Gsis Cases

G.R. No.
98395 October 28, 1994
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DR. MANUEL BARADERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 102449
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and MATILDE S. BELO, respondents.
Belo, Abiera & Associates for Matilde S. Belo.
QUIASON, J.:
Before us are two petitions docketed as G.R. No. 98395 and G.R.
No. 102449. The petitions were consolidated since they principally involved the same issue and
parties.
We grant both petitions.
G.R. No. 98395
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to reverse and set aside
four orders of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), namely: (1) the Resolution No. 90-642 dated July
16, 1990, which resolved as creditable for retirement purposes the service of private
respondent Manuel Baradero, who served as Sangguniang Bayan member on a per diem basis from
January 1, 1976 to October 20, 1978; (2) the Order dated September 20, 1990 directing the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 90-642; (3) the Order dated December 7, 1990 directing the
President and General Manager of petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of Resolution No.
90-642; and (4) the Resolution No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991, which dismissed petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 20, 1990.
Dr. Manuel Baradero was a government employee, who occupied the position of Medical Officer IV
in the Philippine Medical Care Commission, until he reached the mandatory age of retirement of 65
years old.
He served the Philippine Army as an enlisted man from November 17, 1942 until June 30, 1945. He
resumed his government career on January 1, 1976, when he was elected a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of La Castellana, Negros Occidental. As such, he
received per diem for every session attended. He resigned from the Sangguniang Bayan on October
10, 1976. On October 20, 1978, he was appointed Medical Officer I at the Philippine Medical Care
Commission, where he served until he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old
(Rollo, p. 28).
Prior to turning 65 years old, Dr. Baradero applied for compulsory retirement with petitioner, which
credited in his favor 13 years of government service, excluding his term as a Sangguniang Bayan
member. He requested an extension of service from the CSC to enable him to complete 15 years of
government service. This was necessary so that he may avail of retirement benefits.
The request was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 90-642 dated July 16, 1990. Instead, it
ruled that Dr. Baradero's two-year stint as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan be considered as
creditable service, hence completing the mandatory 15-year service and making him eligible for
retirement benefits (Rollo, p. 28).
The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:
(1) Per diem was expressly excluded in the definition of compensation in RA 1573 on
June 16, 1956. Prior to this, services paid on per diem basis were considered
creditable.
(2) Per diems were excluded from the definition of compensation because " per
diems, by themselves are usually of minimal amounts which cannot actually support
an insurance coverage" (Office of the General Counsel Opinion 08-85, June 3,
1985). It had been maintained that "salary is essential to insurance in the System, as
it serves as the basis for the determination of the monthly premiums or contributions"
(Government Corporate Counsel Opinion No. 198, s. 1957).
(3) In the case of the late Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security
System, Commissioner Ferrer received per diems not only for attending meetings of
the Commission but also for hearing cases as hearing officer. With the almost daily
hearings of Commissioner Ferrer, he was said to have been performing full-time
service and received substantial amount of per diems such that "the so-called per
diems that
he received were not really per diems but compensation" (OGC Opinion 08-85).
Hence, his services as hearing Commissioner were considered creditable, but
his per diem for attending the board meetings were excluded in the computation of
his retirement benefits (Rollo, p. 32).
The GSIS advised that the CSC extend the services of Dr. Baradero until he completes the required
15 years so that he may avail of retirement benefits.
On September 20, 1990, the CSC issued an order directing the GSIS to implement Resolution No.
90-642 (Rollo, p. 35).
The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order (Rollo, p. 37), which was denied by the CSC
in its Resolution No. 91-526 dated April 23, 1991. The resolution further directed the GSIS to comply
with the CSC resolution and order under pain of contempt (Rollo, p. 49).
Hence, this petition where the GSIS charges the CSC with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that:
(1) services rendered on a per diem basis is creditable for purposes of retirement; and (2) it has
exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of services which are creditable.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment," which
submitted its position that the law expressly excludes services rendered on per diem basis in
determining creditable government service for retirement purposes.
The Solicitor General is of the opinion that the CSC's resolutions and order crediting such services
were in violation of the law, and encroached on the power of the GSIS to administer and implement
retirement laws. He therefore recommended that the instant petition be given due course (Rollo, p.
100).
G.R. No. 102449
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to reverse and set aside
three orders of the CSC, namely: (1) the Resolution dated June 7, 1989, which resolved as
creditable for retirement purposes the services rendered by respondent Matilde S. Belo, who served
as Vice-Governor of Capiz in a hold-over capacity from December 31, 1976 to January 1, 1979; (2)
the Order dated July 18, 1991 directing the President and General Manager of petitioner to show
cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the implementation of CSC
Resolution No. 89-368; and (3) the Order dated October 3, 1991, finding the President and General
Manager of petitioner guilty of indirect contempt with penalty of a fine of P1,000.00 per day of
defiance until the implementation of CSC Resolution
No. 89-368.
Matilde Belo retired from the government service on February 2, 1988. At the time of her retirement,
Belo was the Vice-Governor of Capiz in a
hold-over capacity. She served as Governor of Capiz from January 25, 1972 until February 1, 1988.
As an elected government official, Belo received a fixed salary of P13,000.00 per annum from
January 25, 1976 until December 31, 1976. Thereafter, she held the same position in a hold-over
capacity and was remunerated as follows: (1) from December 31, 1976 until January 1, 1979, she
received per diem for every session attended of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and (2) from
December 31, 1979 until February 1, 1988, she received a fixed salary ranging from P23,000.00 to
P45,000.00 per annum (Rollo, p. 25).
Belo sought an opinion from the CSC to determine if the services she rendered from December 31,
1976 until January 1, 1979, in which period she was paid on a per diem basis, is creditable for
retirement purposes.
In response to the query, the CSC issued Resolution No. 89-368 dated June 7, 1987, which affirmed
that her services for said period was creditable (Rollo, pp. 25-26).
Belo's application for retirement was referred to the GSIS Committee on Claims, which adopted a
position contrary to that of the CSC.
On August 6, 1991, the GSIS received the Order dated July 18, 1991, which directed its President
and General Manager to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for the delay in the
implementation of CSC Resolution No. 89-368 (Rollo, pp. 28).
The GSIS filed its "Manifestation/Explanation," alleging that it cannot implement the resolution
considering that it has a pending petition for certiorari before this Court in the case of Dr. Baradero
(G.R. No. 98395), where the same issue was raised (Rollo, p. 30).
On October 3, 1991, the CSC issued an order finding the President and General Manager of GSIS
guilty of indirect contempt. Both were meted a penalty of P1,000.00 fine for each day of defiance
until the implementation of Resolution No. 89-368. The CSC noted that the mere pendency of the
case of Dr. Baradero cannot prevent the implementation of its resolution unless this Court issues a
temporary restraining order, and that said case had nothing to do with the case of Belo (Rollo, p. 34).
The GSIS filed the instant petition, charging the CSC with committing the same errors in G.R. No.
98395.
The Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting its "Manifestation and Motion in
Lieu of Comment" filed in G.R. No. 98395, holding the view that the law excluded services rendered
on a per diem basis, in crediting the length of service for retirement purposes (Rollo, p. 62).
In her comment, Belo insisted that CSC was correct in finding that her services rendered on a per
diem basis are creditable for retirement purposes. She claimed that the case of Commissioner
Ferrer of the Social Security Commission applied to her case by analogy.
She likewise contended that Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) vests in the
CSC jurisdiction over matters regarding
the accreditation of government services. She particularly cites Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V
thereof which enumerates the powers and functions of the CSC, among which is to:
xxx xxx xxx
17. Administer the retirement program for government employees and accredit
government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement (Emphasis supplied);
xxx xxx xxx
II
The issues to be resolved are: (1) Is government service rendered on a per diem basis creditable for
computing the length of service for retirement purposes; and (2) Is petitioner the proper government
agency in determining what service is creditable for retirement purposes?
Section 35 of P.D. No. 1146 (Government Service Insurance Act of 1987) vests in petitioner the
power to implement the provisions of said law, which includes the guaranty of retirement benefits.
Under the epigraph "Benefits," Section 10 thereof provides for the computation of service, and reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Computation of Service.
For the purpose of this section, the term service shall include full time service with
compensation: Provided, That part-time and other services with compensation may
be included under such rules and regulations prescribed by the System (Emphasis
supplied).
It is therefore material in the claim of retirement benefits that the employee should have
rendered service with compensation.
"Compensation" is defined by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 1573, which amended Section 1(c) of C.A.
No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act), thus:
(c) "Salary, pay, or compensation" shall be construed as to exclude all bonuses, per
diems, allowances and overtime pay, or salary, pay or compensation given in
addition to the base pay of the position or rank as fixed by law or regulations
(Emphasis supplied).
A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:
(i) Compensation the basic pay or salary received by an employee, pursuant to his
employment/appointments, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, and
allowances (Emphasis supplied).
The law is very clear in its intent to exclude per diem in the definition of "compensation."
Originally, per diem was not among those excluded in the definition of compensation (See Section
1(c) of C.A. No. 186), not until the passage of the amending laws which redefined it to exclude per
diem.
The law not only defines the word "compensation," but it also distinguishes it from other forms of
remunerations. Such distinction is significant not only for purposes of computing the contribution of
the employers and employees to the GSIS but also for computing the employees' service record and
benefits.
The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 196, s. 1976, opined:
. . . That such receipt of salary is an indispensable requirement for membership,

especially in the Retirement Insurance Fund, is logically inferred from these
provisions of the GSIS Act: Section 5 which requires that to receive the benefits
provided for and described in the GSIS Act, each official or employee who is a
member of the System and his employer shall pay the prescribed monthly rates of
contributions or premiums based on a percentage of the "monthly salary" of the
employee or official; Sections 11 and 12, providing that the amount of retirement
annuity or gratuity, or death or disability benefits granted thereunder, shall be based
on the monthly "salary"; and Section 13, providing that the term "service" for
purposes of computing the aggregate period of service which forms the basis for
retirement, shall include only service with "compensation" (Emphasis supplied; G.R.
No. 98395, Rollo, p. 67).
In essence, the grant of retirement benefits necessitates an obligation on the part of the employee to
contribute to the insurance fund of petitioner. Such obligation only arises where the employee is
receiving "salary, pay or compensation" and not per diem, which is not capable of paying off the
premium contributions to petitioner.
Also enlightening is the "Joint Civil Service Commission, Department of Budget and Management
and Government Service Insurance System Circular No. 1-89" dated July 13, 1989. It prescribes the
guidelines on the filing and processing of retirement applications, and we quote:
IV. Certification of Services Rendered.
xxx xxx xxx
C. In certifying to services rendered, Heads and Personnel Officers/Administrative

Officers of agencies shall be guided by the existing laws, rules and regulations
followed by GSIS in determining creditable services for retirement purposes which
are as follows:
1. All previous services rendered by an official/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment, including those of Presidential appointees, to a position in the Civil
Service with compensation or salary or pay whether on permanent, provisional,
temporary, emergency, substitute, or casual status, and whether paid monthly, daily,
or hourly, subject to these conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Services of government employees paid on per diem basis up to June 15, 1956
only.
D. All cases not covered by the procedures/guidelines above shall be referred to

GSIS for final determination (G.R. No. 98395, Rollo, pp. 75 and 77; Emphasis
supplied).
The circular is clear that services rendered on a per diem bases are not creditable for retirement
purposes. It likewise confirms that it is the GSIS, and not the CSC which is the proper agency in
determining services which are creditable for retirement purposes.
In Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 (1992), we ruled that the GSIS has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit
under P.D. No. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of government service. By
analogy, we reiterate our ruling in the cases at bench.
The case of Commissioner Inocencio V. Ferrer of the Social Security System is unapplicable. While
it is true that Commissioner Ferrer was granted retirement benefits notwithstanding being paid on
a per diem basis, we find merit in the GSIS explanation that the grant was consistent with its policy,
since the service which was creditable in Commissioner Ferrer's favor was his full time service as
Hearing Officer, and not his attendance at board meetings, which was not credited.
Anent the CSC's power to "administer the retirement program . . . and accredit government services
. . . for retirement" (Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Chapter 3, Section 12), we rule that CSC
role is ministerial. "Accredit" merely means acknowledge. It must not be confused with the power to
determine what service is creditable for retirement purposes. It has been established that such
power belongs to the GSIS (cf. Profeta v. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]).
The aforementioned provision relied upon by public respondent is derived from the Administrative
Code of 1987, which is a general law. It cannot prevail over the Revised Government Insurance Act
of 1977, which is a special law (cf. Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179 [1992]).
With the passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, members of the Sangguniang Bayan are no
longer paid per diem, but are now receiving compensation. Thus, services rendered after the
effectivity of the law may therefore be considered creditable for retirement purposes.
Private respondents both claim that retirement laws must be liberally interpreted in favor of the
retirees. However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in the instant petitions,
where the law invoked is clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction.
Moreover, to accommodate private respondents' plea will contravene the purpose for which the law
was enacted, and will defeat the ends which it sought to attain (cf. Re: Judge Alex Z. Reyes, 216
SCRA 720 [1992])
WHEREFORE, the petitions are both GRANTED. The CSC resolutions and orders in question are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992
GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity
as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who
has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977? This is the issue raised before this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the
Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.
The facts are not disputed.
Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16, 1978 as Legal
Officer II of the Law Department of Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his
transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the First District of Caloocan
City where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff
Officer.
On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila,
the position he held at the time he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January
22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government service of 11 years, 9 months and 6
days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full
benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission whether or
not to allow the extension of service of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service
Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990, the LRA
Administrator observed that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and
6 days (should be 11 years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to 15 years, he would have to
retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.
On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of
service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered
retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach the compulsory
retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990.
Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the Civil Service
Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No. 90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year
extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 27, series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the
fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to
permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not
exceeding one (1) year.
On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied in its CSC
Resolution No. 91-101.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commission
committed a grave abuse of discretion when it granted the extension of petitioner's service as
Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year pursuant to CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to
complete the 15-year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits as provided under
Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No. 1146, otherwise known as the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977.
Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum Circular No. 27
allowing an extension of service of a compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is
both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent intentions" of Section 11 of P.D.
1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the
maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.
The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provision being
generally worded, Section 11 par. (b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has
no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the privilege under said section to
government employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.
The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is the central
personnel agency of the government, it is vested with the power and authority, among others, to
grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter
3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In
interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase
"Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the
service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause: "Unless the service is extended by
appropriate authorities," which means that the extension of service must be first authorized by the
Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the
service of a compulsory retiree (one who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years
of service) can be extended.
We grant the petition.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(November 24, 1987) cannot be interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only
one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation to or
connection with the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.
Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
provides thus:
Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the
Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;
As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize the modification of
an express provision of a special law (Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise,
the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension of the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.
Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 expressly
provides, thus:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a
member who:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

compulsory for an employee of sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of
service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of service, he shall be
allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)
Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,
security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs. Auditor General,
104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).
The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension partakes of the
nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and
women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to retire from the service with relative
security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishing
retirement plans in cases involving officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service
requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the case of ordinary
employees of the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but
opted to avail of the statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the
service to complete the 15-year service requirement in order to avail of old-age pension.
In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En
Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988, the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana,
who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986 lacked a few months to meet the age
requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910
because his accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age
requirement for retirement.
The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep. Act No.
910 of Associate Justice Ramon B. Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No.
6484 Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended, in favor of
the persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the
application for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as
amended (10-year lump sum without the lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement
under Section 1
(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement was approved on
January 10, 1978 (In Re: Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin,
applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had received was considered by the
Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his
monthly pensions for the next five years.
However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13,
1990, and its six (6) companion cases, 187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming
exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample reasons behind each
grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or
length of service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on case to case basis.
There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the Executive Branch on a
case to case basis, to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of
the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the extension of service to only one
(1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.
In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in the service to
complete the 15-year service, there must be present an essential factor before an application under
Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the employer or government office concerned. In
the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for lack of
required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence,
integrity, and dedication to the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the
instant case.
It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
fifteen years" found in Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text
found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, otherwise known as the
"Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the
original text as well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis for providing the
allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There is likewise no indication that Section 11 par.
(b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday
has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months
short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.
While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commission the
authority "to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil
Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said provision cannot be
extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977 (Sto. Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority
referred to therein is limited only to carrying into effect what the special law, Revised Government
Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked provides. It cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative
regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law,
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren,
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4, 1991, squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case
of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from employment, reinstatement, or
re-employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service
Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is
entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was
meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law
which it is meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated,
thus:
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it
into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself
can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v.
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33
SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also,
Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn
citing Teoxon).
The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of
Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-
year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service
Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the
law supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of
the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the "Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension
of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but has less
than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise
be accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146
supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a
mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146.
As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases
where We allowed two employees in the Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the
government service to complete the 15-year service requirement to be entitled to the benefits under
P.D. 1146.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed Mrs. Florentina J.
Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age
of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government service, to continue her services
until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to complete the
15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D.
1146. The Court observed that Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without any adverse
complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per report of the Medical Clinic.
The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the
extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V,
Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court to continue her
services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days
because she has to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days of government service at the time
she reached the age of 65 years on March 29, 1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement
benefits under P.D. No. 1146.
It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of
government service, Section 12, par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has
rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time of separation shall, . . .
upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly
compensation for every year of service."
The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his 11
years, 9 months and 6 days to complete the 15-year of service consistent with the beneficial
intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of the government office
concerned.
Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena, because he opted to
continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b)
of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement under Section 11 par. (b) partakes
the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is
entitled to the benefits of the old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire
upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years although he has less than 15 years of
service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash
equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.
The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it does not offend
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in
rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year service beyond the retirement age. If he would
be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service at the
age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 years
as required by law for entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a
greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age pension is conditioned upon such completion.
Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled to the benefit
under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for
every year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner
Cena should not be covered by Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65 allowing retention of service for
only six (6) months for "extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have
completed the 15-year service requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees
or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who opted to avail of
the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at the
discretion of the agency concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of the Department of
Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and
6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service so that he may retire with full benefits
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.: concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D. Medialdea, with a slight modification.
The majority opinion would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow
petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days of
government service to complete the fifteen (15) years service so that he may retire with full benefits
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law
which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
xxx xxx xxx

allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.
would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years
of age but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the
service to complete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agency where he is
employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of the subject employee. In short, the
employing government office or agency must allow the government employee who has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, the opportunity
to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order to enjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It
follows from this that if such government employee is no longer fit to complete the remainder of the
fifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for cause, after appropriate
proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to continue in the service for purposes of completing his
fifteen (15) years of service.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting:
The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935 dated October 17, 1990 of
the Civil Service Commission, is whether the government service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as
Registrar of Deeds for Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year only
(from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as long as necessary to enable him to
complete 15 years service so that he may retire with full benefits.
After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws, I submit that inasmuch as
P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to the authority
granted to it in the Administrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all personnel
matters in the Civil Service, including extension of service beyond retirement age" (paragraph 14,
Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V), appropriately promulgated Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not exceeding one year." The pertinent
provisions of the circular are quoted below:
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the
fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the government
service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her,
shall no longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years prior to the date
of compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the
minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six
(6) months only with no further extension. (pp. 64-65, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)
The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in paragraph 1 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the general rule that
"retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).
I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a
compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15, years of
government service, or a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to
collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree
may be granted an extension of not more than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of
government service and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pension which, otherwise,
he would not be entitled to receive. Such extension will enable him to retire after his 65th birthday,
but before he attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 years
fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his 65th birthday until the eve
of his 66th.
Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the government for a total of only 11
years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to an extension of his service to complete 15 years for
it would illegally and unreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or long after
he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.
As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government service even if he were given a one-
year extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of
by him. The applicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which
provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of
service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash
payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service." He is
not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the determinant of whether or not a retired
employee would be entitled to such pension.
The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 years old) should be allowed an
extension of his service for any number of years to complete the 15-year-service requirement under
Section 11(b), P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee who has
rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65 can have his service extended for 12
years and finally retire at the age of 77 and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14
years, but whose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, will only receive a
cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the government, without a life
pension, under "Section 12, paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the
service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers
in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a
younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice
the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the
various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have
long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to
complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.
While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of service may not
exceed one year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from
January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for
that paragraph should apply to a compulsory retiree who needs an extension of "not exceeding one
year" (Cena needs more than 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age
pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree a one-year extension of
service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extension will not enable him to complete 15 years of
government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides
that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years of service upon separation after age sixty,
(shall) receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every
year of service."
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.

ROMERO, J.: dissenting:
I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, J. Carolina Grio-Aquino,
which are at once logical and reasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications
of a contrary ruling. At the same time, I add my own.
J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practically all existing retirement laws
fixing the compulsory retirement age of government employees at sixty-five. The precursor of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided that retirement should
be "automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five years." The phrase "automatic and
compulsory" with reference to the retirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequent
amendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.
The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification: involuntary or forced in
contradistinction to voluntary. 1 Considering the use of the word "compulsory" in connection with age
sixty-five, the same word in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specified retirement
age and not to the fifteen-year service mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of
prospective retirees which would be eligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have
reached the age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit "at least fifteen years
of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by the succeeding proviso that
contemplates the possibility that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less than fifteen
years of service."
Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year length of service
should concur before a government employee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a
situation wherein a person who enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five
would have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided
for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the
law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee who has "less than fifteen
years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years," should
contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period of time left to complete the
fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly declared
to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil
servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.
Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five years would, in
effect, swell the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak
prospect of being edged out of the labor market by those who can but offer to the government and
the people their diminishing physical and mental vitality.
Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance with the present
policy on retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other branches of the government on
the matter.
For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the compulsory retirement
age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by Congressman Roco and other
Congressmen would lower it from sixty-five to sixty. 2
Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano, likewise would
amend the present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3
House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would further reduce
the compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young retirees the opportunity to
engage in gainful employment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they are still
relatively strong.
Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the compulsory age of
retirement at sixty.
On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen years should be
allowed an extension for as long as necessary to enable him to complete the fifteen years of service
required for entitlement to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum
period of "not exceeding one year" as fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported
by the dissenting opinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65 4 issued
by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. Amending Memorandum Circular No. 163 dated
March 5, 1968, it categorically states:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in
which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title of Memorandum
Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or
interpretation inasmuch as there is no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years "but who, at the same time, have
completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the Memorandum Circular this
qualifying phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of
the Executive Secretary.
The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials and employees of
the Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service
requirement to continue working until they complete said period, there is "no cogent reason to rule
otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner
Cena". But there is a cogent reason Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land
Registration Authority under the Department of Justice, falls under the Executive Department.
Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a
retention or extension of only six months and this, only for "extremely meritorious reasons" should be
applicable to his case.
Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the government if this rule
could be rationalized and applied uniformly to all government employees, with the exceptions
provided by law.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.: concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Leo D. Medialdea, with a slight modification.
The majority opinion would vest upon the Land Registration Authority "the discretion to allow
petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days of
government service to complete the fifteen (15) years service so that he may retire with full benefits
under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146" (decision, p. 16). A reading of the cited provision of law
which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
xxx xxx xxx

allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years.
would indicate, in my opinion, that the government employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years
of age but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, has THE RIGHT to continue in the
service to complete fifteen (15) years, and that the government office or agency where he is
employed cannot but allow the exercise of such right of the subject employee. In short, the
employing government office or agency must allow the government employee who has reached
sixty-five (65) years of age, but has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service, the opportunity
to complete the fifteen (15) years of service in order to enjoy the benefits of old-age pension. It
follows from this that if such government employee is no longer fit to complete the remainder of the
fifteen (15) year service (after reaching age 65), he should be terminated for cause, after appropriate
proceedings, otherwise, he has the right to continue in the service for purposes of completing his
fifteen (15) years of service.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The issue raised in this petition for review of the Resolution No. 90-935 dated October 17, 1990 of
the Civil Service Commission, is whether the government service of petitioner Gaudencio Cena as
Registrar of Deeds for Malabon, Metro Manila, may be extended for a period of one (1) year only
(from January 22, 1991 up to January 22, 1992) and not for as long as necessary to enable him to
complete 15 years service so that he may retire with full benefits.
After a careful consideration of related provisions of the retirement laws, I submit that inasmuch as
P.D. No. 1146 is silent on the matter, the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to the authority
granted to it in the Administrative Code of 1987, "to take appropriate action on . . . all personnel
matters in the Civil Service, including extension of service beyond retirement age" (paragraph 14,
Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V), appropriately promulgated Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990, limiting the extension of service to "not exceeding one year." The pertinent
provisions of the circular are quoted below:
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the
fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement who entered the government
service at 57 years of age or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her,
shall no longer be granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for retirement shall be filed not later than three (3) years prior to the date
of compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the
minimum number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six
(6) months only with no further extension. (pp. 64-65, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)
The maximum allowable extension of "not exceeding one year" fixed in paragraph 1 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27 is reasonable, just, and consistent with the general rule that
"retirement shall be automatic and compulsory at the age of 65 years" (Sec. 12[e], Com. Act 186).
I believe that Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a
compulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15, years of
government service, or a few months short of the 15-year requirement which would enable him to
collect an old-age pension. Pursuant to the beneficent objectives of our retirement laws, said retiree
may be granted an extension of not more than one year to enable him to complete 15 years of
government service and receive full retirement benefits including old-age pension which, otherwise,
he would not be entitled to receive. Such extension will enable him to retire after his 65th birthday,
but before he attains 66 years of age, hence, still within the mandatory retirement age of 65 years
fixed by law, for as a matter of fact, one is 65 years old upon reaching his 65th birthday until the eve
of his 66th.
Since Cena, on his 65th birthday, had rendered service to the government for a total of only 11
years, 9 months and 6 days, he is not entitled to an extension of his service to complete 15 years for
it would illegally and unreasonably stretch his retirement age beyond his 68th birthday, or long after
he shall have ceased to be 65 years old.
As Cena would not be able to complete 15 years of government service even if he were given a one-
year extension of service, paragraph 1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 may not be availed of
by him. The applicable legal provision to him would be paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which
provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of
service at the time of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, ** receive a cash
payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service." He is
not entitled to an old-age pension, length of service being the determinant of whether or not a retired
employee would be entitled to such pension.
The petitioner's theory that a compulsory retiree (one who is 65 years old) should be allowed an
extension of his service for any number of years to complete the 15-year-service requirement under
Section 11(b), P.D. 1146, can produce absurd and inequitable results. An employee who has
rendered only 3 years of government service at the age of 65 can have his service extended for 12
years and finally retire at the age of 77 and receive a life pension, while one who has served for 14
years, but whose service is terminated by death or incapacity at the age of 64, will only receive a
cash gratuity equivalent to one month pay for every year of service in the government, without a life
pension, under "Section 12, paragraph (b), P.D. No. 1146.
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the
service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers
in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a
younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice
the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the
various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have
long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to
complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension.
While I agree with the stand of the Civil Service Commission that an extension of service may not
exceed one year, I do not agree with the grant to Cena of a service extension of one (1) year from
January 23, 1991, or until January 22, 1992 under paragraph 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 27 for
that paragraph should apply to a compulsory retiree who needs an extension of "not exceeding one
year" (Cena needs more than 3 years) to complete the 15-year-service requirement for old-age
pension benefits. There is no point in granting to a 65-year-old retiree a one-year extension of
service, if, anyway, as in Cena's case, the extension will not enable him to complete 15 years of
government service. Applicable to Cena is paragraph (b), Section 12 of P.D. 1146 which provides
that "a member who has rendered . . . less than 15 years of service upon separation after age sixty,
(shall) receive a cash payment equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every
year of service."
I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.
I adopt the arguments in the dissenting opinion of my esteemed colleague, J. Carolina Grio-Aquino,
which are at once logical and reasonable even as it takes into account the sociological implications
of a contrary ruling. At the same time, I add my own.
J. Aquino's interpretation is in consonance with the spirit of practically all existing retirement laws
fixing the compulsory retirement age of government employees at sixty-five. The precursor of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, Commonwealth Act No. 186, explicitly provided that retirement should
be "automatic and compulsory at the age of sixty-five years." The phrase "automatic and
compulsory" with reference to the retirement age of sixty-five years had been retained in subsequent
amendatory laws, specifically Republic Act Nos. 660, 728 and 3096.
The word "compulsory" should be understood in its legal signification: involuntary or forced in
contradistinction to voluntary. 1 Considering the use of the word "compulsory" in connection with age
sixty-five, the same word in Sec. 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 should refer only to the specified retirement
age and not to the fifteen-year service mentioned therein. This paragraph merely cites one class of
prospective retirees which would be eligible to receive old-age pension and that is, those who have
reached the age of sixty-five years while at the same time having to their credit "at least fifteen years
of service." That this is the intendment of the law is borne out by the succeeding proviso that
contemplates the possibility that the same sixty-five year old may have served "less than fifteen
years of service."
Moreover, to interpret the law as meaning that the age limit and the fifteen-year length of service
should concur before a government employee is allowed the old-age pension may well give rise to a
situation wherein a person who enters government service a year before reaching age sixty-five
would have to wait until he is seventy-nine years old to be entitled to the old-age pension provided
for in P.D. No. 1146, which is an absurdity. Hence, to give substance to the real signification of the
law, the proviso in Sec. 11 (b) which states that a government employee who has "less than fifteen
years of service, . . . shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years," should
contemplate a situation wherein the employee has only a minimal period of time left to complete the
fifteen-year period. What this minimal period is, the Civil Service Commission has correctly declared
to be "not exceeding one year." Otherwise, the government may well be saddled with a corps of civil
servants that may be regarded graphically as liabilities instead of assets.
Moreover, encouraging the retention of employees well beyond the age of sixty-five years would, in
effect, swell the numbers of the qualified but unemployed many who, even now, face the bleak
prospect of being edged out of the labor market by those who can but offer to the government and
the people their diminishing physical and mental vitality.
Attention should be called to the fact that the dissenting opinion is in consonance with the present
policy on retirement as well as trends being laid down by the other branches of the government on
the matter.
For instance, there are bills now pending in Congress that seek to lower the compulsory retirement
age of the bureaucracy. House Bill No. 33769 sponsored by Congressman Roco and other
Congressmen would lower it from sixty-five to sixty. 2
Its counterpart bill in the Senate, S. No. 561 whose author is Senator Tamano, likewise would
amend the present law by lowering the compulsory age of retirement to sixty. 3
House Bill No. 25903 earlier authored by Congressmen Monfort and Estrella would further reduce
the compulsory retirement age to fifty-six in order to give the young retirees the opportunity to
engage in gainful employment or otherwise utilize their skills and experiences while they are still
relatively strong.
Along the same line of thinking, the proposed Civil Service Code would set the compulsory age of
retirement at sixty.
On the specific issue of whether a compulsory retiree who has not served fifteen years should be
allowed an extension for as long as necessary to enable him to complete the fifteen years of service
required for entitlement to a life pension (which is the position of the petitioner) or just a maximum
period of "not exceeding one year" as fixed in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 which is supported
by the dissenting opinion, it is worthwhile calling attention to Memorandum Circular No. 65 4 issued
by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. Amending Memorandum Circular No. 163 dated
March 5, 1968, it categorically states:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in
which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months.
According to the ponencia, this Circular "should apply only to employees or officials who have
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." A close reading of the title of Memorandum
Circular No. 65, as well as the relevant provision quoted above, leaves no room for ambiguity or
interpretation inasmuch as there is no phrase that qualifies the scope of the law to those employees
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years "but who, at the same time, have
completed the
15-year service requirement for retirement purposes." To read into the Memorandum Circular this
qualifying phrase is to unduly expand the coverage of the law to cases not intended by the Office of
the Executive Secretary.
The ponencia proffers the argument that since the Court has allowed the officials and employees of
the Judiciary who have reached the compulsory age of retirement but lacked the fifteen-year service
requirement to continue working until they complete said period, there is "no cogent reason to rule
otherwise in the case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch as in the case of petitioner
Cena". But there is a cogent reason Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, being an employee of the Land
Registration Authority under the Department of Justice, falls under the Executive Department.
Accordingly, Memorandum Circular No. 65 quoted in the above preceding paragraph which allows a
retention or extension of only six months and this, only for "extremely meritorious reasons" should be
applicable to his case.
Needless to say, it would conduce to sound management practice in the government if this rule
could be rationalized and applied uniformly to all government employees, with the exceptions
provided by law.
Footnotes
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: concurring:
** Separation at age sixty-five is separation "after age sixty."
1 8 Words and Phrases 465 and 15A C.J.S. 312 both citing State v. Bradley, 230 P.
2d 216, 220.
2 The pertinent provision is reproduced below:
(INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMEN ROCO, BAUTISTA, SR., PONCE DE LEON,

BELTRAN, JR., MONFORT, CONGRESSWOMAN PLAZA (C),
CONGRESSWOMEN JAVIER (R), BANDON, JR., ANIAG, JR.,
CONGRESSWOMEN COSETENG, LOBREGAT, CONGRESSMEN DANS, MITRA,
DRAGON, BACALTOS, MONTEJO, MIRAN, VALDEZ, MASKARINO, TY, PUZON,
CALINGASAN, PALACOL, DOMINGUEZ, ROMERO, YULO, MENDIOLA,
DIMAPORO (M.A.B.), NAVARRO, SR., ROXAS, JR., CONGRESSWOMAN
RAYMUNDO, CONGRESSMEN GILLEGO, MARTINEZ, JR., TIROL, BORJAL,
LACSON, DUREZA, DEL MAR, BAGATSING (A), ESTRELLA (E),
CONGRESSWOMEN ALMARIO, LABARIA, CONGRESSMEN WEBB, NOGRALES,
SINGSON (L.) AND VILLAREAL, SR. PER COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 1318)
"Sec. 11. Conditions for [Old-Age Pension] OPTIONAL AND COMPULSORY

RETIREMENT. (a) [Old-Age pension] OPTIONAL RETIREMENT shall be [paid]
AVAILABLE to a member who:
(1) Has at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service;
(2) Is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and
(3) Is [separated from] LEAVING the service.
(b) [Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,] R
Retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age

with at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service: Provided, That, if he has less than
[fifteen] TWELVE years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to
complete the [fifteen] TWELVE years: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL
SERVICES RENDERED IN THE GOVERNMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF STATUS OF
APPOINTMENT DULY ACCREDITED SHALL BE COUNTED AS GOVERNMENT
SERVICE FOR RETIREMENT UNDER THIS ACT; PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT
ALL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF
THIS ACT, ARE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE AND ABOVE SHALL RETIRE
UNDER THE FOLLOWING PHASES:
(1) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-FOUR TO SIXTY-FIVE YEARS OLD

SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ACT;
(2) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-TWO TO SIXTY-THREE YEARS OLD

SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION; AND
(3) THOSE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE THIRD

YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION,
"PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT PAYMENT OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO A

RETIREE SHALL BE MADE IN LUMP-SUM AND PAID NOT LATER THAN THE
EFFECTIVITY DATE OF HIS RETIREMENT."
3 The pertinent provision runs thus:
"Sec. 11. Condition for Old-Age Pension.
(a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who:
(1) has at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;
(2) is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and
(3) is separate from the service.

compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age with at least [fifteen]
TWENTY years of service; Provided, That if he has less than [fifteen] TWENTY years
of service he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the (fifteen)
TWENTY years."
4 This Circular states:
"MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 65
FURTHER AMENDING CIRCULAR NO. 163, DATED MARCH 5, 1968, AS

AMENDED, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE RETENTION IN THE SERVICE
OF PERSONS WHO HAVE REACHED THE COMPULSORY RETIREMENT AGE
OF 65 YEARS.
WHEREAS, this Office has been receiving requests for reinstatement and/or
retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular
No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the
law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely
meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months
only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 on the

retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement

age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service; except for
extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government

including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to
require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
By
authorit
y of the
Preside
nt
(Sgd.)
CATAL
INO
MACA
RAIG,
JR.
Executi
ve
Secret
ary
Manila, June 14, 1988

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995
DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered
the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.
Sometime in May 1991,1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age
of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of
government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of
Membership"2 issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May
1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following
tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-
legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."
Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of
the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the
foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter."
In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor
Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C.
No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder
quoted:
Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory

retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service, except
for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall
not exceed six (6) months.
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.]
Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non-extend[i]ble.3
Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director
Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991."4
Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking
for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15)
years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the
retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about
two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and
functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception
to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President."5 This request was denied by Director
Cawad on 15 August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking
reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr.
Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992.
In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the
appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26
July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:
In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as

Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement under
P.D. 1146.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:
1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to

complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are
regular members of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1)
year.
Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for
retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due
course.6 (Emphasis in the original)
On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service
Commission this time invoking the Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission.7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits, having been
separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Commission.
Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again
requesting that he be allowed to continue rendering service to the Davao City Government as Utility
Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This
request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In this
letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary
on the part of the City Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's
letter, in relevant part, read:
The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, in the advent of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cena
vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal opinion. Both the City
Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are one in these
opinion that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able to complete
the fifteen-year service requirement is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.
Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we can
no longer do so. As you are already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be
able to perform the duties attached to your position. Moreover, the position you had
vacated was already filled up.
We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your

request.8 (Emphases supplied)
At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993
appealing from Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.
The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting a special
civil action of certiorari to review the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the
Commission was required to comment on petitioner's Letter/Petition.9 The Court subsequently noted
petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the mentioned formal
requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel
or to ask for legal assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10
The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment on 16
November 1993. The Court then resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties
to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter through PAO counsel) did so.
In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this
Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 11
Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The Commission,
through the Solicitor General, stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer agency,
the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice, was vested with discretion to grant to
Cena the extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to exercise
its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City
Government did exercise its discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by
petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.
While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the
doctrine of Cena and the theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12
We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.
Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila,
on 16 July 1987. He reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January
1991. By the latter date, his government service would have reached a total of eleven (11) years,
nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the Secretary of
Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to
extend his service to complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the
full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were
granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the age of
sixty-eight (68) years.
The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's
request could be granted considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27,
Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his
service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27.
Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court, claiming
that he was entitled to an extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to
complete the fifteen-year service requirement for retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of
P.D. No. 1146.
This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice
Medialdea, the Court held that a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet completed fifteen (15) years of
government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age
Pension Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as
may be necessary to "fill up" or comply with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also
held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one vested in the head of the
agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and
Department of Justice has the discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to
extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to complete the fifteen-year
service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of
P.D. 1146.13 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning"
of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:
Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a
member who
(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;
(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15)
years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he
shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years.
(Emphases supplied)
The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in
respect of retirement statutes:
Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a]

retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons
intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the
humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being of
government employees may be enhanced.14 (Citations omitted)
While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2)
administrative issuances which prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted
to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.
The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which
should be quoted in its entirety:
TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE
NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING GOVERNMENT- OWNED
AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.
SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen

Years Service Requirement for Retirement Purposes.
Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service
Commission hereby adopts and promulgates the following policies and guidelines in
the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service
requirement for retirement purposes:
1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to

complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement
shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service
who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one
(1) year.
2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to

complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for retirement
who entered the government service at 57 years of age or over upon
prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be
granted.
3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement of retirement shall be filled not later than
three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory retirement.
4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree

who meets the minimum number of years of service for retirement
purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with no further
extension.
This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied)
The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President,
dated 14 June 1988 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or
retention in the service of employees who have reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in Memorandum Circular
No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.
WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the
law providing for compulsory retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely
meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to six (6) months
only.
WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the
retention in the service of officials or employees who have reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement

age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for
extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not
exceed six (6) months.
All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government

including government-owned or controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to
require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.
This Circular shall take effect immediately.
By
authorit
y of the
Preside
nt
(Sgd.)
CATAL
INO
MACA
RAIG,
JR.
Executi
ve
Secret
ary
Manila, June 14, 1988.15 (Emphasis supplied)
Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by,
firstly, considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the
Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T.
Cena.
We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of
an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952,
December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the year the extension of service of an
employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years,
but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum
Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no
relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried
into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of
carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply
perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a
very narrow view on the question of what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is
permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this Court's earlier ruling
in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for
the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into
effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to
standards that the law prescribes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established
passing a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a
prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines, said:
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority
by an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily
broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v.
Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])
The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the

non-delegation objection is easily met. The Standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained in Calalang v. William is "safe transit upon the roads."
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the
1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in
Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these
considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle.20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and partly
supplied)
In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the
standards which our Court has in prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance with
the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-making:
This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of

Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the
interest of law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660 [1919]); "public
interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of
Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be
implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling
statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for
implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to
anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject
matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and
unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation
consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.
We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil
Service law found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise
known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of
service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both
statutes and not alone by Section 11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many
provisions of the present civil service law.
Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt
plans and programsto promote economical, efficient and effective personnel
administration in the government;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and
retention of aqualified and competent work force in the public service;
xxx xxx xxx
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the
Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age;
xxx xxx xxx

(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and
accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for retirement;
xxx xxx xxx
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such
other functions as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil
Service Commission promulgated its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission
was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the
government." 23 It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for
government officials and employees" and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."
In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing
leadership and assistance "in the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in
the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement of the constitutional and statutory
provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the retirement
of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).
We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an
employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane
to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological
processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of
the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided
the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory
retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena:
Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that
extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1)
give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate
against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the
latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment
of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various
government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who
have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their
government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age
pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).
Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself,
quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be
countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as
a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice
Grio-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of
government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and
finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle
of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.
The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and
management in the Civil Service, are aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case
of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of Rule III, Section 22, of the
Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of
persons fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior approval of the Civil
Service Commission. Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a
person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service provided that the
exigencies of the government service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special
qualifications not possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy
cannot be filled by promotion of qualified officers or employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo
was appointed Manager of the Education and Information Division of the Commission on Elections
when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been obtained
either from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission found that the other conditions laid down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not
exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly restrictive
view of permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on.26
When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow.
Under these combined doctrines, a person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the
government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen
(14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory
policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes
unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be
a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government service
should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk
of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life
expectancy of our people which is still significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in
Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.
Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is
hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 must, accordingly, be read
together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the
head of the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow
extension of the service of an official or employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age
without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is, nevertheless, to be
exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1990.
We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of
the President dated 14 June 1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the
text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter, that of Memorandum Circular No.
163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to
officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least
fifteen (l5) years of government service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum
Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have both reached the compulsory
retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so
interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that
employees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years
of government service, may be allowed such extension of service as may be needed to complete
fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way
as to comfort with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In
view of the conclusion that we today reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly
regarded as merely orbiter.
We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular No.
27 is fully compatible with Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must
be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold
that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner
Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and
affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Quiason, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Cena vs. CSC
reported in 211 SCRA 192.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
I vote to grant the petition for the same reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Cena vs. CSC
reported in 211 SCRA 192.
Footnotes
1 Annex "A," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 4.
2 Annex "A-1," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 5.

3 Annex "B," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 6.
4 Annex "B-1," Letter/Petition, Rollo, p. 7.
5 Annex "C," Letter/Petitioner, Rollo, p. 8.
6 CSC Resolution No. 92-594, Rollo, pp. 11-12.
7 211 SCRA 179 (1992).
8 Rollo, p. 3.
9 Supreme Court Resolution dated 24 August 1993, Rollo, p. 17.
10 Rollo, p. 40-A.
11 211 SCRA 179 (1992).
12 Two (2) Justices dissented Grio-Aquino and Romero, JJ. from

the Cena decision.
13 211 SCRA at 192.
14 211 SCRA at 186.
15 211 SCRA at 200-201.
16 211 SCRA at 190.
17 101 Phil. 1125 (1957).
18 101 Phil. at 1129.
19 152 SCRA 730 (1987).
20 152 SCRA at 740-741.
21 35 SCRA 481 (1970).
22 35 SCRA at 497 (note 43).
23 See Addendum to Comment filed by Civil Service Commission dated 5 August

1991; Cena Rollo, p. 91.
24 211 SCRA at 196.
25 202 SCRA 507 (1991). We are not here, of course, reexamining Toledo for this
case is not, strictly speaking, involved at present. At the same time, we cannot
disregard the intellectual relevance of the doctrine in Toledo to the issues that we are
presently addressing.
26 Toledo held:
"[Section 22, Rule III] is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having
no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or
connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect,
such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor in the
employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a
determination of some point in a person's life at which he becomes unemployable or
employable [only] under specific conditions. . . . [S]ince there is no prohibition or
restriction on the employment of fifty-seven (57) year old persons . . . there was
nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter." (202 SCRA
at 513-514, per Paras, J.; Emphasis supplied)
27 64 Official Gazette 3295 (1 April 1968).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970
HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET
AL., respondents.
Hilarion Beronilla in his own behalf.
L. Monasterial and L. A. Diokno, Jr. for respondents GSIS, etc., et al.
T. Besa and J. Jimenez for respondent Rafael S. Recto.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent Auditor General.
BARREDO, J.:
A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustees
of the respondent Government Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that
petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired from the service (as Auditor of
the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been issued, in
the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion,
violation of contracts, removal or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts
heretofore taken in implementation thereof also void, and to prohibit said respondent and its
representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's
prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon
petitioner's filing an injunction bond in the amount of P1,000.00.
At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and
performing the duties of Auditor of the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many
other positions in the government and had been a member of the GSIS during all times required by
law.
In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his
application to be allowed to take civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner
uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He also indicated the same date of
birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant
to the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.
On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General,
that his date of birth indicated in the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the
petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that petitioner discovered that his true
date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla,
purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that
his uncle wanted to take advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when
he would be already twenty-one years of age and the uncle a candidate for vice-president of the
municipality; that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of birth
and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne
and Ricardo Lalin who could do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board and
the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to the Civil Service Commissioner was
supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to the
GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission."
In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959,
denied the same since "all official records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion
Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted additional evidence to support his
request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This
additional evidence notwithstanding, on March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former
denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General Manager of the System who
at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General
Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal
placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.
Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of
petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil
Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. The Legal Counsel whose title and
rank had been meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later
communicated the aforesaid decision of the General manager to the Philippine National Bank on
November 2, 1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on November 12, 1962, by letter and
indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National Bank,
it is stated that "his date of birth has been adjusted by this office, after careful study and
deliberation." On the other hand, in the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made
clear that relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065 which had matured on November
30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on the
basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1,
1960, he was issued a new life policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900.
Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960, demand was made upon
petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of
birth, which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.
Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more
specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the
Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the service of petitioner and
stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was found
that Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances
and other fringe benefits as Auditor of said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has
attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his automatic and
compulsory retirement from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved
June 16, 1961." Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to Assistant General Manager and
Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of the Claims Department. The latter submitted a
memorandum on August 6, 1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records concerning the
determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by
Mr. Andal and the Legal Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution
without even notifying petitioner of Mr. Mathay's letter and without giving him any opportunity to be
heard regarding the same.
Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his
request for the change of the date of his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14,
1898 to January 14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by the Legal Counsel, could
not be legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to decide
such matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor in the
Board, but also because even if the Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the
General Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from revising the same; and,
furthermore, in approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to
petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between petitioner and the GSIS regarding his
retirement. In other words, the main issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call
for Our determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is January 14, 1898 or January 14,
1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within
its powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the
change of his date of birth, taking all circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of
res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and unconstitutional impairment of
contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all pertinent
legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the
GSIS, as amended, together with the relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have
decided to uphold the superior authority of the Board over the General Manager and to dismiss this
petition.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be
sure, to the effect that as between the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent
approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of his date of birth in the records,
the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should
prevail. Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule,
applications for retirement annuities in the GSIS are subject to final approval by the General
Manager after its being approved by one of the Assistant General Managers and/or one or two
Department Managers,1 it is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's
approval is not beyond review and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in mind
that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be managed by the Board of Trustees ... "
and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to adopt by-
laws, rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business."
On the other hand, the extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in
Section 18 as follows:
SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general
manager, who shall be a person of recognized experience and capacity in the
subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive officer of the
System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical
director, and an actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall,
subject to the approval of the Board, appoint additional personnel whenever and
wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of this
Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for
cause. He shall have the power to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe
certain qualifications to the end that only competent persons may be employed, and
appoint committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be
subject to existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the
System and the General Manager is only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of
its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of
its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the
Board may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and
complete delegation resulting in the diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-
based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the System and, accordingly, to decide
with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board may
entrust to the General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement
annuities, the finality of such approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate
cases and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or irregularity in the General Manager's
action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally from the
ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the
charter. Incidentally, it may be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the
GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of the management of the System is rendered more
strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed by the thousands upon
thousands of employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It
is indeed well to remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to
the government, much less to any administration which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle,
and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if the administrators
of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board
called the Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be
sustained and We hold that any authority conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of
Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the exercise of its own
sound discretion review the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the
resolution granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's
acts does not constitute such a representation to third persons dealing with the System that such
finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any estoppel, for the simple reason that it is
not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the System
places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the
management in the Board and makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties
dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard regarding the ultimate authority of the
Board to modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot complain should the
Board exercise its powers in the premises.
Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or
modify any action of the General Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of
the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal acted favorably on his request to
August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more
than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records,
payment and life insurance policies and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties
concerned on the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should be considered as guilty of
laches or held in estoppel to change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not
entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful invocation of the pleas of
laches and estoppel. We have carefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by
petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply to respondent's memorandum as
well as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and
memorandum of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position
cannot be sustained.
It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in
this particular case to nothing more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to
recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There must also be some element of
turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil
Code of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having its
origin in equity and therefore being based on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any
particular case depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of the case."
(Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as
regards the actuations of government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions
do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27,
1969, citing Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc., L-26862, March 30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)
Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not
the actual or, what petitioner calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr.
Andal. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6, 1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter,
what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error in Mr.
Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself alleges,
to spontaneously or in the ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge
thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could not, in logic and conscience, have placed
the Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps taken by
the Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of
unreasonable delay, much more of laches.
The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65
years is founded on public policy which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service
and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the opportunity to enjoy during the
remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to.
the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service
discipline and the exacting demands that the nature of their work and their relations with their
superiors as well as the public would impose upon them. Needless to say, therefore, the officials
charged with the duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding
the correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board
has done is to set aside what it found to be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in
approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence before it, the Board
was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see
where the charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.
Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such
invocation to succeed, it must appear that if the plea is not heeded the party making the plea will
suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or moral or, at least, in a juridical
sense. Such is not the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see
nothing inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades
back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner made it appear in all material government and public
records and in all his representations to respondent System that his date of birth is January 14,
1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would
unquestionably favor his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly adversely affect
those of the System and, of course, its members, was duly investigated and found not to be
sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the authority
to evaluate such request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by
virtue of a procedure not strictly in accordance with the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of
this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable action of the General Manager was in turn reversed
by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority in the System, upon its being informed of the error
thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the
respondent System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was
to take his representations for what they were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but
the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the General Manager found
the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these circumstances, how could the System be
in estoppel where the conflicting representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?
Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on
the letter of Mr. Mathay, without notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that
since there is no showing that under the procedure established in the GSIS, such notice and hearing
are required, considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally notice
and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuch as
what was considered by the Board was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting
representations, and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he could have filed a
motion for reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due
opportunity to present his side.
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an
impairment of the obligations of his contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional
injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the legislature and not to resolutions
even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having
any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific provisions
contemplating the correction of any error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other
hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law and is not the result of any
contractual stipulation.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby dissolved.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Fernando, J., concur in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

# Footnotes
1 With respect to the procedure for approval of applications for retirement, the Board
of Trustees has from time to time approved the following resolutions:
1. On January 15, 1952, Resolution No. 15 providing:
"In order to expedite action on applications for retirement annuities,

the Board resolved to authorize the Manager of the Administrative
Department of the System to process and approve such applications,
subject to final approval of the General Manager and Actuary."
(Emphasis supplied)
2. On March 24, 1954, Resolution No. 145 as follows:
"2. Retirement Applications
"Retirement applications shall be approved by the General Manager, Administrative

Department, the Assistant General Manager, and the Associate Actuary and Acting
Manager, Production Department.
"In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also be required in
addition to those named hereinabove:
a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved By the Legal Officer.
b. No premium payments By the Manager, Accounting Department."
3. On November 3, 1954, Resolution No. 627 reading:
"Retirement applications shall be approved by 3 officials as follows: Manager, Claims

Department, either one of the Assistant General Managers, and either the Actuary or
Associate Actuary.
"In the following cases, approval of the following officials shall also be required in
addition to those named hereinabove:
a. No beneficiary or where there is legal problem involved By the Legal Officer.
b. No premium payments By the Manager, Accounting Department."
4. On July 3, 1957, Resolution No. 1591 thus:
"Where the records show conflicting dates of birth of an applicant for retirement and
no birth or baptismal certificate can be submitted due to its loss or destruction, the
matter is referred to the Corporate Counsel of the System, together with all
secondary evidence in relation to the date of birth of the applicant. The Corporate
Counsel in turn determines the correct date of birth, for purposes of retirement and
life insurance, after evaluating the relative evidentiary value of the documents
submitted, in accordance with the Rules of Court." (Emphasis supplied)
It is the theory of petitioner that Resolutions Nos. 627 and 1591 must be understood
as subject to the condition in Resolution No. 15 that the approval of the other
subordinate managers or officials referred to therein must be approved by the
General Manager whose action shall be final. Respondents deny this, specially as
regards Resolution No. 1591 which they claim makes the Corporate Counsel of the
System the final authority on the matters therein mentioned, which include
controversies or discrepancies as to the date of birth of any applicant for retirement.
The Court sees no necessity, as stated in the above opinion, of passing on the
secondary issue, the same being subordinate, after all, to the main proposition that
the General Manager's decision is subject to the review and final action of the Board
of Trustees.
BERNANDINO S. MANIOSO, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Bernandino S. Manioso, appeals via Petition for Review on

Certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed that of
respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying his claim
for additional disability benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626,
FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 442 ENTITLED LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, as amended.
Petitioner started working on July 13, 1959 as Accounting Clerk I at the
Budget Commission.
On August 10, 1959, he transferred to the Bureau of Forestry, now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), with the same
position of Accounting Clerk I.
On July 1, 1989, petitioner was promoted to the position of Senior
Bookkeeper of DENR, Region IV, Manila.
In 1978, petitioner was found to be suffering from Hypertensive Vascular
Disease (HVD). In 1983, he was diagnosed with Coronary Artery Disease
(CAD). In 1989, he was found to have Nephrolithiasis, Left, with associated
renal parenchymal disease prostatic concretions, which was confirmed in a
medical examination conducted in 1992.
In 1994, the results of petitioners laboratory examinations indicated that he
was suffering from cardiomegaly, LV Form and Atherosclerotic aorta; pelvo-
calycealithiasis (L) and early degenerative changes, spine. In the same year,
another diagnostic report revealed that petitioner was afflicted with staghorn
calculi (L), cortical cyst, and a slightly enlarged prostate gland.
On January 11, 1995 up to January 20, 1995, petitioner was hospitalized
in Batangas City after he experienced chest heaviness, shortness of breath,
and diaphoresis. The results of his examinations showed that he was suffering
from Acute Myocardial Infarction and HVD.
From January 11, 1995 up to May 15, 1995 when petitioner compulsory
retired from government service on reaching 65 years of age and after serving
almost 36 years, he no longer reported for work. His sick leave covering said
period was duly approved.
In the meantime, petitioner filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626
with the GSIS which found his ailments work-related, hence, he was granted
Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits for two months covering the period
from January 11, 1995 to March 11, 1995. He was later granted Permanent
Partial Disability (PPD) benefits for eight (8) months covering the period from
May 15, 1995 to January 14, 1996.
It appears that petitioner appealed for more disability benefits with the
GSIS which subjected him to a series of medical tests.
In 1997, petitioner was brought to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH)
several times due to Chronic Renal Infection (CRI) 2 to Obstructive Uropathy
2 to Staghorn Calculi (L) and Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy (BPH); Diabetes
Mellitus Neprophaty, Stage IV, and Hypertensive Nephrosclerosis.
Petitioner thereupon filed a request with the GSIS for additional disability
benefits, claiming that the ailments for which he was hospitalized several
times in 1997 developed from his work-related illnesses.
The GSIS disapproved petitioners request upon the ground that he was
already paid the maximum monthly income benefit for eight (8) months
covering the period from May 15, 1995 to January 14, 1996 commensurate to
the degree of his disability at the time of his retirement from service.
[1]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the GSIS, it holding that

petitioners physical condition at the time of his retirement was not of such
nature as to satisfy the criteria set for Permanent Total Disability (PTD).
Additionally, it held that since the ailments for which petitioner sought
additional benefits developed after his retirement, they can no longer be
attributed to his former occupation but to factors independent thereof. [2]
Hence, the present petition proffering the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS AILMENTS CONSISTING OF ACUTE
MYOCARDIAL INFRACTION (SIC) AND HYPERTENSIVE VASCULAR
DISEASE, AND OTHER AILMENTS WHICH LATER DEVELOPED FALL
UNDER THE CATEGORY OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY, [AND]
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS RETIREMENT FROM SERVICE

PREVENTS HIM FROM ENTITLEMENT TO PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY BENEFITS. [3]
Respecting the first issue, petitioner claims that the GSIS grant to him of
TTD benefits for two (2) months covering the period from January 11, 1995 to
March 11, 1995, and PPD benefits for eight (8) months covering the period
from May 15, 1995 up to January 14, 1996, showed that it acknowledged that
he was suffering from PTD. The GSIS though, petitioner proffers, mistakenly
[4]
categorized his ailments under PPD instead of PTD.

The Court finds for petitioner. Under Article 192 (c) of PD No. 442, as
amended (the LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES), the following
disabilities are deemed total and permanent: (1) Temporary total
disability lasting continuously for more that one hundred twenty days.[5]
Under Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees

Compensation, [a] disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury
or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a
continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided under
Rule X of these Rules.
The records show that the GSIS evaluated petitioners Myocardial
Infarction and HVD as occupational diseases under PD 626. Petitioner was
on sick leave from January 11, 1995 up to his date of retirement on May 15,
1995 or for a period of more than 120 days. Surely, the DENR, in approving
his more than 120 days leave must have passed upon his Medical Certificate
relative to his ailments.
Petitioners disability having lasted for more than 120 days, he is entitled to
PTD benefits.
Under Article 192 (a) of the Labor Code, any employee who contacts
sickness or sustains an injury resulting in PTD shall, for each month until his
death, be paid by the [GSIS] during such disability, an amount equivalent to
the monthly income benefit, plus ten percent thereof for each dependent child,
but not exceeding five. And under Article 192 (b) of the same Code, the only
time the income benefits, which are guaranteed for five years, shall be
suspended is if the employee becomes gainfully employed, or recovers from
his PTD or fails to be present for examination at least once a year upon notice
by the GSIS.
As petitioners medical records show that the ailments that he suffered in
1997 are complications that resulted from his work-related ailments, the right
to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from compensable injury. [6]
Respecting the second issue, petitioners retirement from the service does
not prevent him from availing of the PTD benefits to which he is entitled. For
as stated earlier, benefits due an employee due to work-related sickness shall
be provided until he becomes gainfully employed, or until his recovery or
death. None of these is present in petitioners case.
It would be an affront to justice if petitioner, a government employee who
had served for thirty six (36) years, is deprived of the benefits due him for
work-related ailments that resulted in his Permanent Total Disability.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and another rendered declaring petitioners disability as
Permanent and Total and ordering the GSIS to pay petitioner, Bernandino S.
Manioso, his benefits arising therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC) and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA S.
ARREOLA, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Did the respondent Court of Appeals err in holding that the nature of the
private respondents work increased the risk of contracting ureterolithiasis,
thereby entitling her to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended? This
issue confronts us in this petition for the review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of 7 August 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34223.[1]
The antecedent facts are summarized in the challenged decision as
follows:
Lilia Arreola [private respondent herein] was employed as a Chemical
Laboratory Technician in the National Bureau of Investigation on March 23,
1972.
Thereafter, Arreola was promoted as Senior Chemical Technician, Chemical
Engineer, and finally as Engineer II.
As Engineer II, Arreola performs the following duties:
1. Makes researches on and designs equipment needed to facilitate
conclusive analysis by Forensic Chemist;
2. Computes cost of proposed equipment based on designs made;
3. Performs instrumental analysis of drugs, insecticides, volatile
poisons, fuels and inorganic compounds, using gas (GS) and
liquid (LC) chromatograph, UV, VIS and IR
Spectrophotometers;
4. Incharge (sic) of the supervision, maintenance and repair of
modern chemical laboratory equipment installed in the Bureau;
5. Computes cost of analysis performed;
6. Attends to field cases and takes paraffin casts at the morgue and in
the office;
7. Renders holiday and night duties once a week and help the chemist
in the examinations on incoming cases during the tour of duty;
8. Assists the supervisor and chemist of the unit in conducting
researches on some special cases;
9. May assist NBI Agents in field work re investigation of industrial
companies engaged in nefarious activities;
10. Performs other duties assigned to me (her) by (sic) supervisor
from time to time. (Annex B of the instant Petition).
Sometime in May, 1993, Arreola suffered pains at her left flank accompanied
by nausea, vomiting, and low moderate fever. Her medical examination
revealed the presence of stone deposits at her left urethra.
On May 18, 1993, Arreola underwent Ureterolithiasis (L) S/P Ureterolithomy
(L) operation, followed by regular check-ups and medication for one
month. She spent P16,019.00 for her hospital bills, doctors fees, x-ray,
laboratory analysis, and medicine.
On June 16, 1993, Arreola filed with the GSIS an application for
compensation benefit under PD No. 626, as amended.
On July 17, 1993, the GSIS denied her claim on the grounds that her ailment
Ureterolithiasis left is a non-occupational disease; and that she failed to show
that her position as Engineer II of the NBI has increased the risk of
contracting the sickness.
Upon the denial of Arreolas request for reconsideration with the GSIS, she
interposed an appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, docketed
as ECC Case No. 6494.
On December 2, 1993, the ECC rendered a decision, the pertinent portions of
which read:
After a study of the records of the case, he failed to find proof that
appellants ailment, Ureterolithiasis left, Ureterolithomy, left, was
brought about by her duties as Engineer II at the National Bureau of
Investigation. Where the ailment is not the direct or customary result
of the employment and the herein appellant failed to show proof that
the risk of contracting the disease was increased by her work and
working conditions, the claim for compensation cannot be
sustained. This is the clear implication of Section I(B) of Rule III of
the Rules Implementing PD 626, as amended, which explicitly
provides that for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under the rules with conditions set therein satisfied,
otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting it is
increased by the working conditions.
xxx
Based on the foregoing discussions, the case therefore, is not
meritorious for compensation benefits under the Employees
Compensation Law (PD 6262 (sic), as amended).
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant case is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
We also note that the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) made

the following observations:
Moreover, medical findings show that Ureterolithiasis is the presence of renal
stones in the ureter. The ureter conveys urine from the renal pelvis to the
bladder. When stones in the renal pappillae or within the urinary collecting
system break loose, they enter the ureter or occlude the ureteropelvic causing
obstruction and pain.
Urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate
balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they must also excrete
materials that have low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be
balanced against one another during adaptation to a particular combination of
diet and activity. (Reference: Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th
Edition, pp. 1211-1212).[3]
Undaunted by the two adverse judgments, Arreola then filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. She insisted that she was entitled to
compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, since she was able to prove
that the exigency and nature of her work as Engineer II of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) greatly increased the risk of contracting the ailment.
In their Comments to the above petition, herein petitioners (respondents
below) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and ECC reiterated their
stand that Arreolas disease was not included in the list of occupational
diseases and the risk of contracting it had not been proved to have been
increased by the nature of the petitioners work.[4]
In its decision of 7 August 1995,[5] the Court of Appeals sustained the
position of Arreola, reversed the appealed decision of the ECC, and ordered
the GSIS to pay Arreola the amount due her under P.D. 626, as amended.[6] In
support of its disposition, the appellate court stated:
The nature of the work of petitioner Arreola as Engineer II in the National
Bureau of Investigation deals with research; instrumental analysis of drugs,
insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels, and inorganic compound; attendance to
field cases; taking of paraffin casts at morgue and in the office; and assisting
NBI agents in field work in the matters of investigation of industrial
corporations engaged in nefarious activities.
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the exingency (sic) of petitioners
assigned tasks was such that she had to forego urination in order not to
interrupt the flow of concentration. In addition, tension, stress, and pressure
must have aggravated her physical condition.
The Supreme Court in Narazo vs. Employees Compensation
Commission[7] held that x x x [i]t may be added that teachers have a tendency
to sit for hours on end, and to put off or postpone emptying their bladders
when it interferes with their teaching hours or preparation of lesson
plans. From human experience, prolonged sitting down and putting off
urination result in stagnation of the urine.This encourages the growth of
bacteria in the urine, and affects the delicate balance between bacterial
multiplication rates and the host defense mechanisms. Delayed excretion may
permit the retention and survival of micro-organisms posing factors to
pyelonephritis and uremia. Thus, while We may concede that these illnesses
are not directly caused by the nature of the duties of a teacher, the risk of
contracting the same is certainly aggravated by their working habits
necessitated by demands of job efficiency.
Similarly, considering the nature of the work of herein petitioner, the same
could have increased the risk of contracting the disease. We thus find her
entitled to receive compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.[8]
In addition, the Court of Appeals commented that the ECC failed to
appreciate the petitioners more than twenty years of devoted public service,
which earned her successive promotions to greater responsibilities and the
fact that she had been performing the strenuous and demanding task of
Chemical Engineer. It also quoted Santos vs. Employees Compensation
Commission,[9] which reiterates that claims falling under the Employees
Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a social
legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our
society.[10]
The petitioners forthwith appealed to us from the decision of the Court of
Appeals by way of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. They contend that the appellate courts determination that Arreolas
work increased the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis is pure
speculation. The petitioners pointedly state that there is no need to apply
Article 4 of the Labor Code on the liberal interpretation of social legislation
when the provisions of such are clear.
In her Comment, Arreola posits that while it is true that ureterolithiasis is
not a listed occupational disease, yet under the increased risk theory, she has
sufficiently proved that her claim for compensation is meritorious. Moreover,
she satisfactorily established that the nature of her work for the past twenty
years, as former Chemical Lab Technician and Chemical Engineer, and
currently as Engineer II, made her miss important health habits such as
regularly drinking water and urinating. She then chides the petitioners for
making her claim for compensation a circuitous and painful path.
After a further evaluation of the case and assessment of the arguments of
the parties, we rule for the private respondent and affirm the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals.
P.D. No. 626 (27 December 1974) further amended Title II of Book IV on
the ECC and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code of the Philippines
(P.D. No. 442, as amended). This law abandoned the presumption of
compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmens
Compensation Act.[11] For the sickness and resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on
Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the claimants working conditions.[12] This means that if the
claimants illness or disease is not included in the said Annex A, then he is
entitled to compensation only if he can prove that the risk of contracting the
illness or disease was increased by his working conditions.[13]
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability
established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an
employees compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the
law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official
agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social
justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims for compensability,[14] especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.[15] Elsewise
stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself
under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to
legitimate appeals of disabled public servants;[16] or that all doubts to the right
to compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily,
the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees compensation
to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.[17]
The private respondent concedes that her ailment, ureterolithiasis, is not
included in Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. Nevertheless,
she asserts that she was able to prove that the risk of contracting it was
increased by the exigency and nature of her work. Her burden of evidence did
not require the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt nor a
preponderance of evidence. It was enough that she adduced substantial
evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, like the
ECC, a fact is deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[18] It was then enough if the private
respondent was able to show that the nature of her work or her working
conditions increased the risk of her contracting ureterolithiasis. Certainly, it
was not necessary for her to breach the parameters of substantial evidence
and to cross the difficult area of preponderance of evidence. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that the private respondent successfully discharged her
burden of evidence and convincingly showed that, indeed, the nature of her
work or her working conditions increased the risk of contracting
ureterolithiasis.
According to the ECC in its impugned decision, ureterolithiasis is the
presence of renal stones in the ureter and urinary stones usually arise
because of the breakdown of a delicate balance. Quoting Harrisons Principles
of Internal Medicine, 11th edition, it added: The kidneys must conserve water,
but they must excrete materials that have low solubility. These two opposing
requirements must be balanced against one another during adaptation to a
particular combination of diet and activity.[19]
In the 13th Edition of Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, vol. 2
(International Edition, 1994), page 1330, we find the following entries:
PATHOGENESIS OF STONES
Urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a delicate

balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they also must excrete
materials that have a low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be
balanced during adaptation to diet, climate, and activity. The problem is
mitigated to some extent by the fact that urine contains substances that inhibit
crystallization of calcium salts and others that bind calcium in soluble
complexes. These protective mechanisms are less than perfect. When the
urine becomes supersaturated with insoluble materials because excretion rates
are excessive and/or because water conservation is extreme, crystals form and
may grow and aggregate to form a stone. (Stress supplied)
Clearly then, diet, climate, and activity are important considerations in
achieving the delicate balance. Note, however, that climate was excluded
from the quotation made by the ECC.
The following are factors which contribute to the development of stones:
Geographic factors contribute to the development of stones. In developing
countries, children -- especially prepubescent boys -- are prone to bladder
calculi. In industrialized countries, most calculi are seen in adults as renal or
ureteral stones. Areas of high humidity and elevated temperatures appear to be
contributing factors, and the incidence of symptomatic ureteral stones is
greatest during hot summer months.
Diet and fluid intake may be important factors in the development of urinary
stones. Excess intake of calcium, oxalate, and purines can increase the
incidence of stones in predisposed individuals.Additionally, water or other
fluid intake is important in preventing urolithiasis. Persons in sedentary
occupations have a higher incidence of stones than manual laborers.
Genetic factors may contribute to urinary stone formation. Cystinuria is an
autosomal recessive disorder. Homozygous individuals have markedly
increased excretion of cystine and frequently have numerous recurrent
episodes of urinary stones despite attempts to optimize medical
treatment. Renal tubular acidosis appears to be transmitted as a hereditary
trait, and urolithiasis occurs in up to 75% of patients affected with this
disorder.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus medically established that the environment (included in
geographic factor), water or other fluid intake and the nature of the occupation
-- sedentary or otherwise -- are important factors in the development or
inhibition of urinary stones or ureterolithiasis in general. Certainly, too, the
regularity of urination plays an important role since withholding urine for
sometime may disturb the balance. It is not denied that the private
respondents work exposed her to drugs, insecticides, volatile poisons, fuels
and inorganic compounds, and chemical laboratory equipment. Moreover, she
attended to field cases and rendered holiday and night duties once a week
and helped the chemists in the examinations of incoming cases. Neither have
the petitioners refuted the claim of the private respondent that she missed
some important health habits such as regularly drinking enough water and
urination. As to the latter, the Court of Appeals concluded that the exigency of
[Arreolas] assigned tasks was such that she had to forego urination in order
not to interrupt the flow of concentration.
All told then, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in its
challenged decision. It is apropos at this juncture to reiterate what we said
in Vicente vs. Employees Compensation Commission:[21]
The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the
welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose
patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but
who, in spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their
appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social
security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a
construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for this reason
that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingmans struggle for his
just dues.
The private respondent, however, is entitled to only twelve thousand six
hundred and nineteen pesos (P12,619.00), and not P16,619.00, as the
records are bereft of any substantiation representing her expenses for X-ray
(P1,600.00), laboratory analysis (P300.00), and medicines (P1,500.00).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
34223 is hereby AFFIRMED, and the Government Service Insurance System is
hereby ordered to pay private respondent Ms. Lilia B. Arreola the sum
of P12,619.00 as compensation. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUFINA TANCINCO, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM and EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the
Resolutions[1] dated May 30, 1997 and March 5, 1998 issued by the former Sixteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44148. The first resolution dismissed petitioners appeal
from the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission, whereas the second resolution
denied her motion for reconsideration.
The facts are:
At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his
house along the National Road in Barangay Palanas, Lemery, Batangas, SPO1 Eddie G.
Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of
the NCR Security Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, and at the time of his
death, was assigned as part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E.
Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty at the time inasmuch as the former Vice-President was in
the United States for medical treatment.
His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). On February 19, 1996, the GSIS denied petitioners claim on
the ground that there was no proof that petitioners husbands death was work-related. Petitioner
appealed the denial to the Employees Compensation Commission (Commission) which, on
December 19, 1996, issued a Resolution[2] dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by the
Commission:
It is evident that the death of SPO1 Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he was on off
duty status did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as a member of
the PNP Security Command.
Apparently, the conditions aforementioned were not satisfied in the present

case. Notably, SPO1 Tancinco was repairing his service vehicle at the time of his
death. He was neither executing an order for VP Estrada nor performing an official
function on that fateful day inasmuch as Police Superintendent Atilano Miranda duly
certified that SPO1 Tancinco was on off-duty status on July 17, 1995.
We would like to stress once more that not all contingencies such as injury, disability,
or death which befall an employee are compensable. The same must be the result of
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Since the cause of SPO1 Tancincos death is no longer part of his official functions,
the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
cannot be given due course.
Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the Commission before
the Court of Appeals. On May 30, 1997, the appellate court issued the first assailed
resolution[3] dismissing the petition for review on the following grounds: (a) that the certification
of non-forum shopping was defective; (b) that certified true copies of material portions of the
record were not attached to the petition; and (c) that the petition failed to state all the material
dates which would establish the timeliness thereof. As admitted by petitioner herself, she
received a copy of the resolution on June 9, 1997, and yet it was only on January 27, 1998, or
seven-and-a-half (7 ) months later, that she filed a motion for reconsideration. As can be
expected, the appellate court denied her motion in the second assailed resolution[4] of March 5,
1998.
Petitioner seeks recourse before us via this petition for review on certiorari, arguing that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION OR A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ENTERTAINING THE
PETITION FILED BY PETITIONER WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED
WITH THE RULES AND WAS ON ITS FACE MERITORIOUS.
In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation[5] signifying its
solidarity with petitioner. The Solicitor General adopts the view that SPO1 Tancincos death is
work-related given the circumstances under which he was killed, given that (a) the deceased was
a policeman and (b) the killing was done in a professional manner. He speculates that the motive
behind the killing is likely to have arisen during the duration of the almost eighteen (18) years
that he served as constable in the PC and as a policeman.
With regret, we deny the petition.
The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed.[6] Under section
1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an appeal from
a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be made within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time. In the
case at bar, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution of
dismissal two hundred thirty one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said resolution final and
executory. The gap of more than seven (7) months is too large for us to ignore. Petitioner did not
even offer any explanation to account for the tardiness. It behooves the party invoking liberality
in the application of procedural rules to at least explain his non-compliance therewith.[7] We have
held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory, but more importantly, it is
jurisdictional.[8] Even we cannot ignore the immutable character of a final judgment.[9]
Prescinding from the finality of the appealed resolutions, the appeal will still fail on the
merits. Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the former Vice-
Presidents security detail, the decedent was required to guard the person of the former; hence, his
presence was officially required wherever the Vice-President would go. At the time of his death,
SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was
at home; it is not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the Vice-
President was away. Clearly, he was not at the place where his work required him to be.
As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died
while performing his official functions. In this regard, we held that policemen are regarded as
being on twenty-four (24) hour alert. As we explained in Employees Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals,[10]
xxx But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members
of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions
technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave,
policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by
any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community.
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No.
626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
The twenty-four hour duty rule was originally applied to members of the armed
forces,[11] until it was applied by extension to policemen, as aforesaid, and eventually to firemen.[12]
However, in the more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
Appeals,[13] we clarified that not all deaths of policemen are compensable. Thus,
Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to
claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his
work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why
SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the
matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying
passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it
did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of
such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of
the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit
permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is
no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC
guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave
will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a
situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman.In
fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty
detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers,
serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope
of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that
may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer
but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically
police service in character. [italics supplied]
In the present case, the decedent was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. We
have tried to view it from all possible angles, but the inescapable conclusion is that he was not
performing acts that are basically police service in character. As a policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is
part of an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and
enforcing the laws xxx.[14] Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was
discharging official functions; if anything, repairing a service vehicle is only incidental to his
job.
Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1
Tancinco was at home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her husband was discharging
a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary to support a claim is
substantial evidence,[15] which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[16] Unfortunately, the burden was not successfully met.
In closing, we express our heartfelt commiseration with petitioner for the misfortune which
has befallen her and her family. Even this Court, the embodiment of justice dispensed
impartially, can feel very human emotions, as it does so now. However, for reasons both
procedural and substantive, we cannot grant her petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 30,
1997 and March 5, 1998 are AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Gsis Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Gsis Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No.

98395 October 28, 1994

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

G.R. No. 102449

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner,

Belo, Abiera & Associates for Matilde S. Belo.

We grant both petitions.

G.R. No. 98395

The GSIS contested the resolution, alleging that:

G.R. No. 102449

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

A similar definition is provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. No. 1146:

The Secretary of Justice, in his Opinion No. 196, s. 1976, opined:

. . . That such receipt of salary is an indispensable requirement for membership,

IV. Certification of Services Rendered.

xxx xxx xxx

C. In certifying to services rendered, Heads and Personnel Officers/Administrative

xxx xxx xxx

D. All cases not covered by the procedures/guidelines above shall be referred to

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,

The facts are not disputed.

We grant the petition.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

PADILLA, J.: concurring:

Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: dissenting:

I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.

Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

PADILLA, J.: concurring:

Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be

GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I therefore vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari.

ROMERO, J.: dissenting:

Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: concurring:

** Separation at age sixty-five is separation "after age sixty."

ROMERO, J.: dissenting:

2 The pertinent provision is reproduced below:

(INTRODUCED BY CONGRESSMEN ROCO, BAUTISTA, SR., PONCE DE LEON,

"Sec. 11. Conditions for [Old-Age Pension] OPTIONAL AND COMPULSORY

(1) Has at least [fifteen] TWELVE years of service;

(2) Is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and

(3) Is [separated from] LEAVING the service.

(b) [Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities,] R

Retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at [sixty-five] SIXTY years of age

(1) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-FOUR TO SIXTY-FIVE YEARS OLD

(2) THOSE WITHIN THE AGES OF SIXTY-TWO TO SIXTY-THREE YEARS OLD

(3) THOSE SIXTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE SHALL BE RETIRED ON THE THIRD

"PROVIDED, FINALLY, THAT PAYMENT OF ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS TO A

3 The pertinent provision runs thus:

"Sec. 11. Condition for Old-Age Pension.

(a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who:

(1) has at least [fifteen] TWENTY years of service;

(2) is at least [sixty] FIFTY-FIVE years of age; and

(3) is separate from the service.