Professional Documents
Culture Documents
BOOK I
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and
potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as
having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged,
but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be
clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey
to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol.
I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is
founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are
immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which
depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is
inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only
an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment
is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan
Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca
and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed
upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be
directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there
is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an
accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for
value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere
issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's
stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society,
should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala
prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only
because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is
whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts
are prohibited for reasons of public policy.
Proximate Cause
3. People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011
Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event
he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight
physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause
of Cruzs death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
Impossible Crimes
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the
crime ofqualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega
Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact
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that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which
was not rightfully hers.
Stages of Execution
6. People of the Philippines v. Malisce, G.R. No. 190912. January 12, 2015
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could
not have produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for
attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head,
petitioners are still criminally liable for attempted murder.
10. Ramie Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 149988, August 14, 2009
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Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not fatal and absent
a showing that such wounds would have certainly caused his death were it not for
timely medical assistance, we declare the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime
of attempted homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that there is an attempt
when the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts
but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Publico, we ruled that
when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to
penetrate, attempted rape is committed; otherwise, the crime committed is merely
acts of lasciviousness.
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang
was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milans closing
the door when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing Carandang to
wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack
SPO1 Montecalvo and Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the
suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a
principal by inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was
what made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds of the
three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct
participation.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing the door
facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The
sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the
intention of appellants and Carandang to prevent any chance for the police officers
to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as what is
decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.
Their acts did not reveal a unity of purpose that is to kill Pasion. Bokingco had
already killed Pasion even before he sought Col. Their moves were not
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coordinated because while Bokingco was killing Pasion because of his pent-up
anger, Col was attempting to rob the pawnshop.
It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general voucher
cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general voucher, the check for the
payment of the supply cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the
check payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully
consummated. Thus, petitioners acts in signing the false tally sheets and/or
delivery receipts are indispensable to the consummation of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents.
Continuing Crime
18. People v Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be characterized
as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the accused were animated by
single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused reveals that they conspired to
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steal the roosters. The taking is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it
was held that the taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion cannot give rise to two crimes of theft.
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of
the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same
"transaction" or as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257,
138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85
Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
20. Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994
The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one hand,
and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are definitely separate
felonies. They were dictated by different criminal intents, committed under different
modes of commission provided by the law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts,
consummated ondifferent occasions, and caused injury to different parties.
In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious physical
injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person who creates in anothers mind
an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to escape is responsible
for whatever the other person may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine
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As found by the trial court, there can be no unlawful aggression on the part of
Joseph because at the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an
egg. According to the trial court, the fact that Joseph was unarmed effectively
belied the allegation of Ronald that he was prompted to retaliate in self-defense
when Joseph first hacked and hit him on his neck. The trial court further pointed
out that if Joseph indeed hacked Ronald on the neck, "it is surprising that the latter
did not suffer any injury when according to them (Ronald, Rolando and Flora
Credo), Joseph was running fast and made a hard thrust on Ronald, hitting the
latters neck."
- State of Necessity
32. Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275. September 27, 2004
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury
feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more
so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks
was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
-Fulfillment of Duty
33. Cabanlig v. Sandiganabayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005
Certainly, an M16 Armalite is a far more powerful and deadly weapon than the
bamboo lance that the fugitive had run away with in People v. Delima. The
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policeman in People v. Delima was held to have been justified in shooting to death
the escaping fugitive because the policeman was merely performing his duty.
In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen
when Valino grabbed the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep
to escape. The policemen would have been justified in shooting Valino if the use
of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape.[22] But Valino was not
only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman.
The policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the
loose firearm. By grabbing Mercados M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm,
Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in grave danger.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom
-- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would
still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real
threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is
already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time
of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a
predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly
attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder
by installment.'" Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in
previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required
imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS,
self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense --
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complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben
was not completely justified under the circumstances.
Exempting Circumstances
- Insanity
37. People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184343, March 2, 2009
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while
committing the act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern,
or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental
faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his
acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An insane person has no full
and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her acts.
- Minority
38. Llave v. People, G.R. No. 166040, April 26, 2006
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted
with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an
essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the
accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or
deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
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and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the
minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes
the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting
victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that
passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was
discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from
the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid
in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained
thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and
should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the
law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC
had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the
application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows: Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural
Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu
of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled
by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
- Accident
42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time
because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense
as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.
Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused
has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The
defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and irresistible master of men
of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the
right of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and ends where it
ends. Although the accused, in fact, injures or kills the victim, however, his act is
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in accordance with law so much so that the accused is deemed not to have
transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and civil liabilities. On the other
hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The basis of the exemption in
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is lack of negligence and intent.
The accused does not commit either an intentional or culpable felony. The accused
commits a crime but there is no criminal liability because of the complete absence
of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act. An
accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances
is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
Mitigating Circumstances
-Praeter Intentionem
44. People v. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which
he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b)
that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating
his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a
direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants
criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had
sufficient time to recover his equanimity. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant
points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife
as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that
he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four
days thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the
attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days
was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could have
regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance
cannot be credited in favor of the accused-appellant.
- Sufficient Provocation
46. Urbano v. People, G.R. No. 182750, January 20, 2009
Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying
to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending
when petitioners lucky punch found its mark. In People v. Macaso, a case where
the accused police officer shot and killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him
with defiant words, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the
shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of Appeals, a case
also involving a policeman who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a
fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the same mitigating circumstance
should not be considered in favor of petitioner.
- Passion/Obfuscation
47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and
passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the
same facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that
passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation
to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover
his moral equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the
discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was
sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
48. People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18, 2015
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that
there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind;
and 2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
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But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two
separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two
circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as
one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that
both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they
should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.
-Voluntary Surrender
50. People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001
The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment
of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that
search and capture would require. Going to the police station to clear his name
does not show any intent of appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities
Aggravating Circumstances
52. People v. Cortes, G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered
for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the
crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is
specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it
facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from
identification or capture." In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused
purposely sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his
identity.
"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it
can not be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance." Here,
treachery qualified the offense to murder.
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- Recidivism
53. People v Molina, G.R. Nos. 134777-78. July 24, 2000
-Reiteracion
54. People v. Cajara, G.R. No. 122498. September 27, 2000
The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art. 14, par.
10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of frustrated
murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to dwelling, illegal
possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his sentences were
later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of P200,000.00. He was
granted conditional pardon by the President of the Philippines on 8 November
1991. Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10, herein cited, is present
when the accused has been previously punished for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached by law to the second
offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a lighter penalty. As already
discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of simple rape and the imposable
penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.Where the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the instant case.
- Treachery
55. People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor
on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself.
Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may
still be appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that
Jesus was stabbed by the group on the lateral part of his body while he was under
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the impression that they were simply leaving the place where they had [a] shabu
session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle driver is seated on the
motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the side car
which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car.
Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing
of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind
him. Thus, the trial courts finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is
treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means,
methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of
treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to
defend himself.
Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult
person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death, treachery
exists.
In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact manner of
the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately after hearing a gunshot, he
could not, and in fact did not, testify as to how the attack had been initiated. The
fact that appellant was standing behind some shrubs when he shot the victim does
not by itself sufficiently establish that the method of execution gave the latter no
opportunity for self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and consciously
adopted by the former without danger to himself.
- Ignominy
59. People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
Alternative Circumstances
60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010
Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not
habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading
intoxication must likewise prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage,
prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. Accused-appellant
utterly failed to present clear and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication
on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was
of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accused-appellants
drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight bottles of gin prior to
the rape incident.
Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed. In People v. Sanchez, et
al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was
not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez
was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one
conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting
crimes. The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
Accomplice
63. People v. Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in
the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design
between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and
assented to Tampus intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She
forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone
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with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus
plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
Accessories
64. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as
an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The
penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in
Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the qualification set
forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement
agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private
properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part
of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly
known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the
effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes
of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code
or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere
accessory but becomes aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the
crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses.
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. evidently, Dimat
knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this
certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino
had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his
promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the
Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
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Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase.
IV. PENALTIES
66. People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the
free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to
the ranged penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised
Penal Code and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern
the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof.
However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua" and death are
indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the
penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier
noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion
perpetua to death" isprision mayor.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the
imposition of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence
imposed (People v. Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service"
of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the
article is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides
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that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe
of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed
the prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high
as 20 years of reclusin temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere
within prisin correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the
afore-stated general rule.
- Subsidiary Imprisonment
71. Narte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004
This Court clarified in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 dated February 14, 2001
that there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
fine. This should finally dispel the petitioners' importunate claim that the imposition
of subsidiary imprisonment in this case is improper.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
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enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental,
and moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all
criminal offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite
minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range
of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of
the Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted.
In Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory to both the Revised Penal Code
and the special laws, and in the same ruling, this Court summarized the
application and non-application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to wit:
g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same.
(People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).
h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1)
year.
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the
accused cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of
which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law
and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court.
(People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-CR, January 22, 1962).
i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the
accused, since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence,
depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record.
The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal
offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws,
with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper
within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be
deemed mandatory.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating circumstance other than the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties.
"It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant
to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
- Probation Law
76. Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for
drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in
statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed
and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule
or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim,index animi sermo, or speech is the
index of intention. Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or apply for
probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he
did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the
conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In
so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990,
which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of
conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated
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homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect
him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit?
He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4
months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing
him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating
the very purpose of the probation law.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this,
the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local
elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the
legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered
by the disqualification.
80. Bala v Judge Jimenez, G.R. No. L-67301, January 29, 1990
under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment if the conditions are violated."
The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section
1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to
do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on or before a definite date,
filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen
the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime
against it. The waiver or loss of the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic
and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to file an information falls
on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the
next working day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal
or prosecution to file the information on the last working day before the criminal
offense prescribes.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the
day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of
the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period.
Thus, the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the
legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not consider the absence of the accused
from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive
period.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control,
like the accuseds delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies.
84. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October
7, 2013
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of
the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect
of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan categorically
stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned.
Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the
doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the prescriptive period
shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before
that, is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period.
To warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or pardon should
be made prior to the institution of the criminal action (People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA
250 [1991]). The present case was filed on February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit
was executed only on March 1, 1988.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the
pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in
violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, the
grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent
Resolution No.12 adopted on 2 June 1994.
In relation to Article 266-C of the RPC, Article 89 of the same Code reads
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
xxxx
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code.
BOOK II
- Piracy
90. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized
in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview
of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go
elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously
part of the act of seizing their boat.
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the arrest
without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. It is not enough
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that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime for an essential precondition under the rule is that the crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first.
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused
and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing
such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused.
Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto
Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days,
counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the
appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.
- Expulsion
94. Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778
The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed
them over to other parties and deposited them in a distant region, deprived these
women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned.
There is no law expressly authorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a new
domicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishes public officials, not
expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compel any person to change his
residence.
When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application
and/ or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or intending to
publish since mere generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of no
consequence and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is
directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized.
Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely
because it was committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If
the killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be
absorbed by the rebellion and the individual misdeed could not be taken with the
rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would
be unrelated to each other. The individual crime would not be a means necessary
for committing the rebellion, as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance
of the latter.
- Sedition
98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common offenses of murder
etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from sedition. Where the acts of
violence were deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, the same does not apply
in the crime of sedition.
-Inciting to Sedition
99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and dishonest
persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals
a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition
to remain loyal to the government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government.
Any citizen may criticize his government and government officials and submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism should be specific and
constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the government. It
must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up.
When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed because the
illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other
offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,
or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d
etat and conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The constitutional bar against double
jeopardy will not apply since these offenses are quite different from one another,
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with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a
special law.
R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime.
The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws, shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the crime
committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding
section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession
of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a
loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal
to that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of
firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the
Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the
violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
- Direct Assault
101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches
to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant is
not actually performing the duties of his office when assaulted, this fact does not
bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority, so long as the
impelling motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there
is a mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time and
place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to sanction unexpected
assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair play.
people who thereafter treacherously slew him, the crime committed is murder with
assault upon a person in authority.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and
for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed
to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in the SALN involves merely a description
of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in a particular set of
facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the
concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines
in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are
related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of
fact. Contrary to petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship may be
proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion.
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Since petitioner Galeos answered No to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has
relatives in the government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he
made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was
then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong
being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN,
Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v.
Mudlong, it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his
information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would
have affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government
position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government service as
required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the
disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted
in the disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j)
(Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the
falsification and malversation are separate offenses. Thus, where the provincial
treasurer, as the custodian of the money forming part of the road and bridge fund,
effected payments to his co-accused for construction materials supposedly
delivered to the province for various projects when in fact no such materials were
delivered, and to camouflage or conceal the defraudation, the accused used six
vouchers which had genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically
authentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimes committed are not complex
but separate crimes of falsification and malversation and the falsifications cannot
be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal
impulse.
108. Tenenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013
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-Usurpation
109. Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the
prosecutions theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can
issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The prosecution asserted
that Ruzol usurped the official functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency
vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged
forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs
may also exercise such authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the
permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood
Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the
subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor and independently of the
official functions granted to the DENR. The records are likewise bereft of any
showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits
could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood
Recovery Permit from the DENR.
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a
buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third,
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent
or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere possession
of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be
sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or possession. The
CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner
as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion
and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence
to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he
used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed
that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials,
the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
the case at bar, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Narciso Sabadlab
and accused-appellant Marcos Sabadlab y Narciso alias Bong Pango could have
been different persons, the established fact remains that it was accused-appellant
who was caught in flagrante delicto by the buy-bust team. Following the
aforementioned jurisprudence, even the lack of participation of PDEA would not
make accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence obtained pursuant thereto
inadmissible. Neither is prior surveillance a necessity for the validity of the buy-
bust operation.
It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the items seized
from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the
place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody
and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v.
Resurreccion, the Court explained that "marking" of the seized items "immediately
after seizure and confiscation" may be undertaken at the police station rather than
at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in
illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
120. People v. Lali y Purih, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to
Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a
passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli
and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she could have been
travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover,
even if it is true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime
of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or knowledge
under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to
transportation of victims, but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for
trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to
illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are
also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for
prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed
through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform
penalty therefor. Even when the Information charges willful malversation,
conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the
evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.
This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public funds or
property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public
funds or property and that he could not account for them, or did not have them in
his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for their
disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation
even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation, and the only evidence is
that there is a shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to
satisfactorily explain.
In the present case, considering that the shortage was duly proven by the
prosecution, petitioners retaliation against the BIR for not promoting him clearly
does not constitute a satisfactory or reasonable explanation for his failure to
account for the missing amount.
-Technical Malversation
124. Parungao v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 96025, May 15, 1991
In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his
own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the
latter's personal use. In technical malversation, the public officer applies public
funds under his administration not for his or another's personal use, but to a public
use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance.
Criminal Law
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include
the crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information.
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third
element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the public fund
used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization
given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34
secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use private party rather than
private person to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term party is a technical word having a precise
meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from person which, in general usage,
refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not
a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean
either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his
personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial
jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.s residence, they accorded such
privilege to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee
charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Despite APIs obvious lack of financial qualification and absence of basic terms and
conditions in the submitted proposal, petitioner who chaired the PBAC,
recommended the approval of APIs proposal just forty-five (45) days after the last
publication of the invitation for comparative proposals, and subsequently
requested the SB to pass a resolution authorizing him to enter into a MOA with API
as the lone bidder for the project. It was only in the MOA that the details of the
construction, terms and conditions of the parties obligations, were laid down at the
time API was already awarded the project. Even the MOA provisions remain vague
as to the parameters of the project, which the Sandiganbayan found as placing
API at an arbitrary position where it can do as it pleases without being accountable
to the municipality in any way whatsoever. True enough, when API failed to
execute the construction works and abandoned the project, the municipality found
itself at extreme disadvantage without recourse to a performance security that API
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In the present case, petitioner is solely charged with violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019. He is being held liable for gross and inexcusable negligence in performing
the duties primarily vested in him by law, resulting in undue injury to private
complainant. The good faith of heads of offices in signing a document will only be
appreciated if they, with trust and confidence, have relied on their subordinates in
whom the duty is primarily lodged. Moreover, the undue injury to private
complainant was established.
The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done
without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the
palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to
private complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers
dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory,
washroom, and waste disposal site.
131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs
finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report.
The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged
on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of
walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms
on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six
merchandising stores where the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price
listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis
tingting purchases of Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with
the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Paraaque
Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the
evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis
tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the
audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis
tingting actually utilized by the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular
inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by
the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have
been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be
concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the
government because only then could a determination have been made to show
that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable
under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
-Anti-Plunder Act
133. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral
or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check
Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the
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Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by
the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element,
that is, a person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain
consciousness after the severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father.
Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by
Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him the day after.
Noemars Death Certificate was also presented in evidence.
present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder,
therefore erred.
Murder
138. People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of
the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)
the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
Homicide
141. Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent to take
his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to
exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is
often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the
nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.
Anti-Hazing Law
143. Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have
spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[]
previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal. Although it may be
regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition
that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered
an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws,
all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule
against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny
Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious
intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases,
considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing,
and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
Unintentional Abortion
144. People v. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884, March 30, 1988
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an
abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to
fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has
not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with
the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an
intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the
victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
Mutilation
145. Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of
mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1)
that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation;
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and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive
the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the
public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as
defined and penalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way
deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his
physical self. Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a
ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation. This we cannot
do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of
our penal code.
Rape
147. People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the
vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is
no penetration of the female organ because although the offender has commenced
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was
performed.
the woman was below 12 years of age. These elements were sufficiently
established during trial and were not rebutted by the defense with any solid
evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any certificate of live birth or
any similar authentic document to prove the age of AAA when she was sexually
violated.Neither did the appellant expressly admit AAAs age.
Thus, the appellant is guilty of simple rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised
Penal Code, and was properly sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy
will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a
single criminal act.
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term homicide is to be
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the
circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation)
alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same
would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still
rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance only.
profit but also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in
any lascivious conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a child
subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse. A child
is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult.
160. People v. Baluya y Notarte, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011
Appellant's arguments that the victim is free to go home if he wanted to because
he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty and that there is no
evidence to show that Glodil sustained any injury, cannot hold water. The CA is
correct in holding that for kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender
kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. Where the victim in a
kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender
forcibly restrained the victim. As discussed above, leaving a child in a place from
which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around
the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such
a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. It
remains undisputed that it was his first time to reach Novaliches and that he did
not know his way home from the place where he was left. It just so happened that
the victim had the presence of mind that, when he saw an opportunity to escape,
he ran away from the place where appellant left him. Moreover, he is intelligent
enough to read the signboards of the passenger jeepneys he saw and follow the
route of the ones going to his place of residence.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims
liberty, coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form
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and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go
out of the place of confinement or detention, or is restricted or impeded in his liberty
to move.
In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter
refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie
pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed
outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced property which is high enough
such that people outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when
appellant tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of her
liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home. Because of her tender age, and because she
did not know her way back home, she was then and there deprived of her
liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a situation.
It has been repeatedly held that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention
is immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more or less
one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could go home.
162. People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special
complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping
with rape. This is because these composite acts are regarded as a single
indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single
penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape because no
matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only
one crime committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender should
not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia, we explained that if the taking
was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped several times, the crimes
committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the
forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other
counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.
crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the
custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted
for months or only for a couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one
point in time, physical and actual custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure
to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters
mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this
case.
Grave Threats
164. Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not
be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling incident which transpired
earlier between petitioner and Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at
Julias forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury
on her person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165. Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to cause
intimidation to the petitioners.
In this case, petitioners claim that respondents padlocked the Unit and cut off the
facilities in the presence of security guards. As aptly held by the CA, it was not
alleged that the security guards committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor
was it alleged that the guards were not customarily stationed there and that they
produced fear on the part of petitioners. To determine the degree of the
intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. Here,
the petitioners who were allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights. The presence of the guards in fact was not found by
petitioners to be significant because they failed to mention it in their Joint Affidavit-
Complaint. What they insist is that, the mere padlocking of the Unit prevented them
from using it for the purpose for which it was intended. This, according to the
petitioners, is grave coercion on the part of respondents.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the
victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent
intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum.
Appellant's plan did not materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced
upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne;
much less, that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne
to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction
on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup." Accordingly, appellant cannot be
convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the
same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any
person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the
prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such
a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty
of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made
under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant
forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to
Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going
home, and we cannot find any.
The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to robbery and
the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the accused. Was the
purpose with intent to gain to take the property of another by use of force or
intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery. Was the purpose, without authority of
law but still believing himself the owner or the creditor, to compel another to do
something against his will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion
under Article 497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a man who
had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own hands
and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was
lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168. Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006
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Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents
thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust
vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary
that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said
petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed,
irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed,
by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented
her from selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was
deprived of her possession of the stall from January 21, 1997.
170. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995
While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on them. Under
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery carries the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band, evident premeditation, craft
and disguise against appellants. However, these circumstances were not
specifically alleged in the information as required under Rule 110, Section 8 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and
mitigating circumstances can be deemed to have attended the commission of the
offense, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on them.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim
of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are
killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of
authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony
would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and
infanticide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the same. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of
homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not
of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide
are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the
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robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his
co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has
materialized.
Theft
178. Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final
payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their
obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their agreement, petitioner was to
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account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners
their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido
what was due him under the construction contract.
Qualified theft
179. Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles
308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal
property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with
intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310
of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence proved,
through the prosecutions eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioners instruction,
several pieces of wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October
2001 and once in November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street,
Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when
he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project
site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the
construction materials.
Anti-Carnapping Law
181. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful
taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration
is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected
from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owners consent constitutes gain.
The acts committed by appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the
deceased was the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that,
in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not
necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the
owner thereof. What is simply required is that the property taken does not belong
to the offender. Actual possession of the property by the person dispossessed
suffices. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another
against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,
unlawful taking of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender.
Estafa
185. Espino v. People, G.R. No. 188217, July 3, 2013
When the information alleges the crime of estafa specified under paragraph 1(b)
and yet what was proven was estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the same Art. 315 of
the RPC, what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information and not the caption
of the information. The information in this case may be interpreted as charging the
accused with both estafa under paragraph 1 (b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a).
It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act can give rise to
two offenses, all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of
commission.
in the other estafas. In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her
subsequent conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it
was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element
of the estafa that the petitioner was charged with.
188. Galvez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere filing of a
formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid.
Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree
of proof is met to justify respondents termination. The affidavit executed by
Montegrico simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed
pilferage, which allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for
dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support
the charge of pilferage.
BP 22
191. People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that appellant
received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer. She was not certain
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if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor of the checks. All she knew was
that a demand letter was sent by her lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after
complainant made that presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against
appellant at the Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter
supposedly sent through registered mail was actually received by appellant.
With the evident lack of notice of dishonor of the checks, appellant cannot be held
guilty of violation of BP 22. The lack of such notice violated appellants right to
procedural due process. It is a general rule that when service of notice is an issue,
the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The
burden of proving receipt of notice rests upon the party asserting it and the
quantum of proof required for conviction in this criminal case is proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
193. Dico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141669, February 28, 2005
A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus
indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent
by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere
oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice
is fatal for the prosecution.
The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the drawer or
maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent criminal prosecution if he
pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that the check has not been paid.
The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge
of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within
90 days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the
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maker to make arrangements for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice
thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of
the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to
arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from
his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time thereof.
Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be presented
for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current
banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, 23 or 180
days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of
the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner
that he would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to
deposit the said checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly
notified of such fact but failed to make arrangements for full payment within five (5)
banking days thereof. There is, on record, sufficient evidence that petitioner had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the
time of issuance of the checks. And despite petitioners insistent plea of innocence,
we find no error in the respondent courts affirmance of his conviction by the trial
court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
- Other Deceits
198. Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005
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For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the prosecution
must prove the following essential elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or
pretense other than those in the preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice.[40] It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with
her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in
Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall provision
for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment.
-Arson
199. People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor:
(a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as
the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c)
if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has
already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then
there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.
- Malicious Mischief
202. Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven
beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of
the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the
evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased
him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more
believable than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which
moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of
the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private
complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to
see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second,
the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner
was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between
him and the private complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had
proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious
mischief.
204. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80838, November 29, 1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified
Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she must be
over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, Consented
Abduction, in addition to the two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking
away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery
from the offender, and, (2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd
designs while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by
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abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has sexual
intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205. Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation
be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation
annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. Here, the
victim was locked inside a windowless room together with her aggressor who
poked a gun at her forehead. Even a grown man would be paralyzed with fear if
threatened at gunpoint, what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old
when she was subjected to such atrocity.
Petitioners acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her,
mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual
organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted
rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into
the complainants sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of
lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and
intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that
the offended party is another person of either sex.
Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610. It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the
slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer
lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like
manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina,
the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape
through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding,
in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be
pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and
licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim,
however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what
specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the
principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape
through sexual assault.
Criminal Law
-Forcible Abduction
208. People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless
of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3)
that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when the
woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve
years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was
taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by
accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be
expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs of accused-
appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance
need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since
the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering that it was raining, going to
the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to seek
shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the taking advantage
of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the
evidence shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected in
furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction
is established by the actual rape of the victim.
The principal objective of Sabadlab and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from
Dapitan Street and in bringing her to another place was to rape and ravish her.
This objective became evident from the successive acts of Sabadlab immediately
after she had alighted from the car in completely undressing her as to expose her
whole body (except the eyes due to the blindfold), in kissing her body from the
neck down, and in having carnal knowledge of her (in that
order). Although forcible abduction was seemingly committed, we cannot hold him
guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape when the objective of
the abduction was to commit the rape. Under the circumstances, the rape
absorbed the forcible abduction.
In the case at bar, while it is true that the element of moral ascendancy is present,
respondent being the person who recommended complainant to her present
position, complainant has failed to prove the alleged sexual advances by evidence
other than her bare allegations in the affidavit-complaint. Even her own actions or
omissions operate to cast doubt on her claim.
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His
contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and
for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle
of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
Criminal Law
215. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity
and commitment.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to
show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.
Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the
publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly
responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said
libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, however, includes not only
Criminal Law
the author but also the person who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge
or participation in the publication of the offending article is not required.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that
appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the preparation
of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate,
on which the subject articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold
positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president
in the publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his
responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they are
not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and
publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and
control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally
liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article. On the theory
that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the
paper, it is held that said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the
duties to employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager
knew the contents of the publication.
- Slander
222. Villanueva v. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006
Criminal Law
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase Fuck You, which is
similar to the expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such
expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People, where the Court said
that: This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever,
taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a
mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived
provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at
complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual
milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to
express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of
his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall
bearresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not
exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari.
Criminal Negligence
225. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 172716, November 17, 2010
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our
penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga the proposition that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative
intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes