy between the inside and outside
perspective. When it is possible, from an outside perspective, to describe
the Aristotelian state in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation, this
does not imply that it is also possible from the inside perspective.
From the inside perspective, the citizens cannot make a difference be-
tween themselves and the lord because they immediately identify them-
selves with the lord. The lord is only real as the contingent (traditional)
law of the state. Therefore, the citizens are neither aware of the vertical
recognition (in their consciousness there is no room for other traditional
laws) nor of the horizontal recognition (the citizens are absorbed by their
social roles: These are not mediated by free choice). Only when the dis-
crepancy between the inside and outside perspectives can be overcome
does the lordship/bondsman model cease to be an external attempt to un-
derstand the unity of mind and body. The external perspective from
which the model is formulated must become part of the model itself.
We, i. e., the author and the readers of this book, are also human beings
in which mind and body are united. Therefore, if we, from a meta point
of view, design a model to understand the unity between mind and body,
we must recognize in the model all the meta considerations we made
about the unity of mind and body. Only under that condition, can we
accept the model as a necessary one.
The process in which the inside and outside perspectives are brought
together results in the development of the consciousness of the bonds-
man. The consciousness of the bondsman becomes more and more
aware of the reality in which he is living. This process is discussed in
the subsequent part of Chapter 1.
Since the consciousness of the bondsman is already a moment of the
entirety of the social organism he is living in, the development of this
consciousness can be reconstructed as a necessary process. At the mo-
ment, however, that the consciousness wants to know what is the content
of the social law, it is not possible to determine this content by a necessary
deduction: The content of the social organism is contingent (Aristotles
model of the state is compatible with a multitude of traditions). Insofar
as the consciousness of the bondsman is already a moment of the social
organism all the time, this social organism is a contingent organism, i. e.
an organism that has historical existence.
Not all historical organisms can be identified as organisms in which
the consciousness of the bondsman is living. The institutional differentia-
tion of the organism must enable this consciousness to pass through the
development in which it will become aware of the reality it is living in.
Hegel identifies this social organism as the polis of the ancient Greek
world. Chapter 2 elaborates how the polis can be conceived of as the his-
torical social organism in which the immediate unity of right and morali-
ty, i. e., the immediate unity of horizontal and vertical recognition, is ob-
jectified.
Introduction 5
Since the institutions of the polis allow a learning process in which

the consciousness of the polis experiences the contingent content of the
law, the Greek world will, sooner or later, decline. Ultimately, the con-
sciousness cannot recognize the social organism, precisely because it is
a contingent organism, as the expression of its moral identity. What re-
mains is a social order that is one-sidedly characterized by the horizontal
recognition of right. Hegel identifies this order as the Roman Empire that
derives its unity from the property right of Roman Law. The Roman citi-
zens are the formal persons who recognize one another as free and equal.
Hegel calls the formal person of the Roman Law the first self. For the
first time, the human self has actualized itself as an autonomous self. The
actions of the person are not determined by tradition, but by the free will
of the persons themselves. In the first self, the unity of mind and body for
the first time appears as an individual. The person is the free will (cf.
mind) that is embodied in the social organism of the family (cf. body).
The person is the lord of the family whose labor is oriented to the re-
production of the family.
Although the first self is a necessary stage in the development of the
nature of the self (the human self must transcend tradition, otherwise the
independence of his mind is not done justice) the adequate unity of mind
and body is not yet attained. The persons are atomized selves, that lack a
common lord who represents their moral identity.5 They only practical-
ly express their moral identity in the private domain, i. e., in the labor of
the family. Therefore, it remains coincidental whether or not the persons
can actualize their moral identity. The Roman Empire has no inner har-
mony, a shared definition of good life, and will sooner or later decline.
Chapter 3 discusses the Realm of Culture that covers a period in Eu-
ropean history that begins after the decline of the Roman Empire, and
ends with the French Revolution, i. e., it is the period of the Middle
Ages. After the first self has been developed in the ancient Greek and
Roman world, the second self is developed in the Middle Ages. In the sec-
ond self, the dimension of right is reunited with the dimension of morality.
In the second self, the immediate unity of right and morality of the Greek
world is transformed in the self-conscious unity of right and morality.
5 Although the Roman Emperor (the lord and master of the world [292/3]) is
the titanic self-consciousness that thinks of itself as being an actual living
god (293) he is a person like the others, a formal self, that has no real power
over the content, i. e., over the substantial world of which he is supposed to
be the ruler.
The idea of the second self is simple: To prevent the risk that the social
law is not in harmony with the moral identity of the person, the second
self wants to make the social law the expression of his moral identity. This
attempt seems to be reasonable when the moral identity is cultivated: It
is no longer the moral identity that is immediately given and that belongs
to the private domain, but it has been socialized and rationalized and has
lost its particular character. The second self wants to make his cultivated
moral identity the content of the social law.
According to Hegel, the absolute freedom of the citizen of the
French Revolution is the historical reality of the second self: He does not
accept any tradition and demands that the social law is in absolutely ac-
cordance with his enlightened moral self. It is, however, impossible to
meet the demand of the citizen, not only because all citizens want to
do the same and cannot accept that the other citizens determine the con-
tent of the social law, but also because the citizens contradict themselves:
Since the moral identity transcends all positive determinedness, they have
to reject any positive shape of the law. Therefore, the subjectivism of the
French Revolution necessarily ends in the revolutionary terror in which the
citizens try to prevent each others attempt to actualize the social law.
Also, although the second self cannot, evidently, be the adequate actu-
alization of the unity of right and morality, it is certainly a necessary stage
in the development of the nature of the self. A free, moral self cannot tol-
erate a given social organism; his freedom is only real if this organism ex-
presses his moral identity. The terror of the French Revolution, however,
has shown what are the bloody consequences of a policy that is immedi-
ately moralized. This is understood by Jean Jacques Rousseau when he
differentiates between the social law and its transcendent moral legitima-
tion. The social law is legitimate insofar as it can be considered as the ex-
pression of the volont gnrale, the general will. This concept remains
transcendent because it must accurately be distinguished from the vo-
lont de tous, the will of all, that can be positively deduced from the
real will of the citizens.
Chapter 4 discusses Hegels reception of this Rousseauian reflection
on the French Revolution in the Morality-Chapter of the Phenomenology of
Spirit. The problem is, on the one hand, how to preserve the transcendent
character of the general will, and on the other hand, at the same time un-
derstand the existing legal order as a manifestation of the general will.
Hegel rejects Kants solution because of his distinction between a noume-
nal and a phenomenal world. Since the general will is situated in the nou-
menal world, and the legal order in the phenomenal world, the problem
Introduction 7
is only shifted: how to think of the relation between the noumenal and
the phenomenal world. Hegels own solution is elaborated as the third self,
the conscientious individual.
The third self (as reflection on the French Revolution) belongs to the
modern world (Hegels own era) and pretends to express the adequate re-
lation between right and morality. The conscientious individual is related
to the transcendent dimension of the absolute Spirit, i. e., to the absolute
essence of his freedom. This relation reflects the citizens relation to the
general will in Rousseau. At the same time, the conscientious individual
tries to actualize his moral freedom in the objective world, i. e., in the so-
cial order in which he is living. Therefore, the adequate relation between
right and morality is conceived of as the relation between objective and ab-
solute Spirit.
In Chapter 5 the three forms of the self are compared to the three
forms of recognition that Axel Honneth distinguishes in The Struggle
for Recognition.6 The comparison is complicated because Honneth re-
lates to the young Hegel whose concept of recognition, according to
Honneth, is influenced by the presuppositions of the metaphysical tra-
dition and has to be reconstructed in the light of empirical social psy-
chology.7 It is examined which meaning Honnths arguments have for
the Phenomenology of Spirit. The conclusion is that the three forms of
the self are not metaphysical in the sense of Honneth.
It took the social experience of the Ancient, the Mediaeval and the
Modern world to be able to formulate the human self adequately. The
insight into the third self presupposes the insight into the first and second
self. The individual who wants to acquire adequate insight into the
human self has to repeat, at an individual level, the social experience of
European history. In other words, this individual must participate in a so-
cial organism whose institutions allow the repetition of this social expe-
rience. In Chapter 6, it is argued that it is exactly this consideration that
is the basis of the project of Hegels Philosophy of Right. 8 The ethical life
that is developed in this work as the unity of Family, civil Society and
State, is an attempt to integrate the development of the first, second
and third self in the institutional framework of one social organism. Fam-
6 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition. The Moral Grammar of Social Con-
flicts, Polity Press, Cambridge 1995.
7 Ibidem, p. 68.
8 Hegels Philosophy of Right, translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press
1967.
ily, Corporation and State are presented as the adequate institutional em-
bodiment of the first, second and third self.
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 consist of a detailed survey of the way in which
the development of, respectively, the first, second and third self in the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, returns in the development of, respectively, family,
civil society and state in the Philosophy of Right. My thesis is that the logical
structure of the Philosophy of Right cannot be understood if one does not
acknowledge that it has been Hegels intention to resume the three peri-
ods of European history (Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modernity) with
the three corresponding forms of the self as the constituting logical mo-
ments of ethical life. From Hegels viewpoint, the Phenomenology of Spirit
and the Philosophy of Right do not represent different positions. The his-
torical order is only transformed into a systematic order.
Curiously enough, however, the Phenomenology of Spirit is not only a
criterion for the positive understanding of the Philosophy of Rights com-
position, but at the same time, a criterion to criticize this composition. In
the Philosophy of Right, the concept of conscience is reduced in compar-
ison with the Phenomenology of Spirit: Since the Philosophy of Right dis-
cusses the objective Spirit, the dimension of the religious conscience is ex-
plicitly excluded. The content of conscience is reduced to what can be ac-
tualized at the (historical) level of objective Spirit. This reduction has huge
consequences for all three domains of ethical life. The ethical life of the
family is reduced to natural life in the form of freedom; the freedom of
civil society is reduced to economic freedom; the ethical life of the state is
reduced to the mono-cultural nation state.
Chapter 7, 8 and 9 not only reconstruct Hegels composition of the
Philosophy of Right, but also the version that would result from a position
in which conscience is not reduced. In this version, consequently, also the
three domains of ethical life are not reduced: It offers room to multi-cul-
turality, to moral and political freedom and to states that are embedded in
a system of international law. In this version, the relation between absolute
and objective Spirit is conceived of as the relation between human rights
and democracy. My thesis is that this alternative version of the Philosophy
of Right, based on the full consequences of the Phenomenology of Spirit,
elaborates a conceptual framework that is better suitable for the under-
standing of contemporary multi-cultural and globalized society than
other proposals, especially the popular theories of Jrgen Habermas9
and John Rawls.10
9 Jrgen Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, Frankfurt/M., 1992.

Introduction 9
My interpretation of the Philosophy of Right is in accordance with

Robert Williams when he brings to the light the concept of recognition
as crucial to the systematic unity of the book (p.27).11 I also agree with
R. Williams when he states that Hegel does not fundamentally change
his position concerning recognition (p.2) and observes in this respect
a continuity between the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of
Right. The distinction that Williams makes between a self-subverting
form of recognition (clearly demonstrated in the case of master and
slave) and an affirmative mutual recognition in the other that is central
to ethical life (characterizing the mature Hegel), however, has to be re-
futed.
Williams illustrates his distinction between two forms of recognition
in his criticism of Alexandre Kojve: although Kojve made the struggle
for recognition central to his interpretation of Hegel, the irony is that
Kojves work obscures and distorts Hegels concept of recognition. How-
ever, for Hegel, recognition is a general concept of intersubjectivity, wider
than master and slave. [] In contrast to Kojve, Hegels master and slave
is but an important first phase of unequal recognition that must and can
be transcended. (p.10) Williams is certainly right that Kojves concept
of recognition is distorted (Kojve thinks the concept of recognition pri-
marily on the basis of an ontology of negation and finitude (p.11) and
that the recognition that is expressed in the metaphor of master and slave
has to be developed. But he is mistaken if he thinks that this development
ultimately implies the overcoming of unequality in the concept of rec-
ognition. As mentioned before, recognition remains characterized by its
two (horizontal and vertical) dimensions. Ultimately, the unequali-
ty remains preserved in the a-symmetry between absolute and objective
Spirit.
I share Williams criticism of Jrgen Habermas and Axel Honneth
when he remarks: Unfortunately, in Honneths and Habermass interpre-
tation, the early Hegel is sharply distinguished from the mature Hegel.
[] Honneth repeats Habermass line that in Hegels mature thought,
the concept of recognition is displaced by a monological conception of
self-reflective subjectivity (p.15).12 He rightly supports Ludwig Sieps
10 John Rawls, Laws of Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1999.

11 Robert Williams, Hegels Ethics of Recognition, University of California Press,
1997.
12 Honneth (1995) remarks: In this sense, the new (and, methodologically speak-
ing, certainly superior), conception found in the Phenomenology of Spirit repre-
reading of Hegel: Siep believes recognition is important for Hegels

practical philosophy because it allows Hegel to renew the classical tradi-
tion of practical philosophy on a postmodern, postliberal, intersubjective-
social basis (p.21). But, I think that his conclusion needs some specifi-
cation: This reading supports Habermass contention that recognition is
an important counter-discours of modernity (p.21) Hegels concept of
recognition is superior to the concept of recognition as it is elaborated
in Habermass Theory of communicative Action. Habermas has never suc-
ceeded in the reconciliation between the domain of recognition and the
domain of nature. His new paradigm remains characterized by a Kantian
dichotomy: the dichotomy between truth and objectivity, the object of
knowledge and the object of experience, intersubjectivity and nature.13
Also Williamss criticism of Michael Theunissen needs some specifi-
cation and correction. Theunissen does attempt to show that intersub-
jectivity is derivative from a pre-social, or transcendental monological
subject, and that objective Geist, while supposedly the consciousness of
individuals, nevertheless comes to have self-consciousness and self-rela-
tion, thereby creating an asymmetry and a heteronomous relation be-
tween objective Geist, ethical substance and independent individuals.
This asymmetry finds expression in a pantheistic conception of the sub-
stance/accidents scheme: Self-conscious, self-relating objective Geist, is
identified with absolute Geist, the ultimate subject that is, at the same
time, ethical substance. In this scheme, individuals are reduced from in-
dependent free beings to mere accidents of substance (p.16).
Williams is right when he defends the intersubjectivity of Hegels
project against Theunissen (I will show that Hegel by no means restricts
recognition to abstract right and property, but clearly indicates that the
concept of recognition is the general structure of ethical life, p.17).
sents, in effect, a fundamental turning-point in the course of Hegels thought. As
a result, the possibility of returning to the most compelling of his earlier intu-
itions, the still incomplete model of the struggle for recognition, is blocked.
(p. 63) Later on he adds: Neither in Hegel nor in Mead does one find a system-
atic consideration of those forms of disrespect that, as negative equivalents for the
corresponding relations of recognition, could enable social actors to realize that
they are being denied recognition. (p. 93) I will show that, in the Phenomenology
of Spirit, the denied recognition appears in the form of the Unhappy Conscious-
ness. The Unhappy Consciousness is not overcome by a struggle for recognition,
but rather by a process of experience in which the consciousness becomes
aware of the social source of his unhappiness.
13 Jrgen Habermas, Wahrheitstheorien, in: Vorstudien und Ergnzungen zur The-
orie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt/M., 1984, pp. 127 186.
Introduction 11
But, in my opinion, the central point is that Theunissen identifies objec-

tive and absolute Spirit. Precisely because Hegel wants to solve the prob-
lem of how to devise a community of independent individuals, he has to
introduce the absolute Spirit in distinction from the objective Spirit. The
a-symmetrical relation between the individuals and the absolute Spirit
grounds the intersubjectivity between individuals that have a symmetrical
relation to one another at the level of the objective Spirit. The identifica-
tion of objective and absolute Spirit totally ignores Hegels project.
The revised Philosophy of Right raises the same questions as Rawlss
Political Liberalism 14 : how to think of a community of persons with dif-
ferent moral opinions. It shows, however, that Rawlss conception of the
moral person remains unreflected. The concept of the moral person al-
ready presupposes a structure of basic institutions all the time. An atom-
ized moral person is a contradiction in itself; the attempt to construct an
overlapping consensus between atomized moral persons is totally super-
fluous. The fundamental failure in Rawlss and Habermass theory con-
verge: neither of them has developed an adequate conception of the
unity between mind and body. They conceptualize a human self without
identity.
The revision of the Philosophy of Right makes it possible to give an
answer to the justified criticism of the Philosophy of Right, itself. In read-
ing Hegels analysis of civil society, for example, Marxs criticism of Hegel
and his alleged alliance with capitalism becomes obvious. The revision,
however, will clarify that Hegel, especially in his analysis of the System
of Needs, betrays his own principles and is too much impressed by the
contingent reality he is confronted with. Also Sieps criticism that
Hegel one-sidedly remains committed to the primacy of the general
and the Christian culture is overcome in the revised version in which
the moral individual transcends the labor system, and in which multi-cul-
turality gets the room it deserves.15
14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993: how is it

possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citi-
zens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and
moral doctrines?. (p .4).
15 Ludwig Siep, Recognition between Individuals and Cultures, [manuscript].
Chapter 1
The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body
Introduction
From a philosophical point of view, a scientific fact cannot entirely ex-
press what makes a man into a man. Scientific facts depend on scientific
theories: It is only in the framework of scientific theory that facts are de-
fined. Theory gives facts their scientific value. Therefore, if man is scien-
tifically defined as a specific organism with a specific genome, he does
not coincide with his existence as an organism. To his existence also be-
longs the scientific theory that he develops in order to represent his spe-
cific organism. In this chapter, it is discussed what it means to conceive of
man both as an organism and as the scientific reason for whom this or-
ganism exists.
The problem to be solved is the age-old problem of the relation be-
tween mind and body. This problem cannot be solved by reduction, as it
is done by David Hume and Ren Descartes. While Hume reduces mind
to body when he maintains that all ideas must be reduced to impressions,
Descartes reduces body to mind when he assumes that the res extensa es-
sentially is a clear and distinct idea. In this reduction, either the mode of
being of the mind, or the mode of being of the body disappears, so that
the relation between two modes of being is revealed as a problem that
does not comply with reality. But neither can the problem be solved in
Kants way. Although Kant has understood the one-sidedness of
Humes empiricism and Descartess rationalism, and was in search of a
synthesis of both approaches, his solution does not escape from repeating
the problems of a scientific definition of man. Although Kants project
essentially is an anti-reductionist one because, in his view, mind and
body have their own domain (namely in the noumenal and the phenom-
enal world), his criteria for the synthesis of mind and body remain exter-
nal to these domains. Kants definition of man as a unity of mind and
body does not elucidate its own necessity.
For a philosopher, it is not sufficient to propose a scientific model of
the relation between mind and body. A scientific model is subjective in
the sense that it is not unconditional. This is not only because alternative
Introduction 13
models are possible, but also because the criterion of its verification (ex-
perimental perception) embodies a specific (conditional) view on the re-
lation between (the world of the) mind and (the world of the) body. This
subjectivity can only be overcome if it has been proven that the model is
not one of the many possible models, but is exclusive. The being that is
modeled as a unity of mind and body must, at the same time, be able to
accept the model that constitutes his unity as a necessary one. The con-
ception of the unity between mind and body has to be unconditional.
Of course, it is not evident that an unconditional model of the unity
of mind and body is possible. All candidate models have to be tested. But
what guarantee have we that the process of testing will ever end? I think
that this dilemma can be overcome by a methodological approach that
allows the systematic construction of the unconditional model. I will
summarize the central steps of this systematic construction:
1. The unity of mind and body must (hypothetically) be determined as
an immediate unity. In that case, the model of the unity between
mind and body necessarily has to be accepted by the mind that is con-
stituted by the model. Because this mind is by definition immediately
unified with the body, it has no room for another interpretation;
2. From an outside perspective, however, the immediate unity of mind
and body is a contradiction (between form and content). Insofar as
it concerns a relation between mind and body, the terms of the rela-
tion are (formally) distinguished. Insofar as it concerns an immediate
relation, however, this distinction disappears because, in regard to
their content, mind and body are immediately identical. As a matter
of fact, an immediate relation is no relation;
3. The process of construction consists of the steps that mediate between
the inside perspective in which mind and body are immediately one,
and the outside perspective in which mind and body have domains
that are explicitly distinguished. Each stage of the process is a revision
of the model that conceptualizes the unity of mind and body. The dis-
tinction between mind and body that is implicitly presupposed in the
model of their immediate unity is, step by step, made more explicit;
4. If the stages in the process are logically interconnected, i. e., if each
stage is logically deduced from the preceding one, the process can re-
sult in an unconditional model of the unity between mind and body:
a model that combines the unity of mind and body with their distinc-
tion, and a model that has a necessary status for the mind that is con-
ceptualized by the model itself.
14 Chapter 1 The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body
In this chapter, I will discuss how Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit can be

interpreted as the systematic development of the unity between mind and
body based on the aforementioned methodological assumptions.16 This
means that this development has a necessary nature, i. e., all stages of
the mind/body unity can be logically deduced.17 Of course, Hegel illus-
trates these stages with historical examples. But even when it has become
clear that the body of the mind has to be understood as a social organism
and, consequently, can be unambiguously related to a specific period in
(European) history, history remains only an illustration. Hegel recon-
structs which stages the (European) reader of the Phenomenology of Spirit
has to pass through to develop an adequate insight into the unity of mind
and body.18 But these stages are logical stages that have appeared in a spe-
16 Wildt (1984) rightly remarks that the Phenemenology of Spirit has to be under-
stood beforehand as a theory of the Self and of Self-Experience. [die Phnome-
nologie des Geistes von vornherein als Theorie des Selbst und der Selbsterfahrung
zu verstehen [ist].](p. 374).
17 This logical deduction is a dialectical deduction. What this dialectical logic pre-
cisely means, will become clear in the next section. Anyhow, the dialectical logic
does not come down to a violation of the law of non-contradiction, as Popper
seems to think. On the contrary, Hegel has developed his dialectics to overcome
contradictory relations and to safeguard the law of non-contradiction.
18 This remark seems to correspond to Terry Pinkards opinion: Accordingly, the
Phenomenology is supposed to take its readers, the participants in the modern Eu-
ropean communitys form of life, through the past formations of consciousness
of the European spirit the ways in which that spirit has both taken the es-
sence of things to be, and the ways in which it has taken agents to be cognitively
related to that essence and demonstrate to them that they require the kind of
account which the Phenomenology as a whole provides, that the Phenomenologys
project is therefore not optional for them but intrinsic to their sense of who
they are. (Terry Pinkard, Hegels Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason, Cam-
bridge 1994, p. 17). The topic of the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, is not
the adequate understanding of European history, but rather the adequate under-
standing of substance (what, for Hegel, equals the adequate understanding of
the unity of mind and body). Although this understanding is actualized in Euro-
pean history, this history remains an illustration (i. e., a contingent manifestation
form) of the fundamental (logical) structures of substance. Therefore, I cannot
agree to his thesis that the three introductory sections show that a kind of
knowledge that would be independent of social practice is impossible. (p. 21).
Also Philip Kain (Hegel and the Other, New York, 2005) seems the be the vic-
tim of the same misunderstanding when he writes: What sense does it make to
call the absolute of one era absolute if it differs from the absolute of another
era? The answer requires us to see that for Hegel reality itself is actually construct-
ed by culture. (p. 19).
The immediate unity of mind and body 15
cific (contingent) manner in European history. Principally these stages

can also be experienced in other cultures. Actually, in the contemporary
globalized world, the experiences of European culture are more or less
shared by all other cultures.
The immediate unity of mind and body

Gene theory determines the organism as a differentiated life process, that
is ultimately directed by the genes. For the time being, I will abstract
from these differentiations and determine the organism as a kind of
black box of which it is only relevant that it is something naturally
given. Unlike the gene theorists view, however, I consider this something
not to be an object of scientific reason, but rather the object of a mind
that forms an immediate and natural unity with it, i. e., with the body
that is conceived of as black box. I want to know under what conditions
this relation between mind and body can be determined as a necessary
one.19
This unity cannot be obtained by a scheme that functions as an ex-
ternal link between mind and body. The connection by an external
scheme remains accidental. Mind and body must be defined in a way
in which they have only existence if they are taken together. They
must be conceived of in a complementary relationship, in the relative op-
position between form and content.20 The mind has to be conceptualized
as the form of the body. The body has to be conceived of as something
Robert Pippin (Hegels Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-consciousness, Cam-

bridge, 1989) elaborates an opposite interpretation. According to him, the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit has to be read as a direct variation on a crucial Kantian
theme, the transcendental unity of apperception. (p. 6). As a consequence, He-
gels project would be totally a priori: As we have also seen, now in great detail,
Hegel rejects the possibility of such reliance on pure intuitions, the possibility of
considering the characteristics of a pure intuited manifold. (p.133). We will see,
however, that the concept of life is central in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Its cen-
tral theme can be formulated as the unity of mind and body.
Good introductions in the Phenomenology of Spirit are, for example, Ludwig
Siep (2000) and Stephen Houlgate (2006).
19 Insofar as the relation between mind and body is not yet understood as a neces-
sary one, I will indicate this relation as a form of the natural consciousness.
20 In a relative opposition, the terms of the opposition are internally related and
cannot be determined without the other. Examples are: general/particular, pa-
rents/child.
that borrows its unity from the mind that functions as its form. The mind
is the form that is only real because the body is its content. In this way,
mind and body relate to one another in a non-relation: Distinct from one
another, both terms have no meaning. This relation can be illustrated by
Berkeleys esse est percipi. The body only exists insofar as it is perceived by
the mind. Outside its perception, the mind has no existence. This rela-
tion is an epistemological relation that is in no way distinguished from
the object that is known. It is about a knowledge that is totally immersed
in its object. Just because of its immediacy, this relation cannot be under-
stood as an interpretation (for example by means of some scientific
model). It is about a knowledge that is completely in unity with its object
and that knows its object absolutely.
If the unity of mind and body is determined in this way, the conclu-
sion is justified that, from a subjective point of view, i. e., from the minds
view, mind and body are a necessary unity. Without one another, mind
and body do not exist at all. But this mind is a very poor one. If it
could express itself, it could not even say I (let alone: I am I). The
relation between mind and body expresses a pure existence that lacks
any determination. The immediacy of the mind/body relation would
be disturbed by any closer determination. In its unity with the body,
the mind is totally undetermined for itself.
The inside and outside perspective are still distinguished. From an
outside perspective, the independence of the mind/body unity is clear.
The unity is distinct from other unities. From an inside perspective, how-
ever, the unity has no independence because it cannot make any distinc-
tion. On the other hand, only from the inside perspective is the mind/
body unity a necessary one. The subjectivity of this necessity can only
be overcome if the mind/body unity is closely specified and has the op-
portunity to internalize what, from the outside perspective, has become
clear: The mind/body unity must not only be determined as pure exis-
tence, but also as determined existence, i. e., as an independent one.
The mind/body unity that is for itself an independent unity, can be
identified with the result of development that Hegel discusses in the
first part of the subjective Spirit: Anthropology or the Soul. The soul is He-
gels terminus technicus to indicate the immediate unity between mind and
body.21 At the level of the soul, however, it is not yet possible to distin-
21 Hegel defines the soul as the allgemeine Immaterialitt der Natur, deren ein-
faches ideelles Leben [as natures universal immaterialism, its simple ideal
life.] (Enz. 389), i. e., the soul is the form in which nature has its unity.
Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside world 17
guish mind and body. The soul is determined by the natural processes in
which its body is involved. At this level, it makes no sense to describe the
mind/body unity as a black-box, because the soul only exists insofar as it
is naturally determined, i. e., the mind has no ability to abstract from the
particular content in which it is involved. This inability has been over-
come when the soul is fully developed. At that level, the soul has eman-
cipated itself from its being-submerged-in-nature. The soul is trans-
formed into a mind that can abstract from particular determinations
and has an abstract unity for itself. This abstract unity is expressed in
the distinction that can be made between an inner and outer world.
The soul that has freed itself from nature is for itself insofar as it can dis-
tinguish itself from the outside world. The soul has been transformed
into the subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself
the sum total of its merely natural features as an object, a world external
to it but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediately re-
flected into itself. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. (Enz.
412) 22 Therefore, consciousness is the mind in an immediate unity
with its body. But in this relation, as the mind is undetermined, its
body is, so to speak, a black-box. The mind, however, is determined in
its relation to the outside world; for itself, the mind/body unity is inde-
pendent. In the second part of the subjective Spirit, the Phenomenology of
Spirit (Enz., 413 ff.), Hegel examines whether the outside and inside
perspective of consciousness are compatible. In the next sections, howev-
er, I will not refer to this second part of the subjective Spirit, but to the
elaborated version of the Phenomenology of Spirit, i. e., to the book that
has the same title as this second part.
Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside

world
In its independence, the mind/body unity is related to the outside world.

It is exactly this relation that threatens the mind/body unity. Insofar as the
unity only exists by excluding an outside world, it is dependent on this
outside world and, consequently, loses its independence. In that case,
the immediacy of the inside perspective can also get lost. If the mind per-
22 in welchem es die natrliche Totalitt seiner Bestimmungen als ein Object, eine
ihm uere Welt, von sich ausschliet und sich darauf bezieht, so da es in der-
selben unmittelbar in sich reflectirt ist, das Bewutseyn. (Enz. 412).
ceives the determinedness of its body (because of any interaction between

the body and the outside world) it becomes aware of the distinction be-
tween the body and itself, so that their immediate unity is broken down.
Therefore, the problem that has to be solved is: How can the mind/body
unity relate to an outside world without threatening the unity of mind
and body from an inside perspective?
A living organism is related to the outside world because of its needs.
In its attempt to satisfy its needs and to reproduce itself, it is involved in
the outside world. In contrast to a lifeless thing, the organism is actively
related to the outside world. While the lifeless thing passively undergoes
the working of external forces of nature and loses its unity by an ongoing
process of erosion, the living organism actively preserves the boundaries
between the outside world and itself. This time the outside world does
not appear as a force of nature that is undergone by the organism, but
as a stimulus to which it actively reacts. The reactions of the organism
can be interpreted in the framework of its striving for self-conservation.
The model to conceive of the organisms relation to the outside world
cannot be maintained if the organism also has a mind at its disposal. We
defined the mind as the form from which the organism borrows its con-
scious unity, i. e., its undetermined existence as it is understood from an
inside perspective. If the organism also has a mind, the stimuli that are
received by the organism can be interpreted as immediate determinations
of the mind, as are the simple ideas of impressions in the sense of Hume.23
The mind, however, that exists in a multitude of determinations loses its
23 Humes definition of impression is not unproblematic. (Cf. An Inquiry concern-

ing Human Understanding, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 17 ff ). Hume dis-
tinguishes between an impression (for example, the impression red) and the sim-
ple idea of an impression (for example, the idea red). An idea is a determination
of the mind and, therefore, something that has a general way of existence. The
idea red is related to the impression red. The impression red is something
real, i. e., something that exists in space and time and has, therefore, a partic-
ular way of existence. But at the same time the impression is experienced and, in
that sense, also a determination of the mind. This time, however, the determina-
tion of the mind is immediate: In its experience of the impression, the mind is
in an immediate unity with reality. As a consequence, the experienced expression
has a higher intensity than the simple idea. The problem is, however, how it is
possible to discern qualitative different impressions (red, blue, pain etc.). An im-
mediate relation excludes qualitative differences. A relation is immediate and, by
implication, qualitatively undetermined; or a relation is qualitatively determined
and, by implication, not immediate. A relation that is immediate, and at the
same time qualitatively determined, is logically impossible.
unity and, consequently, cannot be understood as the form in which the

organism has its conscious unity. The mind as the conscious unity form
of the organism has to be distinguished from the many stimuli in which
the mind has a determined content. The mind must become aware of the
stimuli as coming from outside, from an outside world, in distinction
from the mind/body unity. The way to think of stimuli as coming
from outside is elaborated by Immanuel Kant. As originating from an
outside world, the stimuli24 have a spatial form, the form of existing-be-
side-one-another. As stimuli not only originating from outside but also
determining the mind, they have the form of time, the form of exist-
ing-after-one-another.25
Stimuli situated by the mind in time and space are a multitude that
are distinguished from the immediate mind/body unity. This does not
mean, however, that the mind/ body unity has developed an adequate re-
lation to the outside world and has transformed its pure existence into a
determined existence. The mind/body unity remains beside the multitude
of spatio-temporal stimuli. The multitude of stimuli do not constitute an
independent world. Qualitatively, the stimuli remain undetermined. It is
true that the stimuli have a spatio-temporal form, but this form belongs
to any stimulus. Which stimuli are involved remains unclear.26 The stim-
24 Of course, Kant does not speak about stimuli, but rather about the pure mani-
fold by which Intuition is affected.
25 Robert Pippin (2001), defends the thesis that Hegel rejects the possibility of
such reliance on pure intuitions, the possibility of considering the characteristics
of a purely intuited manifold. (p. 133) For Hegel, there are no possible differ-
ences, no possible determinacy in any manifold means, unless already thought in
certain non-sensible ways. (p. 139) We will see, however, how Hegel under-
stands the intuited nature as life, i. e., as a manifold that brings itself to unity.
Hegels introduction of life is in no way opaque. (p. 138).
26 This is the point that is central at the level of Sense-Certainty, i. e., at the level of
the first form of the mind/body relation that Hegel discusses in his Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit. Something that is sensory-given in time and space cannot be qual-
itatively determined in an immediate relation: All kinds of qualities can be im-
mediately given. It is true that Hegel, at the level of Sense-Certainty, does not
speak about stimuli, but rather about real things like tree and house. This,
however, is not essential for what is at stake in this relation. The main point is
the conclusion that something that is immediately given for the senses cannot
be qualitatively identified.
The I, the subject of Sense-Certainty is not presented as a mind that is in an
immediate unity with its body. It is not even mentioned at all that the subject
has a body. This is only explicated at the level of Self-consciousness. From the
outside perspective, however, it is clear that the subject of Sense-Certainty has a
uli only reflect the internal dividedness of the organism. Any of the end-
less series of stimuli to which the organism is receptive can be taken into
account. The determination of the stimuli only exists in the endless
change of qualities, without having the possibility to concentrate on spe-
cific qualities. Only when the spatio-temporal stimuli have their own
unity (distinct from the unity of the mind) can the mind/body unity ad-
equately relate to them as to an objective world. Only then can the mind
perceive itself as consciousness, i. e., as being related to an objective (out-
side) world.
John Lockes proposal for the solution of this problem will not do.
He interprets the stimuli as properties, and thinks that these properties,
thanks to the workings of the mind, can be understood as properties
of an identity, i. e., as a complex idea in which the simple ideas of the
properties are unified. In this way, however, the unity of things in the
outside world is not an objective one, but rather a unity that is subjective-
ly constituted. For the same reason, the unity of things in the world can-
not be grounded on a priori schemes that belong to the mind or to the
language in which the mind expresses itself: Also in that case, the
unity remains external, i. e., subjectively constituted. The subjectivity of
the unity that is ascribed to the things in the objective world can only
be overcome by considering the radical revolution in the conception of
nature that is introduced by modern science.27
The world of modern science no longer consists of things with prop-
erties, but rather of forces of nature. Modern sciences conception of na-
ture has objectivity because it is the physical force that manifests itself in
nature (or rather as nature). Compared to the conception of nature con-
sidered up until now, a certain reversion has been performed. Points of
departure are no longer the perceived stimuli or properties, invoking
the problem of their unification. For modern science, natures own
body: After all, it is impossible to have sense experiences without the body. Pre-
cisely because the body is, at this level, for the mind only a black-box, it is not
necessary to explicitly thematize the body.
27 The problems in Locke essentially correspond to the problems Hegel discusses at
the second stage of Consciousness: Perception. It is impossible to identify an exter-
nal thing by perception of properties. To succeed, the properties have to be con-
ceived of as properties that, at the same time, include other properties (the num-
ber of properties of a thing can endlessly be enlarged) and exclude other proper-
ties (it must be possible to distinguish the properties of the one thing from the
ones of the other). Worded differently, if the outside thing can only be identified
by means of properties, it cannot be identified at all. The unity of the thing is not
itself a property that can be perceived.
unity is the point of departure: Nature consists of physical forces, i. e., of

selves, unities that manifest themselves in a sensory form. What is per-
ceived is already perceived as the expression of an inner unity all the
time. Observations are no longer immediate, but rather mediated: Obser-
vations have developed into experimental observations that verify the law
hypotheses formulated by the scientists.
The inversion of modern science can be illustrated by an example
from classical mechanics. The point masses introduced by classical me-
chanics are not spatio-temporal stimuli that have to be unified with
other stimuli. The point mass that is experienced in time and space is
considered to be a manifestation of gravitation; it is the manifestation
of a unity that is already objectively working in nature all the time. In
the experimental observation of a point mass in time and space, it appears
that gravitation, i. e., the unity that is hypothetically assumed by the sci-
entist, is an objective unity of nature itself.
How objective, however, is the unity of the physical force itself ?
What exactly is the ontological status of the physical force, or, to apply
this question to the elaborated example, what is the ontological status
of gravitation?28 Science determines gravitation in its law hypothesis:
Under the influence of gravitation a point mass is involved in a certain
movement, i. e., its time and space coordinates are put in a certain rela-
tion to one-another. The possibility to explain the point masss position
in time and space as the result of the gravitational force depends on the
definition of gravitation. Gravitation appears in its working on a point
mass: It causes the time and space coordinates of the point mass to be
put in a relation that can be described in a mathematical form. In
other words, experimental observation does not result in the appearance
of an objective self, but rather in the appearance of an objective self that is
projected in nature by a subjective self, namely the scientist. This illus-
trates what Kant means with the Copernican turn of modern science.29
The unity of the object of experience is constituted by the subject of ex-
perience, i. e., the scientist.30
The preceding development has shown that if the mind/body unity is
understood as an immediate one, it is not possible that the mind, from an
28 This example is discussed by Hegel at the level of the third stage of Conscious-
ness, Understanding. Cf. The Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 93.
29 Cf. I. Kant, Critics of pure Reason, B XVI.
30 The Copernican turn is formulated by Hegel in terms of the tautological move-
ment of Understanding. (PhoS, p. 95).
inside perspective, relates to an objective reality that has an independent

existence. From an inside perspective, the minds objective reality appears
as constituted by the mind itself, and, in this sense, as a subjective reality.
The positive result of this development is the mind that has become
reflected in itself. It has been transformed from an undetermined exis-
tence into a being-in-itself, an I, or a self . This development, howev-
er, was accompanied by a reduction: while, from an outside perspective,
the mind was determined in immediate union with an independent or-
ganism, it seems that this organism, from an inside perspective, has be-
come totally invisible. It seems that the mind can only conceive of itself
as a being-in-itself in relation to an independence that is its own projec-
tion, i. e., in relation to an otherness that it has constituted, itself.
To cancel the discrepancy between the inside and outside perspective
we have to prove under what conditions the mind can still, from an inside
perspective, relate to an objective world. Since, from an outside perspec-
tive, the independent reality has been determined as an independent or-
ganism, the question now is: Is the vision that the mind formulates from
its inside perspective, namely that its objective world is constituted by it-
self, compatible with its position from the outside perspective, namely
that the objective reality has to be understood as organism, i. e., as inde-
pendent life?
In the next section, I will discuss how this problem can be solved. We
have to learn that the distinction between mind and body we made until
now, remains too external, remains a distinction of Understanding. De-
parting from a body that is also a mind, we tried to think of their
inner unity. We will see that mind and body already are a living unity
all the time. The distinction between both has to be understood as the
self-distinction of self-conscious life.
Self-consciousness
The attempt to conceive of the mind/body unity in relation to an inde-
pendent outside world has failed. From the inside perspective, the sensory
perceivable world has been destroyed. As the self or the I, the mind
has emancipated itself from nature and has become a formal self that only
accepts an independency that it has constituted, itself. This self looks like
Descartess cogito. Like the cogito, it is a formal being-in-itself. Also the
cogito seems to presuppose that the formal structure of being-in-itself is
the only acceptable form of independence. (The formal being-in-itself
Self-consciousness 23
of the cogito seems to allow a multitude of cogitos, although it is unclear

where the other cogitos come from).
The difference, however, between the mind that has developed itself
into a formal self and the cogito is not only that, for the mind, other for-
mal selves are not yet developed, but also that, from an outside perspec-
tive, the formal self of the mind is related to an independent organism,
i. e., a body. The formal self of the mind also has a body (although it
is ignorant of this fact). Therefore, the mind will not escape from con-
frontation with other organisms.
Before it is possible to go into the minds confrontation with other
organisms, another problem has to be solved. It has to be clear what it
means to speak about an organism that is not finding its unity in the
mind. Until now we conceived of the organism as a black box existing
in an immediate unity with the mind. To maintain this unity towards
the outside world, we had to understand in what way the mind is able
to grasp the outside world as an independent world to exclude it from
itself as the immediate mind/body unity. Meanwhile, it appears that na-
ture can only be excluded as the otherness if the mind can understand
itself as a pure self. Only then is its unity not threatened by otherness
when the distinction with otherness is constituted by itself. Nature
only has an own self, insofar as this self is assigned to it by the mind.
This is also expressed by Descartes. The existence of the mind can
only be conceived of as a pure existence, as pure self-determination.
The distinction that the mind knows is constituted by itself. This conclu-
sion evokes two problems. In the first place, there is the problem of dual-
ism. If the mind is conceived of as a purely spiritual self, separated from
natural reality, what meaning can it still have to speak about a relation
between mind and body? And, in the second place, what meaning can
still be given to the concept of organism? Until now, the organism was
determined in its immediate unity with the mind. How can the organ-
isms independence be determined when it does not take its unity from
the mind?
Since the organism belongs to the world that is sensorially given, it is
subjected to laws of nature. But this observation does not allow us to as-
sign a self to the organism. This is only possible when the organism is also
understood as life. It is true that the working of living organisms is also
subjected to the laws of nature, but something else is added. An organism
can be interpreted as a relatively stable system of forces, comparable, for
example, to a planetary system. The working of the forces are brought
into line in such a way that they maintain the unity of the system they
are part of. It makes sense to represent the working of an organism by a

teleological model: as if the working of the forces of nature in this case
are oriented on the maintenance of the organisms unity; as if the forces
of nature strive after the survival of the organism. In that sense a practical
self can be assigned to the organism, separated from the mind. As pure
self, the mind can only separate itself from nature when nature has
been grasped as living nature, as nature having a practical self that is sep-
arated from the self of the mind.
But how do we solve the first problem mentioned above? Can the
pure self relate to its body? It is true that from, an outside perspective,
the pure self is related to a living organism, but this living organism is,
from an inside perspective, unknown. Moreover, this living organism is
not its own body, but an organism of the outside world. But of course,
from an outside perspective, the pure self still has its own body. The im-
mediate unity of mind and body was the point of departure we started
with. The question is whether the pure self can ever experience its
body without losing its purity.
Just because the pure self is in immediate unity with its body, it can-
not escape from experiencing it. As an organism, its body is needy, i. e., it
is dependent on the outside world when reproducing itself. As we have
seen before, this dependence manifests itself in stimuli to which the or-
ganism actively reacts. At the level of consciousness, this reaction threat-
ened to undermine the minds unity. This unity could only be saved by
perceiving the stimuli as part of an outside world, i. e., by perceiving
them in the form of time and space. But the pure self s experience of
the stimuli, i. e., the experience of self-consciousness, is not compatible
with this form of time and space. Because the pure self as purely
being-in-itself does not allow any relation to an outside world, it can,
nevertheless, when experiencing an outside world (because of its corpo-
reality) experience it only in an absolute negative form, i. e., in the
form in which the pure self is totally threatened in its existence as
being-purely-in-itself. The involvement of the pure self in the strange or-
ganism can only be conceived of in the form of pure negativity31: To res-
31 Josifovic (2008) adequately formulates: As consciousness the new form in which

subjectivity performs itself preserves, furthermore, the relation to the entire do-
main of what sensually appears, but in such a way that the entire content of this
domain remains at the same time related to the unity of consciousness, and can,
as a consequence, from the perspective of the constituting identity (as Self-con-
sciousness) only represent an otherness or a difference. [Als Bewusstsein behlt
cue its own existence, the pure self has to destroy the existence of the
strange organism.32
The pure negativity towards the strange organism can be articulated
more closely in terms of neediness. Insofar as the body of the mind/body
unity is needy, it is related to an outside world that is determined as a
strange organism. The experience of neediness, however, contradicts the
purely-being-in-itself of the pure self. Therefore, there is no room for a
closer differentiation of neediness. Neediness as such is threatening, not
some particular form of it. Therefore, the pure self turns against needi-
ness as such. Only when it can eliminate neediness as such, can it main-
tain its pure existence.
Up to a certain level, the elimination of neediness in relation to a
strange organism is possible. The relation of neediness between the
own organism of the mind/body unity and the strange organism implies
that the integrity of the own organism is somehow threatened by the
strange organism. If this would not be the case, then the own organism
is not (practically) related to the strange organism at all. The threat of the
strange organism can have an active form (if the own organism is subject-
ed to the needs of the strange organism) or a passive form (if the strange
organism is an object of the own needs, resulting in the experience of
being dependent on the strange organism for satisfying the own needs).
Both forms of the threat can be overcome when the own organism
kills the strange organism and can make it its prey for satisfying its
needs. Then the own organism has repaired its independence towards
the outside world and is no longer related to any strange organism.
After a while, however, the needs will return, and once again a relation
to strange life arises to which the new needs are directed. In this variation
of needs being satisfied and arising once again, the mind/body unity ex-
periences the life process of its own organism by the strange life. There-
die neue Vollzugsweise der Subjektivitt weiterhin die Bezogenheit auf die ge-
samte Sphre des sinnlich Erscheinenden bei, jedoch derart, dass smmtliche In-
halte dieser Sphre zugleich auf die Einheit des Bewusstseins bezogen sind, somit
aus der Perspektive der sich konstituierenden Identitt (als Selbstbewusstsein) nur
ein Anderssein oder einen Unterschied darstellen.] p. 75.
32 Hegel calls this negative relation to the outside organism Desire: The simple
I is the genus or the simple universal, for which the differences are not differ-
ences only by its being the negative essence of the shaped independent moments;
and self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that
presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-consciousness is
Desire. (109).
fore, it is impossible to eliminate the relation to strange life: This would

only be possible if the mind/body unity could totally ignore its own body.
If the relation to strange life cannot be eliminated, the identity of the
pure self seems to be based on illusion. The presupposition of the pure
self is that the own body is totally satisfied.33 It is, however, typical of
an organism that this total satisfaction is impossible: After satisfaction,
inevitably follow new needs. The attempt to conceive of the mind in a
unity with an independent organism seems to have failed, because the re-
sult is a logical contradiction. If the mind has to be understood as a pure
self that can only exist by totally excluding from itself the materiality of
its organism, the demand cannot be made at the same time that the mind
forms a necessary unity with its body. These conflicting points of depar-
ture make mind and body incompatible. The impression is aroused that
those who conceive of man as a corporeal being that is also a spiritual
being, inevitably have to admit to taking a Kantian position in which
mind and body have their own realms. From a noumenal point of
view, man is considered to be a spiritual being, but from a phenomenal
point of view, however, a corporeal one. In that case, it is not possible to
unify both points of view in a way that makes their unity understandable
as a necessary one.
If, however, the organism is considered to be a living one, the claim
that man is separated into two different beings (mind and body) can
hardly be maintained. If the organism dies, the pure self (man as spiritual
being) seems to be automatically involved in its decay. This observation,
however, in no way solves the problem of the unity between mind and
body. If the mind disappears together with the body, the mind is made
a kind of epiphenomenon adhering to corporeal functioning. In effect,
the mind is reduced to the body. The mind loses its independence, im-
33 Self-consciousness as Desire has, so to say, synthesized the pure manifold all the
time: in its own unity, the pure manifold is sublated. Cf. Josifovic (2008): In
this sense, one would maintain that the way in which subjectivity performs
itself is Desire, i. e., if it leaves its immediate identity (as abstract I or motionless
tautology), and orients itself to the manifold of the world of experience, but in
such a way that it negates the independent existence of the world of experience
and wants to maintain itself as truth towards the difference. [Man wrde in die-
sem Sinne festhalten, dass die Art und Weise, auf die sich die Subjektivitt
vollzieht, wenn sie aus ihrer unmittelbaren Identitt (als abstraktes Ich oder be-
wegungslose Tautologie) heraustritt und sich auf die Mannigfaltigkeit der Erfah-
rungswelt einlsst, so jedoch, dass sie das selbststndige Bestehen der Erfahrungs-
gegenstnde negiert und sich als Wahrheit gegenber dem Unterschied behaup-
ten will, Begierde ist.] p. 80.
plying that there cannot be a question of a real relation between mind

and body. The mind that is reduced to a property of an organism no lon-
ger has an own self at its disposal that enables to relate to the body. If the
problem of the relation between mind and body can be solved, mind is
not only a property.
The preceding exposition teached that the problem of the unity be-
tween mind and body cannot be solved insofar as the mind/body unity
is related to an outside organism. Inside and outside perspective cannot
be brought into harmony. From the inside perspective the body is exclud-
ed, but from the outside perspective the mind is in unity with the body.
Therefore, the outside world confronts the mind/body unity to what it
wants to exclude, namely a natural world. If the unity of mind and
body can be solved at all, the mind/body unity must not relate to an out-
side organism, but rather to an outside world that is a mind/body unity,
as well.34 In the symmetrical relation between two mind/body unities, it
seems to be possible that the inside and outside perspective correspond to
one another. The inside perspective in which the body is excluded as an
inessential reality, seems to be affirmed by the outside perspective that fo-
cuses on the mind/body unitys relation to the outside world. In the
framework of the symmetrical relation just mentioned, the outside
world is a mind that excludes the body as well. The outside world is
the reality of what the mind/body unity subjectively thinks to be.
The problem is, however, that the conceptualization of the symmet-
rical relation between two mind/body unities is not trivial, and even
seems to be impossible. An outside mind cannot immediately be made
the object of the mind. The being-object-of-the-mind is mediated by
its body. But how can a mind that makes an embodied mind its object
differentiate between a embodied mind and a strange organism in gener-
al? Rather, it seems to be obvious that it perceives the strange mind/body
simply as a strange organism. As a consequence, it would deal with the
strange mind/body unity as it would deal with any strange organism:
It would try to destroy the strange organism in order to rescue its exis-
tence as pure self. Since the relation between the two mind/body unities
is symmetrical, both unities would try to destroy each other. The result
34 Cf. Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.

(110).
would be a struggle of life and death ending up in the death of one of the
two unities.35
The attempt to develop the adequate relation between mind and
body as the symmetrical relation between two mind/body unities seems
to definitely fail when the struggle results in the death of one of them.
Nevertheless, there is a tradition in philosophy in which the struggle of
life and death between individuals or between groups is presented as a
struggle for recognition. In this tradition, the struggle between individu-
als can result in a situation in which the struggle is overcome because the
individuals constitute a symmetrical relation of recognition, i. e., a rela-
tion in which the individuals relate to one another as self-consciousnesses.
Thomas Hobbes, for example, has the opinion that the so-called legal
status (in which the individuals recognize one another as persons who
participate in a legal order) can be conceived of as a transition from
the natural status (in which the individuals relate to one another in a
struggle of life and death).
Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible?
According to Thomas Hobbes, the natural status can be described as a
struggle of all against all. The goal of the struggle is the maintenance of
the own life. While defending the own life all is permitted, even the kill-
ing of the others. This is the consequence of the ius naturale, the law of
nature that ultimately comes down to kill or be killed.36 The natural sta-
tus, however, can be sustained when the individuals enter into a social
contract. In that case, they submit to a ruler under the condition that
he succeeds in overcoming the mutual struggle. Therefore, in the transi-
tion from the natural status into the legal status, one absolute ruler is ex-
35 In my opinion, Hegels formulation of the struggle is somewhat confusing: Sim-

ilarly, just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the others death, for it
values the other no more than itself; its essential being is present to it in the form
of an other, it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-externality. (114)
It is only from an outside perspective that the struggle can be conceived of as a
struggle for recognition. From an inside perspective, the distinction between a
strange organism and a strange self-consciousness cannot yet be made. That
the self-consciousness values the other no more than itself can only be said
from an external reconstruction of this relation. We will see that only the fear
of death results in self-consciousnesss awareness of its body.
36 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, 1959, p. 66.
Is the transition from the natural into the legal status possible? 29
changed for another: The power of death is replaced by the power of the
social ruler. The profit that is achieved by this transition is the social
order. This order creates room for the labor that produces the riches dedi-
cated to life. In the social contract, the struggle for survival is continued
by other means: The social order can be a more effective means to guar-
antee the survival. The means fails if the ruler cannot maintain the social
order. Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of the ruler is under-
mined and the subjects have the right to chase him away. The distinction
between nature and culture seems to be paper thin. The peace to be
brought about by culture can be threatened at any moment. The return
to the natural status remains always possible, and ultimately depends on
the calculation made by the individuals.
Hobbess construction, however, is based on a false presupposition. If
the individuals in the natural status have the opportunity to calculate and
ask themselves whether or not a contract with a ruler means an improve-
ment, they have, in fact, already left the natural status. If the natural sta-
tus is characterized by the practical struggle of life and death, there is no
room for calculation or for reflecting the others position as a potential
contract partner. Whoever is able to reflect, and knows the difference be-
tween a relation of struggle and a relation of contract, is already part of a
cultural order all the time. Therefore, Hobbess conception of the transi-
tion from the natural into the legal status has failed. The reflecting self-
consciousness cannot be at the same time the presupposition and the re-
sult of the transition.37
Maybe the natural status can be left otherwise. Maybe a legal status
can be created that is not the result of a contract, but rather follows
from a purely practical development. In that case, the legal order does
not presuppose a self-consciousness that already has the ability to reflect
and make free choices. The animal world seems to offer a lot of examples
of a living-together without a developed self-consciousness. Maybe these
examples can help to construct alternative ways for overcoming the nat-
ural status.
Innumerable animal species live together without having a legal order.
Their peaceful cohabitation is not trivial: Animals also have the possibil-
ity to struggle even when they belong to the same species. Therefore, their
37 Cf. PhR 75 comment: The intrusion of this contractual relation, and relation-
ships concerning private property generally, into the relation between the individ-
ual and the state has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitu-
tional law and public life.
living-together presupposes a principle that banishes the struggle and al-

lows them to coordinate their conduct. The cohabitation of the members
of a flock not only implies that they can live in each others neighborhood,
but also that they have the ability to coordinate action. Only this coordi-
nation gives the flock its unity as a flock.
The behavior of animals that coordinate action and form a flock can
be described as the realization of a general law. For, action coordination
only has a meaning under the assumption of a general action goal that is
served by it, for example, the survival of the flock. This general goal can
be interpreted as a general law that is realized by coordinated action.
If it concerns the animals of a flock, the origin of such a general law
can be explained from innate instincts. It can be put forward that these
animals from a natural predestination are predetermined to live in a
flock, although it does not have to be clear in advance which position
they will take within the flock. In some flocks the struggle for leadership
can break out in which the strongest succeeds. Even in that case, the ex-
istence of the flock as such is not the result of the physical power of a
triumphing leader. The struggle is not about the constitution of the
flock, but rather about the individual that will exercise the leading role
in the flock.
If the base of the flocks living-together is interpreted in terms of a
general law, this does not make the flock a legal society. It is true that
the legal status enables one to distinguish between actions that do or
do not correspond to the law. But this distinction gets the legal meaning
only if it is known by the actors. An animal of the flock can disobey the
law. But it can only experience its breach of the law if its behavior is prac-
tically punished; for example, when it went too far from the flock and is,
because of that, caught by a predator. A law can only become the law of a
legal order if it is known by the actors, and the actors know what action is
legal and what is illegal, what action observes the law and what action
does not. Legal order presupposes reflecting self-consciousness and can-
not be situated in a natural order. Once again, the conclusion runs that
the legal status is not preceded by a natural one.38 Although the relation
38 Wildt (1984) seems to suggest that in Hegel the legal status is preceded by a nat-
ural struggle: Oppositely, one has to say that Hegel, in this expression, affirms
the appearance again that the struggle is at all possible as a relation of pre-ethical
and, at the same time, self-conscious human subjects, i. e., as Robinsonate.
[Umgekehrt mu man jedoch sagen, da der Kampf als ein Verhltnis vorsitt-
licher und zugleich selbstbewuter menschlicher Subjekte berhaupt mglich ist
Self-consciousness and the legal status 31
of the struggle can be overcome at the level of living nature in the form of
instinctual laws in which the struggle is transformed in cooperation, these
instinctual laws have no legal status. The laws of the legal status have to
be self-conscious.
Until now, we assumed that the mind/body unity can only exist if it is
able to exclude the strange organism. We concluded that this demands
that the struggle of life and death with the strange organism is overcome,
and suggested that this goal could be achieved in a symmetrical relation
to another mind/body unity, i. e., in a legal status. We have argued that
the constitution of the legal status cannot be conceived of as a temporal
transformation of the natural status. The mind/body unity can only exist
if it has been participating in a legal order all the time. As participant of
the legal order, the mind/body unity is no longer confronted with a
strange objectivity, i. e., the strange organism that has to be excluded. Ob-
jectivity has lost its strangeness because it has been transformed in the law
that is known by the mind. Therefore, the objectivity is no longer practi-
cally excluded, but recognized as an objectivity that has lost its otherness.
Insofar as it can be known by the mind, objectivity and mind must in
some way or another be the same.
The attempt to overcome the contradictions in which the mind/body
unity gets involved, has led to a fundamental change in its determination:
The negative exclusion of strange objectivity has turned into a positive
reception of an objectivity that is knowable. This change, however, has
not been performed from an inside perspective. This perspective will
be elaborated in one of the next sections. Before doing this, however, I
will, in the next section, go into the essential characteristics of the legal
status.
Self-consciousness and the legal status

The actors knowledge of the general law of action is a sufficient precon-
dition to identify this general law with the legal status. The law can be
ascribed to an original lawgiver or be conceived of as having a divine ori-
gin; it can have been transformed into law-instinctual behavior that,
without legal order, would also have been performed; it can serve the in-
terest of many people or that of only one individual. To be valid as a legal
order it is sufficient that the law is known as law. Being known, the law
also als Robinsonade.]. p. 377. However, we will see that all stages of the de-
velopment of consciousness are abstractions of the concrete totality of the polis.
loses its purely practical status. If it is also understood that the law is prac-
tically valid, the law counts as a legal law. Without this insight, the gen-
eral law is exercised as a blind law of nature that not only models the ac-
tions, but also determines them. Only when the actor is self-conscious
and understands to observe the law does he no longer coincide with
his practical actions. Only then, not only the possibility arises not to ob-
serve the general law (incidentally this could have been the case before),
but also the possibility to know that the own actions do not correspond to
the general law. Only then can the actor be made responsible for his ac-
tions, and will it make sense to subject him to jurisdiction. The respon-
sible actor who does not observe the general law commits injustice and
has to bear the consequences of his behavior. Whoever commits injustice
lets himself in for the sanctions of the jurisdiction. This overcomes in two
ways the blindness of the general law that is only natural. Not only will
the violation of the general law lose its innocence, but also the sanctions
that punish the violation. The general law that is known, is also known by
the power that maintains the general law. Therefore, the sanctions on vi-
olation of the law are no longer practical punishments of mindless behav-
ior (the animal that ventures too far from the flock is seized by hostile
claws) but are self-conscious actions. In both cases, the offender against
the general law brings a hostile power upon himself. But when the general
law has become legal, the hostile power has lost its blindness. The pun-
ishment for the breach of the law is no reaction of nature, but a self-con-
scious action that could not have come off (for example, in case the of-
fender is granted mercy). In both cases, the hostile power that has been
aroused can lead to the same results. The offender who is killed by the
blind power of nature can die under legal conditions, as well (when he
is punished by death). Therefore, the decisive distinction between the
natural and the legal status is not the effect of the power that realizes
the general law, but the character of the general power: Is this power
blind or self-consciousness? From the outside perspective, it cannot be
judged whether the animal of the flock observes the general law because
his instincts do not leave him other possibilities, or because he has knowl-
edge of the sanctions that illegal actions can evoke.
Violence, power and the legal status 33
Violence, power and the legal status

The general law is neither a legal law on the basis of its origin, nor on the
basis of its content. Also, a general law that is enacted by a cruel dictator
to serve his own interest can become a legal law. Of course, no plea is
needed to observe that the legitimacy of this kind of legal law is highly
problematic. If these laws can be called legal, then these legal laws, at
the least, are not fair. But why it is nevertheless about legal law? Must
the law as legal law be separated from any moral notion, and is it, there-
fore, a neutral means that can be used by everyone to exercise power, also
by a cruel dictator? Still, what is the difference between the blind violence
of nature and the random will of a cruel dictator?
Indeed, insofar as the will of the dictator has the form of a random
will, the difference is not essential. At the moment, however, that the dic-
tator, in the exercise of his power, appeals to a general law, this power ex-
ecution has lost a bit of its arbitrariness and is characterized by the very
beginning of reasonableness.39 Power execution based on random will, is
not distinguished from violence. Whoever becomes the victim of this
power execution, does not know where he stands. There is no way to an-
ticipate the ruler, because the victim does not know what the former
wants. Therefore, this form of power execution is not effective to enforce
the subjects to coordinate their actions. Because the power has not any
general criterion at its disposal, it only gets validity in the here and
now, i. e., it can only ad hoc enforce an action by immediately threaten-
ing with violence. The fear that is evoked by the exercised violence, or by
the threatening of violence, is the only ground to obey the ruler.
The first step to restrain the random will of the dictator is made at
the moment that the power is exercised in the name of a general law
that is generally known (i. e., not only by the dictator). At that moment,
the dictator commits himself to a norm. If the dictator observes the norm
39 Vgl. J. Hollak, Recht en Macht (Wijsgerig Perspectief 11 (1970/71): Wil ze (i. e.

de macht) zich dan ook als deze vorm blijvend handhaven, dan zal ze niet alleen
de aan haar macht nu onderworpenen maar ook zichzelf moeten binden aan de,
aan haar innerlijke tegenstelling van geboden en verboden geweld ten grondslag
liggende regel alsook deze inhoudelijk moeten rechtvaardigen, daar ze anders zou
terugvallen tot haar fase van puur geweld. (p.322). [If it (i. e., the power) wants
lastingly maintain itself in this form, then it has to bind not only those who are
subjected to its power, but also itself to the rule that underlies its inner contra-
diction of demanded and forbidden violence. Moreover, it has to justify the con-
tent of this rule, because it will otherwise fall back in its phase of pure violence.]
of a general law, the subjects know where they are standing. They know
how to behave for preventing the exercise of violence against them. Only
in this way does it become possible to enforce action coordination. Only
in this way is the most elementary condition satisfied to enforce social
order. This grounds the dictators interest to observe the general law him-
self, although he, as dictator, is not obliged to. Because the law is gener-
ally known, the subjects immediately know whether the ruler observes the
law that he has enacted (or at least has approved). If it appears that the
ruler does not observe the law, it offers the subjects no advantage to ob-
serve the law themselves. For, they do not know whether this is sufficient
to ward off violence. Therefore, by not observing the law, the ruler under-
mines the social order and risks that the power gets the shape of the ex-
ercise of pure violence.
The publicity of the law does not make it a fair one. Publicity, for
example does not need to imply that all are equal for the law. Only
the continuity of the law is guaranteed, because a public law cannot be
changed from day to day. Taken in itself, however, publicity is compatible
with all content, however unfair it may be. Public law can discriminate
between women and men, white and black, nobility and ordinary people.
The public law could even shamelessly formulate that the only important
interest is the interest of the dictator.
It may be clear that the public law cannot have all content. If it is not
more attractive to observe the law than not to observe it, the viability of
the law cannot be explained. Therefore, we can ask ourselves whether
minimal conditions can be formulated to which a viable law has to cor-
respond. What minimal guarantees has the law to offer to make obedi-
ence to the law more attractive than its violation?
According to Thomas Hobbes, the law applies with the minimal con-
dition we are looking for when it enables one to avert death. In the mean-
time, however, we presented the arguments against Hobbes position. The
institution of the legal status necessarily implies that the ruling general
law is known by the self-conscious individuals. Knowledge of the law
characterizes the distinction between the natural society of the flock
and the human society of the legal status. Therefore, a human society ex-
ists of self-conscious individuals, not of individuals who are purely natu-
ral. For self-conscious individuals, the purely physical survival can never
be a sufficiently legitimate basis of the ruling power. This would result in
a remarkable contradiction. How can a status that lacks room for self-
consciousness (a society in which survival is the highest criterion) offer
a solution to an individual who is confronted with the legitimate prob-
Violence, power and the legal status 35
lems just because of his self-consciousness? Therefore, the conclusion

must follow that an individual living in a social order (i. e., a self-con-
scious individual) can only affirm the legitimacy of this order if it guar-
antees his survival as self-conscious individual.
What, however, is the consequence of the aforementioned condition?
Is a legal order able at all to guarantee the survival of a self-conscious in-
dividual? Whoever is self-conscious, is conscious of his own independ-
ence. The self-consciousness distinguishes between itself and the outside
world. The outside world is a strange independence, but at the same time
it is considered continuously by the self-consciousness. In that sense the
outside world only has independence for the self-consciousness, and the
real independence is transferred to the self-consciousness. The outside
world can never be more important than the self-consciousness, because
the distinction between the self-consciousness and the outside world is
only brought about by the self-consciousness, itself. But also, a potential
dictator belongs to the outside world. How can the self-consciousness
ever conform to a dictator without doing violence to itself ? Is it not typ-
ical of the self-consciousness to put itself in the center of the world? How
can the self-consciousness maintain itself and at the same time tolerate a
dictator in the center?
This paradox can only be overcome if self-consciousness thinks that
putting a dictator in the center of the world is compatible with putting
itself in the center of the world. In other words, self-consciousness
must immediately identify itself with the dictator. But why would it
do so?
The last question starts from the wrong assumptions. It presupposes
that self-consciousness coincides with the self-conscious individual who is
more or less able to make his autonomous choices. We will see that such
an individual will only originate when the legal order has passed through
a development. In the elementary definition of self-consciousness, the in-
dividual, autonomous choice is not yet at stake at all. The distinction be-
tween action in the framework of a flock and self-conscious action in the
framework of a legal order is determined by the general law on which the
action is based: Does or does not the actor know the general law? Action
that is determined by instinctual laws belongs to the natural status; if the
general law is known, the natural status has been overcome and trans-
formed into the legal status. Therefore, the question is not whether
self-consciousness would conform to a dictator, but rather, it must be ob-
served that there is only a question of a self-consciousness if action is per-
formed according to a known general law. Self-consciousness has con-

formed to a dictator all the time, i. e., to a known general law.40
The observation that self-consciousness has always conformed to a
dictator can also be expressed otherwise: For self-consciousness, the law
primarily has the status of natural right, i. e., the law rules immediately
and has an absolute, divine status. Although the law is known, this in
no way means that there is room for the consciousness not to accept
the law. Therefore, it is true that at this stage, right is a form of power
exercise that, up to a certain level, can be called reasonable (the ruling
law is known, random will is prevented) but from an outside perspective,
the power exercise has been externally imposed. The factual laws of na-
ture (determining instinctual action) are replaced by laws that are factual,
as well, namely the laws of a holy tradition.
The elementary legal status can be illustrated by the position of Ar-
istotle, who defines the human being as the animal rationale. To under-
stand the human being we have to conceive of him as an animal that also
has a mind at his disposal. The animal strives after the survival of his spe-
cies. His actions are programmed according the laws of his instinct. As a
rational animal the human being has a logos. This means that his striv-
ing after survival is not programmed according instinctual laws, but rath-
er according to self-conscious laws, the laws of the state in which he is
living. Therefore, the state is conceived of as the objectification of the
human species, as social organism in which man gives shape to his striv-
ing for survival as a self-conscious being. Aristotle characterizes the state
as the second nature, as an objective reality that replaces the objective re-
ality of the first nature, i. e., the nature of the body. Both forms of ob-
jectivity are expressed in the ruling of laws. In the case of the first nature,
these laws are naturally given; in the case of the second nature, the laws
are established by men. Therefore, the laws of the second nature can
change, i. e., the human being is an animal that can go through a histor-
ical development.
In Aristotles view, the contradiction between mind and body that
could not be solved at an individual level, is overcome. The mind has
40 Houlgate (2006) is right when he remarks that not all such life and death
struggles in history issue in relations of dominance and subservience. (69) But
he seems to suggest that sometimes (although not always) relations of dominance
and subservience are the result of life and death struggles. Central in Hegels po-
sition is, however, that a natural life and death struggle is incompatible with the
existence of self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion 37
got an own body in the organism of the state. This organism is not de-
termined by nature because the body of the mind is understood as second
nature, i. e., as a nature whose laws are determined by the mind.
Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion

The exposition of the elementary legal status in the two preceding sec-
tions becomes totally superfluous if it remains unclear how the self-con-
sciousness that has to exclude the strange organism can develop into a
self-consciousness with a positive relationship to external objectivity.
We started with the immediate unity of mind and body. Only when all
stages of the development of this relation are necessary will the mind/
body unity be preserved. Moreover, we know now that the transition
from a self-consciousness that excludes the strange organism into a self-
consciousness that has a positive relation to a social organism, can neither
be the result of a struggle nor of any other temporal development. Rather,
it must be shown that the self-consciousness has to integrate conditions
that from the outside perspective are clear, but, from the inside perspec-
tive, remained hidden until now. Transitions of this kind are logical ones.
They change the conceptual determination of self-consciousness in order
to overcome the discrepancy between the inside and the outside perspec-
tive.
From an outside perspective, the self-consciousness that wants to ex-
clude the strange organism, is also itself an organism: It is a mind that is
in immediate unity with its body. Because of this body, external forces
can work on self-consciousness and ultimately cause its death: Sometime
the mind/body unity will be confronted with an external power that it
cannot overcome, i. e., the absolute power of death. According to
Hegel, the absolute power of death can be experienced by the mind in
a relation that he qualifies as the fear of death.41 The fear of death
plays a key role in the solution of the mind/body problem. To elucidate
this claim we need a closer analysis of the concept. The mind, that before
had no awareness at all of its body, experiences in the fear of death its life
as such, i. e., it is related to its own organism as such. Because of this, the
41 It must be clear that this fear of death is not the existential fear of death of a real
individual. The real individual has to be developed as the concrete unity of mind
and body. But the fear of death will appear to be a sublated moment in the real
individual.
mind knows the independence of its own organism: The mind knows it
in its finitude and mortality. But at the same time, the mind is not ab-
sorbed in this finitude and mortality. Because of its knowledge, the
mind distinguishes itself from the finitude and mortality of its organism.
Neither is the mind the essence of the organism, for in that case it would
be conceived of as a kind of (essential) property. The fear of death is, rath-
er, the experience in which the mind not only relates to the organism as
an independent being, but also, at the same time becomes aware of its
own independence that is distinguished from the independence of the or-
ganism. The mind has a transcendental openness to its organism and,
therefore, can be receptive to the own nature of the organism, i. e., it
is able to understand the organism as an independent self. At the same
time, however, the mind experiences that the self of its organism is not
pure. The self of the organism is sunk in nature, i. e., it is not a self
for itself, but only for the mind. And just because the mind conceives
of its organism as this impure, practical self, it can become aware of itself
as the pure self, i. e., the self whose determinations are self-determina-
tions.
If the fear of death can be understood in this way, it is the key for the
solution of the problem we formulated: The fear of death enables the
pure self to relate to its organism in its own independence. The mind/
body problem is not solved by raising the question of how mind and
body can be brought together in an inner unity, but only by the assump-
tion of an organism that is already an inner unity of mind and body at all
times. Only a mental organism is able to develop an explicit insight into
the relation between mind and body, namely by means of the fear of
death it suffers. The problem is not how the pure self can relate to an in-
dependent organism. There is only a question of a pure self insofar as it
has brought about a relation to its organism. In that sense, the purely-
being-for-itself of the minds self is the really-being-for-itself of the or-
ganism that has been brought to its pure concept. Only in the fear of
death can the pure self be explicitly distinguished from the independent
self of its organism.
To understand Hegels concept of the fear of death, we have to ana-
lyze his understanding of the organism. Like the force of lifeless nature,
the organism has the form of a self: It is a unity manifesting itself.42 The
42 Cf. But for us, or in itself, the object which for self-consciousness is the negative
element has, on its side, returned into itself, just as on the other side conscious-
difference, however, is that the self of the organism is an objective self,

not a self that is constituted by the scientist. Independent from scientific
reason, the organism shows its unity by performing the life functions it
needs to maintain its organism. At the moment of the fear of death,
Hegel describes the mind/body unity as a conscious forced back into it-
self (117). The organism of the mind/body unity is no longer able to
express its life functions: These are forced back into the unity of the or-
ganism, making that the mind/body unity experiences the unity of its life,
as such. In that sense the mind/body unity taken as an organism is, in its
fear of death, the really-being-for-itself.43 It is typical for the mind/ body
unity taken as a mind that it can experience the fear of death.44 In the fear
of death, the mental organism is the pure self, the pure being-for-itself
that knows its organism as itself in the form of otherness. In the fear
of death the mind/body unity is transformed into a self-relation: The
mind perceives itself as the pure self that is related to its self in the
form of otherness, i. e., to its organism that is forced back into itself.
In the fear of death, the mind is related to an organism that is not strange,
i. e., to its own organism that it can recognize as itself in the form of oth-
erness.
An animal can experience the fear of death when it is confronted with
an absolute power, the power of death. It can try to escape from this
power and flee, or it can resist this power and fight, or it is killed because
there is no room for fleeing or fighting. The self-conscious organism,
however, processes the fear of death in its own way. Before we considered
the fear of death, the mind was related to a strange organism that it want-
ed to exclude. In that relation it had no awareness of its own organism, its
own body. Its body was, so to speak, an unknown means, unnoticed serv-
ness has done. Through this reflection into itself the object has become Life.
(106).
43 Cf. for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In that ex-
perience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being,
and every thing solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations. But this
pure universal movement, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is
the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure
being-for-itself, which consequently is implicit in this consciousness. (117). In
that experience it has been quite unmanned is the translation of Es ist darin
innerlich aufgelst worden. A better translation would have been: Its differen-
tiated life experiences have been transformed in an inner experience of unity.
44 We will still see that this experience of the fear of death will get shape by repre-
senting the fear of death in a lord: This moment of pure being-for itself is also
explicit for the bondsman, for in the lord it exists for him as its object. (117).
ing the mind. The mind was a lord, served by an unnoticed servant.
When, however, the body is subjected to an absolute power, the mind
can no longer ignore the reality of its body, it sees through the finitude
of its organism and becomes aware of its own mortality. This knowledge
of the mortality is a relation of the pure self to its organism. The pure self
has torn away from the practical relations of its organism. In that sense,
the pure self is free: It has freed itself from the natural determinations.
Because of this freedom, the pure self is able to have an open relation
to its organism: It conceives of its organism in its own nature, i. e., as
a finite organism. The mind knows that it only relates to its organism in-
sofar as this relation is put forth by itself. The finite organism only ap-
pears insofar as the pure self has distinguished itself from it and relates
itself as pure self to its real self, i. e., to its real being-for-itself.
Insofar as it is now possible for the pure self, having experienced the
fear of death, to relate to an independent organism, i. e., its own organ-
ism, the problem of the unity of mind and body is solved from an inside
perspective. From an outside perspective, however, the solution has still
not been found. The fear of death is not only temporal, i. e., linked to
the moment in which the fear of death is experienced, but also dependent
on an absolute power (death) that is practiced on the organism from out-
side. If the fear of death is dependent on the working of an absolute
power, neither the independence of the pure self, nor the independence
of the organism has been adequately expressed. Faced with the absolute
power of death, both lose their independence.
To understand the adequate unity of mind and body at least two
problems have to be solved. Insofar as the fear of death plays a role, it
must not just have a temporal validity. With the temporality of the
fear of death, in some sense death itself has to be overcome. For the
unity of mind and body may not lose its independence on behalf of
the absolute power of death. At first sight, it seems impossible to satisfy
both demands. However, we have already seen that the key for solving the
problem can be found in Aristotle. He also makes an attempt to conceive
of the unity of mind and body. Because he does not situate the problem
at the level of the individual, but at the level of the human species, he
offers an entrance to overcome death: The individual dies, but the species
survives.
The way in which the relation between mind and body gets shape in
the fear of death can be connected with Aristotles conception of the an-
imal rationale when the absolute power that causes the fear of death has
the form of another self-consciousness. Under this assumption, the rela-
tion of the fear of death is transformed in Aristotles state organism if the

following conditions are fulfilled. The pure self that in its fear of death is
related to its organism as to the self in the form of the otherness, objec-
tively contemplates in the other self-consciousness, the self that it thinks
to be itself. As the source of its fear of death, the other self-consciousness
has absolute power over the first self-consciousness. Therefore, the other
self-consciousness is also the source of the experience in which the first
self-consciousness knows itself as the lord of its body.45 The lord of
the body, whom the pure self subjectively thinks to be, therefore, objec-
tively appears in the other self-consciousness.46 The first self-conscious-
ness can recognize the other self-consciousness and practically expresses
this recognition. In its actions it no longer expresses the instinctual
laws of its organism, but the legal laws that are imposed by the recognized
lord. By serving the legal law of the recognized lord, the first self-con-
sciousness has become part of a state organism that corresponds to Aris-
totles conception.47 By recognizing the other self-consciousness as the
lord of the body, the pure self is recognized as the absolute power over
reality. By observing the lords law, human autonomy is expressed. The
state organism can be understood as a reality in which the relation of
the fear of death is objectively, i. e., institutionally embodied. The rela-
tion of the fear of death no longer gets lost by the death of the individual
or by an external absolute power.
45 Cf. Josifovic (2008): To prove itself as the true identity towards its appearance,
the subject has to prove itself as the lord of its body. [Um sich als wahrhaftige
Identitt gegenber seine Erscheinung zu erweisen, muss es sich als Herr ber sei-
nen eigenen Krper erweisen. p. 81].
46 Robert Pippin (2001) has no right when he states that the significance of human
labor is initially merely the avoidance of death. (162) or that self-determi-
nation, viewed as originating in the fear of death, is wholly undetermined by
any specific telos or preset value, some absolute of greater value than life.
(162). Precisely the opposite is true: The labor in service of the lord is an attempt
to realize the absolute essence: self-consciousness.
47 Although Josifovic (2008) analyzes the structure of the fear of death differently,
his conclusion is the same: In the fear of death, self-consciousness learns that the
unity of the species is its essence. (Cf. p. 123.).
The Lord/Bondsman relation

We have seen that the mind/body relation, mediated by the fear of death,
has been transformed in the lord/bondsman relation. 48 While the mind, at
the individual level, can only exclude the body, at the social level inclu-
sion of the body appears to be possible. It seems that the lord can be in-
terpreted as the institutionalized mind and the bondsman as the institu-
tionalized body, i. e., as the body that functions in the framework of a
social organism. At the social level, mind and body seem to be distributed
over two distinguished social roles: lord and bondsman. However, to
avoid misunderstandings, this explanation of the lord/bondsman relation
needs some essential refinements.
To begin with, until now we have characterized the mind as the pure
self. In no way is it possible to assert that the lord is the social objectifi-
cation of the mind. Just because the mind is pure, it cannot be absorbed
in any objectification. Rather, the lord is a specific historical representa-
tion of the mind. The mind can be embodied in a social organism, but
the mind as mind, i. e., the pure self, remains separated from this organ-
ism.
Secondly, lord and bondsman cannot one-sidedly be conceived of as
social roles. The Marxist tradition, for example, to interpret lord and
bondsman respectively as the ruling and the oppressed class, is not com-
patible with Hegels intentions.49 Lord and bondsman are, rather, techni-
cal and metaphorical terms that are useful to express the mind/body unity
as a dialectical relation. As a dialectical unity, mind and body can be rep-
resented as the dialectical unity of lord and bondsman. But once again,
the mind can never be identified with its realization in a dialectical
unity. As pure self, the mind remains transcendental, a free self that is
not determined by natural relations. The crux of the development of
the adequate unity between mind and body is exactly localized in the
problem that the mind, on the one hand, is free, i. e., a transcendental
48 Hegel introduces the lord/bondsman relation as two opposed shapes of conscious-

ness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for it-
self, the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to
live or to be for another. The former is the lord, the other the bondsman. (115).
49 The bondsman is not forced by the master to work on things (p. 69) as Houl-
gate (2006) puts forward. The bondsman serves the lord in a relation of recogni-
tion (that is only practically expressed): for the bondsman, the lord is immediate-
ly his own essence. His submission to the lord is self-submission.
The Lord/Bondsman relation 43
being, and on the other hand, is embodied in the dialectical relation be-
tween mind and body.50
Thirdly, the turn of phrase in which it is said (apparently also by
Hegel51) that the bondsman recognizes the lord as his lord can be mis-
leading. In no way does the recognition at this level concern an inter-sub-
jective relation between individuals in which the bondsman (one-sidedly)
recognizes another individual as his lord. To speak about recognition at
this level makes sense only from an outside perspective. The mind has
recognized its body as its own self in the form of otherness. This recog-
nition is institutionalized in the lord/bondsman relation. From an inside
perspective, this recognition is no relation at all. The recognition of
the lord is practically expressed when the bondsman serves the lord,
i. e., acts according the legal law. At this level, however, the relation be-
tween the legal law and the bondsman is immediate. The legal laws
have the form of traditional values and norms on which the actions of
the bondsman are immediately (i. e., without any critical distance)
based. We will see that the lord, initially, is not a worldly ruler, but rather
a god, i. e., a representation of the bondsmans absolute essence.
Keeping in mind the aforementioned warnings, the lord/bondsman re-
lation can be conceived of as Hegels basic model for the conception of
the unity of mind and body. From an outside perspective, the model is
characterized by two forms of recognition, a vertical one and a horizontal
one. The vertical recognition concerns the relation between the pure self
and the social organism. The social organism is recognized as the histor-
50 Therefore, I totally disagree with Pippin (What is the Question for which He-
gels Theory of Recognition is the Answer?), when he states: Being spiritual
beings is an historical achievement of certain animals; not the manifestation of
an immaterial or divine substance. Said much more simply: The Left-Hegelians
were right. (p. 13) Consequently, I also reject his thesis that There is no super-
naturalism or noumenalism in such an account and it is completely non-dual-
ist. (p.14).
51 Hegel characterizes the recognition between lord and bondsman as a recognition
that is one-sided and unequal. (116). Therefore, this relation has nothing to do
with inter-subjectivity. To begin with, servitude has the lord for its essential re-
ality; hence the truth for it is the independent consciousness that is for itself.
(117). That the lord is the essential reality is only practically expressed by the
bondsman, namely by his labor in service of the lord. Even if the bondsman
has developed self-consciousness (thanks to his labor activities), this does not re-
sult in a recognition of the lord: He only sees his own being in the lord: It is
in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the inde-
pendent being [of the object] its own independence. (118).
ical embodiment of the pure self. As pure self, the individual is absolute,
an end in itself. Therefore, the vertical recognition has to do with the do-
main of morality and (as we will see later on) human rights. The horizon-
tal recognition is situated within the social organism. The social organism
is realized by members who observe a legal law. All members are absolute
equals insofar as they are moral individuals. Because of this absolute
equality, they will express themselves as free and equal citizens of the so-
cial organism. Therefore, the horizontal recognition has to do with the
domain of right. Thus, the lord/bondsman relation, with its two dimen-
sions of recognition, is an elementary model to integrate the domains
of right and morality (of human rights and democracy).
From an inside perspective, however, the domains of right and mor-
ality are still undeveloped. The individuals are totally involved in the
practice of the social organism.52 They cannot differentiate between
their social role and their absolute value as pure selves. Neither they
can differentiate between their social role and their freedom and equality
as citizens. Only when the pure self is integrated in the inside perspective,
when the contradiction between outside and inside perspective is over-
come, can the social organism be conceived of as the adequate unity of
right and morality, of democracy and human rights.
The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation

Although in the lord/bondsman relation the mind/body unity has not yet
found its adequate form, it can be illustrated by historical societies. The
absolute power with which the mind is confronted can be a natural
power. Also a natural power can be recognized by the mind as its lord.
In that case, the natural power is considered as a spiritual power, as a
god who immediately represents the pure self of the mind. Hegel gives
several examples of natural powers that are worshipped as gods53 : god
as light (the sun), god as flower or god as animal (the tribes that represent
their absolute unity in their totem animal54). The most suitable historical
52 But, of course, this does not mean that the individuals consider themselves to be
things, as Williams (1997) maintains: Thus the slave sinks to the level of a mere
commodity, not only for the master, but also for himself. (p. 65).
53 This is discussed at the level of Natural Religion, p. 416 ff.
54 Cf. The actual self-consciousness of this dispersed Spirit is a host of separate,
antagonistic national Spirits who hate and fight each other to death and become
conscious of specific animals as their essence; (420).
The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation 45
illustration of the lord/bondsman relation, however, is elaborated at the

level of the Egyptian world (in the religion of the artificer). In this
case, the lord is the pharaoh, the ruler who is not only the king, but
also the god. Because the pure self this time is represented by a human
being, the bondsmen (i. e., the Egyptians) can go through a learning
process in which they discover that they are in fact themselves the lord.
Originally, there is no room for any learning process. It is only rele-
vant that the labor process serves the godhead. It is of no importance how
the service is specified within the framework of the labor system. Labor
expresses the idea that the social order has power over nature.55 Social
order is the power over nature as such. Therefore, the obedience of the
social order is not subjected to any reflection: It is immediately evident
what has to be done. There is no room for alternative positions.
This learning process has to do with the continuity of the social order
that results in a change of the labor process. To understand this change, a
closer look at the nature of the labor process may be helpful. Labor is not
an action that is immediate and natural, but mediated by the social order
and fitting in a whole of labor division. Therefore, labor presupposes the
intelligibility of nature. Only when nature is, in principle, understandable
is it possible to maintain a labor system in which nature is worked. The
labor system purely practically expresses a certain insight into nature,
namely the insight that nature can be worked in the form of a specific
labor organization. The purely practical status of this insight becomes
clear at the moment that individuals who are working in the labor system
are not necessarily aware of this insight. They only do what is asked from
them in the framework of the labor system.
The stability of the labor system enables its continual evolution. The
ongoing working of the nature contributes to the development of a deep-
er insight into the mechanism of nature. Deeper insight enables the pro-
gressing division of labor; progressing division of labor enables deeper in-
sight.56 The result of this development is that the individual worker at-
55 In contrast to Jrgen Habermas (Arbeit und Interaktion, in: J. Habermas, Tech-

nik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, Frankfurt/M., 1971), who separates labor
and interaction as categories that are fundamentally different, Hegel shows
how these categories cannot be separated.
56 Cf. Karl Marx, who understands the development of labor division as well as a
natural (naturwchsig) process. Da diese Entwicklung [der Produktivkrfte,
P.C.] naturwchsig fr sich geht, d. h. nicht einem Gesamtplan frei vereinigten
Individuen subordiniert ist (Deutsche Ideologie, Berlin 1969, p. 72). (Since
tributes the power over nature ultimately not to the social order, but to
himself. For him, nature has no more secrets. Within the framework of
the social order he is able to subject nature to the desired actions without
being confronted with surprises.57
This shift of power from the lord of the social order to the worker
(the bondsman) is expressed in the differentiation of the workers self-
consciousness. His self-consciousness no longer projects the image of his
identity in the lord of the labor system, but expresses his self in the con-
cepts in which his knowledge of nature is contained. These concepts are
not schemes that are externally (theoretically) applied to nature, but de-
terminations that are mediated by labor activities. For the workers self-
consciousness, these concepts can, therefore, get validity as the essence
of nature.58 By these concepts, the freedom of the pure self, originally
represented by the lord of the labor system, has obtained a specific his-
torical content. The concepts in which nature is interpreted do not ex-
press the concept of nature as such, but only the concept of nature as
it is developed in the framework of a specific (historical) labor system,
i. e., in the framework of a specific social organism. Therefore, the free-
dom of the pure self, being the precondition of the social orders consti-
tution, is hidden behind certain historical ways of expression adopted by
the self.59
The bondsman who has recognized himself in his lord, the worker
who thinks that his concepts of reality are absolute, i. e., are the essence
of reality itself, has fallen into the illusion of having totally realized his
autonomy. He is no longer relating to a god or to any external reality.
He has the illusion that the only reality is the product of his self-con-
this evolution takes place naturally, i. e. is not subordinated to a general plan of
freely combined individuals ).
57 In this sense, the bondsman has developed some freedom. This is the freedom of
the production system as such, not the freedom that can be located in an indi-
vidual as Houlgate (2006) maintains: Accordingly, he will understand himself
to be capable of all kinds of labour and not to be dependent on, or slave to,
any one of them. (p.70).
58 Cf. It is essential, however, in thus characterizing this shape of self-consciousness
to bear firmly in mind that it is thinking consciousness in general, that its object is
an immediate unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself. (120) Hegel calls this
thinking consciousness stoicism.
59 According to Hegel, stoicism is at the level of the Legal status (corresponding to
Roman Law) historically illustrated: The non-actual thought of it [i.e. person-
ality, P.C.] which came from renouncing the actual world appeared earlier as
the Stoical self-consciousness. (290).
The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation 47
scious action. The pure self seems to have totally realized itself, and the
notion that the social organism is only an historical reality seems to
have become totally out of sight. All independent reality that could
have represented the pure self has perished.60
Therefore, the real, historical existence of the social organism makes,
in the long run, the discrepancy between the outside and inside perspec-
tive explicit, and highlights why the social organism until now is not de-
termined in a way in which both perspectives can be reconciled. From the
outside perspective, the social organism must be understood as a specific
historical unity of right and morality. The pure self (the moral self ) real-
izes itself as the legal self that participates in a specific social organism. It
is only important that the moral self expresses itself in the social organ-
ism; therefore, the closer determination of this social organism is irrele-
vant, i. e., is only a matter of contingency. From the inside perspective,
however, the moral self coincides with the historical determination of
the social organism: The real self has concretized itself in the determined
concepts that within the framework of a specific social organism get val-
idity as the concepts of nature as such. The objective reality that, from the
inside perspective, appears as an absolute one, appears, from the outside
perspective, only as an historical one.
To overcome the discrepancy of the outside and inside perspective, it
has to be discussed as to how the unity of mind and body can be devel-
oped in a way that, also from an inside perspective, the mind/body unity
can perceive itself as the pure self that realizes itself in a contingent legal
order. This development will be elaborated in two stages. In the first stage
(the stage of the Unhappy Consciousness) the mind/ body unity will get
insight into itself as the pure self (or as the lord). In the second stage
(the stage of Reason) the mind/body unity will understand the objective
reality to which it is related as a social organism in which it has to realize
itself, i. e., it gets insight into itself as the bondsman.61
60 Robert Pippin (2001) misunderstands stoicism. The stoic self-conscious does not
struggle to understand the significance of his labor. (p. 164). The stoic self-
consciousness is determined because it is mediated by labor. But the stoic self-
consciousness itself has no awareness of this mediation. Neither does it make
sense that this position leaves it undetermined what I am to think (except
that I am to think it) and so is empty, tedious. (164). The stoic self-conscious-
ness is rather characterized by the determinations of his thoughts, just because his
thoughts are mediated by labor.
61 The mind/body unity will develop the insight into itself as the unity of lord and
bondsman: Its true return in itself, or its reconciliation with itself will, however,
The Unhappy Consciousness

The first stage, in which the pure self is made perceptible for the inside
perspective, is performed in the movement that gives the pure self its own
embodiment and liberates it from its absorption by the social organism.
The occasion for the learning process that the mind/body unity can go
through has, again, to do with death. Like the fear of death enabled
the mind/body unity to differentiate its immediate unity and to relate
as pure self to its body, so the death of the social organism brings
about here that the immediate unity of the pure self with the social or-
ganism (or rather, the being submerged of the pure self in the social or-
ganism), is broken: The pure self can loosen itself from the social organ-
ism. We saw how the lord initially represented the pure self and how, later
on (at the level of stoicism) he seemed to have been absorbed in the alleged
autonomy of the bondage. At the moment that the social organism per-
ishes (dies) it also becomes clear from the inside perspective of the mind/
body unity that the autonomy is only appearance. The reality of the social
organism appears to be not dependent on the autonomous action of the
individual, but on an elusive power that transcends reality. It is this elu-
sive power that disturbs the harmony of the alleged autonomy and makes
the individual unhappy. This results in the Unhappy Consciousness, i. e.,
the consciousness that in some form becomes aware of what we already
identified as the constituting moment of self-consciousness, namely the
fear of death, i. e., the experience of the own finitude.62 The Unhappy
Consciousness is aware of its finitude (its mortality) but at the same
time it transcends this finitude precisely because it is aware of the elusive
power that transcends this finitude. Its unhappiness exists in its inability
to bring together the consciousness of its finitude and transcendence.63
display the Notion of Spirit that has become a living Spirit, and has achieved an
actual existence, because it already possesses as a single undivided consciousness a
dual nature. (126).
62 Cf. Consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only an agonizing over
this existence and activity, for therein it is conscious that its essence is only its
opposite, is consciousness only of its own nothingness. (127).
63 We will see that Hegel, in the Spirit and Religion Chapters, in which he recon-
structs the historical reality of the social organism in European history, implicitly
and explicitly discusses several forms of the Unhappy Consciousness. He implicitly
refers to the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of the Ancient Greek world, when
the individual experiences the death of the family member. Explicitly, the Unhap-
py Consciousness is discussed at the level of the Roman Empire, where the death
of the social organism, i. e., the decline of the Roman Empire, is experienced.
The Unhappy Consciousness 49
The transcendental power is not totally elusive for the individual. At

least, it is clear that the power is an absolute one, i. e., a power in which
the real world is grounded, a power over the real world. Moreover, the
power can be determined as an identity because it has turned out that
it can appear in a real social organism. Grounding the identity of the so-
cial organism, the transcendent power must itself also be an identity. But,
at the same time, it is obviously not necessarily linked to its appearance in
the social organism: Its identity is a transcendental, pure identity. Any
closer determination, however, escapes the individual. The individual
has no possibility to represent it in an external power (as he earlier
made the lord the representation of the pure self ), because it is not an
external power that caused the decline of the social organism. The decline
concerns the social organism as such, not the replacement of the one so-
cial power by another. The individual can maintain the pure identity only
as an inner representation without any qualification. The determinedness
of the representation is only felt: The inner representation of the pure
identity is connected with the feeling of an absolute loss.64 The social or-
ganism in which the individual is thought to be at home (in his alleged
autonomy) has declined and appears to be absorbed by the indefiniteness
of the inner representation of the absolute identity. In that sense, the rep-
Hegel interprets the self of the Roman Empire as the stoic self that, after the de-
cline of the Empire, develops into the Unhappy Consciousness: Hence it is only
the Stoic independence of thought, which passes through the dialectic of the
Sceptical consciousness to find its truth in that shape which we have called the
Unhappy Self-consciousness. (454) Hegel describes consciousnesss experience of
the decline as follows: It is the consciousness of the loss of all essential being
in this certainty of itself, and of the loss even of this knowledge about itselfthe
loss of substance as well as of the Self, it is the grief which expresses itself in the
hard saying that God is dead . (455). The third form of the Unhappy Con-
sciousness appears when the results of the French Revolution are reflected.
Here, Hegel develops a concept of conscience that can be considered as the highest
form of the Unhappy Consciousness. The original description of the Unhappy Con-
sciousness in the Self-consciousness Chapter (p. 126 ff.) discusses the elementary
logical structure of Self-consciousness. These structures, however, are formulated
in metaphors that refer to the medieval history, i. e., to the historical period after
the decline of the Roman Empire.
64 From an outside perspective, this inner representation of the pure self in the form
of the feeling of an absolute loss, is the first step to internalize the lord: Con-
sequently, the duplication which formerly was divided between two individuals,
the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged in one. The duplication of the con-
sciousness within itself, which is essential in the notion of Spirit, is thus here be-
fore us, but not yet in its unity: the Unhappy Consciousness is the consciousness of
a self as a dual natured, merely contradictory being. (126).
resentation is the empty remembrance of the absolute loss, the loss of an

absolute home.
The individual can try to determine the pure identity more precisely
by giving the inner representation all kind of qualities. In that case, how-
ever, it gets entangled in the dialectics that characterize Consciousness. 65
An absolute identity cannot be externally determined. The only determi-
nation that does justice to an absolute identity is self-determination. At
this stage, however, the individual is not able to conceptualize the pure
identity as self-actualization. The pure identity is his internalization of
a reality that has gotten lost. The determinations that the individual
can ascribe to this pure identity are factually his own ones, i. e., the de-
terminations of a finite being. Therefore, the absolute identity can be de-
termined as something that escapes to any nearer fixation. As an internal-
ization of the individual, the pure identity is affected by determination.
But as soon as these determinations are specified, they must be taken
back because they are determinations of the finite individual. Hegel
qualifies this undetermined determination of the pure identity as devo-
tion, i. e., as only a movement towards thinking. Its thinking as such
is no more than the chaotic jingling of bells, or a mist of warm incense, a
musical thinking that does not get as far as the Notion, which would be
the sole, immanent objective mode of thought. (131). But the pure self
65 Consciousness tried to identify something that is sensory given in time and space,
i. e., it tries to link the changeable sensory world to the unchangeable mental
world of identifications, and learned that all identification can only be conceived
of as self identification of the mind (Ich=Ich). This process is, as it were, inter-
nalized by the Unhappy Consciousness when it tries to identify the pure self that it
internalized as the Unchangeable. For, it can perform this identification only in
an attempt to link this Unchangeable with the Changeable, i. e., its consciousness
of the finite world. Hegel illustrates this attempt with the attempt of the Chris-
tian belief to identify its absolute god as Christ and as Holy Spirit. Thus there
exist for consciousness three different ways in which individuality is linked with
the Unchangeable. Firstly, it again appears to itself as opposed to the Unchange-
able, and is thrown back to the beginning of the struggle which is throughout the
element in which the whole relationship subsists. Secondly, consciousness learns
that individuality belongs to the Unchangeable, itself, so that it assumes the form
of individuality into which the entire mode of existence passes. Thirdly, it finds
its own self as this particular individual in the Unchangeable. The first Un-
changeable it knows only as the alien Being who passes judgement on the partic-
ular individual; since, secondly, the Unchangeable is a form of individuality like
itself, consciousness becomes, thirdly, Spirit, and experiences the joy of finding
itself therein, and becomes aware of the reconciliation of its individuality with
the universal. (128).
The Unhappy Consciousness 51
that is only the inner representation of a real individual (i. e., the individ-
ual that survived the decline of the social organism), cannot be main-
tained as an absolute one because it will disappear with the death of
the individual. Therefore, the Unhappy Consciousness has, in some
form, to repeat the dialectics of Self-consciousness. It has to free its absolute
essence from the finite natural world. In contrast to Self-consciousness,
however, the Unhappy Consciousness knows itself to be a finite being
that is distinguished from its absolute essence. As a consequence, the in-
dividual tries to find the pure self, i. e., to find an immortal individual in
the real world.66 Such a search, however, is doomed to failure. It is in the
nature of all real individuals to die.67
The failure to find the pure identity in the real world makes sure that
the individual is thrown back to himself and he tries to realize the Un-
changeable by means of his labor.68 The finite existence of the living in-
dividual is dependent on nature as the inexhaustible source of gifts. In-
sofar as these gifts are mediated by labor, labor reveals the existence of an
absolute self, i. e., nature as the absolute source of life. This absolute self,
however, is once again affected by the finite self, simply because it only
66 Like the activity of Desire, this search endlessly repeats itself. The Desire that kil-
led the strange life in order to prove to be the essence of this life, will never have
accomplished its proof because it is, again and again, confronted with other life.
Analogously, the Unhappy Consciousness that thinks to have found an absolute
self, has to repeat itself endlessly. Since a self that can be found is a living self,
it will, again and again, experience that the alleged absolute self dies.
67 Hegel hints at the crusaders who search for a living god, but find an empty grave.
Consciousness, therefore, can only find as a present reality the grave of its life.
But because this grave is itself an actual existence and it is contrary to the nature of
what actually exists to afford a lasting possession, the presence of that grave, too,
is merely the struggle of an enterprise doomed to failure. (132).
68 In this relation, the Unhappy Consciousness can be considered as the self-conscious
repetition of the bondsman who serves his lord. This time, however, the bonds-
man remains distinguished from the lord whom he actualises in his labor. Here,
the lord appears as the absolute source of life, as the nature that enables life to
continue by its gifts. These gifts, however, are mediated by the labor of the
bondsman. The fact that the unchangeable consciousness renounces and surren-
ders its embodied form while, on the other hand, the particular individual con-
sciousness gives thanks [for the gift], i. e., denies itself the satisfaction of being
conscious of its independence, and assigns the essence of its action not to itself
but to the beyond, through these two moments of reciprocal self-surrender of
both parts, consciousness does, of course, gain a sense of its unity with the Un-
changeable. But this unity is, at the same time, affected with division, is again
broken within itself, and from it there emerges once more the antithesis of the
universal and the individual. (134).
appears by mediation of his labor. Therefore, the individual tries to rescue

the absoluteness of the pure self by sacrificing its own reality. It sets aside
its own individuality by serving the pure self that it has represented: it
serves its inner representation as its lord and thinks that it can realize
the lord by sacrificing its own existence.69 If the individual is, however,
in its real actions, not determined by the needs of its organism, but is
able to serve the pure self of the representation, the lord is not the rep-
resented self, but rather the real individual, the bearer of the representa-
tion. The real individual has developed insight into its own pure self and
has become able to understand itself as a moral individual, i. e., as an in-
dividual that makes its pure self, its free self, the essence of its actions.
Therefore, the movement that the mind/body unity has experienced
from the inside perspective is a double one with two opposite directions.
On the one hand, it is the purely practical movement in which the pure
self, mediated by the fear of death, has objectified, and is absorbed by the
social organism. On the other hand, the pure self returns to itself from its
objectification in the social organism, i. e., to the mind/body unity of the
individual. This movement of objectification and sublation of objectifi-
cation has resulted in a real self-consciousness. Now the individual under-
stands that its absolute essence is a pure self. It understands that it is a
moral individual70 that can only do justice to its pure self if this self is
not contradicted by the contingent reality to which it is related.
From an outside perspective, it is already clear under what conditions
the contingent reality does not contradict the real self-consciousness. The
contingent reality must be a social organism that is realized in actions that
69 Here Hegel refers to the medieval monks who tried to be united with their god
by sacrificing their nature and mental existence. It renounces them, partly as
identified with the truth it has attained regarding its own self-consciousness in-
dependenceinasmuch as what it does is foreign to it, a thinking and speaking of
what is meaningless to it; partly, as identified with external possessionswhen it
gives away part of what it has acquired through work; and partly, also, as iden-
tified with the enjoyment it has hadwhen, in its fastings and mortifications, it
once more completely denies itself that enjoyment. (137).
70 It may seem confusing to already speak at this level of a moral individual, espe-
cially since it still takes a long time before Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit,
reaches the Morality Chapter. As indicated in footnote 63, however, the Unhappy
Consciousness is related to the individual insofar as it is not absorbed by social re-
lations: the divine law in the Greek world, the belief in the medieval world, and
conscience in the modern world. We will see that these moments in Hegels Phi-
losophy of Right are systematically developed as moments of Morality.
Reason 53
can be understood as self-expression of the pure self.71 Having developed

the individual into a moral individual, we can examine whether this can
become also clear from the inside perspective, and what are the conse-
quences for the determination of the social organism.
Reason
At the level of Reason, it is investigated under what conditions the moral
individual can exist, i. e., under what conditions the contingent reality to
which it is related does not contradict its pure self. At the level of observ-
ing Reason it is discussed whether the moral individual can be real in a
theoretical relation to the contingent reality. The contingence of reality
comes to the fore in its being sensory-given. Therefore, the question is
whether a reality that is given for the senses can be in harmony with
the pure self of the moral individual. The moral individual has to recog-
nize its pure self in the outside reality; the outside reality must be con-
ceived of as an expression of the pure self.
Insofar as scientists interpret lifeless nature as the expression of natu-
ral laws, they consider lifeless nature to be a self, i. e., a self that is formu-
lated as a force of nature. At the level of consciousness, however, we have
seen that the self of the force of nature is not the self of an independent
outside nature, but a self that refers back to the self of the scientist (cf.
Kants Copernican turn). It is only the living nature that has an own
self. The self of the living nature, however, is not pure, but participating
in the life process of the organism or the species. Therefore, the only
chance for the moral individuals observing Reason to recognize its pure
self in the outside nature, must be situated in its relation to a self-con-
scious being, i. e., to the living self that also has a pure self. However,
the question is whether this pure self can be perceived by observing Rea-
son. Hegels answer is negative. The actions of the real human individuals
are no expression of the pure self. The pure self, rather, manifests itself in
the actions of pure thinking. But observing Reason has no entrance to this
pureness: It is dependent on its observation. In the end, Hegel ridicules
the project of observing Reason in his reference to phrenology. The wish to
observe the pure self is expressed by saying that the being of Spirit is a
71 There would be a reality that is, so to speak, in harmony with the Kantian Cat-
egorical Imperative.
bone. (208) The contradiction in which observing Reason is involved be-

comes clear: What is pure cannot, by definition, be observed.
Since it has been clear that the reality of the moral individual cannot
be conceived of in a theoretical relation to reality, Hegel performs the
transition to active Reason. At this level, it is discussed whether the reality
of the moral individual can possibly be conceived of in a practical relation
to reality. The reason for this attempt is obvious: What fails at the level of
theoretical reason, i. e., the realization of the moral individual in relation
to another moral individual, may be possible at the practical level. At
least, individuals who live together in a social organism are no things
for one-another. Therefore, the question that is raised at the level of active
Reason runs: Can the moral individual realize itself in a social organism?
Since it concerns the realization of a moral individual that has to recog-
nize its essence in the contingent reality, the question can also be formu-
lated as follows: Can the moral individual understand the social organism
as a reality that mediates its relation to another moral individual, so that,
in the social organism, the moral individuals make the other moral indi-
viduals their subject?
At the level of self-consciousness we witnessed the birth of the social
organism. In the social organism the individuals are the bondsmen who
serve the pure self as their lord. Subsequently, the moral individual was
developed as the result of the decline of the social organism: as the indi-
vidual who internalized the pure self as its absolute, inner essence. There-
fore, the question of whether the moral individual can realize itself in the
social organism comes down to the question of whether the moral indi-
vidual can return to its origin. Can the individual who acquired his moral
self-consciousness by leaving the social organism, return to the social or-
ganism without losing its self-consciousness?
When the contingent reality of the moral individual is determined as
social organism, then it is no longer a strange independence that contra-
dicts the absoluteness of the moral individual. As we saw before, the so-
cial organism can be conceived of as the pure self in the form of other-
ness. Therefore, the relation between the moral individual and the social
organism can be characterized as pleasure: The social organism only af-
firms the identity of the moral individual. This time, however, the pure
self is not the self of the lord, but the pure self of the moral individual,
itself.
The moral individual is, so to speak, the bondsman who knows his
own pure self as his lord. Moreover, the pure self is not only the pure
self of one moral individual, but also the pure self of other moral individ-
Reason 55
uals. The moral individuals realize their pure self because they practically
participate in a social relation to other moral individuals. They know that
their pure self is not only their inner essence, but also the essence of the
objective world. The pure self is realized in the social organism that is
produced by the actions of the moral individuals. In this relation, how-
ever, the uniqueness of the pure self, the moral identity, gets lost. Actually,
the reality of the social organism only exists insofar as a shared legal law is
valid. What is realized remains restricted to what actualizes this shared
law. To realize itself the pure self has to determine itself. This determina-
tion is performed in a social organism. This makes it precisely clear that
the pure self has lost its uniqueness or its moral freedom: All moral in-
dividuals appear in a social role that is determined by the social organism.
Here, the tension between right and morality is most elementally
shown. The moral individual who wants to realize himself in a legal
order seems to have given up his absolute moral identity and to have ex-
changed it for the positive social role of the legal subject. The freedom of
the moral individual (implying that all determination is free self-determi-
nation) seems to contradict the positive determination of the social or-
ganism.72 This discrepancy between morality and right is expressed by
Hegel in terms of Pleasure and Necessity. (217 ff.) The pleasure of the
moral individual who again finds his home in the social organism is dis-
turbed by chilly necessity. The unique individuality of the moral individ-
ual gets lost in the general structures of a given social law.
At the level of The law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit
(221 ff.) the moral individual tries to save his unique individuality by
making the law of the social organism his own law, i. e., the law of the
heart. This attempt, however, has to fail. Also the other moral individuals
will try to make the law of the social organism their own law. The result is
a struggle between the moral individuals that cannot be won (unless the
others are eliminated as moral individuals). Therefore, Hegel speaks
about the frenzy of self-conceit: The law of the social organism cannot
be determined from the one-sided subjective point of view.
The potential struggle between the moral individuals can be over-
come at the level of Virtue and the way of the world. (228 ff.) The
moral individual can only tolerate the social organism if he accepts
that he has not the power to enforce the law of the heart. (And even
72 Here Derridas double-bind-relation is thematized. Freedom has to realize itself

to be real, but gets lost as freedom in its realization. Cf., J. Derrida, Prjugs,
devant la loi, in: J. Derrida a.o., La facult de juger, Minuit, Paris, 1985, p. 121.
if he would have had the power, the enforcement of his law of the heart
would not result in the realization of the moral essence). The moral in-
dividual has to accept that the social organism is a contingent reality (way
of the world) that can only maintain its existence when it is actively sup-
ported by the actions of the moral individuals. Although the moral indi-
viduals know that the social organism is a contingent reality, they have to
recognize it as the realization of their moral essence. The moral individ-
uals are virtuous insofar as they try to educate themselves in order to be
able to observe the laws of the social organism. (This education of the
moral individuals is the self-conscious repetition of the education of
the bondsmen. In their practical labor, the bondsmen developed the dif-
ferentiated self-consciousness of stoicism. In their self-conscious labor, the
moral individuals developed a differentiated self-consciousness that they
know as the self-consciousness of a contingent social organism.)
If the moral individuals have developed themselves into virtuous in-
dividuals they can, from an inside perspective, reconcile with the social
organism. But the price paid for this reconciliation seems to be very
high. Right and morality seem to be reconciled by sacrificing morality.
It is true that is was not enforced by external power and was, rather, an
act of self-sacrifice, but nevertheless, morality seems only to survive as
an inner awareness. The legal subjects know that the social organism
has legitimacy only because they have recognized it in their role as
moral individuals. But this moral recognition seems to have no conse-
quence for the reality of the social organism.
Until now, the social organism has not been specifically qualified. It is
clear that the social organism only survives by the actions of its members:
it survives as long as they observe the laws of the social organism. Until
now, however, these laws remained undetermined. Therefore, although it
has been concluded that the moral individuals have to accept the social
organism as a contingent reality, the question must be raised whether
the moral individuals have to accept all social organisms, irrespective of
any specific determination of their laws. This question is discussed in
the section Individuality which takes itself to be real in and for itself .
(236) At this level, Hegel definitely tries to fill the gap between inner
and outside perspective. If the moral individual not only understands
that, for being real, he has to recognize the social organism, but also
knows in what sense the social organism has to be concretely qualified,
then the reality of his individuality no longer differs from his subjective
insight into this reality. Three options for qualifying the social organism
are examined.
Reason 57
At the level of The spiritual animal kingdom and deceit, or the matter
in hand itself (237), the option is considered that the social organism is
immediately given as a traditional society. Like the instinctual laws of the
animal world, the laws in this case are immediately given (cf. animal king-
dom) but, in contrast to the animal world, the laws are also self-conscious.
The individuals immediately know which laws they have to observe (cf.
spiritual animal kingdom). Therefore, the traditional content of the
laws seems the be the matter in hand, itself. The ultimate goal of the
individuals actions is the realization of this traditional content; the ac-
tions of the individuals immediately correspond to the norms and values
of tradition. However, insofar as the individuals are also moral individu-
als, they are only interested in the realization of their moral essence, the
pure self. Therefore, if the individuals act according to the moral values of
the given tradition, they do not really realize themselves. The norms and
values could have been those of another tradition. Contingent norms and
values remain externally related to the moral individuals. What the moral
individuals have in common are not these traditional norms and values,
but rather the moral demand that the social organism expresses their pure
selves.
At the level of Reason and lawgiver (p. 252 ff.), the second option to
determine the social organism is examined. Can the social organism be
the self-conscious product of all moral individuals? Is it possible to iden-
tify laws that are necessary, supported by all of them? According to
Hegel, it is indeed possible to find these laws: This type of laws are called
by Kant natural laws, i. e., laws that can be deduced from the concep-
tual determinations that qualify the relations between the moral individ-
uals. Hegel mentions two examples: Everyone ought to speak the truth
(254) and Love thy neighbor as thyself (255). The first example con-
cerns the moral essence of the individual. Only a moral individual can
speak the truth because of his pure self. As pure self, the moral individual
distinguishes himself from the real world as such. As pure self, he has the
ability to express propositions that qualify things in themselves, i. e., to
express true propositions. Whether the moral individuals can factually
speak the truth, however, is dependent on many contingent conditions.
The second example concerns the realization of the moral individual.
Without the social organism the moral individual cannot be real. In its
turn the existence of the social organism presupposes that the moral in-
dividuals recognize one another as free and equal. In this sense, they have
to love their neighbors as themselves. But the commandment cannot de-
termine what real actions the neighbors love imply.
The third option to determine the laws of the social organism, dis-
cussed as Reason as testing laws (256) is a combination of the first
two options. On the one hand, the point of departure is a traditionally
given social organism, and on the other hand, the laws of this organism
are tested: Are they or are they not an adequate realization of the moral
individuals? But which criterion does reason have at its disposal to per-
form the test? Because the social organism is a contingent, independent
reality, reason cannot impose its own norms and values. The criteria to
test the social organism can only be derived from the social organism it-
self. Reason can test whether the norms and values of the social organism
are consistent, whether the social organism is a viable self. This kind of
testing, however, can never result in an unambiguous determination of
the social organisms laws. Consistent law systems can exist in a multi-
tude. Property, simply as such, does not contradict itself; it is an isolated
determinedness, or is posited as merely self-identical. Non-property, the
non-ownership of things, or common ownership of goods, is just as little
self-contradictory. (258).
The examination of the three options has learned that it makes no
sense to look for the most adequate determination of the social laws.
The moral individual is not unambiguously linked with a specified social
organism. The concrete social organism essentially is a contingent reality.
However, this does not justify the conclusion that the moral individual is
indifferent to the determination of the social laws. It is obvious that a so-
cial organism can offer more or less openness to moral freedom. At least it
can be investigated under what conditions the social organism gives room
to moral freedom.
The mind/ body unity as an historical reality

What is the result of the preceding development? We have observed that,
from the inside perspective (via Unhappy Consciousness, Observing and Ac-
tive Reason) it has become clear what, from an outside perspective, was
already known: The existence of the individual as mind/body unity has
to be understood as a relation in which the pure self is related to an in-
dependent social organism in such a way that it is aware of being the es-
sence of this organism, i. e., that it knows that this organism is the objec-
tification of its freedom. From the inside perspective, however, it is not
possible to determine the content of the social laws. Therefore, the con-
clusion is that the real self, i. e., the mind/body unity, can only adequately
The mind/ body unity as an historical reality 59
be determined by its participation in a contingent, historically given, so-

cial organism: The laws of the social organism are already determined all
the time.
However, not all social organisms will do. They must correspond to
the minimal conditions that create room for moral freedom. Which these
minimal conditions are is already discussed. The institutions of the social
organism must guarantee the development of the moral individual, i. e.,
they must produce the Unhappy Consciousness. Moreover, the institutions
must enable the moral individual to strive after his realization, i. e., the
moral individual must be involved in a learning process that passes
through the stages of observing and active reason. In other words, the
search of the moral individual for the social organism in which it is ad-
equately realized is projected in the social organism, itself. The contin-
gent, historical organism that is adequate to the moral individual cannot
be determined. What, however, can be determined is a dynamic structure
that institutionalizes the search for the adequate social organism. In the
next chapter, we will see that, according to Hegel, this contingent, histor-
ical organism can be identified with the ancient Greek world.
Chapter 2
The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self
Introduction
In this Chapter the law of the social organism, in which the individual (as
the mind/body unity) is real, is nearer determined as the law of a social
organism that is historically found, namely as the Human Law of the
polis, the city-state of Ancient Greece.73 This determination of the social
organism by means of an historically given (contingent) content in some
way joins with the attempt that was made at the level of The spiritual an-
imal kingdom and deceit, or the matter in hand, itself. But the choice of
the Greek city-state is not coincidental. Previously we discussed some ex-
amples of the historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation, such as the
example of the Egyptian world in which the lord of the world (the phar-
aoh) was worshipped as a god. The Human Law of the Greek world,
however, institutionalizes a social organism that (at least initially) has
no gods.74 The Human Law stands for the type of society in which the
bondsmen have recognized themselves in the lord, i. e., a society
that is characterized by the relation of stoicism. The citizens of the
Human Law think to be autonomous; they think that their freedom co-
incides with its expression in the Human Law.
Referring to the ancient Greek tragedies (especially those of Sopho-
cles) Hegel argues that the Human Law presupposes another law, the Di-
vine Law or the Law of the Family. The existence of this second law, ac-
cording to Hegel, is no historical coincidence, but is implied by the ex-
istence of the Human Law. In the Divine Law, the pure self of the citizens
is institutionalized, i. e., the Divine Law is the embodiment of the Un-
happy Consciousness. Therefore, the Divine Law can be considered as
the institutionalized reality of the moral individual.
In the Greek world the domains of right and morality are separately
institutionalized in, respectively, the Human and the Divine Law. More-
73 The Ancient Greece appears as the origin of western culture, i. e., the culture that
produced the philosophical question on which the Phenomenology of Spirit is
based.
74 The original lawgiver, for example, is Solon, a human being.
The polis as the unity of the Human and Divine Law 61
over, the moral domain (the Divine Law) initially does not concern the
living, but the dead individual. The unreality of the moral individual,
however, contradicts his absoluteness. Therefore, the polis is involved
in a development in which the moral individual tries to realize himself
in the social organism of the Human Law. We will see that, in this at-
tempt, the moral individual passes through the same stages as the
moral individual that tried to realize himself at the level of Reason.
Therefore, the moral individual will experience once again that the
laws of the social organism are contingent. This time, however, the expe-
rience is not a hypothetical construction, but an historical reconstruction.
The polis as the unity of the Human and Divine Law

The lordship/bondsman relation is transformed in the relationship of stoi-
cism when the bondsman can identify himself with the lord. The cultiva-
tion the bondsman has undergone in his service has resulted in a reality
that no longer seems to have secrets for the bondsman. The distinctions
in the bondsmans thinking seem to coincide immediately with the dis-
tinctions of reality. In his thoughts, the bondsman supposes to have be-
come immediately the lord of reality. It is exactly this form of stoicism
that characterizes the consciousness and the action of the citizens in
the polis: the action is the transition from thought to actuality mere-
ly as the movement of an insubstantial antithesis whose moments have no
particular, distinctive content and no essentiality of their own (281). In
this action, the pure self disappears behind its historical expression in the
specific historic law of the polis, the Human Law.
Although the actions of the citizens according the Human Law of the
polis are free (the law is a product of human freedom) this freedom is not
yet expressed as such in Human Law. The purity of the free self, the free-
dom that makes it possible to realize oneself in many ways, remains hid-
den behind the factual realization in the ruling Human Law. This means
that the citizen only appears as an instrument of the state. Ultimately, the
state can ask the citizen to sacrifice his life for the salvation of the state.
This does not do justice to the inward freedom of the citizen, to his pure
self that makes him a member of an absolute, supra-temporal moral order
which is distinct from the worldly order of the state. This is a blessing for
the state because it does not need to fear the subversion of its authority by
the pure self. The family is the social organism in which the moral indi-
vidual is embodied.
62 Chapter 2 The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self
If the pure self is not expressed at all in the polis, it would be no more
than a void illusion. Maintaining that the Human Law is an expression of
human freedom would cease to have any meaning. As a result, the law
would only exist, and could have a natural as well as a divine origin.
The human origin of the Human Law can only be understood if this free-
dom belongs to the reality of the polis. According to Hegel, in the Greek
world it is not the state but the family that does justice to the pure self.
The family is not dealing with citizens but with real individuals which
it keeps alive and educates to become citizens. Also, these activities seem
to have nothing to do with the individuals participation in the pure self.
This changes, however, with the death of the individual. For the state, the
death of the individual is a relative loss, the loss of one of its many citi-
zens. Conversely, for the family, the death of the individual is an absolute
loss. Because the family has to educate its members to their ethical role, it
principally does justice to them as free individuals, i. e., as individuals
who participate in the pure self. The submission to the ethical role is es-
sentially self-submission.
The absolute loss of the family leads to a process of experience which
is structured like the Unhappy Consciousness. The absolute essence of the
deceased individual can only be held in the memory of the family and is
thus separated from the objective world. This separation denies the abso-
luteness of its essence. Therefore, the family searches for the dead one in
the real world. However, it can only find the body of the lost individual.
In its work, i. e., in the burying of the body, the family tries to reunite
the dead body, by sacrificing its corporeality (the body is given back to
the bosom of the earth) (271) with its absolute essence. This re-
union, however, is the result of the familys actions. In its entombing
of the dead family member, the family does justice to the pure self of
the deceased. This justice, however, gets no place in the real world.
The deceased, who is honored by the family, has taken a place in the un-
derworld. Individual and community, the right of the pure self and the
right of the citizens of the state, do not need to be opposed if they are
separated and allocated to different worlds. Hegel formulates the decea-
seds right of entombing as the familys duty, i. e., as the Divine Law
that is valid alongside the Human Law. The stability of the Human
Law is saved because the moral dimension is banished to the underworld.
The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in the public domain 63
The abstract work of art: the representation of the pure self in

the public domain
The definite banishment of the pure self to the underworld will fail. The
pure and real self are internally united. This internal bond will inevitably
lead to the penetration by the pure self into the public consciousness and,
consequently, to the undermining of the states stability. This is expressed
in the development of the polis that can be characterized as the return of
the repressed. The freedom of the pure self is the implicit presupposition
of the polis. The pure self will invade the public domain of the polis step
by step. Ultimately, the pure self can claim its place as the formal person.
If this occurs, however, the polis is destroyed.
The development of the polis immediately reflects itself in the reli-
gion in the form of art, in which the self-consciousness of the polis is rep-
resented. Without the threat of this decline, the polis would be in perfect
harmony and the motive to represent this harmony would be absent. This
changes when the harmony is in danger. Since the ethical nation lives in
immediate unity with its substance and lacks the principle of the pure in-
dividuality of self-consciousness, the complete form of its religion first
appears as divorced from its existential shape75 (425).
Apparently, the religious representation has a double meaning. On
the one hand, the representation already expresses the decline of the
polis, for the religious consciousness is a manifestation of the principle
of pure singularity. Without the emergence of self-consciousness, there
would be no need for religion. On the other hand, the decline of the
polis can be delayed when its absolute essence is represented by the reli-
gious consciousness. The religious representation contradicts the actual
decline. For the religious consciousness, the polis still has an absolute es-
sence, even though the facts show otherwise. Here, religion functions as
an ideological consciousness, which is dedicated to the status quo.
From a certain point of view, the polis is itself the perfect work of art.
It is not only a work that embodies human freedom, but also it is the only
existence of this freedom. Freedom has no other mode of being. To be
75 Indem das sittliche Volk in der unmittelbaren Einheit mit seiner Substanz lebt
und das Prinzip der reinen Einzelheit des Selbstbewutseins nicht an ihm hat, so
tritt seine Religion in ihrer Vollendung erst im Scheiden von seinem Bestehen auf
(490/1). The English translation is obviously wrong. The point is not that the
religion is divorced from the ethical substance, but that the religion only gets ex-
istence when the polis threatens to become ruined.
free means to be a citizen of the polis. To be a citizen of the polis means

to be free. There is no way to be free outside the polis. The citizen has no
conscience or subjective identity to differentiate between his public and
subjective role. In this sense, freedom only exists insofar as it is practically
performed. Any reflection on this freedom, any subjective notion of the
citizen about the fact that he is free, would destroy the specific sense of
freedom that is meant here. The polis would no longer be substantial,
for its substantiality would be denied by subjective thinking. This
means, in other words, that the polis, as a work of art, is the exclusive
medium for this type of freedom to appear in. The polis is, in this
sense, the ultimate society of artists.
The harmony of the polis, however, is disturbed at the moment that
the repressed pure self threatens to return and to invade the public con-
sciousness. Then, the harmonious consciousness of the citizen will be un-
dermined and the Human Law will decline. The decline can be warded
off if the Human Law is represented as an absolute entity. Because the
polis itself is a work of art the ideal medium to represent the polis is an-
other work of art. The work of art we are looking for is identified by
Hegel as the statue of the god and the temple, the house of the god.
The statue of the god is an idealized human being and represents, in He-
gels interpretation, the citizen. The ethical substance, in which the citizen
has realized himself, is represented by the temple.76 The temple is the
world of the god, like the ethical substance is the world of the citizen.
It is essential that the god and the temple are works of art that represent
the divine world, i. e., a world that has a stable, absolute existence. The
works express a specific logical relationship, namely, the relationship of
stoicism. For the stoic consciousness, there is only one form, one kocor,
which is both the law of nature and the law of the self. Therefore,
there is no real distinction between nature and self. Correspondingly,
the statue and the temple are both forms of one and the same absolute
substance. Thus, there is also no actual distinction between them. They
represent, to recall a quotation I mentioned before, the movement of
76 The first mode in which the artistic spirit keeps its shape and its active con-
sciousness farthest apart in the immediate mode, viz. the shape is there or is im-
mediately present simply as a thing. In this mode, the shape is broken up into the
distinction of individuality, which bears within it the shape of the self, and of
universality, which represents the inorganic essence in reference to the shape,
its environment and habitation (427).
an insubstantial antithesis whose moments have no particular, distinctive

content and no essentiality of their own (281).
However, in the long run, the moments of the pure self, the coming
to self-consciousness at the level of family in a process of experience that
was structured in the form of Unhappy Consciousness, cannot remain hid-
den from the public consciousness. The result will be that the undermin-
ing force of pure self can no longer be repressed by representing the polis
as an absolute entity and, consequently, that the polis declines. The de-
cline of the polis, however, can, for the time being, be postponed
when the moments of the pure self are not expressed in the form of
self-consciousness but in the form of representation, i. e., as the abstract
works of art. If the moments are represented as absolute works of art
that have their own existence beside the statue and the temple that orig-
inally represent the harmonic unity of the polis, the undermining force of
the pure self is, so to speak, fixated. It is true that the pure self that exists
for the family beside the objective world (as the subjective memory of the
deceased) returns in the public consciousness, but because this return has
the form of the abstract works of art it is compatible with the independent
reality of the Human Law. Human Law is also represented by abstract
works of art that exist alongside the other works and represent their
own absolute reality.
The penetration by the pure self in the public consciousness is done
justice by Hegel when he says that the sculptor does not recognize the ac-
tivity of his actions in the statue.77 The sculptor objectifies his pathos in
the statue, like the citizen objectifies his pathos in the Human Law. 78 The
pathos of the artist, however, is not identical with its expression in the
work of art but also encompasses the moment of freedom.79 The self
77 Since his work comes back to him simply as joyfulness, he does not find therein
the painful labour of making himself into an artist, and of creation, nor the strain
and effort of his work (429).
78 The term pathos shows up for the first time at the level of the ethical world, when
Hegel discusses the objective reality of the polis. The substance does appear, it is
true, in the individuality as his pathos (284). Apparently, pathos is the ab-
solute ethical content insofar as it is experienced by the citizen.
79 It is at the level of religion in the form of art that Hegel uses the term pathos for
the second time. Here, the term has a negative meaning. As the pure form of the
self, the individuality has lost all content. This loss, however, is no emancipation,
is not yet liberation from substantial ties. The loss of the absolute content is ex-
perienced as an absolute emptiness. Or, rather, the absolute being is experienced
in the mode of its total absence. This time, the negative, formless, but absolute
content is called pathos. It is the pathos of the pure self in which all form has
of the artist has dissociated itself from its being immediately determined
by the substance. The work of art is the result of the struggle between the
pure activity of the artist and his pathos. Insofar as the sculptor does not
recognize his activity in the work, the work as well as the polis it repre-
sents loses its absolute status.
The substance of the polis can regain an absolute representation if the
activity of the artist is also represented in the work. According to Hegel,
this happens in the hymn, the second form of the abstract work of art he
discusses. At this level, the god is represented in the medium of the ex-
pressed language. In this medium, the work of art remains, in its objec-
tification, bound to the self. Therefore, the separation between the self
and the substance has been avoided. The hymn is not a thing like a statue
or a temple which, once produced, keeps the activity of the self outside
itself. The hymn only exists in and by the performance of the people.
Here, the religious self-consciousness is pure thought, or the devotion
whose inwardness in the hymn has at the same time an outer existence
(430).
The reverse side of this alliance between the existence of the work of
art and the activity of the self is that the existence of the work of art is
fleeting. The hymn is, in Hegels terminology a vanishing existence
(432). The works objectivity is too much confined in the self and, there-
fore, falls short of attaining a lasting shape and is, like Time, no longer
immediately present in the very moment of its being present (432).
Now it becomes clear what Hegel implicitly already indicated by
using the term Devotion. In the hymn, the theoretical moment of the Un-
happy Consciousness is objectified. In the hymn, the god is represented as
an unchanging but impalpable being. The unhappiness of the Unhappy
Consciousness is due to the contradiction in which it is involved. Because
its god remains impalpable, i. e., it does not appear in the real world, this
been concentrated. The pure self relates itself to the formless essence, as the pure
activity. This pure activity, conscious of its inalienable strength, wrestles with
the shapeless essence. Becoming its master, it has made the pathos into its ma-
terial and given itself its content, and this unity emerges as a work, universal Spi-
rit individualized and set before us (427). This makes clear in what sense the
work of art is an individualisation of the general spirit. Individuality has been
the pure form of the absolute substance itself. Individuality and substance, how-
ever, disintegrate and are transformed into the relationship between the pure self
and its pathos. The specific form of this relationship is objectified in the specific
form of a work of art. Since the work of art gives a renewed and positive reality to
the absolute content, as well, the work of art can be characterized, indeed, as the
individualisation and representation of the general spirit.
god is (negatively) determined by the real world and, therefore, is not

absolute. To rescue the absoluteness of this god, the Unhappy Conscious-
ness looks for its reality. As we saw in the previous chapter, Hegel illus-
trates this search with the example of the medieval crusades that tried
to find the reality of god in the holy land. The crusaders, however,
only found a grave (no real self has an eternal life). Consequently, the Un-
happy Consciousness makes other attempts to reconcile the absolute self
with the real world. By sacrificing its real self, it tries to become unified
with the pure self. If, however, the Unhappy Consciousness succeeds in
overcoming its real self, the Consciousness itself appears to be the absolute
essence of the real self.
The development of the abstract work of art is structured in accord-
ance with the Unhappy Consciousness: The pure self that is represented
in the hymn must be reconciled with the real world. In the abstract
Cult, the third form of the abstract work work of art, the real self is raised
into being the pure divine element (433) by ritual actions: a soul that
cleanses its exterior by washing it, and puts on white robes, while its in-
ward being traverses the imaginatively conceived path of works, punish-
ments, and rewards, the path of spiritual training in general, i. e., of rid-
ding itself of its particularity, as a result of which it reaches the dwellings
and the community of the blest (433).
Like the search for the real self that is divine, the attempts of the ab-
stract Cult will fail. The ritual actions cannot really change the real self
into a divine self. Therefore, a second attempt has to be made in the ac-
tual Cult, the fourth form of the abstract work. The actual Cult is the ac-
tion that can be understood as a spiritual movement, because it is this
twofold process, on the one hand, of superseding the abstraction of the
divine Being (which is how devotion determines its object) and making
it actual, and, on the other hand, of superseding the actual (which is
how the doer determines the object and himself ) and raising it into uni-
versality (433/4). The central action of the actual Cult is an act of sac-
rifice. On the one hand, the divine Being is sacrificed: The animal sac-
rificed is the symbol of a god; the fruits consumed are the living Ceres and
Bacchus themselves (434). On the other hand, the actual is sacrificed to
divine Being: with the pure surrender of a possession which the owner,
apparently without any profit whatever to himself, pours away or lets rise
up in smoke (434). The result of these sacrifices is the transformation of
the divine Being into self-conscious existence, and the self has conscious-
ness of its unity with the divine Being (435).
In the unity of self and divine Being, the devotion is robbed of its
outer existence. The Cult replaces this defect and produces a dwelling
and adornments for the glory of god (435). Once again, it appears
that the labor in which the self sacrifices itself for the god ultimately
shows that the real self is the essence of god: The dwellings and halls
of the god are for the use of man, the treasures preserved therein are
his own in case of need; the honor and glory enjoyed by the god in
his adornment are the honor and the glory of the nation, great in soul
and in artistic achievement (435).
The polis as a harmonic unity

In the first section, we saw that the loss of family members resulted in a
dialectic movement structured according to the Unhappy Consciousness. As
a result of this movement, the family appeared as the essence of the pure
self. The pathos of the family is expressed in the Divine Law. The duty of
the Divine Law guarantees that the pure self of the deceased member re-
mains preserved in the memory of the family. In this sense, the Divine
Law is, so to say, the institutional house of the pure self that is distin-
guished from the domain of the state.
The separation between Human and Divine Law seemed to protect
the state from the undermining force of the pure self. The pure self, how-
ever, is the presupposition of the freedom of the states citizen. Therefore,
the penetration by the pure self into the public consciousness cannot be
prevented; this penetration can only be postponed by representing the re-
lation between citizen and polis in works of art, i. e., as the fixed relation
between statue and temple. As a product of the artist, however, the work
of art also presupposes the pure self and is, itself, undermined in its ab-
soluteness. To repair the absoluteness of the work, the pure self is repre-
sented in its turn as an abstract work of art, structured according the mo-
ments of the Unhappy Consciousness. This time, the result of the dialectic
movement shows the state as the appearance of the pure self. The pathos
of the state (expressed in the Human Law) is no longer separated from the
pathos of the family, but is explicitly understood as the realization of the
pure self.
Now, also the individuals themselves can conceptualize the polis as a
harmonic unity in which all the moments of Reason are objectified.80 The
80 From the outside perspective, this was already clear. In Chapter 2, it has been ela-
Repression of the deed: the living work of art 69
pure self that is institutionalized in the family relates to the objective

world of the state in which it can recognize its own essence. If the relation
is theoretically considered, it appears as the reality of the observing reason:
What observation knew as a given object in which the self had no part, is
here a given custom, but a reality which is, at the same time, the deed and
the work of the subject finding it (276). From a practical perspective, it
is the reality of the active reason: The individual who seeks the pleasure
of enjoying his individuality, finds it in the Family, and the necessity in
which that pleasure passes away is his own self-consciousness as a citizen
of his nation. Or, again, it is in knowing that the law of his own heart is
the law of all hearts, in knowing the consciousness of the self as the ac-
knowledged universal order; it is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sacri-
fice, that brings about what it sets out to do, viz., to bring forth the es-
sence into the light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life. (276/
7).
From a totalizing perspective, it is the reality of the matter in hand:
Finally, consciousness of the matter in hand, itself, finds satisfaction in
the real substance which contains and preserves in a positive manner the
abstract moments of that empty category. That substance has, in the eth-
ical powers, a genuine content that takes the place of the insubstantial
commandments which sound Reason wanted to give and to know; and
thus it gets an intrinsically determinate standard for testing, not the
laws, but what is done. (277).
Repression of the deed: the living work of art

The harmonic unity of the polis is only guaranteed when the citizens
commit no deeds in the pregnant sense, i. e., deeds that are uncondition-
ally free: Their actions have to be in accordance with the prevailing
Human Law. This guarantee fails, however, at the moment that the
Human Law is understood as an expression of the pure self. The pure
borated that the individuals as mind/body unity can only exist under the condi-
tion that the moral individual can recognize himself in the objective world.
Under what condition, in its turn, this recognition is possible is developed at
the level of Reason. Therefore, the conception of the polis as the reality of the
human individual presupposes that the polis is the concrete reality of all the mo-
ments that were passed through to conceive the unity of mind and body. All pre-
vious stages of consciousness are abstract forms of it [i.e., the substantial reality of
the polis, P.C.]. (264).
self is basically a free self that is able to commit any action or, at least,
actions that are not in accordance with the prevailing Human Law.
Therefore, the harmony of the polis is dependent upon restrictive condi-
tions that must be imposed on possible actions. These conditions can be
specified for the different relations that the free individual can take upon
himself towards the polis, i. e., they can be specified for the different mo-
ments of the objectified Reason that compose the polis. We will see that
these conditions are represented in the living and the spiritual works of art.
In the living work of art, the first moment of the objectified Reason,
i. e., the observing Reason, is represented as an absolute, everlasting rela-
tionship. At this level, the statue is unified with its precondition, the
pure self, and has developed into a living statue expressed by living in-
dividuals. The two forms of living art represent, respectively, the Divine
and the Human Law as separated entities. In this separation, the external,
theoretical relationship between the Laws is reflected, which characterizes
the form of the observing Reason.
We have seen that the Divine Law is the house of the pure self. By
means of the Divine Law, the pure self is given an institutional body. The
pure self and its incorporation, mind and body, are represented in the
mystery of bread and wine, of Ceres and Bacchus (438). Ceres stands
for the feminine principle of the body: the simple essence as the move-
ment, partly out of its dark night of concealment up into consciousness,
there to be its silently nourishing substance; but no less, however, the
movement of again losing itself in the nether darkness, and lingering
above only with a silent maternal yearning (437). Bacchus stands for
the masculine principle of the mind. As the moving impulse he is:
nothing but the many-named divine Light of the risen Sun and its un-
disciplined tumultuous life which, similarly let go from its [merely] ab-
stract Being, at first enters into the objective existence of the fruit, and
then, surrendering itself to self-consciousness, in it attains to genuine re-
alityand now roams about as a crowd of frenzied females, the untamed
revelry of Nature in self-conscious form. (437/8).
The Human Law is the mediated house of the pure self, in which its
mediated existence as citizen has been given a second nature in the objec-
tive institutional body of the state. This mediated unity of mind and
body is represented in the athlete of the Olympic Games, the inspired
and living work of art that matches strength with its beauty; and on
him is bestowed, as a reward for his strength, the decoration with
which the statue was honored, and the honor of being, in place of the
god in stone, the highest bodily representation among his people of
The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art 71
their essence (438.) In the representation of the athlete, it becomes clear

how the religious consciousness regulates the actions of the free citizen
(and postpones the decay of the polis). The freedom of the citizen re-
mains encased in natural boundaries: Mind and body appear as strength
and beauty, i. e., as cultivated nature.
The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art

At the level of the active reason, however, the citizen cannot accept boun-
daries that are set by an external, natural world. The active reason wants to
relate itself to an external world that it can recognize as the result of is
own action. Therefore, this world can only be a social world. This is il-
lustrated by the moments of the active reason as they appear in the har-
monic unity of the polis.
The first moment of the active reason, Pleasure and Necessity, consid-
ered within the harmonic unity of the polis, is described by Hegel as fol-
lows: The individual who seeks the pleasure of enjoying his individuality,
finds it in the Family, and the necessity in which that pleasure passes away
is his own self-consciousness as a citizen of his nation (276). If, however,
the individual becomes aware of his pure freedom, he will no longer ac-
cept the self-consciousness of the Human Law and will resist it as a
strange necessity. Once again, the stability of the polis is threatened. To
ward off this threat, the moment of Pleasure and Necessity is represented
as an absolute relation in the first form of the spiritual work of art, name-
ly, the Epic.
In the spiritual work of art, the representation of the pure self is no
longer separated from the representation of its objective expression like
in the living work of art.81 In the spiritual work, the self is represented
as the self expressing itself. Therefore, speech is its medium: The perfect
element in which inwardness is just as external as externality is inward is
once again speech (439). At the level of the Epic, however, the self
that expresses the speech, the minstrel, is still distinguished from the
self that is expressed in the speech. What is expressed is Mnemosyne,
recollection and a gradually developed inwardness, the remembrance of
essence that formerly was directly present (441). Here, Hegel is making
reference to Homers Iliad. In this work, the expression of the self is still
81 In the Bacchic enthusiasm it is the self that is beside itself, but in corporeal beau-
ty it is spiritual essence (439).
the result of the synthetic representation of the minstrel: It is no longer

the actual practice of the Cult, but a practice that is raised, not yet indeed
into the Notion, but at first into picture-thinking, into the synthetic link-
ing-together of self-consciousness and external existence. (440).
In the Epic, Pleasure is represented by human action, i. e., the actions
of the heroes. The actions of the heroes, however, are managed by the
gods: The universal powers have the form of individuality and hence
the principle of action in them; what they effect appears, therefore, to
proceed entirely from them and to be as free an action as that of men.
Consequently, both gods and men have done one and the same thing.
The earnestness of those divine powers is a ridiculous superfluity, since
they are, in fact, the powers or strength of the individuality performing
the action; while the exertions and labor of the latter is an equally useless
effort, since it is rather the gods who manage everything. (441/2).
However, over the many gods hovers the universal self, the might of
Necessity. They are the universal, and the positive, over against the in-
dividual self of mortals which cannot hold out against their might; but
the universal self, for that reason, hovers over them and over this whole
world of picture-thinking to which the entire content belongs, as the irra-
tional void of Necessity . . . (443).
As long as the universal self of Necessity remains undetermined, it
remains unclear how the unity of society can be concretized. Therefore,
the empty self of Necessity has to be transformed into the determined
law of society. We have already seen how the polis can exist as the har-
monic unity of two laws, the Human and the Divine Law. This harmony
is guaranteed insofar as the Divine Law restricts itself to the underworld
so that its action does not interfere with the action of the Human Law,
i. e., when no deed has been committed. In this case, all can accept
the Human Law so that there is no need for the law of the heart to
be revealed as the frenzy of self-conceit. The law of the heart can be un-
derstood as a constituting moment of the harmonic totality of the polis:
Or, again, it is in knowing that the law of his own heart is the law of all
hearts, in knowing the consciousness of the self as the acknowledged uni-
versal order (276).
Principally, however, the deed is unavoidable because the pure self of
the family and the real self of the polis do not immediately coincide.
(Their reciprocal relation has to be developed). This is exemplarily illus-
trated by Creons ban to entomb Polynices, who sacrificed the interest of
the state for his own interest. The clash between the two laws is post-
The representation of the deed: the spiritual work of art 73
poned because in the Tragedy, their ultimate harmony is represented as an

absolute one.
This appeal to the tragedy seems to be strange because Hegel also de-
scribes the deed and the decline of the harmonic unity of the polis in
terms of the Tragedy, in particular, Sophocles Antigone. In the tragedy,
however, the clash between the two laws is accompanied by a process
that Hegel calls the depopulation of Heaven (449). It is this process
that, for the time being, can retain the appearance of harmony.
First, the Chorus of the Elders representing the people praises a
multitude of gods: Lacking the power of the negative, it is unable to
hold together and so subdue the riches and varied abundance of the di-
vine life, but lets it all go its own separate ways, and in its reverential
hymns it extols each individual moment as an independent god, first
one and then another (444). The clash between the two laws, however,
is reflected in the religious representation: If, then, the ethical substance,
in virtue of its Notion, splits itself as regards its content into powers which
were defined as Divine and Human Law, or law of the nether and of the
upper worldthe one of the Family, the other the State power, the first
being the feminine and the second the masculine charactersimilarly,
now, the previously multiform circle of gods with its fluctuating charac-
teristics confines itself to these powers which are thereby brought closer
to genuine individuality. (445).
Both charactersthe actor of the Human Law and the actor of the Di-
vine Laware one-sided: They only know the content of their own law.
Therefore, their consciousness is intrinsically connected with the side of
not-knowing: Therefore, the two sides of consciousness which have,
in actuality, no separate individuality peculiar to each, receive, when pic-
torially represented, each its own particular shape: the one, that of the rev-
elatory god, the other, that of the Furies who keep themselves concealed.
In part, both enjoy equal honor, but again, the shape assumed by the sub-
stance, Zeus, is the necessity of the relation of the two to each other.
(447/8).
In the deed, the one-sidedness of the ethical powers becomes man-
ifest, resulting in the decay of these powers: The action, in being carried
out, demonstrates their unity in the natural82 downfall of both powers
and both self-conscious characters. The reconciliation of the opposition
with itself is the Lethe of the underworld in death; or the Lethe of the
82 Natural is the translation of gegenseitig. A better translation would have been

reciprocal.
upper world as absolution, not from guilt (for consciousness cannot deny
its guilt, because it committed the act83) but from the crime; and also the
peace of mind following atonement for the crime. (448).
The downfall of the ethical powers is reflected in the completion of
the depopulation of Heaven: The self-consciousness that is represented
in the Tragedy knows and acknowledges, therefore, only one supreme
power, and this Zeus only as the power of the state or of the heart,
and in the antithesis belonging to knowing [of knower and known],
only as the father of the particular that is taking shape in the knowing;
and also as the Zeus of the oath and the Furies, the Zeus of the universal,
of the inner being dwelling in concealment. (449).
Self-consciousness, which has kept Zeus as its only god, has lost its
specific content. Zeus has become the representation of the pure form
of self-consciousness. Therefore, self-consciousness is no longer able to
rescue the ethical substance by sacrificing its self-conscious action. The
pure self is explicitly separated from the contingent reality. The third mo-
ment of the active reason, Virtue and the way of the world, ceases being a
constituting moment of the reality of the polis.84 Self-consciousness, the
simple certainty of self, is, in fact, the negative power, the unity of Zeus,
of substantial being and of abstract Necessity; it is the spiritual unity into
which everything returns (449/50). This negative power of self-con-
sciousness is represented in the Comedy: The self-consciousness of the
hero must step forth from his mask and present itself as knowing itself
to be the fate both of the gods of the chorus and of the absolute powers
themselves, and as being no longer separated from the chorus, from the
universal consciousness (450).
In contrast to the self of the gods, the self of self-consciousness is not
imagined. Moreover, the self of self-consciousness is not dependent on a
substantial being: It is only involved in a substantial power insofar as it
acts its part by putting on its mask. But the self quickly breaks out
again from this illusory character and stands forth in its own nakedness
and ordinariness, which it shows to be not distinct from the genuine
self, the actor, or from the spectator (450). This play between the self
of the mask and the genuine self is the exhibition of the ludicrous con-
83 A better translation would have been deed.

84 We have already seen how Hegel characterized Virtue and the way of the world as
a constituting moment of the polis: It is virtue, which enjoys the fruits of sac-
rifice, that brings about what it sets out to do, viz., to bring forth the essence into
the light of day, and its enjoyment is this universal life (276).
Conclusion 75
trast between [the self s] own opinion of itself and its immediate exis-
tence, between its necessity and contingency, its universality and its com-
monness (451).
The self that has emancipated itself from the ethical substance is the
free self with the capacity for reasonable thinking.85 Its gods are no longer
coincidental individualities that reflect the divers powers in the ethical
world. Reasonable thinking develops their individualities into the simple
Ideas of the Beautiful and the Good in which return, at the highest level
of abstraction, the Divine and Human Laws. (In the Beautiful the individ-
ual gets a universal meaning and in the Good the community encompass-
es the interests of the individuals). Insofar as the gods have a natural side,
they are clouds,86 an evanescent mist, like those imaginative representa-
tions (451/2).
Because of their abstractness, the thoughts of the Beautiful and the
Good are empty so that any individual has the opportunity to give
them his or her own meaning and make them the result of his or her co-
incidental, contingent individuality: Therefore, the Fate which up to
this point has lacked consciousness and consists in an empty repose
and oblivion, and is separated from self-consciousness, this Fate is now
united with self-consciousness. The individual self is the negative power
through which and in which the gods, as also their moments, viz. existent
Nature and thoughts of their specific character, vanish. At the same time,
the individual self is not the emptiness of this disappearance but, on the
contrary, preserves itself in this very nothingness, abides with itself and is
the sole actuality. (452).
Conclusion
The religion of the work of art is the religion of freedom in its immediate
form. It is the religion of the ancient Greek people that has objectified the
free self in the polis: The polis is the concrete totality of all moments of
the free self. In the immediate form of the polis, however, freedom as
such (i. e., the free self in its pure form) is not objectified. The pure
85 J. Heinrichs, Die Logik der Phnomenologie des Geistes, Bonn, 1974. He thinks
that the transition of the Greek religion into reasonable thinking corresponds
to the transition from Unhappy Consciousness to Reason, see p. 441. However,
we have seen that Reason is already represented by the living and the spiritual
work of art.
86 Here, of course, Hegel is referring to Aristophanes Comedy, The Clouds.
self is the hidden presupposition of the polis. The reality of the polis is
only a specific historical form of the polis that exists beside a multitude of
other poleis. In the struggle between the poleis, each polis can become
ruined. Their decay appears as an external power, as the empty self of
Fate. In fact, the decay of the polis is caused by an internal power,
i. e., by the penetration of the ethical life of the polis by the pure self.
The development of the polis is the process in which the empty self of
Fate is recognized as the pure self of the real individual. The pure self will
be understood as the Fate of ethical life. In the end, the only reality is the
reality of the contingent self that knows that in its part as persona, it is the
master of this reality.
The development of the polis is an ongoing learning process that is
performed by means of religious representations: All the constituting mo-
ments of the ethical life, the moments of the free self, are successively rep-
resented by a work of art.87 This representation mediates a raising of the
conscious, which results in the explication of the pure self as the presup-
position of the polis.88 At this point, the decay of the polis is over.
The religion of the work art first appears at the moment the pure self
of the individual threatens to penetrate the public domain of the polis.
The decay of the polis is warded off by representing the relation between
individual and community as an absolute and harmonious relation: in
the representation of the statue of the god and the temple. The statue
and the temple, however, cannot repress the pure self because they only
represent the objective appearance of individual and community, not
the free activity that is presupposed by them. Therefore, the pure self
is represented as an absolute being in the abstract work of art. The devel-
opment of the abstract work of art results in the living work of art in which
the representation of the pure self is immediately united with its reality:
87 W. Jaeschke, Vernunft in der Religion, Stuttgard 1986. He interprets the abstract,

living and spiritual works of arts as historical stages of the religion of the work of
art (see p.208). Although within the development of the spiritual work of art
there seems to be some chronological succession, the religious forms represent
the moment of the polis which are real at the same time. Therefore, it is not nec-
essary that the logical development totally coincides with a chronological one.
88 R. Bubner, Die Kunstreligion als politisches Projekt der Moderne in A. Arndt
a.o. (Ed.) Hegel Jahrbuch 2003, Glauben und Wissen. Erster Teil, p. 310: Die
Generalformel einer Entwicklung der Substanz zum Subjekt erzeugt in der spe-
zifischen Anwendung auf das Religionskapitel, das wir diskutierten, die Eigen-
tmlichkeit, da in der griechischen Lebensform das Substantielle eingebter,
weitergereichter und durch Tradition besttigter Sittlichkeit bereits durch sthe-
tische Transformation vom Ansichsein zum Frsichsein emporgehoben ist.
Retrospection 77
In the athlete of the Olympic Games, the statue of god has become a liv-
ing god.
In the athlete, however, the pure self remains embedded in natural
relations. It is only at the level of the spiritual work of art that the self
can be expressed as a spiritual one, i. e., as a self that transcends the nat-
ural relations. In the Epic, Tragedy and Comedy, the pure self is successive-
ly represented as the abstract self of Fate, the self-conscious self of Zeus,
who is the only one supreme power, and the pure self of the real individ-
ual that understands itself as the Fate of the world.
Retrospection
We have seen that the polis can be reconstructed as a free state, i. e., as a
social organism borne by free citizens who think that they, by observing
the law, can objectify their pure freedom. This alleged autonomy, howev-
er, can only be maintained when the pure self of the citizen can be kept
outside the public consciousness: For this pure self, the real social organ-
ism must appear as a contingent order. The pure self is not only embod-
ied in a social organism that is distinguished from the state, namely the
family, but is also placed in another world, i. e., the underworld. The ob-
jectification of the pure self is separated from the objectification of the
real self. Both objectifications are distributed over family and state,
over the Divine and Human Law.
The stability of the polis is continuously threatened by the freedom of
the pure self. This threat is warded off when the public consciousness rep-
resents the social organism as an absolute reality: In two works of art, in
the temple and the statue of god, citizen and polis are represented as an
absolute relation.
The representation of the polis in the works of art, however, cannot
definitely repress the pure self. The works of art themselves are also a
product of the pure self: They are products of free artists. In its pureness,
the pure self is a being that remains elusive and, therefore, it can only be-
come a subject of self-consciousness in the form of the Unhappy Con-
sciousness. By representing the forms in which the Unhappy Consciousness
tries to realize itself in its turn as an absolute work of art, the potential
undermining working of the pure self can be warded off. In this case,
the forms of the Unhappy Consciousness are represented alongside the ab-
solute representation of the polis. Ultimately, it appears that not the ab-
solute work of art, but the real individual is the appearance of the pure
self: The real self is a moral individual.
As long as the moral individual is in harmony with the state, it is con-
vinced that it realizes its freedom in the state, i. e., it is related to the state
as the realized observing and active Reason. Because of the contingent
character of the state organism, however, the harmony cannot stand
firm. The individual has the freedom to perform actions that are not
in harmony with the Human Law 89 and undermine its order. To regain
the stability of the polis, the inharmonious relation between individual
and polis is again represented in a work of art and fixated as an absolute
relation. Insofar as the individual relates to the polis in the form of the
observing Reason, this relation is represented in the living work of art; in-
sofar as the individual is related to the polis in the forms of active Reason,
these relations are represented in the spiritual works of art.
At the level of the comedy, however, it is the representation of the
work of art itself that reveals that the work of art represents a contingent
reality as if it were a divine one. Then the individual can become aware of
the contingence of the social organism in which he is living. Consequent-
ly, the Human Law loses its legitimacy as the alleged expression of the in-
dividuals freedom. This works out in the decline of the Greek world. The
attempt to synthesize the moral and legal dimension has failed; Divine
and Human Law exclude one another.
This conclusion corresponds with the conclusion that was drawn at
the level of the Animal Kingdom. The moral individual cannot adequately
realize itself in a social organism that is contingently given. This time,
however, the conclusion is not drawn on the basis of a hypothetical recon-
struction of a social organism, but on the basis of the reconstruction of an
historical social order. Therefore, the decline of the polis does not lead to
the lawgiving Reason, like the reaction was to the failure of the Animal
Kingdom, but to the reconstruction of a new historical social order: a so-
cial order in which the deficiency of the Greek society is overcome and in
which a new attempt is made to the adequate realization of the moral in-
dividual. Hegel identifies the Roman Empire as this new social order.
89 Hegels example of this individual is Antigone.

The Roman Empire as the result of the Greek World 79
The Roman Empire as the result of the Greek World

According to Hegels reconstruction, the social organism of the Roman
Empire is characterized by the property right of Roman Law. The
Roman citizen is a formal legal person, who owns property. Insofar as
the formal person is free, he is a moral individual that tries to realize
its pure self. By the decline of the Greek World, the moral individual
has learnt that the social organism is a contingent reality and has no ab-
solute ground. Insofar as he played a social role, he was not realizing an
absolute essence, but only wearing a mask. The characters of the tragedy,
recognizable by their masks, appeared to be dependent on real individu-
als. Therefore, if the moral individual can realize himself, he has to turn
to the real individual, not to the social roles of the state organism. Since
the real individual has existence in the social organism of the family, it
appears that it is not a contingent social organism (the state) but a self
constituted social organism (the family).
The person of the Roman Law is, from the inside perspective, the
moral individual that realizes his pure self in the social organism of the
family. On the one hand, the person is free, i. e., he has a pure self; on
the other hand, the person owns property, i. e., he has the right to impose
his will on the properties he owns. The consumption of the properties is
not dedicated to the survival of the persons physical organism, his body,
but rather to the survival of the social organism of the family, i. e., of the
social organism in which the person expresses his free will. The person is,
so to speak, the lord who serves himself as bondsman in the consumption
of his properties. Because of this reason, Hegel also calls the person the
first self. Until now, the moment of the lord (the moral dimension)
and the moment of the bondsman (the legal dimension) were distributed
over distinguished institutions. In the person, however, the moments are
for the first time united in a single individual. Therefore, the person is a
self, an individual unity of mind and body.
As the unity of the lord-moment and the bondsman-moment the per-
son is, like the citizen of the polis, a manifestation of the relation that
Hegel indicates as stoicism. In their actions, the citizens of the polis per-
form the transition from thought to actuality merely as the movement of
an insubstantial antithesis (281). The actions in which the persons con-
sume their properties can be described likewise. This time, however,
thought and actuality have not the generality of the Human Law and
the state organism, but the subjectivity of the persons thought and the
family organism. The general stoicism of the polis is, so to speak, concen-
trated in the individuality of the person.
From an outside perspective, the persons are a multitude of contin-
gent family organisms. The contents that are realized in the distinguished
families are in no way organically tied with one another. The persons are
only formally related as the legal persons of the property right who rec-
ognize one another as free and equal persons. Insofar as the persons coex-
ist as real families, their external relation is represented by the Roman
Emperor. Like the other individuals, the Roman Emperor is a person;
but he is a self beside itself (293), i. e., his content only represents
the externally-being-together of the contingent multitude of families.
This external coherence is also expressed in the religion of the Roman Em-
pire. The Roman gods exist as a pantheon in which they are assimilated in
an external unity.90
The Greek world was structured as the double relation of recognition,
as the being-together of right and morality. Morality was institutionalized
as the Divine Law; alongside morality, right was institutionalized as the
Human Law. In the Roman World right and morality, Human and Divine
Law, are integrated in the reality of the person. On the one hand, the per-
sons recognize one another as the free and equal persons of the Roman
Law; on the other hand, the moral dimension is internalized by the per-
son and practically expressed in the particularity of the family life. This
internalization and practical expression, however, result in the decline
of the pureness of the moral content. In Chapter 4, we will discuss the
return of the pure self in the Realm of Culture. The development of
this world will lead to the genesis of the second self.
90 Cf. In this, the reality of the ethical Spirit is lost, and having lost all content, the
Spirits of national individuals are gathered into a single pantheon, not into a pan-
theon of picture-thought whose powerless form lets each Spirit go its own way,
but into the pantheon of abstract universality, of pure thought, which disembod-
ies them and imparts to the spiritless Self, to the individual person, a being that is
in and for itself. (454).
Chapter 3
The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self
Introduction
As is the case in the polis, also in the Roman Empire the absolute freedom
of the pure self remains an implicit presupposition. The pure self remains
submerged in the practical execution of freedom, i. e., in the way in
which the person expresses his freedom in his property. Therefore, the
discrepancy between inside and outside perspective also at this time con-
tinues to exist. From the outside perspective, the property order is a con-
tingent order: an historical form of a social organism. From the inside
perspective, the self only exists insofar as it participates in a property
order. Just like in the polis, also in the Roman Empire the concealed pre-
suppositions come to light: not by the death of the individual, but by the
death of the social organism, i. e., the decline of the Roman Empire. Be-
cause of its contingent unity, the decline of the empire is as necessary as
the natural death of the individual. Sooner or later, the Empire has to fall
because of opposed internal power positions.
For the person, the Fall of the Roman Empire means the loss of his
reality as person, i. e., the property order declines. Just as the family of
the polis preserves the pure memory of the deceased family member,
tries to find, again, his reality and arrives at the self-consciousness of
the Divine Law by means of the dialectics of the Unhappy Consciousness,
so the person preserves the meaning of the declined Empire as a pure
Being, tries to find, again, its reality and develops by means of the dia-
lectics of the Unhappy Consciousness the consciousness of the pure Be-
lief . We have to dwell on this development of the pure Belief and
to elaborate how exactly the person survives the Fall of the Roman Empire.
The Fall of the Roman Empire and the experience of the person
The decline of the property order does not necessarily mean the decline
of the persons who were the bearers of the property order. The individual
can survive the implosion of the legal order. But what are the consequen-
82 Chapter 3 The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self
ces for his freedom? Does the decline of the property order in which the
freedom is realized, also imply the annihilation of freedom? To answer
this question, we first have to discuss the consequences of the decline
of the property order for the self-consciousness of freedom.
The individual who, as person, participates in the property order can
think to be autonomous. After all, he can have his property at his dispos-
al. By the decline of the property order, however, the individual experi-
ences the boundaries of his autonomy. The decline only happens to
him, and surely is no result of his autonomous action. Therefore, the re-
ality of his autonomy appears to be dependent on a power that transcends
his autonomy. This does raise the question of what exactly is the nature of
this power and how it is related to the alleged freedom of the individual.
The external power to which the individual is related and that has be-
come fatal for the property order (the power that, for example manifested
itself in the power of the Ostrogoths who undermined the property order
of the Roman Empire) cannot be understood as the overwhelming power
of nature that immediately threatens the free self-consciousness. As a per-
son, the individual has experienced that nature, in principle, is no obsta-
cle to his freedom. Obviously, nature cannot only manifest itself as a me-
dium in which he can realize his freedom, but also as a medium that re-
sists his freedom. Because nature is factually appearing as a violent power,
the second sight of nature, i. e., nature that is in harmony with freedom,
can only be maintained as a inner representation of the individual. His
second sight seems to be only a recollection of something that has ever
existed.
The recollection, however, is certainly not just an inessential fiction.
Nature as the power that transcends society cannot only be a blind des-
tiny. There has been a time in which it tolerated a free society (in the age
of the polis and the Roman Empire). Therefore, it is not as much an ab-
solute power that, per se, resists freedom, but an absolute power that has
at its disposal the chance of the free individual to realize his freedom. In
this sense, the absolute power of nature is the essence of freedom.91 In this
case, the external violence that ruins the property order shows not so
much the unreality of the individuals freedom, but rather that the reality
of the conditions under which he can practically realize his freedom tran-
scends his autonomy. Therefore, the individual can rescue his freedom by
representing the absolute power as an inner being that has the absolute
power to permit (or forbid) the actualization of his freedom. By this rep-
91 In fact, here the pure self appears again.

The genesis of the moral individual 83
resentation, the individual has the awareness that the reality in which he
cannot realize his freedom is not the only possible one. At the same time,
the represented absolute power transcends the alleged autonomy of the
individual. After all, the individual has experienced that he is not able
to guarantee for himself that he can realize his freedom in the real
world. In this sense, the inner representation stands for an absolute
power on which the individual knows himself to be dependent. It is
this power that has the real conditions at its disposal under which he
has the possibility to realize his freedom; this power is the ground of
the property order in which he can realize his freedom.
The genesis of the moral individual

The individual who has made the absolute being his inner representation
seems to have emancipated himself from the legal order. His freedom has
received its own place that does not coincide with the freedom he has as a
person in the framework of the legal order. The individual has become a
moral individual who is free because he relates to a pure inner being that
he considers the be the ground of his own freedom. This freedom seems
to be due to any individual, independent of the fact as to whether or not
he participates in a legal order. Accordingly, Jrgen Habermas sharply dis-
tinguishes between the moral individual and the legal subject. As legal
subject the individual belongs to a real legal community, but as moral in-
dividual he belongs to mankind. As moral individuals, all natural individ-
uals are equal, as legal subjects only those individuals are equal who are
also persons and belong to a legal community; the moral point of view
is universal, the legal point of view is restricted to a specific legal com-
munity.92
However, Jrgen Habermas way to distinguish moral individuals and
legal subjects is not tenable. The moral individual not only, in a genetic
sense, presupposes the legal community, but also systematically. Right
and morality are not related in an external relation of completion93,
like Habermas thinks, but are internally linked.
Rightly, Habermas puts forth that the moral point of view is a uni-
versal one. Whoever speaks about human individuals has to involve mor-
ality in his considerations. But why is this the case? Because the moral
92 J. Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, p. 139 ff.

93 J. Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, p. 137, Ergnzungsverhltnis.
individual is not measured to a specific legal community, but to himself:

any moral individual inwardly relates to an absolute being (that later on
will be developed as the conscience). But, why is it necessary to attribute
such an inner being to all individuals? The opinion that all individuals
are moral individuals may have a universal validity, but on this basis it
is not necessarily a universal point of view.
Habermas is right when he maintains that each human individual is a
moral one. But to ground this position, the universality of the moral in-
dividual cannot, just like that, be opposed to the particularity of the legal
subject. As legal subject, i. e., as the person of the property order, the in-
dividual is thought to be autonomous. As autonomous subject, the indi-
vidual can, in a certain sense, claim an absolute status: Reality seems to
coincide with the reality he realizes in his autonomous action. No
power seems to limit his actions. At the moment, however, that the prop-
erty order gets ruined, this power, after all, appears to exist. It is this
power that the moral individual makes the content of his inner represen-
tation. This inner being is absolute because it transcends the alleged ab-
solute power of the autonomous person. Therefore, the independence of
the moral individual, expressing itself in his inner relation to an absolute
being, is linked with the presupposition of the property order. Without
having experienced the alleged autonomy of the property order, the
moral individual cannot be related to an inner being to which he attrib-
utes an absolute meaning.
The real legal community is a particular community and, therefore,
cannot be understood as the presupposition of a universal moral individ-
ual. The moral individual, however, is universal because any individual
with a human self-consciousness is also a moral individual.94 The
human self-consciousness is only real in a legal community and can
only develop into a real moral individual when the legal community
has developed into a property order in which the individual, as a legal
person, thinks to be autonomous. Therefore, the reality of the moral in-
dividual in some sense presupposes the reality of the property order.
That the moral individual who has been developed up to now is in-
ternally involved in the property order can also be shown by considering
the moral individual, himself. The inner being to which the individual is
related can be considered as the representation of the absolute essence
that the person, in his alleged autonomy, thought to be himself. If this
represented essence is absolute, it is, in the same sense, absolute as the
94 This has been developed in the chapter on Self-consciousness.

The genesis of the moral individual 85
person thought himself to be absolute. The person could imagine to be

autonomous as long as he had the opinion that the property order was
nothing other than the realization of his freedom. In the decline of the
property order, however, the opposite has appeared to be the case. The
property order certainly appeared to be dependent on an outside.
This outside already was, in the form of the determinedness of the per-
son, a moment of the property order all the time. What exactly the par-
ticular determinedness of the person is and to what extent the consump-
tion of the property is able to express it, remains, under the conditions of
the property order, a private affair that is, consequently, from the view of
the legal order an accidental one. The accidental existence of the property
order is made explicit when the property order becomes ruined. The per-
son can survive this decline if he conceives of the accidental content as the
contingent reality of an absolute being. By the representation of an abso-
lute being the legal subject is transformed into a moral individual. The
property order gives nature, only in general, the form of freedom by mak-
ing nature its property. The specific content of nature, however, remains
undetermined. The property law is a purely formal law that makes the
content of the legal act a private affair. This, however, makes it principally
possible that the content is not compatible with the formal law order and,
as the outside, turns against law.
The represented inner being is absolute insofar as it is the essence of
all reality to which it is related. It does not stand a reality that has its own
independence. This demand, however, contradicts the determination
that, until now, is given to the inner being: As a being that is only
inner, it is related to an independent outer reality, so that it cannot be
really absolute. This is the starting point for a development process
that the moral individual has to go through in his attempt still to rescue
the absoluteness of his inner being.
It must become clear in what way the outer reality does not contradict
the inner being, i. e., in what way the outer reality can be conceived of as
appearance of the absolute inner being. At first sight, this demand seems
to be impossible because the absolute being is introduced as the inner
being of the free individual to escape a reality that was not compatible
with the freedom of the individual. How could this reality still be inter-
preted as the appearance of a inner being? The conditions to fulfill this
demand, however, can be clear if one considers how the decline of the
property order has given rise to the representation of an inner absolute
being. The inner absolute being is the outside of the freedom that ini-
tially conceived of itself as the absolute being. If the free individual could
get hold of the outside as an inside he would kill two birds with one
stone: He would not only be able to conceive of the inner being of his
freedom as his own freedom, but would also still have the opportunity
to realize its inner being. The realization should be performed in a
legal order in which freedom not only formally gets shape (as in the prop-
erty order) but also really: The legal order should guarantee that the nat-
ural content also is an expression of freedom by ending the banishing of
this content to the private domain. The law that expresses freedom
should immediately validate the particularity of the individual (that is un-
derstood as the content of freedom) as the content of the law.
The aforementioned conditions will be fulfilled by the citizens of the
French Revolution. They not only have put their subjective freedom in the
place of the inner absolute being, but also they want to express their sub-
jective freedom as the content of the law of society. This means that the
formal realization of freedom in the property order has been replaced by
the substantial realization of freedom in a political order in which the citi-
zens immediately want to realize their subjective freedom. The formal re-
alization of freedom by the first self (the person) has been replaced by the
substantial realization of freedom by the second self, i. e., the subject that
wants to realize his subjective freedom.
How the transition from an inner absolute being to which the indi-
vidual is related (a relation that historically can be situated after the Fall
of the Roman Empire) into an absolute being that is understood as a sub-
jective microcosm that wants to realize itself in the political order (a re-
lation that historically can be situated as the aspiration of the citizens of
the French Revolution) can be really performed, in no way is clear. Hegel
tries to interpret this development as the rise and inner dynamics of Me-
dieval Christianity. He discusses this development as structured according
the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness. 95
95 In his first introduction of the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of Self-conscious-

ness, Hegel illustrates this consciousness already with the examples of Medieval
Christianity. However, it is only at the level of the Realm of Culture that this his-
torical reality is explicitly interpreted.
The Embodiment of the pure Being in the real Individual 87
The Embodiment of the pure Being in the real Individual: the

self-conscious reality of the Unhappy Consciousness
In the elementary, logical expression of the Unhappy Consciousness in

Chapter 2, we witnessed how the Unhappy Consciousness was the result
of the decline of the social organism. The Unhappy Consciousness survives
the social organism because it represents the hidden pure essence of the
social organism (the pure self that previously was recognized as the
lord) as an inner absolute being (the unshakable being). The decline
of the social organism is historically exemplified with the Fall of the
Roman Empire. Therefore, also the representation of the inner absolute
being can be historically exemplified. The inner absolute being is repre-
sented by the absolute self, the god, of the Judeo-Christian religion. In-
sofar as the god remains a purely subjective, inward representation along-
side the objective reality, his absoluteness is, according to Hegel, only a
belief. But the subjectivity of the belief is overcome in the historical de-
velopment of Christianity. Just as we have seen before, this time the elu-
sive absolute being of the Unhappy Consciousness also gets its embodiment
in the real self. The logical stages of the development of the Unhappy
Consciousness can be exemplified as historical stages in the development
of Medieval Christianity.
The individual that represents his absolute being as the pure self of a
god gets involved in the dialectics of consciousness.96 To rescue the abso-
luteness of his pure god, the representation must overcome its abstract-
ness, i. e., it must be possible to determine the absolute self of the god.
If, however, the individual represents his god as a real self (as the Son
of God, Christ), it remains unclear how the pure and real self of the
god can be brought together: The represented god is absolute as finite,
as well. The individual can try to solve the problem by representing his
god as the Holy Spirit. In that case, it is not the real individual that
makes his god finite, but it is the god himself who only exists in commu-
nion with the real self. In the representation of the holy spirit, however,
the individual is thrown back to himself: He, himself is the real self with-
out which the pure self of the god has no existence.
96 As we have seen in Chapter 2, Hegels original introduction of the Unhappy Con-

sciousness is illustrated with examples from the medieval world. These medieval
forms are not repeated in the Realm of Culture. In contrast to Hegel, I give
these medieval examples of the Unhappy Consciousness a place in the Realm of
Culture. These forms can be understood as the previous history of the Belief.
Having arrived at this self-consciousness, the Unhappy Consciousness

gets involved in the dialectics of Self-consciousness. 97 It leaves the theoret-
ical relation to an inner self and turns to a practical relation to the objec-
tive world. In this world it seeks a real self that can be understood as the
real existence of an absolute self. This search is expressed in the Crusades
to the Holy Land to find Christ, the living God. The crusades, however,
are doomed to fail. It is in the nature of the real self the be mortal. Con-
sequently, the crusaders can only find an empty grave.98
In the next step to realize the pure self, the individual repeats the lord/
bondsman relation. He now tries to realize the pure self of his god by sac-
rificing his real self. This is possible because the individual is a member of
the community of the (Roman Catholic) church. This community exists
insofar as the individuals serve (as bondsmen, i. e., as monks) their god
(the lord). In their service, the pure self of the god gets real existence.
The individuals, however, strive after the existence of their god as a pure
self, and think to reach this goal by totally sacrificing their real self. They
try to negate the existence of their body by fasting, and to negate the ex-
istence of their mind by the endless repetition of ritual prayers. If the in-
dividuals, however, succeed in their intention, they themselves are the
pure self, not their god. The power to totally discipline their mind and
body presupposes that the individuals are free, i. e., have a pure self.
Just like the pure recollection of the deceased family member got its
embodiment in the living family (by mediation of the dialectics of the
Unhappy Consciousness) so the pure recollection of the declined social or-
ganism gets its embodiment in the living individual (as well mediated by
the dialectic of the Unhappy Consciousness). Initially, the living family
members of the polis were harmoniously related to the objective reality
of the Human Law. They recognized this objectivity as the realization
of their inner being (they recognized the moments of observing and ac-
tive Reason). In contrast to the family of the polis, the real individual of
the Realm of Culture is not related to a social organism, and certainly not
97 The dialectics of Self-Consciousness is performed in the form of the Unhappy Con-

sciousness.
98 The experience of the crusades repeats the relation of Desire in the form of Un-
happy Consciousness. Self-consciousness tries to find again and again its pure es-
sence (the pure self of the God) as a living self. But all living selves appear to
be mortal.
The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world 89
to a social organism to which he is harmoniously related.99 The social or-

ganism has decayed and the objective reality appears as a contingent one.
The meaning of the moral individual in the objective world

The moral individual who has understood that the absolute inner being is
his subjective essence is related to a contingent objective world (the reality
that is left after the decline of the Roman Empire). If his subjective es-
sence, the Lutheran God in which he is inwardly involved, really is an
absolute essence, it cannot remain purely subjective. To affirm the abso-
luteness of the subjective essence, it has to be realized in the objective
world. But insofar as the objective world is a contingent reality, it remains
accidental whether or not this realization is possible. Just because the con-
tingent world is an independent existence, there is no guarantee that the
moral individual can realize himself in this world. This guarantee is only
given under the condition of the first stage of the Revealed Religion, the
religion of the Realm of Culture.
Like the Belief of the moral individual, also the Revealed Religion re-
fers to the Christian religion. At the level of the Revealed Religion the
Christian god, however, is not thematized from the viewpoint of the
moral individual, but as the god of the objective world.100 In the first
stage of the Revealed Religion, god is represented as the Father, the creator
of the objective world.101 This god has created the world in its contingent
99 To a certain extent, the family in the polis can be compared to the religious com-
munity in the Realm of Culture. Like the reality of the Divine Law has been de-
veloped in the family, so the reality of the Belief is developed in the institutions
of the Church. As a subject of Belief, the individual will have a judgment on the
institutions of the realm of Culture. But this independent position, with respect
to the social institutions, is not dependent on institutional actions within the
framework of the church. The subject of Belief has internalised the relation to
the absolute Being: In the transition from Catholicism into Protestantism, the
subject of Belief no longer needs the mediation of the priests.
100 Cf. The content itself which we have to consider has partly been met with al-
ready as the idea of the unhappy and the believing consciousness; The con-
sciousness of the community, on the other hand, possesses the content for its sub-
stance, just as the content is the certainty of the communitys own Spirit. (464).
101 This first moment of the Revealed Religion corresponds to the Unhappy Con-
sciousness in the form of Consciousness. The inner representations of the Father,
the Son and the Holy Spirit return. (There are thus three distinct moments: es-
sence, being-for-self which is the otherness of essence and for which essence is,
existence. Therefore, the objective world is reconciled with the pure self
of God the Father. As creation of God the Father, the objective world
principally is understood as the creation of a pure self. As a consequence,
the moral individual, in principle, has the possibility to realize his subjec-
tive essence in the objective world.
The function of the first stage of the Revealed Religion is comparable
to the first stage of the Religion of Art in the polis. Just like the moments
of the Unhappy Consciousness (namely those moments that resulted in the
embodiment of the recollection of the deceased family member in the liv-
ing family) were introduced in the public domain by their representation
in the abstract works of art, so the representation of God the Father in-
troduces the moments of the Unhappy Consciousness (namely those mo-
ments that resulted in the embodiment of the recollection of the declined
social organism), in the public domain of the Realm of Culture.
The realization of the moral individual in the objective world:

the process of culture
The absoluteness of the subjective essence can only be confirmed when it

is realized in the objective world. The moral individual must be able to
once again find his subjective essence in an objectivity that is structured
like the stages of observing and active Reason. This realization of the moral
individual is mediated by the second and third stages of the Revealed Re-
ligion.
In the second stage of the Revealed Religion, the Realm of the Son
(Christ) in the objective world is not only represented as a creation of
God, but also as a world in which God himself appears, namely in the
form of his Son, Jesus Christ. Because this Son is a human being, at
this stage the religious representation makes clear that the objectivity of
the human world, in itself, expresses the pure self of the divine
and being-for-self, or the knowledge of itself in the other. (464)) And, the ab-
solute self appears again as devotion, as a being that escapes enduring existence:
the being-for-self that shut itself out from essence is essences knowledge of its own
self. It is the word which, when uttered, leaves behind, externalized and emptied,
him who uttered it, but which is as immediately heard, and only this hearing of
his own self is the existence of the Word. (465). This time, however, the abso-
lute self is the God of the community, not just the inner representation of the
individual.
The realization of the moral individual in the objective world: the process of culture 91
being.102 From this religious conviction, the moral individual derives the
certitude that he can find again his subjective essence in the objective
world, namely in the objective human world, the social organism.103
After the Fall of the Roman Empire, the institutions of the social or-
ganism have to be rebuilt. But the process of rebuilding cannot one-
sidedly be understood as a more or less coincidental, practical process
in which the real individuals constitute a new social organism by serving
a lord in their role as bondsmen. Because the individuals are also moral
individuals, they do not accept whatever tradition of the social organism.
For the moral individuals, the social organism has legitimacy only insofar
as they can recognize it as the objectification of their subjective essence.
The moral individuals judge the social organism. They consider it to be
good if it corresponds to subjective pure self, and they consider it to be
bad if does not.104 This judgment gives rise to the dialectics of culture be-
tween the individuals and the social organism. As well, the individual as
the social organism is cultivated in a process that can only end when the
moral individual can recognize the social organism as an adequate objec-
tification of his pure self.
The first stage of the process of cultivation has the structure of observ-
ing Reason. The moral individual tries to recognize his subjective essence
in a (social) world that is objectively given. As we have seen before, the
dialectics of observing Reason repeats (in its own, mediated form) the di-
alectics of Consciousness and Self-consciousness.
Firstly, the moral individual tries to recognize his essence in the social
organism as an immediately given identity (cf. the Sense-Certainty). In
this immediate relation, however, the social organism remains undeter-
mined (all real social organisms can be immediately given). In the second
attempt, the social organism is determined in relation to the individual.
102 Cf. Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness; it is
its community. The movement of the community as self-consciousness that has
distinguished itself from its picture-thought is to make explicit what has been im-
plicitly established. The dead divine Man or human God is in himself the univer-
sal consciousness; this he has to become explicitly for this self-consciousness.
(473).
103 The Realm of the Son has the same function in the Realm of Culture, as the living
work of art has in the polis: It represents the integration between the moral in-
dividual and the objective world.
104 Cf. Now, self-consciousness holds that object to be good, and to possess intrinsic
being, in which it finds itself; and that to be bad in which it finds the opposite of
itself. (302/3).
Also in this relation, however, the social organism cannot be identified.

On the one hand, the individual is a corporeal individual who tries to sat-
isfy his needs in relation to the social organism (the social organism ap-
pears as Wealth, 305).105 On the other hand, the individual is a spiritual
individual who sacrifices his corporeal existence and realizes (as the lord
that is served by his body as the bondsman) the social organism, itself
(that in this relation appears as State Power, 305).106 Like the Perception
was not able to identify the Thing by bringing together the two points
of view concerning the Thing (the Thing is One and Also), so the
moral individual is not able to identify the social organism by bringing
together the two viewpoints (the social organism is State Power and
Wealth). Therefore, it appears, thirdly, that the unity of the social organ-
ism must not be attributed to the social organism itself, but to the judg-
ing individual (cf. Understanding).
In his attempt to understand the social organisms unity as the result
of the judging individual, the moral individual repeats the dialectics of
Self-consciousness (in the form of observing Reason). In the first stage,
the stage of the language of flattery, the moral individual identifies the un-
limited monarch (Louis XIV)107 as the one who represents the unity of
the social organism. He has this position because he is surrounded by in-
dividuals (the noblemen) who are saying to him all the time, in their lan-
guage of the flattery, that he is the unlimited monarch.108
The identity that is dependent on the language of the flattery, however,
gets ruined by the ambiguity of the noblemen. The noblemen do not co-
incide with their service (as bondsmen) to their lord, the monarch.
Insofar as they recognize the unlimited monarch, they are moral individ-
105 Hegel has in mind the feudal nobility that is rewarded for its service to the feudal
sovereign.
106 Hegel means the feudal sovereign.
107 Cf. The result is that the Spirit of this power is now an unlimited Monarch: un-
limited, because the language of flattery raises power into its purified universality;
this moment being the product of language, of an existence which has been pu-
rified into Spirit, is a purified self-identity; a monarch, for such language likewise
raises individuality to its extreme point; what the noble consciousness divests it-
self of as regards this aspect of the simple spiritual unity is the pure intrinsic being
of its thinking, its very I. (310/1).
108 In the relation of Desire, the pure self has to prove again and again the he is the
essence of nature by negating nature. Here, the noblemen have to proof again
and again that the unlimited monarch is the essence of the social organism by
negating themselves and by expressing the judgment that the monarch is the es-
sence. In this sense, Desire is repeated in the form of observing Reason.
uals who are sacrificing themselves for the social organism. But they are
also corporeal individuals who want to satisfy their needs. Therefore, it
remains unsure whether their service concerns the State Power (so that
the language of flattery is completely honest) or the Wealth, i. e., the re-
ward they receive for their service. At any moment, what is meant as
State Power can turn into its opposite, Wealth, the good can change
into the bad, the being-in-itself into the being-for-self. This ongoing pos-
sibility of change is expressed in the language of disruption. 109
The language of disruption seems to make clear that nothing in reality
is what is seems to be. Reality, the social organism seems to lose its sub-
stantiality. This becomes absolutely clear when the individual experiences
that it is related to a contingent world. Whether the individual is reward-
ed for his serving the social organism, he has not under control himself.
Whether he can profit from the Wealth that is produced by the social or-
ganism is not dependent on his own decision, but on a strange being, on
the will of the monarch who can or cannot endow him Wealth. Therefore,
the individual experiences the highest possible alienation. The reality that
he should be able to recognize as the reality in which his freedom is real-
ized appears as a reality in which wealth is an external thing and, in
which, consequently, it is totally accidental whether he can realize his es-
sence.
The experience of the highest possible alienation makes the moral in-
dividual give up the relation form of observing Reason. 110 He has experi-
enced having no opportunity to find again his essence in the objectively
given social organism and returns as the pure Insight (321 ff.) to himself.
As the pure Insight (that repeats the relation form of stoicism), the
moral individual takes on a rationalistic position. He is related to a con-
tingent world, but considers his pure concept as the essence of this reality.
Therefore, in some sense the pure essence of the moral individual has re-
alized itself, for it is nearer determined. This nearer determination, how-
ever, is a conceptual determination that remains alongside the contingent,
sensual reality. [The position of the pure Insight is represented by Ren
Descartes for whom the mathesis universalis is the essence of all reality.]
109 Cf. language of this disrupted consciousness (316), the translation of Sprache
der Zerrissenheit.
110 Cf. But this expendable, selfless being, or the self that has become a Thing, is
rather the return of that being into itself; it is being-for-self that is explicitly for
itself, the concrete existence of Spirit. (316).
As long as the pure Insight is related to a contingent reality his claim

to be the essence of all reality is contradicted. After all, the contingent
reality has its own independence. As the Enlightenment, the pure Insight
turns against the contingent reality and tries to transform it into a reality
that only expresses its own pure insight. In this attempt, it repeats the re-
lation form of active Reason. This repetition only makes sense when the
moral individual presupposes the validity of the third stage of the re-
vealed religion, the stage of the Holy Spirit in which the internal unity
between god and mankind is represented. Mankind is not only the Son
of God, but also realizes, in and through his actions, Gods own es-
sence.111 Under the condition of this religion, the moral individual can
assume that he is able to realize his absolute inner essence.
Firstly, the moral individual repeats the relation of Pleasure and Ne-
cessity when it turns as Enlightenment against Superstition. He understands
the contingent reality as a traditional order that is based on accidental
opinions that are only legitimized by Superstition. Enlightenment thinks
to be able to subject this kind of world without much resistance. It
needs only to confront Superstition with its arguments to make it sure
of its right. It thinks that its enlightened activity can only result in the
pleasure of its triumphing argumentation that experiences no resistance
at all.112
From the outside perspective, reality is not only contingent, but also
is a social organism that can survive because it is grounded in the second
stage of revealed religion. In this religion, human reality is represented as
the son of god, i. e., the social organism is interpreted as a contingent re-
ality in which the pure self has given shape to itself. Since Enlightenment
results from the moral individuals attempt to realize himself, it is by re-
vealed religion not confronted with Superstition, but with its own presup-
position. After all, also the moral individual has made the pure self his ab-
solute essence (albeit that this essence until now was an inner essence). In
111 Cf. Spirit is thus posited in the third element, in universal self-consciousness; it is
its community. The movement of the community as self-consciousness that has
distinguished itself from its picture-thought is to make explicit what has been im-
plicitly established. The dead divine Man or human God is, in himself, the uni-
versal consciousness; this he has to become explicitly for this self-consciousness.
(473).
112 Cf. But this silent, ceaseless weaving of the Spirit in the simple inwardness of its
substance, Spirit concealing its action from itself, is only one side of the realiza-
tion of the pure insight. (332).
its confrontation with the (alleged) Superstition it also becomes clear for
Enlightenment, itself, that it is confronted with its presupposition.
Enlightenment and Superstition relate to one another as the satisfied
and the unsatisfied Enlightenment. 113 The pure Insight that turns against
the contingent reality develops into the satisfied Enlightenment. It tries to
express the essence of the contingent reality in general laws that, in their
turn, express the pure matter, and thus seems to finalize its Enlightenment
project. The alleged superstition, however, remains confined in the reality
of a contingent social organism whose essence, as the beyond (jenseits)
of the divine pure self, remains elusive. Basically, however, both positions
are each others opposite and in this sense they pass into one another. The
beyond of the alleged Superstition (faith) is, as pure thinking, pure iden-
tity, pure matter. The other way around, the pure matter of the satisfied
Enlightenment is, as Thing-in-itself, a beyond.
The passing of both positions into one another is performed in the
Realm of Utility, in which all in the world is only a being-in-itself insofar
as it is for an other.114 The satisfied Enlightenment is related to a contin-
gent reality, and experiences in its relation to the unsatisfied Enlightenment
that the contingent reality only exists distinct from the pure self. The un-
satisfied Enlightenment is related to the pure self, and experiences in its
relation to the satisfied Enlightenment that its pure self only exists distinct
from the contingent reality.
Actually, the hidden unity of the Realm of Utility is the real individ-
ual, i. e., the individual that unites the moral and the legal individual.
The satisfied Enlightenment, by making the unsatisfied Enlightenment its
object, is related to the legal individual, i. e., the member of the social
organism that knows that this organism is legitimated by the pure self
of God. Obviously, the unsatisfied Enlightenment is related to the moral
individual by making the satisfied Enlightenment its object. Therefore,
in the confrontation between satisfied and unsatisfied Enlightenment, the
real individual can develop the awareness to be, as well, the essence as
the appearance of the world. By expressing himself in the social organism,
the real individual is the being-in-itself. This being-in-itself only exists in-
113 Cf. but there is this difference, the latter is satisfied Enlightenment, but faith
is unsatisfied Enlightenment. (349).
114 Cf. What is useful, is something with an enduring being in itself, or a Thing;
this being-in-itself is at the same time only a pure moment; hence it is absolutely
for an other, but equally is for an other merely what it is in itself; these opposed
moments have returned into the indivisible unity of being-for-self. (354).
sofar as it is for another, i. e., the pure self of the god. The pure self of the
god, however, is the inner pure self of the real individual. Therefore, the
real individual appears as the autonomous individual, i. e., the individual
that exists by realizing his inner essence.
The absolute Freedom: the second self

Hegel discusses the autonomous individual as the absolute freedom
(355 ff.) that characterizes the citizens of the French Revolution. The au-
tonomous individual is the moral individual who has the certitude that he
can realize his absolute essence as legal individual, i. e., in the social or-
ganism in which he has realized himself. For the autonomous individual,
the world is nothing else than the self-realization of his inner essence. He
is the autonomous author of the law that is realized in the social organ-
ism. The world where the autonomous individual is living is a world
without alienation, a world in which he can feel totally at home. The
transcendental world of the pure self is united with the real world of
the social organism. The two worlds are reconciled and heaven is trans-
planted to earth below. (355)
At the level of the absolute freedom, the moral and the legal dimension
are, for the second time, united in the individual. Therefore, the absolute
freedom can be called the second self 115, or the moral subject. In contrast to
the first self, the formal person of the Roman Law, the content of the sec-
ond self is not contingent, but posited as the expression of subjective free-
dom. The law of the social organism is the autonomous law of the second
self. Therefore, the absolute freedom can be interpreted as the historical re-
alization of the lawgiving Reason.
The lawgiving Reason was discussed as a hypothetical attempt to de-
termine the law of the social organism from the perspective of the partic-
ular consciousness. This attempt failed because only laws at a very high
abstraction level could be formulated. The absolute freedom, however,
does not content itself with such abstract laws because it intends to be
the lawgiver of a real social organism. As a result, the French Revolution
ends in terror: If all citizens want to impose their specific law, being
the expression of their subjective freedom, they exclude one another
and can only fight a struggle of life and death. This makes explicit that
115 The second self is the world of culture which has attained its truth, or it is Spirit
that has recovered itself from its dividednessabsolute freedom. (384).
Retrospection 97
the that the absolute freedom repeats the second stage of active Reason, The
law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit. The revolutionary citizens
who want to realize their law of the heart are seized by the subjectivism
of self-conceit and are confronted with a strange necessity. The realiza-
tion of the social organisms law presupposes that all serve the same
lord. This is not possible when the distinction between the moral
and political domain is not respected. The immediate moralization of
politics inevitably leads to terror.116
Retrospection
In the Realm of Culture, the structures of the Greek world are repeated
and brought to self-consciousness. The many poleis with their contingent
ethical content return as the families that have their self-consciousness in
the formal legal person of the Roman Law. Like the Human Law of the
polis, the Roman Law is structured to conform to the relation of stoicism,
which implies that the freedoms pure self remains immersed in the prac-
tical performance of freedom. In contrast to the polis, however, in which
the citizen is not aware of the particularity of the ethical content, this
awareness is developed by the person, who knows that the freedom
that he realizes in his family organism has a particular content that is dis-
tinguished from the content of other family organisms. At the level of the
Realm of Culture, it is thematized how the person develops insight into
the contingent content of his freedom (like the Greek citizen developed
insight into the contingency of the poliss ethical life) and how he tries to
overcome this contingency in a doubled process of culture (in which, as
well, the person, as his world, is cultivated).
As in the polis, the return of the repressed pure self in the Realm of
Culture also is mediated by death. This time however, not by the death of
the family member, but by the death of the social organism. The re-
membrance is retained as the inner representation of the absolute pure
Thing. Just as, at the level of the polis, the remembrance of the deceased
family member is embodied in the Divine Law of the family, so the re-
membrance of the declined social organism is embodied in the faith of
116 In this sense, the Sharia is a form of terror and in some sense, also an insult to
god: after all, as an absolute being, he may not be distinguished from the finite
reality.
the individual. In both cases, the embodiment is mediated by the dialec-

tics of the Unhappy Consciousness.
The development of the Realm of Culture is characterized by the
movement in which the faithful individual is integrated with the objective
world. In the first step of this process, mediated by the first stage of the
Revealed Religion, the faithful individual becomes part of the public do-
main. In the second step, the faithful individual really integrates with
the objective world by means of a process of culture. This process is struc-
tured according to the dialectics of observing and active Reason and medi-
ated by, respectively, the second and third stage of the Revealed Religion
(the realm of the Christ and the realm of the Holy Spirit).
The development of the Realm of Culture is the self-conscious repe-
tition of the movement performed in the polis in which the Divine
Law is integrated with the objective world of the Human Law. In the
first step of this process, mediated by the first stage of the Religion of
Art (the abstract work of art) the Divine Law becomes part of the public
domain. In the second step, Divine and Human Law are synthesized in a
process that was also structured according the dialectics observing and ac-
tive Reason and, this time, respectively mediated by the second and third
stage of the Religion of Art (the living work of art and the spiritual work of
art).
In the Greek world, the moral dimension had its place in the under-
world and the legal dimension in the real world of the Human Law. The
first (immediate) attempt to integrate both dimensions in one individual
resulted in the first self of the Roman Law. In the first self, however, the
moral dimension remains implicit: It is only practically expressed in
the freedom of the person to subject his property to his free will. In
the Realm of Culture, the moral dimension has its place in the faithful in-
dividual who, initially, is externally related to the institutions of the legal
order. The second (self-conscious) attempt to integrate the moral and
legal dimension resulted in the second self, the absolute Freedom of the
French Revolution. The self-conscious unity of right and morality, howev-
er, fails and leads to the revolutionary terror.
The failure of the second self can be explained in terms of the discrep-
ancy between the outside and inside perspectives. From the inside per-
spective, the second self tries to realize his subjective freedom in the law
of the social organism and he thinks this law to be nothing else than
the expression of his absolute essence. From the outside perspective, how-
ever, the second self immediately identifies the absolute moral dimension
with the contingent dimension of the social organism. That this imme-
Retrospection 99
diate identification is false appears in the terror of the French Revolution.

All citizens want to realize their subjective freedom in the social law; this
makes explicit that they only realize a contingent content that is not com-
patible with the content of the others.
The failure of the second self shows that the historical experiment still
has not succeeded in finding the adequate unity between mind and body.
In the next chapter, the third attempt is discussed that will result in the
third self, the self of the conscience.
Chapter 4
The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self
Explicit
Introduction
The culture of the French Revolution is, according to Hegel, the grand-
est and the last (362) culture. As the absolute freedom, the moral individ-
ual is no longer related to an external, traditional world. The moral indi-
vidual thinks that it can produce the entire world out of his subjective
freedom. This leads to a position in which the dimension of right is to-
tally swallowed up by the dimension of morality. For this reason, the sec-
ond self of the absolute freedom can be interpreted as the reversal of the
first self of the Roman Empire: The Roman Law represents a world in
which the moral dimension is totally swallowed up by the dimension
of right.
In the Realm of Morality, the realm in which the third self will be iden-
tified as conscience, it is developed as to how the dimensions of right and
morality can be conceived of in an adequate unity. Therefore, in the third
self, the first and second self are brought together in an harmonic synthesis.
In contrast to the polis and the Roman Empire, the Realm of Morality
is not a third historical episode in the European history. (Because the
French Revolution took place during Hegels lifetime, such a third histor-
ical stage could not be formulated by Hegel without having the preten-
sion to be a fortune-teller.) After the grandest and last culture of the
absolute freedom, all historical experiences are finished with that are nec-
essary to conceptualize the philosophical insight into the adequate rela-
tion between the dimensions of right and morality. Therefore, the
Realm of Morality is characterized by philosophical reflection. By
means of the philosophy of Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, himself, in the
Realm of Morality, are discussed as to what conclusions can be drawn
from the experiences of the French Revolution.
The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: the Rousseauian Reflection 101
The point of departure of the Realm of Morality: the

Rousseauian Reflection
After the terror of the French Revolution, society is not lastingly disrupt-
ed: soon Napoleon appears on the stage to restore social order. Therefore,
the question is raised of how the citizens of the Revolution, whose abso-
lute freedom resisted tradition, as such, were able to comply with Napo-
leons government. The principle argument to conceive this transition is
discussed in Chapter 2 at the level of active Reason, when the Law of the
heart or the frenzy of self-conceit (221) is developed into the next stage:
Virtue and the way of the world. (228) When the citizens experience
that it is impossible to impose their subjective law on the social organism
because this is an independent, contingent reality, they conclude that they
can only realize their subjective freedom (and, consequently, let survive
the social organism) by freely chosen, virtuous submission to an existing
objective reality, the way of the world. The grandest culture of the citi-
zens, however, has made clear that the way of the world is no anonymous
destiny, but rather the absolute freedom of the other citizens. In the end,
it was the freedom of the others that manifested itself as the absolute
power of death, the guillotine of the French Revolution. 117 Therefore, if
the virtuous citizens accept the contingent law of the way of the world
(represented by the contingent seize of power by Napoleon) they know
that this law is the contingent expression of an underlying absolute es-
sence, namely the absolute freedom of the citizens. In other words, the
citizens have understood what, from the outside perspective, was already
clear at the level of the lordship/bondsman relation. The absolute essence
of the social organism is the pure self, that is represented by the lord. The
representation of the lord appears as the contingent social law that is re-
alized by the service of the bondsmen.
The insight of the citizens is formulated in the philosophy of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who conceives the pure self, the absolute essence of
the social organism, as the volont gnrale. According to Rousseau, the
117 Cf. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death, a death too
which has no inner significance or filling, for what is negated is the empty point
of the absolute free self. It is thus the coldest and meanest of all deaths, with no
more significance than cutting off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of
water. (360).
102 Chapter 4 The Realm of Morality: Making the Third Self Explicit
legal order is only legitimate insofar as it expresses the universal will; only
under that condition does it do justice to the autonomy of all.118
Like the Human Law and the Roman Law, the Napoleonic Law, inso-
far as it is understood as the expression of the general will, is the third
shape in which the relation of stoicism appears in European history.119
In the Human Law of the polis, stoicism appears in its immediate form
as the autonomous action by which the citizens realize a common tradi-
tional content. In the Roman Law, stoicism appears in its self-conscious
form as the autonomous persons who practically realize their subjective
freedom in their property. The stoicism that appears in the Napoleonic
Law synthesizes the two preceding forms. The autonomous citizens real-
ize a common traditional content, but they know this content as the ex-
pression of the pure self, i. e., they have insight in the historical contin-
gency of this content.
The inner contradiction of the Napoleonic Law: the Kantian

Reflection
In contrast to the polis and the Roman Empire, at the level of the Napo-
leonic Law the pure self is no hidden presupposition because it is explic-
itly expressed by the volont gnrale. Yet, the pure self also, in this case,
causes a problem. The absoluteness of the pure self (the volont gnrale)
contradicts the finitude of the social organism. It is true that the social
organism is conceived of as the finite expression of the pure self, but
this relation, as such, is not expressed in the social organism. From the
outside perspective, there is no difference between a social organism
whose citizens do or do not conceive it as the expression of the pure
118 The self has overcome the absolute freedom; it no longer demands that its actions
immediately coincide with the universal will: For consciousness, the immediate
unity of itself with the universal will, its demand to know itself as this specific
point in the universal will, is changed round into the absolute opposite experi-
ence. What vanishes for it in that experience is abstract being or the immediacy
of that insubstantial point, and this vanished immediacy is the universal will itself
which it now knows itself to be in so far as it is a pure knowing or pure will.
(362/3).
119 In this sense, the Realm of Morality can be considered as a new historical episode
after the French Revolution, but not as a Realm that passes through a real devel-
opment.
The inner contradiction of the Napoleonic Law: the Kantian Reflection 103
self. Hegel discusses this contradiction as Dissemblance or duplicity (374)

in which section he refers to Kants practical philosophy.120
At this stage, it is made explicit that Hegel designed the metaphor of
the lordship/ bondsman relation with reference to Kants categorical im-
perative. The citizens of the Napoleonic Law not only interpret their
world in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation (the volont gnrale
is the lord who is served by the citizens who realize the social organism
of the Napoleonic Law) but also want to observe the categorical impera-
tive. After all, the Napoleonic Law can only be interpreted as expression of
the pure self if the actions of the citizens can be considered to be free
ones. Since the citizens are real individuals, i. e., unity of mind and
body, the assumption that their actions are free and, consequently corre-
spond to the categorical imperative, presupposes that these actions do not
contradict the citizens self-realization as corporeal beings. Therefore,
Kants first postulate of the practical Reason must be formulated, i. e.,
the harmony between morality and nature. Free action must be com-
patible with the satisfaction of needs.121
To guarantee the reality of the Napoleonic Law, however, it is not suf-
ficient to postulate the principle harmony between morality and nature.
The citizens must be able to realize this harmony in their actions, i. e.,
they must be able to will this harmony. Since the citizens are a unity
of mind and body, their will is as well determined by reason as by nature.
Therefore, the possibility to realize the harmony between morality and
nature is dependent on the fulfillment of Kants second postulate of
the practical reason: the harmony of morality and the sensually deter-
mined will.122
But, also under the condition of the second postulate there is no
guarantee that the Napoleonic Law can be realized. The determination
of the will results in conceptual contents that are realized in actions.
These actions must result in the reality of the social organism. The deter-
minations of the social organism must correspond to the conceptual de-
120 The relation Dissemblance or duplicity is a form of scepticism: It makes it clear that
the citizens are not autonomous with regard to the content of their actions.
121 Cf. The harmony of morality and Natureor, since Nature comes into account
only in so far as consciousness experiences its unity with itthe harmony of mor-
ality and happiness, is thought of as something that necessarily is, i. e. it is postu-
lated. (367).
122 Cf. The first postulate was the harmony of morality and objective Nature, the
final purpose of the world; the other, the harmony of morality and the sensuous
will, the final purpose of self-consciousness as such. (369).
terminations of the will. Therefore, the third postulate concerns the har-
mony between thinking and being.123
In the end, however, the postulates do not succeed in their attempt to
clarify the reality of the Napoleonic Law because they cannot sublate the
contradiction that also characterizes this version of stoicism. On the one
hand, the pure self is determined as an absolute being that absolutely
transcends the domain of nature. At the same time, however, the pure
self is realized in the finite reality of the social organism; i. e., without
nature the pure self does not appear at all and can not be determined.
The sublation of the inner contradiction

The two preceding forms of stoicism, the Human and Roman Law, de-
clined because they were confronted with a contradiction. The positive
content of the laws contradicted the underlying freedom that transcends
any determination. The contradiction became manifest by the return of
the repressed pure self that was mediated by death (respectively the
death of the family member and the death of the social organism). At
the level of the Napoleonic Law, all repression has been overcome: the
grandest and the last culture has eliminated all external reality. There-
fore, it is not necessary that the pure self returns by making undone its
repression. The pure self is already part of the Napoleonic Laws con-
sciousness all the time, namely in the form of the volont gnrale. (As
a matter of fact, also this time the occurrence of the pure self in the Na-
poleonic Laws consciousness was mediated by death: the death of the liv-
ing self as the result of the French Revolutions terror).124 The double
movement of the Unhappy Consciousness in which the pure self respective-
ly became embodied and got involved in the objective world (the move-
ment we witnessed, as well, at the level of the Human Law as the level of
Roman Law) does not come off this time. This does not alter the fact that
123 Cf. While, however, the first postulate expresses the harmony of morality and
Nature, as a harmony that simply is, because in it Nature is this negative aspect
of self-consciousness, is the moment of being, this implicit harmony, on the other
hand, is now essentially posited as consciousness. [] This [consciousness, P.C.]
is then henceforth a master and ruler of the world, who brings about the harmo-
ny of morality and happiness, and at the same time sanctifies duties in their mul-
tiplicity. (370).
124 Cf. the terror of death is the vision of this negative nature of itself. (361)
Conscience as the origin of the third self 105
the pure self once again practices an undermining force that leads to a
version of the Unhappy Consciousness.
We have seen that the undermining force of the pure self, at the level
of the Napoleonic Law, results from the reflection of the Dissemblance or
duplicity. As the absolute essence of the world, the pure self is not com-
patible with its appearance in a finite social organism. This contradiction
can be overcome at the level of Conscience. We will see that this level is
structured according to the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness.
The Hegelian reflection on the Napoleonic Law: Conscience as

the origin of the third self
The social organism that is understood as the expression of the volont

gnrale is, for the citizen, nothing else than the objectification of his
own individuality as unity of mind and body. Volont gnrale and social
organism are the objective expression of his mind and body. Therefore,
when the reflection of Dissemblance or duplicity shows that the pure
self and the social organism contradict one another, the citizen cannot ac-
cept this contradiction because this would mean that his own being con-
tradicts itself. Consequently, the citizen concludes that the contradiction
is not essential. It only appears as the result of an external reflection on
the objectified relation between mind and body. From his inside perspec-
tive, the contradiction does not exist at all. Inwardly he persists in the
unity of mind and body.
The citizen who inwardly persists in the unity of mind and body has
passed to the relation of Conscience. As Conscience, the citizen has the cer-
titude that the social organism, i. e., the reality to which he is related, is
nothing else than the objectification of his absolute essence.125 Con-
science is, so to speak, for itself the lord (the pure self ) who realizes him-
self as bondman in the social organism. From the outside perspective,
125 Cf. But as moral pure self-consciousness, it flees from this disparity between the
way it thinks [of these moments] and its own essential nature, flees from this un-
truth which asserts that to be true which it holds to be untrue, flees from this
with abhorrence back into itself. It is a pure conscience which rejects with
scorn such a moral idea of the world; it is in its own self the simple Spirit
that, certain of itself, acts conscientiously regardless of such ideas, and in this im-
mediacy possesses its truth. (383).
however, Conscience is a subjective being that, as Unhappy Consciousness, is

related to the contingent reality of the social organism.
The development of Conscience will consist of the step-by-step reali-
zation of the Unhappy Consciousness leading to the result that Conscience
(as absolute Spirit) is not only subjectively, but also objectively, i. e., from
the outside perspective, the essence of reality. This will accomplish the
project of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The human being can absolutely
be understood as the unity of mind and body.
The development of Conscience

From the inside perspective, the conscientious citizen thinks to have com-
plete moral autonomy at his disposal. Nothing can disturb the absolute
conviction of Conscience. From the outside perspective, however, the pic-
ture looks different. The conscientious citizen appears as the individual
who has internalized the lord and who matters not much to the social or-
ganisms reality. The individual is immediately convinced that the abso-
lute content of his self-consciousness, i. e., the content of his Conscience,
immediately coincides with the content of objective reality in general.
This conviction, however, remains, for the time being, an inner one
and does not matter at all to the social organisms reality.
The question is whether the inner conviction of the conscientious in-
dividual can resist the social organisms reality that he excludes. There-
fore, the development of the conscientious individual discussed by
Hegel under the title Conscience. The beautiful soul, evil and its forgive-
ness (383) can, as a matter of fact, be considered as the systematical re-
search to the question of whether the individual in this form is thinkable
at all. We will see that the development of the conscientious individual is
structured according the stages of the Unhappy Consciousness and repeats,
like the Unhappy Consciousness, the moments of Consciousness and Self-
consciousness.
a. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats Consciousness
The conscientious individual who repeats the development of Conscious-

ness wants to find the content of his Conscience in the reality to which he
is immediately related. In this context, this immediate reality is not an
object (like in the elementary form of Sense-Certainty) but an action
The development of Conscience 107
that is immediately given in the framework of the existing social organ-

ism. Therefore, the individual thinks that this immediately given action
expresses the reality of his Conscience. 126 The action that is immediately
given, however, is only an example of many actions that are immediately
given. This necessitates a nearer identification of the action that expresses
the content of the Conscience. This is done by the individual by claiming
that especially that action expresses the content of Conscience that does so
according to his subjective conviction.127 The subjectivism into which the
consciences content relapses can be overcome when this conviction is rec-
ognized by others.128
b. Conscience as the Unhappy Consciousness that repeats

Self-consciousness
The individual whose conviction is recognized by the others has an inter-

subjective way of existence that is separated from the given reality of the
social organism. Since this individual considers his self-consciousness (the
conviction of his conscience) essential and the given reality inessential, he
repeats, respectively, the three stages of the development of self-con-
sciousness: Desire, Lordship and Bondage and Stoicism.
The individual repeats Desire because he can only retain the convic-
tion of his conscience as the absolute essence (and consequently, can per-
sist in his autonomy) when he demonstrates that the objective reality to
which he is related is inessential. Therefore, the individual understands
the action in which he expresses his inner nature, his drive or desire as
126 Cf. Action qua actualization is thus the pure form of willthe simple conversion
of a reality that merely is into a reality that results from action, the conversion of
the bare mode of objective knowing [i.e. knowing an object] into one of knowing
reality as something produced by consciousness. (385).
127 Cf. This immediate concrete self-certainty is the essence [of the action]; looking
at this certainty from the point of view of the antithesis of consciousness, the
content of the moral action is the doers own immediate individuality; and the
form of that content is just this self as a pure movement, viz. as [the individuals]
knowing or his own conviction. (387).
128 Cf. This being-for-another is, therefore, the substance which remains in itself or
unexplicated, which is distinct from the self. Conscience has not given up pure
duty or the abstract in-itself; duty is the essential moment of relating itself, qua
universality, to another. Conscience is the common element of the two self-con-
sciousnesses, and this element is the substance in which the deed has an enduring
reality, the moment of being recognized and acknowledged by others. (388).
an action that constitutes the social organism. Under that condition his
action contributes to the realization of the absolute content of conscience.
Consequently, the action realizes the individuals duty.129
The needy nature of the individual, however, appears in a multitude
of actions. Therefore, towards the others who dispute that his actions are
dutiful, the individual again and again has to bring up points of view that
show that his actions serve the general good the best. (Analogously, the
elementary Desire had to prove again and again that his pure self is the
essence of the (living) natural objects.) Precisely because of this, because
of the possibility to find again and again a new point of view to illustrate
that his action expresses his duty, the individual can preserve the illusion
of his autonomy.130
Because the individual, on the one hand, thinks himself to be totally
free to determine what is the content of his duty but, on the other hand,
has to manifest himself in a particular action, a discrepancy can arise
about the individuals own opinion with regard to his duty and the opin-
ion of the others. After all, the others judge the individual on the basis of
the actions he performs. If this discrepancy is acknowledged by the indi-
vidual, he arrives at the repetition of the lordship/bondsman relation, but
this time in a version in which he takes on, as well, the role of the lord as
the role of the bondsman. The individual realises that he, being depend-
ent on his actions, remains tied to the external reality and, therefore, plays
the role of the bondsman. At the same time, the individual, as conscience,
performs the role of the lord. He remains autonomous insofar as his sub-
jective conviction remains dependent on that action that he decides to be
the expression of his conscience.131
The moral content of the individual that has internalized the lordship/
bondsman relation, however, remains elusive for the others. If they consid-
er the action that is really performed by the individual to be the expres-
129 Cf. But action is called for, something must be determined by the individual, and
the self-certain Spirit in which the in-itself has attained the significance of the
self-conscious I, knows that it has this determination and content in the imme-
diate certainty of itself. This, as a determination and content, is the natural con-
sciousness, i. e. impulses and inclinations. (390).
130 Cf. In the strength of its own self-assurance it possesses the majesty of absolute
autarky, to bind and to loose. This self-determination is therefore without more
ado absolutely in conformity with duty. (393)
131 Cf. What ought to be there, is here an essentiality solely by its being known to be
self-expression of an individuality; and it is this being known that is acknowl-
edged by others, and which as such ought to have an existence. (395).
The development of Conscience 109
sion of his conscience, the individual always has the possibility to main-
tain that the moral content is not expressed in this action, but is deter-
mined by his expressed conviction that the moral content appears in a
specific action. Moreover, the individuals are not distinguished from
one another, so that it must be assumed that the other individuals also
have internalized the lordship/bondsman relation. They could get involved
in a mutual struggle if one of them identifies the moral content with a
particular action: Regularly the other would identify the moral content
with another action. This mutual struggle, however, would be senseless
because it is not the objectivity of the action that makes it a moral
one, but rather the judgment that the individuals pass on the action.
This makes it possible that the individuals can reconcile. They can recog-
nize themselves in the others with respect to the opinion that it is the in-
dividuals moral judgment that makes or does not make the action of the
expression of conscience. This reconciliation implies the individuals
emancipation from their roles as bondsmen. The objectivity to which
they are related no longer has the quality of an external action, but exists
of the intersubjectively shared judgment on the moral content of the ac-
tion.
The overcoming of their role as bondsmen induces the individuals to
repeat stoicism. 132 Once again they can cherish the illusion to be com-
pletely autonomous. From the inside perspective, the natural reality has
been totally sidetracked. The content of the duty is no longer realized
in the medium of nature, but in the medium of speech. The individuals
have the opinion that the realization of their duty is nothing else than ex-
pressing their conviction concerning the content of their duty towards
others. The objectivity of the duty is derived from the individuals mutual
recognition that they are convinced that the expressed conviction on the
content of the duty is true. Hegel indicates them as the self-satisfied in-
dividuals who are absolutely convinced of their own excellence and who
can persevere in this conviction because they confirm one another in their
being excellent.133
132 Cf. The declaration of this assurance in itself rids the form of its particularity. It
thereby acknowledges the necessary universality of the self. (397).
133 The spirit and substance of their association are thus the mutual assurance of
their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over this mutual purity,
and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cher-
ishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs. (398).
Conscience that becomes aware of itself as Unhappy

Consciousness
From an outside perspective, the individuals lose themselves in their pure

subjectivism (or, as Hegel expresses it, in their solitary divine worship
(397)). They can only retain the illusion of their autonomy as long as
they suppress the natural reality, and this repression only holds as long
as the individuals conserve their collective delusion. In reality, however,
they repeat the relation of scepticism, for, although the reality of their ac-
tion transcends their autonomy, they have the illusion to be able to deter-
mine autonomously whether or not they perform their duty.
Sooner or later, the individuals experience the contradiction in which
they have ended up. Once the speech will fall silent and the spell is bro-
ken that maintained their illusion, this results in a position in which the
individuals repeat the Unhappy Consciousness. When the sounds of the as-
suring speech have faded away, the individuals must observe that they
have lost their consciences content.134 Their pride has gone before the
fall, and leaves the individuals in a situation in which they have to endure
their deepest deceptions. They suffered the greatest possible loss. While
they just celebrated their boundless autonomy, they now are left behind
with nothing. For them, there remains nothing else than the sorrow of an
absolute loss. Although the individual tries to ward off this sorrow by es-
caping reality and to lose himself as beautiful soul (400) in the pureness
that he retains against the evil world, in the end he learns, from an inside
perspective, what he, as conscientious individual, from the outside per-
spective, already was all the time: an individual who is related to a strange
outside world and can only realize the absolute content of his conscience
if he succeeds in eliminating the strangeness of the outside world.
If the individual has been persuaded of the impossibility to retain his
absolute essence as an inner unreal being, he has to identify himself as an
individual who is mind and body, as well. On the one hand, he under-
stands himself as essentially autonomous; on the other hand, he under-
stands that he is also corporeal. At the same time, he acknowledges
that his autonomy and his corporeality are not compatible. He can
only maintain his autonomy if he is able to realize his absolute essence.
134 Cf. The absolute certainty of itself thus finds itself, qua consciousness, changed
immediately into a sound that dies away, into an objectification of its being-for-
self; but this created world is its speech, which likewise it has immediately heard
and only the echo of which returns to it. (399).
Conscience that becomes aware of itself as Unhappy Consciousness 111
This realization, however, can only be performed by means of the linguis-

tic action that belongs to the individual insofar as he is corporeal. Because
every real action necessarily is a finite one, the realization of the absolute
essence necessarily implies the decline of its absoluteness. This dilemma
can also be expressed in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation. As we
saw before, the awareness of the individual is no longer that he plays the
role of the lord (because he transcends all action) as well as the role of the
bondsman (because he is tied to the real action). Now the individual un-
derstands, on the one hand, that he has to be as the lord as well as the
bondsman because the lord cannot be real without the bondsman; but,
on the other hand, he has experienced that both positions exclude one
another.
The necessary conclusion seems to be that, even though Hegel devel-
ops the individual as the unity of mind and body, the individual can not
be conceived of without contradiction, This conclusion, however, is rash.
The development is accomplished by the research of the conditions under
which the individual can be understood, after all, as unity of mind and
body.
The question of whether the lord moment can be compatible with
the bondsman moment can be discussed as an inner dialogue in which it
is investigated how both moments relate. The problem is, however, that
in this exercise it remains unclear what is the objective value of such an
inner dialogue. Because all individuals comprise both moments, the dia-
logue can also be constructed as a dialogue between two individuals who
each take on one of the moments. For conveniences sake, I will indicate
these individuals respectively as the lord and the bondsman.135
The lord thinks that whoever performs the good cannot dirty his
hands by real action. All real action serves a particular interest and has
lost the pureness of the good. The bondsman takes on the opposite po-
sition. He thinks that action is necessary because otherwise the good re-
mains unreal. Therefore, the lord judges that the bondsman performs the
bad and that he is hypocritical because he claims to perform the good.
The bondsman reacts by maintaining that his position is not distinguish-
ed from that of the lord at all. Also the lord performs a real action when
135 As lord, consciousness transcends all specific content; as bondsman, however,

it is linked with a specific content: Conscience, which in the first instance is
only negatively directed against duty as this given specific duty, knows itself to
be free from it; but since it fills the empty duty with a specific content from itself,
it is positively aware that it, as this particular self, makes the content. (400).
he expresses his judgment on the bondsman. Moreover, also the lord is

hypocritical because he pretends, while really acting, to do the good.136
The lord, however, cannot accept this recognition of the bondsman137 be-
cause this would imply the concession that the good is contaminated by
real action. The explicit refusal of the lord to accept the recognition of
the bondsman, however, makes that the lord is not only bad and hypo-
critical from the bondsmans subjective point of view, but also from an
objective point of view. He is bad because he tolerates other criteria for
himself than for the bondsman. While demanding for himself that his
position transcends his real action, this does not apply to the bondsman.
Moreover, he is hypocritical because, having a position that is not distin-
guished from the one of the bondsman at all, he pretends to take another
position. Therefore, it is the lord who hinders the bondsman to manifest
himself objectively as an individual that transcends his real action.
After having objectified his badness and hypocrisy by his attitude of
rejection towards the bondsman, the lord, however, is able to understand
what position he takes, after all. Once he has said that he, himself, is not
to be judged, but the bondsman has to be judged on his real action, the
lord admits that his position is unbearable. He then accepts, after all, the
bondsmans hand that is held out. Lord and bondsman reconcile, objec-
tively expressing by this that all individuals comprise the moment of the
lord, as well as that of the bondsman.138 Both moments cannot be sepa-
rated. Whoever wants to keep clean hands, yet soils his hands for the rea-
son that he sides against the one who thinks that without action the good
remains empty, and who thinks to realize the good by real action, must
understand that the good never coincides with real action.
It is true that the reconciliation between lord and bondsman has
shown that both moments presuppose one another (the one moment nec-
136 Cf. The conscience that judges in this way is itself base, because it divides up the
action, producing and holding fast to the disparity of the action with itself. Fur-
ther, it is hypocrisy, because it passes off such judging, not as another manner of
being wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the action, setting itself up in
this unreality and conceit of knowing well and better above the deeds it discred-
its, and wanting its words without deeds to be taken for a superior kind of real-
ity. (405)
137 But the confession of the one who is wicked, I am so, is not followed by a re-
ciprocal similar confession. (400).
138 Cf. Wildt (1984) Hegel grounds the possibility of confession and reconciliation
in the experience of equality of the subjects. [Hegel begrndet die Mglichkeit
von Bekenntnis und Verzeihung in der Erfahrung der Gleichheit der Subjekte.]
(p. 369).
The meaning of the absolute Spirit 113
essarily implies the other), but this observation is neutral with regard to
the question of the individuals real existence. It is only obvious that, if
the conscientious individual exists, this conscientious individual can real-
ize the good only by finite action. Precisely because he is tied to real ac-
tion, the actual realization of the good transcends his autonomy. The au-
tonomous individual is not the lord who produces the bondsman out of
himself, thus being the creator of his own corporeality. His corporeality
(and, consequently, his being situated), is already predisposed to his au-
tonomy all the time and, therefore, confines his autonomy. The realiza-
tion of the absolute good can only be performed by the absolute good
itself that can use the conscientious individual as a means for this end.
The conscientious individual can do no more than try to realize the
good, insofar as his powers permit him to do so. Whether or not he suc-
ceeds, transcends his autonomy and can only be understood as the mercy
granted by the absolute good, itself: In that sense, the absolute good has
to be understood as an actor, i. e., as the absolute Spirit. 139
The meaning of the absolute Spirit

The conclusion that the mind/body unity has to be concretized as the re-
lation between the absolute Spirit and the social organism may be felt as a
disillusionment. Is not the meaning of this conclusion that human free-
dom, the unity of mind and body, can ultimately only be based on reli-
gion? Is human freedom dependent on the belief that the pure self is a
god who can or can not be merciful to us? If we reflect on the preceding
development, this conclusion appears to be wrong. The absolute Spirit is
not invented by the conscientious individual, but was the presupposition
of the historical world all the time. We have seen that the social organism
of the Human Law could only exist thanks to its foundation in the reli-
gion of the work of art. Also the development from the Roman Law to the
Napoleonic Law presupposed a form of religion, this time the revealed re-
ligion. We have examined the nature of religion and identified both reli-
gions as representations of the pure self. Therefore, religion can be under-
stood as an historical example of the lord, i. e., the pure self that is rec-
139 Cf. The word of reconciliation is the objectively existent Spirit, which beholds
the pure knowledge of itself qua universal essence, in its opposite, in the pure
knowledge of itself qua absolutely self-contained and exclusive individualitya re-
ciprocal recognition which is absolute Spirit. (p. 408).
ognized as the essence of the social organism. If the conscientious indi-

vidual understands the social organism where he is living as an objective
reality in which the absolute Spirit has realized itself (in a finite form), he
only has become aware of the relation that principally is already expressed
in the lordship/bondsman relation all the time. The free individual serves as
bondsman, the pure self that is represented as a lord. If the conscientious
individual conceives of the absolute Spirit as the ground of this world, he
has understood what religion represented: the pure self. The absolute Spi-
rit is the pure self that appears in history.
At this level, the metaphor of lord and bondsman can cause misun-
derstandings. The free individual is no bondsman of the absolute Spirit in
the sense that he is one-sidedly used as a means that realizes the end of the
absolute Spirit. Precisely because the individual has understood that the
absolute Spirit is the essence of religion, he has understood that the god
is his own pure self. In his relation to the absolute Spirit, the individual
has understood his finiteness. On the one hand, he has conceived of
the pure self as his absolute essence, and on the other hand, he knows
that he can only realize this absolute essence in the form of an historical
social organism, i. e., in a finite manner.
We have witnessed that the individuals insight in his finitude is
mediated by an historical process. This insight itself, however, transcends
the historical process. Only when this insight has been developed, can it
become clear that the religious representation of the pure self also reflects
the social organism whose pure self it represents. (We have observed that
the social organism and the religious representation are interconnected.)
In other words, only then can it become clear that religion represents the
(absolute) pure self in a finite form. This comes to the fore in the system-
atical place of religion in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Although it is ob-
vious that Europes historical development cannot be understood without
religion, and although it is obvious, as well, that the religion of the work of
art is an integral part of the Greek world, like the revealed religion is an
integral part of the Realm of Culture, Hegel discusses the religion forms
only after the Realm of Morality, i. e., after having developed the individ-
uals relation to the absolute Spirit. Hegels considerations seem to be plau-
sible.140 Only when religion can be understood as expression of the abso-
lute Spirit, and only when it is understood that this expression is finite,
does the contingence of the religious representation become acceptable:
140 Later on, I will raise the question of the religions systematical place again. See
Chapter 7, Retrospection.
Retrospection 115
Religion can be conceived of as the representation of the lord that neces-

sarily has a contingent form. This contingent form will be sublated at the
level of the philosophical notion, the absolute Knowledge, that Hegel dis-
cusses in the last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, following on the
chapter on Religion. It is true that Hegel also has the opinion that, at the
level of the conscientious individual, the relation to the absolute Spirit is
already reached (so, before the systematical discussion of Religion). But at
this stage, the absolute Spirit can only be formally determined. Only when
it has been shown, at the level of Religion, that the absolute Spirit really
manifests itself in history (i. e., in historical religion forms), can the con-
tent of the absolute Spirit be developed: the absolute Notion that all ap-
pearing reality presupposes.
Retrospection
At the level of the second self, the absolute freedom, the moral individual
had in mind the immediate realization of his freedom in the social organ-
ism. From an outside perspective, however, this attempt resulted in an in-
adequate realization of freedom. The absolute freedom is performed by
the contingent individual who tries to makes his subjective freedom the
measure for all. In this relation the moral and legal order are not compat-
ible: the legal order is sacrificed to the moral one.
At the level of the third self, conscience, the realization of the consci-
entious individuals freedom is mediated by the absolute Spirit. Therefore,
right and morality appear as the relation between social organism and ab-
solute Spirit. At this level, the relation between right and morality, seen
from the inside perspective, is no longer contradicted by the outside per-
spective. This time, neither right is absorbed by morality, nor is morality
absorbed by right. It is true that the moral dimension (the absolute Spirit)
is objectified in the social organism, but this means in no way that the
separation between right and morality disappears. The difference between
absolute Spirit and social organism is maintained (as a kind of ontolog-
ical difference): The absolute Spirit transcends the social organism. This
transcendence is objectively expressed in the process of world history.
World history makes explicit that all social organisms are only contingent,
i. e., they decline and are followed by other social organisms.141
141 The Phenomenology of Spirit discusses world history at the level of religion.
The social organisms in history appear as a multitude of contingent

entities, like the Human, the Roman and the Napoleonic Laws. Although
these organisms are not related to one another in a teleological process,
they can, retrospectively, be hierarchically ordered. We have seen how
the Human, the Roman and the Napoleonic Laws respectively produced
the first, the second and the third self. In the first self, the pure self remains
implicit and is only practically expressed; in the second self, the pure self
has become self-conscious; in the third self, the pure self is understood as
the absolute Subject of reality, the absolute Spirit. Moreover, the world of
the second self cannot be developed without the experiences of the first self,
and the world of the third self cannot be developed without the experien-
ces of the first and second self.
Since the adequate relation between right and morality is only acces-
sible for the third self and the third self can only be developed when the
experiences of the first and second self are passed through, the conditions
can be formulated to which a social organism must respond to allow its
citizens the adequate realization of their freedom: The institutions of this
social organism must enable its citizens to reproduce the experiences of as
well the first, and the second and the third self. This conclusion results in
criteria to test contingent (historical) social organisms. The completion of
the Phenomenology of Spirit has produced the criteria that can be applied
by the Reason as testing laws. We will see in the next chapters that the
project of Hegels Philosophy of Right can be considered as the elaboration
of the Reason as testing laws applied to Hegels own time. The Philosophy
of Right tests to which extent the institutions of Northwestern Europe can
be considered as institutions that correspond to the criteria developed in
the Phenomenology of Spirit. To what extent should these institutions
allow their citizens to reproduce the experiences of the first, the second
and the third self ? 142
Before going into the project of the Philosophy of Right, however, I
will discuss Axel Honneths criticism of Hegels concept of recognition.
According to Honneth, this concept is too metaphysical and needs sup-
port from empirical sciences. It is true that this critcism is not oriented to
142 Cf. Smith (1989): As we shall see later, there is an inner teleology to moral
growth whereby the life-cycle of the individual moral agent, in some sense, reca-
pitulates the experience or history of the entire species. Nothing is ever lost or
forgotten, but is incorporated into a richer conception of the self. For Hegel,
as for Freud later on, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. p. 129.
Retrospection 117
the Phenomenology of Spirit, but I will show that this work provides in the
adequate elements for a reconstruction of Hegels answer to Honneth.
Chapter 5
Honneths Criticism of Hegels Metaphysics
Introduction
In his book, The Struggle for Recognition, Axel Honneth reverts to the
concept of recognition that has been developed by the young Hegel. At
the same time, however, he claims that we cannot appeal to this concept
just like that, because it remains connected to the presuppositions of the
metaphysical tradition. Hegels speculative thesis that the formation of
the practical self presupposes mutual recognition between subjects has to
be reconstructed in the light of empirical social psychology. (68) The
thesis that there exist various forms of reciprocal recognition, needs
an empirically supported phenomenology, one that allows Hegels the-
oretical proposal to be tested and, if necessary, corrected. (69) At the
end, it has to be examined whether the third thesis, according to
which the sequence of forms of recognition follows the logic of a forma-
tive process that is mediated by the stages of moral struggle (69) can
withstand empirical doubts (70).
Although Honneth does not expressly relate himself to the Phenom-
enology of Spirit (in which the topic of a struggle for recognition was
restricted to the issue of the conditions for the emergence of self-con-
sciousness [145]), I will investigate in this chapter whether I have to
take to heart the objections that Honneth expresses against the young
Hegel if I relate myself to the concept of recognition in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, and want to make it productive for our era. Is this concept a
metaphysical one, and does this mean that we can only sensibly relate to
this concept if it can stand an empirical test?
The Phenomenology of Spirit and the question of The

Nature of the Self
In the introductory chapter, the question of the nature of the self is not
immediately related to the Phenomenology of Spirit, and developed from
the central question of this work. Rather, it was observed that contempo-
The Phenomenology of Spirit and the question of The Nature of the Self 119
rary thinkers like Jrgen Habermas and John Rawls seem to determine
the human individual, in the footsteps of Kant, in an ambiguous manner.
On the one hand, the human being is a reasonable or moral individual
and borrows his uniqueness from this qualification (he is a discourse part-
ner who is not exchangeable or has a unique plan of life); on the other
hand, he is a corporeal individual who is distinguished from the others
by his corporeal identity. However, it remains unclear how his moral
or reasonable identity has to be conceived of in a unity with his corporeal
identity. As a corporeal individual, the human being seems to be the bear-
er of mental powers. But how the human being can be understood as the
unity of mind and body is not thematized. It is only clear that the cor-
poreal identity does not determine the mental one, and that the mental
identity does not determine the corporeal one.
In the preceding chapters it is examined whether the unity between
mind and body can be understood by conceptualizing their mutual rela-
tion as a relative contradiction, i. e. as a form/content distinction: The
mind is understood as the form in which the body gets its unity. It was
investigated under which conditions the inner unity between mind and
body that was formulated from an outside perspective, could also be un-
derstood from an inside perspective. If this investigation is successful,
then the mind/body unity can be understood as a unity in itself, i. e.,
as a unity that independently exists. Therefore, this investigation can
also be formulated as the question of whether the unity of mind and
body can be conceived of as a substance.
Such a project is as well distinguished from the project of Descartes,
who separated mind and body by assigning them to different substances,
as from the one of Spinoza who transformed mind and body by means of
the attributes of thinking and extension into moments of the unique di-
vine substance. As the Cartesian project, this project does justice to the
unique individual, but this time it does not result in the dualism between
mind and body. The project is closely related to Hegels project in the
Phenomenology of Spirit, but initially has another objective. After all
Hegel does not raise the question of whether the unity of mind and
body can be conceived of as substance, but rather the question of whether
it has a meaning at all to speak about the existence of a substance. Ulti-
mately, his answer is positive. It makes sense, if we understand substance
as subject, as the absolute Spirit. This seems to bring Hegels project into
the neighborhood of Spinoza: Substance is eminently the divine sub-
stance.
120 Chapter 5 Honneths Criticism of Hegels Metaphysics
Hegel begins his project with the consciousness of the Sense-Certainty,

i. e., the consciousness that tests whether an object that is immediately
given as a sensory one can be understood as substance. The result of
this test is negative, because what is sensorially given exists of a multitude
that can only be brought to an unity in a external way. The unity that
consciousness tries to find refers back to the unity of consciousness itself,
i. e., to a pure self. Therefore, the determination of consciousness can
only be understood as self-determination.
However, this conclusion does not imply, according to Hegel, that the
pure self has to be understood as the Cartesian cogito. After all, it was
only possible to draw this conclusion because consciousness is related
to nature. This relation to nature presupposes that consciousness is al-
ready a corporeal consciousness all the time. Therefore, Hegel explicitly
thematizes in the chapter on Self-consciousness the question of whether
the pure self can be conceived of in unity with a living organism. This
means that the question of whether it makes sense at all to speak
about the existence of substance, has been evolved to the question of
whether the unity of mind and body can be conceived of as a unity.
That the project of the preceding chapters, unlike the Phenomenology
of Spirit, immediately begins with the question of whether the unity of
mind and body can be conceived of as substance, makes clear that the ob-
jective of this project is in no way a divine substance, an absolute spirit
that cannot accommodate an independent human subject. It is true
that this objective has the consequence that the setting of the Phenomen-
ology of Spirit is not copied, but this deviation only concerns the presen-
tation. With regards to the content, it has no meaning at all.
While Hegel, in the Consciousness-Chapter, raises the question of
whether the natural multitude can be understood as a unity by itself , I
raise the question of whether the relation to the natural multitude does
not affect the mind/body unity. Also this affection can only be prevented
if the natural multitude can, by itself, be understood as a unity that is dis-
tinguished from the mind/body unity. While in the Phenomenology of Spi-
rit, the corporeality of consciousness is only thematized at the level of self-
consciousness, I brought this corporeality into question from the begin-
ning. In this way, I hope that I have clarified from the outset that Hegels
project is, in principle, not metaphysical in the sense of Habermas and
Honneth: as an absolute Spirit in which the independence of the real
human individual gets lost. We will still see, however, that it is necessary
to differentiate between a formal and a substantial concept of the absolute
Spirit.
The development of freedom from the inside perspective 121
The relation of mind and body as the primordial form of

recognition
We have seen that the central step that is performed in the Phenomenology
of Spirit to conceive the unity of mind and body is thematized under the
title, fear of death. In the fear of death, the pure self recognizes itself in the
organism that makes it a real individual. The organism is the real self that
in the fear of death is recognized by the pure self as the self of which itself
is the essence. In the fear of death, the relation between mind and body
that is conceptualized as a relative contradiction becomes self-conscious.
The pure self recognizes itself in its body as a self in the form of other-
ness. The fear of death is the elementary experience in which the mind is
at itself in the other as other.
The inner experience of the fear of death is objectified in the lordship/
bondsman relation that, therefore, can also be understood as the institu-
tionally objectified fear of death. In the lord, the pure self is objectified
as an institutional self that is the essence of a social organism. In the
bondsman, the organism is objectified as a social organism. The fear of
death is objectified in the labor that the bondsman performs in service
of the lord.
Considered from an outside perspective, the mind/body unity that is
objectified in the lord who is recognized by the bondsman, is a free unity.
Unlike the natural organism, the social organism is not determined by ex-
ternally given natural laws, but by man-made laws that are symbolized in
the lord. From an inside perspective, these laws appear as not free, as the
traditional laws that are already given all the time. The entire further de-
velopment of the Phenomenology of Spirit exists in examining under
which conditions the laws can, also from an inside perspective, become
valid as self-made.
The development of freedom from the inside perspective

In order to assure, also from an inside perspective, the insight into the
freedom of the social organism, the law that commands this organism
has to be explicated as a free law. In terms of the lordship/bondsman met-
aphor: Freedom must not only practically be expressed by replacing the
natural action of an organism with action in service of the lord, but also it
must become clear that the lord is a pure self, a self that is freely related to
the social organism. It has to be clear that the social organism is a con-
tingent reality in which the free self has expressed itself in a specific
way. In other words, the free self must not be absorbed in the specific
way in which it has objectified itself.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the first step to develop freedom from
the inside perspective is performed at the level of the Unhappy Conscious-
ness, the position in which, so to speak, the bondsman has internalized the
pure essence of the social organism (the pure self of the lord). The second
step is performed at the level of Reason, where the Unhappy Consciousness
wants to find again the (social) reality as expression of his internalized
pure self. From the outside perspective, it is clear at once that this second
step has to fail. As a contingent reality, the social organism cannot at the
same time be understood as the expression of many free selves. Therefore,
the result of the development of Reason is that the single self gets the in-
sight that the social organism remains an external contingent reality. The
law of the social organism cannot be determined from the perspective of
the single self.
The transition from a monological into a dialogical approach

Referring to Jrgen Habermass terminology, the failure of Reason to de-
termine the law of the social organism can also be formulated as the fail-
ure of a monological approach. The single self (the bondsman who has
internalized the pure self ), is monologically related to the objective reality
that it tries to determine as the expression of its particular freedom. This
monological approach contrasts with the dialogical approach that was al-
ready addressed in the case of the constitution of the lordships/bondsman
relation. After all, the social organism can only exist if the lord for all
symbolizes the social organism, and if the actualization of the law imme-
diately coincides with the actualization of their own essence. This dialog-
ical approach, however, gets lost if, at the level of Unhappy Consciousness
and Reason, it is thematized as to how the single self can become aware of
the actualization of his freedom.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Spirit-Chapter takes up again the
dialogical approach of the lordship/bondsman relation. Point of departure
is the contingent organism that all participants immediately understand
as the actualization of their free essence. Hegel identifies this organism
as the Human Law of the Greek polis that is realized in the actions of
the free citizens. This transition to an historical dimension implies that
The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical relation 123
the question of whether the unity of mind and body can be conceived of
as a substance has become, in a certain way, empirically testable. The re-
sponse to this question appears to be dependent upon the answer to an-
other question: Can the Human Law of the polis sensibly be understood
as a social organism in which the lordship/bondsman relation has got real
shape? And, subsequently, can the Human Law be understood as sub-
stance?
The relation between the lordship/bondsman relation and the Human
Law that is established here, can raise the question of why Hegel, after his
discussion of the lordship/bondsman relation, does not immediately switch
over to the Spirit-Chapter, leaving out the passages regarding the Unhap-
py Consciousness and Reason. This, however, can effectively be explained.
The Human Law can only be understood as substance if it can be clari-
fied that the pure freedom of the Greek citizens does not submerge in the
Human Laws practical actualization of freedom. The Greek citizen has to
acquire insight into the contingency of the Human Law. In other words,
he has to endure the experiences of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason.
This means that not only the lordship/ bondsman relation, but also the Un-
happy Consciousness and Reason must be found again in the historical re-
ality of the polis. We have seen that this, according to Hegel, is indeed the
case: In the polis, the Unhappy Consciousness can be found again in the
relations of the Divine Law, the law of the family, and Reason can be
found again in the relation between Human and Divine Law.
The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical

relation
In the Spirit-Chapter, the question is thematized under which conditions

the social organism that is understood as a dialogical relation can be un-
derstood as a substance. This comes down to the question of whether the
social organism can be conceived of in a unity with the pure self. How-
ever, the social organism is now identified as the Human Law of the polis,
i. e., as an historical organism.
We have seen how Hegel describes the development of the polis as the
process in which the pure self of the Divine Law penetrates the Human
Law. Again, the result of this development is that the law of society is un-
derstood as a contingent law, leading to the decline of the polis. The in-
sight into the contingency of the Human Law does not mean that the so-
cial organism cannot be understood as a substance at all: Hegel presents

the Roman Empire as a social order in which the contradiction of the
Greek world has been solved.
The Roman Empires solution of the contradiction between the tradi-
tion of the Human Law and the pure self is the formal Roman property
law. Thanks to this law, the citizens of the social organism are free and
equal persons who are not bound to any tradition. Each person has the
right to determine his own tradition at the level of the family. The person
is, so to speak, the lord of his family. The many families are united by a
formal law that gives all citizens the right to express their particular free-
dom in the private domain.
Hegel shows that, in the long term, the Roman Empire has to decline
because the many traditions that it contains do not display an internal
coherence. Therefore, the survival of the Empire is dependent on the bal-
ance of power between the families. If this power balance is disturbed
and, consequently, the decline of the Roman Empire is brought about,
the persons experience that the reality of their freedom does not coincide
with the existence of the Roman Empire. It appears that the essence of the
social organism is a pure self that also cannot manifest itself. The person
who has internalized the pure self is the Unhappy Consciousness that this
time does not exist beside the Human Law, but wants to actualize its
inner essence as the Human Law.
We have seen how Hegel thematizes the self-actualization of this form
of the Unhappy Consciousness at the level of the Realm of Education. Here,
the Unhappy Consciousness is the moral person who wants to immediately
actualize himself as the Human Law. Once again the question has to be
raised as to whether the unity of mind and body can be understood in this
relation as a substantial unity. It appeared that this was again not the case.
After all, this development ended in the absolute freedom and the terror
of the French Revolution: if all want to sublate the contingency of the
Human Law by making it the immediate expression of their moral self,
the result will be that the Human Law will be ruined.
The contradiction of the Realm of Education (the general social or-
ganism that has to be the expression of the particular freedom), is sublat-
ed at the level of Morality: By understanding the essence of the social or-
ganism, in accordance with Rousseau, as the volont gnrale, the social
organism can still be understood as the moral self-expression of all, but
now at the level of a pure being.
The attempt to conceptualize this pure being (in accordance with
Kant), in unity with the real social organism, however, fails. This results
The absolute Spirit as the presupposition of the dialogical relation 125
in the conclusion that the pure self and the social organism can only be
understood as a substantial unity if they are already comprehended as an
inner unity all the time. This position demarcates the inner certainty of
Conscience, the third form of the Unhappy Consciousness that is discussed
in the Spirit-Chapter.
We have examined how conscience, in the development in which it ac-
tualizes its subjective certainty, repeats in a self-conscious manner the di-
alectical movement of Consciousness and Self-consciousness, and acquires
the explicit insight into itself as Unhappy Consciousness. Then, Conscience
becomes aware that it has to understand its pure essence (its lord), as
the absolute Spirit that realizes itself in and by the social organism.
What this self-realization of the lord (the absolute Spirit), exactly means
can easily evoke misunderstandings.
The introduction of the absolute Spirit does not mean that the real
human being (as unity of mind and body), is reduced to a marionette,
to be tools in the hands of an absolute power. After all the point of de-
parture of the Spirit-Chapter was human freedom: the human who is not
one-sidedly understood as a natural being, but also as a spiritual being
who is autonomous and has, therefore, objectified himself in the
Human Law. This Human Law has been understood as an historical, dia-
logical relation, i. e., as a relation that for the particular individual appears
as a contingent reality. Therefore, the question has to be answered of how
this contingent reality (the Human Laws collective actualization of free-
dom), can be reconciled with the particular freedom of the individual.
The response to this question resulted in the three forms of the self
that can be considered as closer determinations of the institutional struc-
ture of the Human Law: Only under the condition of these closer deter-
minations can the Human Law be reconciled with the particular freedom.
The institutional structure of the first self (the person) has to guarantee
that each individual has room for the particular determination of his free-
dom (for a particular tradition). The institutional structure of the second
self (the absolute freedom), has to guarantee that the Human Law is no
contingent reality, but is explicitly posed as the reality that has been
brought about in and by the actions of socialized individuals, and that,
consequently, becomes valid as a dialogical reality. The institutional struc-
ture of the third self has to guarantee that the dialogical reality is effective-
ly brought about. It must guarantee that all comprehend the dialogical
reality as expression of their pure freedom. This means that they have
to understand this reality as self-expression of the absolute Spirit.
The insight into the three forms of the self can hardly be called a met-
aphysical insight. They determine the conditions under which the social
organism can be reconciled with the particular freedom. Because Hegel
makes certain historical conditions the presupposition to acquire these in-
sights, they have, in some sense, an empirical basis. Neither can it be
maintained that the development of these historical conditions imply a
metaphysical conception of history: as if history is ruled by a necessary
teleology. It is only implied that if the unity of mind and body is ade-
quately understood as substance (i. e. as well from the inside as from
the outside perspective), the involved historical stages must have been
gone through. Like Habermas, Hegel could distinguish between develop-
ment logic and development dynamic: The logical reconstruction of the
historical process may well be distinguished from its actual dynamic.
Absolute Spirit and metaphysics

Nevertheless, Hegel seems to make a step that justifies the criticism of
Habermas and Honneth. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Spirit-Chap-
ter is followed by the chapter about Religion. In this chapter, the formal
concept of the absolute Spirit that is introduced at the end of the Spirit-
Chapter, is transformed in the substantial concept of the absolute Spirit
that is elaborated in the final chapter, absolute Knowing. While the abso-
lute Spirit first was the formal condition that had to be fulfilled to com-
prehend the unity of the particular freedom and the Human Law, it now
seems to be transformed into a real self, a god who is the true actor of the
historical process. Is this step acceptable? Does it not come down that
Hegel establishes that, departing from the particular freedom, it is not
possible to comprehend it adequately in unity with the Human Law,
and that, therefore, an appeal to a supra-human power is unavoidable?
Does not the transition to religion mark the point that only the absolute
Spirit can be understood as a substance? Does this concept of the absolute
Spirit as the absolute subject substance not definitely make clear that the
human individual, the unity of mind and body cannot be understood as
substance? Is not the human being reduced here to a tool of the absolute
Spirit?
To understand which step Hegel is making here, it is good to return
once again to the lordship/bondsman relation. At this stage, the thesis was
elaborated that the unity of mind and body can only be comprehended as
a substantial unity in the domain of society. In this domain, the relation
Absolute Spirit and metaphysics 127
between mind and body is objectified as a social organism that is under-

stood as the expression of an institutional self, i. e., the lord. The lord rep-
resents the pure self that is actualized in the social organism in a partic-
ular, historical manner. The actualization of the social organism is per-
formed by the labor of the bondsman who works in the service of the
lord. Considered from the outside perspective, the lord has two functions.
On the one hand, he represents the unity of the social system: He is, so to
speak, the king who symbolizes the norms and values that determine the
tradition of the ruling social system. On the other hand, he represents the
legitimacy of the ruling power: He is, so to speak, the god, the transcen-
dent being that is the basis of the ruling power. This transcendent being is
a pure self. Because this transcendent being is actually the essence of the
bondsman, the power of the king is legitimate. From the inside perspec-
tive, initially both roles totally coincide. The pure freedom of the bonds-
man totally remains absorbed in the practical action by which he actual-
izes the social organism.
Nevertheless, the bondsman does not totally coincide with his social
action. If this would be the case, he would not distinguish himself from
an animal that lives in a social connection. The bondsman is also a self-
conscious being. This is expressed by Hegel when he says that the bonds-
man recognizes the lord as his essence. This recognition means, firstly,
that the lord may not be one-sidedly interpreted as an external power
of nature that physically forces the bondsman to do what he wants. Sec-
ondly, this recognition means, positively, that for the bondsman, the lord
represents his own absolute essence: In this sense, the lord is the represen-
tation of a goddess. Therefore, the recognition of the lord by the bonds-
man has nothing to do with the recognition of the one human individual
by the other. It is not necessary at all that the lord represents a human
individual. He, rather, represents an absolute power with which the
human individual is confronted (which power, just by recognizing it as
a lord, is no external power). Therefore, it is no option at all, that the
relation between lord and bondsman (to do justice to democratic free-
dom), actually should be a symmetrical one. In his recognition of the
lord, the bondsman recognizes that the values that regulate his practical
action are absolute ones.
The lordship/bondsman relation teaches that, for the bondsmen who
actualize in their actions the Human Law, this law never is a contingent
reality. This is expressed by them when they represent the lord for whom
they work as an absolute power. For that reason, the exercise that was
executed in the Spirit-Chapter with regard to historical forms of the
Human Law (Antiquity, Middle Ages, Modernity), still is an abstraction.

After all, we saw that the Spirit-Chapter was preceded by an attempt (by
means of the development at the level of Unhappy Consciousness and Rea-
son), to comprehend the pure freedom of the singular self in unity with
the Human Law. This attempt failed because, for the pure freedom of the
singular self, the Human Law is a contingent reality, with which it is, con-
sequently, not internally linked. At that stage, the transition to the Spirit-
Chapter was made. Point of departure of this chapter was a contingent,
historically observed Human Law, i. e., the law of the polis, of the Greek
society. The choice for the Greek society was made because it could be
reconstructed as a society in which the relation forms of the Unhappy
Consciousness and Reason could be found again. In this way, the search
for the unity of the singular self s pure freedom and the Human Law
was continued otherwise: as the search that was actually performed in
a contingent, historical process.
The historical setting of the Spirit-Chapter remains abstract because
it initially remains implicit what is already clear at the level of the lord-
ship/bondsman relation all the time. It is true that, in relation to the
pure freedom of the singular self, the specific tradition of the Human
Law appears as a contingent tradition, but at the same time, the pure free-
dom of the singular self cannot have existence when it does not partici-
pate in the social organism. The what of the tradition may be contingent,
but this contingency does not concern the that of the tradition. In a real
historical society, the singular self expresses this necessary relation be-
tween itself and society by representing the social organism as an absolute
self, i. e., by its religious representation. In the Spirit-Chapter, this reli-
gious dimension is not yet explicitly thematized.
The abstraction of the Spirit-Chapter becomes explicit when Con-
science, at the end of the chapter, performs the transition from a formal
concept of the absolute Spirit. Here it becomes clear, from an inside per-
spective, what, from an outside perspective, was already clear at the level
of the lordship/bondsman relation: The singular self can only actualize its
freedom in the historical reality of the Human Law in which it already
participates all the time. It is true that the Human Law as an historical
reality is a contingent one, but formally, as an expression of freedom, it
is not. In the formal concept of the absolute Spirit, the Human Law is un-
derstood as a specific historical expression of pure freedom. At that stage,
it is not only understood that the essence of the divine being is the pure
human freedom, but also that the Human Law has to be understood by
the bondsman as self-expression of this essence. It is true that the human
Religion 129
being actualizes the Human Law in and by his action, and that this action
actualizes at the same time his particular freedom, but that he is able at all
to express his actions in a Human Law in which all express their freedom,
transcends his particular freedom. He positively expresses this notion of
his own finitude when he understands the Human Law as the self-expres-
sion of an absolute subject whose essence is the human freedom. The Phe-
nomenology of Spirit discusses this absolute subject in the chapters about
Religion and absolute Knowledge.
Religion
We have seen that, at the level of religion, the social organism is repre-
sented as an absolute being. Therefore, the essence of the goddess can
only be understood as the general human freedom if, in the social organ-
ism, justice has been done to the free self. We have seen that this is only
the case after the French Revolution. Since in the Spirit-Chapter several
forms of the social organism are gone through, this could be the basis
for a reconstruction of the religious representations that correspond to
these forms. Only together with these religious representations can the
historic reality of these forms of the Human Law be understood, so
that the abstraction of the Spirit-Chapter is overcome. Unlike Hegel, I
have discussed the society forms of the Spirit-Chapter in connection
with the corresponding religion forms. I will explain the reason for this
later on in this chapter.
In his reconstruction of the religion forms, however, Hegel goes a step
further. At the level of the Religion of Nature, he reconstructs the religion
forms that precede the Greek society, i. e., that precede the society in
which human freedom has at least objectified itself in a Human Law.
These religion forms correspond with relations that were discussed be-
fore, at the level of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. At this level,
human freedom still is absorbed in relations of nature. This can also
be formulated in terms of the lordship/bondsman relation (which, for a
matter of fact, is not done by Hegel, himself ): The action of the bonds-
man is still linked with the natural organism (it has not yet obtained a
institutional form in a social organism), and the lord is, at this level,
the power of nature that is represented as a divine power. This results
in the forms of the so-called religion of nature.
In the first form of the religion of nature (god as light), the natural
reality of Sense-Certainty (the many sensory given objects), is represented
as a divine being. In the second form (god as flower or god as animal), the
object of Perception (the thing with many properties), and Understanding
(the force), are respectively represented by a flower and an animal as a
divine being. Finally, in the third form (the religion of the artificer),
the world of the lordship/bondsman relation is represented as a divine re-
lation, namely the relation between pharaoh and pyramid. (From these
religions of nature, by the way, an extra argument can be borrowed for
my alternative presentation of the Consciousness Chapter: The attempts
to comprehend the outside world as a unity are repeated here by the rep-
resentation of the outside world as a goddess. Since the goddess is the ab-
solute essence of the representing self, here it becomes explicit that it is
about comprehending the representing self as substance.)
At first it may seem strange that, in the Religion-Chapter, Hegel re-
verts to religion forms that precede the Greek world. Why discuss these
forms, when the Spirit-Chapter historically only begins at the Greek
world? At second glance, there are, at least from Hegels perspective,
good reasons for this move. Due to the introduction of the religion of
nature, not only do the forms of the Unhappy Consciousness and Reason
have their religious representation (we have seen how this happened at
the level of the religion of art and the revealed religion), but also the
forms of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. Consequently, all forms of
consciousness that are gone through in the development that was oriented
to the comprehension of the mind/body unity, have their religious repre-
sentation. Moreover, these representations are thus reconstructed, that
they are placed in a dialectical coherence. Together, they form a develop-
ment in which it is more and more adequately explicated under which
conditions the unity of mind and body can be comprehended as a sub-
stantial unity. This development is completed in the formal concept of
the absolute Spirit in which it is comprehended that the human being
can express the substantial unity of mind and body when he actualizes
himself in a Human Law that he can, at the same time, understand as
self-expression of a pure self. This formal concept of the absolute Spirit
is transformed into a substantial one when the dialectical coherence of re-
ligion forms (and the societies that correspond to these forms), can be un-
derstood as moments of the self-expression of the pure self. Then, sub-
stance is understood as subject. However, this subject is not the
human subject, the substantial unity of mind and body, but rather is
the divine subject that in his self-realization produces the entire reality.
With this last step, an absolute subject is introduced that is linked with
Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism 131
the metaphysical position that is rightly rejected by Habermas and Hon-

neth.
Hegel, however, does something else. Although Hegel also completes
his project with a substantial concept of the absolute Spirit and, conse-
quently, comprehends substance as subject, this subject is distinguished
from the metaphysical subject against which Habermas and Honneth
turn themselves. In Habermass and Honneths interpretation, the absolute
Spirit is factually historicized: Objective and absolute Spirit coincide. In
this case, it becomes impossible indeed to distinguish a development
logic and dynamic: The self-actualization of the absolute Spirit is identified
with a contingent historical process. However, as remarked before, Hegel
could also have made the distinction between development logic and dy-
namic. Not just the religion forms, but the religion forms that are
brought to concept, their conceptual structures, are part of Hegels sub-
stantial concept of absolute Spirit. The substantial concept of absolute Spi-
rit does not coincide with the historical process, but rather enables con-
ceptualization of the contingent historical process as such. The insight has
been acquired that the substantial unity of mind and body can only be
conceived of as an historical process in which the pure freedom more
or less realizes itself in the social organism. The insight into this process,
as such, is not historical, even though it is recognized that there are his-
torical conditions that enable us to have access to this insight.
Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism

The rejection of the historical interpretation of the absolute subject has
no implications for the fundamental (necessary) status of the three
forms of the self. We have seen how these three forms followed from
the project in which it was tried to comprehend the unity of mind and
body as a substantial one. Point of departure of this project is a funda-
mental form of recognition, a form of recognition that precedes the
one that expresses itself in the three forms of the self: the recognition
of the body by the mind. We have seen how this project, in the Spirit-
Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, resulted in the question of
how the unity of the pure self and an empirical Human Law (the social
organism) can be conceptualized. In the response to this question, the
three forms of recognition were developed that Hegel expresses as the
three forms of the self.
Although these three forms are developed in a reflection on the con-

tingent European history (Antiquity, Middle Ages, Modernity), and, con-
sequently, represent insights that could only be developed on the basis of
an historical process of experience, they express necessary relations. They
express the necessary forms to which the institutional structure of the
Human Law has to correspond to be valid as the actualization of the
pure self. It is true that this means that the appearance of these three
forms of the self in a real society can only be mapped if they are linked
to empirical data that are borrowed from that society (this is elaborated in
the next chapters), but the relevance of these three forms as such is not
based on empirical testing.
Although Axel Honneth, in his The Struggle for Recognition, re-
lates to works that Hegel has written earlier than the Phenomenology of
Spirit, the three forms of recognition he distinguishes (Love, Respect
and Solidarity), strongly recall the three forms of the self that Hegel
has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is especially true be-
cause, for Honneth, the three forms of recognition have their institutional
reality in family, civil society and state. In the next chapters, it will be made
clear that this is also the case for the three forms of the self. If Honneths
three forms of recognition can indeed be related to the three forms of the
self in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and if Honneth implicitly presupposes
the unity of mind and body, this would mean that his project, as formu-
lated at the beginning of this chapter, has to be reformulated. The testing,
in the light of empirical social psychology for which Honneth is look-
ing, must concern the concrete historical appearance of the three forms of
the self, not the metaphysical framework in which these forms are de-
veloped. I think that this reformulation is only supported if it is more
closely viewed what the empirical testing to which he is appealing actually
implies. Then, it appears that this testing already presupposes the norma-
tive framework of the three forms of recognition all the time. The way in
which Honneth formulates his program is already an indication for this:
But before I can outline at least a few of the essential features of the social
theory I have in mind, two presuppositions must first be systematically clari-
fied, presuppositions that are inherent but not developed in Hegels and
Meads theories of recognition. First, the three-part division that both au-
thors appear to make among forms of recognition needs a justification
that goes beyond what has been said thus far. The extent to which such a
distinction actually fits anything in the structure of social relations is some-
thing that must be demonstratedindependently of the texts discussed until
nowby showing that this way of distinguishing phenomena can be brought
into approximate agreement with the results of empirical research. In what
Recognition between metaphysics and empiricism 133
follows, this demonstration is to take the form of a phenomenologically-ori-

ented typology that aims to describe the three patterns of recognition in such
a way that they can be checked empirically against the data from individual
sciences. Central here will be evidence for the claim that the various forms of
reciprocal recognition can, in fact, be mapped onto different levels of the
practical relations-to-self in the way suggested, in vague outline, in Meads
social psychology. On the basis of this typology, one can approach the second
task that Hegel and Mead bequeathed to us in failing to clarify a crucial im-
plication of their theoretical ideas. Both thinkers were in fact equally unable
to identify accurately the social experiences that would generate the pressure
under which struggles for recognition would emerge within the historical
process (p.93)
In this program, the metaphysical presuppositions on which Hegel bases
his three forms of recognition remain intact. Consequently, the program
is presented as a completion to Hegel: It is about an elaboration of pre-
suppositions that are inherent in Hegels theory of recognition. If the
three forms of recognition are once made the point of departure, it can
empirically be examined if and how they can be found again in empirical
societies, and to which development processes they belong. In the mean-
time, we have seen that the completions that are demanded here are, in
some form, present in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and we will see that
this is also the case for the Philosophy of Right.
Only in the last chapter of The struggle for Recognition, does Hon-
neth go into the entirety of his social theory and give formulations that
concern the entirety of the three forms of recognition: The concept of
ethical life is now meant to include the entirety of inter-subjective con-
ditions that can be shown to serve as necessary preconditions for individ-
ual self-realization. (173) These formulations are striking because they
seem to come very close to what I presented here as the result of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit. Also the three forms of the self could be described as
the entirety of inter-subjective conditions that can be shown to serve as
necessary preconditions for individual self-realization. But it remains a
riddle as to why Honneth, after his criticism of Hegels metaphysical
roots, thinks to be entitled to speak about necessary conditions, and
all the more, because he stated in a previous page: Our approach departs
from the Kantian tradition in that it is concerned not solely with the
moral autonomy of human beings, but also with the conditions for
their self-realization in general. Hence, morality, understood as the
point of view of universal respect, becomes one of several protective
measures that serve the general purpose of enabling a good life. But in
contrast to those movements that distance themselves from Kant, this
concept of the good should not be conceived of as the expression of sub-

stantive values that constitute the ethos of a concrete tradition-based com-
munity. Rather, it has to do with the structural elements of ethical life
which, from the general point of view of the communicative enabling
of self-realization, can be normatively extracted from the plurality of all
particular forms of life. (172) It remains unclear how such an extraction
can result in necessary preconditions.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel showed how these necessary
conditions can be deduced from the question of how the unity of
mind and body can be comprehended as a substantial unity. Honneth
seems to presuppose this unity. He does not understand that the necessary
preconditions of individual self-realization precisely follow from Hegels
deduction. In his theory of the three forms of recognition, therein fails
the fundamental form of recognition that is able to base the inner
unity of these three forms: the recognition of the body by the mind.
Honneths project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit

and the Philosophy of Right
We witnessed the kinship between Hegels project in the Phenomenology of

Spirit and the project of Honneth. The three forms of the self that Hegel
develops in this work can be understood as: the entirety of inter-subjec-
tive conditions that can be shown to serve as necessary preconditions for
individual self-realization. The big difference is that Hegel establishes the
necessity of the preconditions, and Honneth does not. In the preceding
chapter, we also saw that the Phenomenology of Spirit solves a deficit
that Honneth observes in the young Hegel, when he discusses his third
thesis (the sequence of forms of recognition follows the logic of a forma-
tive process that is mediated by the stages of moral struggle). In the Spi-
rit-Chapter, the three forms of the self are developed in relation to the
European history, so that it responds to Honneths demand that stages
of moral struggle can withstand empirical doubts. A reconciliation be-
tween the positions of Hegel and Honneth, however, would not be pos-
sible if the transition that is made in the Phenomenology of Spirit from the
formal concept of the absolute Spirit to the substantial one, should be
one-sidedly interpreted historically. In that case, this transition would
mark a form of metaphysics that is rightly criticized by Honneth.
After all, the consequence of this transition would be that the ethos of
Honneths project in relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit 135
concrete tradition-based communities would be one-sidedly interpreted

as the self-expression of an absolute subject and, consequently, would be
ruined as contingent ethos. The historical interpretation of the substantial
concept of the absolute Spirit, however, is false. Nevertheless, this histor-
ical interpretation of the substantial concept of the absolute Spirit may be
adequate for the Philosophy of Right. Just because the religious self-con-
scious fails in this work, there seems to be no room for the learning proc-
ess that results in the insight into the contingency of the ethos of con-
crete tradition-based communities.
In the next chapters, I will elaborate how the Philosophy of Right
builds on the Phenomenology of Spirit, how the Philosophy of Right places
the three forms of the self in a systematic coherence, and how the actu-
alization of this systematic coherence can be conceived of in our era. It
will appear that the historical interpretation of the substantial concept
of the absolute Spirit plays a role in the Philosophy of Right. As a conse-
quence, the ethos that Hegel elaborates for his era threatens to be
made absolute.143 Ethical life is not explicitly developed as a contingent
historical appearance of the three forms of the self. Especially this contin-
gent status asks for a contribution of the empirical sciences (empirical
psychology, social psychology), to develop the concrete content of ethical
substance.
In the next chapters it will also be discussed as to how a contemporary
version of the Philosophy of Right will look when, in line with Honneth,
we abstain from the substantial concept of the absolute Spirit that is one-
sidedly interpreted as an historical one. In this elaboration, there is room
for contingency and positive sciences. Moreover, it will appear that, in
contrast to Hegel, the appeal to religion forms that correspond to the de-
velopment in the Spirit-Chapter (religion of art and revealed religion), is in
one way or another necessary. It is precisely these religion forms that play
a role in putting the social objectivity in perspective. Anticipating this dis-
cussion, I already have combined, in the preceding interpretation of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, unlike Hegel, the polis and the Realm of Educa-
tion with their corresponding religion forms, i. e., religion of art and re-
vealed religion.
143 Erzsbet Rzsa (2005) shows that, in this respect, there is a discrepancy between
the preface and the main text of the Philosophy of Right.
Chapter 6
The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaboration
of the Phenomenologys project
Introduction
In this chapter, I will show that the program that Hegel elaborates in his
Philosophy of Right can be completely understood as the elaboration of a
project that is inspired by the Phenomenology of Spirit. The relation be-
tween both works not only implies that the Phenomenology of Spirit
can elucidate what is at stake in the Philosophy of Right, but also can
serve as a critical touchstone. Does Hegel remain true to his own project?
I will put forward the thesis that it has been Hegels intention to remain
totally true to the position he has developed in the Phenomenology of Spi-
rit. But I also want to make clear that the relation between both works is
complex: Starting from the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is possible to write
a Philosophy of Right that responds much better to the demands of our
era. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel is sometimes so much led by the
reality of his time, that it is at the cost of the critical potency that has al-
ready been developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
Partly, the fact that Hegel has been led by his own time is unavoid-
able. In the introduction of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel, himself, al-
ready indicates that a philosopher cannot surpass his era.144 This is not
only about a form of modesty, but also about a boundary that Hegel
has methodologically justified. The institutions of the rule of law cannot,
once and for all, be developed by a philosopher who takes in the stand-
point of eternity, but essentially have an historical form. They are the re-
sult from the Reason as testing laws, i. e., from the reason that, on the base
of universal criteria, tests in what sense existing institutions can be inter-
preted as expressions of freedom.
My criticism on Hegel does not concern the historical determinedness
of the institutions in the Philosophy of Right, but rather, the universal cri-
144 It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary
world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over
Rhodes. PhR, p.11.
The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right 137
teria that underlie his testing. Although Hegel derives his central argu-
ments from the Phenomenology of Spirit, I will show that there is some
tension between both works. Ultimately, in his reception of these criteria
in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel has been influenced too much by the
reality of his time. Consequently, the realization of human freedom has
been conceived of too much from the primacy of labor, i. e., from the
economic domain. At the same time, it cannot be put just like that,
that this making labor absolute (what comes down to conceiving the spi-
ritual existence of man too much from his corporeal existence) is inno-
cent of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In principle, this making labor abso-
lute is innocent of the project of the Phenomenology of Spirit: After all it is
again and again argued that the pure self cannot be absorbed by the social
organism. But the methodological organization of the work, in which the
religion forms corresponding to the historical forms of the social organ-
ism are discussed afterwards, promotes making labor absolute in the Phi-
losophy of Right. In the Philosophy of Right, the methodological distinction
between objective and absolute Spirit is made a real one. The relation to
the absolute Spirit is only discussed at the level of world history, not at
the level at which the real social institutions are developed. After all,
these institutions are not real because they are developed from the objec-
tive Spirits point of view. Their reality is only in sight when the relation
to the absolute Spirit is developed.
The conceptual design of the Philosophy of Right

Hegel formulates the program of the Philosophy of Right in 1: The sub-
ject-matter of the philosophical science of right is the Idea of right, i. e.,
the concept of right, together with the actualization of that concept. The
concept of right is more closely elaborated in the first two parts: Abstract
Right and Morality. The actualization of the concept of right is more
closely elaborated in the third part: Ethical Life. I will show how, in
the first part (abstract Right) the formal concept of the first self from
the Phenomenology of Spirit returns and how, in the second part (Morali-
ty), the formal concept of the second and third self from the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit return.145 Therefore, the concept of right appears as the for-
145 Rightly Erzsbet Rzsa (2007) states: The second self, i. e., the individual as es-
sential moment of the substance, as well as the sublation of the first self are
thought determinations of Hegelian philosophy that can also be recognized in
138 Chapter 6 The program of the Philosophy of Right
mal unity of the three forms of the self, as the formal unity of Right and
Morality.
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, I will discuss how Hegels concept of right
applies to the institutions that he finds in the modern world of his
time: To what extent can they be conceived of as expression of free-
dom?146 Insofar as the contingent institutions from his era can indeed
be conceived of as expression of freedom, he includes them in his Philos-
ophy of Right as institutions of Ethical Life. I will show how Hegel, in the
three sections of Ethical Life (Family, Civil Society and State)147 reverts to
the Philosophy of Right. [Das zweite Selbst, d. h. das Individuum als wesentliches
Moment der Substanz, wie auch die Aufhebung des ersten Selbst sind Gedanken-
bestimmungen der hegelschen Philosophie, die auch in der Rechtsphilosophie zu
erkennen sind.] (p. 78).
146 In contrast to Alan Patton (1999), I do not think that Hegel makes a priori
claims about the social and institutional conditions under which human person-
ality and subjectivity can be developed and sustained. (p. 204).
147 Honneth (2003) remarks: how much the idea of a social differentiation of
three spheres of recognition owes to a kind of social-theoretical transformation of
Hegels Philosophy of Right. Just as Hegel spoke with regard to the ethical (sit-
tlich) order of modern society of three institutional complexes (the family, civil
society, and the state), whose internal constitution as spheres of recognition al-
lows the subject to attain the highest degree of individual freedom through active
participation, the same basis idea is to be found in my own reflections in the
form of a differentiation of three differently constituted spheres of reciprocal rec-
ognition. p. 143/4. However, Honneth distinguishes two differences with He-
gels approaches. In the first place, the struggles for recognition at the three levels
essentially function only to motivate the transition to the next level of ethically
constituted institutions. (p. 144).
Secondly, Honneth reproaches Hegel a concretism that makes that the bor-
ders between the institutional complexes on the one side, and the spheres of rec-
ognition on the other, break down altogether. (p. 146). I do not think that this
conclusion can be maintained. The three forms of the self represent three forms
of recognition that are relatively independent. Moreover, it is rather Honneths
concretist reading of Hegel than Hegel himself, who identifies the three
forms of the self with the contingent institutions.
Honneth (2000) interprets Right and Morality in the Philosophy of Right as
two definitions of individual freedom, which independently of each other
had already exerted, in his view, considerable influence upon the practical self-
conception of society. (p. 34) I have tried to clarify that Right and Morality
are internally linked in Hegels concept of recognition. In this sense, recognition
reconciles the complementary perspectives of Nancy Fraser and can become clear
what according to Honneth remains unclear: it remains completely unclear why
the capitalist social order is now to be investigated specifically from the two per-
spectives of economy and culture, when it would seem equally possible to an-
alyze the object filed from other perspectives, such as morality or law. [law
The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self 139
the Phenomenology of Spirit. On the one hand, they are designed as actu-
alization of the three forms of the self (as Family, Corporation and State)
and revert to Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modernity (respectively Ethical
World, World of Culture and Morality); on the other hand, these actual
forms of the self, as in the Phenomenology of Spirit, can be understood
as ways in which the spiritual animal kingdom, the Reason as lawgiver
and the Reason as testing laws get shaped.
The abstract Right as the formal Notion of the first self

The first self, the formal person of the Roman Law, is a free individual
who expresses his freedom in the free use of his property. The law guar-
antees that the individual is recognized as owner of his property. The per-
sons recognize one another as equal: All have the equal right to dispose of
their property. The formal property law guarantees the horizontal recog-
nition of the law by which all individuals are valid as equal.148
From the view of Roman Law, the content that is given by the indi-
vidual to his freedom is accidental: The persons are contingent individ-
uals and the property they have at their disposal is a contingent fact. At
the level of abstract Right, Hegel tries to determine the first self in a way
that refrains from all historical contingencies. The person is no longer a
real individual to which the Roman property law is attributed, but a for-
malized relation: a free will that is only real insofar as it expresses itself in
property.149 This relation is the first moment of abstract Right: Property.
( 41 ff.). To what individual the free will is attributed does not matter,
for each (human) individual has a free will. Moreover, in what property
the free will expresses itself is of no importance, either. It will do to sim-
ply determine the property as thing, i. e., as something that can sensu-
ally appear.
The formal notion of the first self is only then adequately expressed
when inside and outside perspective do not contradict one another.
Therefore, if the person, for himself, expresses his freedom in the
thing, this must be also true from the outside perspective. This is guar-
is here the translation of the German Recht and can, therefore, also be translated
as right, P.C.] p.156.
148 Cf. R. Williams (1997): My thesis is that for Hegel, right is grounded in mutual
recognition. (p. 138).
149 Since the free will wants to find itself in the objective reality (cf. the property),
abstract Right repeats the relation forms of observing Reason.
anteed when the persons relation to the thing is principally mediated by

exchange. If all property is the result of exchange between persons, the
person has a free relation to his property.150 (This is the second moment
of abstract Right: Contract ( 72 ff.)) The property that expresses his free-
dom can basically be exchanged to another property, so the person is not
tied to any specific property.
If the persons reality is dependent on property exchange, his existence
is only guaranteed if the property exchange is possible. Therefore, in con-
trast to the person of the Roman Law, the existence of the person is not
dependent on the existence of an historical property order, but rather on
the nearer qualification of the thing. Until now, the quality of the thing is
undetermined. The exchange between two undetermined things, howev-
er, cannot express the persons subjective freedom with regard to the
thing. The existence of the person remains dependent on a accidental,
undetermined thing.151 Only when the exchange process shows that it
is the person who decides to relate to a particular thing because its par-
ticular quality attributes to the actualization of his subjective freedom,
is the freedom of the person with regard to the thing objectified. At
the level of abstract Right, however, there is no room for this particular
relation to the thing. On the one hand, the persons are free and equal,
i. e., totally exchangeable; on the other hand, even if the persons could
have particular preferences with regard to the thing, it would be acciden-
tal as to whether or not the thing would be qualified to play a role in the
subjective actualization of freedom. In the third moment of abstract Right,
the Wrong ( 82 ff.) it is made explicit for the person that the subjective
actualization of his freedom remains accidental. This accidental actualiza-
tion can only be overcome when the transition is made to the second self
of Morality.
150 Therefore, A. Patton (1999) is right when he understands property as a mediator

of recognition (p. 159). The weakness that he observes in Hegels approach a
priorism) (p. 123) makes no sense: We have seen that Hegels development of rec-
ognition and his actualization of recognition has, on the one hand, a logical di-
mension (unity of inside and outside perspective) and, on the other hand, an em-
pirical dimension: the examination of how recognition is actualised in a specific
era.
151 Cf. the conclusion of the observing Reason: The being of Spirit is a bone. (208).
Morality as the formal notion of the second self 141
Morality as the formal notion of the second self

Morality in the Philosophy of Right can be conceived of as the pure form of
the second self of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the absolute freedom. We
have characterized the absolute freedom as the morality that has absorbed
the domain of right: As absolute freedom the, moral individual wants im-
mediately to make himself the lawgiver of the social organism. In the Phi-
losophy of Right, Hegel develops the pure form of the second self by ab-
stracting from the contingent relations. He develops the relations to real-
ity that the moral self (the subject) has to take on to understand reality
as one in which he can express his freedom.
The first moment of Morality (in the Philosophy of Right) Hegel char-
acterizes as Purpose and Responsibility ( 115 ff.). In this relation it is ex-
pressed that reality, first of all, has to be understood as the result of self-
conscious action. The intended content of action (purpose) has to be ac-
tualized in the actions result, so that the moral individual can take re-
sponsibility for his action.152
Hegel indicates the second moment of Morality (in the Philosophy of
Right) as Intention and Welfare ( 119 ff.). This moment makes it clear
that the action for which the subject takes responsibility has to be closer
determined as an action that serves the welfare of the subject. This pre-
supposes the subjects insight in his welfare: Only then can he purpose-
fully make welfare the dedication of his action.153
In the third moment of Morality, Good and Conscience ( 129 ff.), it is
discussed that the subjective welfare can only be actualized when it is in
harmony with the welfare of the others. ( 134) Therefore, the subject
has the duty (cf. Conscience) to fill in the actualization of his welfare in a
way that he also actualizes the welfare of the others, i. e., he has to realize
the good.154
152 This moment refers to the first moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of
Spirit: Pleasure and Necessity. This time, however, pleasure (as purpose) is, so to
speak, developed as a positive moment of the moral individual in his entirety, the
conscientious individual.
153 This moment refers to the second moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology
of Spirit: the law of the heart and the frenzy of self- deceit. This time, however, the
law of the heart (as intention) is, so to speak, developed as a positive moment of
the moral individual in his entirety, the conscientious individual.
154 This moment refers to the third moment of active Reason in the Phenomenology of
Spirit: Virtue and the way of the world. This time, however, virtue (as conscience)
Conscience as the formal unity of right and morality

The conscience that Hegel introduces in the Philosophy of Right can be
understood as the unity of abstract Right and Morality, i. e., as the
unity of the formal notion of the first and second self. After all, we
have not only seen that morality in its most concrete determination
(the third moment) has been transferred to conscience, but in his deter-
mination as conscience, at the same time, is returned to abstract Right.
For, conscience demands the actualization of the good155, i. e., conscience
demands to actualize moral freedom in the form of right.
In the next chapters, we will see how Hegel, in the development of
the third part of the Philosophy of Right, understands ethical Life as the
actualization of conscience.156 Conscience, as the unity of the formal no-
tion of the first and second self, is confronted with the institutions that
Hegel finds in his era in an attempt to actualize Reason as testing laws. In-
sofar as Hegel thinks to be able to understand them as actualization of
conscience, he includes them in the Philosophy of Right as institutions
of ethical Life. We will see how the state, as the dialectical unity of family
and civil society, can be understood as the actualization of conscience,
unifying in itself the actualization of the first and second self.
Conscience in the Philosophy of Right vis--vis conscience in

the Phenomenology of Spirit
Until now, I carefully avoided linking conscience in the Philosophy of

Right, with the third self of the Phenomenology of Spirit that Hegel also
characterizes as conscience. The conscientious individual of the Phenom-
enology of Spirit is related to the absolute Spirit. He understands the social
organism as the contingent self-expression of the absolute spirit, and
knows that he can only indirectly take care of the realization of the
is, so to speak, developed as a positive moment of the moral individual in his
entirety, the conscientious individual.
155 Cf. The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the partic-
ular will. In this unity, abstract right, welfare, the subjectivity of knowing and the
contingency of external fact, have their independent self-subsistence superseded,
though at the same time they are still contained and retained within in it in their
essence. ( 129).
156 Ethical life is the good become alive ( 142), the concrete identity of the good
with the subjective will ( 141).
The formal unity of the three forms of the self 143
good: by serving the institutions of the social organism in which he lives.

Essentially, this conscience is distinguished from the one of the Philosophy
of Right that is determined as a conscience that actualizes itself in the so-
cial organism. Obviously, Hegel did not want to discuss in the Philosophy
of Right the relation to the absolute Spirit. This relation is only touched
on at the end of the Philosophy of Right, namely at the level of world his-
tory, when the transition to the absolute Spirit is performed.157 The cur-
tailment that Hegel displays concerning the concept of conscience in the
Philosophy of Right 158 has dramatic consequences for the entirety of the
further development.159 The adequate notion of the relation between
right and morality, the Reason as testing laws adequately applied to the in-
stitutions of our era, has to revert to the concept of conscience in the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit.
The formal unity of the three forms of the self following from
If we depart from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the formal unity of the

three forms of the self look different. Once again conscience, as the
third form of the self, can be understood as the unity of the first and sec-
ond self. We have seen that the individual who is conceived of as the unity
of mind and body, at the level of conscience, could be understood for the
first time in a way in which inside and outside perspective coincide. As
conscience, the individual is related to the absolute Spirit that he under-
stands as the pure self manifesting itself in the social organism. He has the
certitude that he indirectly actualizes his freedom by observing the laws of
157 The element in which the universal mind exists in art is intuition and imagery,
in religion feeling and representative thinking, in philosophy pure freedom of
thought. In world history this element is the actuality of mind in its whole com-
pass of internality and externality alike. PhR 341.
158 The religious conscience, however, does not belong to this sphere at all. ( 137
A).
159 Fred. Neuhouser maintains: Indeed, one of the persistent aims of this book has
been to show that the normative standards that inform Hegels social theory can
be made plausible and compelling in detachment from his secular theodicy sim-
ply by articulating how they have their source in the idea of practical freedom
(p. 270). I will invert Neuhousers critcism. The problem of the Philosophy of
Right is that it is too much detached from Hegels secular theodicy. Hegels com-
prehensive metaphysical vision (p. 270) precisely consists of the adequate artic-
ulation of the ideal of practical freedom.
the social organism in which he is living. Also from the outside perspec-
tive, the perspective of world history, the actualization of freedom is un-
derstood in this way. Since outside and inside perspective coincide, this
concept of conscience can be immediately valid as the formal, absolute
concept of conscience. There is no need to abstract from historical con-
ditions.
The first and the second self belong to the previous history of con-
science. They determine the fundamental structures of the society
forms that the individual must have passed through to have the ability
to develop insight into conscience. At the level of conscience, the individ-
ual knows that he can actualize his freedom only in a finite way, namely
by participating in the social organism of which he is part. The first and
the second self impose a nearer determination of the social organism in
which conscience can actualize his freedom. The social organism has to
be thus structured so that it enables the conscientious individual to
pass through the relation forms of the first and second self; or better,
that it has already passed through them all the time, so that his insight
in the social organism as one in which he can actualize his freedom is con-
ditioned by this social organism itself.
The conscientious individual can only pass through the relation form
of the first self when the social organism corresponds to the demand that
it is already given all the time as an objective reality. Since this demand
means that conscience has to find his freedom immediately in the reality
that is objectively given, it comes down to understanding the social or-
ganism as objectification of observing Reason. Since the social organism
that is immediately given is real as property, the relation in which the
first self appears can, like in the Philosophy of Right, be understood as
the relation between person and property, i. e., as the free self who
takes the given thing as the expression of his freedom. In contrast to
the Philosophy of Right, the relation between person and property is
this time already understood all the time as a moment of the surpassing
conscience. As conscience, the individual knows that his free essence, in
the form of immediacy, is realized in the relation between person and
property.
The freedom of the person is only practically expressed in the prop-
erty. His pure self, the self that transcends any actualization, is absorbed
in the practical process. It is true that the person in the use of the prop-
erty can show that he is the lord of the thing, but this lordship is only
expressed because the person is, so to speak, his own bondsman. In
the labor of the use of the property, the person practically expresses
his subjective freedom, i. e., the thing appears as use value that is con-
sumed by the person. This consumption, however, does not satisfy imme-
diately given natural needs, but rather the needs that are defined by the
norms and values of the immediately given social organism. The pure self
of the person is not expressed in the labor of the use of the property.
This would only be the case if, at the same time, the factual use of the
property expresses that the person has the freedom to use the property
otherwise.
The persons independence from the particular use of the property
(his freedom vis--vis the thing) can appear when the property only func-
tions as a token of the persons freedom. The property, in its function as
token, abstracts from the physical qualities of the thing without which the
thing could not have any use value. It is only important insofar as it refers
to the undetermined freedom of the person: it only represents the that of
his freedom. The problem is, however, how the thing can appear as token
in the objectifying relation that characterizes the first self, i. e., the self of
the abstract Right. 160 Can the token be found in the given objectivity of
the world? As in Hegels version of the abstract Right, the transition of
the relation of Contract can also be made in this revised version. If the
possession of property is principally mediated by exchange on the base
of an exchange contract, this cannot only make explicit that the persons
recognize one another as proprietors, but also that the quality of the
property is inessential. Principally, everything can be exchanged to every-
thing else. The property is only a token for recognition, i. e., the repre-
sentation of the persons freedom.
While the second moment of the abstract Right in the revised Philos-
ophy of Right is once again the Contract, the third moment of abstract
Right differs from the original version and can not be identified as the
Wrong. For, the problem that has to be solved at the level of the second
moment is not that the exchange between persons remains accidental. It is
true that the content of the commodities that are exchanged between the
persons is not determined. Consequently, it remains accidental whether
or not the exchanged commodities are qualified to satisfy the needs
that are defined by the norms and values of the social organism in
which the person practically expresses his freedom. But this state of affairs
does not result in the Wrong, i. e., the possible contradiction between the
formal (general) will of the free and equal persons and their particular
160 In the abstract Right, the relations of observing Reason appear in their true form:
Objective reality is developed as expression of the free self, i. e., the person.
will. The problem of the revised abstract Right is rather that it does not
allow bringing together the general freedom of the formal persons and
the content of their particular will. At the level of abstract Right both di-
mensions exclude one another. Either the will of the person is determined
as a particular will that is expressed in the thing as a particular use value,
or the will of the person is determined as a free will that is expressed in
the thing as a general exchange value. But the thing that appears as use
value does not appear as exchange value, and vice versa. This problem
can only be overcome by the second self that is discussed at the level of
Morality.
The conscientious individual can only pass through the relation form
of the second self when the social organism corresponds to the demand
that it is produced by the individual himself: He must be the lawgiver
of the social organism. As in Hegels Philosophy of Right, the first moment
of Morality can be characterized as Purpose and Responsibility ( 115
118). If the social organism is the product of the free individual, it is
overcome that the content of the social law is accidental; at the same
time, the content can be freely determined.
As in Hegels Philosophy of Right, also the second moment of Morality
can be determined as Intention and Welfare ( 119 128). At this level is
formulated as to what criteria the free content of the social law is subject-
ed: In the social law, the welfare of the individual has to be actualized.
The approval of this demand, however, is not unproblematic. When it
is assumed that each subject can have knowledge of his subjective free-
dom and, based on this knowledge, can try to actualize his welfare in a
social organism (for example a family organism), then the question re-
mains as to whether the realization of the welfare of the one subject is
compatible with the one of the other. Therefore, in his Philosophy of
Right, Hegel adds the demand that also the welfare of the others has to
be actualized, and elaborates this demand as the third moment of Mor-
ality, as Conscience that has the duty to actualize the general good
( 129 140). This move, however, is highly problematic. In a certain
sense, the subjective identity that tries to express his subjective freedom
is given. The subject cannot assume at random any identity, but has to
discover by life experience what his very identity is. This contingence
of subjective identity makes the possible harmony between the actualiza-
tion of subjective welfare by many subjects a rather accidental affair. The
accidentalness of this harmony can only be overcome when the many
subjective identities can be conceived of as moments of a shared social
organism. But this is only possible when their contingence, in one way
or another, is abolished. The problem of abstract Right returns in a spe-

cific form at the level of Morality. The particular and the general actual-
ization of freedom can, on the one hand, not be brought together, but on
the other hand, do presuppose one another. The particular realization of
freedom is not possible when it is not in harmony with the actualization
of freedom of all. But if it is in harmony with the general actualization of
freedom, it seems to decline as particular freedom realization. Therefore,
at the level of the second moment of Morality, only the demand can be
formulated that the particular as well as the general freedom, that the par-
ticular welfare as well as the general welfare, has to be actualized. Both
demands, however, cannot be unified in the conscience that is deter-
mined as the duty to actualize the general good, as is done in the Philos-
ophy of Right.
We have seen that conscience in the revised Philosophy of Right has
been differently determined. The conscientious individual knows that
the social organism in which he is living is a contingent self-expression
of the absolute Spirit, and he knows that he can only indirectly contribute
to the actualization of the absolute good by serving the institutions of the
social organism in which he is living. By now we have seen to which near-
er determinations this social organism has to respond: to the structures of
abstract Right and Morality. We have also seen what are the consequences
of these determinations: The demand has to be made upon the social or-
ganism that it actualizes right and morality in an adequate unity; room
must be made for both subjective and general actualization of freedom.
Moreover, it is clear that the subjective actualization of freedom may
not be reduced to a moment of the general good; neither may the abso-
lute good161 be reduced to the general good.
Only when the conscientious individual actualizes himself in a social
organism that is structured according the revised abstract Right and the
revised Morality, can he also realize in this organism the self-insight of
being a conscientious individual. Precisely because the social organism in-
stitutionally distinguishes between the particular and the general actuali-
zation of freedom can it meet the demands raised by the conscientious
individual: The social organism has to be a contingent realization form
of the absolute Spirit (it actualizes the absolute good in the form of the
161 Hegel maintains: The good is thus freedom realized, the absolute end and aim
of the world. ( 129) This absolute good may not be confused with the general
good that is realized in the particular state.
general good). But the self-actualization of the absolute Spirit has to go

together with the realization of subjective freedom.
The actualization of the Human Self

We have elaborated what it means to understand the human self as the
unity of mind and body. This unity can only be conceived of in the
framework of a social organism that can be described by means of the
metaphorical lordship/bondsman relation. This metaphor elucidates that
the unity between mind and body gets shape in the form of two kinds
of recognition: a vertical recognition (the recognition of the lord) that
makes the individual a moral individual; and a horizontal recognition
(the mutual recognition of the bondsmen as free and equal). To think
of the adequate unity of mind and body comes down to thinking of
the adequate unity of Right and Morality, which relation Hegel concep-
tualizes as the relation between objective and absolute Spirit.
The adequate conceptualization of the relation between right and
morality has succeeded if the inside perspective of this relation coincides
with the outside perspective. According to Hegel, this adequate relation
expresses the absolute Notion of man as unity of mind and body, i. e.,
this Notion transcends all historical actualization forms. Since the
moral individual is an absolute self, human beings, as moral individuals,
are absolutely equal. This equality is principally expressed in a social or-
ganism in which all individuals are free and equal persons, i. e., the social
organism is principally a democratic one. Therefore, in the adequate
unity of right and morality, at the same time the elementary unity of
human rights162 and democracy has been expressed.
The adequate unity of right and morality, of democracy and human
rights, is an absolute criterion to test contingent social organisms: To
what extent do they adequately express human rights and democracy,
morality and right? In the second part of this book we will test the social
organism of the modern, globalized world. To exercise this test we can
appeal to two examples163 : on the one hand, the example of European
162 We will see how the institutions of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat) are developed as
the unity of Right and Morality. Insofar as they express the moral dimension, I
will claim that they are related to human rights.
163 Although Honneth (1995) seems to accept the structures of recognition that cor-
respond to the three selves, he states that Hegels line of thought is tainted by
The actualization of the Human Self 149
history that Hegel has elaborated in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and on

the other hand, the example of the Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel
has synthesized the experiences of European history to conceptualize
the adequate institutions for his era. We have to repeat Hegels attempt
for our time. But we have to avoid the curtailment as it is represented
by the Philosophy of Right, in comparison to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
metaphysical premises that can no longer be easily reconciled with contemporary

thought. (p. 67). He concludes: an empirically supported phenomenology
is thus needed, one that allows Hegels theoretical proposal to be tested and, if
necessary, corrected. (p. 69) We have seen, however, that the three forms of
the self result from the making more explicit of the conditions that allow us
to conceive of the unity of mind and body. Since the problem of the unity of
mind and body is not even raised by George Herbert Mead, his translation of
Hegels theory of intersubjectivity into a postmetaphysical language (p. 70) is
redundant. But, of course, the historical appearance of the three forms of the
self has to be tested. This test is performed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spi-
rit, as well as in the Philosophy of Right.
Chapter 7
The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the first
self for our era, i. e., I will confront the conceptual determinations of the
first self with institutions of our globalized world and examine which in-
stitutions can be considered as an adequate realization of the first self. To
prepare for this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegels attempt in
the Philosophy of Right to elaborate the institutionalization of the first self
for the nineteenth century. I will criticize the result of Hegels attempt,
i. e., the family. This criticism does not concern the features of the family
that typically seems to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is more el-
ementary. I will show that Hegel, by giving the family a natural content,
confuses natural and ethical immediacy. As a consequence, his concept of
family does not meet the criteria for the first self that Hegel himself has
developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This criticism will appear help-
ful for the positive construction of the first self s institutional embodi-
ment.
The species life of animals

In contrast to human beings, the species life of animals is not institution-
alized. It is only practically performed in the process in which the species
reproduces itself. At least in the case of mammals, this reproduction proc-
ess can be described in a kind of dialectical structure. Insofar as the fe-
male individual produces offspring, it is, from an outside perspective (as
such, in itself ), a being that belongs to a species. The relation to the spe-
cies becomes for the female individual in its relation to the male indi-
vidual. In the sexual intercourse, the membership of the species is ex-
pressed by the actions of the individuals, themselves. Moreover, the rela-
tion between the male and the female individual can be interpreted as a
relation in which the species in its generality is related to the individual
exemplar of the species. The relation between the sexes is a general rela-
tion of the species. But the consequences of this relation, pregnancy, is
The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the form of freedom 151
objectified in a particular female individual. The male individual repre-

sents the moment of generality; the female individual, on the other
hand, represents the moment of particularity. Finally, the offspring ex-
presses the species life as it is in and for itself. From the outside perspec-
tive, the offspring has been produced by his parents; from the inside per-
spective, the offspring recognizes its parents and acts in accordance with
them.
The family in the Philosophy of Right: animal life in the form

of freedom
Hegels construction of the family in the Philosophy of Right can be con-

ceived of as a social organism in which the animal reproduction can get
shape in the form of freedom. The individuals who constitute the social
organism of the family are not natural individuals, but free and equal per-
sons who can make a free decision for marriage. This decision is, first of
all, the formal decision to constitute one person. ( 162) Moreover, the
content that is actualized in the social organism of the family is not a nat-
ural one (the decision to marry is not motivated by sexual interests), but
an ethical one. The formal decision to marry implies, at the same time,
the substantial decision to share one identity that is expressed in the
love between the marriage partners. ( 163) Therefore, the social organ-
ism of the family is the concrete person: the person who is free and equal
in his relation to other persons and real in the shared love between the
marriage partners.
The love between the partners is objectified in their children. ( 163)
The labor that is done in the family organism exists of raising the children
to adulthood. The product of the family is the children that have been
raised into free and equal persons. Therefore, in the family, the natural
reproduction of the species has been transformed in the ethical reproduc-
tion of the free and equal persons.
But also, Hegels interpretation of the natural individuals in logical
terms (the male individual standing for the moment of universality and
the female individual standing for the moment of particularity), returns
in the social organism of the family and gets its free, ethical meaning
in the gender roles of the marriage partners. ( 166) These gender
roles are structured according the lordship/bondsman relation. The
woman recognizes in her husband her free essence, i. e., her lord:
152 Chapter 7 The Family: The Institutional House of the First Self
The man is the free person who represents the family in the social domain
(the civil society as the multitude of families). ( 178) The woman is the
bondsman of her husband insofar as she actualizes in her labor the free-
dom of the lord: In the labor of the family, the free and equal persons
are reproduced.164
The social organism of the family vis--vis the conceptual

framework of the Philosophy of Right and the
Phenomenology of Spirit
I will not interfere with the discussion as to how Hegels concept of the
family is related to the historical family institutions in the Europe of the
Nineteenth Century. I limit myself to the question of whether his con-
cept of the family corresponds to the criteria that he himself has formu-
lated in the Philosophy of Right. 165 Since ethical life in general is deter-
mined as the unity of abstract Right and Morality, the family, as the im-
mediate form of ethical life, has to be structured as the unity of first mo-
ment of abstract Right and the first moment of Morality, i. e., as the unity
of Person/Property and Purpose/Responsibility. We have observed that the
social organism of the family can be considered as the concrete Person.
Moreover, it is evident that this concrete person, according to Hegel,
has his own (family) property. ( 170) Therefore, it is in no way problem-
atic to interpret Hegels concept of the family as the actualization of the
first moment of abstract Right. But we must check, later on, whether
property functions as use value or only as exchange value.
It is, however, problematic to interpret Hegels concept of the family
as the actualization of the Purpose/Responsibility relation. Although this re-
lation seems only to demand that the social organism of the family is the
result of free action (of course, the marriage is constituted by the free de-
cision of the partners), the actions that are performed by the partners can-
not be considered free in this sense. The role patterns that Hegel ascribes
164 Cf. From the physical point of view, the presuppositionpersons immediately
existent (as parents) here becomes a result, a process which runs away into
the infinite series of generations, each producing the next and presupposing
the one before. ( 173).
165 Steinberger (1988) states that Hegel [] has shown [] that something like
marriage is necessary to the unfolding of Objective Spirit, but has failed to prove
that only marriage can do the job. (p. 187) Of course, it is not Hegels claim to
identify historical institutions with the Objective Spirit.
The social organism of the family 153
to the man and the woman, i. e., a pattern that is based on a biological
qualification, makes that their action is inspired by their pathos
(their character as man or woman), rather than that it is a free action.
It is true that, compared to the polis, the relation between man and
woman has changed. Although also in the polis the man is linked with
the moment of generality (the Human Law), and the woman to the mo-
ment of particularity (the Divine Law), their actions are fundamentally
different from those of the marriage partners in the Philosophy of Right.
The actions of man and woman in the polis are one-sided because they
only observe one of the two laws. In the marriage of the Philosophy of
Right, this one-sidedness seems to have been overcome. The Human
and Divine Law are, so to speak, unified in the love of the marriage part-
ners. In their love the partners share their identity. Therefore, the actions
of man and woman can no longer be one-sided. If the woman acts, she
acts at the same time in the name of her husband, and vice versa. Man
and woman both represent in their actions the entirety of their shared
identity.
However, if we compare the way in which the division between
Human and Divine Law is overcome in the family of the Philosophy of
Right, to the way in which it is overcome in the Phenomenology of Spirit,
it is immediately clear that the actions of the marriage partners cannot be
considered to be free ones. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the overcoming
of the division between the two laws is performed in the transition from
the polis into the Roman world. This transition results in the formal per-
son of the Roman Law that Hegel characterized as the first self. The first
self as it appears in the Roman Law seems to coincide with the first self as
it is embodied in the marriage of the Philosophy of Right. On the one
hand, in both cases the first self is real as the family organism that appears
in the property of the family; on the other hand, the family organisms
relate to one another as the free and equal persons. Nevertheless, this sim-
ilarity is deceitful.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the transition from the polis to the
Roman Law implies what Hegel calls a ruin of ethical substance.
(289) The person of the Roman Law has emancipated himself from the
tradition of the polis (or better, since the different poleis have different
traditions from the traditions of the polis). As person the individual
has internalized the pure self that was remembered by the Divine Law.
This internalization, however, is only immediately performed: It is not
known by the individual, but only practically expressed in the family
life. As a consequence, the content of family life is purely contingent;
it is no longer embedded in a shared tradition. This exactly is indicated

by the formula loss of ethical life.
In the Philosophy of Right, however, this disappearance of ethical life
has not been performed within the family.166 After all, the man and the
woman have their traditional gender role.167 The loss of ethical life is
only discussed at the level of the Dissolution of the family, i. e., at the mo-
ment that the children have left the family and relate as free and equal
persons in the civil society. ( 177) These persons do not share a common
tradition and are no longer determined by the tradition of their original
family. This does not mean, however, that the persons in the civil society
are able to understand the traditional content of the family as a contin-
gent one. On the one hand, it appears that the persons that create new
marriages observe the same traditional gender roles as in their original
family. On the other hand, as we will see in the next chapter, Hegel con-
siders the commodities that belong to the family property not as use-val-
ues to satisfy the needs of the contingent norms and values of the family,
but as use-values that satisfy natural needs. These natural needs are only
socialized by the culture of the market.
From the perspective of the Phenomenology of Spirit, one would ex-
pect the construction of a Philosophy of Right in which each family has
its own contingent tradition (like the contingent traditions of the differ-
ent poleis). Within these families, the education of the children would be
a twofold process: In the first stage, the children would be socialized in
the contingent tradition of the family; in the second stage, the children
would be involved in a learning process in which they develop insight
in the contingency of the family tradition as such (cf. the citizens of
the polis who, mediated by the religion of the work of art, developed in-
sight in the contingency of the poliss ethical life).
166 It is only in the transition into the civil society that Hegel speaks about the dis-
appearance of ethical life. ( 181).
167 Therefore, I agree with Steinberger (1988): But, more strongly, I would suggest
that the twothe theory of gender and the theory of marriageare, in fact, flatly
contradictory. (p. 188). For a criticism of Hegels conception of the gender val-
ues see also Hardimon (1994), p. 185).
The education of the children in the family 155
The education of the children in the family of the revised

Philosophy of Right
a. The socialization of the child in the contingent tradition of the family
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, it has been developed that the individual,

as unity of mind and body, can only be conceived of as the member of a
social organism that corresponds to structures that can be represented by
means of the metaphor lordship/bondsman. Therefore, the child who is so-
cialized in the social organism of the family must have passed through all
stages of the natural consciousness that Hegel developed from Sense-Cer-
tainty up to and including the lordship/bondsman relation. Whether a psy-
chological development in this sense is realistic can only be established by
scientific research.168 Since it is not within my competence to practice this
research, I restrict myself to the attempt to repeat this development of the
natural consciousness in terms of the psychological development of a
child. Evidently, this reconstruction has only the status of a research hy-
pothesis.
I depart from the newborn child and assume that he already has an
elementary consciousness of the I all the time. I assume that the new-
born baby already has a notion of his own being-in-himself, so that he
can distinguish between himself and the outside world. Moreover, I pre-
suppose that this elementary consciousness of the I also embraces an
elementary form of an (inner) freedom, i. e., it can retain itself as an el-
ementary consciousness of the I and is not determined by the outside
world. The I can hold the boundary between the world and itself. The
outside world appears in the form of variable impressions; through these
variable impressions the I remains at itself. Subsequently, I assume that
the baby finds himself already in a family situation. For example, he has a
father and a mother taking care of him and, together with, for example,
some brothers or sisters, he is part of a common household.
Initially, the newborn child is absorbed by the above-mentioned con-
sciousness of the I. He has no knowledge of his own body and no more
168 Thomas Kesselring tries to explain that the Piagets development psychology is
structured like the stages of Consciousness and Self-consciousness. Cf. Thomas
Kesselring, Entwicklung und Widerspruch. Ein Vergleich zwischen Piagets geneti-
scher Erkenntnistheorie und Hegels Dialektik, Frankfurt/M., 1981; Thomas
Kesselring, Die Produktivitt der Antinomie. Hegels Dialektik im Lichte der genet-
ischen Erkenntnistheorie und der formalen Logik, Frankfurt/M., 1984.
self-knowledge than that he is an I, distinguished from the outside

world. The only substantial knowledge he has, are the various impres-
sions of the outside world.
Considered from the outside perspective, it is clear that the baby can
only relate to the outside world because he has a body, rather than because
of his ability to identify objects in the outside world by means of sensual
perception. The newborn baby has not yet reached the stage of this the-
oretical knowledge. Rather, his relation to the outside world is practical.
As corporeal being, the baby is needy: He is hungry, thirsty and needs
protection against the cold. The perception of the outside world is at
first the practical experience of this neediness: a feeling of hunger, thirst
and coldness. In its experience of the neediness, the I-Consciousness of
the baby is determined by the outside world. A baby who is hungry co-
incides with his feeling of hunger. He cannot distinguish between himself
and this feeling. The feeling of hunger appears to be an overpowering ob-
session. Therefore, the experience of neediness is the experience of a lack
of freedom. In this relation, the distinction between the I and the out-
side world cannot be retained.
The experience of neediness is overcome at the moment that the need
is satisfied. A child who is given the breast has overcome the hostile out-
side world. From the feeling of being dominated by the outside world he
has returned to a positive self-awareness. Therefore, the breast of the
mother (the mamma) can become the symbol of the consciousness of
the I that was previously totally undetermined. However, if the con-
sciousness of the I can be symbolized, the relation to the outside
world has been submitted to a change. The satisfaction, i. e., the presence
of the mothers breast, is only temporary. After the satisfaction, the feel-
ing of neediness returns, until the new need is also satisfied. Therefore,
the self-awareness is mediated by a feeling of negativity, by the feeling
of being dependent on a outside world. Because of this, the consciousness
of the I is actualized as a process, i. e., as a being determined by the
needs and the return to the own identity by the overcoming of this
being-determined. This makes that the own identity is experienced as
the identity of an organism. An organism is free insofar as the mainte-
nance of its identity is due to itself; insofar as it satisfies its needs.
This freedom is lacking, however, insofar as this self-maintenance is de-
pendent on given means of satisfaction. This makes the consciousness
of the I somewhat ambivalent. The consciousness of the I is free,
but this freedom can only be maintained if the external reality has a qual-
ity that is able to satisfy the needs of the I. Since the I has not the ability
to determine the quality of the external world, it lacks, in this sense, free-
dom.
The experience of the lack of freedom is based on the naturally given
neediness; in this relation freedom is impossible. In his neediness the
child is confronted with a power that it cannot overcome. As a natural
organism he can never break the power of the outside world. In his need-
iness, he remains dependent on the outside world and, in the long run, he
will even decline by its power. Ultimately the child dies (although we may
hope that this will only happen at an older age). Not the free will has the
ultimate control over the body, but death. Therefore, freedom seems to
be incompatible with corporeality.
The child, however, is not a mere natural organism that is related to a
natural environment. He is cared for by his parents and lives in the con-
text of his family. The life environment of the child is, so to speak, an
artificial organism: a life community that is created by the actions of
the parents. The goal of the life community is, amongst others, to guar-
antee that the needs of the communitys family members are satisfied.
Good parents will do their utmost best to make sure that their children
lack nothing. If they succeed, the child is not related to an outside world
manifesting itself as a strange power that leaves it accidental whether his
needs are or are not satisfied, but rather to an outside world in which he
recognizes his own essence. His parents have taken care that his world is
an extension of himself in which all his needs are satisfied. Therefore,
nothing seems to hinder the childs awareness of the I. The only reason
for the existence of the world seems to be to serve the child.
The world to which the child is related is the social organism of the
family in which his parents have expressed their subjective freedom.
(Later on, I will discuss how this has to be understood.) Consequently,
the childs needs that are satisfied cannot be considered as immediate nat-
ural needs (the needs of a biological organism), but rather as the cultural
needs in which the free subjective identity of the parents expresses itself.
In this sense, the natural organism of the child is already socialized all the
time: The needs that he can satisfy and that are developed in the course
of his growing up are already the cultural needs of the social organism of
the family all the time. Therefore, the child cannot distinguish between
the actualization of his I and the actualization of the free subjectivity
of his parents, i. e., he can immediately recognize his parents as his
lord, as representation of his own essence.169
169 Here, it has no meaning at all to maintain that the childs recognition of the pa-
Partly, the freedom of the child is only appearance. The child thinks
to be free because he identifies himself with his guardians. Actually, how-
ever, the relation between the child and his parents is totally a-symmet-
rical. The child conforms to the family life that is constituted by his pa-
rents. But at the same time, it cannot be maintained that this relation
lacks any freedom. The child is not subjected to the parental authority
because he has been driven by instinctual actions. Neither is he subjected
because he has been forced by his parents. The child obeys because he
identifies himself with his guardians. His submission, like the submission
of the bondsman to the lord, is self-submission. This is exactly the germ
of his freedom.
The child who grows up in the context of the family becomes more
and more familiar with its norms and values. He learns to speak the lan-
guage in which he can make all the distinctions that are necessary for the
family life. He approaches, more and more, the role that is expected of
him. The child internalizes the demands of his parent, so that the life
in the family becomes something totally obvious. Because of that, the au-
thority of the parents vis--vis the child loses its externality. The child no
longer identifies with the guardians, but experiences family life as the ac-
tualization of his own freedom. He thinks that he is doing nothing other
than practicing the norms and values that follow from his own convic-
tion. He is convinced that his life is totally in harmony with himself.
Therefore, the disciplining in the family to which the child is subjected
appears as self-discipline and self-expression.
b. The process in which the child develops awareness of the contingence

of the family tradition
The freedom of the child that has socialized himself in the social organ-
ism of the family is freedom only in appearance. The social content he
has appropriated is constituted by his parents. Although the process of
socialization presupposes that the child is free (he is able to observe cul-
tural norms and values), his pure self is absorbed by the norms and values
that he practically performs in the family. Like the citizen of the polis, the
rents has to be preceded by a struggle of life and death. The reality of the child is
not first a natural organism that is afterwards socialized. He already realizes him-
self in the form of freedom all the time. Yet, it makes sense to put forth that the
fear of death is institutionalised in the social organism of the family: Without the
family the child would die.
child can only become aware of his pure freedom when he develops in-
sight into the contingency of the family norms and values. I will show
that the stages of this process of development can be reconstructed ac-
cording to the format of the religion of the work of art. As in the polis,
the pure self will appear as the undermining force of the family tradi-
tion.170
We have experienced that, at the level of the polis, the pure self got its
embodiment in the family, i. e., in its Divine Law. Later on, I will elab-
orate that, also in the revised Philosophy of Right, the pure self (in its im-
mediate form) gets its embodiment in the family. This time, however, the
pure self that is embodied is not the pure self of the deceased family
member, but the pure self of the parents. The persons that constitute
the family organism can express their subjective freedom in the norms
and values of the family they create. Therefore, the norms and values
of the family have a totally different status for the parents than for the
child.
That the norms and values of the family express the subjective free-
dom of the parents, is indirectly experienced by the child who is growing
up. Since the parents express their subjective freedom in the family organ-
ism, all families have different, contingent norms and values. The differ-
ence between the norms and values is experienced by the child when he is
confronted with other families. The experience of the contingence of the
family norms and values threatens to undermine the childs confidence in
his own family. For the first time, he has the suspicion that there is some
difference between his identity and the one of his parents.
The child, however, had identified himself with his parents and had
been convinced that his destiny lies in the unconditional care of his pa-
rents. Therefore, the experience of contingence does not immediately re-
sult in the childs loss of basic trust, or in an identity crisis. The child,
rather, tries to ward off the undermining forces, and repairs the convic-
tion that his own family expresses his own absolute identity. His confron-
tation with other families does not make his own family an exchangeable
one. The childs consciousness of the absolute meaning of his own family
is represented by the image of his family. The child makes his parents and
his parental house the representation of his absolute identity (like the citi-
zens of the polis represented their absolute identity in the statue of the
god and the temple).
170 Once again, this reconstruction of the childs development is purely hypothetical.
By representing the family, the child can develop a self-conscious in-

sight into the family relation. To maintain his image of the family as the
expression of his subjective identity, the child is obliged to assimilate
more and more determinations in his image until the moment when
he must admit that the family organism is a contingent entity that fails
to give shape to his subjective identity. We will see that the stages of
the representations can indeed be structured like the stages of the religion
of the work of art.
The child was urged on the representation of the family because he
was confronted with other families having other values and norms.
This diversity practically expresses the pure self of the persons: They
all have the subjective freedom to constitute a family organism in
which their subjective norms and values are embodied. If, however, the
child represents the family organism in which he is living by means of
the image of his parents and his house, he represents the subjective par-
ticularity of the family organism. But this particularity is not represented
as the product of the pure self of his parents. Therefore, to retain the
image of the family as the representation of his absolute identity, the
child must integrate the pure self of his parents in his image of the family.
Since his parents express their pure self in the language in which they
utter their subjectivity, the child must make this language the image of
the family, as well. Insofar as this language functions as an image of
the family, the pure self has become part of the childs consciousness of
it.171 We will see that this penetration of the pure self, in the end, con-
tributes to the revelation of the contingency of the family organism.
The pure self that is embodied in the speaking voice of the parents
has a vanishing existence that falls short of attaining a lasting shape
and is, like Time, no longer immediately present in the very moment
of its being present.172 Therefore, the child passes through the Unhappy
Consciousness: The representation of his absolute essence slips away. The
representation can only be brought back when the free self of the parents
is synthesized with the social organism of the family. The representation
of this synthesis finds the child in the ritual actions of the parents, i. e.,
171 Cf. the hymn at the level of the religion of the work of art: The hymn represents
the pure self of the artist who produced the work of art (the statue of the god).
With the hymn, the pure self penetrates in the public consciousness of the polis
(likewise here, in the family, in the form of the human voice).
172 Here, I repeat the qualifications that Hegel gives to the hymn at the level of the
religion of the work of art.
in the actions in which the parents symbolize the reproduction of the

familys social organism. These actions are performed in the festivities
and ceremonies in which the family life is central: birthdays, funerals, sea-
sons celebrations, baptismal ceremonies, Mothers and Fathers days,
etc.173 Insofar as these actions concern the institutional reality of the fam-
ily, they are involved in an objective existence, i. e., in an existence that
survives the vanishing existence of the speaking voice. Insofar as these ac-
tions are symbolic, they concern the family organism as such and are, in
this sense, free.
In the ritual actions, however, the synthesis between the subjective
freedom of the parents and the family organism remains external. Because
these actions are only ritual, they exist over and above their real actions
and cannot guarantee the absolute existence of the family organism. This
existence seems to be guaranteed only if the externality of the relation be-
tween the free action and the family organism is overcome. The free ac-
tion must necessarily be oriented to the actualization of the family organ-
ism. This demand seems to be impossible: The freedom of the action
contradicts the demanded necessity.
The aforementioned contradiction can be overcome when the free ac-
tion that has to actualize the family organism is not attributed to the pa-
rents, but to the child himself. Because the child accepts the norms and
values of the family as his absolute essence, he can have the conviction
that he realizes his freedom when he observes the norms and values in
his actions. Therefore, the child turns to a new stage in his development:
He tries to actualize the norms and values of his family. He takes up the
role of the bondsman who tries to observe the norms and values of his
lord. By sacrificing himself to this lord, i. e., to these norms and values,
he tries to actualize his free essence.174
By totally observing the norms and values of the family, the model
child learns that he is the lord of these norms and values: Their real
existence is dependent on his freedom. At this stage, the child becomes
aware of his free identity, of his independence from his parents. But at
the same time he still identifies himself with the norms and values of
his original family: He has appropriated these norms and values as his
own ones. Consequently, the objective reality of the family organism
has become a reality in which the child recognizes his own inner essence.
This relation to the objectivity of the family determines how the child
173 Cf. the abstract Cult in the Greek world.

174 Cf. the actual Cult of the Greek world.
relates to the broader objectivity of the social world. The child expects to
get back his free essence in the social reality: He identifies himself with
sport heroes, pop stars and movie stars.175
Sooner or later, the child will experience the limitations of the iden-
tification with his youth heroes. They become stiffened icons in which he
cannot recognize the freedom of his identity. Therefore, the child tries to
understand the broader objective world as the world in which he can rec-
ognize his free essence, because this world is mediated by his action. Since
the actions of the broader social world are outside the scope of the child
(who only acts in the domain of the family), this understanding of the
broader social world can only be achieved be means of representations.
Like the Ancient Greek citizens who represented their social world in
the spiritual works of art (Epic, Tragedy and Comedy), so the modern
child portrays his world in distinct spiritual works of art. In both cases,
the representations must ward off the outside world that threatens the
norms and values of the original family.
In the multicultural society, collectively shared stories such as the
Iliad, and the tragedies and comedies of the Ancient Greek world, fail.
Nevertheless, in the public domain of the multicultural society, stories
circulate (in the form of books, movies, theatre pieces, television pro-
grams, songs, musicals), that can have the same educative function as
the spirituals works of art, namely making the children aware of the con-
tingency of the norms and values of their original families. These stories
can teach (as in the Epic), that if all individuals persist in their original
norms and values while acting in the public domain, they make the
blind destiny master of the world. Or they can make it clear (as in the
tragedies), that, although the subjectivity that is expressed in the family
organism excludes the inter-subjectivity that is expressed in the public do-
main, at the same time they presuppose one another. Or, ultimately, they
show (as in the comedies), that the stories are only constructions in which
the protagonists play their roles. Under the masks of their roles, however,
they remain the ordinary individuals who all have their own family norms
and values. Probably this explains the popularity of (real-life) soaps and
programs like Idols, i. e., programs in which the actors are unskilled, or-
dinary people.
The stories teach the children that all attempts to attribute to the
norms and values of their own family a status that surpasses contingency,
175 Cf. the living work of art in the Greek world, in which the observing Reason was
represented.
are in vain. The norms and values express the subjectivity of their parents
to which the children are related as to a contingent fact. The awareness of
this contingency ends in the ethical dissolution of the family: At the
moment that the child himself realizes that the norms and values of his
original family are contingent, his relation to these norms and values be-
comes external. As a consequence, he is no longer a member of the social
organism of the family. Although the child may factually still live with his
original family, it loses for him the meaning of an ethical institution in
which he shares the norms and values with his family members.
In Hegels Philosophy of Right, the ethical dissolution of the family has
another meaning: The ethical dissolution of the family consists in this,
that once the children have been educated to freedom of personality, and
have come of age, they become recognized as persons in the eyes of the
law and as capable of holding free property of their own and founding
families of their own, the sons as heads of new families, the daughters
as wives. They now have their substantive destiny in the new family;
the old family, on the other hand, falls into the background as merely
their ultimate basis and origin, while, a fortiori, the clan is an abstraction,
devoid of rights. ( 177)
Also according to Hegel, the ethical dissolution of the family has to
do with the growing up of the children and the external relation they de-
velop towards the original family. In Hegels view, this externality is prac-
tically expressed in the new families that are constituted by the children.
The externality does not concern the awareness that the norms and values
of the original family are contingent. On the contrary, it appears that the
new families essentially have exactly the same norms and values as the
original family. Hegel not only indicates that the man and woman in
the new families have the same gender roles as in the original family
(the sons as heads of new families, the daughters as wives), but he
also seems to assume that the grownup sons and daughters are immedi-
ately prepared to constitute a new family. The notion fails that the chil-
dren can only constitute their own family when they have developed their
own subjective norms and values. Once again it appears that Hegel con-
fuses ethical immediacy with natural immediacy. Ethical immediacy ex-
presses non-exchangeable subjectivity and appears in a multitude of
forms. In the Philosophy of Right, the ethical immediacy is not only con-
fused with natural immediacy because it has apparently only one form of
appearance, but also because this single form is, as we have seen before,
deduced from natural (biological) relations.
In our view, the adequate constitution of new families is only possible

when the grownup children have passed through a learning process in
which they develop insight into their own subjectivity. In this case,
they can overcome the contingency of the norms and values of the orig-
inal family and constitute a family organism in which norms and values
are observed that express their own subjectivity, not the one of their pa-
rents (although the children can, of course, discover that their own norms
and values do not differ from the ones of their parents). Since this learn-
ing process takes place at the level of civil society, it can only be discussed
in the next chapter, in which the civil society is systematically developed.
Although the systematic exposition of the institutional embodiment of
the three selves has to get shape after one another, it is clear that the ex-
position is a logical one, so that the distinct parts already presuppose one
another all the time. After the development of civil society, we have, so to
speak, to return to this chapter (that concerns the first self ): Only the per-
sons who are educated at the level of civil society are prepared for the ad-
equate constitution of new families.176
Retrospection
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel understands the family as the social or-
ganism in which the animal reproduction gets shape in the form of free-
dom. As a consequence, the ethical content of the family is not developed
as the ethical life in the form of immediacy, i. e., as the domain in which
the contingent subjectivity of the free individuals is expressed. The ethical
immediacy is confused with the natural immediacy: Natural relations are
transformed into ethical relations that are still determined by nature.177
This determination of the family not only contradicts subjective freedom
because it confines the tradition of family life to the one that is deter-
mined by nature, but also because this confined tradition offers no
176 Also in the Philosophy of Right, the persons develop their subjectivity only at the
level of civil society. This subjectivity, however, is not brought down to the family
relations. In this respect, Hegel seems to be influenced by the Phenomenology of
Spirit, in which the three forms of the self belong to distinct historical periods
and are not developed as moments in the framework of a concrete entirety.
177 In fact, Hegel returns to his position of the Jena Lectures of Philosophy. Cf. Hon-
neth (1995): Hegel now makes use of recognition: In love relationships, he
writes in a marginal remark, it is the uncultivated natural self that is recog-
nized. (p. 37).
Retrospection 165
room for the actualization of subjective freedom at all. According to He-

gels Philosophy of Right, there is only a place for subjectivity outside the
family: at the level of civil society.
Departing from the Phenomenology of Spirit, the embodiment of the
first self in the social organism of the family must be understood other-
wise. The family members themselves must be able to understand the eth-
ical life of the family as a contingent tradition in which the life partners
express their subjective freedom. In this revised conception of the family,
the education of the children becomes more complicated. Education is
not only the process in which the children are socialized in the tradition
of the family, but also the process in which they develop insight into the
contingent status of this tradition. Moreover, the education process has to
be continued at the level of civil society, where the children must develop
insight into their own subjective identity. Only when this condition is ful-
filled, are they in the position to constitute their own marriage.
Although the revision of the concept of family is inspired by the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, this work is at the same time responsible for the con-
fusion in the Philosophy of Right. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel
discusses the religion forms that belong to the historical worlds only after-
wards, when the transition to the absolute Spirit has been performed. The
separation between religion and the objective world returns in the Philos-
ophy of Right, because this work is meant as the systematic development
of the objective Spirit. However, it is precisely this separation that prevents
the adequate development of the first self s embodiment.
In Chapter 8, I will examine the embodiment of the second self in civil
society. At this level, I can discuss the continuing education process in
which subjective identity is developed. Before the elaboration of this pro-
gram, however, I will first make an attempt to make my reconstruction of
the childs moral development more plausible. In an Excursus, I will com-
pare this reconstruction with Habermass reconstruction of Kohlbergs
stages of moral consciousness.
Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person in

Confrontation with Jrgen Habermass Reception of the Stages
of Moral Consciousness developed by Lawrence Kohlberg
Introduction
In his discourse ethics, Jrgen Habermas develops an alternative for Kants

categorical imperative, his so-called Principle of Universalization, abbrevi-
ated by him as U: Every valid norm has to fulfill the condition that All
affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general ob-
servance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyones inter-
ests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative
possibilities for regulation).178 Together with the Principle of discourse
ethics D, that implies that: Only those norms can claim to be valid
that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capaci-
ty as participants in a practical discourse179, U is the core of Habermass
ethical theory.
D indicates that the highest moral law, like the categorical imper-
ative, aims at testing certain norms on their moral content. As in Kant,
it is about the universalizability of norms. This time, however, universal-
izability does not mean an absolute freedom that transcends all content,
but rather, a generality that is understood as rational consensus. There-
fore, dependent on this consensus, the test can result in norms that
have a defined content. In U, the demands that the content of the
moral norms has to satisfy are specified more precisely: Action that is pre-
scribed by a moral norm must have a result that does justice to the sub-
jective interest of all.
From the fundamental determinations of the moral subject as they
are developed up until now, Habermass discourse ethical findings are
hardly surprising. Also, the determination of the concrete person (the
moral subject) ended in the conclusion that real freedom is only possible
if there has been justice done to the subjective interests of all (cf. U).
Moreover, at the level of the formal determination of the free person,
it became clear that that free persons relate completely symmetrically
to one another, so that no person can do anything without the consent
178 Cf. Jrgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical

Justification, p. 65. In: Jrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communica-
tive Action, Polity Press 1992.
179 Ibidem, p. 66.
Excursus: The Development of the Child to a Real Person 167
of all. (cf. D). Nevertheless, both approaches diverge at an essential

point. While it came to the fore in our exposition that it is possibly prob-
lematic whether the symmetry between the formally determined persons
is compatible with the demand that justice has been done to the subjec-
tive interest of every person, it seems that for Habermas there is no prob-
lem at all. Habermass secret is the discourse theory of truth and rightness,
based on his conception of discourse. A norm is just when all involved
have reached rational consensus about it. Rational consensus is distin-
guished from consensus that is only factual and can only be accomplished
if certain conditions are satisfied. It can only be accomplished as the result
of a reasonable argumentation process between all involved. The reason-
ability of the argumentation is guaranteed if the argumentation partners
relate freely and equally (symmetrically) to one another. Moreover, they
must be prepared at all times to exchange the paradigmatic presupposi-
tions of their argumentation to other paradigmatic presuppositions.
It is not difficult to recognize that precisely the discourse theory of
rightness hides the problems observed by us. As soon as the discussion
partners relate themselves to concrete contents, they do no longer relate
symmetrically to one another. They have a determined relation to the
content that is, especially in its determinedness, distinct from the relation
other partners take to the content. From this it follows that the discourse
theory of rightness is untenable, and that the problems observed by us
return also to Habermas. He should have asked himself whether U
and D are compatible.
Until now, the distinction between our approach to the moral subject
and the one of Habermas has in no way been articulated sufficiently
sharply. To make this clear, I still have to make some remarks about
what is at stake in Habermass thought enterprise. As it has already
been mentioned before, U can be understood as the discourse ethical
translation of Kants categorical imperative. Accordingly, so also can
D be understood as the discourse theoretical transformation of the
Kantian concept of autonomy. It can even be defended that the whole
Theory of communicative Action can be interpreted as a discourse theoret-
ical transformation of Kantian Reason.180 But Habermas does not only
want to develop another philosophy, but also undermine the status of tra-
ditional philosophy as such. Philosophy has lost its autonomy. Therefore,
U and D do not have the status of philosophical insight, but rather
180 Cf. Paul Cobben, Communicatief handelen als theoretisch grondbegrip,

ANTW, 81.4, 1989, pp. 241 263.
have for Habermas the status of what he calls hypothetical reconstruc-

tion. (116) Habermas tries to reconstruct which concept of moral law
and which concept of autonomy are active in our cultural tradition. Ra-
tional reconstructions remain to have a hypothetical status, and can only
retain their attractiveness if they are indirectly supported by scientific,
i. e., empirically testable theories. (116/7) Our attempts to get to grips
with the essential determinations of the moral subject by conceptual anal-
ysis will be a thorn in Habermass side. After all, this kind of project tries
to maintain philosophys autonomy.
Yet, Habermas appeal to scientific (and, consequently, testable) the-
ories, offers an exquisite chance to deepen the confrontation with our ap-
proach. In his article Moralbewutsein und kommunikatives Handeln
(Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action181), Habermas con-
fronts himself with the development stages of the moral consciousness as
they are conceived of by Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg has the opinion
that the development of the moral consciousness (at least insofar as it
is characteristic for our culture), necessarily goes through six stages. It
is about a developmental psychological theory that pretends that it can
be empirically tested. In the article just mentioned, Habermas tries to in-
terpret development stages in terms of the discourse ethics. If this is pos-
sible, discourse ethics can profit from the empirical testing by which
Kohlbergs theory is supported.
Also in our approach, the moral consciousness can only be generated
if it goes through some number of development stages. In this case, how-
ever, the development stages do not have the status of a scientific hypoth-
esis, but are developed in the framework of an attempt to understand how
a free person can be conceived of as a corporal individual at all. There-
fore, philosophical insights are pretended. But also, philosophical insights
are not apart from the empirical reality. Therefore, it is worth the effort to
examine whether the development stages that are distinguished by Kohl-
berg can also be explained in terms of philosophical development stages.
In the following exposition, the discourse ethical interpretation is
compared to the philosophical one. This makes it possible to articulate
more precisely the import and scope of both approaches.
181 Jrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, in: Jr-
gen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Polity Press 1992.
The interpretation of the development stages of Kohlberg
Habermas tries to interpret the moral stages distinguished by Kohlberg in

the framework of his Theory of communicative Action. In the consecutive
stages, the communicative action is more and more explicated, until fi-
nally the sixth and highest stage of communicative action is completely
crystallized as the action oriented toward reaching understanding182
of the discourse. Like Kohlberg, Habermas divides the stages into three
phases, each of which in turn is comprised of two stages: the pre-conven-
tional, the conventional and the post-conventional phase. I will start with
the discussion of the pre-conventional phase and will, subsequently, ex-
amine how this phase can be interpreted by our philosophical approach.
The pre-conventional phase is characterized by the lack of thematiz-
ing social reality. The moral subject (the child) is, in his actions, imme-
diately related towards (the actions of ) his direct family members. The
relation to others is not at stake. Moreover, at this level, action has a pure-
ly egocentric perspective: Empathy in the others position is still impos-
sible. In the first stage of this phase, the child does what his guardian tells
him to do, acting from a feeling of loyalty towards this guardian. The
child is obedient because he cannot imagine not to be. In the second
phase, the child only does something if he gets something in return
that is in his interest.
In our approach, the consecutive stages of the moral consciousness
can be interpreted as well as a process of explication. This time, however,
it is not about the explication of communicative action, but rather about
an explication of the reality of freedom. But also, in this case, the first
phase of the development process can be called pre-conventional. In
this phase, the I-consciousness is not yet that far developed that it is
aware of a social reality. The world to which it is related is a natural
one, not a social one. In the first stage of this phase, the child is only re-
lated to the immediately given, natural reality and it is one-sidedly orient-
ed to the actualization of its I-awareness. It can only maintain this aware-
ness, as long as it has overcome its needy relation to nature. Therefore,
the mamma (the breast of the mother) can become a symbol of the
I-awareness. In this stage, the action of the child is oriented to being
not related to natural reality; he does not want to know about his needi-
ness, because this threatens his I-identity.
182 Ibid, p. 160.

In the second stage of the pre-conventional phase, the moral con-

sciousness has experienced that it cannot overcome its relation to nature.
It experiences what it means to be a living organism. It is constantly con-
fronted with its own neediness and its action is oriented to the satisfaction
of its needs. Now, nature appears as an independent power that has the
structure of an organism; nature appears as the process in which the child
sometimes can satisfy his needs and sometimes not.
The second phase that Habermas (with Kohlberg) distinguishes is the
conventional phase. In this phase, the social reality no longer remains kept
out of range. The moral subject knows that his action takes place in the
social context and is, therefore, linked with conventions. His motive to
act is no longer inspired by the power of the guardian or by the advantage
a certain action brings, but by the duty to respect the prevailing tradition.
In the first stage of the conventional phase (i. e., in the third stage of the
moral consciousness), the moral consciousness identifies itself with the
specific role it has in society. It thinks to have the duty to fulfill the
role society has in mind. In the second stage of the conventional stage
(i. e., in the fourth stage of the moral consciousness), it no longer acts
one-sidedly from the specific role that has been assigned to it, but relates
itself to the social system in its entirety. It understands that that society
can only survive if it has certain underlying norms. It considers it to be
its duty to observe these norms because they are legitimized by the uni-
versal will.
Also, the conventional phase can be distinguished in our approach.
The moral subject that cannot realize its freedom as a natural organism
tries to reach its goal in the framework of the family community. In
this relation, the objective reality is no longer a given natural being-at-it-
self, but the traditional reality of the family. In the first stage of this con-
ventional phase, the child identifies himself with the head of the family.
He obeys the head of the family as an undisputed authority, and by this,
takes on his role as a member of the family. He experiences the fulfill-
ment of this role as his immediate duty because, without this role, he
would be deprived of his identity.
Precisely because the child conforms himself to the tradition of the
family, he passes step by step through a development by which he reaches
the second stage of the conventional stage. Step by step, he gets involved
in the life of the family. He develops a language with which he can make
all distinctions that are relevant in this world. For him, the world loses all
its strangeness. Therefore, a change can take place in his conception of
the familys essence. The reality of family life is no longer conceived of
as dependent on the family heads authority, but gets its ground in the
insight that the child has developed in family life. The child completely
knows his reality: he has appropriated this reality and feels as at home in
it as a fish does in the water. Reality has removed all its strangeness and is,
for the child, nothing other than the real appearance of his own insight.
The child no longer acts on the basis of the authority of the family head,
but on the basis of his own insight, i. e., his insight into the nature of re-
ality. The child knows that he lives in a specific family community. He
acts in correspondence to his insight into how a member of the family
should behave.
In the post-conventional phase, the moral subject is able to discuss
society as such. He is explicitly able to distinguish between the subjective,
inter-subjective and objective world. Therefore, he not only knows that
social conventions are changeable, but also he can distinguish between
the norms that are factually valid in the social world and those that
should be valid according to his subjective insight. In the first stage of
the post-conventional insight (i. e., the fifth stage of the moral conscious-
ness), the moral subject wants to discover the highest principles of justice
and wants to test (in a scientific discourse), to what extent the norms that
are actually valid correspond to these highest principles of justice. The
Theory of Justice, as it has been developed by John Rawls, can be con-
sidered a model of this stage.
In the second stage of the post-conventional phase (i. e. the sixth and
highest stage of moral consciousness), the moral consciousness no longer
thinks that the highest principles of justice can be identified by a theoret-
ical construction. It is only certain that the highest principles of justice are
the result of a procedure as described by Habermas in his concept of the
practical discourse. Therefore, the moral subject strives for the creation of
the conditions under which the practical discourse can be performed.
Also in our approach, a post-conventional phase can be distinguished.
In this phase, the child is confronted with other families and discovers the
contingence of the tradition of his own family life. For the first time, the
child is forced to conceive of his subjective identity independently from
his family life. He opposes family life as a changeable traditional reality.
Because of this, he seems to have lost all moral certainty. Yet this does not
imply that the child relapses into moral skepticism. He has felt complete-
ly at home in the family. He has experienced the family affection resulting
in his opinion to be really free. Family has made him what he is, includ-
ing the one who is now opposing the family. Now the child knows that he
can never again be absorbed by family life and that he has an independent
identity. At the same time, he knows that he never would have become
who he is without the family. Therefore, he once again turns to the family
and examines which principles underlie the tradition of the family, and
hopes after all to find in these principles the actualization of his freedom.
The stage in which the moral consciousness identifies these principles
with the family rituals that raise up the life of the family members above
actual life and link it with the continuity of changing generations, corre-
sponds to the first stage of Kohlsbergs post-conventional consciousness.
Now moral consciousness understands family life as appearance of uni-
versal principles. The transition into the sixth and highest stage of
moral consciousness, however, has not been made. If the moral con-
sciousness of the child concludes that the family rituals are after all
only valid in the contingent family community, then he does not con-
clude that the principles that underlie family have to be understood as
the result of a practical discourse, but he turns away from the family
and no longer tries to actualize his freedom in it. The child leaves the pa-
rental house and tries to keep the universality of his freedom by actual-
izing his freedom outside the family, namely in his role as the person
who actualizes himself in the symmetrical exchange of properties. We
will still see how the grownup child later founds his own family and
no longer has to consider the real family life as an external, contingent
reality, because he can make it the expression of his subjective freedom.
In the next chapter, I will elaborate under what conditions this subjective
freedom can be developed. At least the grownup children will have to par-
ticipate in the public discussion of civil society.
Concluding considerations
Habermas claims that his Theory of communicative Action, and the related
discourse ethics, acquires indirect scientific support with the help of the
stages of moral consciousness that Kohlberg distinguishes. On the one
hand, these stages of the moral consciousness can be interpreted in
terms of the Theory of communicative Action, and, on the other hand,
they can be experimentally tested. However, if it is right that the stages
of moral consciousness developed by Kohlberg can be equally well inter-
preted in our approach, there seems to be a problem. Which approach is
affirmed by Kohlbergs scientific experiments? Are the stages formulated
thus abstractly that they are compatible with at least two and possibly
more approaches? Then it has little meaning to claim that a theory is in-
directly supported by scientific experiments. At best, it can be maintained

that the experiments do not contradict the theory.
Yet, the preceding argumentation does not imply that Kohlbergs sci-
entific and empirically testable theory is, in the same way, related to the
theory of Habermas as to our approach. In the last case, the stages of
moral consciousness are deduced in an immanently philosophical reason-
ing: They resulted from the attempt to reconcile freedom and corporeal-
ity. If a developmental psychologist comes to similar formulations of the
stages and can connect them with the moral development of real children
with the help of experiments, this can certainly be interpreted as an affir-
mation of the philosophically developed stages of the moral conscious-
ness. However, I think that the relation between the Theory of communi-
cative Action and Kohlbergs development psychology remains that ob-
scure, that the affirmation of Habermass theory by Kohlbergs psychol-
ogy, does not succeed.
Habermas makes two important remarks about the relation between
his theory and the one of Kohlberg:
A nonfoundationalist self-understanding of this kind does more, however,
than simply relieve philosophy of tasks that have overburdened it. It not
only takes something away from philosophy; it also provides it with the op-
portunity for a certain navet and a new self-confidence in its cooperative
relationship with the reconstructive sciences. A relationship of mutual de-
pendence becomes established. Thus, to return to the matter at hand, not
only does moral philosophy depend on direct conformation from a develop-
mental psychology of moral consciousness; the latter in turn is built on phil-
osophical assumptions. I will investigate this interdependence by using Kohl-
berg as an example.183
Later on in the article, Habermas maintains:
What follows has the limited purpose of making a plausible case for the
foregoing hypotheses about the ontogenesis of speaker and world perspec-
tives, on the basis of existing empirical studies. At best, a hypothetical recon-
struction of this kind can serve as a guide to further research. Admittedly, my
hypotheses do require distinctions not easy to operationalize, distinctions be-
tween (a) communicative roles and speaker perspectives, (b) implementa-
tions of these speaker perspectives in different types of interactions, and
(c) the perspective structure of an understanding of the world that permits
a choice between basic attitudes to the objective, social and subjective worlds.
I am aware of the difficulty that results from the fact that I have to bring
183 Ibid., p. 119.

these distinctions from the outside to bear on material derived from previous
research.184
Here, Habermas speaks about a certain navet of non-foundationalist
philosophy towards the reconstructive sciences. If he wants to stress
with this the methodological independence of science, then, of course,
there is nothing against it. I simply do not understand what it has to
do with the self-understanding of philosophy that is or is not founda-
tionalist. Also, a philosophy that acknowledges philosophically based in-
sights leaves room to the specificity of scientific research. Whoever thinks
that the development stages of the moral consciousness in a specific cul-
ture can be deduced from a philosophical ground position, does not re-
alize, himself, that the philosophical conceptualization of reality leaves
plenty of room for an historical concretizing that can only be made acces-
sible by scientific research.
However, the way in which Habermas makes a problem of the rela-
tion between philosophy and science is highly dubious. On the one hand,
he speaks about a mutual dependency between science and philosophy,
and, on the other hand, he acknowledges that the analytic points of view
of his philosophy are externally related to science. This means that the
relation between science and philosophy cannot be determined at all.
Firstly, the mutual dependency leads to a circularity in which nothing
can be determined with certainty, even though Habermas makes the im-
pressive revelation that he has reservations about the circular character
of the mutual testing of philosophy and science that he considers to be
unfounded. (p. 117) Secondly, one can ask oneself what this circularity
means when the relation between philosophy and science is understood in
this external way. Why, considering this externality, should the philosoph-
ical presuppositions of the scientific hypotheses (in this case: the develop-
ment stages of moral consciousness), have anything to do with the theory
of communicative action? Why, considering this externality, should the
theory of communicative action be precisely related to Kohlbergs scientif-
ic theory? Who can conclude that there are no better candidates?
Habermass misconception of the relation between philosophy and
science is expressed when he discusses the universal status of the stages
of moral development. According to Habermas, Kohlberg opposes all
kinds of relativistic approaches, and persists in universalistic stages by
(a) reducing the empirical diversity of existing moral views to variation
184 Ibid., p. 141.

in the contents, in contrast to the universal forms, of moral judgment, and

(b) explaining the remaining structural differences between moralities as
differences in this stage of development of the capacity for moral judg-
ment. (p. 117). Of this exists the consonance between psychological
theory and normative theory (p. 117), i. e., between what I indicated
as philosophy and science.
The finding of universal forms, however, is not a matter of science.
With the help of scientific testing it can never be proven that a form is
universal. Universal forms follow from philosophical standpoints. An ex-
ample would be our philosophical position from which we have deduced
universal development stages of the moral consciousness. If Kohlberg in-
troduces universal forms, this means that he is, at that moment, active as
a philosopher, not as a scientist. Kohlbergs philosophical position can or
cannot coincide with the one of Habermas. But in both cases there is no
matter of an indirect affirmation of Habermass theory.
The development stages that can be philosophically deduced always
have a logical, not psychological status. For example, they show the logical
steps that have to be passed through by a free individual who is still ab-
sorbed by natural relations and who wants to develop into an explicitly
free individual, or they show the logical steps that have to be passed
through by the individual who has the potency to make himself under-
standable towards others and who wants to actualize this potency.
These logical steps can be the criteria for the formulation of psychological
development stages that are passed through by a concrete individual.
This, however, asks for a certain cultural realization. Only in this transi-
tion does science come into sight. One could maintain that philosophy
that is based on the results of fruitful scientific research is indirectly af-
firmed. But also, in this case, there is no matter of mutual dependency
between philosophy and science.
Chapter 8
The Civil Society: Developing the Institutional House
of the Second Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the second
second self with institutions of our globalized world and examine which
institutions can be considered as an adequate realization of the second
self. To prepare this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegels attempt
in the Philosophy of Right, to elaborate the institutionalization of the sec-
ond self for the Nineteenth Century. I will critique the result of Hegels
attempt, the Corporation (or, what Hegel calls, the second family). This
criticism does not concern the features of the Corporation that typically
seem to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is more elementary. I
will show what are the consequences of Hegels confusion at the level
of the family (where he confused natural and ethical immediacy). At
the level of civil society, there is no room for subjective freedom in its
pregnant meaning: It is reduced to a subjectivity that is totally socialized.
As a consequence, Hegels concept of Corporation does not meet the cri-
teria for the second self that Hegel himself has developed in the Phenom-
enology of Spirit. This criticism will appear helpful for the positive con-
struction of the second self s institutional embodiment.
The development of the second self s embodiment in the

Philosophy of Right: civil society
Systematically, the second self has to be conceived of as the mediated (self-

conscious) unity of right and morality. Therefore, one would expect that
the civil society is constructed as the unity of the second moment of ab-
stract Right, i. e., Contract, and the second moment of Morality, i. e., In-
tention and Welfare.
Insofar as the civil society is understood as the domain of the multi-
tude of families, it is not difficult to recognize the relation of the Con-
The development of the second self s embodiment 177
tract. The families are the concrete persons who recognize one another
as free and equal. Their mutual recognition becomes real in the Contract,
i. e., at the moment that the families exchange their properties.
The civil society, as the multitude of families, seems to correspond to
the Roman Law in which the legal persons recognize one another as free
and equal. Also the persons of the Roman Law are family heads, and in
this sense, concrete persons: They reproduce themselves by the free con-
sumption of the familys property and they express their mutual recogni-
tion by the exchange of properties.
The comparison between the civil society and the Roman Law allows a
further elaboration insofar as Hegel characterizes the relations between
the persons in both cases as a disappearance of ethical life. The
Roman Law has been constituted after the decline of the ethical life
that was actualized in the Greek world. The Roman families no longer
share their norms and values, and are only related insofar as they ex-
change properties. At the level of civil society, the free and equal persons
have left family life: The family is only represented as the commodities
that are produced by the family and that can be exchanged with the com-
modities of other families.
The disappearance of ethical life leads to the decline of the Roman
Empire because it is not guaranteed that the persons can harmoniously
live together. In Chapter 4, it is discussed which developments this de-
cline induced: The pure self that was absorbed by the practical freedom
of family life returned in the form of an inner representation, and was
embodied in the Belief. The judgment that the Belief passed on the (ob-
jective) institutional world, induced, in its turn, a process of culture in
which the persons were completely socialized. This resulted in the abso-
lute freedom of the French Revolution, i. e., in the revolutionary citizens
who want to immediately actualize their alleged autonomy.
At the level of civil society, however, the disappearance of ethical life
cannot lead to the decline of civil society. Civil society is already a moment
of the entirety of the ethical life in which the conscientious individual has
actualized his freedom all the time. The person is the conscientious indi-
vidual who is aware that he actualizes his freedom in the civil society: He
knows that his actualization of freedom, at the level of civil society, has a
mediated form, i. e., the mediated unity of right and morality. Therefore,
the person of the civil society is also an autonomous moral subject who
wants to actualize his subjective freedom. The person of the Contract
is, at the same time, the subject of Intention and Welfare.
178 Chapter 8 The Civil Society
The problem is, however, that it is not evident that the persons of the
civil society can be the subjects of Intention and Welfare, as well. Whereas
the formal (free and equal) persons do not exclude one another, this may
be different for the subjects of Intention and Welfare. The actualization of
the welfare of the one can exclude the welfare of the other. Therefore, the
persons of the civil society, like the persons of the Realm of Culture, must
pass through a process of culture that guarantees that they can strive after
their subjective welfare without excluding one another. We will see that
this process results in the Corporations. The Corporations make possible
what failed, at the level of absolute freedom, in the Realm of Culture:
the harmony between the moral individuals that actualize their subjective
freedom. In the next section, I will discuss the process of education in the
civil society, and show that it is structured like the process of culture in the
Realm of Culture.
The process of Culture in Civil Society

We have seen that the moral individual of the Realm of Culture was relat-
ed to an objective institutional world. In his process of culture, the moral
individual repeated the stages of observing and active Reason. Also the per-
son of civil society is related to an independent, objective world, namely
the commodities that he finds at the free market. His process of culture
concerns his relation to these commodities, and repeats once again the
stages of observing and active Reason. 185
Since the observing Reason repeats, in its turn, the stages of Conscious-
ness and Self-consciousness, the persons process of culture begins with a re-
lation that is structured as the Sense-Certainty (in the form of observing
Reason): The commodities that he finds at the market are immediately
given, contingent entities. Therefore, it is completely accidental whether
these commodities can or cannot satisfy the persons welfare. This can be-
come clear only when the persons specific relation to the commodity is
considered. The commodity must have use-value for the person, i. e., it
must have specific qualities that are able to satisfy his welfare. As a con-
sequence, however, the objectivity of the commodity is broken down. Its
existence disintegrates into two distinct points of view: on the one hand,
185 Of course, this repetition does not concern the status of dialectics: The absolute
position that has to be developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is already devel-
oped in the Philosophy of Right all the time.
The process of Culture in Civil Society 179
the subjective point of view of the person for whom the commodity, as
use-value, exists of a multitude of qualities; on the other hand, the objec-
tive point of view of the market. In this objective view, the commodity
has exchange-value, i. e., a general value that is equal for all persons of
the market. Like the Perception (the second moment of Consciousness)
was not able to bring together his two points of view (the One and the
Also), or, like the moral individual (of the Realm of Culture) was not
able to reconcile State Power and Wealth, so the person fails to bring to-
gether the points of view that divide the commodity in use-value and ex-
change-value. This is only possible from a point of view in which Under-
standing is repeated.
The person can restore the unity of the commodity when he realizes
that the use-value, as well as the exchange-value, must be reduced to him-
self. The exchange-value of the commodity is no objectivistic quality be-
side the use-value, but is intrinsically twined with the use-value: Ex-
change-value has to be understood as use-value as such. ( 63) Ex-
change-value and use-value are related as being essence and appearance.
The commodity has a general value on the market (exchange-value);
but it can only have this exchange-value when this exchange-value is ex-
pressed in some (specific) use-value. Without use-value, the commodity
has no exchange-value. Therefore, at this level the person is related to
the commodity like Understanding (the third moment of Consciousness)
is related to nature: Objectivity is conceived of as a supra-sensual force
(cf. exchange-value) that is expressed in the sensual manifestations of
the force (cf. use-value). Since, however, the value of the commodity
(both exchange-value and use-value), depends on the evaluating person,
the commodity has its unity in the evaluating person (as in the Realm
of Culture, State Power and Wealth appeared to have their unity in the
judging individual).
After having repeated the stages of Consciousness (in the form of ob-
serving Reason), the person repeats the stages of Self-consciousness (in the
form of observing Reason). If the unity of the commodity is dependent
on the persons evaluation, its objectivity is only guaranteed as long as
the process of evaluation is continued. This means that the exchange of
commodities must be overcome as an accidental action. In that case,
the families are not households that are, in principle, self-supporting,
only exchanging the commodities that they do not need for their own
consumption, but households whose consumption is structurally mediat-
ed by the exchange on the market. They maintain the objective world
that corresponds to their evaluating activity by repeating again and
again the exchange of commodities. (Cf. the Desire that maintains its cer-
titude to be the essence of all reality by repeating again and again the neg-
ation of nature, or the (Realm of Cultures) moral individual who main-
tains the objectivity of the unlimited Monarch by repeating again and
again his language of flattery.)
Even if the persons consumption is structurally mediated by the mar-
ket, it remains possible that the person has needs that are not satisfied by
the exchange process. This means that his welfare is not adequately actual-
ized. The adequate integration of Contract, and Intention and Welfare, de-
mands further steps. Only when the person is totally socialized and the
families have become moments of a production system that is essentially
mediated by market exchange, can the actualization of the persons wel-
fare be guaranteed. This total socialization, that Hegel considers the prop-
er Culture of civil society, is performed in a relation in which the lordship/
bondsman relation is repeated (in the form of observing Reason).
The total socialization of the person presupposes that the family is no
longer the institution in which the labor activities are localized. Labor
must have the shape of a social production system, i. e., a labor system
in which labor essentially is mediated by exchange. In Marxist terminol-
ogy, one would say: Labor must have become a commodity at the market.
The person who sells his labor as a commodity on the market gets in-
volved in a relation that can be described in terms of a lordship/bondsman
relation. By selling his labor force, he places himself (as bondsman), in
the service of an employer (as lord), who organizes the labor process.
The goal of the labor process is not the immediate satisfaction of the
needs of a family, but rather the production of commodities that can
be sold at the market (and indirectly satisfy the needs of the families).186
The mechanism of the market is determined by the two relation
forms that constitute it: Contract, and Intention and Welfare. As the per-
sons of the Contract, the individuals are exchangeable, i. e., their actions
are formal and general; as subjects of Intention and Welfare, the individ-
uals are particular, i. e., they strive after their particular welfare. There-
fore, Hegel can maintain that the moment of generality and the moment
of particularity are the constituting coordinates of the market. ( 186)
These moments, however, are externally related, so that the process of
186 Later on we will see that this relation can, in some respect, be compared to the
Marxist relation between wage labor and capital. In principle, however, this com-
parison cannot be made because Hegel does not sustain the doctrine of labor
value.
The process of Culture in Civil Society 181
their integration has the form of a continuous turn. The moment of gen-
erality turns into the moment of particularity, and the moment of partic-
ularity turns into the moment of generality. This continuous movement
appears in the supply and demand of the market. On the one hand, the
persons of the market offer a particular supply, i. e., a use-value. On the
market, this particular supply turns into a general exchange-value. On the
other hand, the persons of the market sell the commodities that corre-
spond to their demand. In this case, the general exchange-value of the
commodities turns into the particular use-value. This turn from use-
value into exchange-value, and vice versa, matches with the language of
disruption in the Realm of Culture.
The competition at the market evokes innovations: not only concern-
ing the development of new products, but also in the field of technolog-
ical improvements. This innovation is at the center of the process of cul-
ture that Hegel discerns in civil society. When Hegel introduces, in 190
of the Philosophy of Right, the concept of human need, he distinguishes it
from animal need. The animal need is naturally given and, therefore,
fixed: An animals needs and its ways and means of satisfying them
are both alike restricted in scope. As a spiritual being, man transcends
the animals natural fixation: Though man is subject to this restriction
too, yet at the same time he evinces his transcendence of it and his uni-
versality, first by the multiplication of needs and means of satisfying
them, and secondly by the differentiation and division of concrete need
into single parts and aspects which in turn become different needs, par-
ticularized and so more abstract.
What is remarkable here is that Hegel interprets human needs as a
prolongation of animal needs.187 Human needs can be understood as a
multiplication and differentiation of natural needs. ( 195) Such an
opinion one would sooner expect in Marx (who understands the needy
man in his relation to nature), than in Hegel. For, Hegel emphasizes
that the reality of man as a spiritual being is only conceivable within a
culture community (of which the lord/bondsman relation is the basic
model). According to that view, human need has not to be conceptual-
ized, as in the case of animals, in relation to the first nature, but in rela-
tion to the second nature ( 151): the norms and values of the family
187 This conclusion is in line with Houlgate (2006): Instead of simply having a nat-
ural need for food, therefore, they may want a particular kind of food prepared in
a particular way, for example. In this way, Hegel explains, the needs and wants of
human beings become more and more specialized and refined.
community that determine which needs are valid in it. Once again, how-
ever, it becomes clear that Hegel identifies the contingence of the family
community (for the children, the norms and values of the family appear
as traditional facts), i. e., its finitude, with its naturalness in the form of
freedom: Traditional facts are equated with natural immediacy that is
taken up in the form of freedom. We already saw what the consequences
are : The contingence of the family community is not discussed, so that
the norms and values of the family community seem to be given once and
for all and, moreover, the same for all families, i. e., there is no room for
multi-culturality.
Culture in the socialized production System as part of the

System of Needs
The competition on the market has consequences for the production

process: It is subjected to the ongoing division of labor and technological
improvements. This changes not only the nature of the objective side of
the labor process (the technology of the machines), but also its subjective
side, the worker. He passes through a process of culture that is differen-
tiated in theoretical and practical education. The theoretical education
that Hegel equates with Understanding and language is not only under-
stood by him as the multiplicity of ideas and facts developing itself
in line with the ongoing division of labor, but also as a flexibility and
rapidity of mind, ability to pass from one idea to another, to grasp com-
plex and general relations, and so on. ( 197) Therefore, the theoretical
development of education consists of the development of an increasingly
differentiated scientific insight into reality, and of the power to integrate
this insight more and more self-evidently in an immediate view on the
world. According to Hegel, labors practical education consists first in
the automatically recurrent need for something to do, and the habit of
simply being busy; next, in the strict adaptation of ones activity accord-
ing not only to the nature of the material worked on, but also, and espe-
cially, to the pleasure of other workers; and finally, in a habit, produced
by this discipline, of objective activity and universally recognized apti-
tudes . ( 197) Therefore, practical education results in a socializing
of action that has become a second nature, and that makes it possible
to function trouble-free in a labor system that is based on scientific
and technological insights.
Culture in the socialized production System as part of the System of Needs 183
The ongoing scientification of the labor system not only results in a

growth of social wealth (because specialized labor is more productive),
but also in the exclusion of some to participate in this wealth: despite
an excess of wealth, civil society [is] not rich enough ( 245) This last
observation relies on a series of presuppositions. The first presupposition
is that the division of labor makes it less and less complicated, so that less
and less education is needed (compare Marx who makes labor of the as-
sembly line the standard of labor belonging to the modern production
system).188 For that reason, the potential supply of labor grows bigger
and bigger. On the other hand, the technological development of the
labor system leads to a higher and higher productivity, lowering the de-
mand for labor. Both factors together bring about that the supply of
labor surpasses the demand. The consequence is a surplus of laborers
who can in no way be integrated in the System of Needs. On the one
hand, the potential supply of labor cannot be integrated by creating
extra jobs (this would only further disturb the market relations, because
it would generate a supply of goods for which there is no demand).189 On
the other hand, the demand on the market cannot be enlarged by putting
an unearned income to the unemployed persons disposal, because this
makes the unemployed one-sidedly dependent and deprives them of
their self-esteem as human beings, i. e., of the freedom that manifests it-
self in the System of Needs as the freedom to acquire income through ones
own labor.190
188 Karl Marx (1969): Es ist ein Produkt der manufakturmigen Teilung der Ar-
beit, ihnen die geistige Potenzen des materiellen Produktionsprozesses als fremdes
Eigentum und sie beherrschende Macht gegenberzustellen. (p. 382). (It is a re-
sult of the division of labour in manufactures, that the labourer is brought face to
face with the intellectual potencies of the material process of production, as the
property of another, and as ruling power.).
189 As an alternative, they might be given subsistence indirectly through being given
work, i. e., the opportunity to work. In this event, the volume of production
would be increased, but the evil consists precisely in an excess of production
and the lack of an proportionate number of consumers who are themselves
also producers ( 245).
190 the burden of maintaining them at their ordinary standard of living might be
directly laid on the wealthier classes, or they might receive the means of liveli-
hood directly from other public sources of wealth (e. g. from the endowments
of rich hospitals, monasteries and other foundations). In either case, however,
the needy would receive subsistence directly, not by means of their work, and
this would violate the principle of civil society and the feeling of individual in-
dependence and self-respect in its individual members. ( 245).
The consequences implicated in the culture of the System of Needs

cannot be true. An institutional order departing from the realization of
freedom for all, cannot end in the conclusion that some are superfluous
without contradiction. This can only mean that somewhere Hegel as-
sumes presuppositions that are not correct, or with regard to which, at
least it has to be observed that it concerns presuppositions based on his-
torically contingent data. But what data are involved?
That the civil society is not rich enough for all cannot mean that it is
principally impossible to produce enough for all. The modern production
system raises productivity and, therefore, is better equipped than ever to
provide society with at least a minimum existence. The not-being-rich-
enough has to be related to the mechanism of the market: it must be
proved that the play of supply and demand is functioning in a way
that some necessarily become superfluous. Hegel has exactly this in
mind when he assumes that some players on the market can offer no
more than unskilled labor. If the ongoing scientification of the labor sys-
tem, interrelated with the ongoing division of labor, makes that unskilled
labor (the mechanical labor) can be replaced by machines, it will lose the
competition with the machine at the moment that the quantity of the un-
skilled labor that can be replaced by the machine191 is higher than the
quantity required for the production of the machine. Here it comes to
the fore that Hegels appeal to Adam Smith192 has left its traces: The peo-
ples being superfluous, the being-not-rich-enough of civil society, only
has a meaning if his doctrine of the labor value can be appealed to.193
However, this appeal has, in turn, only meaning if mechanical labor,
i. e., labor that principally can be replaced by machines, can be made
the standard for human labor in general. Such a one-sided view of
labor has a certain validity in a society in which unskilled labor factually
191 Further, the abstraction of one mans production from anothers makes work
more and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install ma-
chines in his place. ( 198).
192 Hegel refers to Smith, Say and Ricardo, see 189.
193 If the labor force of the worker can principally be replaced by machines, the
worker is reduced to a thing, i. e., he is only a commodity. This is the central
observation on which Marxs criticism of capitalism is based. After all, Marxs cri-
terion for criticism is Kants categorical imperative: capitalism reduces man to a
mere means. In Hegels system, the not-being-rich enough refers to the end of
observing Reason: Der Geist ist ein Knochen, i.e, the reduction of the workers
freedom to a thing. For this reason the systematical transition to active Reason
has to be made.
Culture in the socialized production System as part of the System of Needs 185
has some dominance, but cannot sustain the argument that civil society is
not rich enough in principle.
Distinct from Marx and Smith, Hegel is not one-sidedly connected to
the doctrine of labor value. He emphatically maintains that the value of a
service in which someones personality or spiritual powers are called upon
cannot just be compared to the value of things.194 Hegels argumentation
that some are superfluous because they cannot get a job in the System of
Needs, appears not to be principal. Factually, the supply of unskilled labor
may surpass the demand, but precisely because they are spiritual beings,
people are able to educate themselves, and thus offer an alternative supply
that matches the demand of the market.
The reification that is performed in the labor process is a self-reifica-
tion. The workers are self-conscious to participate in a dynamic process in
which the self-reification can be performed again and again differently
and more differentiated. The reification in the labor process is mediated
by a contract between persons and, therefore, is based on a relation of
law. The culture of the labor process contributes to the reality of formal
law.195 It results in a socialization of the persons nature, leading to the fact
that the person not only formally, but also really can participate in a social
order structured according to general rules of law.
Insofar as the persons are totally socialized, they have replaced their
natural needs and drives196 by actions that completely correspond to
the System of Needs: The formal persons of the Contract have completely
socialized the actions in which they actualize their welfare. This means
that they are also in their real actions free and equal: Their real actions
are exchangeable because they have been transformed in inter-subjective
actions that function as a moment in the rationalized System of Needs.
194 Counsels acceptance of a brief is akin to this, and so are other contracts whose
fulfilment depends on character, good faith, or superior gifts, and where an in-
commensurability arises between the services rendered and value in terms of cash.
(In such cases the cash payment is called not wages but honorarium.) ( 80).
195 As the private particularity of knowing and willing, the principle of this system
of needs contains absolute universality, the universality of freedom, only abstract-
ly and therefore as the right of property. At this point, however, this right is no
longer merely implicit but has attained is recognized actuality as the protection of
property through the administration of justice. ( 208).
196 See: Introduction Philosophy of Right, 19.
Under this condition, the social presuppositions are fulfilled for the func-
tioning of what Hegel calls the Administration of Justice. 197
The Administration of Justice institutionalizes what we call today pri-
vate Law. It not only formulates the generalized action patterns as positive
rules of laws, but also takes care for the maintenance of these rules of law.
On the one hand, this Administration of Justice has been made possible
because the persons have cultivated their nature; on the other hand, it
is the Administration of Justice that contributes to the process of culture
and makes it possible. The integration of Contract, and Intention and wel-
fare has its institutional shape in the Administration of Justice. And, like
the System of Needs that it contains, the Administration of Justice is also
a dynamic system that develops itself in time, for example, under the in-
fluence of technological improvements.
The Administration of Justice ( 209 ff.) can be characterized as the
domain in which the person practically actualizes the general good. It in-
stitutionalizes the System of Needs that produces all commodities for the
good life, i. e., the ethical community in which all families are united.
Therefore, the existence of the Administration of Justice is dependent on
the particular will that wills the general as such, i. e., on the lord of
the ethical community. In the next chapter, we will see that this lord is
institutionalized as the third self who manifests itself in the state power.
The System of Needs that is institutionalized in the framework of the
Administration of Justice can be considered as the immediate, positive ac-
tualization of the freedom of the persons. By participating in the System of
Needs, they practically satisfy their needs in the form of freedom. This
immediate form of the actualization of freedom is once again structured
as the relation of stoicism (in the form of observing Reason), i. e., the free-
dom of the pure self is absorbed in its practical manifestation: The pure
self as such is not expressed. However, insofar as the persons are also
moral subjects, they are also conscientious individuals, i. e., they know
themselves as the pure selves who cannot content themselves with the ac-
tualization of the immediate good in the System of Needs, but who have to
actualize the absolute good in which they can recognize themselves as
pure selves. To reach this goal, the person passes through the stages of ac-
tive Reason.
197 This moment matches with the pure Insight of the Realm of Culture: it repeats the
relation of stocism (in the form of observing Reason).
Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moral subjects 187
Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moral

subjects
Insofar as the individuals know themselves as pure selves, i. e., as persons

who also have a conscience, they know that they are not exchangeable.
They have an absolute value that cannot be objectified in whatever his-
torical System of Needs. As free individuals they transcend the positive
laws of any real social organism. They are not dependent on the historical
organism, but rather, the other way around; the social organism is a spe-
cific form in which they actualize their pure selves. To this absolute value
of the individuals justice is done at the level of the institution that Hegel
calls Police. ( 231 ff.)
The Police, in the Philosophy of Right, is an institution with a much
broader mission than that which we nowadays call police. Its main task
is to guarantee that none of the absolute individuals is excluded from
the System of Needs that is institutionalized in the framework of the Ad-
ministration of Justice. The police have to organize the institutional facili-
ties that offer each person the chance for real participation in the social
system. The police not only take care of the daily functioning of the Sys-
tem of Needs (maintenance of the public order, organization of the infra-
structure, prevention of monopoly positions, inspection of labor condi-
tions, quality examination of commodities, etc.), but also organize the fa-
cilities that enable the persons to enter the System of Needs. According to
Hegel, the individuals have become more and more sons of the civil so-
ciety. ( 238) Therefore, it belongs to the tasks of the police to bring
about the institutions of education in which the young persons can
gain the certificates that are necessary to participate in the System of
Needs. ( 239)
However, even if the Police is a perfectly functioning institution, it
cannot guarantee that all persons have entrance to the market. Just be-
cause the market is free, it has its own necessity, the law of supply and
demand. Those persons who are not able to generate a supply that cor-
responds to a demand of the market (who have not, for example, the de-
manded professional qualifications), will be excluded. Therefore, the Po-
lice institutionalizes a relation form that we encountered before as the first
stage of active Reason, i. e., Pleasure and Necessity. The absolute value of
the persons who are also moral subjects is not compatible with a social
organism in which they are only moments. The Pleasure of the persons
to actualize their moral freedom in the System of Needs is confronted with

the Necessity of the free market.198
The actualization of freedom that is dependent on the law of the mar-
ket remains accidental and is, therefore, inadequate. According to Hegel,
this problem can be solved at the level of Corporations ( 250 ff.), insti-
tutions that have features of mediaeval guilds, modern companies,
trade unions and professional organizations. The basic idea is that persons
who belong to the System of Needs can be divided as participants of differ-
ent branches. Each branch forms a corporation in which the participants
relate to one another as in a second family. ( 252). As in the first (nor-
mal) family, the welfare of the participants of the corporation coincides.
The Corporation is a social organism in which the participants share the
norms and values of the branch they belong to. The work of the second
family is not (as is the work of the first family), the reproduction of the
free person, but rather the reproduction of the free society. In the multi-
tude of Corporations, the production system is organized as an organic en-
tirety in which each Corporation is an organ. The production system as
such produces all commodities that are needed for the good life, i. e.,
the ethical life that is explicitly institutionalized at the level of the State
(cf. next chapter).
As in the first family, the participants of the Corporation do not relate
to one another as persons. They share the love for their profession (pro-
fessional ethics), and know that it is their collective goal to perform the
production of their branch. Once the individual is a member of the Cor-
poration he remains a life long member. The Corporation will take care of
his income and family when external disasters prevent him doing this
himself. ( 252) Therefore, the market relations (including the additional
dependence on its chance), are overcome between the participants of a
Corporation. The Corporation guarantees the social security.
In distinction from the first family, however, the access to the second
family is mediated by freedom.199 On the one hand, the individuals are
not members of the Corporation on the basis of their birth (for example,
because they have to practice the profession of their parents), but by free
198 Therefore, the Police repeats the Epic that discussed the difficulty to subsume the
many gods in one community, or it repeats the Struggle of Enlightenment with
Superstition at the level of the Realm of Culture: the difficulty to subsume the
many subjects of the Belief in one worldly community.
199 Therefore, Houlgate (2006) has no right when he remarks that the corporations
are essentially the same as guilds. (p. 204).
Institutionalizing the second self: the community of moral subjects 189
decision. The individual must decide that he is willing to become a mem-

ber of a Corporation, and the Corporations must decide that they accept
the individual as a member. On the other hand, both decisions must
be rooted in rational arguments. The individual must make his choice
for a profession because he understands that he has the subjective capaci-
ties for it. And the Corporation must accept an individual as its member
on objective grounds. The Corporation must need new members for the
economically considered production of its commodities, and the individ-
ual must be objectively qualified (by the demanded certificates), for the
branch of the Corporation.
At the level of the Corporation, the second stage of active Reason, The
law of the heart and the frenzy of self-conceit, is repeated.200 The law of the
market is replaced by a self-made and self-conscious law, the law that
dominates the social organism of the Corporation. For the individual,
the law of the Corporation can be identified as the law of the heart.
The individual has cultivated his immediate nature on the market and
by means of education. By transforming his immediate nature, he has ap-
propriated it as his free, subjective nature. It is this subjective nature that
he can actualize in the framework of the Corporation as his law of the
heart. At the state level, the actualization of subjective freedom of the
one (his law of the heart) would exclude the actualization of the subjective
freedom of the others (the other laws of the heart). All individuals would
make the law of the state their subjective law, and would experience that
their intentions are not compatible. They would become aware of the
frenzy of self-conceit, the hubris of the one-sided subjective autonomy
that, at the level of the Realm of Culture, led to the absolute freedom, to
the terror of the French Revolution. At the level of the Corporation, how-
ever, the confrontation between incompatible subjectivities can be avoid-
ed. Because there are many Corporations, the individuals can choose the
one that corresponds to their subjective freedom. Moreover, the Corpora-
tions do not exclude one another, but are rather moments of the produc-
tion system in its entirety.
Although not all individuals can become a member of a Corporation,
at least the ones who participate in them seem to have the possibility to
actualize their subjective freedom. However, since we have seen that the
Administration of Justice, as the Police and the Corporation, presuppose, as
200 The Corporation repeats, as well, the Tragedy that thematizes two laws of the
heart that are still determined by natural qualifications: the Human and the Di-
vine Law.
well, the existence of a state in which the particular will, that wills the
general as such, is institutionalized, the adequate actualization of freedom
demands the development of the institutions of the state. This will be the
subject of the next chapter. Before we can turn to this chapter, however,
we must examine what criticism Hegels conception of civil society evokes,
and discuss the possible alternatives.
Criticism of the development of civil society in the light of the

Phenomenology of Spirit
Although the development of the civil society, as it is performed in the

Philosophy of Right, can be elucidated from the background of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, it is precisely the last work that can also help to criti-
cize this development. The program that follows from the Phenomenology
of Spirit is not consequently elaborated in the Philosophy of Right.
The main point of criticism we have already encountered at the level
of the family, where Hegel reduced ethical immediacy (in which the sub-
jectivity is expressed that is not exchangeable, and that has many forms of
appearance), to natural immediacy in the form of freedom (in which only
the pathos of man and woman are expressed, without giving room to a
multitude of forms). This reduction returns in a certain form at the
level of civil society, when the persons at the market are presented as per-
sons who initially have natural needs. It is these natural needs that are cul-
tivated until they are totally socialized and integrated in the social pro-
duction system.
The consequence of this reduction is the disappearance of moral sub-
jectivity at the level of civil society. There is only room for exchangeable,
socialized persons, not for unique subjects. This comes explicitly to the
fore when Hegel maintains that some form of (mechanical) labor can
be replaced by machines. This not only means that some people are fac-
tually reduced to things, but also, since Hegel speaks about the civil soci-
ety that is not rich enough ( 245)201, that for some this reduction is
unavoidable.202 Of course, one could object that there may be principal
201 The problem of poverty is clearly discussed by Hardimon (1994), p. 236 ff.
202 I disagree with Fred. Neuhouser (2000) when he remarks: Finally, there is no
reason that Hegels theory need make outlaws, or even social outcasts, of the mi-
nority of individuals who lead more idiosyncratic lives at the margins of bour-
geois respectability. (p. 268).
Criticism of the development of civil society 191
limits to the supply of unskilled labor that the market can absorb. But
that argumentation also cannot be proved. Firstly, the modern produc-
tion system is characterized by a dynamics in which the demand of prod-
ucts and services can be infinitely differentiated, so that the demand for
labor is not principally clamped down.203 And secondly, it is always pos-
sible to adjust the labor supply by education.
Hegels thesis that the civil society is not rich enough for all appears to
arise from making the distinction between theoretical and practical edu-
cation absolute. Influenced by the reality of his era, Hegel has been se-
duced to separate both forms of education, and so creates room for a
Marxist analysis avant la lettre. In that analysis, the distinction between
theoretical and practical education is transformed into the separation be-
tween spiritual and manual labor (a separation that Marx characterizes as
the highest form of labor division).204 Then, the ultimate consequence of
practical education is the ability to make oneself part of the mechanical
labor process. This makes man an appendage of the machine, and reduces
labor to purely physical effort.205 Only under that condition does the doc-
trine of labor value have a certain validity. To Hegel, however, it has to be
objected to that this form of manual labor is incompatible with his theory
of the realization of freedom. In human labor, theoretical and practical
education have to remain connected.
It is true that Hegel seems to resume the moral subjectivity at the level
of Police, and Corporation, but this resumption remains insufficient.
These institutions do not only not change the fact that some are excluded
(because the market mechanism principally excludes them), but also re-
strict the subjective freedom to economic freedom: In the Corporation,
the individuals are recognized as professionals, not as unique subjects.
203 According to Houlgate (2006), Hegel also assumes this infinite differentiation:
it is evident that there is no limit to what people might want or need in
the future. (p. 199) However, for Hegel, the production system operates in
the framework of the good life.
204 Karl Marx, Deutsche Ideologie, Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung
von dem Augenblicke an, wo eine Teilung der materiellen und geistigen Arbeit
eintritt. (p. 31). (Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment
when a division of material and mental labour appears.).
205 Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Alle Arbeit ist einerseits Verausgabung menschlicher Ar-
beit im physiologischen Sinn, und in dieser Eigenschaft gleicher menschlicher
oder abstrakt menschlicher Arbeit bildet sie den Warenwert. (p. 61). (On the
one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human labour
power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and
forms the value of commodities.).
They have the freedom to choose and develop their professions, but not
the freedom to actualize their subjective freedom as such; they are appre-
ciated colleagues, not ends in themselves.
Although Hegel rightly maintains that good workmanship is to be
framed in an ethical community (i. e., a community with shared views
on the good life), at least two fundamental objections can be made
against his attempt to understand this community as a Corporation.
First, in his opinion, the corporations have a mediating function in the
development of the highest form of the ethical community, the good
life as it is shaped at state level. The corporations can have this function
because Hegel thinks that they together form an organic unity: the pro-
duction system in its entirety that is in the service of the good life at state
level. This assumption is based on a presupposition that was criticized be-
fore, namely the assumption that the commodities and services produced
by the production system can be understood as the ongoing differentia-
tion of the natural individuals needs, which have their unity in his nat-
ural organism. The differentiation of the production system flows from
the immoderate differentiation of the scientific and technological knowl-
edge in reaction to the immoderate differentiation of the demand on the
market. This demand has no organic limits on itself, neither of the indi-
vidual (whose needs are not natural, but cultural), nor of the state (pro-
duction is oriented to the world market, not to the state organism).
The internal immoderation of the production systems rationality,
i. e., the rationality of Understanding 206, leads to a second fundamental
objection against the Corporation: Any attempt to understand the labor
community immediately as a moral community, in accordance with con-
temporary business ethics207, neither does justice to morality, nor to the
rationality of the production system. A company selects people because
of their professional qualities, and enters into a contract with them
that is principally redeemable. In that sense, the employee is not a
moral individual. In the other way around, the moral individual does
not derive the norms and values in which he expresses his subjectivity
from the particularity of a production branch.
At the end, Hegels reduction (making the economic domain absolute
at the cost of ethical immediacy), is caused by a methodological demar-
206 The rationality of Understanding exists of the endless repetition of analysis and
synthesis without inner unity.
207 P. Ulrich, Ch. Sasarin, Facing Public Interests. The Ethical Challenge to Business
Policy and Corporate Communications.
The revised concept of Culture in Civil Society 193
cation. In the Philosophy of Right, he only discusses the objective Spirit,

not the absolute Spirit. Only at the end of the Philosophy of Right is the
absolute Spirit in sight because, at the level of world history, it is when
the transition from objective to absolute Spirit is performed. Therefore,
in the Philosophy of Right, the concept of conscience is not determined
as a relation to the absolute Spirit (as is the case in the Phenomenology
of Spirit).208 In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explicitly distinguishes
the conscience that he develops at the level of Morality from the religious
conscience. The demand of the moral conscience is to actualize the general
good, a duty that can be accomplished by participation in the institutions
of ethical life. The duty of the religious conscience is to actualize the ab-
solute good. This duty transcends objective Spirit and is not thematized in
the Philosophy of Right.
It is precisely this limited concept of conscience that prevents the ad-
equate examination of subjective freedom. The welfare and the good that
are under discussion at the level of civil society are only the welfare and the
good that can be objectified in the socialized production system. Welfare
is not thematized as the appearance of the subjective norms and values in
which subjective freedom expresses itself; the good is not thematized as
the historical appearance of the absolute good. In the next sections, we
will see that this is only possible when the Philosophy of Right is rewritten,
departing from the concept of conscience that is developed in the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, i. e., from a position in which the religious con-
science is not excluded.
The revised concept of Culture in Civil Society

The revised process of culture at the level of civil society, starts from real
individuals, i. e., conscientious individuals, who want to realize their sec-
ond self. Once again, the individuals relate to one another in the institu-
tional form of the Contract: They recognize one another as free and equal
persons, and they actualize this recognition by the exchange of commod-
ities. Once again, the individuals are also moral subjects who want to ac-
tualize their welfare. But in this revised version of the process of culture,
this welfare is not discussed in terms of natural needs that have to be so-
208 Maybe we have to make an exception for the conscience of the Monarch, see
Chapter 9.
cialized. The initial determination of the welfare has to do with the im-
mediate ethical life of the family.
Later on, it shall become clear that the ethical life of the family can be
understood as the objectification of the shared subjective norms and val-
ues of the marriage partners who have constituted the family. The process
of culture, however, does not start from the position of these marriage
partners, but from the position of their grown up children. As we have
witnessed in Chapter 7, these children have experienced that these
norms and values are contingent, i. e., different from the norms and val-
ues of other families. For the time being, however, this does not mean
that the grown up children dissociate themselves from these norms and
values. Although they know that they are contingent, they have, for the
moment, no reason to adopt other norms and values than those of
their original family. Therefore, they consider these norms and values
as their own ones, and if they have the intention to actualize their sub-
jective welfare, they want to recognize these norms and values in the ob-
jective world.
As in the Philosophy of Right, the revised process of culture begins
with the repetition of the stages of observing Reason and, more particular-
ly, with the relation forms of Consciousness and Self-consciousness in the
form of observing Reason. Therefore, the initial situation of the process
of culture can be characterized as the grown up children who want to ac-
tualize their subjective welfare immediately: They want to recognize the
norms and values of their original family in the commodities they find at
the market, i. e., they expect that these commodities immediately corre-
spond to their family life. The commodities must be able to satisfy the
needs that belong to the immediate ethical life of their families (cf.
Sense-Certainty).
The commodities on the market, however, have general exchange
value, i. e., they can satisfy the needs of some families, but not necessarily
the needs of all of them. Therefore, for the grownup children, the objec-
tivity of the commodities on the market falls apart in use-values and ex-
change-values, i. e., in commodities that canand those that cannotsatis-
fy their subjective welfare (cf. Perception). It depends, from the familys
point of view, on whether or not the objective world actualizes its subjec-
tive welfare.
The grownup children can restore the unity of the commodity when
they succeed in bringing together the two points of view. The exchange
value of the commodity is no objectivistic quality beside the use-value,
but is intrinsically intertwined with the use-value: exchange-value has
to be understood as use-value as such. Exchange-value and use-value are

related as essence and appearance. The commodity has a general value on
the market (exchange-value); but it can only have this exchange-value
when this exchange-value is expressed in some (specific) use-value.209
Without use-value, the commodity has no exchange-value. Therefore,
at this level, the grownup child (as moral subject), is related to the com-
modity, like Understanding is related to nature: Objectivity is conceived
of as a supra-sensual force (cf. exchange-value) that is expressed in the
sensual manifestations of the force (cf. use-value). Since, however, the
value of the commodity (both exchange-value and use-value) depends
on the evaluating person, the commodity has its unity in the evaluating
person. It is the grownup children themselves who, as family members,
decide whether the commodities have value at all. According to them,
the commodities in themselves, i. e., as objective entities, have no intrin-
sic value.
After having repeated the stages of Consciousness (in the form of ob-
serving Reason), the grown up child (as moral subject) repeats the stages of
Self-consciousness (in the form of observing Reason). Insofar as the com-
modities are properties that are exchanged on the market by free and
equal persons, they belong to a world that is inessential for the grownup
children. In the public domain of the market, the commodities have ex-
change-value. This exchange-value, however, is factually determined at
the market, i. e., it is uncoupled from the validating activity of the grown-
up child. Therefore, from an outside (objective) perspective, reality falls
apart in two domains: the private domain of the family and the public
domain of the market. From the inside perspective of the grownup
child, however, the public domain of the market is inessential. For the
grownup child, the commodities have only value as a result of his own
validating activities. Since the commodities on the market have an ex-
change-value that is independent from his validating activity, they are in-
different to them; in fact, they are non-existent. Therefore, the grownup
child can imagine himself to be an autonomous self-consciousness who
produces a world by his autonomous validating activities (cf. the pure
self ).
The alleged autonomy, however, is disrupted at the moment that the
family requires the commodities of the market to satisfy its needs. Then,
it is confronted with a strange objectivity that it cannot neglect. The fam-
209 Of course the relation between use-value and exchange-value is not determined in
a Marxist way.
ily can overcome this strange objectivity when it is able to buy (or acquire
by exchange), the commodities that can satisfy its needs (because they
have, inside the framework of the family use-value). But in this case,
the strange objectivity will sooner or later return when the family
needs other commodities from the market. It seems that this return
can be prevented when the satisfaction of needs is structurally mediated
by the market, i. e., under the conditions of a fully developed free market:
capitalism.
In a fully developed free market, the production process is no longer
centered in the family, but in organizational units (factories) whose work-
ers are gathered by mediation of the market. Therefore, the family can no
longer exchange its surplus products, i. e., the products it does not need
for its own consumption. The only products of the family are the family
members themselves. The only commodity it can exchange is the labor
force of the family members. So, the family sells the labor force of the
family members and buys the commodities that can satisfy the needs
of the family. The labor force is bought by the factories that produce
commodities for the market, i. e., commodities that have to be sold to
the families. Under these conditions, the commodities on the market
have become a moment in the consumption process of the families.
They have lost their strange objectivity because they are produced to
be sold at the market, i. e., in the end they are produced for the consump-
tion of the families.210
Even under the conditions of a fully developed market, however, the
autonomy of the family members cannot be completely restored. One the
one hand, the immediate ethical life of the family can generate needs that
do not correspond to commodities that are supplied by the market; on
the other hand, it can be the case that the family cannot afford to buy
the commodities of the market. The question is how the demand in
the private domain of the family can be geared to the supply in the public
domain of the market.
Insofar as the family members sell their labor force to the factories,
they enter a labor process in which they repeat the lordship/bondsman re-
lation in the form of observing Reason. They serve their lord, i. e., the
organizer of the labor process, by performing the tasks that are demanded
by the labor process. Once again, this labor process is involved in the dy-
namics of the free market. These dynamics result in a development of the
210 The endless repetition of the exchange process in order to restore autonomy
matches with the relation form of Desire (in the form of observing Reason).
labor process (new products, ongoing division of labor, new technolo-

gies), and a cultivation of the workers. The process of cultivation, how-
ever, differs fundamentally from the process of culture as it is elaborated
in the Philosophy of Right.
The central difference is that the process of culture can never lead to
the complete socialization of the worker. Although his mind and body
can be better and better trained to accomplish the job, although the
job may become more and more specialized, under all circumstances
the worker remains a moral individual. The cultivation results in better
practical skills and better insight into the objective nature of the labor
process, but the worker will never coincide with his labor activities.
The cultivation, rather, creates the possibility to make a distinction be-
tween the subjective norms and values of the family and the objective
world of labor. While the subjective norms and values of the family
are originally completely immersed in the labor process within the family,
the differentiation between the family and the labor process,211 also ena-
bles the worker to differentiate between his subjective norms and values
and the normative demands of labor itself. The more the labor process is
objectified in machines and labor division, the more insight the worker
can develop into the pure identity of his subjective norms and values.
Once again the process of culture prepares the individuals to live
under the conditions of the Administration of Justice. They learn what
it means to act according to rules that have an inter-subjective validity.
After all, the culture in the labor process finishes the education of the
grown up children. Thanks to the process of culture, they have the ability
to act as real persons, i. e., to actualize their freedom and equality because
they observe the rule of law that is equal for everybody. In contrast to the
Philosophy of Right, however, the process of culture does not solve the
problem of how to harmonize the demand of the families and the supply
of the market. The socialization of the worker in the labor process does
not imply at all that that the needs of the families are also socialized. By
becoming aware of the subjectivity of the family norms and values, the
individuals understand that the needs of the family are subjective. Al-
though these subjective needs can only be satisfied by mediation of the
market, this does not mean that the market can satisfy all subjective
needs. The problem is not so much that the market would not be able
to respond to the diversity of the family needs because the supply on
the market is qualitatively and quantitatively limited. New demand gen-
211 Vs. Habermas, no separation between labor and interaction, cf. footnote 55.
erates new supply. The problem is, rather, whether the families have
enough money to effectuate their demand on the market. In other
words, can the families satisfy their needs with the money that they re-
ceive in exchange for their labor force? Has the production system the
ability to actualize the good life, i. e., can it satisfy the needs of all indi-
viduals?
The free market and the exclusion of individuals

As long as it remains accidental whether the individual can or cannot sell
his labor force on the market, it is clear that the actualization of the good
life cannot be guaranteed. For the individuals who fail in finding a job,
the objective world remains a hostile world in which they cannot recog-
nize themselves.212 The market reduces them to a commodity without
value. Therefore, also in the revised version of the civil society, the tran-
sition to the relation forms of active Reason has to be made, to begin
with, to the first moment, Pleasure and Necessity.
As in the Philosophy of Right, this moment gets shape in the institu-
tion of the Police, that must safeguard that all individuals will at least have
the chance to participate in the market. It is up to the individuals them-
selves to take their chances, i. e., the pleasure to actualize their welfare.
But this time, the failure of the Police has nothing to do with the mech-
anization of labor, as is the argument in the Philosophy of Right. The
problem is not that some individuals can only supply unskilled labor
while it is cheaper to replace unskilled labor by machines. Labor that is
purely mechanical cannot be accepted in a free society, because it reduces
individuals to things. The point is not that all forms of simple labor must
be banned, but rather that in those cases in which unskilled labor is per-
formed, the workers may not be reduced to things. They are not only per-
sons on the market, but also in the labor process: By doing their unskilled
job they remain colleagues who have to be respected as persons. This has
consequences for the value of their labor force. This value cannot be
equated with the costs of replacing machines. All workers, included the
unskilled workers, are persons and moral subjects. Therefore, they
must earn enough to actualize their welfare. If it is cheaper to leave the
unskilled labor to the machines, unskilled labor is simply no option for
212 Cf. Der Geist ist ein Knochen, the being of Spirit is a bone. (208).
The market and the moral subject 199
persons. To find a job, the unskilled persons must be schooled in other

professions.
But, even if the unskilled labor is eliminated by machines and the Po-
lice offer adequate opportunities for training and retraining, the free mar-
ket cannot guarantee an acceptable job for all, because the criteria for
what is acceptable are contradictory. On the one hand, an acceptable
job must guarantee an income that permits the actualization of the per-
sons welfare, and on the other hand, the market determines the incomes
according the law of supply and demand. The criteria of the market are
normally not compatible with moral criteria for welfare: the moral crite-
ria are not deduced from the market, but from the norms and values of
the family. From the incompatibility of criteria it does not follow that
civil society is not rich enough for all; not only because, even if some
are excluded, the criteria remain incompatible, but also because the par-
ticipation of all is the basic principle of a society in which all are free and
equal persons. An acceptable job for all is, so to speak, the basic demand
that the market has to satisfy. The conclusion concerning the contradict-
ing criteria can only be that the mechanism of the market is not sufficient
to solve the problem, i. e., how to conceive of a civil society in which a
multitude of moral subjects can actualize their welfare.
The market and the moral subject

The moral subject that wants to actualize his welfare on the market seems
to be in an underdog position. He has learnt that the norms and values
from his original family are contingent and subjective. So, which weapons
has he to defend them against the objective power that is exercised by the
law of the market? Only if the subjectivity of these norms and values can
be overcome does it seem to be possible to resist the pressure of the mar-
ket. The anxiety concerning the survival of the norms and values, how-
ever, is premature. After all we have seen that the embodiment of the sec-
ond self starts from the conscientious self that knows that it objectifies itself
in the form of the second self. Therefore, the subjective norms and values
have an absolute ground in the conscience of the individual. But until
now, the grownup children are not aware of this absolute ground. There-
fore, we have to elaborate the institutional learning process in which the
grownup children can discover this absolute ground.
The public domain of the free market is not only the domain of eco-
nomic exchange, but also the domain in which the individuals are in-
volved with one another as moral subjects. More particularly, there can
be, for example, public discussions about subjective norms and values,
or the individuals can inform themselves about the norms and values
of the others by mass-media, movies, books, etc. This confrontation
can have effects of several kinds. The individuals can conclude that the
multitude of norms and values puts them all in perspective, so that, in
fact, it is irrelevant in which norms and values the individuals express
their subjectivity. This kind of relativism, however, would not only con-
tradict freedom itself (we have seen that the moral dimension is a neces-
sary moment of freedom), but also cannot explain the social reality of the
individuals: If they live in a world that is characterized by a multitude of
subjective norms and values, it must be clear how this multitude can be
reproduced. Therefore, in the end, only two other possible reactions are
meaningful. On the one hand, the individual can experience that the
norms and values of his original family are indeed also his own. On
the other hand, he can discover that the norms and values that express
his subjectivity are different, and identify them as the norms and values
he is confronted with in civil society. In both cases, the norms and values
lose, from the perspective of the individual, their contingent status. If the
individual is convinced that the norms and values express his own subjec-
tivity, he understand them as the appearance of his absolute essence, i. e.,
he understands them as the manifestation of his conscience.
To get its social meaning, the new conviction of the individual has to
be institutionally objectified. The individual must express his subjective
norms and values in the family organism, i. e., the grownup child must
marry and create his own family. The marriage, however, cannot be the
marriage as it is conceived of in the Philosophy of Right. We have seen
that the gender roles in this conception do not leave room for subjective
norms and values. In these gender roles, a specific tradition is made ab-
solute. If, however, the complementary gender roles are given up and
both partners are themselves already complete moral subjects, the prob-
lem has to be solved as to how it is still possible to think of a lifelong re-
lationship between partners.
Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership

If the complementary role division between man and woman is given up
and if one tries to think of a relationship between complete individuals, a
new problem immediately arises. Why should individuals, who are com-
Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership 201
plete in themselves, share a subjective identity? Would there be any rea-

son for the individual to constitute a household together with another in-
dividual? Could the general conditions be met for the maintenance of an
institution which has, amongst other things, the task to raise and educate
children?
At first glance, a relationship between partners who are not comple-
mentary seems to be contradictory. If a relationship between partners im-
plies a shared subjective identity, it must be possible to conceptualise this
identity as an harmonious unity. How is this harmony thinkable if the
participating partners are not complementary? There is only one alterna-
tive. The love of the partner must not concern the other in his specific
gender role, but the other individual as such. In that case, the partners ex-
perience a full openness for one another. Their relationship is not dialec-
tical in the sense that the identity of the partner has a meaning that is
only relative to his own identity. The identity of the other partner be-
comes meaningful in itself. The shared identity with the partner is con-
stituted, so to say, by suspending his own identity. The one partner makes
the identity of the other partner his own. The asymmetry of this kind of
relationship can be avoided if both partners perform the same movement,
i. e., if both partners make the other partners identity their own.
This alternative of totally sacrificing ones own identity may seem
rather unrealistic. But I think that the alternative gives an adequate de-
scription of two individuals who have fallen in love. If I am in love,
the loved one, in the first place, is not a woman or man, but an irreplace-
able, unique individual. I will be obsessed by the loved one and not be
able to keep her out of my mind. Moreover, I will be prepared to please
her in all possible ways. For me, the loved one would be the centre of the
world.
The question is however, whether love has any objectivity.213 Is it not
the saying that love makes one blind? What can be the meaning of appro-
213 This problem cannot be solved by institutionalizing the partner relationship in

marriage, as R.Winfield seems to think: By itself, however, lovers concern
and sharing remains purely contingent upon personal feeling, whose own dura-
bility is itself accidental. Marriage, on the other hand, upholds the rights and du-
ties of spouses even when their passion has lapsed. (R. Winfield, The just Family,
New York, 1998, p. 84) The question is that, even if the passion has lapsed, the
partners must still want to join immediately together in their unique individu-
ality. (p. 82) If passion has lapsed, the way Winfield characterizes the positive
freedom of marriage no longer holds: Accordingly, marriage can be said to con-
tribute a positive freedom in which the immediacy of romantic love becomes
priating the partners identity if there is no adequate knowledge of it? Is it

possible at all to have complete knowledge of a unique identity? Does it
ever make sense to assume that one knows his own identity, let alone the
identity of another person? Although all pretended absolute insight in an
individual identity must be refuted, the lover necessarily has a notion of
the beloveds identity. This notion, however, must not be understood as
an intellectual insight, but rather as the experience of beauty. For the
lover, the beauty of the partner is the representation of the partners ab-
solute identity. In the experience of beauty he feels the totality of the per-
sonality which he wants to make his own.
To speak about beauty as the representation of an absolute identity
corresponds to Hegels concept of beauty. According to Hegel, in beauty
the absolute appears in the form of the sensible.214 The experience of
beauty can be interpreted as the intuition of the absolute. At the same
time, however, beauty is only a representation of the absolute, and is
in no way the concrete realisation of it. The experience of beauty, for ex-
ample, has a subjective dimension: Both partners have their own repre-
sentation. Although this subjective dimension may be considered as a
shortcoming, it is the only way to do justice to the absoluteness of the
individual identity. Simply because beauty is a subjective image of an ab-
solute identity, it can tolerate the existence of an alternative image of the
absolute identity, namely the image the partner has.
Besides the advantage just mentioned, the subjectivity of the repre-
sentation of the absolute identity also has a disadvantage. This comes
to the fore when the beauty of the partner withers and it loses its
magic power. This explicates that the alleged absolute identity of the part-
ner is dependent on the identity of the lover. The partners absolute iden-
tity is only real when (in the form of her beauty), it is experienced by the
other partner. This may seem to be the end of the absoluteness of the
identity. But in fact, the absoluteness of the identity now turns to the
other partner. The awareness that the absolute love for the partner was
a subjective interpretation does not undermine the absoluteness of the
feeling of being in love. If, however, the beloved partner no longer is iden-
tified as the source of love, the lover himself remains left as the only al-
ternative source. Therefore, the former lover understands that only an in-
mediated by an objective bond, formally recognized by spouses and outsiders
alike to empower spouses with juridical entitlements that are not simply expres-
sions of the passions of individuals. (p.85) Romantic love that has lapsed cannot
be mediated by an objective bond.
214 G.W.F. Hegel, sthetik, p. 179 (Stuttgart).
Moral subjectivity and lifelong partnership 203
dividual who has an absolute identity can fall in love. Only an individual
who already owns an absolute identity can absolutely make his partners
identity his own. In accordance with Hegel, I will refer to this absolute
identity as conscience. (Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 382) Let us consider
the new situation in which the magic power of love has collapsed, and the
partners are pushed back into the intimacy of their conscience. The at-
tempt to comprehend the shared identity in terms of the receptiveness
for the beauty of the partner has failed. Once again, the partners appear
in complete isolation, delivered to the mystery of their private conscience.
Yet the introversion of the private conscience cannot be accepted. If con-
science stands for the absoluteness of ones identity, it must overcome its
one-sided subjective status. An identity which has no real existence, can-
not be maintained as an absolute one.215
From the inside perspective, the real existence of the absolute identity
seems not to be problematic. The individual who claims to know his ab-
solute identity evidently will act in accordance with his insight. There-
fore, he will claim that the actions in which his existence is real, expresses
his conscience. From the outside perspective, however, things are differ-
ent, because the immediate unity between conscience and the expression
of conscience in actions has no validity. The external observer is confront-
ed with a multitude of actions, and must ask himself which actions are
expressing the others conscience. Is, for instance, the other expressing
his identity by walking? Therefore, the subjective conviction to express
his own identity by subjective action only makes objective sense if the
conviction is acknowledged by others. In this way, the first step can be
made to restore the identity, which is shared by both partners. In the mu-
tual acknowledgement by both partners that the conviction is right that
the subjective actions express the absolute subjective identity, they enable
one another to give their claim for an absolute identity some objectivity,
namely as the claim which is inter-subjectively shared. (Cf. the transition
from Consciousness in to Self-consciousness)
Even in case of a shared claim, however, it remains unclear where the
content of this claim comes from, and on what grounds the reached con-
sensus is based. If, for instance, identity is physically determined because
the individual decides to express the most intimate subjective feelings, du-
215 In the following paragraphs, I interpret the dialectics of Morality (Phenomenol-

ogy of Spirit) in the light of the partner relationship of man and woman. As is
discussed in Chapter 6, this dialectics repeats Consciousness, Self-Consciousness
and Unhappy Consciousness.
rable consensus is impossible. The one partner has to indicate which feel-
ings express his identity. But each time the other partner thinks he knows
the relevant feelings, it can be too late, because the feelings have already
changed. It is impossible to deduce an absolute identity from a multitude
of feelings. All synthesis of feelings into a unity can only be provisional.
Therefore, the partners can only maintain their absolute identity if they
assume that it has a spiritual origin. (Cf. Desire)
As a consequence, subjective identity should be understood as free
self-determination, which surpasses its subjective status because it is ac-
knowledged as free self-expression. But even then the absolute subjective
identity is not safeguarded. Once again, subjective identity appears as de-
pendent on (mutual) recognition, i. e., consensus. The progress which has
been made consists of the demand that not only the that of consciences
conviction, but also the what of its spiritual content must be recognized
by the partner. But as long as recognition only has an inter-subjective sta-
tus, it still remains unclear what is the objective ground of the consensus
between the partners and, in connection to this omission, whether the
consensus is more than a temporary one. The subjective identity has ex-
istence as long as, and as far as, the mutual recognition actually is ex-
pressed. In that sense, the subjective identity is dependent on time-spatial
activities, i. e., on speech-acts. (Cf. Stoicism) This dependency excludes its
absoluteness.
The conclusion seems to be justified that the idea of an absolute sub-
jective identity must be dropped. The acts which mediate its existence, at
the same time deprive it of its absoluteness. Only one escape is possible.
The partners must realise that their subjective identity, i. e., the identity
which makes them soul mates for one another, has already been given
all the time. (Cf. the transition to the Unhappy Consciousness)
Real action is not oriented to the constitution of an absolute identity,
but on the striving for knowing the absolute identity. This learning proc-
ess is embedded in a practical relationship in which the partners, as mu-
tual lovers, are already involved all the time. The choice of the partners to
form one shared subjective identity does not create the soulmateship, but
can, at best, formalize the soulmateship which already existed all the time.
The choice for one shared subjective identity is divided in itself. By their
choice, the partners do not become one individual, but they are express-
ing that the process of developing insight into their subjective identity
cannot be performed without the partner. The appropriation of ones
subjective identity is the ongoing striving for clarifying ones life history.
On the one hand, this clarification presupposes that the own life has been
The market and the good life 205
already been lived all the time (including the participation in civil soci-
ety), and, on the other hand, it presupposes that the recognition by the
partner is looked for. Of course, the acknowledgement of an interpreta-
tion by the partner is not the criterion of its truth. Yet, it can be main-
tained that without this acknowledgement the interpretation cannot be
true. The objectivity of the own subjective identity can only be known,
insofar as it is continuously expressing itself in the relationship with
the partner. Mortal men are not able to have absolute knowledge of
their absolute subjective identity. But the continuity of the relationship
with the life partner, and the associated acknowledgement of the attempt
of interpreting the own life history, can be a hint for the truth of this in-
terpretation.
The market and the good life

If the existence of the many families, having their own subjective norms
and values, is guaranteed, the problem has to be solved as to how the fam-
ilies can live together in one society. Insofar as the welfare of all families
can be actualized, the society objectifies the good life. Since the actuali-
zation of the good life is mediated by the market, the definition of the
good life can be considered as a normative standard for the functioning
of the market. The market must not only produce all commodities
that are needed to satisfy the needs of all families, but also take care
that all families have an income that allows them to buy what is needed
for the satisfaction of their welfare. We have already observed that the
normative standard for the market cannot be deduced from the law of
the market itself. The norms and values of the families are independent
from the market. It is neither the market that constitutes the unity of the
many families, nor is the market the material base for the unity of the
good life. Therefore, the transition to the good life cannot be made at the
level of the System of Needs as it is laid down in the Philosophy of Right. In
this work, the norms and values of the family are replaced by the norms
and values of the second family (the Corporation), i. e., replaced by norms
and values that are deduced from the production system. This under-
mines the independence of the domain of the family. Moreover, the de-
velopment of the Philosophy of Right assumes that the Corporations are
part of the organic unity of the production system, i. e., it assumes
that the unity of the good life (that is explicitly discussed at the level
of the state), is preceded (at the level of civil society), by the material
unity of the production system (the Verstandesstaat216). The produc-

tion system of modern society, however, produces for the world market.
This means that the production system, out of itself, has no unity that
precedes the good life as it is defined at state level. Nor are the branches
in the production system organically linked to one another. If somewhere
in the world new demand is created, then, in principal, new branches can
be developed without limitations prescribed by the market system.
The normative standards for the production system must in some
way or another be deduced from the norms and values of the families.
This, however, is only possible when a number of mediations can be per-
formed. On the one hand, it must become clear how the multitude of
norms and values of the distinct families can brought together in an en-
compassing system of norms and values. On the other hand, it must be
understood how the norms and values are related to the production sys-
tem.
It is evident that the norms and values of the distinct families are re-
stricted by the modern production system: Only those norms and values
are permissible that respect the separation between the private domain of
the family and the public domain of the System of Needs. 217 But the at-
tempt to bring the various norms and values of the families together,
can initially be performed apart from the System of Needs. Although, in
principle, each family can have its own norms and values, in reality
many families will share its norms and values with other families. There-
fore, it is possible to divide civil society into groups of families that share
norms and values.218 Insofar as these groups are institutionalized in ideo-
logical associations like denominations, cultural organizations, journals,
ideological clubs (humanists, socialists, liberals) etc., the first step has
been made to transform the various norms and values in an encompassing
system: The many families are structured in a limited number of ideolog-
ical associations.219
216 Cf. 183 the state as the Understanding envisages it.

217 In an allusion to Rawls one could say: not all values and norms belong to rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines.
218 Which groups exactly exist and how they emerge in a struggle for recognition
has to be observed by empirical sociology.
219 These ideological associations can, for example, be interpreted as cultural mi-
norities. In this sense, the freedom and equality of the French Revolution has
prepared the contemporary multi-cultural society. Of course, these cultural mi-
norities differ from the national minorities Kymlicka (1995) has in mind
when he writes: On the contrary, national minorities often claim an inherent
The market and the good life 207
The ideological associations can be compared with the Corporations in

the Philosophy of Right, insofar as they have the function to create a
local generality, i. e., a generality that still is distinct from the encom-
passing system. At the same time, the ideological associations are funda-
mentally different from the Corporations because they are disconnected
from the production system. This disconnection is necessary since, on
the one hand, it prevents the family from losing its independence and
being absorbed by production relations, and on the other hand, that
the production is moralized and its rationality is undermined. Moreover,
the ideological associations, unlike the Corporations, are not organically
involved in a coherent system. As a consequence, not only is the number
of ideological associations open, but also the number of participants each
of them can accept: No individuals are excluded, as was in the case of the
Corporations. In the ideological associations the multi-culturality of mod-
ern society is explicitly objectified.
Although the ideological associations exist beside the production sys-
tem, they cannot just leave the production system to itself. From the per-
spective of the ideological association, the concept of the good life can be
determined, namely as the life in which the norms and values of the as-
sociation can be actualized. Therefore, the ideological association can for-
mulate normative standards for the production system. These standards,
however, remain as a moral ought, externally related to the production
system. The ideological association can only formulate a political pro-
gram that elaborates which measures have to be taken to subject the pro-
duction system to its normative standards.
The moral freedom of the associations can only be actualized if their
political program is realized. Since the distinct ideological associations
also have distinct political programs, their programs cannot immediately
be made the program of the state power that unites the ideological asso-
ciations. In some way or another, the distinct political programs must be
mediated to the unity of an encompassing political program. In contem-
porary society, this process of mediation gets its shape in the institutional
framework of political parties.220 A political party can represent the polit-
right to self-government, which they see as pre-dating their incorporation into

the larger state, and as enduring into the infinite future. (p. 142) He mentions
the example of residents of Indian reservations.
220 Cf. Fred. Neuhouser: Thus, liberal critics are clearly right in arguing that He-
gels theory, without going so far as legally to prohibit radical social critique, fails
to recognize it as having a value in the modern world that would warrant its
being specially protected or encouraged, or even thought worthwhile. (p.
ical program of an ideological association. All political parties together

must, in some way or another, determine the encompassing political pro-
gram of the state. In the next chapter we will see how this task is institu-
tionalized in the parliament.
If the moral dimension of labor is determined at state level by medi-
ation of political parties, the production organizations (the companies)
are guarded against an immediate moralization of the production. This
prevents the development of factories and companies that are, for exam-
ple, Catholic, Islamic or Humanist. The companies would be restricted
by ideological demands. As a consequence, the rationality of the free mar-
ket would be undermined. Yet, the moralized production that is implicat-
ed by the Corporations of the Philosophy of Right does justice to an aspect
that cannot be neglected: In the Corporations, the moral dimension of
labor is sustained by the workers themselves. They know that they realize
their own welfare in the Corporations. This evokes the question of
whether a moral dimension of production that is externally imposed by
politics can be effective at all. Can this kind of morality motivate the
workers? Do politics not lack the knowledge that is demanded for the im-
plementation of normative standards in the production process?
The aforementioned problem can be solved when, as in the Philoso-
phy of Right, the branches of the production process participate in the
elaboration of the normative standards insofar as these concern their
own branch. This, however, is only possible when two conditions are ful-
filled. On the one hand, the elaboration of the normative standards must
be mediated by the general normal standards as they are fixed at political
level. On the other hand, the elaboration may not be done by a party of
the market, i. e., individual companies or factories that belong to the
branch. Rather, it must be the responsibility of the branch organization
as such that does not itself operate at the market, and represents all indi-
vidual companies or factories that belong to that branch. Therefore, the
Corporations of the Philosophy of Right can keep their function in the re-
vised civil society if they are interpreted as branch organizations that con-
trol and develop the normative standards of their members.
In the Philosophy of Right, it belongs to the task of the Corporations to
take care of the professional education of its members. In contemporary
society, however, the institutions of education are normally (at least in
Europe), organized by the state (state universities and schools), or by
265). By means of the political parties, it is possible to recognize radical social
critique.
Retrospection 209
ideological associations (for example, Christian universities and schools,

financially supported by the state). It is precisely because these universi-
ties and schools are not common players on the market (their prod-
uct, the output of certified students, is controlled by the state, i. e., by
education authorities), that they are extremely suitable for integrating
normative standards in their education program, i. e., the normative
standards that are formulated at state level. Insofar as the education pro-
grams are specialized in specific professional abilities, the normative di-
mension of the program can be developed in cooperation with the con-
cerned branch organization, i. e., the revised Corporation.
In contrast to the assumption in the Philosophy of Right, employees do
no longer work their whole life in the same enterprise. They may not
even work lifelong in the same branch. If the individuals change their
labor situation, especially with the switch over to a new branch of produc-
tion, they may need complementary education. Insofar as the comple-
mentary education has a normative dimension, it is important that it is
organized again by the universities and schools in cooperation with the
branch organizations.
Retrospection
We have discussed how Hegel develops the Corporation as the institution-
al embodiment of the second self. This embodiment presupposes that the
contradiction between the freedom and equality of the persons and the
uniqueness of the moral subjects is overcome by a process of culture in
the modern production system. The culture of the production system so-
cializes the moral individuals and makes them suitable to participate in
the legal order of a social organism. This social organism is subdivided
in Corporations in which the individuals can actualize their moral partic-
ularity.
We observe that Hegels conception of the embodiment of the second
self does not adequately do justice to the moral subject. Ultimately, he is
sacrificed to the labor system. As an alternative to Hegels concept, I de-
veloped the ideological association. These associations are not mediated
by the culture of the production process, but rather by a learning process
in the public domain of civil society. By mediation of public discussion,
the individuals develop insight into their subjective norms and values.
Mediated by political parties, the ideological associations formulate the
normative framework of the production system, i. e., the shared norms
and values of the good life. In the next chapter, it will be discussed how
the good life is institutionalized in the state, and how the state can be con-
sidered as the embodiment of the third self.
Chapter 9
The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self
Introduction
In this chapter, I will elaborate the institutional actualization of the third
third self (as elaborated at the level of Morality in the Phenomenology of
Spirit), with institutions of our globalized world, and examine which in-
stitutions can be considered as adequate realizations of the third self. To
prepare this attempt, however, I will first go into Hegels attempt in the
Philosophy of Right to elaborate the institutionalization of the third self for
the Nineteenth Century. I will criticize the results of Hegels attempt, the
Nation State (or, what one could call in a variation on Hegel, the third
family). This criticism does not concern the features of the State that typ-
ically seem to belong to the Nineteenth Century, but is again more ele-
mentary. I will show what are the consequences of Hegels confusion at
the level of the family (where he confused natural and ethical immedia-
cy), and at the level of civil society (in which subjective freedom is re-
duced to a subjectivity that is totally socialized). As a consequence, He-
gels concept of State does not meet the criteria for the third self that
Hegel himself has developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For the citi-
zens, the third self seems to coincide with the objective reality of the Mon-
arch. Therefore, their conscience is restricted to its objective appearance
and is not conceived of in its relation to the absolute Spirit. This criticism
will appear helpful for the positive construction of the third self s institu-
tional embodiment.
The development of the third self s embodiment in the

Philosophy of Right: the State
Systematically, the third self has to be conceived of as the adequate unity

of right and morality. Therefore, one would expect that the State is con-
structed as the unity of the third moment of abstract Right (Injustice), and
the third moment of morality (Good and Conscience). To make Injustice a
212 Chapter 9 The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self
moment of the State, however, seems a bit strange. But this becomes un-
derstandable if we call to mind what Hegel meant by Injustice. At the
level of abstract Right, it remained undetermined whether the particular
and the general will were in harmony. Therefore, Injustice could not be
excluded: particular and general will could contradict one another.
That was precisely the reason that the transition to Morality had to be
made: The particular will could not remain undetermined. At the level
of the State, however, the adequate unity of Right and Morality has
been developed. Therefore, the harmony between the particular and gen-
eral will can be guaranteed. As the moment of the State, Injustice is sub-
lated, i. e., the particular and the general will are in harmony. The State is
the particular will who wills the general will as such. The State is an in-
stitutionalized self: the Monarch. The Monarch is the individual who, in
his institutional role as Monarch, wills the general will as such. ( 279).
For the citizens of the State, the Monarch represents the objectifica-
tion of their freedom. The State is the reality of the good life, the actual-
ization of the (general) Good. The conviction that the State is the actual-
ization of the Good is subjectively expressed in the patriotism of the citi-
zens. This patriotism functions as the Conscience of the citizens who are
convinced that this Conscience is actualized in the ethical life of the
State. ( 268) In the relation between the Monarch and the citizen, the
lordship/bondsman relation has got its definitive shape. The citizen acts
in service of the Monarch. But he knows that he, by this service, actual-
izes his own freedom. After all, the Monarch represents the good life: in
his recognition of the Monarch, the citizen recognizes his own freedom.
As representation of the citizens freedom, the Monarch is an individ-
ual who plays, as does the lord, an institutional role. In this institution-
al role, the Monarch is, so to speak, an immortal individual: not only be-
cause the institutional role survives when the Monarch dies, but also be-
cause the monarchy is hereditary, i. e., the reproduction of the monarchal
family guarantees that the monarch is succeeded. ( 280) But, in contrast
to the lord of the initial lordship/bondsman relation, the Monarch is not
only the (institutionalized) symbol of the citizens freedom, but also the
developed reality of this freedom. He is the adequate reality of the
third self and, therefore, the adequate unity of the first and second self.
We have seen that the embodiment of the first self, the family, could
be interpreted as the immediate actualization of freedom. In the family,
the moments of the free person, i. e., generality, particularity and singu-
larity, are actualized in the immediate unity of the family organism: the
gender role of man (moment of generality), and woman (moment of par-
The development of the third self s embodiment 213
ticularity), are unified in the mutual love (moment of singularity). In the

embodiment of the second self, the Corporation, the actualization of free-
dom has become self-conscious. The moment of generality has become
self-conscious as the free and equal person of the free market; the mo-
ment of particularity, as the welfare that is expressed in the commodities
of the market. And, the moment of singularity has become self-conscious
in the unity of both preceding moments: In the Corporation, the free per-
sons have decided to actualize their welfare in cooperation with the other
members of the Corporation. This cooperation is self-conscious in the
mutual respect that the corporation members express to one another as
skilled professionals.
In the Philosophy of Right, the many Corporations are understood as
the organs of a coherent production system. (Verstandesstaat) This
production system is in the service of the good life that, at the level of
civil society, is only a practical unity. It is only at the level of the State
that the unity of the good life is as such intended: the Monarch is the
particular will who wants the good life as such. Therefore, the embodi-
ment of the third self, the Monarch, has to be understood as an institu-
tional whole that is presupposed to the institutions of civil society and
that explicates the unity that remains implicit at the level of civil society.
The institutions of the state (the Constitution, 259) are differentiated in
three powers (273) in which the moments of the Person have their
true existence, i. e., they are not only self-conscious (like the institutions
of civil society), but also explicitly realized as moments of the good lifes
unity.
In the Legislature ( 198 ff.) the moment of generality has its true
existence. It explicitly formulates the laws of the good life as the laws
of the state. The Legislature is the institution that is presupposed to the
Administration of Justice, i. e., to the institution that guarantees the reality
of the free and equal persons. Thanks to the Legislature, the state has a
coherent system of laws that allows the citizens to understand themselves
as the free and equal citizens of the state organism.
In the Executive ( 287 ff.) the moment of particularity has its true
existence. Thanks to the Executive, all actions of ethical life (resulting in
particular existence), are manifestations of the good life. The Executive is
the institution that is presupposed to the system of production (including
Police and Corporations). It not only guarantees, in general, that the pro-
duction of welfare is in harmony with the actualization of freedom, i. e.,
it is a moment of the good life, but also it is particularly responsible for
the well-functioning and coordination of Police and Corporations. More-
over, the Executive is, in some sense, responsible for the Administration of
Justice because it not only contains what we call nowadays the Govern-
ment, but also Jurisdiction, i. e., juridical actions that try to correct nor-
mal actions.
Finally, Legislature and Executive are united in the Crown ( 275 ff.),
the true existence of the moment of singularity. This not only means
that both these powers are intertwined (the Executive is based on the
laws of the Legislature, as is the existence of the Legislature as institution
based on actions of the Executive), but also that they are the moment of
an encompassing power: The Monarch, i. e., the representative of the
Crown, is, as well, President, Leader of the Government and Chief Justice.
Although the good life, as it is objectified in the state, is mediated by
the subjective freedom of the free market, it remains an historical man-
ifestation of freedom. In the language of the Philosophy of Right, the
good life objectifies the Spirit of a People. Therefore, the State does
not seem to be considered as the adequate realization of the third self.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the third self is developed as the consci-
entious individual who is related to the absolute Spirit. The conscientious
individual knows that the actualization of his freedom has a contingent,
historical form. In that sense, the ethical life cannot be the absolute end
and aim of the world ( 129) as it is stated in the Philosophy of Right.
In the Philosophy of Right, this problem is solved by the differentia-
tion between the conscience of the citizens and the conscience of the
Monarch. As conscientious individuals, the citizens are the patriots who
are convinced that it is their duty the observe the laws of the state.
The obedience of this duty coincides with the actualization of their free-
dom. At state level, the moral ought, i. e., the duty to realize the good,
has been completely fulfilled. The Monarch, however, is the conscientious
individual who is aware of the finitude of ethical life. The Monarch can,
so to speak, distinguish between the general good that is actualized in the
state, and the absolute good that principally transcends any historical re-
alization. The Monarch is the conscientious individual who is related to
the absolute Spirit and, therefore, knows that the objective world of
the state is only a finite manifestation of the absolute Spirit.
In the Philosophy of Right, the conscience of the Monarch is men-
tioned in 285: The third moment in the power of the crown concerns
the absolute universality which subsists subjectively in the conscience of
the monarch and objectively in the whole of the constitution and the
laws. Although this formulation makes it dubious whether the Monarch
really transcends the objective world of the state, this transcendence seems
The development of the third self s embodiment 215
to be presupposed in the right to pardon criminals: The right to par-

don criminals arises from the sovereignty of the Monarch, since it is this
alone which is empowered to actualize minds221power of making undone
what has been done and wiping out a crime by forgiving and forgetting
it. ( 282) Moreover, also the majesty of the Monarch seems to indi-
cate his transcendence: The personal majesty of the monarch, on the
other hand, as the final subjectivity of decision, is above all answerability
for acts of government. ( 284)
The transcendence of the state and the relation to the absolute Spirit is
explicitly discussed at the level of International Law (330 ff.) and World
History ( 341 ff.): In the relations between the states, the transition from
objective into absolute Spirit has been made. Therefore, it is at this level
that the conscience of the Monarch can be compared with the conscience
as it is developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The relations between
states are essentially conceived of as relations between the Monarchs of
the states: The states tendency to look abroad lies in the fact that it is
an individual subject. Its relation to other states, therefore, falls to the
power of the crown. ( 329) This means that the relations between states
depend on different wills each of which is sovereign. ( 330) Precisely
because of the sovereignty of these wills, they are free to recognize one
another or to refuse this. If they do recognize one another, their relation
is structured like the beautiful soul, one of the moments of conscience
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. As long as the Monarchs recognize one
another, they can persevere in the illusion of their absolute autonomy.
This autonomy, however, is only real insofar as the Monarchs continue
to express their mutual recognition. When, however, this process is bro-
ken off, the contradiction in which they are involved becomes clear. The
Monarch is autonomous insofar as he has realized himself in the good life
of the state. Also, the other Monarch is autonomous insofar as he has re-
alized himself in the state: But this time it is about another state. There-
fore, the conclusion must be that, insofar as the Monarch has realized
himself in the good life of the state, his autonomy cannot be recognized
by the other Monarch. As expression of the Monarchs conscience, the
states exclude one another: They cannot both be an absolute reality.
The mutual exclusion of states is discussed at the level of world his-
tory. Since there exists no international legal order, the states are related
as in a state of nature ( 333) i. e., when the states do not succeed in
arranging agreements, the ultimate consequence is war. The struggle of
221 In German: Macht des Geistes.

world history, however, has not only a destructive result. Although all
states strive after their own survival, world history can be conceived of
as a process in which freedom is actualized more and more adequately.
This is the cunning of Reason that is active in history, behind the
back of the world leaders. In the cunning of Reason, it is expressed
that it is ultimately the absolute Spirit that manifests itself in world history,
not blind destiny.
In the Philosophy of Right, world history is classified in four Realms:
the Oriental Realm, the Greek Realm, the Roman Realm and the Germanic
Realm. These four realms correspond to the four stages of world history
as they are discussed in the Religion Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spi-
rit 222. Once again, world history is interpreted as a process in which the
absolute Spirit comes to itself in a progressive development of religion
forms. And, once again, these religion forms are attributed to distinct
states in distinct historical periods, i. e., states which are essentially
mono-cultural. In contrast to the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, the
transition to the absolute Spirit is not performed by the conscience of
the individual. Even the Monarchs do not understand that their actions
can be interpreted as manifestations of the absolute Spirit.
Criticizing the state of the Philosophy of Right in the light of

I will abstain from a closer discussion of how the institutions of the state
are elaborated in the Philosophy of Right. It will be sufficient to criticize
the aforementioned main features of the development of the state, in-
spired by the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the next section, this criticism
will be the starting point of an alternative construction of the state. In
the elaboration of the institutions of this revised state, it will be possible
to return to some aspects of the state institutions as they are developed in
the Philosophy of Right.
The central criticism of the concept of state in the Philosophy of Right,
concerns the relation between the citizen and the Monarch. On the one
hand, the citizen has a conscience that, in comparison with the conscience
222 The Religion Chapter distinguishes between the natural religion (that comprises
the Oriental religions), the Greek religion of art developing in the Roman pan-
theon of gods, and the Christian revealed religion that ends in (German) Luther-
anism.
The revision of the citizen and the Monarch 217
of the Phenomenology of Spirit, is reduced: The citizen is a patriot, i. e., he

has the duty to actualize the good life of his state. On the other hand, the
Monarch only represents the actualized good life. It is true that, in some
aspects, the conscience of the Monarch transcends the actualized good
life, but even in this case, conscience is reduced in comparison with
the Phenomenology of Spirit: The conscience of the Monarch is not related
to the absolute good, to the absolute Spirit. The relation to the absolute
Spirit is only practically developed in the process of world history. As
the cunning of Reason, the absolute Spirit manifests itself in world his-
tory.
The reduction of conscience implies that the good life of the state ab-
sorbs, so to speak, the pure self. There is no room for subjective freedom
that transcends the historical actualization of good life.223 Subjective free-
dom remains reduced to the social System of Needs: subjective freedom in
the field of consumption and labor.
At the level of world history, it becomes clear why religion is excluded
from the institutional framework of ethical life. It is obvious that Hegel
presupposes states that are, generally speaking, mono-cultural, i. e., states
in which the citizens share their religion. Therefore, religion becomes
only relevant when the state is transcended at the level of world history.
The revision of the citizen and the Monarch

As in the Philosophy of Right, the embodiment of the third self can be un-
derstood as the relation between citizen and Monarch if citizen and
Monarch are terms that are respectively related to the bondsman
and the lord of the bondsman/lord relation. The citizen/monarch rela-
tion has to be understood as the adequate form of the bondsman/lord re-
lation, i. e., as the adequate unity of right and morality, the adequate
unity of horizontal and vertical recognition. Since we have already seen
(in Chapter 6) that the adequate unity of right and morality coincides
with the adequate unity between objective and absolute Spirit, this last
unity must also characterize the citizen/monarch relation. As in the Phi-
223 I think that Fred. Neuhouser (2000) assigns more self-reflexivity to the social
members than Hegel intends to do: That is, Hegels ideal requires that social
members have a general grasp of the purpose of each of the social spheres to
which they belong, and of how the three principal institutions constitute a com-
plete and coherent whole. (p. 253).
losophy of Right, this is possible when the citizen recognizes the monarch
as a person who represents the social organism in which his freedom is
actualized. Once again, the citizen is understood as the third self, the con-
scientious individual. This time, however, the conscience of the citizen
cannot be identified with his patriotism. As in the Phenomenology of Spi-
rit, the citizen is, as a conscientious individual, related to the absolute Spi-
rit.
For the revised citizen, the social organism of the state that is repre-
sented by the monarch does not coincide with the adequate actualiza-
tion of his conscience. The revised citizen knows that he can actualize
his freedom only in the form of objective Spirit, i. e., as the good life
that is only an historical realization form of the absolute good. The
good life remains distinguished from the absolute Spirit. Therefore, the
monarch is not absolute insofar as he represents the unity of the
good life in which the citizen actualizes his freedom, but rather insofar
as he represents the absolute ground of the states unity, the absolute Spi-
rit.
The monarch who represents the absolute Spirit can be interpreted
as the president of the constitutional state. Insofar as the state organism is
an historical entity, its law is subjected to changes that are especially re-
lated to developments in the domain of civil society. However, insofar
as this law is also legitimized as the embodiment of the third self, it is
also founded in the absolute Spirit, i. e., it has a supra-historical essence.
In our era, we know this supra-historical essence as the so called human
rights, as the absolute moral rights that are attributed to human beings as
such. These are the rights whose conceptions are developed at the level of
the revised abstract Right and the revised Morality. (cf. Chapter 6).
The human rights can get a specific formulation in the Constitution of
the state. This is the first step to actualize the human rights in the objec-
tive world. In the Constitution, the human rights are related to an histor-
ical state organism. The Constitution gives the human rights not only a
positive formulation as the fundamental rights of the Constitution, but
also reconciles them to the normative framework of the positive law
that is valid in an historical state organism.
The president who represents the Constitution plays an institutional
role that is distinguished from his natural existence. Since this institution-
al role expresses that the existence of the state is legitimized by the abso-
lute Spirit, it has the majesty that the Philosophy of Right attributes to the
monarch. The majesty, however, cannot be an argument to make the
function of the president an hereditary one. It is only important that
The revision of the citizen and the Monarch 219
the Constitution guarantees that the function of the president is, under all
circumstances, fulfilled. This could be done by determining the presiden-
cy as a constitutional monarchy. An argument for this solution would be
that it at least becomes clear that it is irrelevant what are the personal
qualities of the president. But it is an illusion to think that an hereditary
president can claim a status that is more absolute than, for example, an
elected president. In both cases, it is the Constitution that determines how
an individual is selected for the presidency. Nature can not only not guar-
antee that a president has offspring (so that constitutional rules are need-
ed to determine who in this case will be the successor), but even when
offspring are available, it is, for example, not a law of nature that the eld-
est son will be the successor224 : The constitution determines which family
relations are relevant.
As the representative of the absolute Spirit, i. e., as the representative
of the Constitution, the president cannot be the leader of the government.
As a finite reality, the good life and its government are distinguished from
the absolute Spirit: they have an independent, contingent existence. Nev-
ertheless, however, the good life is not totally separated from the absolute
Spirit: in its absoluteness the absolute Spirit has to manifest itself in the
good life. As manifestation of the absolute Spirit, the laws that constitute
good life can be considered as contingent appearances of human rights.
Therefore, the Constitution determines that the president has to take
care for the powers that constitute good life. The president is not himself
the leader of these powers, but he has to install them as relative independ-
ent powers. As the absolute ground of the powers of good life, the pres-
ident represents, in the eyes of the citizens, not only the human rights,
but also democracy: By installing the powers of good life that is in ac-
cordance to the human rights, the president guarantees the existence of
a democratic legal order.
In contrast to the Philosophy of Right, the powers of the good life can-
not be identified as, respectively, Legislature, Executive and Crown, but
rather as the trias politica of Montesquieu. Although the state nowadays
also has a legislative power, this power cannot be a moment of the Crown
or the Presidency. As the power that constitutes the framework of the so-
cial organism of the state, it has a relative independency: On the one
hand, the legislative power formulates his laws in correspondence with
224 This was precisely the conflict between Eteokles and Polyneikes: for the Divine
Law they were both son of the king (even twins), who could claim to be his suc-
cessor. For the Human Law, however, only the eldest son has this right.
the Constitution; on the other hand, the laws integrate the developments
at the level of civil society. The second power of the present day state, the
Government, has the same task as the Executive, insofar as the Govern-
ment is responsible for the existence of the institutional framework in
which the laws of the legislative power are actualized. Jurisdiction, how-
ever, does not belong to the task of the Government, but is, rather, the
third power of the social organism of the state. The power of Jurisdiction
guarantees the unity of the state organism as such: It judges whether the
laws of the legislative power are in harmony with the Constitution, and
whether the actions of the Government and the citizens are in harmony
with the laws. Once again, the three powers of the state can be considered
as the institutional objectification of the three moments of the person
(generality, particularity and singularity). But this time, these powers can-
not (like the Monarch) be considered as the absolute end and aim of the
world that is only practically legitimized at the level of world history. The
three powers are embedded in, and legitimized by, the Constitution that is
represented by the President.
In the next section, I will discuss how the conscience of the citizen
can be developed in accordance with the conscience as it is developed
in the Phenomenology of Spirit. After all, the third self of the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit is the presupposition of the revised concept of the state.
The development of the third self as the presupposition of the

revised state
In Chapter 8, we have seen that the cultivated persons can organize them-
selves in ideological associations in which they share subjective norms and
values. If these ideological associations elaborate what these values and
norms imply with respect to the conception of good life, they can be
the base of political parties. Only when all political parties are represented
in the legislative power that determines the legal framework of good life,
does society do justice to subjective freedom. In contemporary states, this
representation is institutionalized in several variations of parliamentary
democracy.
I abstract from the different forms in which democracy gets shape,
and observe that the central point is that all, or at least the most impor-
tant, ideological associations are represented by political parties in the
parliament. The political parties have to rationally discuss the legal frame-
The development of the third self as the presupposition of the revised state 221
work of good life. Insofar as they do not succeed in reaching a rational

consensus, they have to come to a compromise. To guarantee that
these compromises are reached, the parliament commits itself to institu-
tional rules (for example, voting procedures in which the majority deter-
mines the ultimate decision). In this context, however, I am especially in-
terested in the parliament as an institution of education. It plays a central
role in the education of the citizens. Without the parliament, they cannot
develop the conscience as it is discussed in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
The relation between the political parties in the parliament is struc-
tured like the relations between the monarchs, as I discussed in one of
the previous sections. As long as the political parties do not disagree,
they can have the illusion to be totally autonomous. They are the beau-
tiful souls who affirm to one another this alleged autonomy and lose
themselves in the expression of each others excellence. At the moment,
however, that this mutual recognition fades away, they have to face the
reality in which they are situated. They all have their political program
in which their subjective norms and values are actualized. Insofar as
the parties consider their norms and values as the good, they are absolute
and they have to be realized. But insofar as the good is identified as the
actualization of specific (subjectivist) norms and values, it is disputed by
other parties on the basis of other (subjectivist) norms and values, and de-
clines as the (absolute) good.
The contrast between the parties can only be overcome in a learning
process that makes clear that all political programs are historical manifes-
tations of an absolute concept of freedom (as developed in Chapter 6).
This insight makes it possible to be tolerant towards other political pro-
grams. Moreover, the learning process has to elucidate that the political
parties, as members of the parliament, are already functioning all the
time within a legal framework that transcends the specific political con-
ceptions of good life. Therefore, the political process appears, like the
process of world history in the Philosophy of Right, as the manifestation
of the absolute Spirit. In contrast to the Philosophy of Right, however,
where the monarchs were not aware of their relation to the absolute Spirit,
the political parties have explicit insight into the legislative power as a
power that gives a specific historical interpretation of the absolute con-
cept of freedom, i. e., the political parties embody the third self. Since
the learning process of the political parties in the parliament is reflected
in the discussions of the mass media in the public domain, all citizens can
reproduce this learning process and understand themselves as citizens of a
state in which the third self is embodied.
Once the citizens have developed insight into the conscience at state
level, they understand the entirety of their conscience. At the level of the
family, the conscientious individuals actualize their conscience in the
form of immediacy. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the conscientious
marriage partners actualize their conscience by repeating the stages of
Consciousness and Self-consciousness (cf. pp. 106 109). At the level
of the System of Needs, the conscientious individuals actualize their con-
science in the form of mediation. As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the
conscientious persons on the market actualize their conscience by repeat-
ing the stages of observing Reason (cf. 194 196). It is true that we have
presented this stage of the actualization of conscience as a learning process
in which the grownup children acquired insight in the norms and values
of their original family in distinction from the reality of the production
system. But this learning process remains important for the persons who
have founded their own family. In their participation in the System of
Needs, they actualize the norms and values of their family by their specific
supply and demand on the market, and by their specific contribution to
the discussions in civil society. Moreover, they can develop these norms
and values under influence of the confrontation with newly developed
products and services or new ideological positions and opinions. At the
level of the revised Police and Corporation (the ideological Association),
the transition is made to the ultimate form of conscience (as it gets
shape at the level of the state). As in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the
moral subjects actualize their conscience by repeating active Reason. At
the end, they learn at the level of Jurisdiction, that their conscience is re-
lated to the absolute Spirit.
The three domains of ethical life, family, civil society and state, insti-
tutionalize together the complete learning process of conscience in ac-
cordance with the learning process as it is developed in the Phenomenology
of Spirit. As a consequence, in the revised Philosophy of Right, the moral
ought is conserved at the level of ethical life. In the original Philosophy
of Right, the moral ought is overcome because the three moments of the
moral subject (Purpose and Responsibility, Intention and Welfare, Good and
Conscience), are realized at the level of ethical life: In the social organism
of the family, the purpose of the partners is realized so that they are re-
sponsible for their actions; in the social organism of the Corporation,
the intention is realized so that the actions of the Corporations members
serve their welfare; in the social organism of the state, conscience (patrio-
The Government 223
tism) is realized so that the state coincides with good life.225 In the revised
Philosophy of Right, however, Purpose is not absorbed by the social organ-
ism of the family, but remains distinguished from this organism because
it is expressed by the partners insofar as they actualize conscience in the
form of immediacy. Likewise, Intention is not absorbed by the social or-
ganism of the Corporation. Intention appears as the actualization of con-
science in the form of mediation, i. e., as the subjective norms and values
that are explicated in distinction from the production system. Conscience,
finally, is not absorbed by the social organism of the state because it is not
narrowed to patriotism. By the discussions in the parliament and the cor-
responding discussions in the public domain, the citizens learn that the
realized good life is an historical manifestation of the absolute good,
i. e., the tension between conscience and good life is conserved.
The Government
Like the Executive in the Philosophy of Right, the Government is the mo-
ment of state power in which the moment of particularity is objectively
institutionalized, i. e., the Government guarantees that the real actions
of the citizens are performed within the framework of the general laws
as they are determined by the legislative power. The Government, howev-
er, is not only an instrument of the legislative power, i. e., a bureaucracy of
civil servants who only execute what is told by the legislative power, but
also is a relative independent power. Although the Government is depend-
ent on the legislative power, this last power is, in the other way around,
also dependent on the Government. The political parties in the parlia-
ment can try to formulate their conception of good life, based on their
subjective norms and values, and translate this conception in a systematic
system of laws. This system of laws, however, cannot coincide with the
system of law that underlies the States reality of good life. Not only be-
cause the system of law is a compromise between many political parties
(the dominance of one party would contradict subjective freedom), but
225 Nevertheless, I do not think that Peter Steinbergers (1988) conclusion can be
maintained: In this regard, I believe that Hegels intention to view political so-
ciety as an ethical community is emblematic of the degree to which his political
thought is so very different from the superficially similar views of more orthodox
liberals, including Kant himself. (p. 244) The realization of good life in world
history is distinguished from the absolute good. My criticism of Hegel is that
only the philosopher seems to know this distinction, not the citizen himself.
also because of the dynamics of modern society. The dynamics of civil

society results in an ongoing process of differentiation, with respect to
the ideological associations, as well as with respect to the production sys-
tem. Neither these ideological associations, nor the companies of the pro-
duction system form an inner organic unity which the lawgiver could an-
ticipate (as the Corporations in the Philosophy of Right are considered as
organs of a production system). They are part of a global market of
opinions and commodities that can endlessly expand their differentiation.
Therefore, the process of lawgiving needs the continuous input from the
developments in the practical world, i. e., it needs some input from the
Government.
Insofar as good life is realized, it is based on the institutional structure
that has been actualized by the Government according to the existing law
system. The real good life, however, is a dynamic system in which, on the
one hand, the application of the existing legal rules is not a mechanical
process, but rather a process that asks for interpretation and putting pri-
orities. On the other hand, the new development of good life (originating
in civil society) continuously transcends the framework that is foreseen by
the lawgiver, so that the Government can only function when there is
some discretional power. Because of these two reasons, the Government
is a political body that has to formulate an action program that is sus-
tained and controlled by the parliament. Since it is, in the first place,
the Government that is confronted with developments that transcend
the framework of the law, it is obvious that the Government can take
the initiative for the formulation of law proposals, and submit them to
the parliament.
Jurisdiction
In the revised Philosophy of Right, the moment of singularity is not objec-
tified in the power of the President. We have seen that the President rep-
resents the absolute ground of the state, not state power itself. Neverthe-
less, also the revised Philosophy of Right needs a power in which the mo-
ment of singularity is objectively objectified. Since the legislative power in
the Government are relatively independent, their mutual harmony is not
guaranteed, and cannot be guaranteed by one of these two powers: In
that case, they would lose their relative independence. Therefore, the har-
mony can only be safeguarded by a third power, namely Jurisdiction. Ju-
risdiction judges whether the actions in the State are in accordance with
International Law 225
the law. It judges not only the actions of the Government, but also the ac-
tions of the legislative power itself (are the laws in accordance with the
Constitution?), the citizens, the family members and the persons of the
market. The Administration of Law that was already discussed at the
level of civil society, is part of the power of Jurisdiction (in contrast to
the Police that is part of the Government).
International Law
Since the citizens are conscientious individuals who are related to the ab-
solute Spirit, i. e., who know that the state they are living in is only an
historical form of good life, the modern state is not only practically relat-
ed to other states. The citizens know that it is their absolute duty to actu-
alize human rights in the good life of a democratic state. Because this
moral demand concerns all human beings, the citizens are not only relat-
ed to their fellow citizens, but to all. At the same time, however, the citi-
zens know that the moral demand can only be actualized in an historical
state that is distinguished from other states. The awareness of the histor-
ical finiteness of the own state implies an internal relation to other states:
Domestic and international law are intertwined.
Insofar as all states are legitimized by human rights, international law
exists and can made explicit by international treaties in which the human
rights are recognized. By this recognition, the states, at the same time,
recognize one another as equal, i. e., as historical forms of good life.
This mutual recognition of states excludes illegitimate states, i. e., states
in which the human rights are internally violated, or states that do not
recognize all legitimate states as equal.
The possible existence of illegitimate states seems to imply that only
under the condition of a world Government can the actualization of free-
dom be guaranteed. A world Government, however, cannot be defended
on principle grounds. It is true that if a world Government exists, the con-
clusion must be that the world citizens obviously recognize this world
Government as a legitimate state, but this does not mean that the world
Government is the most adequate form to actualize freedom. The exis-
tence of a world Government only factually expresses that there are no il-
legitimate states that can threaten the realization of freedom. But it can-
not principally prevent this threatening. Since the actualized good life is
an historical existence (be it in the form of a world state or in the form of
many states), good life principally exists as a multitude of good lives. In
that sense, a world government will always be an historical accident that

can be overcome. The point is that the adequate realization of freedom
(eternal peace) is only guaranteed if all citizens can participate in a
state that they can recognize as the actualization of good life. Normally
this implies a multitude of states.
If the adequate realization of freedom gets shape in a multitude of
states, institutional mechanisms are presupposed that prevent or over-
come the existence of illegitimate states. In the contemporary world
there were examples of military interventions (called humanitarian inter-
ventions), against regimes that violated human rights. Even if these inter-
ventions are based on mandates of the United Nations, they remain very
problematic. Since no world Government exists, these kinds of actions are
only possible thanks to opportunistic coalitions that evoke the suspicion
that they are, rather, the result of power politics. Moreover, even the
mightiest nation does not have the power to enforce human rights. Inter-
vention makes sense only when it sustains internal, oppositional powers
that can be helped by an internal regime change. Military intervention
to overthrow a dictatorship has to be motivated by the request of a ma-
jority, representing internal opposition to that dictatorship.226
The most important mechanism for the creation of eternal peace has
nothing to do with exceptional situations that ask for military interven-
tion, but rather with the regular international relations that are the result
of the world market. Since, at the national level, the markets function in
the normative framework that is politically defined, the nation states are
inclined to demand that the import products are produced under compa-
rable normative conditions (for example concerning health, labor times,
minimum wages, prohibition of child labor, responsibility for the envi-
ronment, etc.). This may result in a convergence of the normative frame-
works of all states that participate in the world market. Moreover, the
world market can contribute to a convergence of normative frameworks
in a different manner. The world market has created multicultural soci-
eties. Therefore, the process of lawgiving is mediated by more and
more ideological associations and, consequently, different cultural influ-
ences. In this sense, the practical process of world history, the confronta-
tion between mono-cultural states as discussed in the Philosophy of Right,
226 The invasion of Iraq has shown that, even if the protection of human rights had
been the main argument for intervention, an external imposition of a democratic
order makes no sense. A government that is not able to guarantee the lives of its
citizens is not in the position to defend the values of human rights.
The political cooperation between nation states 227
is internalized in the national state and has become a self-conscious proc-

ess.
But the integrating mechanisms of the world market will not be suf-
ficient for the creation of eternal peace. Precisely, the relative independ-
ence of the world market leaves room for developments that escape the
normative political frameworks. Multi-nationals can operate world wide
and try to play the national states off against one another. The immod-
erate expansion of the production process can generate struggles for the
scarce raw materials and energy sources. The burdening of the environ-
ment can undermine the very conditions of existence for all civilized
communities. In their attempt to ward off these problems, the national
states can, as well, identify themselves with some multi-nationals
(which ultimately will lead to war), or politically cooperate. The political
cooperation between the states transcends the mechanisms of the world
market. In the next section, I will discuss the structures of political coop-
eration.
The political cooperation between nation states

The intertwinement between domestic and international law has conse-
quences for the foreign policy of the nation state. Even if an international
power to enforce international law does not exist, the nation state cannot
avoid observing some rules of international law without contradicting it-
self.227 The presupposition of the modern nation state that all human be-
ings have human rights, has a positive and a negative implication for na-
tional policy in its relation to international law. The negative implication
is that national policy may not destroy foreign legal communities, insofar
as they can be considered a specific historical form in which the freedom
of moral persons has been realized. The positive implication is that na-
tional policy must promote the development of free legal communities
when there are human individuals who do not participate in a free
legal community.
The free legal community not only makes those who are outside, to a
certain extent, insiders (because they are recognized as bearers of human
rights), but also makes those who are inside, to a certain extent, outsiders.
227 International law has recognized powers and constraints, and rights and duties,
which transcend the claims of nation-states and which, while they may not be
backed by institutions with coercive powers of enforcement, nonetheless have
far-reaching consequences. (Held, 1996, p.101).
Just because the participants in the legal system are also conscientious in-
dividuals, they do not coincide with their role as legal persons. As consci-
entious individuals, they are also outsiders, critically relating themselves
to the operating conception of the good life. It is because of this outside
position that the free legal community is an open and dynamic society
which must again and again integrate newly developed views: not only
new technological inventions, but also new cultural costumes, originating
from one of its cultural subgroups.
Modern society has to integrate colliding opinions about, for exam-
ple, sexuality, abortion, euthanasia, the relation between state and reli-
gion, the meaning of the public domain, the relation between men and
women. Because of its openness to cultural diversity, the modern nation
state has made the international dimension part of its internal function-
ing. The self-reflexivity of the modern state not only concerns the aware-
ness of being a specific historical state among other states, but also (and
especially), the insight of being involved in an ongoing process of change,
provoking the ongoing necessity for critical discussions about how to
handle these changes. For that reason, national law is not locked in itself,
but is rather open for international dimensions.228
This openness is given shape in international law.229 On the one
hand, nation states may enter into treaties, which give international
courts the competence to review national legislation and jurisprudence
(for example the European Court); on the other hand, they can, with
the help of the UN, intervene in foreign legal communities. The problem
is, however, that the legitimacy of international law remains dependent
on national law.230 Nations can withdraw from international treaties, if
they do not want to accept decisions of international courts concerning
their legislation and jurisprudence.231 And the legitimacy of interventions
228 On the one hand, this international dimension is recognized by Francis Fukuya-
ma (Francis Fukuyama, State Building. Governance and World Order in the Twen-
ty-First Century, Profile Books, 2005, p.154). But he confronts this position with
the idea that the will of the people is the highest authority (ibidem, p.155).
229 This opinion, however, is disqualified by Francis Fukuyama as a European illu-
sion: The problem with the European position is that while such a higher realm
of liberal democratic values might theoretically exist, it is very imperfectly em-
bodied in any given international institution. (Fukuyama, 2005, p.156).
230 The international community is a fiction insofar as any enforcement capabil-
ity depends entirely on the action of individual nation-states. (Fukuyama, 2005,
p.157).
231 Fukuyama gives a couple of examples concerning the United States: Much of
this centered on European charges of American unilateralism on issues like the
in a state which has terminated its UN membership seems to be very du-

bious. Once again, international law seems to have no legitimacy without
the existence of a world state. Nevertheless, I think this conclusion is pre-
mature. We have not only seen that the world state is not a necessary pre-
condition for international law, but also that it is not even its most ade-
quate institutional form.
Essentially the existence of international law is not dependent on the
existence of a world state. As soon as reason is the legitimisation of the
legal order, domestic law can potentially be developed into international
law: the universality of reason can be translated into the universality of
law, i. e., into law without boundaries. If national law is understood as
the expression of universal values (human rights and democracy)232, it
is a small step to recognize other legal systems, which understand them-
selves as the expression of these universal values, as well.233 International
law is created from the moment that the shared universal norms are for-
mulated in a treaty text (like the UN declaration for human rights), and
subscribed to by a number of countries. In that case, international law is
not dependent on the existence of a central world power, but rather on
the explicit self-submission of nation states to the shared universal values.
Under these circumstances international law is not an external power, im-
posed upon the nation states, but rather an objectification of what was
treatment of al-Qaida prisoners in Guantnamo Bay, the American abrogation of

the antiballistic missile treaty, Washingtons failure to join the International
Criminal Court, and, earlier, the Bush administrations announcement that it
was withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. The most serious
rift, however, emerged over Washingtons intention to attack Iraq in order to ef-
fect regime change and eliminate its WMD. (Fukuyama, 2005, p.142).
232 Habermass discourse theory of law is an example of this position. Erst nach die-
ser Weichenstellung kann ich das System der Rechte mit Hilfe des Diskursprin-
zips so begrnden, da klar wird, warum sich private und ffentliche Autonomie,
Menschenrechte und Volkssouvernitt wechselseitig voraussetzen . (Habermas,
1992, p. 111/2). (Only after this preliminary spadework can I ground the sys-
tem of rights with the help of the discourse principle, so that it becomes clear
why private and public autonomy, human rights and popular sovereignty, mutu-
ally presuppose one another., Habermas (1996), p. 84).
233 Of course, this view opposes John Rawlss Fact of Reasonable Pluralism (John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press 2000, p.124). However, if
Rawls remarks that They cannot argue that being in a relation of equality
with other peoples is a western ideal. (p.122), it appears to be possible to
speak about equality independent of the cultural context. In my Das Gesetz
der multikulturellen Gesellschaft (Paul Cobben, 2002, Wrzburg), I develop free-
dom and equality as absolute values, which precede all cultural differences.
already implied in domestic law all the time. The question can be raised
whether this way of institutionalizing international law is the best alter-
native. Can it be argued that the world state is a better solution?
International law, that is not enforced by the power of a world state,
seems to be powerless. If it is not powerless, it seems to be dependent on a
coincidental coalition of states. In that case, particular states would, under
the guise of international law, only strive after their own interests. I think,
however, that the powerlessness of international law does not necessarily
need to be a disadvantage. The powerlessness of international law has a
reverse side. Because international treaties seems to be without enforcea-
ble obligations, they are less affected by the constraints of domestic law,
i. e., they offer more room to the universal, moral point of view.234
Norms for protection of the environment or minorities can correspond
to higher, i. e., more universal standards than would be possible in the
domain of domestic law. In international treaties, nation states can
show their moral superiority without having to be afraid of its practical
consequences. In the end, there is no power to enforce international trea-
ties, even if there are international courts. But, and this is the point I want
to make here, in a mediated way international treaties do have a practical
meaning. They can be an important factor in domestic public discussions,
and ultimately result in an adjustment of domestic law. In this mediated
way, international law can be enforced by particular nation states. The
high moral standard of international law can influence the development
of domestic law. The other way around, the development of domestic law
can influence the development of international law. Because nation states
are becoming more and more globalized and multicultural, international
relations are becoming, as it were, more and more internalized in domes-
tic law. Domestic law has to deal with many cultural groups that have
their own values and norms, and with economic processes which are es-
sentially part of a globalized market. Therefore, the gap between domestic
and international law becomes narrower, so that, as in the EU, domestic
law can become part of a continental law system.
234 For Francis Fukuyama, the lack of enforceable obligations is only a disadvantage:
A great deal of both international and national law coming out of Europe con-
sists of what amounts to social policy wish lists that are completely unenforcea-
ble. Europeans justify these kinds of laws by saying they are expressions of social
objectives; Americans reply, correctly in my view, that such unenforceable aspi-
rations undermine the rule of law itself. (Fukuyama, 2005, p.157).
Domestic and international law are not only interdependent, but can
also strengthen one another. Domestic law can be influenced by the less
restricted moral orientation of international law; international law can
profit from the internalized international law structures of domestic
law. Because of these dialectics between domestic and international law,
the existence of a multitude of nation states in no way contradicts the ex-
istence of international law. Therefore, the world state can be redefined as
the process in which international law is developed in its dialectic relation
to a multitude of domestic law systems.235
235 Instead of this dialectics between domestic and international law, Thomas Pogge
proposes an intermediary position: What I am proposing instead is not the idea
of a centralized world state, which is really a variant of the pre-eminent-state idea.
Rather, the proposal is that governmental authority or sovereignty be widely
dispersed in the vertical dimension. [] Thus, persons should be citizens of, and
govern themselves through, a number of political units of various sizes, without
any one political unit being dominant and thus occupying the traditional role of
the state. (Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, Cambridge, 2004,
p.178) However, these political units must derive their legitimacy from a central
body. I think that this central body can only be identified as the state.
Concluding remarks
We have examined the nature of the self. In Chapter 1, we stated that the
human self cannot be determined by science. Because the human self is
the actor of science, he transcends all scientific objectification. The
human self has a nature that has insight into his nature, i. e., the
human self is self-reflective. Therefore, it is not sufficient to determine
the human self as a natural self (a body) that has also the capacity
for science (i. e., has also a mind), but our definition of the mind/
body-unity must coincide with the self-insight of the human self into
his existence as unity of mind and body.
The first step to develop the adequate conception of the unity of
mind and body has been made by Aristotle. Only when the body is un-
derstood as a social organism can it be prevented that the mind is reduced
to an epiphenomenon of the body; only in the relation between mind
and social organism can both terms of the relation maintain their relative
independency.
The second step to develop the adequate conception of the unity be-
tween mind and body has been made by Hegel. Only when the relation
between mind and social organism is understood as a relation of recogni-
tion is the general freedom of the mind (expressing itself in the law of the
social organism), compatible with the particular freedom of the mind (ex-
pressing itself in the subjective freedom of the individual).
In the relation of recognition, two forms of recognition are com-
bined: on the one hand, the horizontal recognition that makes that the
individuals recognize one another as the free and equal persons of a
shared law; on the other hand, the vertical recognition that makes that
the individuals recognize that their subjective existence has its ground
in an absolute being. Recognition unites the dimensions of right and
morality.
The third step to develop the adequate conception between mind and
body implies the elaboration of the relation of recognition. The horizon-
tal and vertical recognition of right and morality have to be developed
into an institutional entirety in which the free and equal legal persons
are reconciled with the absolute value of the moral subjects. Therefore,
Concluding remarks 233
this institutional entirety guarantees the adequate actualization of democ-

racy and human rights.
In the first part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel develops under
what conditions the social organism has to correspond in order to gener-
ate citizens who can understand this social organism as the unity of right
and morality. This development, however, cannot result in the determi-
nation of a concrete social law. A real social organism remains a contin-
gent reality.
In the second part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presents a
contingent social organism, i. e., the Ancient Greek world, as the social
organism that fulfills the structural conditions of the relation of recogni-
tion. As the unity of the Divine Law and the Human Law, the Greek
world embodies the (immediate) unity of morality and right.
Since the absolute value of the moral subject contradicts the exchan-
geability of the legal person, the immediate unity of right and morality in
the Greek world can only exist as long as the Human and Divine Law re-
main separated, i. e., are assigned to different worlds. The separation be-
tween these worlds, however, cannot be maintained, and the Roman Law
appears as the truth of the Greek world.
The Roman Law represents the world of the first self in which the re-
lation of recognition is one-sidedly actualized. The first self is the legal
person whose actualization as a moral subject remains accidental. Since
the moral subject has an absolute value, this accidentality of is realization
has to be overcome. Historically, the moral subject is done justice during
the French Revolution, when the second self realizes himself in the form of
the absolute freedom. The second self is the moral subject that makes his
moral content the content of the social law. The second self, however, ex-
cludes the others. Therefore, the second self is as much one-sided as the
first self. His attempt to realize himself as a moral subject is incompatible
with the existence of a multitude of legal persons.
The insight into the adequate actualization of recognition results
from the philosophical reflection on the French Revolution by Rousseau,
Kant and Hegel. The adequate actualization of recognition presupposes
the existence of the third self, the conscientious individual. The third
self knows that he cannot immediately realize his moral subjectivity in
the legal order, because this moral subjectivity transcends all historical ob-
jectification. Nevertheless, he can understand the (legitimate) legal order
as a finite (historical) attempt to actualize his moral subjectivity. The
third self can understand the history of states as the ongoing process
that is oriented to a better realization of the moral subject.
234 Concluding remarks
Hegels Philosophy of Right elaborates how the three forms of the self
can be brought together in the institutional framework of the legitimate
social order. This framework enables the individual to repeat the histor-
ical learning process in which the three selves are developed. Therefore,
the institutions that are developed in the Philosophy of Right, in principle,
express the adequate realization of recognition, i. e., the adequate unity of
Right and Morality. In the ethical institutions of family, civil society and
state, the three forms of the human self are, in principle, actualized. He-
gels actual elaboration of the systematic unity of the three selves, howev-
er, has to be criticized. His systematic development remains too much in-
fluenced by European history. The first and second self are not adequate-
ly developed as moments of the third self. As a consequence, the institu-
tions of the Philosophy of Right fail to do sufficient justice to the consci-
entious individual. Hegel, however, offers the conceptual tools for an ad-
equate elaboration of the unity of the three selves. This results in a revised
version of the Philosophy of Right, in which, for example, mono-cultural-
ity, the primacy of economics and the lack of a democratic public domain
are overcome.
The adequate actualization of recognition coincides with the ade-
quate realization of the unity between Right and Morality. This unity ap-
pears in an institutional order in which the three forms of the self get
shape. My thesis is that only an ethical order that does justice to the ad-
equate institutionalization of the three forms of the self can be considered
as a legitimate order, i. e., as a legitimate actualization of human rights
and democracy.
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Axel Honneth, Suffering from Indeterminacy. An Attempt at a Reactualization of
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Walter Jaeschke, Vernunft in der Religion, Stuttgard, 1986.
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Author index
Antigone 73, 78 Kant, Immanuel 2, 6, 12, 19, 21, 53,

Aristophanes 75 57, 100, 103, 119, 124, 133,
Aristotelian 2f. 166f., 184, 223, 233
Aristotle 2, 4, 36, 40f., 232 Kesselring, Thomas 155
Kohlberg, Lawrence 165f.,
Bacchus 67, 70 168170, 172175
Berkeley, Georg 16 Khler, Dietmar 236
Bubner, Rdiger 76 Kojve, Alexandre 9
Kymlicka, Will 206
Ceres 67, 70
Cobben, Paul 167, 229 Locke, John 20
Copernican 21, 53 Luhmann, Niklas 236
Creon 72 Lusordo, Dominico 236
Derrida, Jacques 55 Marx, Karl 11, 45, 181, 183185,

Descartes, Ren 12, 22f., 93, 119 191
Montesquieu, Charles 219
Fraser, Nancy 138
Fukuyama, Francis 228230 Napoleon 101
Neuhouser, Frederick 143, 190, 207,
Habermas, Jrgen 811, 45, 83f., 217
119f., 122, 126, 131, 165175,
197, 229 Patton, Alan 138, 140
Halbig, Christoph 235 Pinkard, Terry 14
Hardimon, Michael 154, 190 Pippin, Robert 15, 19, 41, 43, 47
Heinrichs, Johannes 75 Plato 2
Held, David, 62, 112, 227 Pogge, Thomas 231
Hobbes, Thomas 28f., 34 Polynices 72
Hollak, Jan 33
Homer 71 Quante, Michael 235
Honneth, Axel 7, 9, 116118, 120,
126, 131135, 138, 148, 164 Rawls, John 8f., 11, 119, 171, 206,
Houlgate, Stephen 15, 36, 42, 46, 229
181, 188, 191 Ricardo, David 184
Hume, David 12, 18 Ricoeur, Paul 2
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 6f., 100f.,
Jaeschke, Walter 76 124, 233
Josifovic, Sasa 24, 26, 41 Rzsa, Erzsbet 135, 137
Kain, Philip 14 Sasarin, Ch. 192

Author index 239
Say, Jean-Baptiste 16, 26, 30, 65, 68, Taylor, Charles 1

127, 180, 184, 201, 206 Theunissen, Michael 10f.
Siep, Ludwig 911, 15
Smith, Adam 184 Ulrich, P. 192
Smith, Adam 184f.
Smith, Steven 116 Wildt, Andreas 14, 30, 112
Solon 60 Williams, Robert 2, 9f., 44, 139
Steinberger, Peter 152, 154, 223 Winfield, Richard 201
Zeus 73f., 77
Subject index
Abortion 228 Asymmetry 10, 201

Absoluteness 52, 54, 61f., 67f., 85, Authority 61, 158, 170f., 228, 231
87, 89f., 102, 111, 202204, 219 Autonomy 3, 41, 46, 48f., 77,
Action 2f., 5, 3036, 41, 43, 4548, 8284, 102, 106108, 110, 113,
5153, 5557, 61f., 65, 67, 133, 167f., 177, 189, 195f., 215,
6974, 78f., 82, 84, 89, 94, 221, 229
102f., 106113, 121f., 125, 127,
129, 141, 150, 152f., 157f., Baby 155f.
160162, 166, 169f., 179f., 182,
Basic Trust 159
185f., 203f., 213f., 216, 220,
Beautiful 75
222226, 228
Beauty 70f., 202f.
Communicative Action 10,
Being 5, 10, 12f., 15, 17, 20, 22,
166169, 172174
2428, 31, 36, 3840, 43, 46,
Actualization 6, 50, 82, 107,
4851, 53, 56, 58, 63, 6567, 70,
122125, 127, 131f., 135, 137,
73f., 76f., 8093, 9597,
139142, 144, 146148, 150,
102110, 112f., 124f., 127, 129,
152, 157f., 161, 165, 169, 172,
140, 147, 150, 155f., 160, 169f.,
176178, 180, 186, 188190,
179, 181185, 194, 198, 202,
198f., 205, 211214, 217f.,
207, 228f., 231f.
221223, 225f., 233f.
Divine Being 67f., 91, 128, 130
Administration of Justice 189-191,
193, 201, 217, 218 Human Being 4, 36, 45, 60, 64,
Adulthood 151 90, 106, 119, 125f., 129f., 133,
148, 150, 181, 183, 218, 225, 227
Affection 120, 171
Belief 50, 52, 81, 87, 89, 113, 177,
Affirmation 173, 175
188
Animal 2, 29f., 32, 36, 39f., 43f.,
Birthday 161
57, 67, 127, 130, 150f., 164, 181
Body 15, 1128, 31, 3644, 47f.,
Animal Kingdom 57, 60, 78, 139
52, 58, 60, 62, 6971, 79, 88, 92,
Antiquity 8, 128, 132, 139
99, 103, 105f., 110f., 113,
Antithesis 51, 61, 65, 74, 79, 107
119121, 123127, 130132,
Appearance 21, 30, 41, 48f., 68, 73,
134, 143, 148f., 155157, 197,
76, 78, 85, 95, 105, 132, 135,
224, 231f.
149, 158, 163, 171f., 179, 190,
Breast 156, 169
193, 195, 200, 211, 219
Argumentation 94, 167, 173, 185,
191 Capital 180
Artist 6466, 68, 77, 160 Capitalism 11, 184, 196
Association 109, 207, 209 Care 142, 155, 157, 159, 186188,
Ideological Association 206209, 205, 208, 219
220, 222, 224, 226 Category 69
Subject index 241
Categorical Imperative 53, 103, Unhappy Consciousness 10,

166f., 184 4752, 5860, 62, 6568, 75, 77,
Character 6, 32, 7375, 78f., 153, 81, 8690, 98, 104107, 110,
174, 185, 191 122125, 128, 130, 160, 203f.
Child 173-177, 179, 186, 198 Consensus 11, 166f., 203f., 221
Christ 50, 87f., 90, 98 Constitution 30f., 46, 122, 138,
Christianity 86f. 164, 204, 213f., 218220, 225
Citizen 37, 11, 44, 6062, 64f., Consumption 79, 85, 145, 177,
6871, 77, 79, 86, 96f., 99, 179f., 196, 217
101103, 105f., 116, 122124, Contingence 53, 78, 114, 146,
154, 158f., 162, 177, 211214, 158f., 171, 182
216223, 225f., 231, 233 Contingency 47, 75, 97, 102, 123f.,
Cogito 26, 27, 124 128, 135, 142, 154, 159f.,
Coherence 80, 124, 130, 135 162164
Comedy 74f., 77f., 162 Contract 28f., 140, 145, 176f., 180,
Commodity 44, 178180, 184, 185f., 192f.
194196, 198 Contradiction 11, 13f., 26, 31, 33f.,
Community 11, 14, 62, 67, 75f., 36, 44, 54, 66, 102105, 110f.,
84, 8891, 94, 134, 157, 119, 121, 124, 145, 161, 184,
170172, 182, 186188, 192, 209, 215
223, 228 Conviction 91, 106109, 158f.,
Culture Community 181 161, 200, 203f., 212
Legal Community 83f., 227f. Corporation 8, 139, 176, 178,
Competition 181f., 184 188f., 191f., 205, 207209, 213,
Condition 4, 15, 22, 28, 32, 34f., 222224
37, 41, 52f., 5759, 69f., 82f., Corporeality 24, 62, 110, 113, 120,
85f., 89, 94, 102f., 108, 111, 157, 173
116, 118f., 121, 123, 125f., Criminal 215, 229
130f., 133f., 138, 144, 149, Crown 214f., 219
165167, 171f., 186f., 191, Crusade 67, 88
196f., 201, 208, 225227, 233 Crusader 51, 67, 88
Inter-subjective Condition 137, Cult 68, 72
138 Abstract Cult 67, 161
Precondition 35, 50, 74, 137, Actual Cult 67, 161
138, 233 Culture 1, 11, 14f., 29, 60, 90f.,
Confession 112 9698, 100f., 104, 138f., 154,
Conscience 3, 8, 49, 52, 64, 84, 168, 174, 177f., 180182,
99f., 105112, 115, 125, 128, 184186, 193f., 197, 209
141144, 146f., 187, 193, 199f., Realm of Culture 5, 80f., 8691,
203f., 211f., 214218, 220223 97f., 114, 178181, 186, 188f.
Religious Conscience 8, 143, 193 Custom 69
Consciousness 4f., 10, 14f., 17,
20f., 24, 31, 36, 39, 4143, 46, Daughter 163
4853, 61, 6365, 6775, 77, 81, Death 3, 28f., 31f., 34, 36f.,
8689, 9194, 96, 102108, 3941, 44, 48, 51, 62, 73, 81,
110112, 120, 125, 129f., 155f., 96f., 101, 104, 157f.
159f., 165f., 168175, 178f., Decay 26, 71, 73, 76
194f., 203, 222 Deception 110
242 Subject index
Decision 93, 151f., 189, 215, 221, 6671, 74, 79, 82, 84f., 8796,
228 98, 101, 105108, 110f., 113f.,
Decline 5, 48f., 51, 54, 6365, 73, 121f., 124f., 127130, 142, 144,
7882, 85, 87, 89, 111, 115, 151, 157, 160162, 170, 179f.,
123f., 147, 157, 177, 221 195, 200, 218
Delusion 110 Europe 114, 116, 152, 208, 230
Demand 6, 26, 31, 40, 57, 85, 102, European 14f., 228, 230
134, 136, 142, 144, 146f., 152, European Court 232
158, 161, 166f., 180f., 183185, Euthanasia 228
187, 190193, 196199, 204, Exchange 140, 145f., 152, 167, 172,
206, 208, 222, 225f. 177, 179181, 193196, 198f.
Democracy 8, 44, 148, 219f., 229, Executive 213f., 219f., 223
233f. Experiment 99, 172f.
Dependency 174f., 204
Desire 25f., 51, 88, 92, 107f., 180, Faith 95, 97, 185
196, 204 Fall 33, 46, 66, 81, 86f., 91, 110,
Destiny 82, 101, 159, 162f., 216 160, 163, 194f., 201, 203, 215
Devotion 50, 6668, 90 Family 5, 7f., 48, 6062, 65, 68f.,
Dialectics 14, 50f., 81, 87f., 91f., 7173, 77, 7981, 8890, 97,
98, 178, 203, 231 104, 123f., 132, 138f., 142, 146,
Dialogue 111 150155, 157165, 169172,
Dictator 3336 176f., 180182, 188, 190,
Dictatorship 226 194197, 199201, 205207,
Disappearance of ethical life 154, 211f., 219, 222f., 225, 234
177 Fate 7477
Discourse 2, 119, 166169, 171, Father 74, 89f., 155, 161
229 Fear 33, 61
Practical Discourse 166, 171f. Fear of death 28, 3742, 48, 52,
Discourse Ethics 166, 168, 172 121, 158
Disillusionment 113 Finitude 9, 38, 40, 48, 102, 114,
Dissemblance or Duplicity 103, 105 129, 182, 214
Duty 62, 68, 107111, 141, 146f., Force 18, 20f., 23f., 37f., 53, 65,
170, 193, 214, 217, 225 68, 105, 127, 130, 159, 179f.,
184, 195f., 198
Education 56, 154f., 165, 178, Freedom 2, 68, 40, 44, 46, 55,
182f., 187, 189, 191, 197, 208f., 5865, 68, 71, 75, 77f., 8183,
221 85f., 93, 9698, 100102, 104,
Egyptian 45 113, 115f., 121129, 131,
Embodiment 8, 44, 48, 60, 87f., 90, 136147, 151f., 155159,
98, 150, 159, 164f., 176, 199, 161164, 166, 169f., 172f.,
209213, 217f. 177f., 182186, 188192, 197,
Employee 192, 209 200f., 206f., 209, 212214, 216,
Enlightenment 94f., 188 218, 221, 225227, 229, 232f.
Satisfied Enlightenment 95 Subjective Freedom 2, 86, 96,
Unsatisfied Enlightenment 95 98102, 115, 140, 145f., 148,
Epic 71f., 77, 162, 188 157, 159161, 164f., 172,
Essence 1, 3, 7, 14, 25, 38, 4144, 176178, 189, 191193, 211,
46, 48, 51f., 5458, 6264, 214, 217, 220, 223, 232
Subject index 243
Frenzy of Self-conceit 55, 72, 97, 159162, 165, 169172, 197,

101, 189 201205
Funeral 161 Identity Crisis 163
Illusion 3, 26, 46, 62, 108110, 215,
Generality 79, 150f., 153, 166, 219, 221, 228
180f., 207, 212f., 220 Immediacy 16f., 102, 105, 144,
Generation 152, 172 150, 163f., 176, 182, 190, 192,
Genesis 80f., 83 201, 211, 222f.
Gene-theory 1 Inclination 108
God 5, 4346, 4952, 60, 64, Income 183, 188, 199, 205
6668, 70, 7277, 80, 8791, Individual 3, 5, 7, 10f., 2831,
9497, 113f., 126f., 129f., 3437, 4046, 4854, 5658,
159f., 188, 216 6062, 6873, 7593, 95f., 98,
Good 15, 58, 75, 91, 93, 108f., 103, 106116, 119121,
111113, 126, 130, 134, 125127, 133f., 136139,
141143, 146148, 157, 183, 141144, 146148, 150f., 153,
185f., 192f., 212, 214, 217f., 155, 162, 164, 168, 175, 177,
221, 223, 225 179f., 183, 186193, 197204,
Good and Conscience 141, 211, 207209, 212, 214216, 218f.,
222 222, 225, 227f., 232234
Government 101, 207, 214f., 219f., Moral Individual 11, 44, 5261,
223226 69, 78f., 8385, 8996, 100, 115,
Gravitation 21 119, 141f., 148, 178180, 192,
Greece 60 197, 209
Guardian 158, 169f. Individuality 50, 52, 55f., 6366,
Guild 188 69, 7173, 75, 80, 92, 105, 107f.,
113, 201
Infrastructure 187
Harmony 5f., 27, 48, 53, 63f., 70, Injustice 32, 211f.
72f., 78, 82, 103f., 141, 146f., Insight 1f., 7, 14, 32, 38, 45, 47, 52,
158, 178, 201, 212f., 220, 224 56, 97, 100102, 114, 121123,
Heaven 73f., 96 125f., 131f., 135, 141, 144, 147,
Hero 72, 74, 162 154, 159f., 164f., 167f., 171,
History 14, 36, 49, 87, 114116, 174, 182, 197, 202204, 209,
126, 144, 204f., 216, 233 221f., 228, 232f.
European History 5, 7f., 14f., 48, Pure Insight 9395, 186
100, 102, 132, 134, 149, 234 Institution 5, 7, 11, 34, 59, 79, 89,
World History 115, 137, 143f., 91, 98, 116, 136138, 142f.,
193, 215217, 220f., 223, 226 147150, 152, 163, 176, 180,
Household 155, 179, 201 187f., 190f., 193, 198, 201, 208,
Hunger 156 211, 213f., 216f., 221, 227f.,
Husband 151153 234
Hymn 66f., 73, 160 Intention and Welfare 141, 146,
Hypocrisy 112 176178, 180, 186, 222
Interest 31, 33f., 72, 75, 111, 151,
Identity 5f., 11, 20, 24, 26, 41, 46, 166f., 169, 192, 230
4951, 54f., 64, 91f., 95, 119, Internalization 50, 80, 153
142, 146, 151, 153, 156f., Intervention 226, 228
244 Subject index
Humanitarian Intervention 226 Law of the Heart 55f., 72, 97,

Intimacy 203 101, 141, 189
Law Proposal 224
Jurisdiction 32, 214, 220, 222, 224f. Law System 58, 224, 230f.
Justice 5, 50, 52, 61f., 65, 102, 119, Natural law 53, 57, 121
127, 129, 166f., 171, 185187, Positive Law 187, 218
189, 192, 197, 202, 208f., 213f., Roman Law 5, 46, 79f., 9698,
220, 233f. 100, 102, 104, 113, 139f., 153,
177, 233
Knowledge 2, 10, 14, 16, 31f., 34, Rule of Law 136, 148, 185f.,
38, 40, 46, 49, 90, 113, 146, 197, 230
155f., 192, 202, 208 Legislature 213f., 219
Absolute Knowledge 115, 129, Legitimacy 29, 33, 35, 56, 78, 91,
205 127, 228f., 231
Lethe 73
Labor 5, 11, 29, 41, 43, 4547, Life 8, 1416, 19, 22f., 25f., 28f.,
51f., 56, 68, 72, 121, 127, 137, 31, 36f., 39, 41, 48, 51, 53, 61,
144f., 151f., 180, 182184, 187, 67, 69f., 73f., 80, 96, 116, 134,
190192, 196198, 208f., 217, 146, 150f., 153, 157f., 161f.,
226 164f., 170172, 177, 188, 194,
Child Labor 226 204f., 207, 209
Division of Labor 45, 182184, Ethical Life 710, 76, 97,
197 133135, 137f., 142, 152, 154,
Labor Division 45, 191, 197 164f., 177, 188, 193f., 196,
Labor Organization 45 212214, 217, 222
Labor Process 45, 180, 182, 185, Good Life 5, 133, 186, 188,
191, 196198 191f., 198, 205207, 210,
Unskilled Labor 184f., 191, 198f. 212215, 217221, 223226,
Language 20, 66, 92f., 149, 158, 228
160, 170, 182, 214 Plan of Life 119
Language of Disruption 93, 181 Lord 25, 3949, 51f., 54, 60f., 79,
Language of Flattery 92f., 180 87f., 91f., 97, 101, 103, 105f.,
Law 26, 9, 14, 21, 23, 2837, 41, 108, 111115, 121f., 124f., 127,
43f., 5562, 64, 69f., 72f., 77, 129, 144, 148, 151f., 157f., 161,
85f., 9599, 101105, 113, 116, 180, 186, 196, 212, 217
121124, 127f., 138f., 143, 146, Lord/bondsman relation 4245,
153, 163, 166, 168, 185189, 60, 88, 181
199, 205, 213f., 218220, Loss 49f., 62, 65, 68, 81, 110, 154,
223225, 228233 159
Divine Law 52, 6062, 68, 70, Love 57, 132, 151, 153, 164, 188,
72f., 80f., 89, 97f., 123, 153, 201203, 213
159, 189, 219, 233
Human Law 3, 6062, 64f., Machine 182, 184, 190f., 197199
6873, 75, 7780, 88, 97f., 102, Majesty 108, 215, 218
104, 113, 122132, 153, 219, Majority 221, 226
233 Market 154, 178185, 187192,
International Law 8, 215, 225, 194199, 205f., 208f., 213f.,
227231 222, 224227, 230
Subject index 245
Marriage 151154, 165, 194, 200f., Norm 33, 43, 57f., 127, 145, 154,
222 158164, 166f., 170f., 177,
Mask 74, 79, 162 181f., 188, 192194, 197, 199f.,
Matter 2, 13, 47, 95, 104, 106, 129, 205207, 209, 220223, 229f.
137, 139, 173, 175 Notion 33, 4750, 64, 72f., 115,
Matter in Hand 57, 60, 69 129, 139, 141143, 148, 155,
Memory 62, 65, 68, 81 163, 202
Metaphor 2, 9, 49, 103, 114, 121,
148, 155 Objectivity 10, 20, 31, 36f., 66, 88,
Metaphysics 118, 126, 131, 134 90, 109, 135, 145, 161f.,
Middle Ages 5, 8, 128, 132, 139 178180, 194196, 201, 203,
Mind 15, 1128, 31, 3640, 205
4244, 4648, 50, 52, 58, 60, Offspring 150f., 219
6971, 74, 79, 88, 92, 99, 103, Organism 1, 46, 12, 15, 1820,
105f., 110f., 113, 115, 119121, 2228, 31, 3742, 52f., 58f.,
123127, 130132, 134, 143, 7880, 95, 97, 116, 120123,
148f., 155, 170, 182, 184, 197, 146f., 151, 153, 156f., 159162,
201, 206, 212, 215, 232 164, 170, 187, 192, 200, 212f.,
Modernity 8, 10, 128, 132, 139 218, 220, 223
Monarch 92f., 180, 193, 211218, Natural Organism 121, 129,
220f. 157f., 170, 192
Monasteries 187 Social Organism 27, 14, 36f.,
Morality 1, 37, 44, 47, 52, 55f., 4244, 4649, 5161, 7779, 81,
60, 80, 83, 98, 100, 103f., 115f., 8798, 101108, 113116,
124, 133, 137143, 146148, 121129, 131, 137, 141148,
152, 176f., 192f., 203, 208, 151f., 155, 157f., 160f.,
211f., 217f., 232234 163165, 187189, 209,
Mother 155f., 161, 169 218220, 222f., 232f.
Multi-culturality 8, 11, 182, 207 Origin 30f., 33, 54, 60, 62, 105,
163, 204
Naturalness 186 Parents 15, 151f., 157161, 163f.,
Nature 13, 5f., 10, 14, 1624, 188
28f., 3133, 3640, 42, 4548, Parliament 208, 220f., 223f.
5153, 64, 70f., 75, 82, 85, 88, Particularity 67, 80, 84, 86, 97, 109,
92, 103105, 107109, 113, 118, 151, 153, 160, 180f., 185, 192,
120, 127, 129, 164, 169171, 209, 212f., 220, 223
179182, 185f., 189, 195, 197, Partner 29, 119, 151153, 165, 167,
215, 219, 232 194, 200205, 222f.
Necessity 12, 16, 55, 69, 7175, 94, Discussion Partner 167
97, 134, 141, 161, 187f., 198, Party 208, 223
228 Political Party 207
Need 10, 18, 25f., 34, 37, 39, 42, Pathos 65f., 68, 153, 190
52, 6163, 68, 72, 89, 9294, Patriotism 212, 218, 223
103, 116, 118, 132, 144f., 154, Peace 29, 74
156f., 170, 179182, 185f., Eternal Peace 226f.
189198, 205, 209, 224, 230 Perception 13, 16, 20, 92, 130, 156,
Neediness 25, 156f., 169f. 179, 194
246 Subject index
Pharaoh 45, 60, 130 Punishment 32, 67

Phase 9, 33, 169171 Purpose and Responsibility 141,
Conventional Phase 170 146, 222
Post-conventional Phase 169, 171
Pre-conventional Phase 169f. Realm 26, 90f., 98, 100, 102, 216,
Philosophy 711, 28, 52, 100f., 228
103, 116, 133138, 141147, Realm of Culture, see Culture
149155, 159, 163165, 167f., Realm of Education 124, 135
173176, 178, 181, 185, 187, Realm of Morality 100102, 114
190, 193f., 197f., 200, 205, Realm of Utility 95
207209, 211, 213f., 216219, Reason 12, 14f., 20f., 39, 47, 53f.,
221224, 226, 234 57f., 61, 6870, 72, 75, 79, 100,
Pleasure 54f., 69, 71f., 94, 141, 103, 112, 122f., 127130, 136,
182, 187, 198 139, 157, 183f., 190, 194, 201,
Police 187189, 191, 198f., 213, 212, 224, 228f.
222, 225 Active Reason 54, 58f., 69, 71,
Polis 4f., 31, 6066, 6882, 8891, 74, 78, 88, 90, 94, 97f., 101, 141,
97f., 100, 102, 122f., 128, 135, 178, 184, 186f., 189, 198, 222
153f., 158160 Cunning of Reason 216f.
Possession 55, 56, 71, 149 Kantian Reason 167
Power 5, 29f., 3234, 36f., 3941, Lawgiving Reason 78, 96
4446, 48f., 55f., 69, 7277, Observing Reason 53f., 69f., 78,
8184, 88, 92, 101, 113, 119, 9193, 139f., 144f., 162,
124127, 129, 157, 170, 182f., 178180, 184, 186, 194196,
185, 191, 199, 202f., 213215, 222
219221, 223227, 229f. Practical Reason 103
Prayer 88 Reason as testing Laws 58, 116,
Pregnancy 150 136, 139, 142f.
Presidency 219 Theoretical Reason 58
President 214, 218220, 224 Recognition 13, 7, 911, 28,
Presupposition 7, 26, 29, 63, 68, 76, 4144, 56, 69, 80, 112f., 116,
81, 84, 94f., 102, 113, 118, 123, 118, 121, 127, 131134, 138,
126, 132f., 152, 167, 174, 183f., 140, 145, 148, 157, 164, 193,
186, 192, 220, 227 204206, 212, 225, 232234
Principle of Universalization 166 Horizontal Recognition 35, 44,
Professional 187f., 191f., 208f., 139, 148, 232
213 Mutual Recognition 9, 109, 118,
Profit 29, 67, 93, 168, 231 139, 148, 177, 204, 215, 221, 225
Property 5, 10, 20, 27, 29, 38, 58, Struggle for Recognition 11, 13, 14,
7982, 85, 98, 102, 124, 139f., 32, 122, 136, 137, 210, 240
144f., 152154, 163, 177, 183, Vertical Recognition 3f., 43f.,
185 148, 217, 232
Property Order 8186, 140 Reconciliation 10, 47, 50, 56, 73,
Psychology 135, 173 109, 112f., 134
Development Psychology 155, Reconstruction 28, 61, 78f., 117,
173 126, 129, 155, 159, 165, 168
Social Psychology 7, 118, 132f., Hypothetical Reconstruction 78,
135 168, 173
Subject index 247
Reification 185 Abstract Right 10, 137, 139f.,

Relation 2f., 7f., 1019, 2131, 142, 145147, 152, 176, 211f.,
3643, 5155, 57f., 60f., 6873, 218
7680, 83f., 86, 88f., 9195, 97, Human Rights 8, 44, 148, 218f.,
100103, 105, 108111, 225227, 229, 231, 233f.
113116, 119130, 132134, Role 4, 30, 37, 40, 42, 44, 55f., 62,
136f., 139141, 143146, 148, 64, 79, 91, 108f., 111, 127, 135,
150153, 155158, 160f., 163f., 140, 152, 158, 161f., 170, 172f.,
167, 169f., 173178, 180182, 200, 212, 218, 221, 228, 231
185187, 193196, 198, 207, Gender Role 151, 154, 163,
211f., 215217, 219, 221, 200f., 212
225233 Roman emperor 5, 80
Dialogical Relation 123, 125 Roman Empire 5, 48f., 7882, 86f.,
Market Relation 183, 188 89, 91, 100, 102, 124, 177
Religion 44, 48, 63, 65, 75f., 80,
87, 89, 94, 113115, 126, Satisfaction 15, 26f., 51, 69, 103,
129131, 135, 137, 143, 154, 156, 166, 170, 180, 196, 205
159f., 165, 216f., 228 Scepticism 107, 114, 175
Religion of Art 90, 98, 130, 135, School 208f.
216 Science 21, 116, 133, 135, 137,
Religion of Nature 129f. 174f., 232
Religion of the Artificer 45, 130 Empirical Science 120, 139
Modern Science 20f.
Revealed Religion 89f., 94, 98,
Reconstructive Science 173f.
113f., 130, 135, 216
Scientification 183f.
Remembrance 50, 71, 97 Sculptor 65f.
Repetition 7, 51, 56, 88, 94, 98, Self-consciousness 5, 10, 15, 19, 22,
108, 178, 192, 194, 196 2432, 3441, 43f., 4649, 51f.,
Representation 3, 42f., 4952, 63, 54, 56, 63, 65f., 6972, 74f., 77,
65f., 7078, 8285, 87, 89f., 97, 81f., 84, 86, 88, 91f., 94, 97,
101, 113115, 127130, 145, 103f., 106f., 118, 120, 125,
157, 159f., 162, 177, 202, 212, 129f., 155, 178f., 194f., 203,
220 222
Research 106, 111, 132, 155, Self-expression 53, 108, 124f.,
173175 128130, 135, 142, 147, 158,
Revolution 20, 101 204
French Revolution 57, 49, 86, Self
96, 98102, 104, 124, 129, 177, First Self 5, 41, 60, 79, 86, 96,
189, 206, 233 98, 100, 116, 125, 137, 139,
Reward 67, 70, 93 144f., 150, 153, 164f., 212, 233
Right 1, 311, 29, 36, 41, 43f., 47, Human Self 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15,
52, 55f., 60, 62, 79f., 83f., 94, 16f., 152, 153, 236, 238
98, 100, 115f., 124, 133155, Pure Self 2327, 3855, 57f.,
159, 163165, 172, 176178, 6072, 74, 7682, 87f., 9092,
181, 185, 187f., 190, 193f., 9497, 101105, 108, 113f., 116,
197f., 200f., 203, 205, 207209, 120125, 127, 130132, 137,
211219, 221224, 226f., 229, 143145, 153, 158160, 177,
232234 186, 195, 217
248 Subject index
Real Self 40, 47, 52, 58, 63, 67f., 165, 193, 211, 214219, 221f.,
72, 77f., 87f., 121, 126 225
Second Self 57, 80f., 86, 96, Holy Spirit 50, 87, 89, 94, 98
98100, 115f., 125, 137, Objective Spirit 8f., 11, 137, 152,
140144, 146, 165, 176, 187, 165, 193, 218
193, 199, 209, 212f., 233f. Spirit-Chapter 122f., 125131,
Self-awareness 156 134f.
Third Self 7f., 99f., 105, 115f., Subjective Spirit 16f.
125, 137, 142, 186, 210214, Spiritual 23, 26, 43f., 57, 60, 67,
217f., 220f., 233f. 70f., 7478, 92, 98, 125, 137,
Sense-Certainty 19, 91, 106, 120, 139, 162, 181, 185, 191, 204
129, 155, 178, 194 State 24, 79, 29, 36f., 41, 43,
Similarity 153 6063, 6870, 72, 74, 7779,
Singularity 63, 212214, 220, 224 109, 132, 137139, 142, 145,
Soap 162 147f., 152, 188190, 192,
Socialization 155, 158, 180, 185, 205231, 233f.
197 Democratic State 225
Social Security 188 Nation State 8, 211, 226231
Society 2f., 8, 11, 30, 34, 57, 60, 64, State Power 73, 92f., 179, 186,
72, 78, 82, 86, 101, 123, 126, 207, 223f.
128f., 132, 138, 144, 170f., 184, Statue 6466, 68, 70, 76f., 159f.
188, 198f., 205208, 220, 223f., Status 2, 13, 21, 28f., 31f., 3436,
228 45, 63, 66, 84, 131, 135, 155,
Civil Society 7f., 11, 132, 138, 159, 162, 165, 167f., 174f., 178,
142, 152, 154, 164f., 172, 200, 203f., 219
176178, 180f., 183185, 187, Legal Status 2837, 46
190f., 193, 198200, 205f., Stoicism 4648, 56, 60f., 64, 79f.,
208f., 211, 213, 218, 220, 222, 93, 97, 102, 104, 107, 109, 186,
224f., 234 204
Multicultural Society 162 Strangeness 31, 110, 170f.
Son 87, 8991, 94, 163, 187, 219 Struggle 7, 9f., 2831, 36f., 47,
Soul 16f., 67f., 204 50f., 55, 66, 76, 96, 109, 118,
Beautiful Soul 106, 110, 215, 221 132f., 138, 158, 188, 206, 215,
Soulmateship 204 227
Species 29, 36, 40f., 53, 116, 150f. Moral Struggle 118, 134
Human Species 36, 40 Subject 1, 10, 17, 19, 21, 29f.,
Speech 71, 109f., 204 3234, 41, 46, 5456, 69, 77,
Spirit 1f., 610, 14f., 17, 19, 21, 8386, 89, 94, 96, 98, 112, 116,
44, 4850, 52f., 60, 64, 66, 80, 118120, 126, 129131, 135,
89, 9194, 96, 105f., 108f., 137f., 141, 146, 166171, 177f.,
113122, 126, 129, 131137, 180f., 186188, 190f., 193, 195,
139143, 149f., 152155, 164f., 198200, 207, 209, 215, 222,
176, 178, 190, 193, 198, 203, 232f.
211, 214218, 220222, 233 Subjectivity 9, 13, 16, 20, 24, 26,
Absolute Spirit 7, 11, 106, 43, 79, 87, 138, 142, 157, 160,
113116, 119f., 123, 125f., 128, 162165, 176, 190192, 197,
130f., 134f., 137, 142f., 147f., 199f., 202, 211, 215, 233
Subject index 249
Substance 2, 10, 14, 43, 49, 6366, Understanding 8, 14, 18, 21f., 38,
69f., 7375, 89, 94, 107, 109, 92, 124, 130, 144, 162, 169,
119f., 123f., 126, 130f., 135, 173f., 179, 182, 192, 195, 206
137, 153 Unity 17, 9, 1127, 30f., 3744,
Superstition 94f., 188 4649, 51f., 58, 60f., 63, 6574,
Supply 181, 183185, 187, 191, 7981, 92, 94f., 98100, 102f.,
196199, 222 105f., 111, 113, 119121,
Survival 24, 29f., 3436, 79, 124, 123128, 130132, 134, 138,
199, 216 140, 142f., 147149, 152, 155,
Suspicion 159, 226 176f., 179, 192, 194f., 201,
System 8, 11, 23, 45f., 127, 170, 203207, 211213, 217f., 220,
180, 182184, 186193, 198, 224, 232234
205207, 209, 213, 222224, Substantial Unity 124126,
228f. 130f., 134
Labor System 15, 49, 50, 184, Universalizability 166
186-188, 213 University 1, 7, 9, 11, 18, 229
System of Needs 11, 182188,
205f., 217, 222 Value 12, 28, 41, 43f., 57f., 111,
127, 134, 145f., 152, 154,
158164, 177, 179, 181f., 185,
Teleology 116, 126 187f., 191195, 197200,
Temple 6466, 68, 76f., 159 205207, 209f., 220223, 226,
Terror 6, 9699, 101, 104, 124, 189 228230, 232f.
Theory 1f., 1012, 14f., 43, Exchange-value 183, 185, 198,
132134, 143, 149, 154, 199
166169, 172175, 190f., 207, Labor Value 180, 184f., 191
229 Use-value 154, 178f., 181,
Theory of justice 171 194196
Thesis 2, 8, 14, 19, 43, 118, 126, Violence 3335, 82
134, 136, 139, 191, 234 Virtue 55, 69, 73f., 101, 141
Thing 14, 1820, 39, 42, 44, 54, Volont de tous 6
57f., 64, 66, 72, 92f., 95, 130, Volont gnrale 6, 101105, 124
139f., 144146, 184f., 190, 198,
201, 203 Wage 180, 185, 226
Pure Thing 97 Wealth 92f., 179, 183
Thirst 156 Welfare 141f., 146, 178, 180, 185,
Threat 25, 63, 71, 77, 225 188, 193f., 198f., 205, 208, 213,
Token 145 222
Trade Union 188 General Welfare 147
Tradition 47, 10, 28, 36, 42, 57, Particular Welfare 147, 180
76, 91, 101, 118, 124f., 127f., Will 36, 10f., 1315, 17, 19f.,
133135, 153155, 158f., 164f., 22f., 25f., 28, 3033, 3537, 39,
168, 170172, 200 43f., 4648, 51f., 55, 59, 61,
Tragedy 73f., 77, 79, 162, 189 6365, 67, 70f., 76, 79f., 84, 86,
Transcendence 48, 115, 181, 214f. 89, 93, 98100, 102107, 110f.,
Treaty 229 114118, 120, 124, 129, 132f.,
Truth 10, 26, 43, 49, 52, 57, 96, 135139, 142f., 145f., 148, 150,
105, 167, 205, 233 152, 154, 157, 159f., 162, 165,
250 Subject index
168170, 172f., 176, 178, 180, 8791, 9398, 100, 103105,

184, 186188, 190, 193, 110, 113f., 116, 124, 130, 136,
196198, 201, 203, 206, 208, 138f., 145, 147f., 150, 153,
210213, 215f., 219f., 226228 155157, 161f., 165, 169171,
General Will 6f., 102, 212 173, 176179, 182, 192, 194f.,
Work 7, 9, 37, 42f., 45f., 52, 197f., 200f., 206f., 211, 214,
6269, 71, 76, 78, 101, 117f., 216, 218, 220, 224231, 233
127, 132, 134137, 165, Ancient Greek World 4, 48, 59,
182184, 188, 190, 197, 205, 162, 233
209 Egyptian World 45, 60
Work of Art 6371, 7578, 90f., Underworld 62f., 72f., 77, 98
98, 113f., 154, 159f., 162 Way of the World 55f., 74, 101,
World 57, 12f., 15, 1720, 2227, 141
29, 35, 46, 4952, 55, 57, 60, 62, Worship 110
6467, 69, 7175, 7780, 83, Wrong 35, 63, 113, 140, 145

COBBEN - The Nature of The Self - Recognition in The Form of Right and Morality (Quellen Und Studien Zur Philosophie) (2009)

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COBBEN - The Nature of The Self - Recognition in The Form of Right and Morality (Quellen Und Studien Zur Philosophie) (2009)

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Paul Cobben

The Nature of the Self

Walter de Gruyter Berlin New York

Walter de Gruyter Berlin New York

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

Chapter 1 The Human Self as the Unity of Mind and Body . . . . 12

Chapter 2 The Greek World: The Origin of the First Self . . . . . . 60

Chapter 3 The Realm of Culture: The Genesis of the Second Self 81

Chapter 5 Honneths Criticism of Hegels Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . 118

Chapter 6 The program of the Philosophy of Right as elaboration

Chapter 8 The Civil Society: Developing the Institutional House of

The development of the second self s embodiment in the

Chapter 9 The State: The Embodiment of the Third Self . . . . . . . 211

Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

1 Therefore, this book is not meant as a replacement of Charles Taylors Sources of

individual. If the mind is understood as the autonomy of the individual,

Since the institutions of the polis allow a learning process in which

9 Jrgen Habermas, Faktizitt und Geltung, Frankfurt/M., 1992.

My interpretation of the Philosophy of Right is in accordance with

10 John Rawls, Laws of Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1999.

reading of Hegel: Siep believes recognition is important for Hegels

But, in my opinion, the central point is that Theunissen identifies objec-

14 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993: how is it

In this chapter, I will discuss how Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit can be

cific (contingent) manner in European history. Principally these stages

The immediate unity of mind and body

Robert Pippin (Hegels Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-consciousness, Cam-

Consciousness: looking for the independence of the outside

In its independence, the mind/body unity is related to the outside world.

ceives the determinedness of its body (because of any interaction between

23 Humes definition of impression is not unproblematic. (Cf. An Inquiry concern-

unity and, consequently, cannot be understood as the form in which the

unity is the point of departure: Nature consists of physical forces, i. e., of

inside perspective, relates to an objective reality that has an independent

of the cogito seems to allow a multitude of cogitos, although it is unclear

are part of. It makes sense to represent the working of an organism by a

31 Josifovic (2008) adequately formulates: As consciousness the new form in which

fore, it is impossible to eliminate the relation to strange life: This would

plying that there cannot be a question of a real relation between mind

34 Cf. Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.

35 In my opinion, Hegels formulation of the struggle is somewhat confusing: Sim-

living-together presupposes a principle that banishes the struggle and al-

Self-consciousness and the legal status

Violence, power and the legal status

39 Vgl. J. Hollak, Recht en Macht (Wijsgerig Perspectief 11 (1970/71): Wil ze (i. e.

lems just because of his self-consciousness? Therefore, the conclusion

formed according to a known general law. Self-consciousness has con-

Self-consciousness and the overcoming of exclusion

difference, however, is that the self of the organism is an objective self,

tion of the fear of death is transformed in Aristotles state organism if the

The Lord/Bondsman relation

48 Hegel introduces the lord/bondsman relation as two opposed shapes of conscious-

The historical reality of the lord/bondsman relation

illustration of the lord/bondsman relation, however, is elaborated at the

55 In contrast to Jrgen Habermas (Arbeit und Interaktion, in: J. Habermas, Tech-

The Unhappy Consciousness

The transcendental power is not totally elusive for the individual. At

resentation is the empty remembrance of the absolute loss, the loss of an

appears by mediation of his labor. Therefore, the individual tries to rescue

can be understood as self-expression of the pure self.71 Having developed

bone. (208) The contradiction in which observing Reason is involved be-

72 Here Derridas double-bind-relation is thematized. Freedom has to realize itself