1.

Unconstitutionality of law cannot be cured by reenactment

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a
recruitment and placement agency.
FACTS:
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on
June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy claims that
she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed
the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed
and awarding her three months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation,
and attorneys fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondents salary should
be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled
that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation
of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence
of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All
laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would
warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

Constitutional supremacy not an automatic

excuse for non-compliance of treaty
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

DECISION
(En Banc)
BUENA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and
was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the
Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,
materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave
abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
`
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state,
 the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as
long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be
taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long
as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply
with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Self-executing vs. non-self-executing provisions

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its
stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Whether 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming 10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino corporation,
over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation.

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]

1. YES, 10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and
does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect.
 Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further
laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.
The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to
enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first
paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it
means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

xxx xxx xxx

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become
part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview
of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot
sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.

3. YES, GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from
the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a
public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It
is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed
to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.

4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder
after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending
of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the
highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if
we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this
may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law

Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Self Executing Statutes

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic
partner, will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a managers check as bid security, which
GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the
petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there
is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a
landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in
1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there
is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino
matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and
meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated
nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution
and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which
investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and
obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross
errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution
is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than
let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding
documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm
clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching
bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect
the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY
G.R. No. L-36142, March 31 1973, 50 SCRA 33

FACTS:
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana
filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed
Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a
qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new
constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon
ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens
Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a
free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and
therefore non-justiciable.

2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people.

4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

HELD:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new
constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that
the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935
Constitution) shall show.

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and
having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizens assemblies void. Proceedings
held in such Citizens Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications
prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there
is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from
those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with
the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in
plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the
Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by
the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry,
when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point
is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and
without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.
The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the
returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the
1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to
insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the
Citizens Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC
the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,"
independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged
results of the citizens assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the
alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had
certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizens
assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there
have been no such citizens assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the
Philippines.

Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department,
in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This
is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the
people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
Neither does the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their
compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of
said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these
conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to
a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative
measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results
of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive
department of the Government.

In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due
course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the
people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935
Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed
Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of
the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they
could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2
members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new
Constitution is not in force.

Aquino v. Enrile
59 SCRA 183

FACTS:
The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and
detained by the military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested
and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or for
having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the
country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No. 2 was issued
by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation
1081 placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:
1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare
martial law subject to judicial inquiry?; and
2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial
law?

HELD:
5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry,
while 4 Justices held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this
Court in the present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the
proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in the state of
martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to
persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation,
which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety
against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes
precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the
writ as to the persons referred to in this case.

Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC

140 SCRA 455
January 7, 1986

FACTS:

11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for
special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President
and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it
allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election.

Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation did not
create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could
be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier
than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President
is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is
held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath
office ten (10) days after his proclamation.

The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited
constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office
and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their
standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate
his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest.

ISSUE:

Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the
holding of the elections

HELD:

The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as
there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.

The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely
justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the
actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be truly decided only by the people in
their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political
than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through
their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new
president.

Case outline: Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Elizabeth
Dimaano G.R. No. 104768

The Case
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, Elizabeth
Dimaano G.R. No. 104768
 Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November 1991 and
25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.

The first Resolution dismissed petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Amended

Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners (Republic of
the Philippines) Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or
in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the
presentation of its evidence.

Statement of Facts
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)

o President Corazon C. Aquino, immediately upon

assuming Malacaang, enacts Executive Order 1 (EO No. 1) or the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). It is
mandated to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates.

o EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power:

(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to

accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the
power

(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.

o Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,

created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate
reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.

AFP Board

o The AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q.
Josephus Ramas.

o On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and findings on

Ramas alleged ill gotten wealth. It submits the following findings:
 Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the
owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista,
Quezon City. The aforementioned property in Quezon City
may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu

City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

Communication equipment and facilities are found in the

premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a Confidential Agent of the
Military Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the
PC Command of Batangas.

These items could not have been in the possession of

Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and

communications equipment, the raiding team was also able
to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3
March 1986.

Aside from the military equipment/items and

communications equipment, the raiding team was also able
to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3
March 1986.

Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus

Ramas mistress. She does not have any means to acquire
the communications equipment as well as the
aforementioned money.

o The AFP Board finds a prima facie case against Major General
Josephus Ramas for ill gotten wealth and unexplained wealth in the
amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

o Decision: It is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.)

be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379,
as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.

o On 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under

Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) against Ramas.
 o Amended Complaint: Amended Complaint further alleged that
Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public
office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.

o The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a
previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents
have violated RA No. 1379. The Amended Complaint prayed for, among
others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment
in favor of the State.

Ramas Answer:

o Ramas contends that his property consisted only of a residential

house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which
was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income.

o He denies ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,

communications equipment and other items confiscated from the
house of Dimaano.

o Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting

her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-
November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her
house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan

o On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the

complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with being
subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.

o Petitioner fails to present witnesses and delays the court for over a
year.

o on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to

trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the
interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within
which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take
drastic action.
 o Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on
Republic v. Migrino.The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not
have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
subordinates of former President Marcos.

o Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The
counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

o The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the
Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture
cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

o Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance

with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve
the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations

in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and
Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not

constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items

confiscated.

Issues
1. PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

2. Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of

Evidence Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing
the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

3. Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure Petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears
 a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of
petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much
evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are
inadmissible in evidence.Ruling

1. First issue:

1. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall
under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1.
These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the administration of former President Marcos by being the
latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate,
taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft
and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.

2. Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel
before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner
argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to
receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably
making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

3. We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President

Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.

4. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make

him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos.

2. Second issue:

1. Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this

case, we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-
completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.

3. Third issue:

1. On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos

residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but
Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the
items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not
 included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items:
one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56
ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash
consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

2. Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after
the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were
taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.
Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed
private respondents exclusionary right.

3. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from

an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights
under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at
the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did
not enjoy any constitutional right.

4. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

5. The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was
bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power
by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance
by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

6. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the
protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

7. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary

government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of
the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
 there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum.

8. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A

revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the
established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change
in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or
at least some acts of violence. In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law
and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not
prescribed by the first order itself.

9. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a

revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could
validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the
sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary
to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

10. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue
here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part
of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate
the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the
1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

11. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,

directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long
as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have
also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to
be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to
the items specifically described in the warrant.

12. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant
did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
 land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did
not particularly describe these items and the raiding team
confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no
legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could
be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.The seizure of
these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband
per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from
whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and
seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these
items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be
returned immediately to Dimaano.

The Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
are AFFIRMED.

IN RE: LETTER OF REYNATO PUNO

June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA

FACTS:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November
1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals. It appears
from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but
took his oath of office for said position only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in
the Office of the Solicitor General since 1974.

On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant
to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For
Other Purposes.

Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On 7 November 1984, petitioner accepted an appointment to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of
Justice; he thus ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.

The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a reorganization of the entire government,
including the Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a
Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now Senator Neptali Gonzales as Chairman
and then Solicitor General, now Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoez as Vice Chairman.
President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No.
33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary.

The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate Justice of the new Court of Appeals
and assigned him the rank of number eleven (11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments
were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioners seniority ranking changed, however, from number
eleven (11) to number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be attributed to inadvertence for,
otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33.

Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to comply with her own Executive Order
No. 33 so much so that the correction of the inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as
well as the spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of constitutional confrontation (between
the President and the Supreme Court).

In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted Justice Punos request. The
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is directed to correct the seniority rank
of Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number five (5). However,
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed
by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the
ordered correction. They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members
and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court; neither can he claim that he was returning to
his former court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment.

Petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in
the Court of Appeals is now number five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution,
she had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the Freedom Constitution) that no
right provided under the unratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution.

Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of
Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate,
according to positioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the
original statute.

Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be
usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be regulated by the Constitution and by the
appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by Executive Order No. 33 for the power of appointment cannot be
wielded in violation of law

ISSUE:
Whether or not the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate any claim to precedence or
seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court which
existing prior to Executive Order No. 33.

HELD:
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the
Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in
the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the
aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986. A revolution has been defined as the complete
overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it, or as
a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system usually effected with violence or
at least some acts of violence.

It has been said that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is
derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard
to the existing constitution.

These summarize the Aquino governments position that its mandate is taken from a direct exercise of the power
of the Filipino people.

A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order was overthrown by the Aquino
government. A legal order is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the
enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may be
readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are ascertained, it becomes an easy matter
to locate their enactments. The rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal
order of that constitutional state. It is assumed that the legal order remains as a culture system of the polity as
long as the latter endures and that a point may be reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be
operative as a whole for it is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials.

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was
achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier
declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of
Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the
appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the legal system then in effect, had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.

The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals,
including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are recognized
and upheld.

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