1

JAVELLANA VS THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

50 SCRA 30; March 31, 1973

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed a prohibition case to restrain respondents from implementing
any of the provisions of the proposed constitution not found in the present constitution. Javellana
maintained that the respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing proposed
constitution and that the president is without power to proclaim the ratification of the constitution. Similar
actions were filed by Vidal Tan, Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners pray for the nullification of
Proclamation 1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order, decree, and proclamation which are similar in
objective.

ISSUES:
1. Is the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 justiciable?
2. Was the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention ratified validly in compliance to
applicable laws?
3. Was the proposed Constitution acquiesced by the people?
4. Are the petitioners entitled relief?
5. Is the proposed Constitution in force?

HELD:
Whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to an existing constitution is a
judicial question as it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been
amended in the manner required by the constitution. The Constitution proposed by the 1971 Convention
was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which provides
only one way for ratification (election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and only with qualified
voters). Due to the environmental and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e. martial law) the Court
cannot honestly say that the people acquiesced to the proposed Constitution. The majority ruled to
dismiss the cases as the effectivity of the proposed Constitution is the basic issue posed by the cases
which considerations other than judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The new constitution is in force as
there are not enough votes to say otherwise.
2

Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order
No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2
was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081
placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject
to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices
held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation,
which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent
danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of
martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.
3

PVTA v. CIR
65 SCRA 416

FACTS:
On December 20, 1966, private respondents filed a petition to seek relief for their alleged overtime
services in accordance with the Commonwealth Act No. 444. Respondent court sustained the claims of
private respondents hence the petition of certiorari and plea for reversal from PVTA. Petitioner contends
that they are exercising governmental functions thus they are exempt from the Eight-Hour Labor Law and
respondent court have no jurisdiction over them.

ISSUE:
Is the PVTA discharging governmental functions and not proprietary functions thus exempting it from
Commonwealth Act. No. 444?

HELD:
There is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor formerly reserved for
private enterprise. Just because the petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary
function, it does not follow that the labor controversy is beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent court.
The growing complexities of modern society have rendered the traditional classification of the functions
of the government (constituent and ministrant), unrealistic, not to say, obsolete. The contention that the
Eight-Hour Labor Law did not apply to the petitioner, moreover, lacked merit on the grounds of the
casualness in the way such argument was advanced in the petition.
 4

CABAAS v. PILAPIL
58 SCRA 94

FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil, the insured, had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, Melchora Cabanas. The
complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant Francisco Pilapil, the brother of the deceased is
the one designated by the latter to act as his daughters trustee during her minority. Thus, upon
Florentinos death, the proceeds were paid to his brother hence the complaint of the mother whom the
child lives with. Petitioner contends that she should be entitled to act as the trustee of the insurance policy
of her child.

ISSUE:
Does the State have the authority to interfere with the terms of the insurance policy by virtue of parens
patriae?

HELD:
The appealed decision adheres to the concept that the judiciary, as an agent of the State, acts as parens
patriae. As such, the judiciary cannot remain insensible to the validity of the petitioners plea. The State
shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution. The Constitution, moreover, dictates that it is the
family as a unit that has to be strengthened. As such, the decision of the lower courts, entitling the mother
as the trustee, is affirmed.
 5

CO KIM CHAN v. VALDEZ TAN KEH

75 PHIL 113

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in
petitioners case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of court during the
Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue
pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was
no de facto government.

ISSUE:

1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and
valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of said
court?
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?

HELD:
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military
forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto
governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that
the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not
invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence of
the courts depend upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, not
political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed by
legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in
cases not of political complexion.
6

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS.

PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986

FACTS:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3
was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people
have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not
merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
7

LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and
that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such
thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.
8

MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION
114 SCRA 77

FACTS:
On August 6, 1968, petitioner, Bernadita Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI of
Leyte, now Associate Justice of CA, with acts unbecoming of a judge when the latter purchased a
property which was previously the subject of litigation on which he rendered decision. Respondent and his
wife were also members of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and
interests in said property were conveyed. According to the petitioner, respondent allegedly violated Article
1491 (5) of the New Civil Code and Article 14 (1) and (5) of Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Sec. 12 XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of Canons of Judicial Ethics.

ISSUE:
Is Article 14 of the Code of Commerce still in force?

HELD:
Article 14 partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government
and certain public officers and employees like justices and judges. Said provision must be deemed to
have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated. As such, Article 14 is not in force. The respondent is not found to
have violated the articles invoked by the petitioner but he was advised by the Court to be more discreet in
his private and business activities.

9
SYQUIA v. ALMEDA LOPEZ
84 PHIL 312

FACTS: Plaintiffs Syquia leased their apartment buildings

in favor of the US for the duration of the war and six
months after, unless sooner terminated by the US. These
were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US
armed forces. Six months after Japan surrendered,
Syquia requested the return of the buildings but were
advised that the US wanted to continue occupying the
premises. They requested for a renegotiation of the lease.
US officers refused but advised them that they would
vacate in a few months time. But because the US did not
vacate within the given period, Syquia filed an action for
unlawful detainer with the MTC against the US officers.
US said that the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendants and of the subject matter because the real
party in interest was the US government and not the
individual officers named in the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.

HELD: Since the action was against the US government,

Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case. The
US has not given its consent to the filing of the suit which
is essentially against her, though not in name. This is not
only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own
Government without the latters consent, but it is of a
citizen filing an action against a foreign government
without the said governments consent, which renders
more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his
country.

10
11
SANDERS v. VERIDIANO
162 SCRA 88

FACTS: Sanders was a special services director of the

US Naval Station in Olongapo. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which
includes the said station. Private respondent Rossi is an
American citizen with permanent residence in the
Philippines. Respondents Rossi and Wyer (who died)
were gameroom attendants in the special services
department of the Naval Station.
In 1975, Rossi and Wyer were advised that their
employment had been converted to permanent full-time to
permanent part-time. This led them to file a protest for
their conversion (demotion) to the US Dept of Defense.
Hearing was conducted which reported an autocratic form
of supervision.
Sanders disagreed and asked for the rejection of
the report of the hearing. Later on, a letter allegedly from
Moreau was received. The letter said that the records are
public.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners were performing their official
duties when they did the acts for which they have been
sued for damages by the private respondents.
HELD/RATIO: On the basis of these antecedent facts,
the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance
of Olongapo City for damages against the herein
petitioners on November 8, 1976. The plaintiffs claimed
that the letters contained libelous imputations that had
exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish
and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings
was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the
petitioners were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a
special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts
complained of were performed by them in the discharge of
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had
no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state
immunity.

12
USA v. GUINTO
182 SCRA 644

FACTS:
The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No.
76607, private respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for
barbering services in Clark Air Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust
operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming
that because of the acts of the respondents, he lost his job. In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR No. 80258,
complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by
plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners immune from suit?

HELD:
It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They
cannot be directly impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No.
79470, petitioners are not immune for restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of
damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence presented. Barber shops are also
commercial enterprises operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR No. 76607 cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive the
evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in
what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

13
THE HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO

238 SCRA 524

FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A,located in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila andregistered in the name of petitioner. Said
Lot5-A is contiguous toLots5-B and 5-Dregistered in the name of the Philippine
RealtyCorporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup,through Msgr.
Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.Later, Licup assigned his rights to
the sale to private respondent,Starbright Enterprises. The squatters refused to vacate
the lots soldto private respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties hasthe
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squattersoccurred. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale bypetitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and
DevelopmentCorporation (Tropicana).Private respondent filed a complaint
forannulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specificperformance and
damages against petitioner, represented by thePapal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.
ISSUE:
WON (whether or not) the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit.
HELD:
YES. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged inthe activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is notengaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act ortransaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit ofa sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jureimperii
especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.Lot5-Awas acquired by petitioner
as a donation from the Archdiocese ofManila. The donation was made not for
commercial purpose, but forthe use of petitioner to construct thereon the official
place ofresidence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign toacquire
property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary forthe creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognizedin the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. In Article31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted
immunity fromthe civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over anyreal
action relating to private immovable property situated inthe territory of the receiving
state which the envo yholds on behalf ofthe sending state for the purposes of the
mission. If this immunity isprovided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason shouldimmunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in thiscase
is the Holy See.