12.

Yu v Magpayo 44 S 163

Facts:
Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover from defendant
Mapayo the sum of P2, 800, which represented an unpaid balance of the
purchase price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold to defendant.

The defendant admitted the said transaction in his answer but he alleged that the
engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the same amount for the repairs
and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of
the engine and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees.

The Court disallowed the defences and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,
500.00 and costs.

Defendant Mapayo appealed to CFI and filed an answer that was a virtual
reproduction of his original defences in the City Court.

The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled
the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to
present his evidence but it failed to do so. The plaintiff's counsel refused to
comply and instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them
after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked said counsel
twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel
refused to do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses
only in rebuttal.

This prompted the court to dismiss the case on ground of failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute, hence this appeal.

Issue: W/N the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of plaintiff's failure to
prosecute

NO. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and contrary to law. The defendant
was not able to support his special defenses. The answer admitted defendant's
obligation as stated in the complaint, and pleaded special defences hence the plaintiff
had every right to insist that it was for the defendant to come forward with evidence in
support of his special defences. Judicial admissions do not require proof.
13. Republic v Vda de Neri GR 139588 March 4, 2008 14. Sps Calo v Sps Tan GR 151266 November 29, 2005
15. Active v CA, 181 S 774
Facts:
A mortgage on land was constituted by petitioner Active Wood in favor of private
respondent State Investment to secure an indebtedness. The said mortgage was
foreclosed and the lands auctioned off to State Investment as the highest bidder.
The certificate of sale issued to State Investment was registered.
Petitioner filed a civil case with Branch XX questioning the validity of the
foreclosure wherein the court declared as null and void the foreclosure including
State Investment's certificate of sale.
The consolidation of cases becomes mandatory because it involves the same
parties and the same subject matter which is the same parcel of land. Such
consolidation is desirable to avoid confusion and unnecessary costs and
expenses with the multiplicity of suits. Thus the rules do not distinguish between
cases filed before the same branch or judge and those that are pending in
different branches, or before different judges of the same court, in order that
consolidation may be proper, as long as the cases involve the resolution of
questions of law or facts in common with each other.

Subsequently, on February 14, 1984, State Investment filed a petition for a writ of
possession pending redemption of the lands by Active Wood. The petition was
assigned to Branch XIV, and that court granted the writ and also set aside the
order of Branch XX that had earlier declared null and void the foreclosure and
State Investment's certificate of sale.

Petitioner filed a motion in Branch XIV for the consolidation of the two cases, it
also filed motion to dismiss and/or suspend the proceedings of that case until
Branch XX resolved the issue of validity of the mortgage raised in Civil Case No.
6518-M. The judge denied the motion to the proposed consolidation of the 2
cases. Note that Civil Case No. 6518-M was filed by the petitioner herein on June
7, 1982, much ahead than the filing the private respondent on February 1, 1984,
of its "Petition for Writ of Possession."

CA denied the petition and ruled that the consolidation is proper when they
involve a common question of law or fact and they are pending before the court.

Issue: W/N consolidation of the 2 cases is proper

YES.

Consolidation is proper when actions involving a common question of law or fact

are pending before the court. The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases,
which are intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered that will not serve the orderly
administration of justice. Time and again we have said that the rules of procedure
must be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.

It is true that a petition for a writ of possession is made ex-parte to facilitate

proceedings, being founded on a presumed right of ownership. Be that as it may,
when this presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of
another action, then the proceedings for writ of possession would also become
seemingly groundless. The entire case must be litigated and if need be as in the
case at bar, must be consolidated with a related case so as to thresh out
thoroughly all related issues.
16. Superlines v Victor, 124 S 939
Doctrine: Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as the
convenience of the parties for which rules on procedure and venue were formulated,
dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca court, which serves as the
more suitable forum for the determination of the rights and obligations of the parties
concerned.
Facts:
Bus No. 3008 of the Pantranco South Express, Inc., driven by Rogelio Dillomas,
collided with Bus No. 331 of the Superlines Transportation Co., Inc, then driven
by Erlito Lorca along the highway at Lumilang, Calauag, Quezon.
o Resulting in the instantaneous death of Cayetano P. Moralde, Sr., a
passenger in the Pantranco bus.
Superlines instituted an action for damage before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Gumaca Branch, against Pantranco and Rogelio Dillomas, driver of said
Pantranco Bus No. 3008.
o Superlines alleged that the recklessness and negligence of the
Pantranco bus driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that
there was want of diligence on the part of Pantranco in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
Private respondents Timotea T. Moralde, widow of the deceased Cayetano P.
Moralde, Sr., and her children filed a complaint for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite City, against Superlines and its driver Rogelio Dillomas.
o Cause of action: based on quasi-delict while that against Pantranco, on
culpa-contractual.
Petitioners Superlines and its driver Erlito Lorca filed a motion to dismiss
o Ground: Pendency of another action. Referring to the civil case pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon, Gumaca Branch.
Respondent Judge Luis Victor denied the motion to dismiss
o Finding that the two cases involved different parties as well as different
cause of action.
IAC: denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Issue: WON the Gumaca case should be consolidated with the Cavite case.
Petitioner argues:
That private respondents should pursue their claim for damages by
intervening in the Gumaca Action
The right of the private respondents to claim damages is founded
on the same facts involved in the Gumaca action, any judgment
rendered therein will amount to res judicata in the Cavite case
Such intervention would prevent multiplicity of suits.
Held: Yes. The petitioners stand is consistent with the previous ruling of this court.
Ratio:
There is, however, the more pragmatic solution to the controversy at bar;
and that is to consolidate the Gumaca case with the Cavite case.
o Considerations of judicial economy and administration, as well as the
convenience of the parties for which rules on procedure and venue were
formulated, dictate that it is the Cavite court, rather than the Gumaca
court, which serves as the more suitable forum for the determination of
the rights and obligations of the parties concerned.
To require private respondents who are all residents of Kawit, Cavite, to
litigate their claims in the Quezon Court would unnecessarily expose them
to considerable expenses.
o On the other hand, no like prejudice would befall the defendants
transportation companies if they were required to plead their causes in
Cavite, for such venue would not expose them to expenses which they
are not already liable to incur in connection with the Gumaca case.
o The objection interposed by Superlines that it has offices in Atimonan,
Quezon, should not detract from the overall convenience afforded by the
consolidation of cases in the Cavite Court. For apart from the fact that
petitioner and its driver are represented by the same counsel with
offices located in Manila, defendants transportation companies can
readily avail of their facilities for conveying their witnesses to the place
of trial.
The whole purpose and object of the procedure is to make the powers of
the court fully and completely available for justice.
o The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives
opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of
the court within the limitations set by natural justice.
17. Steel Corporation of the Philippines v Equitable PCI Bank 635 S 403
The Court held that it is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases
involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to
settle expeditiously the issues involved. In other words, consolidation is proper
wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make
it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the
rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.

18. Deutsche Bank AG vs Court of Appeals 667 S 82


Respondent Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SteelCorp), as borrower,
entered into a loan agreement with a consortium of financing banks and other
financial institutions including Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) for
the purpose of partially financing the construction of its integrated steel mill
project. SteelCorp failed to pay its loan obligations as they fell due, so Equitable
PCI Bank, Inc. (now Banco de Oro) filed a creditor-initiated petition to place
SteelCorp under corporate rehabilitation which was then approved.
During the pendency of the Rehabilitation Plan proceedings, RCBC and
petitioner Deutsche Bank AG entered into a deed of assignment, wherein the
former assigned to the latter all of its rights, obligations, title to, and interest in,
the loans which it has extended to SteelCorp in the aggregate principal amount
of P94,412,862.58, of which SteelCorp was duly informed. Deustche Bank also
informed RTC-Batangas through its Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Substitution of Parties.
The RTC-Batangas, upon the motion of SteelCorp, issued an Order directing its
assignees, including Deutsche Bank, to disclose the actual price or consideration
paid by them for SteelCorp debts assigned and transferred to them. From this
order, Deutsche Bank, along with two other creditors of SteelCorp, filed its
Petition for Certiorari.
In the meantime, SteelCorp filed its Motion for Consolidation, praying for
consolidation of the Deutsche Bank AG Petition, together with the Investments
2234 Petition and EPCIB Petition, with the Vitarich Petition on the ground that the
cases involved the same question of law whether creditors could be compelled
to disclose the actual assignment of price for credits in litigation which were
assigned in the context of a corporate rehabilitation proceeding pursuant to
Articles 1634 and 1236 of the Civil Code.
The Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution ordering the consolidation
of Deutsche Bank AG Petition with the Vitarich Petition. Deutsche Bank filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Deutsche Bank AG Petition and the
Vitarich Petition were not related cases which would merit consolidation. It
stressed that a common question of law alone does not warrant consolidation to
be proper, the cases must be related. It also claimed that the consolidation of
these two unrelated cases would not serve the purpose of consolidation, which
was to obtain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants.
This was denied by the CA. Citing Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, it held that
consolidation of cases was proper as the cases involved common questions of
law. It agreed with SteelCorps conclusion that when two cases involved the
same parties, or related questions of fact, or related questions of law, then they
were considered as related cases for purpose of consolidation.
But then, SteelCorp filed a Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Consolidation. In
view of this, the petition assailing the CAs order of consolidation has been
rendered moot and academic. However, the issue in this case is one that will
most likely recur. Thus, there is a necessity to decide on the merits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the consolidation of the Deutsche
Bank AG petition and the Vitarich petition YES
RULING:
A common question of law alone would not warrant consolidation. For cases to
be consolidated, they must be related cases.
Actions involving common question of law or fact may be tried together where
they arise from the same act, event, or transaction, involve the same or like
issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence.
Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation.
The Court held that it is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases
involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be
consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties
and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. Consolidation is proper wherever
the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the different suits make it
expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the
rights of the parties by hearing the suits together.
The Court finds merit in Deutsche Bank AGs contention that the consolidation of
the subject cases will defeat the purpose of consolidation.
It is well recognized that the purpose of the rule on consolidation is
to avoid multiplicity of suits; to guard against oppression and abuse;
to prevent delays; to clear congested dockets; and to simplify the
work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord
with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in
the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which would
otherwise require a single judgment.
Under the circumstances, the consolidation of the Deutsche Bank
AG Petition with the Vitarich Petition does not appear to be a
prudent move as it serves none of the purposes cited above. On
the contrary and as correctly pointed out by Deutsche Bank AG, it
will only complicate the resolution of the cases as the CA would
have to consider the different factual antecedents of both the
Deutsche Bank AG and Vitarich petitions.
PETITION GRANTED.
19. Producers Bank of the Philippines v Excelsa Industries 669 S 470

FACTS:
Excelsa obtained a loan from Producers Bank in the form of a bill discounted and
secured credit accommodation in the amount of P200,000.00, secured by a real
estate mortgage over real estate properties. Excelsa extended its loan by
applying for a packing credit line or a credit export advance with petitioner
supported by a letter of credit issued by its Korean buyers.
Upon collection, the Korean buyer refused to pay the export documents
prompting Prudential Bank to demand from Excelsa the payment of the peso
equivalent of said export documents together with its due and unpaid loans.
Excelsa failed to make the payment. As a result, Prudential Bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
o The case stemmed from two separate cases:
o Civil Case No. 1587-A was instituted by Excelsa for the annulment of
the foreclosure and
o LR Case No. 90-787 was filed by Producers Bank as a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
o The RTC thereafter ordered the consolidation of the two cases, Civil
Case No. 1587-A and LR Case No. 90-787. On December 18, 1997, the
RTC rendered a decision upholding the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
Producers Bank.
o Excelsa availed of two modes of appeal:
for Civil Case No. 1587-A, Excelsa made an appeal to the CA
via ordinary appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
59931 and
for LR Case No. 90-787, Excelsa filed a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 46514.
The CA made the following decisions:
o for Civil Case No. 1587-A or CA-G.R. CV No. 59931, CA rendered a
decision on May 30, 2001, reversing and setting aside the RTC decision
thereby declaring the foreclosure of mortgage invalid and annulling the
issuance of the writ of possession in favor of Producers Bank, and
o for LR Case No. 90-787 or CA-G.R. SP. No. 46514, the CA, on April 4,
2006, granted the petition of Excelsa and reversed the decision of the
RTC .
Producers Bank elevated Civil Case No. 1587-A or CA-G.R. CV No. 59931 to the
Supreme Court which was docketed as GR 152071. On May 8, 2009, the
Supreme Court reversed and set aside the CA (First Division) decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59931 and reinstated that of the RTC. In other words, the Court
settled once and for all the validity of the foreclosure and the propriety of the
issuance of the writ of possession.
Faced with the CAs decision dated April 4, 2006, for CA-G.R. SP. No. 46514,
Prudential Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Rules of
Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Excelsa can file a separate petition for certiorari before
the CA based on a judgment that consolidated two separate actions
HELD:
No, Excelsa committed a procedural blunder when it filed a separate petition for
certiorari before the CA, because when the two cases were consolidated and a
joint decision was rendered, the cases lost their identities; and a petition
for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a decision granting the issuance
of a writ of possession.
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding
how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties.
o It is governed by Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court which states:
o Section 1. Consolidation.When actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing
or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all
the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Consolidation of cases may take place in any of the following ways:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which
case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not
actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity,
and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the
same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type
of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the
parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
In this case, there was a joint hearing and the RTC eventually rendered a Joint
Decision disposing of the cases both as to the validity of the foreclosure (subject
of Civil Case No. 1587-A) and the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
possession (subject of LR Case No. 90-787).
o This being so, the two cases ceased to be separate and the parties are
left with a single remedy to elevate the issues to the appellate court.
 o This is bolstered by the fact that when the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
59931 was disposed of by the CA (First Division) by reversing the RTC
decision, the appellate court not only declared the foreclosure of
mortgage invalid but likewise annulled the issuance of the writ of
possession.
o Again, when the Court finally settled the issues in G.R. No. 152071, it
reversed and set aside the CA decision and reinstated that of the RTC
thereby disposing of the said two issues.
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the Producers Bank and declared that
the parties are bound by the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 152071.
20. Teston v DBP GR 144374 November 11, 2005
There are two cases:
Case 1 Special Civil Case (SCC) No. 4243.
This was filed by Teston through Colarina on November 3, 1993.
It was a complaint against DBP, LBP, and DAR Secretary for the
determination and payment of just compensation of two parcels of
agricultural land.
Teston alleges that he is the owner of the two parcels of land in Brgy.
Lantangan, Mandaon, Masbate through a Deed of Conditional Sale from
DBP. He voluntarily offered the lands to the DAR Secretary under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
It was for consideration of P12,172,854.63, however the DBP without
notifying him transferred the land to the government through the DAR.
Teston argues that after the sale to him, DBP had no right to transfer the
properties.
Case 2 SCC No. 4242.
This was filed by Colarina against the GSIS, LBP, and the DAR Secretary for
the determination and payment of just compensation for fifteen parcels of
agricultural land.
The lands were in Barrio Malaran and Lamintao, Municipality of Dimasalong
(now Uson), Masbate. The land was originally mortgaged by the Associated
Agricultural Activities, Inc. (AAA) to GSIS but failed to pay the loan, GSIS
foreclosed the property at public auction, GSIS was the highest bidder.
Certificates of sale were issued and registered in the name of the GSIS.
Conrado claims that he bought the lands from AAA on December 8, 1988, he
then offered to sell the lands to the DAR.
But when GSIS consolidated the titles to its name, it executed a Deed of
Transfer in favour of the DAR. Despite repeated demands, LBP and DAR
refused to determine and pay just compensation for the lots.
Both cases raffled to RTC Masbate, Branch 48.
In separate answers for SCC 4243, DBP, LBP, and the DAR Secretary commonly
averred that petitioner has no cause of action since he was never the owner of
the properties because DBP rescinded the Deed of Conditional Sale for non-
payment of purchase price.
In separate answers for SCC 4242, GSIS, LBP, and the DAR Secretary contend
that Colarina has no cause of action since he is not the owner of the lands, he
only bought from AAA the right to redeem the property and he failed to exercise
such right within the one-year period allowed by law.

Without any order of the RTC expressly consolidating the cases, a notice of
hearing of both cases were sent to the parties. RTC terminated the pre-trial on
both cases in November 16, 1994.
September 19, 1995, GSIS filed a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. That Colarina has no right because he failed to redeem,
therefore he was not the real party-in-interest in the case. Colarina opposed by
declaring that GSIS was a necessary party being the mortgagee but did not
dispute his failure to redeem. No pleading, manifestation, or motion was filed by
the petitioner Teston or respondents DBP, LBP, and the DAR Secretary.
At the hearing, only DBP appeared despite notice. LBP filed a telegraphic motion
for postponement. RTC thus considered the motion to dismiss submitted for
resolution. RTC issued its order dismissing both cases for failure to state a cause
of action. It reasoned that Colarina failed to redeem and Testons sale was
rescinded.
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Pejo Buenviaje & Associates, common
counsel of petitioner and Colarina, but denied by RTC. Colarina and Teston filed
separate petitions for review in the CA. However, Colarinas petition was granted
by the CA but CA was reversed by the SC and Testons petition was decided by
the CA by affirming the RTC decision. MR was denied hence this petition.
CA held that the RTC is given the option to have a joint hearing or to order
consolidation if the motion involves a common question of law or fact, pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 31 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; since SCC 4242, and
4243 have a common question of law and face, which is the determination and
payment of just compensation, the joint hearing conducted by the RTC was
proper and valid; the rule clearly gives the RTC discretion to decide what course
of action to take; furthermore, the court may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Petitioners claim is that no consolidation in contemplation of the Rules took
place since there was no order for consolidation; the RTC only scheduled both
cases for simultaneous hearing. He further argues that the RTC erred in
dismissing in one order both cases based on a motion to dismiss directed against
one case only.
On the other hand, DBP submits that petitioners argument regarding
consolidation deals principally on technicalities and semantics. It avers that it
cannot be denied that the two cases involved are of the same nature and pray for
the same relief. DBP admits that there was no written order from the RTC
expressly consolidating both cases, but it maintains that the RTC scheduled both
cases for simultaneous trial and hearing and all the conditions for consolidation
exist.
LBP submits that the RTC did not err, since the two cases were consolidated and
involved common questions of law and facts.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in applying Rule 31, Sec 1 of the rules of civil procedure?
YES
HELD: YES, CA erred.
Rule 31 Sec. 1. Consolidation When actions involving a common question of
law or fact or pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where
they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like
issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that
the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that the joint trial
will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of
any of the parties. The obvious purpose of the rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits
to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested
dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants.
In the present case, although both were raffled to the same RTC, involve
the same prayer for determination and payment of just compensation and
petitioners are represented by the same counsel, and respondents LBP and
DAR Secretary are common defendants, these are not sufficient
justifications for joint trial and joint order dismissing both cases.
o There is no real identity of parties, facts, or rights asserted.
4242 was initiated by Colarina in his own name against GSIS
and concerns 15 parcels of land in a Barrio. 4243 was
instituted by Teston represented by Colarina against DBP for 2
parcels of land in a Baranggay. Colarinas claim is as a
redemptioner while Teston claims as a buyer.
o The causes of action are clearly different events or
transactions, involve different issues, and ultimately will
depend on different evidence.
RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in setting the joint trial of the two cases.
In view of the improper consolidation, the RTC judge was also in error by
dismissing 4243 based on a motion to dismiss filed by GSIS for 4242. GSIS
claim that Colarina failed to become the owner of the 15 parcels of land is totally
alien from the claim of DBP against Teston with respect to the 2 parcels of land
from the deed of conditional sale.
Only Colarina was directed to file an opposition to GSIS motion to dismiss while
DBP, LBP, and DAR Secretary did not file any motion to dismiss. RTC cannot
motu proprio or on its own initiative, consider the ground of lack of cause of
action on the part of petitioner when it was not raised by DBP in the motion to
dismiss filed by GSIS, without running afoul of petitioners right to due process.
Court will no longer delve on the question of whether petitioners compliant failed
to state the cause of action.
 WHEREFORE, instant petition is GRANTED. Case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings insofar as SCC no. 4243 is concerned.

21. Gregorio Espinoza v UOB GR 175380 March 22, 2010

In the recent case of Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils.,[34] the Court, in the
same manner ruled against the consolidation of the proceedings for the issuance of a
writ of possession with that for the declaration of nullity of a foreclosure sale on the
ground that it would run counter to the purpose of consolidation:

In this case, title to the litigated property had already been consolidated in the
name of respondent, making the issuance of a writ of possession a matter of right.
Consequently, the consolidation of the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
with the proceedings for nullification of foreclosure would be highly improper.
Otherwise, not only will the very purpose of consolidation (which is to avoid
unnecessary delay) be defeated but the procedural matter of consolidation will also
adversely affect the substantive right of possession as an incident of ownership.[35]