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Charvaka Philosophy Notes:

Elucide the main features of Charvaka Materialism.


Determine the value of Charvaka theory in Indian Philosophy.

Of the Nastik pholosophical systems in Indian philsophy none is so much anti-Vedic as


the Charvaka school. It is more a philosophy of life than a theory of ultimate reality. It
has its truth in man's eternal urgue for pleasure. It has its truth in challenging all the
traditional values. In metaphysics and epistomology, Charvaka stands in defying contrast
to all other Indian philosophical systems. Tha is its weakness and again that is its
strength and co-tribution. To initiate discussion and rethinking on time-old principles,,

Y
is always valuable in philosophy. Charvaka dogmatically rejected all dogmas. As Hume

H
PH
aroused the celebrated philosopher Kant from his dogmatic slumbers by challenging

G
all that was hitherto accepted in philosophy, so Charvaka gave a death blow to all

O IN
traditional thoughts and values, and thus created the need of rethinking and revolution,

S S
necessay for all living philosophy.

O Y R
Charvaka's Materialism:

IL B MA
Materialism, is one form or the other, is to be found in Indian philosophy from the

PH
distant past, it is also occasionally mentioned in the Vedas, Buddha works, Puranas

U
and Sarva Darshan Sangraha etc. It has no independent and exclusive book of philosphy

K
of its own. So we can gather information about it mainly from the repudiation of

P
materailism or of Charvaka school that we find in other philosophical books. Charvaka
is materialistic. In fact, people with materialistic outlook have been branded as
O
Charvakas in ancient indian literature. For persons believing in a materialistic phisolophy
O
only gross matter exists and consiciousness or mind also springs from gross matter.
N
Krishnapati Misra refers to materialistic philosophy in the following words, "Lokayat
A
is the only Shastra, perception is the only authority (pramana), earth, water, fire and air
the only elements: enjoyment of pleasure is the only aim of human existence; means is
nothing more than a byproduct of matter. No other world exists; death means
Nirvana." Similarly, the Charvaka philosophy is elucidated in Sarva Darshan Sangraha
as "There is no heaven, no ultimate salvation. No soul exists in the next world, nor are
the actions of the four varnas fructuous in any way. Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the
three stages of the tapasvi and application of dust to the body are the Nature's means

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of livelihood for worthless ans mindless people. If the animal sacrificed in the jyotishtom Notes:

yajna goes to heaven, why does not the sacrificer sacrifice his own father. If sraddha
on earth satisfies the appetite of souls in heaven, why do you not feed on the I wer
floor the people, who are standing on the roof? So long as one is alive one should live
enjoying pleasures, should incur debt to drink butter. After the body has been reduced
to ashes, how can it come back?" All this clearly indicates that Charvaka philosophy is
materialistic through and through in every field, i.e., in metaphysics, epistemology and
ethics.

The Meaning of the Word Charvaka:


The origin of the Word Charvaka is not definite. According to some scholars a seer

Y H
named Charvaka who is mentioned in the Mahabharat, enunciated this school of

H G
philosophy and so it is named after him. Other consider Charvaka to be the name of

P N
the pupil who was first of all taught this philosophy by its author. The word Charvaka

)
om
O I

l.c
was derived from the root 'charva' which means to chew or to eat. The special emphasis

ai
S
gm
S
given on eating and drinking in this philosophy explains the name alloted to it. There is

8@
O Y R
yet another viewpoint. The philosophy is very pleasing to our ears. So the welcome
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IL B MA
.1
ce
utterances (Charu-vaka) found in this philosophy account for its name. Charvaka school
.e
ya

H
is also referred to as 'Lokayat School' because it is spread among the people (Lok-
ar
w
sh

P U
Ayat). It is not sure if Charvaka was the particular name of some individual or merely
ai
y(
ya

K
an epithet of the followers of Lokayat school. In fact Charvaka and Lokayat views are
dh
pa

P
used as synonyms in Indian philosophical books.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

Materialism:
is
rA

O
As has already been said, the Charvaka philosophy is materialistic. Perception being
fo
ed

N
is

the only authority for them, the Charvakas recognise no other existence except that of
al
on

A
matter. God, soul, heaven, next world, the eternity of life, etc. cannot be perceived and
rs
pe
s

so they are not recognised by the Charvaka.


ti
en
m
cu

The Universe is Composed of four Material Elements:


do
is

Indian philosophers trace the origin of the universe to five elementsearth, water, air,
Th

fire and ether (Akasa). Charvakas, the materialists, do not recognise ether, as it is
known not through perception but through inference. The whole universe, animate as
well as inanimate, is composed of these four elements. Beings are born of them and
they merge into them after death.

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Explain and examine the materialistic conception of self advanced by the Notes:

Charvakas.
State and examine the Charvakas view of self.

Being materialistic, the Charvakas do not believe in the existence of an invisible,


unchangeable and immortal soul. Consciousness is, in fact, that quality of body. It does
not exist separate from or outside the body. We do not perceive any soul except body
in a conscious state. The combination of the five elements is termed as body.
Consciousness is produced by the coalition of these five elements. How can a soul or
a conscious being originate from inanimate objects? This question naturally crops up.
Charvaka replies that just as combination of betel leaf, but, lime and catechu produces

Y H
red colour, in the same way the fusion of these elements sparks off consciousness of

H G
Vijnana. The actions attributed to the soul are really the actions of the body. In our

P N
day-to-day prasctice also we identify body and soul. Sentences in common use like 'I

)
om
O I

l.c
am lame,' or 'I am fat' clearly indicate that common people do not differentiate between

ai
S
gm
S
body and soul. According to the Charvakas everybody should follow the path pursued

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O Y R
by mean in general. Knowledge, action, conscience, memony, experience etc., are not
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IL B MA
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ce
the attributes of the soul, but of the body. Happiness and sorrow are attributes of the
.e
ya

body.
H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

Of the Charvakas there are two types viz., Dhurta or cunning Charvakas and Susiksit
y(
ya

K
dh

or educated Charvaka. The former consider the conscious body to be the soul. With
pa

P
U

body it exists and with body it parishes. Consciousness can be experienced no where
ya
ar

O
hw

except in the body. So consciousness is not the attribute of soul, which has a separate
is
rA

O
existence of its own. It is associated solely with body. The Susiksit Charvakas, on the
fo
ed

N
is

other hand, believe in the separate existence of body. The soul has eternal knowledge
al
on

A
and enjoys different experiences. But it perishes with the body. The soul does not
rs
pe
s

migrate from one body to another, had it been so, man would have retained the
ti
en
m

experience of previous life, just as he remembers his experience of childhood. Thus


cu
do

some of the Charvakas are Dehatmavadin, i.e., those who identify body and soul.
is
Th

Others are Indrjyatmanvadin, because they consider the series to be the soul. there
are others who regard soul as nothing but Prana or vital principle and are therefore
termed as Pranavadin.

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There are still others among the Charvakas who see no differences between 'mana' or Notes:

mind and soul and are known as Atmamanovadin. Sadanand has described these four
categories of the Charvakas in his 'Vedantsara'. But all of them unanimously hold that
the soul does not survive the body. Hence their repudiation of the theories of rebirth,
heaven, hell and karma etc.

Criticism of the Charvaka View of Soul:


The above mentioned views about the soul have come under heavy firre. The soul
occupies a very high and important place in Indian metaphysics. So the other Indian
philosophers have put forth the following strong arguments to contradict the Charvaka
view:

Y H
1. According to Vatsyayan, a prominent Naiyayika, the fact that consciousness resides

H G
in body does not necessarily make the former an attribute of the letter. For example,

P N
water can be hot, but hotness is the quality not of water but of fire. Similarly,

)
om
O I

l.c
consciousness though residing in body is an attribute not of the body but of the

ai
S
gm
S
soul. Secondly, the body is composed of different parts. Had consciousness been

8@
O Y R
the attribute of the body, it should have been located in some particular part of the
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ce
body. But it is found in all the parts of the body. The qualities of the body are either
.e
ya

H
perceptible by the external sense-organs or imperceptible. But consciousness is
ar
w
sh

P U
neither perceived by the external sense nor inperceptible, so it is not a quality of
ai
y(
ya

the body.
K
dh
pa

P
U

2. According to Udayana body is changeable. Its consciousness is the quality of the


ya
ar

O
hw

body, it should also be changeable. In that the memories of childhood cannot be


is
rA

O
retained by a young man, recollection is not the function of the body, because we
fo
ed

N
is

remember actions of a particular part of the body, even when that part is severed
al
on

A
from the body. Nor can we maintain that past experiences are remembered by the
rs
pe
s

atoms of the body. If it were so, then recollection would not be perceived because
ti
en
m

the atoms in which it subsists are imperceptible. That consciousness isa quality of
cu
do

the body is clearly ruled out by these arguments. It is immune to change and
is
Th

recollection is possible because of it.

3. Jayant has also put forth similar arguments. According to him if consciousness
were the quality of the body, the latter would not be exposed to uncounsciousness
and death. Further, any increase or decrease in the body would necessarily entail

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a corresponding increase or decrease of consciousness. It also cannot be a quality Notes:

of mind or senses. If the Charvaka persists in regarding it as conscious, his mind


differs from the self (atman) only in name. In fact, consciousness in the quality of
the soul.

4. Vijnan Bhikshu repudiates the Charvaka doctrine of the origion of consciousness.


Only that think can be produced by the combination of some elements, which
though in a doment stage, is already possessed by the latter. Obviously, therefore,
consciousness cannot be the outcome of the fusion of the four inanimate elements.
Again, if it were a natural quality of the body it should be always with it, since a
natural quality persists so long as the substance persists. Moreover, if consciousness

Y H
were the quality of the body it would be found in different parts of the body, even

H G
when they are divorced from the body. But a part of the body, even separated

P N
from it, loses consciousness. The qualities of a thing exist in its material ingredients.

)
om
O I

l.c
So if consciousness does not exist in the component parts of the body, it cannot

ai
S
gm
S
exist in the body as a whole also. It is more reasonable to believe in an external

8@
O Y R
soul, having consciousness as its attribute, than to regard body as full of several
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ce
powers of consciousness.
.e
ya

H
ar

5. Samkara and Vachaspati Misra have given the following arguments against the
w
sh

P U
ai

Charvaka philosophy:
y(
ya

K
dh

(a) If consciousness is the specific quality of the body, it should exist in deep
pa

P
U
ya

sleep, swoon and the like.


ar

O
hw
is

(b) If consciousness is the quality of the soul, why is it not perceived by other
rA

O
fo

people? Other qualities are perceptible to others. Why is there an exception in


ed

N
is
al

the case of consciousness?


on

A
rs
pe

(c) Consciousness is either insentiment or sentient. According to the Charvaklas


s
ti
en

everything in this universe is insentient. So it follows that consciousness is also


m
cu

insentient. But an insentient object cannot be apprehended by another insentient


do
is
Th

object. Then how does conciousness apprehend other insentient things? Thus
it is clear that consciousness is different from insentient matter. Consciousness
is self-luminous and illuminates other objects also. Therefore, consciousness
can never be denoted with its objects.

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(d) Recollection etc., cannot be the function of the changeable body. Only an Notes:

eternal and unchangeable soul can account for such actions.

(e) Consciousness cannot be the quality of the body, because when the person
dreams, consciousness remains active, although the body becomes inactive.

(f) There cannot be usual perception without light. The perception, however, is
not a property of the light, but of the eyes. There is no consciousness without
body. But consciousness, is a quality, not of the body but of the soul.

(g) Subject cannot be identified with object. The body is subject and the soul is
object. So the soul has an existence separate from the body. Consciousness is
the quality of the soul. Chaitanya is identical with soul.

Y H
6. According to Rajasekhar Suri, soul is one, permanent and the perceiver. The

H G
identification of body with soul cannot explain of recollection, the synthesis of
P N

)
om
I
different sensations and the process of perception. So consciousness is a quality

l.c
ai
S
of the soul. It cannot be attributed of the body.

gm
S
8@
O Y R
7. Vidyanandiswami, a jain philosophers, has exposed the Charvaka doctrine of the
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IL B MA
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origin of consciousness. The existence of the soul is proved by self-consciousness
ce
.e
ya

H
(Swasamvedena), It is known by self-awareness. So conscious being is different
ar
w
sh

P U
from insentieint objects. The latter are perceived by sense organs. The former is
ai
y(
ya

K
self conscious and self-aware.
dh
pa

P
U

Give a critical exposition of Charvaka theory of knowledge and its bearing


ya
ar

O
hw

on Charvaka metaphysics.
is
rA

Examine Charvaka Epistemology.


O
fo
ed

Set out the main contributions of Charvaka epistomology to Indian


N
is
al
on

A
Philosophy.
rs
pe

State and examine Charvaka position in regard to pramanas.


s
ti
en

What according to the Charvakas is the value of Inference as a means of


m
cu
do

knowledge?
is
Th

Critically examine the Charvaka theory of knowledge.


Explain and examine Charvaka theory of inference.
Explain the grounds on which the Charvaka rejects Inference as a Pramana.

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The metahysics conceptions and theoretical knowledge are essentially inter-dependent. Notes:

Charvaka is materialistic and so admits only four elements, viz., earth, water, air and
fire. We experience all the four through perception. So, for Charvaka school, perception
is the only authority. Originally they equated visibility with perceptibility but afterwards
they widened its scope and maintained a five-fold perception, based on our five senses.
Perception is further divided into two categoriesexternal and internal. External
perception comes through the contact of external senses with objects. Internal perception
depends upon external perception. Inner actions of the mind are based upon material
received through external perception. But all perception is not authoritative and authentic.
Some perceptions are but illusions.

Y
Repudiation of Inference:
H
H G
Giving credence only to perception, Charvaka philosophy repudiates other means of

P N
knowledge (Pramanas). The Charvaka philosophy refutes inferences by the following

)
om
O I

l.c
arguments:

ai
S
gm
S
(a) In Nyaya philosophy inference depends upon Vyapti According to Charvaka

8@
O Y R
philosophers Vyapti is impossible because firstly, it is not based on perception
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ce
and secondly it deduces imperceptible from the perceptibe. The smoke as an
.e
ya

H
inevitable comombitant of fire cannot be inferred from seeing smoke with fire
ar
w
sh

P U
at some odd places. Charvaka agrees with Hume that a general rule can be
ai
y(
ya

K
formed only after seeing all the events of that type. Unless one sees fire of all
dh
pa

P
times and all places, one cannot vindicate the rule that everywhere fire is
U
ya
ar

invariably accompanied by smoke. The condition for making it valid being


O
hw
is
rA

obviously impracticable. Vyapti is also impraticable and therefore impossible.

O
fo
ed

Therefore, Vyapti cannot be substantiated by perception. Vyapti is the inevitable

N
is
al
on

interrelationship between all actions of cause and effect. It cannot be perceived

A
rs
pe

with the help of external sense. Vyapti cannot be known by inner perception
s
ti
en

also, as the latter depends upon external perception.


m
cu
do

(b) Nor can Vyapti be established by inference, because the inference will also
is
Th

depend on Vyapti and perception will again be required to prove the Vyapti.
Vyapti is based on inference and vice versa. So they suffer from the fallacy of
inter-dependence.

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(c) Vyapti cannot be known by testimony, because the authority of the latter also Notes:

is based on inference. Secondly, taking inference to be based on testimony


everybody will always have to depend upon the words of some other person
for inference. There will be no end to this chain. It will again lead to inter-
dependence.

(d) The validity of causation cannot be established but on the basis of perception.
Jati or Samanya cannot be known either by external, or by internal perception.
The Naiyayikas try to establish inevitable relationship between fireness and
smokeness although they have not seen fire and smoke of all the times and of
all the places. Perception of all kinds of smoke is required to known smokeness.

Y H
It being patently infeasible, smokeness can be equated only with those objects

H G
with smoke whose perception it is. Evidently; smokeness is not inevitable and

P N
it cannot lead to Vyapti Jnana.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
(e) Vyapti cannot be established on the basis of comparison. Comparison depends

gm
S
8@
on the universal relation between words and objects signified by them. This,

O Y R
again is not the object of perception.
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ce
.e
ya

(f) Vyapti is without conditions (Nirupadhi). But it is impossible to known all the

H
ar
w

conditions of an inference. The relationship between pratijna and upanaya


sh

P U
ai
y(

depends upon the absence of conditions. But the knowledge of condition


ya

K
dh
pa

must necessarily precede the knowledge of its absence. The knowledge of all

P
U
ya

conditions being impossible, we cannot know absence and we cannot be certain


ar

O
hw
is

of Vyapti.
rA

O
fo
ed

Causation is also not Valid:


N
is
al
on

Like the Western philosopher Hume, the Charvakas do not believe in causation and its

A
rs
pe

universality, as it also depends upon Vyapti. The two events are found together on
s
ti
en

many an occasion and consequently make us to expect they will invariably go together.
m
cu
do

But there is, in fact, no certainty about their co-presence. The supposition of causal
is
Th

relation between fire and smoke from the sight of smoke with fire several times admits
of loopholes, as it over-looks several conditions (upadhi), e.g., the wetness of fuel.
Wood gives out smoke, only if it is wet. The relationship of cause and effect cannot be
established with knowledge of all conditions and the perception of all conditions cannot
be known with the help of inference or testimony because they themselves are not
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valid. The accidental conjunctions of an antecedent and a consequent cannot indicate Notes:

Vyapti. So interference cannot be immune from doubts.

Criticism of the Charvaka School:


Faith in the validity of inference is a common trait of almost all the schools of Indian
Philosophy. So they have made a common cause against philosophy which strikes
vehemently at that faith.

1. According to Buddhist philosophers, the Charvakas had known it with the help of
inference that other philosophical schools have faith in inference. Thus they very
refutation of inference by the Charvakas is itself based on inference. The thoughts
of other people are not the object of sense perception, but that of inference. So

Y H
the Charvakas cannot refute inference.

PH G
2. Vainkath Nath, a disciple of Ramanuja asserts that in case of absense of definite

)
om
O I
knowledge can be a valid ground for denying the validity of inference, the same

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
can be used against the authority of perception also as it lacks definite knowledge.

8@
O Y R
If inference conduces to both pravrtti and Nivrtti, perception also suffers from the
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.1
same defect. The invalidity of inference can be proved neither by perception nor
ce
.e
ya

by inference. In fact, inference is not indefinite in character, because common

H
ar
w

sense regards it as definite knowledge.


sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
3. The absence of causation is advanced by the Charvakas as an argument against
dh
pa

P
the validity of inference. But in doing so, they themselves put forth an argument. In
U
ya
ar

fact, Charvakas cannot propound their own theories without the help of inference.
O
hw
is
rA

O
4. The main argument used against Vyapti by the Charvakas is that it cannot be
fo
ed

N
is

ascertained in all the conditions. This argument is applicable only when it is valid in
al
on

A
all the cases. Even if it is not so, Vyapti cannot be proved to be invalid.
rs
pe
s
ti

5. The Charvakas do not accept any argument without conditions. Thus their own
en
m
cu

argument becomes self-contradicted, as it is not without conditions (nirupadhi).


do
is
Th

6. According to Udayana, a leading Naiyayika, life depends not on probabilities and


presumptions but on the definite knowledge of presence or absence. According to
him wherever there is doubt there is inference and the absence of doubt conclusively
proves the latter. Regarding Vyapti as sophadi (with conditions) the Charvakas

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point out the probability of its exception in future or at remote places. The argument Notes:

it itself based on inference, because the future and the remote places depend not
on perception but on inference. As a matter of fact after the start of an action
definite knowledge replaces doubts and preumptions.

7. The Charvakas have refuted the existence of the cause-effect relation. Udayana
sees no reason for doubting the inevitability of the cause-effect relation. Otherwise,
any cause may lead to any effect. Truly speaking, the reason for doubt in Vyapti
can be established on the basis of the double method of agreement in presence
(Anyaya) and agreement in absence (Vyatireka). The same method also makes
Vyapti a valid source of knowledge.

Y
Sabda is also Invalid:
H
H G
Scriptures cannot be valid in the case of imperceptible things. According to the Charvaka,

P N

)
om
the words of reliable persons are authoritative in the case of perceptible things. These

O I

l.c
ai
S
words are also known by perception. But even the Vedas are no authority so far as

gm
S
8@
imperceptible things are concerned. For the Charvakas the imperceptible things are

O Y R
concerned. For the Charvakas the imperceptible things have no existence. Those who
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ce
.e

choose to talk on such topics are knaves. The Vedas are fraught with untruths,
ya

H
ar

contradictions and tautologies. The authors of the Vedas happen to be those fraudulent
w
sh

P U
ai

purohits, whose sole aim was to exploit ignorant and credulous people for furthering
y(
ya

K
dh

their own selfish ends. The so-called bliss of Heaven is nothing but senseless talk of the
pa

P
U

knaves. So the three Vedas, which dwell on heavenly bliss are the preposterous
ya
ar

O
hw

statements of the knaves.


is
rA

O
fo

Word being based on inference is doubtful like the latter. According to the Charvakas
ed

N
is
al

the knowlede gained through words is also based on inference, That the words of all
on

A
rs

reliable people are valid is the general rule on the basis of which we have implicit faith
pe
s
ti

on these words. But inference itself is not valid. How can, then, the world based on its
en
m
cu

be valid? Words also, like inference, casually come out to be true. But it does not
do
is

indicate the view that the world is necessarily and invariably an instrument of authoritative
Th

knowledge.

Criticism of the Censure of the Vedas:


Udayana, a famous Naiyayika, has strongly denunciated the criticism of the Vedas by
the Charvakas. Far from being the product of priests and purohits out to deceive the
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people, the Vedas are the master works of those great seers who were famous for Notes:

their intergrity, uprightness, magnanimity and selflessness. These seers were on a high
moral plane and were immune from flaws like hypocrisy, selfishness, acquisitiveness
and other mundane pursuits. Coming out from such exceptionally spiritual people, the
Vedic Mantras are above doughts and suspicious. Vainkathnath has put forth similar
arguments. Needless to say that the Charvaka view of the Vedas is one-sided.

Attempt as exposition and criticism of Charvaka ethics. What are the


presuppositions on which it is based?
State and explain the main features of Charvaka pholosophy.
State the ethical teaching of Charvaka. What are its theoretical
foundations?
Y H
PH
"The Charvaka Ethics follows logically from the Charvakas theory of
G
N
reality". Discuss.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
Hedonism has, since times immemorial, charatirised Indian philosophy in some form

gm
S
8@
or the other. It has been mentioned in pholosophic treatises like Vedas, Buddhist texts,

O Y R 11
Puranas, Sarva Darshan Sagraha and the like. Due to its lack of any individual exposition,
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

its details can be found only in the criticism of hedonism or the Charvaka thought, in
ya

H
ar

books belonging to other philosophies. Charvaka is hedonist and actually in ancient


w
sh

P U
ai

Indian literture the name Charvaka was applied to hedonists. According to hedonism,
y(
ya

K
dh

matter is the solitary reality and the origin of mind or consciousness. According to the
pa

P
U

play 'Prabodhachandrodaya,' Krishnapati Misra introduced hedonism in these words


ya
ar

O
hw

"Lokayata is the only philosophy in which perception in the one source of knowledge:
is
rA

O
earth, fire, water and air the only elements; wealth and enjoyment the only purusarthas;
fo
ed

N
is

concluousness springs from the elements and in which there is no other world and
al
on

A
death is the liberation," Similarly, in the first chapter of the Sarva Darshan Sangraha,
rs
pe
s

Charvaka philosophy is propounded thusThere is no heaven, no absolute moksa,


ti
en
m

and neither is there any supernatural self nor any real result of the organised action of
cu
do

the four Varnas. Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the three stages of tapasvi and putting
is
Th

ashes on the bodyare means devised by nature for people who laek knowledge and
purusartha. If the animal sacrificed in the Jyotishtoma yajna goes to heaven, then why
not sacrifice one's elders? If rites performed for deceased persons satisfy them the
people who travel should find superfluous the provisions they carry. As long as life

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lasts man should live in pleasure going to the extent of borrowing because whence Notes:

does one return after the body has once turned to ashes? The above description makes
it abundantly clear that in all aspects of metaphysics and ethics, Charvaka philosophy
is materiaslistic.

Being materialists, Charvakas do not belive in any imperceptible, unchanging self existing
separately from the body. According to them consciousness is a quality of the body,
having no separate existence outside or away from the body. Besides the conscious
body, no other self can be perceived. Therefore, the conciousness should be called the
self. An organisation of the five Bhutas has been given names like body, sense organs
and objects. Consciousness results from the combination of these same five elements.

Y H
Actually, activities said to be charaterising the self are attributes of body and our daily

H G
life proceeds upon an identification of self with the body, "I am fat, I am lame," and

P N
other sentences of a similar nature indicate that ordinary people believe the body to be

)
om
O I

l.c
the soul. The Charvakas claim that every one should follow the path of the common

ai
S
gm
S
people. Qualities like knowledge, action, consciousness, memory, volition and feeling

8@
O Y R
belong to the body and not to the soul. Pleasure and pain are physical states.
11
00
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.1
ce

Insult of Vedas:
.e
ya

H
ar

According to Indian philosophers there are four purusarthasDharma, Artha, Kama


w
sh

P U
ai

and Mokasa. The Charvakas have bitterly antagonised against the Vedas. According
y(
ya

K
dh

to them, the vedic ritualism is useless, heaven and hell the imaginings of priests, the
pa

P
U

other world an unproved conception.


ya
ar

O
hw

Liberation is Impossible:
is
rA

O
fo

According to the Charvakas, it is foolish to hope for liberation from pains. It is impossible
ed

N
is
al

for the self to gain liberation from bodily ties. Even during life there cannot be even the
on

A
rs

most remote probability for a complete escape from pain. Pain is always an antecedent
pe
s
ti

of the body. Liberation, be it from the body or from pain, can be attained completely
en
m
cu

ej.k ,oa vioxZ meaning that death is liberation.


only upon death. The Charvakas stateej.k
do
is
Th

Pleasure is the Ultimate End of Life:


Thus, pleasure is the ultimate end of life. Money is a means to enjoyment and
consequently it is necessary to earn it. Pleasure cannot be rejected on account of its
complicity with pain. No intelligent person can forego wheat merely because it is mixed
with chaff. One cannot give up a diet of fish because of the bones in it. Farming cannot
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be abandoned for fear of animals devouring the crops. One cannot stop cooking merely Notes:

because of the possibility of some beggar demanding a share in it. One should not
reject the pleasures of this life upon the false hope of a future life, A bird in hand is
worth two in the bush. A penny exceeds in value the gold of a redoubtable nature. It is
silly to give wealth to otners. Thus maximum pleasure is the ultimate end. Any action
rendering more pain than pleasure is the ultimate end. Any action rendering more pain
than pleasure is wrong. In this way, Charvakas are hedonists in their ethical
considerations.

Criticism:
The hedonism of the Charvaka opinion has been bitterly criticised. Although the

Y H
acceptance of the theory of pleasure as the ultimate end of life involves many difficulties,

H G
yet the importance of pleasure in life cannot be denied. Actually, all the Charvaka

P N
principles contain some element of truth, the chief mistake lying in their treatment of

)
om
O I

l.c
their principles as the most superior. As it is, even upon the question of hedonism the

ai
S
gm
S
Charvakas are divided in their opinions. The unrefined hedonists support gross hedonism,

8@
O Y R
but refined Charvakas like Vatsyayana established a refined and cultural hedonism, in
11
00
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.1
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which there is much evidence of profound thought. The author of Kama Sntra, V
.e
ya

H
atsyayana, had described 64 arts and was a firm believer in God and the hereafter and
ar
w
sh

P U
the purusarthas, of which in his opinion, Kama was the supreme. The basis of action is
ai
y(
ya

K
satisfaction of the five elements. And, for preservation of the body, satisfaction of the
dh
pa

P
senses as that of the sex, Vatsyayana also stressed the importance of celibacy, religion
U
ya
ar

and good citizenship. Mastery over the 64 arts can be attained only after celibacy and
O
hw
is
rA

study of the Vedas. Vatsyayana stressed the controlof sense organs and transformation

O
fo
ed

of passion to occur with religion and ethics. Proper enjoyment of pleasure can be

N
is
al
on

achieved only by a scientific analysis of the states of and means to pleasure.

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Jaina Philosophy Notes:

Syadvada:
Syadvada which is also called Sapta-bhangi-naya is the theory of relativity of knowledge.
Sapta-bhangi-naya means dialectic of the seven steps or the story of seven-fold
judgment. The word syat literally means probable, perhaps, may be. And Syadvada
is sometimes translated as the theory of probability or the doctrine of the may-be. But
it is not in the literal sense of probability that the word syat is used here. Probability
suggests scepticism and Jainism is not scepticism. Sometimes the word syat is translated
as somehow. But this too smacks of agnosticism and Jainism, again, is not agnosticism.
The word syat is used here in the sense of the relative and the correct translation of

Y H
Syadvada is the theory of Relativity of knowledge. Reality has infinite aspects which

H G
are all relative and we can know only some of these aspects. All our judgments,

P N

)
om
I
therefore, are necessarily relative, conditional and limited. Syat or Relatively speaking

l.c
ai
S
or Viewed from a particular view-point which is necessarily related to other view-

gm
S
8@
points must precede all our judgments. Absolute affirmation and absolute negation

O Y R
both are wrong. All judgments are conditional. This is not a self-contradictory position 11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

because the very nature of reality is indeterminate and infinitely complex and because
ya

H
ar
w

affirmation and negation both are not made from the same standpoint. The difficulty of
sh

P U
ai

predication is solved by maintaining that the subject and the predicate are identical
y(
ya

K
dh

from the point of view of substance and different the point of view of modes. Hence
pa

P
U

categorical or absolute predication is ruled out as erroneous. All judgments are double-
ya
ar

O
hw

edged. Affirmation presupposes negation as much as negation presupposes affirmation.


is
rA

O
The infinitely complex reality (ananta-dharmakam vastu) admits of all opposite predicates
fo
ed

N
is

from different standpoints. It is real as well as unreal (sadasadatmakam). It is universal


al
on

A
rs

as well as particular (vyavrty-anugamatmakam). It is permanent as well as momentary


pe
s

(nityanityasvarupam). It is one as well as many (anekamekatmakam). Viewed from


ti
en
m

the point of view of substance, it is real, universal, permanent and one; viewed from
cu
do

the point of view of modes, it is unreal, particular, momentary and many. The Jainas
is
Th

are fond of quoting the old story of the six blind men and the elephant. The blind men
put their hands on the different parts of the elephant and each tried to describe the
whole animal from the part touched by him. Thus the man who caught the ear said the
elephant was like a country-made fan; the person touching the leg said the elephant

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was like a pillar; the holder of the trunk said it was like a python; the feeler of the tail Notes:

said it was like a rope; the person who touched the side said the animal was like a wall;
and the man who touched the forehead said the elephant was like the breast. And all
the six quarreled among themselves, each one asserting that his description alone was
correct. But he who can see the whole elephant can easily know that each blind man
feels only a part of the elephant which he mistakes to be the whole animal. Almost all
philosophical, ideological and religious differences and disputes are mainly due to
mistaking a partial truth for the whole truth. Our judgments represent different aspects
of the manysided reality and can claim only partial truth. This view makes Jainism
catholic, broad-minded and tolerant. It teaches respect for others points of view.

Y H
We can know an object in three ways through durniti, naya and pramana. Mistaking a

H G
partial truth for the whole and the absolute truth is called. durniti or bad judgment,

P N
e.g., the insistence that an object is absolutely real (sadeva). A mere statement of a

)
om
O I

l.c
relative truth without calling it either absolute or relative is called naya or judgment,

ai
S
gm
S
e.g., the statement that an object is real (sat). A statement of a partial truth knowing

8@
O Y R
that it is only partial, relative and conditional and has possibility of being differently
11
00
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ce
interpreted from different points of view is called pramana or valid judgment (syat
.e
ya

H
sat). Every naya in order to become pramana must be qualified by syat. Syat is said to
ar
w
sh

P U
be the symbol of truth. It is relative and successive knowledge. It removes all
ai
y(
ya

K
contradictions among different points of view. To reject syat is to embrace unwarranted
dh
pa

P
absolutism which is directly contradicted by experience.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

Everything exists from the point of view of its own substance, space, time and form
is
rA

O
and it does not exist from the point of view of others substance, space, time and form.
fo
ed

N
is

When we say This table exists, we cannot mean that this table exists absolutely and
al
on

A
unconditionally. Our knowledge of the table is necessarily relative. The table has got
rs
pe
s

innumerable characteristics out of which we can know only some. The table exists in
ti
en
m

itself as an absolutely real and infinitely complex reality; only our knowledge of it is
cu
do

relative. For us the table must exist in its own matter as made of wood, in its own form
is
Th

as having a particular shape, length, breadth and height, at a particular space and at a
particular time. It does not exist in other matter, other form and at other space and
time. So a table is both existent and non-existent viewed from different standpoints
and there is no contradiction in it.

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The Jaina logic distinguishes seven forms of judgment. Each judgment, being relative, Notes:

is preceded by the word syat. This is Syadvada or Sapta-bhangi-naya. The seven


steps are as follows:-
(1) Syadasti: Relatively, a thing is real.
(2) Syannasti: Relatively, a thing is unreal.
(3) Syadasti nasti: Relatively, a thing is both real and unreal.
(4) Syadavaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is indescribable.
(5) Syadasti cha avaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is real and is indescribable.
(6) Syannasti cha avaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is unreal and indescribable.
(7) Syadasti cha nasti cha avaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is real, unreal and

Y
indescribable.

H H
G
From the point of view of ones own substance, everything is, while from the point of

P N
view of others substance, everything is not. As we have just remarked that we can

)
om
O I

l.c
know a thing in relation to its own matter, form, space and time as a positive reality,

ai
S
gm
S
while in relation to others matter, form, space and time it becomes a negative entity.

8@
O Y R
When we affirm the two different stand-points successively we get the third judgment-
11
00
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a thing is both real and unreal (of course in two different senses). If we affirm or deny
.e
ya

H
both existence and non-existence simultaneously to any thing, if we assert or negate
ar
w
sh

P U
the two different aspects of being and non-being together, the thing baffles all description.
ai
y(
ya

K
It becomes indescribable, i.e., either both real and unreal simultaneously or neither real
dh
pa

P
nor unreal. This is the fourth judgment. The remaining three are the combinations of the
U
ya
ar

fourth with the first, second and third respectively.


O
hw
is
rA

O
Criticism of Syadvada:
fo
ed

N
is

THE Buddhists and the Vedantins have criticized Syadvada as a self-contradictory


al
on

A
doctrine. Taking the word syat in its popular sense of probability, they have found it
rs
pe
s

easy to condemn this theory. Contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence
ti
en
m

cannot belong to the same thing in the same sense. Like light and darkness they cannot
cu
do

remain together. Dharmakirti says: These shameless and naked Jainas make
is
Th

contradictory statements like a mad man. Shantaraksita says that Syadvada which
combines the real and the unreal, the existent and the non-existent, the one and the
many, the identify and the difference, the universal and the particular, is like a mad
mans cry. Similarly, Shankaracharya also says that Syadvada appears like the words

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of a lunatic. You cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. Unity and plurality, Notes:

permanence and momentariness, reality and unreality cannot remain at the same time
and in the same thing, like light and darkness. Ramanuja also says that contradictory
attributes such as existence and non-existence, like light and darkness, can never be
combined.

But these criticisms are off the mark. Jainism never says that and contradictory attributes
belong to the same thing at the same time and in the same sense Anekantavada asserts
that the real has infinite attributes because it is an identity and-difference and that
though, from the stand point of substance, it is a unity, permanent and real, yet from the
stand point of substance, it is a plurality, changing and unreal. A thing is regarded as

Y H
real from the view-point of its own matter, form, space and time: and it is regarded as

H G
unreal, not from the same standpoint, but from the view-point of others matter, form

P N
space and time. There is no room for contradiction here. The very nature of reality is

)
om
O I

l.c
infinitely complex And it, being an identify-and-difference, admits of contradictory

ai
S
gm
S
attributes from different points of view which are all partial and relative. Existence,

8@
O Y R
non-existence, both existence and non-existence successively, and indescribability are
11
00
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.1
ce
attributed to a thing from different view-points. No understanding this and fearing
.e
ya

H
imaginary contradictions and mistaking partial and relative views as absolute, fools fall
ar
w
sh

P U
from the right position.
ai
y(
ya

K
dh

The Vedantin levels another charge against Syadvada. He says that no theory can be
pa

P
U

sustained by mere probability. If everything is probable, then Syadvada, by its own


ya
ar

O
hw

assertion, becomes only probable. The Jainas might retort that Syadvada does not
is
rA

O
mean the theory of probability that it is not self-condemned scepticism, but it means
fo
ed

N
is

theory of relativity of knowledge. All judgments are relative and conditional and all
al
on

A
truth is partial. But even now, the objection of Shankaracharya stands with full force.
rs
pe
s

Relativity itself cannot be sustained without the true Absolute. If all truth is partial, then
ti
en
m

Syadvada itself is only partially true and therefore partially false. Relativity itself is
cu
do

related to the Absolute and presupposes its existence. The fact that all our judgments
is
Th

are relative requires us to presuppose an Absolute in which all the relatives fall and
through which they are manifested.

When we examine the seven steps in the Syadvada, we find that the last three are
superfluous and redundant. They are merely the combination of the fourth with the

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first, second and third respectively. If we take to combinations, we may have as many Notes:

steps as we like. The retort of Kumarila that thus instead of seven steps you may have
hundred steps seems to be quite right to us. Hence only the first four steps are real.
These are not the inventions of the Jainas. They are borrowed from the famous
Chatuskotis or the four categories of thought accepted by Buddhism and Vedanta. It
is significant to note in this connection that the doctrine of Syadvada in its fully developed
form of seven steps is found perhaps for the first time in Kundakundas Panchastikaya
and Pravachanasara. Two passages have been traced in the Jaina canon which contain
a reference to the Syadvada. They are in the Bhagavatisutra and are quoted by Mallavadi
in his Naya-chakra. One reference runs thusRelatively, the soul is knowledge; relatively,

Y
the soul is ignorance; and the other Relatively, the soul exists; relatively, the soul

H H
does not exist; relatively, the soul is indescribable. Here at the most only three steps

P G
are mentioned. In the Buddhist Digha-nikaya and Majjhima-nikaya we find

)
om
O I
references to the four categories of thought-is, is not, both is and is not, and

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
neither is nor is not. In our opinion, therefore, Syadvada is definitely influenced by

8@
O Y R
the Anirvachaniyata-vada of Shunyavada Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta.
11
00
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.1
ce
Jainism rightly points out that all our knowledge is necessarily relative, conditional and
.e
ya

H
partial. All human knowledge is empirical and therefore relative. The Buddhist doctrine
ar
w
sh

P U
of Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpada) also tells us that all things have dependent
ai
y(
ya

K
and conditional origination and are therefore relative. Shunyavada, Vijnanavada and
dh
pa

P
Advaita Vedanta have always maintained the necessarily relative character of our
U
ya
ar

empirical knowledge. But while they have made a distinction between the empirical
O
hw
is
rA

and the absolute, the phenomenal and the noumenal, the conditional and the

O
fo
ed

unconditional, the Samvrti and the Paramartha or the Paratantra and the Parinispanna

N
is
al
on

or the Vyavahara and the Paramartha, Jainism has bluntly refused to make any such

A
rs
pe

distinction. It refuses to rise higher than the relative. It has a bias against absolutism and
s
ti
en

in favour of common sense realistic pluralism. Being wedded to common sense realism
m
cu
do

and having pinned its faith to seeming pluralism, Jainism has conveniently forgotten the
is
Th

implications of its own logic and has refused to rise above the relative.

Syadvada give us only sever scattered forms of judgments and makes no attempt to
synthesize them. These seven forms of judgment are like scattered pearls or beads or
flowers. They cannot be woven into a philosophical garland in the absence of the

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Absolute which alone can act as the thread. The relatives are bound together in the Notes:

Absolute. It is the Absolute which gives life, meaning and significance to the relatives.
If you throw away the Absolute, you cannot have ever the relatives. If you reject the
noumenal, you cannot retain even the phenomenal. Syadvada itself becomes relative
and partial. The Jainas do not give us a real identity-in-difference. What they give is
merely identity plus difference. But reality is not a mathematical sum total of partial
view points. The Absolute is not all the relatives put together. The Jainas forget that
organic synthesis and not arithmetical addition is the secret of reality. They forget their
prejudice against absolutism when they absolutely assert that their teaching alone
represents the whole truth, while all other systems give partial truths. Some schools

Y
teach Being, Permanence, Identity and Universality, while others teach Non-being,

H H
Momentariness, Plurality and Particularly. The Jainas have combined both, thinking

P G
that a mere combination of partial truths will give them the whole truth. But this is not

)
om
O I
the way of reaching truth. The Jainas make a distinction between sakaladesha and

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
vikaladesha. The scattered partial truths are called vikaladesha. But when they are put

8@
O Y R
together they become the whole truth which is called sakaladesha. Like the Shunyavadins
11
00
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.1
and the Vedantins, the Jainas also have criticized one view by advancing the arguments
ce
.e
ya

of its opposite view and the latter by means of the arguments given by the former. Thus

H
ar
w

they criticize permanence through the arguments in favour of momentariness and the
sh

P U
ai
y(

latter through the arguments supporting the former. They criticised satkaryavada through
ya

K
dh
pa

asatkaryavada and vice versa. Also so on. But while the Shunyavadins and the Vedantins

P
U
ya

synthesize the two partial views into a higher reality, the Jainas simply put them together
ar

O
hw
is

and think very have reached the whole truth thus impartially. All other views are partial
rA

O
fo

and defective; but if they are put down together, they become the Jaina view and Lo!
ed

N
is
al

By the magic lamp of Aladin all their defects vanish over-night and they represent the
on

A
rs

whole truth! Thus Yashovijaya says that the Jaina view is evidently the best because it
pe
s
ti

has woven together all the nayas in it. But the difficulty is that the nayas have not been
en
m
cu

woven together; they have been simply put together. The Absolute is the only thread
do
is

which can weave them together and it has been want only thrown away by Jainism. He
Th

further says that Anekantavada is impartial and treats all the nayas equally like ones
own children. This impartially is rather dangerous as it goes against the qualitative
differences in the nayas. Hemachandra also says that other system are relative and
partial and fight against one another, while Jainism alone is impartial because it puts all

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the nayas together. It is forgotten that a mere pooling together of the nayas by no Notes:

means removes their contradictions. For this a proper synthesis is required which will
unify all the nayas, preserve their merits and remove their defects. In the absence of the
Absolute, this synthesis is an impossibility for Jainism. Again, to say that other systems,
being relative and partial, are like fire-flies giving only broken light, while Jainism alone,
being the complete truth, is like the luminous sun, is to make a half-hearted confession
of Absolutism, for by a mere addition of the light of innumerable fire-flies you cannot
have the light of the sun. So far as other systems are concerned, they are repeatedly
accused by the Jainas of committing the fallacy of mistaking a relative truth to be the
absolute truth. They are called Ekantadava. Jainism alone is said to be really relative

Y
Anekantavada, and relativity is proclaimed to be the only truth. Thus, by its own assertion

H H
Jainism becomes partially false. And in practice this relativity is often forgotten. Jainism

P G
is often made in exception and absolute validity is claimed for it. While all other teachings

)
om
O I
are relatively real, the Jaina teaching is held to be absolutely real This goes against the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Jaina doctrine itself. It relativity is the only truth, how can the Jaina teaching be absolutely

8@
O Y R
true? How can a mere bundle of the relatives become itself Absolute? Hemachandra,
11
00
IL B MA
.1
for example, commits this fallacy when in his religious zeal he proclaims is a loud and
ce
.e
ya

solemn voice before his opponents that Vitaraga is the only God and that Anekanta is

H
ar
w

the only philosophy. Is it not a confession of Absolutism? Akalanka, Vidyananda,


sh

P U
ai
y(

Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, Haribhadra, Vadideva, Hemachandra, Mallisena and


ya

K
dh
pa

others have criticized and refuted the views of other systems. It is interesting to note

P
U
ya

that their objections are almost the same as those which are used by the Buddhist and
ar

O
hw
is

the Vedantin dialecticians, so far as other systems are concerned. For example, the
rA

O
fo

Jainas say: If the effect pre-exists in its cause, it is already an existent fact and needs no
ed

N
is
al

repeated birth; If the effect does not pre-exist in its cause, it is like a sky-flower and
on

A
rs

cannot be produced. If reality is eternal and permanent, change becomes impossible,


pe
s
ti

for how can the eternal change? If reality is momentary and fleeting, change becomes
en
m
cu

impossible, for what is that which changes? And so on. The whole offshoot or these
do
is

dialectics is that without Anekanta we cannot explain reality; without Anekanta, pain
Th

and pleasure, actions and fruits, bondage and liberation, good and evil, existence and
non-existence, one and many, permanence and change, universal and particular all
become impossible. Hence the opponents are out to destroy the world which is to be
preserved only by the Jainas. The Buddhist and the Vedantins also claim the same

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thing for themselves. They say that all objects of though are necessarily relative and so Notes:

if reality is to be experienced, it can be realized only by transcending the categories of


thought and merging them in the Absolute. The Absolute is immanent in all the categories
and gives life and meaning to them. Everything throbs with its presence. The whole
world is the manifestation of the Absolute. Hence if the reality of the world is to be
preserved, it can be done only by transcending the world, otherwise even the empirical
will be lost to us. The relatives are preserved only because they are synthesized in the
Absolute. The Jainas, on the other hand, want to preserve the relative by throwing
away the Absolute and by combining the relatives together. The Jainas, the Buddhists
and the Vedantins all join in saying that the world is not absolutely real and that it is not

Y
absolutely unreal also. But whereas the Buddhists and the Vedantins say that because

H H
the world is neither real non unreal, it is indescribable and false, and ultimately it is non-

P G
different from the Absolute where it is transcended, the Jainas say that because the

)
om
O I
world is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal, it is both real and unreal from

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
different point of view, They refuse to go higher. But putting together different standpoints

8@
O Y R
does not solve the contradictions of the world. The Jainas criticize the conception of
11
00
IL B MA
.1
the indescribable as self-contradictory. They have forgotten that they themselves have
ce
.e
ya

made a place for the indescribable in the fourth step of the sapta-bhangi. The avaktavya

H
ar
w

is also the anirvachaniya which is neither real nor unreal. Moreover, the Buddhists and
sh

P U
ai
y(

the Vedantins also agree that the indescribable world is self-contradictory and if you
ya

K
dh
pa

want to remove the contradiction, you have to transcend the world. If you throw away

P
U
ya

the Absolute in your zeal to preserve the relative, you lose not only the Absolute but
ar

O
hw
is

also the relative. And this is exactly what the Jainas have done.
rA

O
fo
ed

The Jaina Conception of substance:

N
is
al
on

The Jaina metaphysics is a realistic and relativistic pluralism. It is called Anekantavada

A
rs
pe

or the doctrine of the manyness of reality. We have just seen that objects have
s
ti
en

innumerable positive and negative characters (dharma) which possesses the characters
m
cu
do

(dharmi) = (Anantdharmakam vastu) (Anantdharmatmakameva tattvam- Anyayoga)


is
Th

The letter generally called a substance (dravya).

Jaina point out there are two kinds of characters found in every substance essential
and accidental. The essential characters of a substance remain in the substance as long
as the substance remains. The accidental characters of a substance come and go they

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succeed one another essential characters are permanent and accidental characters are Notes:

changing. For example, consciousness is an essential character of soul and desires


volitions, pleasure and pain are accidental characters of soul. The Jains call on essential
unchanging character guna and on accidental changing character paryaya. The former
are called attributes (guna) and the latter modes (paryaya). Substance is defined as
that which possess qualities and nodes. (Gunaparyaya dravyam- Tattvarthasutra).
Substance and attributes are inseparable because attributes are the permanent essence
of the substance and can not remain without it. Modes or modifications are changing
& accidental. Viewed from the point of view of substance a thing is one and permanent
and real; viewed from the point of view of modes. It is many and momentary and
unreal.

Y H
PH
Utpada vyaya dhrauvyasam yuktam Sat- Tattvarthasutra Jainism here becomes a

G
theological mean, between Brahmanism and early Buddhism (Hinayana). Brahmanism

)
om
O I
emphasizes the one, the permanent, the real. Early Buddhism emphasizes the many,

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
the changing, the unreal. Jainism points out that both are the two sides of the same

8@
thing. Therefore, substance is also defined as that which possesses the three
O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
characteristics of production, destruction and permanence. Substance has its unchanging .1
ce
.e

essence and therefore is permanent. But it also has its changing modes and therefore is
ya

H
ar
w

subject is to orgination and decay.


sh

P U
ai
y(

Classification of Substance (dravya)


ya

K
dh
pa

P
U

Extended (astikaya) Non-extended (anastikaya)


ya
ar

time (kala)

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo

Animate (Jiva) Inanimate (ajiva)


ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs

Emancipated Fettered Pudgala Akasa Dharma Adharma


pe

(mukta) (baddha)
s
ti
en
m
cu

atom compounds space motion Rest


do
is
Th

moving Non moving


(trasa) (sthavara)
lokakasa alokakasa
(filled space) (empty space)
2sensed 3senses 4sensed 5sensed
(worms) (ants) (bees) (man)
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Time or Kala Notes:

Time is anastikaya because it does not extend in space.

It is infinite. It is one and indivisible.

Umaswami states- It is not perceived, but inferred from its characteristics


which make possible, continuity (vartana), activity (kriya), modification
(parinama), now or new (paratva then or old (Aparatva).

Jaina writer sometimes distinguished between real time (Parmarthikakala) and


empirical or conventional time (vyavaharika kala) ( = also called samaya).

Some Jaina teachers, Gunaratna observes, do not admit time as a separate

Y H
substance, but regard it as a mode (Paryaya) of the other substance.


PH G
Continuity or duration (vartana) is the mark of real time & real time is formless

)
om
O I
and eternal. Empirical or conventional time (samaya) is divided into moments,

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
hours, days, months, and years.

8@
O Y R Atom (Anu)
11
00
IL B MA
.1
Matter (Pudgala)-
ce
.e
ya

H Compound objects (Sanghata or Skandha)


ar
w
sh

P U
ai

Means- Matter in Jaina philosophy is called Pudgala. Pudgala etymologically


y(
ya

K
dh

means- that which is liable to integration and disintegration. (Purayanti


pa

P
U

galanti cha).
ya
ar

O
hw
is

* This word is used in Buddhism in the sense of soul, while in Jainism it is used
rA

O
fo

for matter.
ed

N
is
al
on

Parts- An atom (Anu) is supposed to be smallest part of matter which cannot be

A
rs
pe

further divided. Compound objects (Sanghata or Skandha) of the material world


s
ti
en

including sense, mind etc. are the combinations of atom.


m
cu
do

Qualities- Matter possesses the four qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch.
is
Th

Pudgala thought of Jainism is like the ancient Greek atomists Democrites & Leucippus
and unlike the Nyaya. Vaishesika thinkers. The Jains do not maintain any qualitative
difference in the atoms. All atoms are qualitatively alike and indistinguishable.

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Space: Space is infinite, eternal & imperceptible. It is inferred as the condition of Notes:

extension. The function of space is to afford room for existence of all extended substance.
Soul, matter dharma and adharma all exist in space. Space itself is not extension; It is
the locus of extension.

The Jaina distinguishes to kind of space- In one, motion is possible and it is called
Lokakasa or filled space. In the other, motion is not possible and it is called Alokakasa
or empty space. The former contains all the worlds where life and movement are; the
letter stretches itself infinitely beyond the former. At the summit of Lokakasa in
Siddhashila, the abode of the liberated souls.

Dharma and Adharma: Dharma and Adharma are used here in these technical senses,

Y
and not in their ordinary moral sense (i.e. merit and demerit)
H
H G
Like space and time, these also are eternal and imperceptible.

P N

)
They are inferred as the conditions which help motion and rest respectively. They are

om
O I

l.c
formless & passive Dharma cannot generate motion nor can Adharma arrest it. They

ai
S
gm
S
8@
only help or favour motion or rest. The Jaina argues that just as the movement of a fish

O Y R
in the river, though initiated by the fish itself, would not be possible without the medium
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce

conditions, without which its motion would not be possible. Such a condition, is the
.e
ya

H
substance called dharma.
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

Adharma on the contrary, is the substance that helps the restful state or immobility of
y(
ya

K
objects. Just as the shade of a tree helps a travellor to rest, or the earth supports things
dh
pa

P
U

that rest on it.


ya
ar

O
hw

Jiva:
is
rA

O
Jiva is generally the same as the Atman or the Purusa in other pluralistic schools with
fo
ed

N
is

this important difference that it is identified with life of which consciousness is said to
al
on

A
rs

be essence. Like the monads of Leibnitz, the Jivas of Jainism are qualitatively alike and
pe
s

only quantitatively different and the whole universe is literally filled with them. The jivas
ti
en
m

are divided first into those who are liberated (mukta) and those who are bound (baddha).
cu
do

The bound souls are further divided into mobile (trasa) and immobile (sthavara). The
is
Th

latter live in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air and in the vegetable kingdom and
have only one sensethat of touch. The mobile souls are again classified as those who
have two senses (e.g. worms), three senses (e.g. ants), four senses (e.g. wasps, bees
etc.) and five senses (e.g. higher animals and men).

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Consciousness is regarded as the essence of the soul (chetanalaksano jivah). Every Notes:

soul from the lowest to the highest possesses consciousness. The degrees of
consciousness may vary according to the obstacles of karma. The lowest souls which
inhabit material atoms appear to be lifeless and unconscious, but in fact life and
consciousness if found in the in them though in a dormant form. Purest consciousness
is found in the emancipated souls where there is no shred of karma. All souls are really
alike. The degrees of consciousness are due merely to the karma-obstacles. The soul
in its intrinsic nature possesses Infinite Faith, Infinite Knowledge, Infinite Bliss and
Infinite Power. In the case of the bound souls these characteristics are obscured by
karma. A jiva is a real knower (jnata), a real agent (karta) and a real experient (bhokta).

Y
It is included in the astikaya dravyas because its constituents possess extension in

H H
space. But it does not extend in space like matter. It is like the light. Just as the light fills

P G
th space where it is burning and just as many lights may remain in the same place

)
om
O I
without coming into conflict with one another, similarly the soul fills the space and many

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
souls may rdmain together without any conflict. Though itself formles, it takes the form

8@
O Y R
of the body which it illuminates. The soul of an ant is as big as the body of it and the
11
00
IL B MA
.1
soul of an elephant is as big as the elephant itself. The soul is coextensive with the
ce
.e
ya

body. Though we find souls in this world as embodied and as possessing the senses

H
ar
w

and the manas which help the soul to know, yet really the body, the senses and the
sh

P U
ai
y(

manas are obstructions placed by karma and hinder the souls in their direct knowledge.
ya

K
dh
pa

Knowledge is not a property of the soul; it is its very essence. Every soul, therefore,

P
U
ya

can directly and immediately know everything if it is not obstructed by matter. Freedom
ar

O
hw
is

from matter means omniscience and emancipation.


rA

O
fo
ed

Bondage and Liberation:


N
is
al
on

KARMA is the link which unites the soul to the body. Ignorance of truth and four

A
rs
pe

passions anger (krodha), greed (lobha), pride (mana) and delusion (maya) which
s
ti
en

are called kasaya or sticky substances wheres karmic particles stick, attract the flow
m
cu
do

of karmic matter towards the soul. The state when karmic particles actually begin to
is
Th

flow towards the soul to bind it is called Asrava or flow. The state when these particles
actually infiltrate into the soul and bind it is called Bandha or bondage. The ideal bondage
(bhava-bandha) of the soul takes place as soon as it has bad disposition and the
material bondage (dravya-bandha) takes place when there is actual influx of karma

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into the soul. In bondage, the karmic matter unites with the soul by intimate Notes:

interpenetration, just as water unites with milk or fire unites with the red-hot iron ball.
It is for this reason that we find life and consciousness in every part of the body. By the
possession and practice of right faith, knowledge and conduct, the influx of fresh karma
is stopped. This state is called samvara or stoppage. Then, the already existing karma
must be exhausted. This state is called Nirjara or wearing out. When the last particle of
karma has been exhausted the partnership between soul and matter is dissolved, and
the soul shines in its intrinsic nature of infinite faith, knowledge, bliss and power. This
state is called Moksa or liberation. Here kevalajnana or omniscience is attained. The
liberated soul transcends samsara and goes straight to siddha-shila at the top of the

Y
world and dwells there in eternal knowledge and bliss. Bondage, therefore, means

H H
union of the soul with matter and consequently liberation means separation of matter

P G
from the soul. We, conscious living souls, find ourselves bound to karmic matter and

)
om
O I
the end of our life is to remove this karmic dross and regain our intrinsic nature. Hence

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Jainism is primarily an ethical teaching and its aim is the perfection of the soul. Asrava

8@
O Y R
or the flow of matter towards the soul is the cause of bondage and samvara or the
11
00
IL B MA
.1
stoppage of this flow is the cause of liberation. Everything else in Jainism is said to be
ce
.e
ya

the elaboration of this fundamental teaching. These five states together with the Jiva

H
ar
w

and the Ajiva make the seven principles of Jainism. Sometimes virtue (punya) and vice
sh

P U
ai
y(

(papa) are added to these seven to make up the nine categories of Jainism.
ya

K
dh
pa

P
Passions attract the flow of karmic matter into the souls. And passions are due to
U
ya
ar

ignorance. So ignorance is the real cause of bondage. Here Jainism agrees with Sankhya,
O
hw
is
rA

Buddhism and Vedanta. Now, ignorance can be removed only by knowledge. So right

O
fo
ed

knowledge is the cause of liberation. This right knowledge is produced by faith in the

N
is
al
on

teachings of the omniscient Tirthankaras. Hence faith is necessary. And it is right conduct

A
rs
pe

which perfects knowledge since theory without practice is empty and practice without
s
ti
en

theory is blind. Right knowledge dawns when all the karmas are destroyed by right
m
cu
do

conduct. Hence right faith, right conduct and right knowledge all the three together
is
Th

from the path of liberation which is the joint effect of these three. Right faith (samyak
darshana), knowledge (jnana) and conduct (charitra) are the three Jewels (tri-ratna)
of Jainism. They are inseparably bound up and perfection of one goes with the perfection
of the other two.

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Buddha Philosophy Notes:

The Buddha was primarily an ethical teacher and not a metaphysician or philosopher.
He saw his urgent task as that of showing man the way out of suffering and not one of
constructing philosophical theory about man and the world. The Buddhas teachings
therefore lay great emphasis on the practical matters of discipline and conduct leading
to liberation through non-attachment and freedom from all passions. According to the
Buddha ignorance is the root cause of suffering, and it is only by removing ignorance
that suffering can be removed. But ignorance is to be combated by knowledgeinsight
into the nature of existence. What is the nature of ignorance that has to be overcome?
What constitutes the knowledge that dispels ignorance? In order to answer these

Y H
questions, we should turn our attention to the philosophical implications of the Buddhas

H G
teachings; that is, we should uncover the intellectual insights on which the Buddhas

P N

)
om
I
teachings are based. These insights are what are referred to as Right Views, the first

l.c
ai
S
step of the Eightfold Path.

gm
S
8@
O Y R
Process Ontology, Dependent Origination, and Impermanence:
11
00
IL B MA
.1
It is customary to divide philosophies into the substance and process varieties
ce
.e
ya

philosophies of Being and Becoming, respectively. The term ontology means the
H
ar
w
sh

study of the most general and pervasive traits and modes of existence. Those ontologies
P U
ai
y(
ya

which hold that underlying the seeming change, variety, and multiplicity of existence
K
dh
pa

there are unchanging and permanent entities (the so-called substances) are known as

P
U
ya

substance ontologies. On the other hand, those according to which there exists nothing
ar

O
hw
is

permanent and unchanging, within or without man, are known as process ontologies,
rA

O
fo

also referred to as modal ontologies . In the West, the philosophies of Parmenides,


ed

N
is
al

Aristotle, Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Locke, and Kant are but a few examples of
on

A
rs
pe

substance ontology, whereas those of Heraclitus, Henri Bergson, and Alfred North
s
ti

Whitehead are instances of process ontology. On the Indian philosophical scene, Jainism,
en
m
cu

Samkhya, and Vedanta are representatives of substance ontology, while the teaching
do
is

of the Buddha are based on process ontology. We may thus say that the Buddha is a
Th

process philosopher. We shall now present the grounds for describing the Buddhas
philosophy as process philosophy (or philosophy of Becoming).

One of the central teaching of the Buddha is the doctrine of universal change and
impermanence. Everything in the world is changing and impermanent. There is nothing
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that endures and abides eternally, Birth, growth, and decay are the all-pervading features Notes:

of existence. Things come into being and pass away. The seed germinates, the sprout
grows into the plant, the plant becomes the tree, the tree bears fruit and flower and
withers away. The child is born, grows into the adult, suffers sickness and old age, and
dies. Mountains arise and crumble away, continents are formed and dissolved, stars
appear and disappear, and the face of the earth as well as that of the heavens itself
changes. Thus it appears that no matter when and where we look we find all round us
continuous change and impermanence holding sway. Wherever there is birth, there is
death; wherever there is growth, there is decay; wherever there is meeting, there is
parting; wherever there is a beginning, there is an end; wherever there is arising, there

Y
is passing away. In the light of such inescapable observations, the Buddha taught that

H H
change and impermanence are the basic traits of all existence. If impermanence is the

P G
fundament characteristic of existence, one might ask, why do men believe that there

)
om
O I
exist permanent entities called substances? Our answer to this question is that the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
nation of permanence arises in part out of language and thought. Consider, for example,

8@
O Y R
my writing desk. I proudly and sentimentally describe it as the same desk my father,
11
00
IL B MA
.1
grandfather, and great-grandfather used. But in what sense is it the same desk? Has is
ce
.e
ya

not in the course of four generations undergone any change at all? Look at it and you

H
ar
w

will see for yourself. Surely it looks worn, the varnish has faded away, the wood has
sh

P U
ai
y(

become weak, and the surface is warped. Why then do I refer to it as the same desk?
ya

K
dh
pa

There must be something of it that has remained the same since my great-grandfather

P
U
ya

made it a hundred years ago. But there is nothing about the desk that we can point to
ar

O
hw
is

that has not undergone some change or other. The reason why we are led into thinking
rA

O
fo

that it is the same desk is to be found in the fact that we use the same term desk to
ed

N
is
al

describe it at different times. That is, by overlooking the fact that it is words that we
on

A
rs

hold constant in time in order to facilitate communication, we think that since the same
pe
s
ti

work is used at different times the object to which the word refers has also remained
en
m
cu

constant and unchanged in time. It is of the utmost importance to note that words (and
do
is

symbols in general), which make possible thought and communication by virtue of the
Th

constancy of their meanings, also lead us into the illusion that what they refer to is
unchanging and permanent. Language, then, is the source of our mistaken belief that
there exist permanent and unchanging objects.

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It is worth nothing that the doctrine of universal change and impermanence follows Notes:

from the fundamental teaching, namely, the Doctrine of Dependent Origination,


according to which nothing exists unconditionally and absolutelythis arising, that arises
and this ceasing to be, that ceases to be. If anything exists absolutely and unconditionally,
then it is incapable of entering into interaction with anything else, for to enter into
interaction is to undergo change. Thus the view that anything exists permanently
contradicts the Doctrine of Dependent Origination. The conclusion then, is that the
thesis of universal change and impermanence logically from the Doctrine of Dependent
Origination, the foundation of the Buddhas teachings.

It should be emphasized that the Buddha recommends the Doctrine of Dependent

Y H
Origination as the Middle Way which avoids the two dogmatic extremes of eternalism

H G
and annihilationism. Eternalism is dogmatic since according to it reality consists of

P N
permanent and unchanging entities, the so-called substance, although none of these

)
om
O I

l.c
can be objects of our experience, actual of possible. Annihilationism is the equally

ai
S
gm
S
dogmatic teaching that, contrary to our experience, reality is made up of entities that

8@
O Y R
simply perish away without leaving any trace. The Doctrine of Dependent Origination
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
is truly the Middle Way, the way of becoming, in that it teaches not only that the
.e
ya

H
objects of our experience existnot. However, absolutely and unconditionally, but
ar
w
sh

P U
dependently and conditionallybut also that owing to its conditional existence every
ai
y(
ya

K
object, instead of simply perishing away, produces some effect or other. It may be
dh
pa

P
remarked in passing that in the light of the Doctrine of Dependent Origination the
U
ya
ar

common expression the world is changing is misleading, in that it suggests that there
O
hw
is
rA

exists some permanent entity called the world undergoing change; instead, the correct

O
fo
ed

expression is The world is change, change being understood in the sense of

N
is
al
on

conditional existence.

A
rs
pe
s

The Doctrine of Karma:


ti
en
m

The Doctrine of Dependent Origination, expressed as the twelvefold chain of causation,


cu
do

contains as links karmic impressions from past existence and rebirth. These two links
is
Th

signify the proposition that the present existence of a man is dependent upon his past
existence; that is, his present existence is the effect of his thoughts, words, and actions
in his past existence. Similarly his future existence is dependent upon his present
existence. This is precisely the law of karma: ever event, be it thoughts, word, or

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action, produces its effects, which in turn become causes for other effects, and so on, Notes:

thus generating the karmic chain. It is easy to see, then, that the law of karma is but a
special case of the Doctrine of Dependent Origination which governs all existence.
One form of the Doctrine of Dependent Origination is: If this is that comes to be; from
the arising of this that arises; if this is not that does not come to be; from the stopping
of this that is stopped. We can now state the law of karma explicitly as an instance of
this doctrine: Depending on the past, there is the present and depending on the present,
there will be the future. In other words, our present and future are neither capricious
nor unconditional, but are conditioned by our past and present, respectively.

The Doctrine of Non-self (Anatmavada):

Y H
Another consequence of the Doctrine of Dependent Origination is the doctrine of non-

H G
self (anatmavada). It is an age-old belief in almost all cultures that there exists in man

P N
an eternal and permanent entity variously known as the soul, the self, or the spirit

)
om
O I

l.c
in short, there exist in man a substance called the soul. Philosophers as well as

ai
S
gm
S
primitive peoples subscribe to this belief. Among the worlds great religions, Judaism,

8@
O Y R
Christianity, Islam, Jainism, and Hinduism teach that the soul of man is an immortal
11
00
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ce
substance. Such great philosophers as Socrates, Plato, Descartes, and Kant
.e
ya

H
acknowledge the soul as an eternal substance. These philosophers hold that the soul is
ar
w
sh

P U
the essence of man. Thus, although mans body of changes and perishes, his soul is
ai
y(
ya

K
changeless and immortal, abiding and immutable. It is the soul which animates the
dh
pa

P
body. The soul is to equated neither with any part of the body or with the body as a
U
ya
ar

whole. The soul is known in Jainism as the jiva and is Hinduism as the Atman. In sharp
O
hw
is
rA

contrast to these philosophies and religions, the Buddha teaches that there is no

O
fo
ed

permanent and enduring entity in man. According to the Doctrine of Dependent

N
is
al
on

Origination, everything exists dependently and conditionally; and we have seen that

A
rs
pe

the fact of universal change and impermanence logically follows from the Doctrine of
s
ti
en

Dependent Origination. As such, there can be nothing which is permanent and


m
cu
do

unchanging. Much like David Hume, the Buddha asks every man to enter into his
is
Th

deepest recess and examine whether he could ever become aware of an unchanging
entity called the soul: All one could become aware of when one thinks of ones self or
soul is a sensation, an impression, a perception, an image, a feeling, an impulse, etc.
but never a thing or substance called the soul. Accordingly, the Buddha analyzes man

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into five groups (skandhas): (1) form (matter), (2) feeling (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral), Notes:

(3) perception (sight, smell, etc.), (4) impulses (hate, greed, etc.), and (5) consciousness.
Anything a man thinks he is or has must fall into one or other of these five heaps. The
self or soul is simply an abbreviation for the aggregate of these skandhas and not some
entity over and above the aggregate. Thus there is no distinct substance known as the
self or soul. To think otherwise is to labor under a fond but dangerous illusion.
Notice also that every one of the skandhas is subject to the Doctrine of Dependent
Origination. And if man is no more and no less than the collection of the skandhas,
there can be no substances in him, material or spiritual. Here it is important to dispel a
common misunderstanding concerning the doctrine of anatta. It is often said that the

Y
through his doctrine of anatta the Buddha denies man a self or soul. This view is

H H
mistaken, for the Buddha does not deny the existence of self or soul understood as the

P G
collection of the skandhas; what he does deny is the belief that there exists behind and

)
om
O I
beyond the skandhas a self or soul as a permanent and unchanging entity. To put it

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
differently, the Buddha readily acknowledges a changing self, but rejects an unchanging

8@
O Y R
substantial self as an illusion traceable partly to our linguistic habits and partly to such
11
00
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psychological factors as craving, grasping, insecurity, and, most importantly, fear of
ce
.e
ya

vanishing away with death. We shall have more to say later about this last point.

H
ar
w
sh

P U
How, then, one might ask, does the Buddha explain not only our feeling of continuity
ai
y(
ya

K
and unity of experience but also karma and rebirth? If the Buddha denies a permanent
dh
pa

P
soul, what is it that is reborn according to law of karma? How can we even say that it
U
ya
ar

is the child which has grown into the adult? Moreover, if there is not identical, unchanging
O
hw
is
rA

self, how can we hold a man responsible for his actions and apportion praise and

O
fo
ed

blame and reward and punishment? After all, if as the Buddha teaches, there is no

N
is
al
on

enduring soul, the man who performed an action and the man who is being judged and

A
rs
pe

rewarded or punished cannot be the same. Surely, the objector continues, the Buddhas
s
ti
en

anatta doctrine makes a mockery of morality and responsibility.


m
cu
do

Let us admit immediately that these questions are natural and pertinent reactions to the
is
Th

doctrine of anatta. But can they be satisfactorily answered by the Buddha without
doing violence to his doctrine of non-self? We submit that they can be answered. The
Buddha accounts for the felt continuity and unity of our experience by drawing attention
to an analogy. Consider, for example, a chain made up of several links. The chain is

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continuous and unbroken, although there is no single strand which runs from one end Notes:

of the chain to the other. What provides for the continuity of the chain is the connection
between successive links. Similarly, the unity and continuity of our experience is due to
the causal connections of our successive experiences. Or, to take another example,
consider a candle. The candle gives continuous light as a single flame. But is there
something persisting in the flame from one moment to another? Further, we can light
one candle by the flame of the other. Does this mean that the continuity between the
first and the second flame is due to some persistent entity? The answer to both these
questions is a definite no. When a candle burns, its flame at any moment is dependent
upon certain conditions which are different from those governing the flame at another

Y
moment. The observed continuity of the flame is due to the unbroken succession of the

H H
causal connections between the flame at one moment and that at the immediately

P G
succeeding moment. And when we light one flame by another, no enduring entity is

)
om
O I
being transferred from one of the other. Though the two flames are different, they are

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
continuous owing to the causal connection between them. But if someone were to

8@
O Y R
maintain that the continuity is due to some permanent entity, he should tell us whether
11
00
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the entity is located in the first flame, or the second flame, or in both at the same time.
ce
.e
ya

It is easy to see now the insurmountable difficulties which the advocate of permanent

H
ar
w

entities faces. The upshot of these analogies is that we can cogently account for our
sh

P U
ai
y(

feeling of continuity and unity of experience without having to postulate some mysterious
ya

K
dh
pa

permanent entity called the soul or self. The feeling of continuity and unity of

P
U
ya

experience is due to the fact that the various states constituting our experience form an
ar

O
hw
is

unbroken succession of causes and effects in accordance with the Doctrine of Dependent
rA

O
fo

Origination. In a similar manner, karmic impressions of our past existence constitute a


ed

N
is
al

causal chain of which our present life is the effect. It is important, then, to bear in mind
on

A
rs

that rebirth in the context of the Buddhas teachings is not to be understood as


pe
s
ti

transmigrationthe migration of the same soul from one body into anotherbut as the
en
m
cu

causation of our present life by the past and future life by the present. Much like
do
is

William James twenty-five hundred years later, the Buddha discredits the notion of a
Th

permanent soul and teaches that consciousness is neither abiding an entity, but is merely
an unbroken stream, each moment of the stream arising in dependence on the conditions
in the immediately preceding one. Thus it is the unbroken stream of consciousness and
not an enduring soul that provides the continuity between our past and present lives on

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the one hand and our present and future lives on the other. Finally, in connection with Notes:

the Buddhas teachings, it is best to avoid the term reincarnation altogether on account
of its misleading connotation of an enduring entity, and to use instead the term rebirth.
It becomes clear not that moral responsibility presents no problem to the doctrine of
anatta. A man is held responsible for his actions, not because he possesses a permanent
soul, but because his existence is an unbroken stream in which the past, present, and
future are bound together by causal chains. In other words, it is by virtue of the continuity
of his existence and not because he possesses a permanent soul that a man is responsible
for his actions.

The implications of the doctrine of anatta to ethics and morality area both striking and

Y
far-reaching. It is belaboring the obvious to point out that while mans material progress
H
PH
is truly astounding, ethically he has made little or no progress. He is no better than his

G
hoary ancestors of the cave and the jungle. Why is it that morally man is a dismal

)
om
O I

l.c
spectacle? Today, as thousands of years ago, he makes war with a zest and enthusiasm

ai
S
gm
S
unmatched elsewhere in the animal kingdom; he is greedy, cruel, wicked, and blood-

8@
O Y R
thirsty, takes pleasure and delight in killing both beasts and his fellowmen, and enjoys
11
00
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inflicting untold suffering and destruction. The reason, it seems to me, is to be sought in
ce
.e
ya

H
the incompatibility between his ethics and ontology. Almost all philosophies and religions
ar
w
sh

P U
teach on the one hand that man has a permanent soul or self (which has to be saved)
ai
y(
ya

K
and exhort him on the other to practice compassion, charity, and, above all, selflessness.
dh
pa

But as long a man believes that he has an eternal self or soul, he finds it not only difficult

P
U
ya
ar

but ever unnatural to be unselfish, for, after all, he has been taught that it is in the very

O
hw
is

nature of things that he has a self. No wonder the conflict between the ontological view
rA

O
fo

of what we are and the ethical teachings on how we ought to be leads to a life or
ed

N
is
al

doubt, tension, guilt, and anxiety. The Buddha is unique among the teachers of the
on

A
rs
pe

world in that he not only clearly saw the bearing of ontology on ethics but also taught
s
ti
en

an ontology that is most conducive to the moral development of man. Thus the Buddhas
m
cu

ethics flow from his doctrine of anatta, which in turn is ontologically firmly grounded in
do
is
Th

the Doctrine of Dependent Origination. The remarkable insight of the Buddha is that
moral perfection cannot be attained without knowledge (right views) concerning
existence. We can see now why right views constitute the first step of the Eightfold
Path. We can also understand why the Buddha untiringly exhorted men to give up to

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pernicious illusion of a permanent self. The destruction of this illusion is the first step Notes:

toward enlightenment, conquest of suffering, and perfection itself.

We close this section by nothing that the freedom of thought and intellectual
independence allowednay, encouragedby the Buddha are unique in the history of
religious. The Buddha insisted that no one accept his teaching merely out of reverence
for him, but that each man subject the teachings to rigorous reflection and analysis and
accept it only after all doubts and perplexities are overcome.

The Yogacara School:


There are two different accounts of the origin of the name of the Yogacara school.
According to one account, the Yogacara is so called because the followers of the

Y H
school emphasized critical inquiry (yoga) along with exemplary conduct (acara);

H G
according to the other, the adherents of the school practiced yoga for the realization of

P N
the truth that reality is of the nature of consciousness.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
The distinguishing doctrine of the Yogacara is that consciousness (mind) alone is ultimately

gm
S
8@
real. Consequently, external objects are regarded by the Yogacara as unreal. The

O Y R
Yogacara accepts the Doctrine of Dependent Origination and therewith pure process 11
00
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ce
.e

ontology, in that it holds that consciousness is not a substance but an everchanging


ya

H
ar
w

stream. All objects, internal and external, are ideas of the mind. According to the
sh

P U
ai
y(

Yogacara, it is impossible to demonstrate the independent existence of external objects.


ya

K
dh

The main argument for this view is that since consciousness and its object are
pa

P
U
ya

simultaneous, they are identical. To put it differently, no object can ever be experienced
ar

O
hw

apart from consciousness; therefore, consciousness and its object are one and the
is
rA

O
same. We have already presented the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika criticism of this
fo
ed

N
is

argument.
al
on

A
rs
pe

The Yogacara also offer other arguments against belief in the independent existence of
s
ti
en

external objects. These arguments may be construed as the Yogacara critique of the
m
cu

Saltrantika and Vaibhasika. Assume, for example, that there exists an external object.
do
is

This object must be either indivisible, partless, and atomic, or divisible and composite.
Th

If it is the former, it cannot be perceived, since atoms are too minute to be perceived.
On the other hand, if it is composite, we can never perceive all the parts and the sides
of the object simultaneously. Thus in either case the assumption of the existence of
external objects is fraught with insurmountable difficulties. The Yogacara now points

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out that his own thesis of the identity of consciousness and its object is not open to the Notes:

above objections and difficulties, for one cannot sensibly ask whether consciousness
is atomic or composite.

Another argument of the Yogacara against the thesis of the independent existence of
external objects is based on the ontology of momentariness. The Yogacara points out
that, since objects are not substances but durationless point-instants, it is difficult to
see how a momentary object can be the cause of consciousness; for if it is the cause of
consciousness, there must be a time lapse between the arising of the object and our
consciousness of it. But such a time lapse is impossible on two counts: (1) the object
as point-instant is durationless, and hence it cannot be causally efficacious; and (2) the

Y H
object and the consciousness of it are experienced by us simultaneously. Therefore,

H G
the Yogacara concludes, the external object cannot be the cause the consciousness;

P N
quite the contrary, being simultaneous with consciousness, it can be no more and no

)
om
O I

l.c
less than consciousness itself. The Yogacara further points out that it is equally absurd

ai
S
gm
S
to argue that we become conscious of an object after the object has vanished away

8@
O Y R
and ceased to exist, because in that case it would be impossible to account for our
11
00
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ce
immediate (present) consciousness of the object. On the other hand, says the Yogacara,
.e
ya

H
if consciousness and its object are one and the same, there can be no difficulty in
ar
w
sh

P U
explaining the fact of our immediate perception and knowledge of objects.
ai
y(
ya

K
dh

Because of its central doctrine that ultimate reality is of the nature of consciousness
pa

P
U

(vijnana) the Yogacara school is also called Vijnanavada. We have seen that for the
ya
ar

O
hw

Yogacara external objects are nothing but ideas in the mind (states of consciousness).
is
rA

O
This is the same as saying that for the Yogacara the external world is not only
fo
ed

N
is

epistemologically but also ontologically dependent upon the perceiving mind or


al
on

A
consciousness. It may be noted that the Yogacara position is remarkably similar to the
rs
pe
s

subjective idealism of George Berkeley?


ti
en
m
cu

The chief objection against the Yogacara is as follows: If external objects are identical
do
is

with consciousness (mind), how is it what we cannot perceive whatever we want to


Th

perceive? How is it that we seem to be powerless over the appearance, change, and
disappearance of the objects of our perception? In order to answer this objection, the
Yogacara appeals to the law of karma. The mind (consciousness), according to the
Yogacara, is a stream of ideas and states containing within themselves the karmic

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impressions from our past existence. As such, what one perceives at a given time Notes:

depends upon certain karmic impressions; in other words, the karmic impressions
from the past, latent in the stream of consciousness, rise to the surface under appropriate
circumstances. An analogy may shed some light on this point. Just as of the countless
things that make up our memory we remember and recall only certain things at certain
times and places, so also of the myriads of impressions that lie deep in consciousness
only some rise to the surface under certain circumstances and appear as objects,
internal and external. It is from this point of view that the Yogacara calls consciousness
Alayavijnana (the repository or storehouse of all past impressions). It should be
emphasized, however, that for the Yogacara consciousness is not an unchanging

Y
substance but an unbroken stream of states and impressions. As long as one is in

H H
bondage and ignorance, impressions, thoughts, ideas, desires, etc., arise in accordance

P G
with the law of karma. The practice of yoga, coupled with exemplary conduct, enables

)
om
O I
man to put an end to the arising of mental states which, by breeding attachment to the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
illusion of the external world, perpetuate the round of births and deaths. One who thus

8@
O Y R
overcomes attachment and illusion realizes the sole reality of consciousness. According
11
00
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to the Yogacara, the attainment of consciousness, pure and serene, is indeed the
ce
.e
ya

attainment of nirvana.

H
ar
w
sh

P U
The Madhyamika School:
ai
y(
ya

K
The literal meaning of the term Madhyamika is the farer of the Middle Way. The
dh
pa

Madhyamika avoids all extremes, such as eternalism and annihilationism, self and non-
P
U
ya
ar

self, matter and spirit, body and soul, substance and process, unity and plurality,

O
hw
is

affirmation and denial, identity and differencein general, all dogmatic and exclusive
rA

O
fo

dualismand treads the Middle Way in the true spirit of the teachings of the Buddha.
ed

N
is
al
on

A
Nagarjuna (second century AD) is generally regarded as the founder of the Madhyamika
rs
pe

school. Although some of the unique insight of the school are already to be found in the
s
ti
en

celebrated MahayanaSraddhotpadaSastra (The Awakening of Faith in the


m
cu
do

Mahayana) of Asvaghosa, the author of Buddhacarita, it is to Nagarjunas penetrating


is
Th

intellect and extraordinary dialectical skill that the school owes its power and glory.
Nagarjunas famous Mulamadhyamakakarika is the fountainhead of the method,
teaching, and spirit of the Madhyamika school. Besides Nagarjuna, Aryadeva,
Candrakirti, Kumarajiva, and Santideva are among the most illustrious figures of the
school.
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The Madhyamika conception of philosophy: Notes:

Philosophies, both in India and elsewhere, can be divided into two classes: the Atman
schools (eternalism) and the Anatman schools (annihilationism). The term Atman here
is to be understood not just in its ordinary meaning of soul but in its generic meaning of
unchanging, permanent, eternal entity. The Atman schools, then, are those whose
fundamental doctrine is that ultimate reality is of the nature of unchanging and eternal
substance. On the other hand, the Anatman schools are those according to which
ultimate reality is devoid of any unchanging and eternal entities, but is pure flux. In a
real sense the perennial conflicts between philosophical schools are grounded in the
fundamental clash between the Atman and Anatman views of reality. Thus, in Greek

Y
antiquity, the opposition between Parmenides and Heraclitus is none other than the

H H
Atman-versus-Anatman conflict. Similarly, in India, the controversy between the

P G
orthodox schools and certain Buddhist schools stems from the fundamental divergence

)
om
O I
between the Atman ontology of the former and the Anatman ontology of the latter. It is

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
worth nothing that Atman philosophies, in that they regard ultimate reality as unchanging

8@
O Y R
and eternal, may also be described as philosophies of identity; on the other hand,
11
00
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Anatman philosophies, since they reject the Atman doctrine and advocate instead the
ce
.e
ya

view that reality is pure change with no abiding entities, may also be characterized as

H
ar
w

philosophies of difference. For these reasons, the Atman and Anatman views are
sh

P U
ai
y(

sometimes referred to as the doctrine of the one and the doctrine of the Many,
ya

K
dh
pa

respectively; or, equivalently, as monism and pluralism.

P
U
ya
ar

One of the most original insights of Nagarjuna concerns the origin and nature of
O
hw
is
rA

philosophies and philosophical conflicts. According to Nagarjuna, philosophical

O
fo
ed

doctrines originate in mans unquenchable thirst for the real, the ultimate, the

N
is
al
on

unconditioned, and the absolute. Confronting the world as something other than himself,

A
rs
pe

man embarks on the search for the knowledge of the world as non-self (the other). But
s
ti
en

knowledge is always a relation between the knower and the known in that it brings the
m
cu
do

two together. Knowledge is the means by which man seeks to unite the self and the
is
Th

other. In this manner, the thirst for knowledge is at bottom the quest form being. To put
it differently, in his very attempt to know the world man appropriate the world to
himself. But, Nagarjuna asks, what exactly is knowledge? How is it produced?
Nagarjunas answers to these questions constitute another of the great and revolutionary

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insights of he Madhyamika school. Knowledge, insofar as it is expressible at all, is Notes:

propositional, and propositions in turn are constituted of concepts and percepts, which
the Madhyamika refers to as names and forms. Accordingly, the reality which
philosophers create in their knowledge is the reality of names and forms and not reality
as it is in itself. But in their thirst for the real philosophers forget this and mistake the
reality they construct out of names and forms for reality itself. Thus they are like thirsty
travelers in a desert who, not knowing the difference between reality and illusion, are
tempted by the mirage and rush in vain from place to place hoping to quench their
thirst. But just as mirages cannot quench our thirst, so also imaginative construction of
reality cannot quench mans thirst for the real. Man thus becomes a wanderer in the

Y
jungle of his own imaginative constructions (vikalpa) of the real. The failure to distinguish

H H
between reality in itself and reality of names and forms is ignorance, which breeds

P G
suffering (duhkha). Each school, in its thirst for the real and quest for being, claims

)
om
O I
absolute truth and validity for its own doctrines of the real and condemns those of the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
other schools as false and misguided. Thus, philosophies become dogmatic, and

8@
O Y R
dogmatism produces blindness, intolerance, opposition, and conflict.
11
00
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ce
The question now arises whether one can ever hope to capture reality through names
.e
ya

H
and forms. The Madhyamika answer to this question is a definite no. How does the
ar
w
sh

P U
Madhyamika support this negative answer? The key is to be found in the Madhyamika
ai
y(
ya

K
analysis of the nature of thought and knowledge. According to the Madhyamika, thought
dh
pa

P
originates in and thrives on the polar nature of concepts. Every concept is polar in that
U
ya
ar

it acquire meaning in contrast with other concepts. This is the case not just with such
O
hw
is
rA

explicitly polar concepts as short and long, convex and concave, light and dark,

O
fo
ed

but with respect to all concepts. Consider, for example, the concept table. The meaning

N
is
al
on

of this concept is dependent upon that of the concept non-table. Were it not so, we

A
rs
pe

could not explain to someone what a table is; all we could say is A table is a table,
s
ti
en

which is tautologous and unilluminating as a means to knowledge of table. When we


m
cu
do

say, A table is, the statement is necessarily to be completed with concepts other
is
Th

than table if our explication of table is to be informative and knowledge-producing.


In brief, where there is no concept of non-table there can be no concept of table either.
The point, then, is that knowledge and intelligibility are made possible by the polar
character of conceptsthe polar nature of thinking itself. Language, thought, and

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knowledge would become crippled and vanish away were it not for the dependence Notes:

of one concept on another. The important question now is: Is there a unique way in
which concepts can be brought together in order to produce knowledge? The
Madhyamika answer to this question is in the negative; there is no unique way of
relating concepts to each other. The concepts a thinker generates, the ways in which
he joins them, and, consequently, the particular body of knowledge and truths he
claims, are dependent upon many considerations, the most important of which are the
presuppositions of the given thinker. It should be clear, therefore, that it is impossible
to demonstrate within a given system (or theory) of reality the presuppositions of that
system itself. Any purported demonstration is bound to be circular for the reason that

Y
the demonstration has to employ the very concepts and categories determined in the

H H
first place by the presuppositions themselves. We many introduce here the notion of

P G
the transcendental deduction of a conceptual system, a notion first introduced by

)
om
O I
Immanuel Kant. To provide a transcendental deduction for a conceptual system is to

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
demonstrate not only that people employ that conceptual system for an objective

8@
O Y R
description of reality, but also that it is the only one suitable for objectively dealing with
11
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reality. The latter part of this demonstration is known as uniqueness demonstration.
ce
.e
ya

But it is impossible to offer a non-circular demonstration for the uniqueness of any

H
ar
w

system, because by the very claim of uniqueness the given system is the only one which
sh

P U
ai
y(

can describe reality objectively. This in effect means that uniqueness demonstrations
ya

K
dh
pa

beg the very question at issue and so become circular. Thus transcendental deductions

P
U
ya

are necessarily circular and worthless. This is precisely the Madhyamika observation
ar

O
hw
is

that every claim to describe the real is bound to the dogmatic and every attempt to
rA

O
fo

demonstrate the truth of the claim circular.


ed

N
is
al
on

The main points of the Madhyamika school covered thus far can now be summarized.

A
rs
pe

Concepts as well as conceptual systems are relative to each other. No concepts or


s
ti
en

conceptual system can stand by themselves and generate truths. The truths generated
m
cu
do

by one system are necessarily dependent upon those generated by others. Consequently,
is
Th

no system can lay claim to absolute truth and validity. The truths of each system can
only be relative and partial. All theories or reality are conceptual constructions (vikalpa),
each construction emphasizing some particular aspect and point of view. But the
advocate of each system, forgetting that his own system necessarily depends upon

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others, including his opponents, claims absolute truth and unconditional validity for it Notes:

and rejects other systems as false and misguided. The cause of such forgetfulness is
mans quest for the real, the absolute, the ultimate, and the unconditioned. Philosophers
and other system-builders thus cling to their own views and constructions of reality.
Such clinging is due to ignorancethe failure to distinguish between a view of reality
and reality itself. This ignorance is the source of duhkha. Another way of saying the
same thing is, the disparity between a view of reality and reality and reality manifests
itself as despair, anxiety, and ill-being in general. Keenly aware of the emphasis the
Buddha placed on non-clinging in overcoming suffering and bondage, Nagarjuna tries
to free men by calling attention to the relativity of all thought-constructions, thereby

Y
eliminating the very basis for all clinging.

H H
G
According to the Madhyamika, true philosophy, in the sense of liberating wisdom, is

P N
the dialectical consciousness of the limitations of our constructions of reality out of

)
om
O I

l.c
nama and rupait is reason discovering its own shortcomings and powerlessness to

ai
S
gm
S
give us insight into reality as it is. Freedom, according to Nagarjuna, is freedom from

8@
O Y R
being enamored of conceptual construction of reality, and the recognition of the relativity
11
00
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ce
of all views of reality. Prajna-paramita, the highest wisdom, in on the one hand the
.e
ya

H
keen awareness of the limitations and relativity of all thought-constructions of reality,
ar
w
sh

P U
and direct, non-perceptual, non-conceptual intuitive insight into reality on the other.
ai
y(
ya

K
Prajna is thus at once perfect freedom and perfect peace.
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Samkhya Philosophy Notes:

How does Samkhya establish Satkaryavada? Explain fully.

Explain the Samkhya doctrine of causation.

According to Samkhya philosophy, that which does not exist cannot come into existence,
and there is no absence of what is existent. The effect is concealed in the cause before
it is produced. In this way, creation means the manifestation of that which is hidden,
and destruction implies the concealment of that which is manifest. In this way, both
creation and destruction indicate the discarding of one form or quality and adoption of
another form or quality. The difference between the cause and the effect is one of

Y H
quality or form. The effect exists in its cause. This view is called Satkaryavada. Because

H G
of their refusal to recognize the distinct existences of the cause and the effect the

P N
followers of this view are also called bhedasahisnu abhedavadi.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
Prakriti Parinamavada:
S
gm
S
8@
Even among those who accept the theory of the reality of the effect, as stated above,

O Y R
there are two-opinions Parinamavada and vivartavada. According to Parinamavada 11
00
IL B MA
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ce
.e

the cause really changes into effect while according to vivartavada this changing of the
ya

H
ar
w

cause into the effect is not real but only illusory, Clay turning into pot is an example of
sh

P U
ai

parinamavada while the ropes appearing as a snake is can example of vivartavada. In


y(
ya

K
dh

this way, according to parinamavada, the existence of the cause and effect is the same
pa

P
U

while according to vivartavada the existence of the two is different or separate.


ya
ar

O
hw
is

The Samkhya philosophers believe the theory of parinamavada while the Vedanta
rA

O
fo

philosophers accept the theory of vivartavada. In this way, according to Samkhya all
ed

N
is
al

creation is manifestation while all destruction is concealment. The distinction between


on

A
rs
pe

cause and effect is only for practical purpose. Being only two different states of the
s
ti

same object, there is no difference between them. Ramanuja like the Samkhya, accepts
en
m
cu

parinamavada. But according to Ramanuja, the universe is the result of Brahman while
do
is

according to Samkhya the universe is the result of prakrti. Hence, Ramanujas view is
Th

called Brahma parinamavada and the Samkhya view prakrti parinamavada.

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Proof for Satkaryavada: Notes:

Iswara Krishna has prescribed a sloka in the Samkhya Karika to prove the theory of
Satkaryavada. It is explained below:

(1) Asadakaranat That which is not does not possess the capacity to create. That
which does not exist cannot be the cause. This if the effect is not previously or potentially
present in the cause it is like the horns of a rabbit or the lotus in the sky which can never
create anything. If the effect does not exist in the cause, then the cause can never
manifest the effect.

(2) Upadana grahanat For the creation of the object, particular cause, the
constitutive cause, is necessary. If the effect is not present in the material cause, the

Y H
latter can never create the effect. Hence, the effect is the manifestation of the material

H G
cause because it is inevitably related to it.

P N

)
om
O I
(3) Sarvasambhavabhavat If the effect is not related to the material cause, then

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
any cause could manifest any effect. But experience does not bear this out. Hence, the

8@
O Y R
effect is present in the cause before its manifestation.
11
00
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ce
(4) Shaktasya Shakyakaranat Creation is the manifestation of the concealed
.e
ya

H
potential of power. A cause produces only that effect which it has the potentiality to
ar
w
sh

P U
produce, and no other. If this were not true, one could get oil from sand. For this
ai
y(
ya

K
reason, the effect is present in unmanifest or potential form in its cause before it is
dh
pa

P
produced.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

(5) Karanabhavat There is identity between cause and effect. When the obstacle is
is
rA

O
removed from the path of manifestation, the effect is expressed by the cause. Hence,
fo
ed

N
is

the effect is present in the cause before it is manifested.


al
on

A
rs

Difference between Material and Efficient Cause:


pe
s
ti

In Samkhya philosophy, a distinction has been made between the efficient and the
en
m
cu

material cause. The material cause enters into the effect while the efficient cause acts
do
is

from with out. Despite the fact that the effect is hidden in the cause before it is manifested
Th

an efficient cause is needed to make it manifest. In order to obtain oil it is necessary to


crush the seeds. In the absence of this cooperating power or energy, the effect cannot
be made manifest. In order to obtain oil it is necessary to crush the seeds. In the
absence of this cooperating power or energy, the effect cannot be made manifest.

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Hence, the absence of the effect in the cause is dependent upon certain conditions. Notes:

According to Vyasa, these conditions are space, time, form and shape. When the
internal quality of an object is transformed it is called the quantitative effect but when
only the external manifestation is changed it is called apparent result.

State the nature of Prakrti according to Samkhya. How does Samkhya


prove the existence of Prakrti.

State the Samkhya conception of Prakrti. Show how Prakrti is related to


Purusa. Analyse the Samkhya a arguments for Prakrti What is exactly the
relation between Purusha and Prakrti.

Many Names of Prakrti:


Y H
H
It is on the basis of their theory of causation that the Samkhya philosophers deduce the

P G
ultimate cause of the universe, prakrti. Everything has a cause of the universe, prakrti.

)
om
O I
Everything has a cause but nor prakrti. It is the first cause. It precedes creation. All the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
effects of the universe are based and depend upon it. It is the first element of universe,

8@
O Y R
and his therefore called pradhana. Lokacharya writes that it is called prakrti because
11
00
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it causes all the distortions, it is called avidya. because it contradicts knowledge, it is
ce
.e
ya

called maya, because it evolves the peculiar creation.

H
ar
w
sh

P U
It is very subtle and visible, and can be deduced or inferred only from its creations. For
ai
y(
ya

K
this reason, prakrti is also known a anuma. In the form of the unconscious element it
dh
pa

P
is called jada and in the form of unilimited but always active force it is called shakti,
U
ya
ar

and in the form of the unmanifested objects it is called avyakta or unexpressed.


O
hw
is
rA

O
First Cause of the Universe:
fo
ed

N
is

According to Samkhya, the entire universe is composed of objects which are effect
al
on

A
and have their origin in material cause. Universe is a flow of causes and effects. Hence,
rs
pe
s

it also must have a fundamental cause. The fundamental cause cannot be the soul or
ti
en
m

the self because the self is neither a cause nor an effect, besides which its nature
cu
do

contradicts the nature of objects found in the universe. According to the Charvakas,
is
Th

Buddha, Jaina and Nyaya Vaisesika philosophers, the universe is composed of the
atoms of earth, water, fire and air. It is the contention of the Samkhya that the subtle
elements such as mind, intelligence and ahamkara or ego cannot have their origin in
these physical elements. The cause of the universe should be such that, even though it

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is physical, it should be as subtle and infinitesimal as possible, should have no beginning Notes:

and no end, and should be able to give rise to all the entities. All these qualities are to
be found in prakrti. Hence, prakrti is the fundamental or first cause of all the objects of
the world. It is eternal and absolute, because a relative and non-eternal element cannot
be the fundamental cause of the world. It is a profound, inexhaustible and microscopic
power of energy.

Difference between Prakrti and Objects:


Objects which have their origin in prakrti are effects, dependent, relative, many and
non-eternal because they are born and they die, they are created and destroyed. Prakrti
is unborn, independent, absolute, one, eternal and beyond creation and destruction.

Y H
Objects are limited within the space-time continuum but prakrti is beginningless and

H G
endless. Being extremely microscopic, prakrti is imperceptible and unmanifest. It is

P N
inferred from the objects which originate in it. Motion is present in it in the form of

)
om
O I

l.c
rajas. Objects are manifest while prakrti is unmanifest. Objects are composite, prakrti

ai
S
gm
S
has no parts. Without a cause no effect can result. Hence, that which is the cause of all

8@
O Y R
the objects and substances of the universe is prakrti of pradhana. Being very subtle it
11
00
IL B MA
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ce
is not perceptible.
.e
ya

H
ar

Proofs for the Existence of Prakrti:


w
sh

P U
ai

The following proofs have been adduced, in the Samkhya Karika in the form of a
y(
ya

K
dh

sloka, in order to establish the existence of prakrti.


pa

P
U
ya

(1) Bhedanam Parimanat All the objects of the world are limited, dependent;
ar

O
hw
is

relative and have an end. Hence the cause which creates them should be unlimited,
rA

O
fo

independent, absolute and unending prakrti.


ed

N
is
al
on

(2) Bhedanam Samanvayat The objects of the world possess some common

A
rs
pe

qualities in spite of being different and due to this homogeneity they arouse pleasure,
s
ti
en

pain or attachment. Hence, there should be a general cause which can tie them in a
m
cu
do

common string, being possessed of all there qualities and being the sole cause in which
is
Th

all the objects of the world originate, and which can synthesize, or which is possessed
of one uniform nature.

(3) Karytah pravrttescha All effects arise out of cause in which they were present
in unmanifest form. Evolution means the manifestation of that which is concealed. The

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energy which causes evolution in the universe should be inherent in the cause of the Notes:

universe. The cause is prakrti.

(4) Karana karya vibhagat Cause and effect are distinct from each other. The
elements or objects are distinguished on the basis of cause and effects. e.g., mahat is
the cause and ahamkara is its effect. Effect is the manifest cause and cause is the
unexpressed effect. Every cause has its effect. Thus the universe must also have a
cause in which the entire universe lies unmanifest. This is the unmanifest or prakrti.

(5) Avibhagat Vaishwarupasya Samkhya has accepted an identity between cause


and effect. When it goes from the present to the past, the effect loses its identity in the
cause. In the process every effect proceeds backward and is dissolved in its cause. In

Y H
this way, in order that complete identity of homogenity should be apparent in the

H G
universe, the mahat should also be dissolved in its cause. Hence, the unmanifest is that

P N
in which all the effects dissolve and the universe appears undifferentiated.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
Other Characteristics of Prakrti:

gm
S
8@
Iswara Krishna greets prakrti by saying that we adore prakrti which is unborn, red,

O Y R
white and black, the mother of all, the benefactor or nourisher of all, and that which
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

assumes the entire multitude. According to Vyasa, prakrti is that which both is and is
ya

H
ar

not which does not have existence, in which there is no non-existence, which is
w
sh

P U
ai

unmanifest, partless and pradhana.


y(
ya

K
dh
pa

Prakrti is not so much existence as it is energy. We are not acquainted with prakrti and

P
U
ya

the real nature of its qualities since our knowledge is limited only to the objective
ar

O
hw
is

existence of the universe. It has neither touch nor sound. From the practical viewpoint
rA

O
fo

it is no more than a name. But nevertheless, the fact of the its existence is the absolute
ed

N
is
al

truth and is known by inference on the basis of objects of the universe.


on

A
rs
pe

(1) Criticism Samkhya has described prakrti as independent and absolute but it
s
ti
en

does not appear to be so from the account given of it in the Samkhya philosophy. It
m
cu
do

has three qualities and hence the self, which does not have these qualities, is distinct
is
Th

from it. Prakrti is dependent upon the self or Purusa. Without the influence of the
purusa prakrti cannot evolve the universe, even thought that influence may consist in
mere proximity. It (prakrti) creates and evolves only for the purusa. When the purusa
comes to know it, for him prakrti vanishes. In this way, it is better to rename prakrti as
ignorance or absence of knowledge. It cannot be absolute and independent.
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(2) Prakrti has been characterised as personal by Samkhya, there are any number of Notes:

sentences strewn about the books of Samkhya showing it to be personal. She is a


dancer. She is female, she has superlative qualities. She is benevolent, she serves the
purusa with detachment, is completely selfless. She is very delicate and withdrawing
and cannot stand the stare of the purusa. She has the colours of the rainbow and tries
to attract the purusa. In this way prakrti reflects the personality of a woman.

State the grounds for the existence of Purusas according to the Sankhya
system. In the sankhya theory of Plurality of Purusas tenable?

State and explain Samkhya view about Purusha (self) Discuss plurality of
selves.

Y H
H
Analyse the Samkhya concept of purusa. How does Samkhya try to

P G
establish that there are many purusas?

)
om
O I

l.c
Bring out the nature of Purusa. How are Purusa and Prakrti related?

ai
S
gm
S
8@
What arguments are put forward by the Samkhya for the existence of self

O Y R
(purusa)? Explain the nature of the purusa.
11
00
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ce
.e
ya

What is the nature of purusa according to the Samkhya? State their

H
ar
w

arguments in support of the existence of purusa.


sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
What is the nature of purusa according to Samkhya? Are its arguments for
dh
pa

P
the plurality of purusas conclusive?
U
ya
ar

O
hw

Nature of Purusa (Self):


is
rA

O
After prakrti, the other reality of the Samkhya philosophy is Purusa or self. Purusa is
fo
ed

N
is

self, subject, the knower. It is neither the body, nor the mind (manas), neither ahamkara
al
on

A
nor intellect or buddhi. It is not the substance which has the quality of consciousness,
rs
pe
s

but is itself pure consciousness. It is basis of all knowledge and is the supreme knower.
ti
en
m

It cannot be the object of knowledge. It is the observer, eternally free, impartial spectator
cu
do

and peaceful. It is beyond the space-time continuum, change and activity. It is self
is
Th

enlightened and self-proved. It is all pervading, formless and eternal. Its existence
cannot be doubted because in its absence, all knowledge and even doubt is not possible.
He has been described as devoid of the three gunas, negative, inactive, solitary witness,
observer, knower and of the nature of illumination. Unlike the Vedanta, Samkhya does

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not believe the self to be of the nature of happiness (Ananda). According to it, happiness Notes:

and consciousness (chaitanya) are different. The purusa is of the nature of pure
consciousness and it is beyond the limit of prakrti. It is inactive and is free from distortions.
Its objects change but it itself never changes. It is above self-arrogance and aversion
and achievement. Action, result, pleasure, pain etc., are the qualities of prakrti and its
distortions.

Proofs of the Existence of Purusa:


The following arguments have been adduced in the Samkhya Karika to prove the
existence of purusa.

(1) Sanghat Pratha ttvat All composed objects are meant for someone else. The

Y H
unconscious element cannot make use of them, hence all these substances are for

H G
purusa or self. The body, sense organs, mind, intellect are only the tools of the purusa.

P N

)
om
The three gunas, prakrti, subtle body, all serve the purpose of the purusa. Evolution is

O I

l.c
ai
S
teleological. Its purpose is to work for the purusa. It is only in order that purusa may

gm
S
8@
achieve his purpose that prakrti manifests itself in the form of the universe.

O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
.1
(2) Trigunadi Viparyayat All substances are composed of three gunas. Purusa is
ce
.e
ya

the witness of these gunas and is himself beyond them. Purusa is the witness of these

H
ar
w

gunas and is himself beyond them. The substances composed of the three gunas prove
sh

P U
ai
y(

the existence of the purusa who is not made of three gunas and is beyond them.
ya

K
dh
pa

P
(3) Adhisthanat There should be a pure consciousness, which is beyond experience
U
ya
ar

and is capable of synthesizing to create harmony among all the experiences. All
O
hw
is
rA

knowledge depends upon the knower. Purusa is the substratum of all practical

O
fo
ed

knowledge. He must he present is all kinds of affirmations and negations. There can be

N
is
al
on

no experience without him.

A
rs
pe
s

(4) Bhoktrbhavat Unconscious prakrti cannot make use of its own creation. A
ti
en
m

conscious element is needed to make use of them. Prakrti is the one to be enjoyed
cu
do

hence there must be someone to enjoy it. All the objects of the world create either pain
is
Th

or pleasure or indifference, but there must be some conscious element to experience


these three feelings of pain, pleasure or indifference. Hence, there must necessarily be
a purusa a self.

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(5) Kaivalyartha Pravrtti In the world there are many individuals who endeavour Notes:

to gain freedom from the pains and displeasures of the world. For the desire of salvation
to exist a person is needed to wish for salvation or moksa and to make an effort for it
and attain it. For there to be any prayer there must be someone to pray. Hence it is
necessary to accept the existence of purusas.

Plurality of Selves:
In contradiction of Advaita Vedanta, and in agreement with the Jaina and the Mimamsa
philosophies, Samkhya accepts the plurality of selves. In their fundamental form these
selves are the same but they are many in number. Their essence is consciousness
which is the same in all souls.

Y H
Proofs for Plurality of Selves:

H G
The following arguments are given to prove the pluralistic concept of selves and they

P N

)
om
are to be found in the Samkhya Karika:

O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
(1) Janma marana Karananam Pratiniyamat The births, deaths and sensory

8@
O Y R
activities of all individual beings are different. One is belind while another has two eyes.
11
00
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.1
The difference is possible when there are more than one selves otherwise all would
ce
.e
ya

have died when one died, and all would have been blinded when one becomes so. But

H
ar
w

such is not the experience of every day life, hence there is a plurality of selves.
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
(2) Ayuagpat Prvttescha All individuals are not possessed of the same tendencies.
dh
pa

P
A different tendency is to be found in every different individual. In an individual one
U
ya
ar

may find a positive tendency at a particular moment and a negative tendency in another
O
hw
is
rA

person at the same moment. In this way, the failure to find a concurrence of tendencies

O
fo
ed

leads to the conclusion that there are many purusas. If there were only one purusa then

N
is
al
on

all beings should have been possessed with the same single tendency at one time.

A
rs
pe
s

(3) Traigunyaviparyayat In all the individuals in the world, one finds different
ti
en
m

combinations of the three gunas. Otherwise, every object in the world equally contains
cu
do

sattva, rajas and tamas, the three gunas. But even then, one individual is sattive, another
is
Th

rajasic and yet another tamasic. Those who are sattvic have peace light and pleasure.
Those who are rajasic or have a preponderance or rajas have pain, disturbance and
anger while the tamasic are ignorant and prone to attachment. If there were only one

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purusa, then all would have been sattvic, rajasic or tamasic. But such does not appear Notes:

to the case. Hence, there are many selves.

Criticism:
Samkhya has time and again confused between the worldly being and the unqualified
witness, purusa Samkhya has given ample evidence of the truly spiritual outlook in
describing the soul as pure consciousness, the basis of knowledge, other than three
gunas, witness, inactive, self-evident, invisible and absolute. But the proofs it has adduced
to prove the existence of the purusa are applicable to the practical, psychological
being and not to the spiritual soul. How can the spiritual self be manas and the recipient
of experience? If the true existence of the universe as well as the eternally independent

Y H
and free nature of the soul have to be postulated simultaneously, then actually, two

H G
types of purusas, the transcendental and the empirical, will have to be postulated.

P N

)
om
Critically examine the relation between Purusa and Prakrti according to

O I

l.c
ai
Samkhya system?
S
gm
S
8@
O Y R
For the difference between the prakrti and the purusa of the Samkhya philosophy
11
00
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.1
please see the preceding answers. The difference is clearly illustrated in the following
ce
.e
ya

table:

H
ar
w

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRAKRTI AND PURUSA


sh

P U
ai
y(

Prakrti Purusa
ya

K
dh
pa

P
(1) material conscious
U
ya
ar

O
hw

(2) object subject


is
rA

O
fo

(3) of three gunas impartial above the three gunas


ed

N
is
al
on

(4) one many

A
rs
pe
s

(5) active inactive


ti
en
m
cu

(6) in space and time beyond space and time


do
is
Th

(7) that which is experienced that which experiences

(8) ignorance of the nature of knowledge

(9) first cause of universe above the universe

(10) cause of attachment free


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Dualism of Samkhya Notes:

Samkhya philosophy is dualistic. According to it prakrti and purusa are of entirely


contradictory nature, as is also evident from the foregoing table. Prakrti and purusa
are completely independent and absolute. Evolution and distortion in the constituent
elements takes place as soon as purusa comes into close proximity with prakrti. But
the purusa never gets tied down or attached to the universe because he is eternally
free. In this way, although Samkhya philosophy has made concerted efforts to establish
some sort of relation between these two, it has failed to resolve their dualism.

Dualism is not Adequate:


By utilizing the classic example of the blind and the lame, Samkhya has tried to establish

Y H
some relation between prakrti and purusa, simultaneously maintaining their dualism

H G
intact the while. According to Samkhya, just as the tree bears fruits for others or water

P N
flows because of the slope of surface or the pieces of iron are attached by the magnet

)
om
O I

l.c
of milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of the calf similarly

ai
S
gm
S
Prakrti manifests for the Purusha. These arguments put forward by Samkhya are not

8@
O Y R
logical. Not one of the examples given above suitably fits with or illustrates the relation
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
between prakrti and purusa. Samkhya has remarked correctly that purusa being inactive
.e
ya

H
and prakrti being unconscious, no third element can bring about any conjunction between
ar
w
sh

P U
them. Actually, both prakrti and purusa appear to a abstraction taken from the real
ai
y(
ya

K
concrete world. For the purpose of intellectual consideration, it is permissible to separate
dh
pa

P
prakrti and purusa, conscious and material elements. But in doing this sight should not
U
ya
ar

be lost of the fact that this division is merely for the purpose and facility of thought and
O
hw
is
rA

in the real world there is only one absolute or eternal reality. In this way, the dualism of

O
fo
ed

Samkhya is merely imaginary and in philosophy it cannot be accepted as ultimate truth.

N
is
al
on

A
Write short note on Samkhya conception of the three gunas.
rs
pe
s
ti

According to Samkhya, the state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas is called
en
m
cu

prakrti. In this way, sattva, rajas and tamas are three gunas in prakrti. The word guna
do
is

has three meanings in Sanskrit, viz., quality, strand of rope, and secondary. The gunas
Th

of prakrti are not qualities but substance. On analysis prakrti is found to contain three
kinds of substances. There are the three qualities, or, in the sense here used, the three
constituent elements. These fundamental substances are the material elements of prakrti.
They are called gunas also because they ensnare the purusa by interwinding together

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like the strands of a rope. Besides, their name derives also from the fact that they are Notes:

of secondary help to the purusa in his effort to achieve his end, liberation.

Relation of the Gunas:


Sattva is believed to be white, rajas or rajoguna to be red and tamoguna or tamas to
be black. These there gunas both contradict each other as well as co-operate with
each other. None of them exists alone or is capable of existing alone. These three
constituent elements are present in all the objects of the world in the same way in
which fire and oil, though of mutually destructive or contradictory natures, help in
giving light. Among them each gunas tries to suppress the other two, and in an object
its nature corresponds to the gunas which is the strongest of the three in that object.

Y H
The other two constituent elements also continue to exist in the object but they now

H G
assume secondary importance. It is due to these three qualities that all the objects of

P N
the world are divided into desirable, undesirable and indifferent. These three constituent

)
om
O I

l.c
elements are continually changing. They cannot remain pure for a single moment because

ai
S
gm
S
distortion in their nature.

8@
O Y R
Svarupa and Virupa Tranformation:
11
00
IL B MA
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ce
.e

There are two kinds of transformations that occur in the gunas Svarupa and virupa. In
ya

H
ar

the state of dissolution, every element is drawn into itself, away from its other
w
sh

P U
ai

counterparts, and becomes stable. It is changed into the homogeneous. In this way,
y(
ya

K
dh

sattva changes into the sattva, rajas into rajas and tamas into tamas. This transformation
pa

P
U

is called Svarupa transformation. Being such by itself, none of the gunas can do anything.
ya
ar

O
hw

Before creation, this state of equilibrium exists. In the state of equilibrium, the gunas
is
rA

O
exist in the form of unmanifest groups in which there is no transformation, no object
fo
ed

N
is

and none of the qualities such as sound, touch, form, taste and smell, etc. This is the
al
on

A
prakrti of Samkhya. In creation, and till the stage of dissolution sets in, the gunas are in
rs
pe
s

the state of constant flux and each tries to dominate the others. It is this flux of gunas
ti
en
m

that result in the formation of various objects. This kind of transformation is called
cu
do

virupa transformation and is changed into the heterogeneous. This causes creation.
is
Th

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Give an account of the Samkhya theory of evolution. Notes:

Discuss the concept of evolution in Samkhya system.

According to the Samkhya, the universe evolves. The evolution takes place because
of the contact between prakrti and the purusa. The purusa individually cannot create
because he is inactive, and in the same manner prakrti cannot create unassisted because
it is material. The contact of these two is necessary for creation to take place. The
evolution of creation can take place through the activity of Prakrti only when the energy
of prakrti is conjoined to the consciousness of the purusa. But how is this possible
when they differ so much in their respective natures? In explaining this apparent
contradiction, Samkhya employs classic example of the blind man and the lame. The

Y H
blind and the lame man call co-operate with each other. The lame man can climb on

H G
the shoulder of the blind and can direct him along the correct path. In this way, both of

P N

)
om
them can reach the safe and desired spot In much the same manner inactive purusa

O I

l.c
ai
S
and unconscious prakrti cooperate in order to achieve the objective. This contact

gm
S
8@
creates disturbance in the stability of the gunas and evolution starts. Purusa is needed

O Y R
to see, know and utilize prakrti and the purusa stands in need of prakrti in order to
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

experience, or to attain substances by distinguishing between himself and prakrti. But


ya

H
ar

how can there be any real contact of two contrary and independent substances? Realizing
w
sh

P U
ai

this difficulty Samkhya has stated that there is no real contact between prakrti and
y(
ya

K
dh

purusa but only nearness. The mere proximity of the purusa is enough to create
pa

P
U

disturbance and distortion in the state of equilibrium of the gunas and to start evolution.
ya
ar

O
hw
is

4The constituents of the gunas exist in a state of equilibrium even before creation. This
rA

O
fo

state of equilibrium is disurbed when there is nearness of prakrti and purusa. That is
ed

N
is
al

known as the state of guna ksobha. In this, the first to change in the rajas, because it is
on

A
rs

active and dynamic by nature. Because of rajas the other gunas are also activated. In
pe
s
ti

this way, a seismic upheaval disturbs and


en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Prakrti Purusa Notes:

Mahat

Ahamkara of Ego

Tanmatras Sense Organs Organs of Action Mind

Mahabhuta eyes, ears, nose, mouth, hand, feet,


tongue, skin anus, sex organs

Y H
eather, air, fire, water, earth

PH G
N
World

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
disrupts the stability of Prakrti. One constituent element tries to gain control over the

O Y R
others. The three elements are constantly mixing and separating. This leads to the
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

creation of many kinds of objects and beings, differing from each other because of the
ya

H
ar

difference in the proportion of these three constituent elements which are to some
w
sh

P U
ai

extent found in every one of them.


y(
ya

K
dh
pa

(1) Mahat The first distortion in evolution is mahat or mahan. Along with intellect,

P
U
ya

ego and mind, it is the cause of the entire creation. Mahat is the cosmic aspect of
ar

O
hw
is

intellect, and intellect in the individuals is the psychological aspect of mahat. Mahat is
rA

O
fo

both eternal and non eternal. Vijnana Bhiksu has accepted past tendency in buddhi.
ed

N
is
al

The special function of the buddhi or intellect is decision and memory as it is the means
on

A
rs

of distinguishing between the knower and the known. It is by means of intellect that
pe
s
ti

decision is given in any matter. Buddhi has its origin in the abundance of the sattva
en
m
cu

elements. Its natural function is to manifest and other objects. With an increase in the
do
is

sattva elements, buddhi gains in virtue, knowledge, detachment and excellence. If the
Th

tamas element increases it is marked by such attributes as vice (adharma), ignorance


(ajnana) and attachment (asakti). The qualities of sattva element hare the proper qualities
of the buddhi. Purusa can understand the difference that exists between himself and
prakrti, and can then contemplate or analyse his own real nature. In this way, buddhi

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differs from soul or atma. The soul is above all physical substances and qualities or Notes:

gunas. Buddhi is the basis of the actions of the jivatma or living being. When the
element of sattva increases in the buddhi the image of the soul falls on it and enlightens
or manifests the Buddhi. The function of the sense organs and the mind are for the
buddhi while the activity of Buddhi is for the benefit of the soul or the atman.

(2) Ahamkara Ahamkara or the ego is the second product of evolution. The I of
the Buddhi or intellect and the pride of mind is ego or ahamkara. Buddhi is an
intellectual concept while ahamkara is practical. It is because of ahamkara or ego that
purusa looks upon himself as an active agent, desiring and striving after ends, and the
possessor of properties. Ahamkara is the basis of all wordly activities. The object is

Y H
first perceived through the senses. The mind then reflects on these perceived and

H G
determines their nature. Following this the attitude of mine and for me, is attributed

P N
to those objects. Ahamkara or ego is just this sense of I.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
Distinctions of Ahamkara:
S
gm
S
8@
O Y R
There are three distinctions of ahamkara
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
(a) Vaikarika or sattvika In this there is preponderance of the element of sattva. In
.e
ya

H
its cosmic from it gives rise to mind, the five senses and five organs of action. In its
ar
w
sh

P U
psychological form it gives rise to meritorious actions.
ai
y(
ya

K
dh

(b) Bhutadi or tamas In this it is the element of tamas which is dominant. In its
pa

P
U

universal form it forms the origin of the five subtle elements (tanmatras). In its
ya
ar

O
hw

psychological form it causes lethargy, indifference and disturbance.


is
rA

O
fo

(c) Taijas or rajas In this the dominant element is rajas. In its cosmic aspect it
ed

N
is
al

supplies energy to both sattva and tamas to change into their products. In its psychological
on

A
rs

form it is responsible for bad activities.


pe
s
ti
en

This order to evolution, originating in ahamkara, is given in the Samkhya Karika. It is


m
cu
do

accepted by Vachaspati Misra. But in Samkhya Pravachana Bhasya Vijnanabhiksu


is
Th

has accepted mind or manas as the only sense organ in which the sattva element is
preponderant and which has its organ in the sattvic ahamkara. The other ten sense are
result of the rajas ahamkara, while the five tanmatras or subtle elements have their
origin in the tamas ahamkara.

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(3) Mind The co-operation of the mind is necessary for both activity and knowledge. Notes:

This is the internal organ which stimulates the other senses to attend to their respective
objects. It is composite even though subtle and can be conjoined to all the senses
simultaneously. The organs of perception (jnanendriyan) and the organs of action
(Karmendriyan) are external tools. Manas, ahamkara and Buddhi are three internal
organs. The vital processes are the functions of the internal organs. These internal
organs are influenced by the external organs. Perception by the sense organs is of an
indiscriminate or indeterminate nature, which is given a determinate form of the mind
after it has determined the nature of the perception. The ego or ahamkara takes
command of the perception and likes or dislikes them accordingly, as they are or not

Y
useful to the achievement of its purpose. And intellect decides whether these objects

H H
are to be adopted or rejected. There three internal organs along with ten external

P G
organs are called the thirteen karanas or organs. The external organs maintain contact

)
om
O I
only with objects that are present. But the internal organs are aware of objects belonging

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
to past, present and future.

8@
O Y R
(4) Five senses (jnanendriyan) The five senses are skin, nose, eyes, ears and
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
tongue. In fact, sense is an imperceptible energy or force which exists in the perceived
.e
ya

H
part and apprehends the object. In this way then, the sense is not the eye but its power
ar
w
sh

P U
of visual perception. The senses are not perceived, They are inferred from the functions
ai
y(
ya

K
that they perform. The five organs procure and produce knowledge of touch, smell,
dh
pa

P
colour, sound and taste. All these are born because of the purusa and are the results of
U
ya
ar

the ego or ahamkara.


O
hw
is
rA

O
(5) Five organs of action (Karmendriyan) The cause of the creation of objects
fo
ed

N
is

and the organs of action and perception is the desire of the purusa to experience. The
al
on

A
five organs of action (imperceptible powers) reside in these part of the body mouth,
rs
pe
s

hands, feet, anus and the sex organs. They perform the following functions respectively
ti
en
m

speech, handling, movement, excretion and reproduction.


cu
do
is

(6) Five subtle elements (tanmatras) The subtle elements of the objects are
Th

called tanmatras. There are five tanmatras in the five objects touch, speech, colour,
taste and smell. The tanmatras are very subtle and cannot be perceived. They are
known by inference. But yogis or saints can perceive even them. According to Nyaya

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Vaisesika the tanmatras originates in the five physical elements, but contrary to this the Notes:

Samkhya holds that it is the five elements that have their origin in the five tanmatras.

(7) Five physical elements (mahabhutas) The five physical elements originate in
the five subtle elements in the following manner:

(a) Akasa or ether and the quality of sound originate in speech tanmatra. Sound is the
quality of ether of akasa, and it can be perceived by the ear. (b) The mixing of the
sound and touch tanmatras results in the creation of air whose qualities are sound and
touch. The qualities are born along with air. (c) The further mixing of the colour tanmatra
with the sound and touch tanmatra to the previous results in water. (d) And when the
smell tanmatra is added to those of sound, touch, colour and taste, the element of earth

Y H
comes into existence, in addition to its qualities smell, sound, colour, taste and touch.

H G
In this way, each new element that appears in this order possesses the qualities of the

P N

)
om
elements that have appeared before it, besides its own qualities. Accordingly, the

O I

l.c
ai
S
characteristic qualities of earth, water, fire and other are smell, taste, colour, touch and

gm
S
8@
sound respectively.

O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
.1
Four kinds of Elements:
ce
.e
ya

In this way, there are four kinds of elements in the entire sequence of evolution prakrti

H
ar
w

or equilibrium, vikrti or distortion or flux, prakrti-vikrti and neither prakrti nor vikrti
sh

P U
ai
y(

Purusa is in neither prakrti nor vikrti. In the above mentioned twenty five elements,
ya

K
dh
pa

prakrti is only prakrti, Mahat, ahamkara or ego, and the five tanmatras or subtle

P
U
ya

elements, together with five elements, are both prakrti and vikrti. The other sixteen
ar

O
hw
is

elements five organs of perception, five organs of action, five physical elements and
rA

O
fo

the mind or manas, - are only distortions or vikrti.


ed

N
is
al
on

Two forms of Evolution


A
rs
pe

The order of evolution also has two form (1) psychical (pratyasarga or buddhisarga),
s
ti
en

and (2) physical (tanmatra sarga or bhautika sarga). The first to appear is the Buddhi
m
cu
do

or intellect, ego or ahamkara and the eleven organs. In the second stage appear five
is
Th

subtle elements (tanmatras), the five gross physical elements (mahabhutas) and their
products. The five subtle elements are imperceptible to the ordinary individuals and
are hence called avivesa or those devoid of perceptible qualities. In the physical
elements and their products, are the qualities such as pain, pleasure and attachment,

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etc. Hence, They are called visesa or particular. These peculiar or visesa substances Notes:

are of three kinds (1) Gross physical elements. (2) Gross body made up of the five
elements. (3) Subtle body is the name given to the group of Buddhi, ego, eleven
organs and the five subtle elements. The gross body is the abode of the subtle body.
The intellect, ego and the organs cannot function without physical substratum. Vachaspati
Misra has accepted the existence of these two bodies, the subtle and the gross, and
Vijnanabhiksu has postulated a third king of body, called the adhisthana sarsra, which
serves as medium for the transfer of the subtle body from one gross body to another
gross body.

Purpose of Evolution:

Y H
The evolution of Samkhya is not the mere combination of atoms. It is a teleological

H G
evolution. In an indirect manner every object in the worlds gives credence to the purpose,

P N
the soul or atma. Just an unconscious tree bears fruits or water flows because of the

)
om
O I

l.c
slope in the earths surface of the pieces of iron are attacted towards the magnet or

ai
S
gm
S
milk flows from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of its calf, in the same

8@
O Y R
manner every object unconsciously fulfils the purpose of the purusa be in liberation or
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
be it experience. Prakrti assists the purusa. Although purusa is inactive, indifferent and
.e
ya

H
unqualified the benevolent prakrti, maintaining detachment, works unceasingly towards
ar
w
sh

P U
the objective of the purusa. Prakrti words for the liberation of the purusa. Although
ai
y(
ya

K
Samkhya has postulated prakrti as the material as well the efficient cause while the
dh
pa

P
purusa is neither a cause nor an effect but instead of prakrti it is purusa who should be
U
ya
ar

considered the efficient and final cause of evolution. Despite their being of contradictory
O
hw
is
rA

natures, the two co-operate like the oil, wick and flame of the lamp to manifest the

O
fo
ed

purpose of the puruta and present in to the intellect. All organs are for the purpose of

N
is
al
on

the purusa. The subtle body also is for the use of the purusa. In this way, the entire

A
rs
pe

process of evolution, from mahat, the first distortion, to the physical elements, the last
s
ti
en

distortion, aims at the liberation of the purusa. The evolution shall continue till all the
m
cu
do

purusas attain their liberation.


is
Th

Criticism:
(1) There is no logical basis for the order of distortions of prakrti. Appearance of these
distortions of prakrti in the specific order named in Samkhya does not appear to be
supported either by logical or metaphysical necessity. Realizing this fact, Vijnanabhiksu

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said that shastra is the only evidence in support of this order of evolution. But this Notes:

implies acceptance of the fact that this order of evolution cannot be proved by argument.

(2) According to Dr. Radhakrisnan, Samkhya has mixed up its spiritual or intellectual
metaphysics with psychological facts. It has mixed up its own assumption with the
thoughts borrowed from the Upanishad. Hence the evolution of Samkhya is not
adequate and logical;

Sankhya: Bondage and Liberation:


The earthly life is full of three kinds of pain. The first kind, called adhyatmika, is due to
intra-organic psychological causes and includes all mental and bodily sufferings. The
second, adhibhautika, is due to extra-organic natural causes like men, beasts, birds,

Y H
thorns etc. The third, adhidaivika, is due to supernatural causes like the planets, elemental

H G
agencies, ghosts, demons etc. Wherever there are gunas there are pains. Even the so-

P N

)
om
called pleasures lead to pain. Even the life in heaven is subject to the gunas. The end of

O I

l.c
ai
S
man is to get rid of these three kinds of pain and sufferings. Liberation means complete

gm
S
8@
cessation of all suffering which is the summum bonum, the highest end of life (Apavarga

O
or Purusartha).
Y R 11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e
ya

Purusa is free and pure consciousness. It is inactive, indifferent and possesses no

H
ar
w

attributes. Really speaking, it is above time and space, merit and demerit, bondage
sh

P U
ai
y(

and liberation. It is only when it mistakes its reflection in the buddhi for itself and
ya

K
dh
pa

identifies itself wrongly with the internal organ the intellect, the ego and the mind, that

P
U
ya

it is said to be bound. It is the ego, and not the Purusa, which is bound. When the
ar

O
hw
is

Purusa realizes its own pure nature, it gets liberated which in fact it always was. Hence
rA

O
fo

bondage is due to ignorance or non-discrimination between the self and the not-self
ed

N
is
al

and liberation is due to right knowledge or discrimination between the self and the not-
on

A
rs

self. Liberation cannot be obtained by means of actions. Karma, good or bad or


pe
s
ti

indifferent, is the function of the gunas and leads to bondage and not to liberation.
en
m
cu

Good actions may leads to heaven and bad actions to hell but heaven and hell alike,
do
is

like this wordly life, are subject to pain. It is only knowledge which lead to liberation
Th

because bondage is due to ignorance and ignorance can be removed only by knowledge.
The Jiva has to realize itself as the pure Purusa through discrimination between Purusa
and Prakrti. Actions and fruits, merits and demerits, pleasure and pain all belong to the
not-self. The knowledge that I am not (the not-self), that nothing is mine, that ego

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is unreal, when constantly meditated upon, becomes pure, incontrovertible and absolute Notes:

and leads to liberation. Sankhya admits both Jivanmukti and Videhamukti. The moment
right knowledge dawns, the person becomes liberated here and now, even though he
may be embodied due to prarabdha karma. On account of the momentum of past
deeds, the body continues to exist for some time, just as the wheel of a potter goes on
revolving for some time due to previous momentum even though the potter has withdrawn
his hand from it. As the liberated saint, though embodied, feels no association with the
body, no new karma gets accumulated as all karma loses causal energy. The final and
the absolute emancipation, the complete disembodied isolation automatically results
after death. Sankhya liberation is a state of complete isolation, freedom from all pain,

Y
a return of the Purusa to its pure nature as consciousness. There is no pleasure or

H H
happiness or bliss here, for pleasure presupposes pain and is relative to it. Pleasure is

P G
the result of sattya guna and liberation transcends all gunas.

)
om
O I

l.c
Sankhya believes that bondage and liberation a like are only phenomenal. The bondage

ai
S
gm
S
of the Purusa is a fiction. It is only the ego, the product of Prakrti, which is bound. And

8@
O Y R
consequently it is only the ego which is liberated. Purusa, in its complete isolation, is
11
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untouched by bondage and liberation. If Purusa were really bound, it could not have
.e
ya

H
obtained liberation even after hundred births, for real bondage can never be destroyed.
ar
w
sh

P U
It is Prakrti which is bound and Prakrti which is liberated. Ishvarakrsna frankly says:
ai
y(
ya

K
Purusa, therefore, is really neither bound nor is it liberated nor does it transmigrate;
dh
pa

P
bondage, liberation and transmigration belong to Prakrti in its manifold forms. Prakrti
U
ya
ar

binds itself with its seven forms. There is nothing finer and subtler than Prakrti; she is so
O
hw
is
rA

shy that she never reappears before that Purusa who has once seen her in her true

O
fo
ed

colours. Just as a dancing girl retires from the stage after entertaining the audience,

N
is
al
on

similarly Prakrti also retires after exhibiting herself to the Purusa.

A
rs
pe
s

God:
ti
en
m
cu

The original Sankhya was monistic and theistic. But the classical Sankhya, perhaps
do
is

under the influence of Materialism, Jainism and Early Buddhism, became atheistic. It is
Th

orthodox because it believes in the authority of the Veda. It does not establish the non-
existence of God. It only shows that Prakrti and Purusas are sufficient to explain this
universe and therefore there is no reason for postulating a hypothesis of God. But
some commentators have tried to repudiate the existence of God, while the later Sankhya

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writers like Vijnanabhiksu have tried to revive the necessity for admitting god. Those Notes:

who repudiate the existence of God give the following arguments; if God is affected by
selfish motives, He is not free; if He is free, He will not create this world of pain and
misery. Either God is unjust and cruel or He is not free and all-powerful. If He is
determined by the law of Karma, He is not free: if not, He is tyrant. Again, God being
pure knowledge, this material world cannot spring from Him. The effects are implicitly
contained in their cause and the material world which is subject to change requires an
unintelligent and ever-changing cause and not a spiritual and immutable God. Again,
the eternal existence of the Purusas is inconsistent with God. If they are the parts of
God, they must have some divine power. If they are created by God, they are subject

Y
to destruction. Hence there is no God.

H H
G
Criticism:

P N
The logic of the Sankhya system, like that of Jainism, impels it to embrace idealistic

)
om
O I

l.c
monism or absolutism but it clings, like Jainism, to spiritualistic pluralism and dualistic

ai
S
gm
S
realism. The fundamental blunder of Sankhya is to treat Prakrti and Purusa as absolutely

8@
O Y R
separate and independent realities. The Prakrti and Purusa of Sankhya thus become
11
00
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mere abstractions torn away from the context of concrete experience. The object and
.e
ya

H
the subject are relative and not independent and absolute. Experience always unfolds
ar
w
sh

P U
them together. Like the two sides of the same coin, they are the two aspects of the
ai
y(
ya

K
same reality. To dig a chasm between them is to undermine them both. And that is what
dh
pa

P
Sankhya has done. The logic of Sankhya requires it to maintain the ultimate reality of
U
ya
ar

the transcendental Purusa alone and to regard Prakrti as its inseparable power. When
O
hw
is
rA

this Purusa is reflected in its own power Prakrti, it becomes the empirical ego, the Jiva,

O
fo
ed

the phenomenal. Plurality belongs to this Jiva, not to the transcendental Purusa. The

N
is
al
on

subject and the object, the Jiva and the Prakrti, are the two aspects of the Purusa

A
rs
pe

which is their transcendental background. It is the Purusa which sustains the empirical
s
ti
en

dualism between Prakrti and Jiva and which finally transcends it. Every Jiva is the
m
cu
do

potential Purusa and liberation consists in the actualization of this potentiality. Thus is
is
Th

the philosophy to which the Sankhya logic points and which is throughout implicit in
Sankhya, but which is explicitly rejected by Sankhya with the inevitable and unfortunate
result that Sankhya has reduced itself to a bundle of contradictions.

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If Prakrti and Purusa are absolute and independent, they can never come into contact Notes:

and hence there can be no evolution at all. As Shankara has pointed out, Prakrti being
unintelligent and Purusa being indifferent and there being no third principle, no tertium
quid, there can be no connection of the two. Neither real contact (samyoga) nor
semblance of contact (samyogabhasa) nor mere presence of Purusa (sannidhya-matra),
as we have noticed above, can explain evolution. Sankhya realizes the mistake, but in
order to defend the initial blunder it commits blunders after blunders.

The Sankhya account of Prakrti makes it a mere abstraction, an emptiness of pure


object. The original state of Prakrti is not a harmony, but only a tension of the three
gunas. The gunas point to a state beyond them. It is this state which gives harmony to

Y H
the gunas and transcends them. Prakrti does not do that. Hence it is not real. Reality is

H G
the Purusa alone. Again, Prakrti is unconscious and unintelligent. How can it then

P N
explain the teleology which is immanent in creation? If Prakrti is unconscious and

)
om
O I

l.c
blind, evolution must be mechanical and blind and there can be no freedom of the will.

ai
S
gm
S
And if Prakrti and all its evolutes from Mahat to the Mahabhutas tend to serve the

8@
O Y R
purpose of the Purusa, it can be neither unconscious nor independent. Again, if Prakrti
11
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is blind and non-intelligent, it cannot evolve this world which is full of harmony, order,
.e
ya

H
design and purpose. Stones, bricks and mortar cannot account for the design of a
ar
w
sh

P U
building. Mere clay cannot fashion itself into a pot. How can Prakrti explain the original
ai
y(
ya

K
impetus, the first push, the elen vital which disturbs the equilibrium of the gunas? The
dh
pa

P
argument that Prakrti work unconsciously for the emancipation of the Purusa just as
U
ya
ar

unintelligent milk flows for the nourishment of the calf is untenable because milk flows
O
hw
is
rA

as there is a living cow and there is the motherly love in the cow for the calf. Nor can

O
fo
ed

the modification of Prakrti be compared to that of grass which turns into milk. Grass

N
is
al
on

becomes milk only when it is eaten by a milch now, and not when it lies uneaten or is

A
rs
pe

eaten by a bull. The simite of the blind and the lame is also misleading since the blind
s
ti
en

and the lame are both intelligent and active being who can devise plants to realize a
m
cu
do

common purpose, while Prakrti is unconscious and Purusa is indifferent and there is no
is
Th

common purpose. The simile of magnet and iron is also misleading because the proximity
of the Purusa being permanent, there would be no dissolution and hence no liberation
and the very state of Prakrti as the equilibrium of the gunas would be impossible since
the presence of the Purusa would never permit the state of equilibrium. Moreover,

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activity is said to belong to Prakrti and enjoyment to Purusa. This overthrows the Notes:

moral law of Karma and brings in the charge of vicarious liability. Poor Purusa suffers
for no fault of its own. Prakrti performs actions and Purusa has to reap their fruits,
good or bad. And Prakrti knows how to make delicious dishes, but not to enjoy them!

Though Prakrti is called absolute and independent yet there is a note of relativism in
the conception of Prakrti. As a triad of the gunas it points towards the nistraigunya
Purusa as the transcendental reality. At every step, it shows its dependence on Purusa.
It cannot evolve this world by itself without being influenced by the Purusa whether
that influence is due to real contact or semblance of contact or mere presence. How
can Prakrti be absolute then? An absolute Prakrti is a contradiction-in-terms. If it is

Y H
absolute why should it care to sever the purpose of the Purusa? Does it not make it

H G
subservient to the Purusa? And if it is unconscious and blind, how can it serve this

P N
purpose? Though Sankhya calls Prakrti as impersonal, yet its descriptions of Prakrti

)
om
O I

l.c
are full of personal notes. Prakrti is called a dancing girl; she is feminine, she is virtuous

ai
S
gm
S
and generous; she is the benefactress of the Purusa; she serves Purusas purpose in a

8@
O Y R
spirit of perfect detachment for no gain to herself; and yet she is blind; she is extremely
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delicate and shy and cannot stand the eye of the Purusa; she is seven-rainbow-coloured
.e
ya

H
and want to attract the Purusa. How can such Prakrti be absolute and impersonal?
ar
w
sh

P U
Purusa is untouched by bondage, liberation and transmigration. It is Prakrti who blinds
ai
y(
ya

K
herself and liberates herself and transmigrates. Prakrti is said to vanish for that Purusa
dh
pa

P
who has seen her, though she continue to exist for others. Does this not make Prakrti
U
ya
ar

relative? If she vanishes, how can she be absolute and eternal? Why not frankly
O
hw
is
rA

equate Prakrti with Avidya? Either maintain a plurality of Prakrtis or equate it with

O
fo
ed

Avidya. These descriptions of Prakrti clearly show that Vedanta is implicit in Sankhya.

N
is
al
on

A
Sankhya throughout makes a confusion between the Purusa, the transcendental subject
rs
pe
s

and the Jiva, the empirical ego, the product of the reflection of Purusa in Buddhi or
ti
en
m

Mahat. Sankhya rightly emphasizes that the Purusa is pure consciousness and that it is
cu
do

the foundation of all knowledge and that it is beyond bondage, liberation transmigration.
is
Th

Purusa has really nothing to do with the play of Prakrti. It is a mere spectator and is not
among the dramatis personae. It is not contaminated by action. It is self-proved and
self-shining. It is the transcendental subject which appears as the phenomenal ego. We
cannot derive consciousness from Prakrti or matter, nor can we regard consciousness

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as a quality. The self is not a substance but a subject. It is the Alone, the unseen seer, Notes:

the transcendental Absolute. But Sankhya soon forgets its own position and reduces
the ultimate Purusa to the level of the phenomenal ego. Some of the proofs advanced
in support of the existence of Purusa, are proofs only for the phenomenal ego. Purusa
is called enjoyer and Prakrti enjoyed. But if Purusa is the transcendental subject, how
can it be an enjoyer? If it is passive, indifferent and inactive, how can it enjoy? Again,
how can the transcendental reality be split into the many reals? How can there be a
plurality of the transcendental subjects, the Purusas? Of course, no one denies the
plurality of the empirical egos, the Jivas. But the manyness of the egos, the empirical
souls, does not lead us to the manyness of the transcendental selves, the Purusas. In

Y
fact, all the arguments advanced by Sankhya to prove the plurality of the Purusas turn

H H
out to be arguments to prove the plurality of the Jivas which none has ever denied.

P G
Sankhya proves the plurality of the Purusas by such flimsy arguments that if there were

)
om
O I
only one Purusa, the birth or death or bondage or liberation or experience of pleasure

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
or pain or indifference of one should lead to the same result in the case of all, forgetting

8@
O Y R
its own doctrine that the Purusa is not subject to birth or death or bondage or liberation
11
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or any action. Realizing this grave defect, the commentators like Vachaspati, Gaudapada
ce
.e
ya

and Vijnanabhiksu have maintained the reality of one Purusa only. If Sankhya can

H
ar
w

reduce all objects to one Prakrti, why can it not reduce all the empirical souls to one
sh

P U
ai
y(

Purusas by the same logic? And why can Prakrti and the empirical Purusa be not
ya

K
dh
pa

reduced to the Absolute Purusa by the same logic? Again, if all the Purusas are essentially

P
U
ya

similar, if the essence of all is pure consciousness, how can they be really many?
ar

O
hw
is

Differences and distinctions constitute individuality. If all the Purusas are essentially the
rA

O
fo

same, there is no meaning in proclaiming their quantitative plurality. Numerical pluralism


ed

N
is
al

is sheer nonsense.
on

A
rs
pe

Another grave defect in Sankhya is in its conception of liberation. Liberation is regarded


s
ti
en

as a negative cessation of the three kinds of pain and not as a state of positive bliss.
m
cu
do

Sankhya feels that bliss is a product of Sattva guna and cannot remain in liberation
is
Th

which is the state beyond the gunas. But Sankhya forgets that the bliss in liberation is
not empirical happiness produced by Sattva. This bliss is also transcendental in character.
It is beyond both pain and pleasure. What is related to pain is empirical pleasure and
not transcendental bliss. The negative Kaivalya suggests an influence of the Hinayana

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Nirvana. Will the liberated Purusas, the eternally isolated units not represent a vast Notes:

array of sad personalities? If liberation is an annihilation (nasmi, naham) of human


personality and not its perfection, the ideal of liberation is most uninspiring. It must be
substituted by an ideal of positively blissful eternal existence in the bosom of the
Absolute.

Sankhya, therefore, should let its Prakrti glide into Avidya, the inseparable power of
the Purusa; its Prakrti-parinama-vada into Purusa-vivarta-vada; its so-called empirical
Purusa into phenomenal Jiva; its negative Kaivalya into positively Moksa, and should,
instead of maintaining the plurality of Purusas and creating an unbridgeable chasm
between the subject and the object, recognize the Absolute Purusa, the transcendental

Y H
subject which gives life and meaning to the empirical subject and object and holds

H G
them together and ultimately transcends them both.

P N

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
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ce
.e
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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ThePhilosophy of Yoga Notes:

"Define Yoga and discuss its utility in practical life.

Yoga is the practical path of realisation of the theoretical ideals of Samkhya philosophy.
Both Samkhya and Yoga philosophies maintain that liberation can be attained only by
knowledge. But the attachment of this knowledge requires suppression of the physical
and mental modifications and gradual control over body, senses, mind, intellect and
ego, so that the pure self may be realised. The realisation of the pure self requires the
cognition that the self is beyond the body, mind, senses, intellect and ego etc. It is
beyond space and time, liberated, eternal and beyond sins, disease, miseries and death.

Y
The realisation of this truth is the self-realisation. The Samkhya philosophy emphasizes

H
PH
the attainment of knowledge by means of study, concentration and meditation. The

G
Yoga presents as practical path for the realisation of the self. It tells us the way by

)
om
O I
following which the self can be realised.

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Yoga admits all the three pramanas accepted by the Samkhya philosophy, e.g.,

8@
O Y R
perception, inference and scripture etc. The 25 elements of the Samkhya philosophy
11
00
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have also been admitted in Yoga in which one more, i.e., God has been added to it.
.e
ya

H
ar

Thus in their essential metaphysical foundations, both Yoga and Samkhya are the same.
w
sh

P U
The study of Yoga is necessary for the study of Samkhya philosophy. Hence, it is
ai
y(
ya

K
rightly said, "The Yoga system is the natural complement of practical discipline to achieve
dh
pa

P
U

the Samkhya ideal of Kaivalya.


ya
ar

O
hw

Give an account of Yoga Psychology.


is
rA

O
Bring out the nature of the various levels of mental life as expounded by
fo
ed

N
is

Yoga Philosophy.
al
on

A
rs
pe

The path of Yoga is based on sound psychological foundations. Hence to appreciate


s
ti

this path the psychology of Yoga must first be understood. The most important element
en
m
cu

in the psychology of Yoga is Chitta. Chitta is the first modification of prakrti in which
do
is

there is the predominance of Sattva over Rajas and Tamas Gunas. It is material by
Th

nature, but due to closest contact with the self it is enlightened by its light. It assumes
the form of anything in whose contact it comes. Due to the modification of the Chitta
according to objects the knowns these objects. According to Yoga Sutra, though there
is na modification in the self, but due to the reflection of the changing Chitta Vrttis,

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there is an appearance of change in it, just as the moon reflecting in the river reems to Notes:

be moving. So as knowledge is not attained, the soul sees itself in these modifications
of the Chitta and gets rid of attachment and aversion in the Worldly pleasures and
sufferings. This attachment and aversion is the bondage. The only way to get rid of this
bondage is the control of the modifications of the Chitta. This control is the result of
Yoga. In the words of Patanjali,' Yoga is the cessation of the modifications of Chitta".

Stages of Chitta:
The Chitta has five stages which are known as Chitta Bhumi. These five stages are as
follows:

1. Ksipta This is the stage in which are known as Chitta is very much disturbed

Y H
and remains running after the worldly objects just as the Chitta of the demons or

H G
those intoxicated by the possession of superfluous money.

P N

)
om
O I
2. Mudha When there is the preponderance of the tamas just as when one is

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
powered by sleep, the stage of the Chitta is known as Mudha, e.g., the Chitta of

8@
O Y R
the demons or of the intoxicated persons.
11
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3. Viksipta This is the state in which in spite of preponderance of the sattva guna,
.e
ya

H
the Chitta is oscillating between the tendendies of sucesses and failures created by
ar
w
sh

P U
the rajas gunas. The Chitta of hte gods and that of the beginners in Yoga is of this
ai
y(
ya

K
sort. This differs from the ksipta stage because due to the preponderance of sattva
dh
pa

P
sometimes there is temporary ceasing of the modification of Chitta in this stage.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

4. Ekagra The stage of the Chitta when it is fixed on some one subject due to the
is
rA

O
preponderasnce of the Sattva is known as the ekagra stage, just as the flame of the
fo
ed

N
is

burning lamp remains always pointing to one side and does not flicker hither and
al
on

A
rhither.
rs
pe
s
ti

5. Niruddha When only time samskaras remain in Chitta after the cessatio of the
en
m
cu

modification, the stage is known as niruddha stage. It is this stage which is known
do
is

as Yoga.
Th

Of the above mentioned five stages; the first three stages are in Yoga and can be
removed by practice. The last three stages are useful in Yoga.

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Forms of Chitta: Notes:

Because the Chitta is of the nature of three gunas, it always remains changing due to
the preponderance. With this preponderance three main forms of Chitta can be noticed
which are as under:

1. Prakhya In this stage the Chitta is predominated by sattva guna and the tamas
remains in subordination. In this form the Chitta aspires for different powers of
Yoga, e.g., Anima etc.

2. Pravrtti When the tamas guna becomes weak, and the chitta is predominated
by rajas, it appears as enlightened and full of dharma, knowledge, renunciation
etc.

Y H
H
3. Sthiti As the rajas is subordinated, the chitta, predominated by the sattva element,

P G
gets established in its own form and attains the dicriminating reason. This form of

)
om
O I
the chitta is known as sthiti.

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Modifications of Chitta:

8@
O Y R
As has been already pointed out, the chitta, in spite of being material, seems to be like
11
00
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.1
ce
living to the reflection of the self in it. It is these changes in the chitta which are known
.e
ya

H
as its vrttis or modifications. These modifications are due to ignorance and their result
ar
w
sh

P U
is the bondage. These modifications are of five types which are as follows:
ai
y(
ya

K
1. Pramana Like Samkhya philosophy, Yoga has also accepted the three testimonies
dh
pa

P
of perception, inference and scripture. By being outside through the sensation the
U
ya
ar

chitta attains the form of object, this is known as pramana. The inference and
O
hw
is
rA

sabda pramana in Yoga philosophy are the same as that in Samkhya.

O
fo
ed

N
is

2. Viparyaya The false knowledge of anything is known as viparyata. Vachaspati


al
on

A
Misra has included doubt (Samsya) also in viparyaya.
rs
pe
s
ti

3. Vikalpa This is the knowledge in which the object which is known does not
en
m
cu

exist, e.g., in the knowledge that consciousness is the form of the purusa, a distinction
do
is

is made between the consciousness and the purusa which precisely does not exist.
Th

The conception of the two as distinct is vikalpa.

4. Nidura The modification of the chitta which is the subtratum of the knowledge
of absence of anything is known as nidra. Due to preponderance of tamas in its

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vrtti, there is absolute absence of the waking and dreaming modifications. But his Notes:

stage should not be conceived as the total absence of knowledge because after
arising from sleep the person has consciousness that he slept well. Hence sleep is
also a modification.

5. Memory (Smrti) Memory is the remembering of the experienced objects. The


above mentioned modifications cause samskaras or tendencies in the inner
instrument. i.e., chitta and in due course these tendencies again take the form of
modifications. Thus the cycle goes on for ever.

According to Yoga philosophy there are several causes of disturbance (Viksepa) in the
chitta. These are as follows

Y H
H
Disease, inactity, doubt, carelessness, attachment with the objects, false, knowledge,

P G
non-attainment of the sage of samadhi, obsence of concentration etc. Due to the

)
om
O I
disturbances in the chitta sufferlngs, frustration and physical disturbances follow.'

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
The Yoga prescribes the practice of concentration to check the above mentioned cause

8@
O Y R
of the distraction of chitta. Together with concentration there should be friendship
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00
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towards living beings sympathy towards sufferers, aversion towars evil-doers and
.e
ya

H
pleasant attitude towards the good persons.
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

Kinds of Klesas:
y(
ya

K
dh

Avidya or ignorance breeds false knowledge and false knowledge breeds klesas which
pa

P
U

are of five types:


ya
ar

O
hw

1. Avidya The seeing of self as the eternal and pure in non-eternal, impure and
is
rA

O
painful not-self is Avidya or ignorance.
fo
ed

N
is

2. Asmita Asmita is the false conception of identity between Purusa and Prakrti
al
on

A
and the absence of dintinction between them.
rs
pe
s

3. Raga Raga is the acute thirsting for worldly pleasure.


ti
en
m

4. Dvesa Dvesa is the anger in the means of suffering.


cu
do

5. Abhinivesa Abhinivsa is the fear of death.


is
Th

Explin the eight fold path of the yoga system, What ss its goal?
Write a critical note on the eightfold path of Yoga as method of liberation?
Explain the eight limbs of the yoga system. What do they signify?
What is samadhi? What are its various levels? Discuss fully.

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"Yoga is chittravarti nirodha," Explain. Notes:

What is Samadhi according to Patanjali? How can it be achieved?


What is the purpose of the Yoga of Patanjali? How is it achived?
Distinguish the different kinds of Samadis and explain the Yogomgas for
the attainment of Samadhi.

To get ride of klesas, the chitta must be controlled and concentrated. The Yoga
philosophy has prescribed the following eight sadhanas for this purpose.

1. YamaYama is the control of the body, speech and mind. The Yamas are five
which are as follows:

Y
(a) Non-violence (Ahimsa) Ahimsa is the absolute absence of any form of injury

H H
to any living being.

P G
N
(b) Truth (Satya) Truth us ti be exact in mind and speech i.e., to speak things as

)
om
O I

l.c
they are and to remember exactly as seen, heard and imagined.

ai
S
gm
S
8@
(c) Non-steallng (Asteya) Asteya includes both not taking or stealing another's

O Y R
property and not to have even a desire for it.
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e
ya

(d) Celibacy (Brahmacharya) Brahmacharya is the control of atachment in the

H
ar
w

enjoyment of the senses specially those of sex,


sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
(e) Non-covetousness (Aparigraha) Aparigraha requires not to accept any
dh
pa

P
unnecessary thing or collect it.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

2. Niyama Another important step in Yoga is Niyama or following the rules of


is
rA

O
good conduct. These Niyamas are five which are as follows.
fo
ed

N
is
al

(a) Cleanliness (Saucha) Saucha includes external cleaning through bath and
on

A
rs

pure diet etc., aswell as internal cleaning through sympathy, friendliness,


pe
s
ti

happiness and detachment.


en
m
cu
do

(b) Contentment (Santosa) Santosa means satisfaction in whatever is attained


is
Th

by sufficient and suitable efforts.

(c) Penance (Tapa) Tapa includes the practice of tolerance of the cold and
heat. It requires various types of hard practices.

(d) Reading of religious scriptures (Swadhyaya) Reading of religious scriptures

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is very much useful in the spiritual advancement. Hence it is a necessary principle Notes:

of good conduct in yoga.

(e) Iswara Pranidhana The fifth niyama in yoga is to remember God and to
surrender oneself to Him. This helps the aspirant in the prasctice of yoga.

3. Asama The third step in the advancement of yoga is Asana or posture. Asana
helps in the concentration of chitta and the control of the mind. Yoga has prescribed
various types of postures e.g. Padma, Veera, Bhadra, Seersa, Garuda, Mayura
etc.
These postures are very much helpful in the control of mind as well as of vital
elements in the body. They also help in removing the sufficient due to cold and

Y H
heat. As a matter of fact, posture is the control of the body. It also keeps the body

H G
free from disease and makes it strong. Body it one can control the different external

P N

)
om
as well as internal organs in the body. Thus yoga philosophers had the valuable

O I

l.c
ai
S
insight that the mental control requires and in the discipline of the body as well.

gm
S
8@
O Y R
4. Prayanama The fourth state in the practice of the yoga is pranayama or the
11
00
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.1
control of the breadth. This pre-supposes the control of the body through postures.
ce
.e
ya

By pranayama the aspirant controls the inhaling and exhaling of the breadth which

H
ar
w

helps in the concentration of chitta, There are three main steps in pranayama.
sh

P U
ai
y(

(a) Puraka (Inhaling) The first step in the pranayama is to take in as much air as
ya

K
dh
pa

possible.

P
U
ya
ar

(b) Kumbhaka (retaining of the breath) After the maximum amount of air is
O
hw
is
rA

taken, the second stage in prenayama is to retain it for half of the time taken in

O
fo
ed

inhaling.

N
is
al
on

A
(c) Rechaka (Exhaling) The third stage in pranayama is to gradually exhale this
rs
pe
s

air in almost the same time as taken in inhaling.


ti
en
m
cu

The time taken in these three stages of pranayama is gradually increased so


do
is

that in due course the aspirant can control the breath, thus helping in the
Th

concentration of the chitta.

5. Pratyahara The fifth stage in the path of yoga is Pratyahara. The introversion of
the different sense organs by restraining them from their objects is known as

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pratyahara. By practice in this mind of the aspirant is not disturbed by a worldly Notes:

object area while he lives in the world. This requires very strong determination and
repression of the senses.

The above mentioned five stages are known as external means. The remaining
three stages are known as internal means. As a matter of fact the first five are
merely preparatory to the latter three which are directly concerned with yoga.

6. Dhyana The sixth stage in the path of yoga is Dharana. Dharana is the
concentration of the chitta on some object. This object can be external like the
image of some God etc. It can also be internal as the part in between the eyebrows,
the lotus of the heart. This is the beginning in the stage of samadhi.

Y H
H
7. Dhyana The seventh stage in the process of Yoga is dhyana. When the knowledge

P G
of a certain object of concentration is continued in a process, it is known as dhyana,

)
om
O I
This requires continuous meditation on the object of concentration. By it one has

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
clear knowlege of the object. In Dhyana, in the beginning the aspirant knows only

8@
O Y R
the different parts or forms of the object and gradually he realises the whole of it.
11
00
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.1
Thus by Dhyana the aspirant has the real knowledge of the object.
ce
.e
ya

H
8. Samadhi The last and the most important stage in yoga is samadhi. This is the
ar
w
sh

P U
culmination and the goal to which all other above mentioned seven stages are
ai
y(
ya

K
preparatory steps. When the process of concertration and this object become one
dh
pa

P
and identical, negative the difference between the subject and object, this stage of
U
ya
ar

absolute indentity is known as samadhi. In this stage there is no separate cognition


O
hw
is
rA

of the subject or the process of concentration and the chitta attains the form of the

O
fo
ed

object. Thus, in this stage the subject and the object as well as the process of

N
is
al
on

concentration become one.

A
rs
pe
s

Samadhi or the cessation of the modification of chitta has been conceived of two
ti
en
m

types:
cu
do
is

1. Samprajnata or sabeeja (attributed) Samadhi In this form of samadhi, some


Th

type of substratum of concentration remains and the aspirant has awareness of this
substratum. This stage is realised when chitta is concentrated on some object. Due
to this concentration, the same modification arises in the chitta and other
modifications are annihilated. Due the concentration on one object there is the

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arousal of Prajna which destroys other modifications. This leads to destruction of Notes:

Klesas, the loosening of the bonds of Karma and enlightenment of the real
knowledge. This is the stage of very near to the attainment of yoga. This form of
samadhi is further sub-divided into four types:

(a) Savitarka Samadhi In this type the chitta becomes identified with some
object outside and assumes its form. In this stage there is the awareness of
some one object. Hence it is known as savitarka.

(b) Savichara Samadhi In this type of Samadhi, the chitta is indentified with
some subtle object, and assumes its form.

Y
(c) Sananda Samadhi When the chitta is concentrated on some sattvika subtle

H H
object, it increases sattva guna which results in the attainment of bliss.

P G
N
(d) Sasmita Samadhi In this type, the Asmita itself becomes the object of

)
om
O I

l.c
concentration. Asmita is the intellect reflecting in the chitta. It is subtler than the

ai
S
gm
S
senses on which thechitta is concentrated is sanada samadhi. The senses are

8@
O Y R
born out of asmita. Thus this type of samadi is higher than the above mentioned
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
three.
.e
ya

H
ar

2. Asamprajnata or Nirbeeja (Attributeless) Samadhi This is the highest form of


w
sh

P U
ai

samadhi in which the distinction between the knower, knowledge and known,
y(
ya

K
dh

disappears. In it there are no klesas or attributes. Hence, it is known ,as nirbeeja


pa

P
U

or attributeless samadhi. This form of samadhi is also divided into tewo subtypes,
ya
ar

O
hw

which are as under:


is
rA

O
fo

(a) Bhava Pratyaya Samadhi Samadhi is disturbed due to ignorance, Bhava


ed

N
is
al

means ignorance, Ignorance means seeing of the self as not-self. In this form
on

A
rs

of samadhi only the samaskaras of the passions remain. Thus the ignorance is
pe
s
ti

not absolutely destroyed at this stage due to which even after the attainment of
en
m
cu

this stage the beings have to return to the world again.


do
is
Th

(b) Upaya Pratyaya In this type of samadhi the ignorance is absolutely destroyed
due to arousal or prajna. In it all the klesas are annihilated and the chitta becomes
established in true knowledge. This is the samadhi of the Yogis. It breeds the
pleasure of the chitta, concentration, knowledge etc.

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Eight Siddhis: Notes:

According to Yoga philosophy, the Yogis attain various siddhis by the practice of the
part of Yoga. These powers are mainly of eight types and hence called Asta Siddhi or
Asta Aiswarya:

1. Anima This is the power to become small like atom and to disappear.

2. Laghima This is the power to become light like cotton and so to fly away.

3. Mahima This is the power to become big like mountains.

4. Prapti This is the power to secure whatever is desired.

5. Prakamya This is the power by which all the impediments in the will power are
removed.
Y H
PH G
6. Vashitwa This is the power by which all the living beings can be conquered.

)
om
O I

l.c
7. Eshitwa This is the power by which one attains absolute mastery on all the

ai
S
gm
S
physical objects.

8@
O Y R
8. Yatrakamavasayitwa This is the power by which all the desires are fulfilled.
11
00
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.1
ce
.e
ya

The above mentioned eight siddhis can be used according to the wish of the yogi. But

H
ar
w

in the Yoga philosophy the pursuance of the path of the yoga for the attainment of these
sh

P U
ai
y(

power has been vehemently descried becouse that results in misleading an aspirant
ya

K
dh
pa

from the path of yoga. The ultimate end of the yoga is not the attainment of these

P
U
ya

powers, but the realisation of Moksa.


ar

O
hw
is

What is the place and nature of God in Yoga philosophy? What are the
rA

O
fo
ed

proofs of his existence adduced in this philosophy?

N
is
al
on

In what sense is Yoga sasvara (Theist) Samkhya? Explain the Yoga


A
rs
pe

argument for the existence of God.


s
ti
en
m

According to Vijnana Bhiksu, "The Yoga in order to avoid the difficiulties of meheting
cu
do

the imputations of a partial or a cruel God has accepted prakrti in all its winding an
is
Th

unwinding." Iswara is only one of the many objects on which Yogis can concentrate
their mind. The only purpose of Iswara is to do good to his devotees. Thus God in
Yoga has only practical importance. The meditation on God or Pranava helps in the
concentration of the Chitta. According to Patanjali, Iswara pranidhana helps in the

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attainment of samadhi. Thus in the old Yoga philosophy not much theoretical importance Notes:

has been attached to God. Patanjali himself did not consider God as necessary to
solve the problems of the world. Prof. Max Muller has pointed out, "I do not consider,
therefore, that Rajendra Lal Mitra was right when in his abstract of Yoga he represented
this belief in one Supreme as the first and most importanta event of Patanjali's philosophy."
But the latter Yoga philosophers admitted the existence of God from the theoretical
standpoint as well and advanced arguments for his existence.

Describing the characteristics of God, Patanjali has written in Yoga Sutra, "God is a
particular person who is devoid of the five klesas of Avidya, Raga, Dvesa, Abhinivesa
etc." The Jiva has to bean the fruits of his karmas and he enjoys and suffers in the

Y H
world. The God is free from all this. He is different even from the kevali i.e., the

H G
liberated man. The kevali is liberated from the bondage, but God was neither in bondage

P N
nor ever will be. Hence he is different from kevali. The liberated persons like Kapila

)
om
O I

l.c
etc., were first in the bondage and then liberated. The God, on the other hand, was

ai
S
gm
S
never in bondage. Hence he is different from the Mukta Purusa also. The God is

8@
O Y R
different from the Mukta Purusa, because such a Purusa, in spite of being liberated has
11
00
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.1
ce
the possibility of getting into bondage in future. The God is called Iswala because of his
.e
ya

H
powers of knowledge, desire and activity. He is omniscient and the substratum of all
ar
w
sh

P U
things. He has eternal knowledge and eternal bliss. He is transcendent and greater than
ai
y(
ya

K
everything else. There is no one equal or better to Him in virtues. As a matter of fact
dh
pa

P
God is the name for Him woh excels in all virtues. These virtues have been defined by
U
ya
ar

the scriptures. God possesses all these virtues since eternity. He has always been
O
hw
is
rA

Iswara. He was always liberated. He is the teacher of the teachers like Kapila etc.

O
fo
ed

Thus he is a particular person. Hence Patanjali has not considered God as different

N
is
al
on

from the twentyfive elements of Samkhya. The only purpose of God is to have

A
rs
pe

compassion towards the living beings. He does nothing for his own sake, but only for
s
ti
en

the sake of the world. He has resolved to help the worldly beings in creation and
m
cu
do

destruction, through the preaching of dharma and knowledge.


is
Th

The Yoga philosophers have advanced the following arguments to prove God
1. The existence of God is proved by the scriptures. The scriptures, including Vedas
and Upanishads etc., have described God as the ultimate existence and the
summum-bonum of life.

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2. Existence must have a lowest and highest limit. Just as with regard to the quantity Notes:

there is the smallest and the biggest, similarly knowledge and power etc. must also
have their highest limits, i.e., there should be persons possessing the greatest
knowledge and maximum power. Thus the ultimate Purusa is Iswara. Had there
been another person equal to him, in knowledge and power, the system of the
world should be destroyed by their conflict. Hence God is unique.

3. The union and disunion of Prakrti and Purusa lead to creation and destruction
respectively, but because they are very much different in nature, the union and
disunion is not possible spontaneously. Hence there must be an efficienct cause,
responsible for the union. The efficient cause is God. Without the direction from

Y H
God, the Prakrti cannot evolve a world which is favourable for the self-evolution

H
of the living beings.

P G
N

)
om
According to Patanjali, Iswarapranidhana is also a means toattain samadhi. But the

O I

l.c
ai
S
later Yoga philosophers considered it to be the best means, because God is not merely

gm
S
8@
an object of concentration, but also the great. Lord who removes the impediments

O Y R
from the path of aspirants and thus makes the path of Yoga easy. A true devotee of
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

God and one who always depends on Him, remains meditating on Him and sees him
ya

H
ar

pervading the whole universe. Such a devotee gets the purity of the heart and the light
w
sh

P U
ai

of the intellect and other excellencies from the God. 'Pranava' is a synonym for God.
y(
ya

K
dh

The repetition and meditation of its meaning help in the concentration. By meditting on
pa

P
U

God with one pointed mind the intellect is purified and all the impediments are destroyed.
ya
ar

O
hw

The aspirant realises his self through Iswarapranidhana.


is
rA

O
fo

The stage which the India philosophers entered through Yoga has been recognised as
ed

N
is
al

spiritual by many in East and West, in ancient and modern times. Some of the modern
on

A
rs

psychologists, however, have compared Yoga with mysticism, auto-suggestion, and


pe
s
ti

psychopathic states. Such a comparison only shows ignorance regarding the actual
en
m
cu

state of Yoga. Yoga is a practical affair and it is useless and unreasonable to say anything
do
is

regarding it without practising it under the guidance of some able teacher. Every science
Th

has its own methods peculiar to it, its own experts and its own norms regarding the
training to enter it. Yoga is a science like other sciences and hence has its own methods,
experts and norms of training etc. Any criticism without following these is at best a
partial judgement.

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According to Prof. Garbe all the verses of Patanjali sutra concerning God are un- Notes:

related with the rest and even against its fundamental principles. Dr. Radhakrishnan
has also supported this vies. The God of Yoga is not the summum bonum of life. He is
not the creator or sustainer of the world, but only a particular person. Devotion of God
is only one of the many means to reach the ultimate end. Vijnana Bhiksu has also
admitted God as secondary in Yoga. At least it should be admitted that Patanjali has
not given such importance to God in his Yoga. When God is conceived as a particular
Purusa, the idea of union with Him is difficult to understand.

Y H
PH G
N

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
O Y R 11
00
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ce
.e
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Nyaya Philosophy Notes:

What do you understand by Pramanas? Explain the nature of Upamana


and Sabda according to Nyaya.
Describe briefly the four Pramanas according to Nyaya Philosophy.
What is the Nyaya concept of Vyapti? How is Vyapti established?
Explain the nature of perception according to Nyaya. What are the different
forms of it?
State the Nyaya view of syllogism and compare it with the Western view.
Explain the nature of inference according to Nyaya.
What is the definition of inference in Nyaya logic? Explain the main
Y H
conditions of inference.
H G
Compare the Nyaya syllogism with Aristotelian syllogism. Which of these
P N

)
om
I
do you prefer? Assign reasons for you preference.
O

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Define inference and discuss its kinds.

8@
What exactly is the basis for the distinction between Rankika Pratyaksa
O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
and Alankik Pratyaksa? Explain and illustrate the different kinds of Alankik .1
ce
.e

Pratyaksa.
ya

H
ar
w

Knowledge and its Distinctions:


sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

In Nyaya philosophy knowledge is spoken of as the manifestation of objects.


K
dh
pa

Knowledge lights its objects as does a lamp. Knowledge has two distinctions valid

P
U
ya

(prama) and invalid (aprama). According to Nyaya, valid knowledge is definite


ar

O
hw
is

knowledge or real knowledge and it consists in knowing the object as it is, for example
rA

O
fo

to know the snake as a snake and the bowl as the bowl. Valid knowledge has four
ed

N
is
al

distinctive sources, viz., perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Knowledge


on

A
rs
pe

arising from sources other than these is called invalid or aprama.


s
ti
en

(1) Perception According to Gautama perception is uncontradicted knowledge


m
cu
do

which arises out of the proximity of object and sense organ, it is distinct and is unrelated
is
Th

to any name, According to this view, perception is that form of knowledge which
results from the contact or nearness between the object and the sense organ, and
which is apparent and real knowledge. For example, when any object is so near my
eye that I have no doubts whatever as to its being real, then it is perceptual knowledge.

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If a distinct object appears to me to be human being and I have some doubt this Notes:

knowledge, then inspite of the actual contact between the sense organ and the object,
the knowledge is not perceptual. In the same way, knowledge or perception of the
rope as the snake is not perpetual knowledge even though it is attended by any doubt.
Hence illusory knowledge cannot be considered to be perceptual. The Nyaya
philosophers have recognised six kinds of proximity sanyog, samyak samavaya,
sanyukt samaveta samavaya samaveta samavaya and vishesya bhava.

This analysis of perception does not take into account the extraordinary and intuitive
perceptions because there can be no knowledge of them without contact with senses.
Knowledge of pleasure and pain, etc., occurs without ostensible contact with the sense

Y H
organs. In this way, the general characteristic of perception is not contact with the

H G
senses but rather immediate cognition. Perceptual knowledge of an object occurs only

P N
when there is cognition of it, meaning thereby that in perception, knowledge occurs

)
om
O I

l.c
without any past experience or inference. In this way, some Nyaya philosophers have

ai
S
gm
S
given the name perception (pratiti) to cognition implying therein that perception is such

8@
O Y R
knowledge which is not the result of any other knowledge.
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

Distinctions of Perception Ordinary and Extraordinary:


ya

H
ar
w

Perception has been analysed inn various ways. From one angle perception has two
sh

P U
ai
y(

distinctions ordinary (Laukika) and extraordinary (Alaukika). In ordinary perception


ya

K
dh

knowledge results from the contact of the sense organs with the object. Extraordinary
pa

P
U
ya

perception provides immediate knowledge ever with the senses. Ordinary perception
ar

O
hw

also admits of two distinctions external (bahya) and internal (manas). External
is
rA

O
fo

perceptions have five distinct types concerning with the five senses visual, tactual,
ed

N
is

auditory, gustatory and olfactory. In internal perception, the actual contact between
al
on

A
rs

the object and the mind produces knowledge of the pleasure, pain, hatred, morality,
pe
s
ti

immorality etc. In this way the two kinds of perception, internal and external, admit of
en
m
cu

six distinctions. From another viewpoint, ordinary perception has three distinctions
do
is

determinate (savikalpa), indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and recognition (Pratybhijna). On


Th

the other hand, extraordinary perception also has three distinctions perception of
classes (samanya laksana), complication (jnana laksana) and intuitive (yogaja).

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There are three Distinctions of Ordinary Perception: Notes:

(1) Indeterminate Perception Gautama, in his sutras, accepts this distinction of


perception. When the external organ comes into contact with the object, first of all a
particular kind of knowledge known as sanmukh or avyakrt in Nyaya philosophy,
arises in the self consisting merely of an awareness of the existence of the object
without any knowledge of its name, qualities, etc. It is called indeterminate (nirvikalpa)
perception because it lacks any determining feature such as quality. It is the first
undeveloped form of perception. Its existence is proved not by perception but by
inference. According to the Nyaya philosophers, there should be indeterminate
knowledge preceding determinate knowledge. There two states of perception are

Y
inferred because no relation can be established between the object and the quality
H
PH
without differentiating and distinguishing the two.

G
N

)
(2) Determinate perception Indeterminate perception can not have practical utility.

om
O I

l.c
In determinate perception there is no doubt as to whether it is an animal or a human

ai
S
gm
S
8@
being or anything else. According to the Nyaya view, a moment before it arises, the

O Y R
knowledge of an object is devoid of characters such as name, class, etc., but following
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce

this, the next moment there is awareness in the same knowledge, of such character of
.e
ya

H
ar

the object as name, class, shape, quality, etc., and the one indeterminate but same
w
sh

P U
ai

knowledge is manifested in practice in the form of sentences presenting knowledge.


y(
ya

K
dh

This is determinate (savikalpa) knowledge. In this way, determinate perception gives


pa

P
U

knowledge of the fact that this is a man, he is black, he is still etc. It is the developed
ya
ar

O
hw

form of perception and it is on the basis of it that the practices of the world continue to
is
rA

O
function.
fo
ed

N
is

(3) Recognition In this arises the feeling that the object now being perceived has
al
on

A
rs

been seen at some earlier juncture. To take an example, if upon now meeting the
pe
s
ti

person to whom you were introduced a year ago you feel that he is that same individual,
en
m
cu

this knowledge will be called recognition. In this there is always the element of immediate
do
is

experience.
Th

Three Modes of Extraordinary Perception:


(1) Perception of class (samanya Laksana) That which is perceived by a common
quality or attribute is different from ordinary perception and it, therefore, is called
perception of classes. When we say that all men are mortal, the observation is based
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upon the knowledge of the morality of all men and this knowledge arises from the Notes:

perception of classes. When, upon perceiving someone, we say that he is a man, we


perceive manhood in him, or, in other words, according to the Nyaya philosophers,
knowledge of man arises from the perception of this common quality of manhood
which he shares with all men. It is on the basis of this same perceptual existence that
we say that man is mortal because mortality is an attribute of manhood.

(2) Perception by Complication (jnana laksana) This includes perceptions


such as: the ice looks cold, the stone appears solid and the grass soft. Here coldness,
solidity and softness are subjects of tactual perception; then how can they be visually
perceived. It is explained by the Nyaya philosophers thus. We have, on many previous

Y H
occasions, perceived sandal wood. By smelling it at the same time as perceiving it

H G
visually a relation between its colour and its smell is established in mind. It is for this

P N
reason that the sight of sandal wood causes perception of its smell as well. In this

)
om
O I

l.c
example the present experience of smell is based upon a collection of the previous

ai
S
gm
S
smell. It is called perception by complication because it is based upon past experience.

8@
O Y R
It is extraordinary perception because generally one sense organ does not perceive
11
00
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.1
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sensations of a different nature, which usually stimulate some other sense organ.
.e
ya

H
ar

(3) Intuitive perception It is the intuitive perception of all objects, and is peculiar
w
sh

P U
ai

to yogis who possess supernatural power. This experience can be had only by those
y(
ya

K
dh

who have achieved supernatural power after meditation and yogic practice. This power
pa

P
U

makes it possible for them to have perceptual knowledge of all objects, past and
ya
ar

O
hw

future, complex and minute, near and for. Intuitive perception is also recognised by
is
rA

O
other Indian philosophers. The distinctions of perception are clearly illustrated in the
fo
ed

N
is

following chart.
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Perceptual Knowledge Notes:

Ordinary Extraordinary

External mental or internal determinate

Indeterminate recognition

Y H
visual
P
olfactoryH Gtactual gustatory

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
O
Perception of

Y R Perception by Intuitive

00
11

IL B MA
.1
Classes complication perception
ce
.e
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P
Inference:
U
ai
y(
ya

K
According to Nyaya philosophy, the second source of valid knowledge is inference.
dh
pa

P
Inference is the means to anuma knowledge. It is that knowledge preceding which
U
ya
ar

there is some other knowledge. It is past of indirect (paroksa) and takes place through
O
hw
is
rA

the medium of some mark which is called the hetu and bears the relation of invariable

O
fo
ed

concomitance with the observed feature. Inference literally means that knowledge which

N
is
al
on

follows some other knowledge. The basis of inference is the relation of invariable

A
rs
pe

concomitance. The invariable relation between the hetu and the sadhya is called
s
ti
en

vyapti. The knowledge of the qualities of the paksa through the hetu is called
m
cu
do

paramarsa. Hence inference or anumana is aid to knowledge gained through


is
Th

paramarsa, or in other words, the knowledge of the presence of the sadhya in the
paksa through the linga, which is in the quality of paksa and is invariably related by
vyapti. For example, there is fire on the hill, because there is smoke on the hill and
where there is smoke there is fire. Hence there is the relation of vyapti or invariable

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concomitance between smoke and fire. For this reason the presence of fire on the hill Notes:

is inferred from the presence of smoke on the hill because of vyapti, fire is invariably
present where there is smoke.

Constituent of Inference:
In an inference there are three terms and at least three sentences. These three
constituents of inference are respectively called paksa and hetu or linga. These are
similar to the three items, Minor, Major, and Middle of the Syllogism of Western logic.
Paksa is that part of the inference about which there is inference. Sadhya denotes that
which is proved of the paksa. Hetu establishes that there is relation between the sadhya
and the paksa. For this reason hetu is also known as the means. To illustrate by means

Y H
of example, in the above inference of fire on the hill, smoke is the means of inference.

H G
It is the linga or hetu or sign, the observation of which leads to the inference of the fire.

P N

)
This inference is based upon the invariable relation between fire and smoke. In this

om
O I

l.c
way the inference of fire from smoke has three parts:- (1) There is smoke on the bill.

ai
S
gm
S
8@
(2) There is vyapti or invariable concomitance between smoke and fire (of which we

O Y R 11
are already aware): (3) There is fire on the hill. Here the hill is the paksa because it is
00
IL B MA
.1
ce

in relation to it that the inference is being made, fire is the sadhya because it is fire
.e
ya

H
ar

which is being proved of the paksa (hill), and smoke is the linga. In this way, from the
w
sh

P U
ai

standpoint of thought process first of all in this inference is knowledge of paksa and
y(
ya

K
dh

sadhya and finally the decision about the relation of the sadhya with the paksa. But this
pa

P
U

same inference will be stated in the following manner:-


ya
ar

O
hw

There is fire on the hillside,


is
rA

O
Because there is smoke on the hill side.
fo
ed

N
Where there is smoke there is fire as in the stove.
is
al
on

A
rs

Comparison with the Western Syllogism:


pe
s
ti

In this, the first step is to establish a relation between the minor paksa and the major
en
m
cu

sadhya, the second is to describe the middle hetu and the final step is to give example
do
is

to show the invariable relation of the sadhya with the hetu. This order of inference in
Th

Indian logic differs from the Western syllogism only in respect of the order of judgements,
which are the same in both cases. All three judgements of the foregoing example are
similar to the Conclusion, Minor Premise and the Major Premise of the syllogism
respectively. In the syllogism the order is the following Major Premise, Minor Premise

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and the Conclusion. In this way, the order of the syllogism is the opposite of the order Notes:

of the anumana. In the syllogism, the major premise is stated first but in anumana it is
stated last. All three sentences of anumana are categorical and can be either affirmative
or negative.

Inference for self and other:


Inference has been divided into two kinds according to the purpose for which it is
meant (1) Svarth or for self, and (2) parartha or for others. In the former distinction,
the inference is intended for oneself while in the latter it is for conveying knowledge to
others. In the former there is no necessity of presenting the statements in an orderly
fashion but when it is case of making another person understand it is necessary that the

Y H
correct order or the sentences he adhered to. According to the Nyaya philosophers,

H G
inference for other consists of five constituents. An example of the five constituents of

P N

)
inference follows.

om
O I

l.c
(1) Pratijna There is fire on the hill.

ai
S
gm
S
8@
(2) Hetu Because (on the hill) there is smoke.

O Y R
(3) Drstanta Where there is smoke there is fire, as in the stove.
11
00
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(4) Upanaya There is smoke on this hill.


.e
ya

H
ar

(5) Nigamana Hence, there is fire on his hill.


w
sh

P U
ai
y(

Hetu shows the reason for the Pratijna. Drstanta is a complete comprehensive sentence
ya

K
dh

which, along with an example, shows the invariable relation between sadhya and hetu.
pa

P
U
ya

Upanava shows that drstanta sentence applies to this particular instance. Nigamana is
ar

O
hw

that which result from its preceding sentences. In this inference the linga is observed
is
rA

O
fo

thrice. The first time smoke is observed in the stove, second time in the hill and a third
ed

N
is

time when it is seen in relation to fire. This inference which has five constituents has
al
on

A
rs

been called paramanyayaby Gautama because it includes four pramanas. In Gautamas


pe
s
ti

ancient logic inference has been divided into three kinds on the basis of the distinctions
en
m
cu

of vyapti into its kinds-purvavat, sesavat and samanyatodrsta. Of these the first two
do
is

are based upon the causal relationship while the last is not on this basis.
Th

(1) Purvavat Purva means first or preceding of the cause while vat means like. In
this way purvavat inference is that which is like previous, or in other words, one in
which the effect is inferred from the cause. In this manner, in purvavat inference, the
future effect is anticipated on the basis of the present cause. It is purvavat inference on
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perceiving the clouds in the sky when it is said that it will rain. In purvavat inference Notes:

there is a cause-effect relationship between the sadhana and sadhya.

(2) Sesavat Sesa means effect. In this way, inference of the cause from its effect is
sesavat inference. Contrary of purvavat inference, here the causal relationship is between
sadhya and sadhana in the vyapti. In this, the previous or past cause in inferred from
the present effect. To infer that it must have rained some where by observing an increase
in the water in the river, its speed or its muddiness is to employ the sesavat form of
inference. It is also sesavat inference, when, on examining one part of the whole it is
deduced that the remaining must also possess the same qualities. Thus it is sesavat
inference when from tasting a breaker full of sea water it is inferred that the water in the

Y H
rest of the sea must also be saline. Commentators upon the classics have interpreted

H G
sesavat inference in a different way also. When the possibles are nullified and there is

P N
no possible material form left, then what remains is called sesa. Any inference through

)
om
O I

l.c
the medium of this sesa is called sesavat inference. For example being a characteristic

ai
S
gm
S
quality, sound is not in time, space or mind. It cannot be the special quality of earth,

8@
O Y R 00
water, fire, air or soul because it is heard by the ears. That which is left is the sky. There
11

IL B MA
.1
ce
is no ninth form of matter or padartha. Hence according to sesavat inference it is
.e
ya

H
proved that sound is the quality of sky.
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

(3) Samanyatodrsta That inference which provides knowledge of any imperceptible


y(
ya

K
dh

or unperceived object is called samanyatodrsta, such as the inference of motion in the


pa

P
U

sun by observing it in the East in the morning and in the West in the evening. This
ya
ar

O
hw

inference is not based upon the relation of causality but it is based on the fact that there
is
rA

O
is motion in the sun. It is inferred from the change of position because when other
fo
ed

N
is

objects change their position, motion is always apparent. Hence samanyatodrsta


al
on

A
resembles comparison to some extent.
rs
pe
s
ti

Inference has been further divided into three by the neo Nyaya school, on the basis of
en
m
cu

the method of establishing vyapti or the relation of invariable concomitance


do
is

Kevalanvayi, Kevalavyatireki and anvaya vyatireki.


Th

(1) Kevalanrayi This applies to the case where the means and the object are always
found going together, meaning thereby that case in which the vyapti is established by
an agreement in presence between the middle and the major term, and in which there
is no exception. For example,
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all knowable objects are nameable; Notes:

the pot is a knowable object;


therefore the pot is nameable;

or that which can be known must also have a name. The pot can be known, hence it
must also have a name.

In the first sentence of this inference there is the relation of vyapti between the subject
and the object.

(2) Kevala-vyatireki Where the inference proceeds not from the agreement in
presence of the middle and major term but from the vyapti between the absence of the

Y
major term and the absence of the middle term, it is called kevala-vyatireki inference.

H H
An example on this type of inference would be

P G
That which is not different from other elements.

)
om
O I
The earth has smell:

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Therefore the earth is different from other elements.

8@
O Y R
In this inference the first sentences establishes a relation between the absence of the
11
00
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.1
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major term and the middle term and the relation established is one of the invariable
.e
ya

H
concomitance. It is not possible to discover the characteristic smell in any place other
ar
w
sh

P U
than earth. For this reason it is not possible to establish a relation of agreement in
ai
y(
ya

K
presence between the major and the middle term. In this way, here inference has been
dh
pa

P
made on the basis of absence through the medium of invariable concomitance.
U
ya
ar

(5) Anyaya Vyatireki When the relation between the major and the middle term is
O
hw
is
rA

based on both agreement in presence and absence, the inference is anyaya vyatireki.

O
fo
ed

The following is an example of it:-

N
is
al
on

Where there is smoke there is fire;

A
rs
pe

There is smoke on the hill;


s
ti
en

Hence there is fire on the hill;


m
cu
do

Where there is no fire there is no smoke;


is
Th

There is smoke on the hill:


Hence there is fire on the hill.

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Inference Notes:

Distinctions of Distinctions of Distinctions of the basis


Purpose kinds of vyapti of establishment of vyapti

Purvavat Sesavat Samanyatodrsta

Y
Svartha Parartha Kevalanvayi Keval Anvaya

H H Vyatireki Vyatireki

P G
N

)
om
(4) Comparison:
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
According to Nyaya philosophy, comparison is the name given to the knowledge of

8@
O Y R
the relation between a name and the thing so named. It supplies knowledge of the
11
00
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.1
relation between a name and the object which is given that name. It is based on the
ce
.e
ya

knowledge of some common property of similarity between two major objects Take it

H
ar
w

for granted that you have never seen wild cow. A person dwelling in the forest informs
sh

P U
ai
y(

you that it is not unlike an ordinary cow and possesses much the same shape. If, then
ya

K
dh
pa

you come across some animal which resembles a cow and conclude that this is the

P
U
ya

animal known as wild cow, then this knowledge is the result of comparison. Here,
ar

O
hw
is

there is a relation between the name and the object of that name, or in other words, the
rA

O
fo

animal known as the wild cow is similar to a cow. In this activity of comparison when
ed

N
is
al

we see the similarity between the cow and the wild cow, and recollect that the wild
on

A
rs

cow resembles as cow, only then do we know that its name is wild cow.
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Discuss the Nyaya theory of verbal testimony. Notes:

(5) Testimony According to Nyaya philosophy, testimony is a reliable statement. A


sentence is a group of words, and word is an entity which has the power to express
some meaning. According to the ancient Nyaya system this power of being is dues to
God while according to the later Nyaya philosophers it is endowed by tradition. The
quality of being evidence or source of valid knowledge, is possessed, not by all words,
but only by the words of seers. If some individual has knowledge of the truth and
presents this knowledge for the good of humanity, then his word shall be accepted as
ture. Knowledge comes about with the comprehension of the meaning and not only of
the word. Hence, the knowledge of the meaning of the statements of seers is testimony.

Y H
Drstartha and Adrstartha Words:

H G
Words have been sub-divided into two classes according to the object of the meaning

P N

)
om
Drstartha and Adrstartha. The former relate to the knowledge of such objects that

O I

l.c
ai
S
are perceptible, as statements of seers and ordinary persons who can be believed,

gm
S
8@
descriptions contained in religious texts concerning objects that have been seen,

O Y R
evidence given by witnesses in courts of law, believable facts concerning agriculture
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

and the rituals described in religious texts for rain etc. The latter classification relates to
ya

H
ar

imperceptible objects such as acceptable statements of common men, saints, religious


w
sh

P U
ai

leaders and religious texts, statements of scientists concerning atoms; beliefs of religious
y(
ya

K
dh

leaders concerning sin and virtue and the explanation of God, creatures and other
pa

P
U

things offered in the religious texts.


ya
ar

O
hw
is

Vedic and Laukika Words:


rA

O
fo

The origin of the words forms another basis for their classification (1) Vedic, and (2)
ed

N
is
al

Laukika (ordinary). According to the Nyaya philosophers, words originate with some
on

A
rs
pe

person, be it a human individual or even God Himself. Vedic words are the productions
s
ti
en

of God Himself. Ordinary words are created by human beings. For this reason Vedic
m
cu

words are completely free from defects and delusion. Ordinary words can be true as
do
is
Th

well as false. The utterances of reliable individuals are treated as true.

It must have become evident from the foregoing description of Nyaya epistemology
that in epistemological thought Nyaya philosophy is second to no other system of
Indian philosophy. After going through the detailed and subtle description, no one can
say that logic has not been adequately develop in Indian philosophy.
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How does Nyaya prove the existence of God? Distinguish the Nyaya Notes:

conception of God from the Advaita Vedanta conception of the same.

What is God?
According to Nyaya, God is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. He is
the efficient, not the material cause of the universe. He directs the activities of living
souls. Just as an intelligent and benevolent father inspires the son to act according to
his intelligence, capability and qualities. God also, in the same way, inspires living beings
to act according to the tendencies acquired by them in the past and to win rewards
appropriate to their action. It is he who determines the pains and pleasures of the jivas,
provides their merits and awards their action appropriately. He creates the universe

Y H
from the eternal entities such as atoms, space, time, ether, mind souls, which live with

H G
Him. It is because of His desire that the universe remains in its state of stability. In this

P N
way it is He who also sustains the universe. He employs his powers of destruction

)
om
O I

l.c
when it becomes imperative that the universe be destroyed. In this way, He is also

ai
S
gm
S
destroyer of the universe. Substances such as space, time, etc., have he relation of

8@
O Y R
body and soul to God, consequently they do limit Him. He is, all powerful ever though
11
00
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man proceeds according to virtues and sins. He has real knowledge of all objects and
.e
ya

H
occurrences. He is, therefore, omniscient. He is the substratum in which knowledge
ar
w
sh

P U
exist. He Himself is the knowledge. In Him the six perfections majesty, almighty, all-
ai
y(
ya

K
glorious, infinitely beautiful, and infinite knowledge and perfect freedom from attachment
dh
pa

P
are present in full measure.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

Proofs for the Existence of God:


is
rA

O
fo

Nyaya philosophers have put forward all the ten proofs for the existence of God.
ed

N
is

Some of the important ones are the following:


al
on

A
rs

(1) God is the creator of organic objects of the universe There are two kinds of
pe
s
ti

objects in the universe organic and inorganic. The atoms of space, time, ether, mind
en
m
cu

and earth, water, fire and air are perfect and eternal. Hence there can be no question
do
is

of their creator. But objects other than these are neither atomic nor all pervading (Vibhu).
Th

Hence, they must necessarily have some cause. Without the guidance and direction by
an intelligent agent their material causes cannot possess the form of space they are
found possessing. This agent must possess the knowledge, the desire to attain the
objective, and the power to make an effort. He must also be omniscient, otherwise

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how can he have knowledge of such microscopic existence as the atoms? All these Notes:

qualities to such an agent are to be found only in God. Hence the existence of God as
the creator of the universe is proved.

(2) Gods is the cause of difference of fortune and the rules of past tendencies
In this world, the fortunes of everyone are different. One is born in a rich family and
another in the house of a pauper. Some do not get a full meal even after back breaking
labour while others have everything at their beck and call. Some are intelligent and
others foolish. It is the belief of the Naiyayikas that this difference is due to their past
adrsta. The entity, called adrsta is conglomeration of merits and demerits developing
from good or bad actions of the past. Good actions create merit in our souls and bad

Y H
actions in this way, adrsta is the collection of Good and bad actions of the present and

H G
the previous lives. Good actions have good and bad actions had results. According to

P N
this adrsta the individual is the recipient of pleasure and of pain in this life as well as in

)
om
O I

l.c
the next. But adrsta is unintelligent and hence it can not of itself create correlation in the

ai
S
gm
S
past actions and their results; for this an intelligent director and guide is needed. The

8@
O Y R
jivatma can not be the guide of the adrsta, because it does not have any knowledge of
11
00
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ce
its past tendencies, besides which, the results of past tendencies have been known to
.e
ya

H
run counter to the desire of the jivatma. Thus, according to the Naiyayikas, only God
ar
w
sh

P U
who is immortal, all powerful and omniscient, can be the guide of past tendencies. In
ai
y(
ya

K
this way, differences in fortunes and the influence of past tendencies prove the existence
dh
pa

P
of God.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

(3) God is the cause of the validity of religious texts Vedas are valid and
is
rA

O
authoritative, hence their creator God, is also authoritative. Just as a science can be
fo
ed

N
is

declared valid after testing only a part of it, the entire Vedas including its supernatural
al
on

A
provision can be accepted as valid after testing the validity of its pronouncements
rs
pe
s

about the worldly things. The validity of the Vedas depends upon their author. The
ti
en
m

author of the Vedas cannot be jiva since he cannot be cognizant of their supernatural
cu
do

and extra-sensory subjects. The author of the Vedas can only be one who can have
is
Th

perceptual and actual knowledge of the past, present and future, atom and cosmos,
sensible and extra-sensory objects. In this way, the creator of the Vedas is God and
their validity transpires from Him. Just as the validity of the science depends upon their
creator so does the validity of the Vedas depends upon God.

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(4) Divine utterances also prove the existence of God The fourth proof that Notes:

God exists is forthcoming from sruti, the Vedic script. The existence of God has been
accepted by the Vedas, Upanisads and the Gita. The existence of God can be proved
by experience and not by logic. For this reason, those individuals who do not have
personal experience should depend upon sruti or divine utterance. According to
Kusumanjali, just as the sciences themselves and scientification are proofs of the truth
of scientific laws, the sruti also is evidence for proving the existence of God.

Udayans Arguments:
Udayan had deduced nine arguments, contained in the following sloka for proving the
existence of God.

Y H
(1) Karyat The universe is an effect, hence it must have an instrumental cause. This
cause is God.

PH G
N

)
(2) Ayojanat Atoms are inactive hence they must be provided with motion by God,

om
O I

l.c
which is necessary for their conjunction. Past tendency cannot impart motion to the

ai
S
gm
S
8@
atom: without God.

O Y R
(3) Dhrtyadesh The creator and the destroyer of the universe is God. It is due to his
11
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ce

decision that creation, stability and destruction take place.


.e
ya

H
ar

(4) Padat Words get their power of giving meaning to their subjects from God.
w
sh

P U
ai

(5) Pratyayatah God is the author of the authoritative Vedas.


y(
ya

K
dh

(6) Shrutesh Sruti establishes the existence of God.


pa

P
U

(7) Vakyat Vedic sentences give utterance to moral laws. God is the author of moral
ya
ar

O
hw

laws. Vedic laws are divine.


is
rA

O
(8) Samkhya Visesachcha According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, the diatomic structure
fo
ed

N
is not formed of the microscopic substances of two atoms but of their number two.
is
al
on

A
The numeral one is perceptible, but all the other numerals are mental concepts. At the
rs
pe

time of creation, the souls, atoms, adrsta, space, time, manas, etc., are all unconscious
s
ti
en
m

or unintelligent. For this reason number will be dependent upon the mind of God and
cu
do

will created by it. In this way it is necessary to believe in the existence of God.
is
Th

(9) Adrstat We experience the result of our actions and our qualities. Actions lead to
merit and demerit, and adrsta is the collection of merits and demerits. But the adrsta is
unintelligent. Hence, in order that there may experience of the result of the adrsta there
must be God.

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Objections to God and their Answers: Notes:

Some arguments have been given against the proofs for the existence of God which
Naiyayikas have put forward, They have been answered by the Nyaya philosophers.
The major ones among them are:

(1) In connection with the foregoing third and fourth proofs for the existence of God it
can be objected that they are interdependent, and are consequently defective. But
according to the Sarva Darsana Samgraha, this interdependence is no defect because
it can be defect only when two subjects are interdependent from the same point of
view. In this case from the view point of existence Vedas are dependent upon God
because God is their author while from the viewpoint of human knowledge, God is

Y H
dependent upon the Vedas because it is through the Vedas that the human being set to
know God.

PH G
N

)
om
I
(2) The second objection to the Nyaya conception of God is that if God is the creator

l.c
ai
S
of this universe he must possess a body because without a body no activity can be

gm
S
8@
indulged in. Naiyayikas answer this by saying that existence of God is either proved

O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
by the Sruti or it is disproved. If it has been proved then this objection has no value,.1
ce
.e

and if it has not been proved then what is the use of raising this objection?
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
(3) The third objection to the Nyaya conception of God is concerned with the pressure
ai
y(
ya

K
which God has in creating the universe. God can have no purpose of his own in creating
dh
pa

the universe because He is perfect. His purpose in doing it cannot be said to be for

P
U
ya
ar

others because one who works for the good of other cannot be wise. If this purpose is

O
hw
is

benevolence, then why are there so many unhappy individuals in this world? Hence,
rA

O
fo

God cannot be credited with having credited this world? Answering this objection the
ed

N
is
al

Naiyayikas say that God has created this world out of compassion. The world having
on

A
rs
pe

been created it is only natural that there should be pain and pleasure in the world,
s
ti
en

because the jivatmas are attended by their respective adrsta. But God is not limited by
m
cu

His creation. Just as mind is not the slave of body, it helps it in the achievement of his
do
is
Th

objective and acting to his end; in much the same way the universe does not make the
God dependent upon another but helps Him in the realisation of His objective.

The conception of God professed by the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophy does not appear
correct at all. Samkara has criticised this view. This Nyaya theism is undeveloped and
incomplete.
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The Nyaya Vaisesika are allied systems of philosophy. How are they allied? Notes:

Do they differ in some way? If so how?

Similarity:
Nyaya and Vaisesikas philosophies are allied. The main points that they have in common
are the following:
(1) The aim of both is moksa or liberation of the jiva (2) The root cause of pains is lack
of knowledge. (3) Moksa implies complete freedom from pain. (4) Same from of the
atman (5) Same ways of knowing the atman. (6) Delineation of intelligence, knowledge,
perception, inference, doubt, illusion, etc. (7) Both have postulated five distinctions of
actions (8) Both are agreed on the nature of the universe.

Differences: Y H
PH G
(1) Scope Nyaya is particularly devoted to the study of the sources of knowledge. It

)
om
O I
has dealt only briefly, and that too from the general viewpoint, with the elements. In the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Vaisesika school the elements have been discussed in detail. In metaphysics, they do

8@
O Y R
not restrict themselves to the ordinary but their vision comprehends even the microscopic
11
00
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.1
universe.
ce
.e
ya

H
(2) Categories and prameya In the Nyaya view, there are sixteen categories and
ar
w
sh

P U
nine prameyas whereas in the Vaisesika school there are seven categories and nine
ai
y(
ya

substances.
K
dh
pa

P
U

(3) Sources of knowledge In Nyaya, perception, inference, comparison, and


ya
ar

O
hw

testimony have been accepted as the four sources of valid knowledge. Vaisesikas
is
rA

O
accept only two, perception and inference, as the source of knowledge. Both
fo
ed

N
is

comparison and testimony are included in inference.


al
on

A
rs

(4) Perception According to Nyaya there are five kinds of perception concerning
pe
s
ti

with the five kinds of sense organs (visual, tactual, auditory, olfactory and gustatory).
en
m
cu

But Vaisesika accept only visual perception.


do
is
Th

(5) Samavaya According to Nyaya the knowledge of samavaya can be had through
perception. But according to the Vaisesika view samavaya is known by inference.

(6) Hetvabhasa According to Nyaya there are five kinds of fallacies. On the other
hand, Vaisesika accept only three.

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(7) Dreams According to the Nyaya as opposed to Vaisesika view, dreams arising Notes:

out of merit are true while those arising out of demerit are false.

(8) Deity Naiyayikas are the followers of Siva while the Vaisesikas look upon
Maheswara as the God of all.

(9) Chemical actions Chemical action in Nyaya terminology is pilpaka, while in


the Vaiseska it is pilupaka.

(10) Other subjects In addition to these. Nyaya and Vaisesika also differ regarding
the status of action etc.

Y H
PH G
N

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
O Y R 11
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.1
ce
.e
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Vaisesika Philosophy Notes:

Padartha or Categories:
Nyaya philosophy Is devoted to the almost exclusive study of the sources of valid
knowledge, Vaisesika philosophy devotes itself to metaphysics. According to it, all the
objects of the universe can be divided into seven categories or padarthas, the latter
term denoting those objects which are known through the medium of a word. In this
way these seven categories of reality comprehend all those objects in the world which
can be named. These seven categories are (1) Dravya or substance, (2) Guna or
quality, (3) Karma or action, (4) Samanya or genera-lity, (5) Visesa or particularity,
(6) Samavaya or inherence, and (7) Abhava or non-existence. In these seven

Y H
categories, there are two distinctions (1) Bhava padartha, and (2) Abhava padartha.

H G
The first distinction denotes those categories which have an existence, or those which

P N

)
om
I
are present. The first relates to being. The second distinction, non-being,is a later

l.c
ai
S
addition to the Vaisesika philosophy by later commentators and is not originally

gm
S
8@
discussed. The other six categories, with the exception of abhava, are all existent and

O Y R
are included in being.
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

(1) Dravya or Substance ; Five elements


ya

H
ar
w

According to the Vaisesika view, dravya or substance is the substratum of action and
sh

P U
ai
y(

qualities, and the material or constitutive cause of composite things produced from it,
ya

K
dh

just as the cotton fibre is the cause of cotton cloth produced from it. Even though being
pa

P
U
ya

different from quality and action substance h their substratum. Without it, quality and
ar

O
hw

action can have no existence. Substances are of nine kinds(a) earth or prthvi, (2)
is
rA

O
fo

water or jal, (3) fire or tej, (4) air or vayu, (5) ether or akasa, (6) lime or kala, (7)
ed

N
is

space or dik, (8) self or atma, (9) mind or manas. Among these, the first five are called
al
on

A
rs

panchmahabhuta. In each of these there is one such specific quality which can be
pe
s

perceived by one of the external sense organs. The earth has the quality of smell, water
ti
en
m

that of taste, fire of colour, air of touch and ether that of sound. These are perceived by
cu
do

the nose, tongue, eyes, skin and ears respectively, These sense organs are also believed
is
Th

to have originated in the earth, water, fire, air and ether. With the exception of ether,
the other four physical elements are eternal or nitya in the form of cause and non-
eternal, or anitya, in the form of effect.

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Accordingly the atoms of earth, water, fire and air are beginingless because they are Notes:

not composite, and consequently are eternal, but all the substances formed by the
conjunction of these atoms, which, therefore, are effects, are not eternal because their
constituent atoms can be separated or even destroyed. The fifth substance, the ether,
is the basis of sound. The ether is not perceived because it does not satisfy the conditions
of external perception, is not being possessed of either a perceptible dimension or of
any colour. It is inferred from the perception of sound, and every quality must have a
substratum and none of the other, earth, air, water or fire can be its bearer. There are
two reasons for this. In the first place the qualities of these substances, smell, taste,
form and touch, are not heard whereas sounds of words are heard and are audibly
perceived. In the second place, sound is created even where these elements are absent.

Y H
Sound cannot be the quality of space, time, mind and soul because they continue to

H G
exist even when there is no sound. In this way, ether is the basis of sound. Being

P N

)
om
particles, the ether is one and eternal. It is cosmic, all-pervading and infinite because its

O I

l.c
ai
quality sound is perceived in ail directions.
S
gm
S
8@
Like the ether, space and time are also not perceptible. They are one, eternal and all-
O Y R 11
00
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pervading. Space is inferred by the knowledge of concepts such as here, there, near, .1
ce
.e

far, etc. Time is inferred on the basis of concepts such as past, future, present, old and
ya

H
ar
w

ancient. In this way, then, the earth, space and time are actually identical but they
sh

P U
ai
y(

appear to be distinct because their qualities differ, and even their parts appear to be
ya

K
dh

different.
pa

P
U
ya

Soul or Atman:
ar

O
hw
is

The opinion of the Vaisesika philosophy is the same as that of the Naiyayikas on the
rA

O
fo

subject of soul. The soul is the basis of the phenomenon of consciousness and it is
ed

N
is
al

eternal and all-pervading. It is perceived by the mind and is thus known. The souls in
on

A
rs

different bodies are also different. In this way there are many souls. Besides the soul of
pe
s
ti

human beings called the jiva the other form of the soul is the Paramatma who is one
en
m
cu

and the creator of the universe.


do
is
Th

Mind or Mana:
The existence of the mind can be inferred from the following two factors(1) As in
the case of external substance of the universe, for the perception of which external
sense organs are required, so is an internal sense organ required to perceive the
internal categories composed of knowledge, desire, pain, pleasure etc., and this internal

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sense is the mind. (2) In spite of there being contact between the object and the Notes:

external sense organ knowledge does not occur without a mind. And even when all the
five senses come into contact with their respective qualities in different objects
simultaneously, there is knowledge of only one in one particular moment. In this way,
this not only proves the existence of the mind, it also proves that the mind is atomic and
partless. Had the mind not been an infinitesimal and atomic entity, it was possible for its
various parts to come into contact with different sense organs simultaneously and for
many perceptions to manifest themselves at the same time. But we find in practice that
this does not occur. Hence, it follows that the mind is a partless or atomic form and is
that internal sense of perception. The soul receives its knowledge of the objects through
the medium of mind.

Y H
(2) Quality:

PH G
According to Vaisesika philosophy, quality is that category which subsists in substance

)
om
O I
but in which no other quality or action can inhere. Qualities cannot exist without substance

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
and hence they are said to be other-dependent. As has been stated before only substance

8@
can be the material or constitutive cause of action. It is of secondary help in the action.
O Y R 11
00
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In view of the fact that all qualities are dependent upon substance, there cannot be any
.1
ce
.e

quality of quality. Quality also lacks action or motion. It resides inactively in its
ya

H
ar
w

substratum, the substance. In this way, it differs from both substance as well as action.
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
Distinctions of Quality:
dh
pa

There are twenty-four qualities1. rupa or colour, 2. rasa or taste, 3. gandha or

P
U
ya

smell, 4. sparsa or touch, 5. Sabda or sound, 6, samkhya or number. 7. parimana or


ar

O
hw
is

magnitude, 8. prthakatvaor distinctness, 0. samyog or conjunction, 10. vibhaga or


rA

O
fo

disjunction, 11. paratva or remoteness, 12. aparatva or nearness, 13. bodhi or cognition,
ed

N
is
al

14. sukha or reversion, 15. dukba or pain, 16. iccha or desire, 17. dvesa or reversion,
on

A
rs

18. Prayatna or effort, 19. gurutva or heaviness, 20. dravyaiva or fluidity, 21, sneha or
pe
s
ti

viscidity, 22. samskara or tendency, 23. dharma or merit, 24. adharma or demerit.
en
m
cu

These qualities have been further subdivided ; as various tastes such as sweet, sour,
do
is

saline, bitter, etc., or the sounds such as the articulate and the inarticulate. Magnitude
Th

is further divided into very small, medium and very big. Numbers start from one and
proceed upwards.

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Conjunction and Disjunction: Notes:

Conjunction is the noun predicated of the relation of meeting of two substances capable
of existing apart such as the relation of the hand and the pen. The causal relation is not
a conjuctive relation because the separate existence of the cause of the effect is not
possible. Disjunction is the name of the ending of conjunction or separation, such as
happens when the pen falls from the hand. It Vaisesika philosophy, three kinds of
conjunctions are accepted.

(1) Anyatarkarmajwhere one substance comes and meets or conjoins another. (2)
Ubhaya karmajwhere the conjunction takes place as the result of activity on the
part of both the subs-tances such as when two wrestlers meet, (i) Samyogaj where
one conjunction takes place through the medium of another conjunction such as, the
Y H
hand and paper are in conjunction when the hand touch the pen and the pen the paper.

H G
This is called samyogaj samyog.
P N

)
om
O I
Disjunction has been subdivided into three, on the same basis as conjunction(1)

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Anyatarkarmajwhere the action of one of the substances leads to disjunction; as

8@
when the leaf falls from the tree. (2) Ubhaya karmajwhere the disjunction of the
O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
two takes place through activity and both the substances as when two wrestlers break .1
ce
.e

apart. (3) Vibhagaj where one disjunction leads to another as when the conjunction
ya

H
ar
w

between the hand and the paper is ended when the pen, which is the link between the
sh

P U
ai
y(

two, is put down.


ya

K
dh
pa

Remoteness and Nearness:

P
U
ya

Remoteness and nearness also have two distinctionsspatial and temporal. Temporal
ar

O
hw

remoteness implies oldness while nearness indicates modernity. In the same way, spatial
is
rA

O
fo

remoteness is indicative of great distance while spatial nearness denotes proximity.


ed

N
is
al

Cognition, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion:


on

A
rs

Cognition (knowledge) has been treated in detail in the preceding discussion on Nayaya
pe
s
ti

philosophy. And everybody is familiar with pleasure, pain, desire and aversion. Effort
en
m
cu

has three distinctions : (1) Pravrttithe effort for possessing some object, (2) Nivrtti
do
is

the effort to be rid of something, (3) Jivan yonithe activity of protection.


Th

Fluidity and Viscidity:


The cause of liquid substances flowing is their fluidity, such as is possessed by water.
Similarly, substances like butter have the tendency to conjoin and form lumps, the
tendency being named viscidity or sneha.

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Samskara or tendency also has three distinctions (1) vega or velocity by virtue Notes:

of which an object possesses motion, (2) bhavana or feelingdue to which there is


memory of recognition of some subject, (3) oscillationby means of which some
substance returns from a long distance to its original position such as a rubber ball.

Merit is a virtue which leads to proper activity and results in pleasure. Demerit is a sin
which leads to improper activity and causes pain.

Reason for there being twenty four Qualities:


If all these distinctions of the various qualities were to be counted, their total number
would be well high stupendous, but in these twenty four qualities only the basic qualities
have been counted. The other qualities are only the distinctions of these and are included

Y
there in. In this way these twenty four qualities are funda-mental and it is by their

H
PH
conjunction that the other compound qualities are formed.

G
(3) Karma or Action: What is Karma?

)
om
O I

l.c
Action or karma is the commonly used name of the fundamental dynamic qualities of

ai
S
gm
S
substance. The inactive manifestation of substance is quality and its active manifestation

8@
O R
is action or mobility. Substances combine and separate because of action. Action has
Y 11
00
IL B MA
.1
no quality. Quality is dependent upon substance. Action cannot subsist in all-pervading
ce
.e
ya

substances because in them there is no change of position. Hence, the basis of action

H
ar
w
sh

can only be material substances like the earth, air, fire and mind.
P U
ai
y(
ya

K
Distinctions of Karma:
dh
pa

There are five distinctions of karma(1) utksepana or throwing upwards. In this way,
P
U
ya
ar

due to action the conjunction takes place with the higher plane, (2) avaksepana or

O
hw
is

throwing downwards in which action leads to conjunction with the lower plane, (3)
rA

O
fo

akunchana or contraction, which activity is designed to create conjunction in an ever


ed

N
is
al

nearer sphere such as twisting the hand, (4) prasarana or expansion, (5) gamana or
on

A
rs
pe

locomotion. Actions other than the first four are comprehended by locomotion. The
s
ti
en

activity of substances such as earth, water, fire, etc., is perceptible but the activity of an
m
cu

imperceptible entity like the mind cannot be known by perception.


do
is
Th

(4) Samanya or Generality:


Generality is that category by virtue of which various different individual beings are
enumerated in one class and called by a common name, just as all beings are called by
a word or term indicating class, the examples of which are man, horse, cow, etc.
These have some general or common quality which is to be found in the entire class
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and is its characteristic. Objects or individuals possess similarity because of the general Notes:

quality. In the consideration of the general quality Indian philosophers have subscribed
to one of the following three opinions

Three Different Opinions Concerning Generality:


(1) NominalismAccording to this school of thought, generality is no essential quality
but merely a name which gives similarity to the beings belonging to its class and
distinguishes it from other classes only by virtue of this name. The general has no
individual or separate existence. Among the Indian philosophies it is the Buddhist
philosophy which has accepted this view.

(2) ConceptualismThe second view concerning generality is Conceptualism.

Y H
According to this view, the general quality has no existence apart from the individuals

H G
and neither does it come from outside and enter into the individual. The individual and

P
the general cannot be separated from each other. It is the essential quality or the eternal
N

)
om
O I

l.c
form of general individuals which is appre-hended by our mind or intellect. This point

ai
S
gm
S
is to be found in the Jaina and Advaita Vedanta system of Indian philosophy.

8@
O Y R
(3) Realism -The third view of generality is realism. According to it the general is
11
00
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.1
ce

neither a mental thought or concept nor merely a name but has its own individual
.e
ya

H
ar

existence. The generals are eternal categories which, although separate from the
w
sh

P U
ai

individual, still pervade them. In this way, the general is included or mixed in individuals.
y(
ya

K
It is only because of the general that there is any similarity between different individuals.
dh
pa

P
U

It subsists in substance, quality and action. It is because of general that they are called
ya
ar

O
by the same name or are said to belong to the same class. This view is propounded by
hw
is
rA

the Nyaya-Vaisesika among the systems of Indian philosophy.


O
fo
ed

N
is

Distinctions of Generality:
al
on

A
From the point of view of pervasion generality is of three kindspara, apara and
rs
pe
s

parapara. Para is the most comprehen-sive, such as existense. Apara is the name
ti
en
m

given to the least comprehensive such as potness. The third distinction, parapara is
cu
do

between para and apara, an example of it being fluidity. With relation to existence it is
is
Th

apara, and with relation to potness it is para.

(5) Visesa or Particularity:


Visesa is the very opposite of generality. Visesa is the term indicating the unique or
specific particularity or individuality of eternal substances which have no part. These

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substances are - space, time, ether, mind, soul and the atoms of the four elements. It is Notes:

because of particularity that individuals are distinguished from each other as the atoms
of the same substance considered separately. Particulars are those forms of substances
by means of which they are known distinct from each other. Particulars are needed to
distinguish between composite and non-eternal objects, which are effects, such as
chair, table, etc. The particular is in partless and eternal substances which are
innumerable. Hence the particulars are also eternal, partless and innumerable. They
are themselves recognizable. There can be no perceptual cognition of them because
like the atom, they too are invisible.

(6) Inherence or Samavaya:

Y
According to Prasatapad, inherence is that relation which exists in invariably conjoined

H
PH
(v;qrfl) objects, between which there is (he relation of subsisting and substratum,

G
elements, and which is I he middle term of the concept that this is in them. In tins way,

)
om
O I
objects connected by inherence are so conjoined that they are inseparable. The

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
following are conjunctions of inherenceFinality and substratum, action and the doer,

8@
individual and class, particular and eternal, element and substance, part and whole. In
O Y R 11
00
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this way, there is cloth in cotton fibers, smell in the flower, motion in water, humanity in
.1
ce
.e

human beings, and these are due to samavaya.


ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
Inherence and Conjunction:
ai
y(
ya

K
Vaisesika has accepted two types of relationship inherence and conjunction. These
dh
pa

two differ from each other in the following respects.

P
U
ya

(1) Conjunction is momentary and non-eternal, while inherence is an eternal


ar

O
hw
is

relationship.
rA

O
fo

(2) Conjunction is the relationship which results from the connection of two substances.
ed

N
is
al

Inherence does riot result from the conjunction of substances.


on

A
rs

(3) Conjunction results from the activity of elements or two objects. Inherence is
pe
s
ti

always present in substances. The relation of conjoined substances is mutual.


en
m
cu

(4) Conjunction is an external relation whereas inherence is an internal relation.


do
is

Conjoined substances are capable of existing apart. But substances related by inherence
Th

cannot exist separated. The part and the whole cannot remain apart.

(7) Abhava or Non-Existence:


Being entirely different from the foregoing six substances, non-existence is regarded as
the seventh category. Kanada has accepted only six categories, but in the Vaisesika

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sutra. Non-existence is mentioned in prameya form. This category has been dealt with Notes:

at length in the authoritative text of Vaisesika philosophy, the Prasastapada bhasya,


non-existence is the absence of an object. No body can deny the absence of the moon
on dark nights. Hence it is necessary to include non-existence.

Distinctions of Non-Existence:
There are two main distinctions of non-existence:
(1) Sansargabhava or the absence of one quatity in another, such as the absence of
heat in the moon.
(2) Anyonyabhava or the absence of one object in another just as the moon is not the
sun.

Y H
Distinctions of Sansargabhava:

H G
(1) This type of non-existence, sansargabhava, also has three distinctions(1)

P
Pragabhava or antecedent non-existence, which means the absence of the substance
N

)
om
O I

l.c
which is effect before it is created, just as the absence of the substance of the pot in the

ai
S
gm
S
clay before the clay is made into a pot. Antecedent non-existence has no beginning but

8@
O Y R
it has an end. There was always the absence of the pot in the clay but with the
11
00
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.1
construction of the pot the beginngless non-existence comes to an end.
ce
.e
ya

H
ar

(2) Dhvansabhavaor non-existence on the destruction of substance which is an


w
sh

P U
ai

effect just as the absence of the pot in its pieces after the pot has been destroyed.
y(
ya

K
Dhvansabhava has begin-ning but it has no end. When the pot breaks dhvansabhava
dh
pa

P
U

has a beginning in time but the pot can never come back or be recrea-ted. Thus, this
ya
ar

O
non-existence can have no end.
hw
is
rA

O
(3) Atyantabhava or absolute non-existencemeaning that non-existence between
fo
ed

N
is

two objects which extends over the entire temporal expanse, past, present and future,
al
on

A
such as the absence of coolness in fire. And absolute non-existence has neither a
rs
pe
s

begin-ning nor an end. It is always there. The absence of coolness in fire will continue
ti
en
m

over all time. In this way, absolute non-existence is neither born nor destroyed.
cu
do
is

Differences between Sansargabhava and Anyonyabhava:


Th

Sansargabhava and anyonyabhava differ from each other in the following respects:
(1) Sannsargabhava is the absence of relation between two objects. The latter is the
absence of something in some other objects.

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(2) Sansargabhava is the absence of relation whereas anyonyabhava is the absence Notes:

of identity, A rabbit does not hare any horse : in this example there is absence of
relation between the rabbit and the horse and it is an example of sansargabhava. The
donkey is not a horse; in this relation there is the non-existence of identity, and it is an
example of anyonyabhava.

Criticism of the Concept of Categories


The following objections have been levelled at the Vaisesika concept of categories :
(1) Vaiseska philosophy has mentioned seven categories but substance appears to
be the only category. Quality and action are dependent upon substance. Non-existence
is relative to existence. In this way one of them can be said to be a category. And in the

Y
absence of these qualities and relationships even the nature of the substance cannot be

H
determined.

PH G
(2) Substances have been stated as being nine in number of which ether is the basis

)
om
O I
of sound, space and time are based on experience and mind is the internal sense

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
organ. In this way, actually, the only substances are the atoms of the four elements and

8@
the souls.
O Y R 11
00
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(3) Vaisesikas acceptance of the soul as unconscious and many does not appear to .1
ce
.e

be logical.
ya

H
ar
w

(4) According to the Vaisesika, qualities cannot exist without substance and composite
sh

P U
ai
y(

objects without parts : then how can substance exist without quality and generality can
ya

K
dh

not exist without particularities.


pa

P
U
ya

(5) The Vaisesika philosophers postulate that there is a particular in every atom and
ar

O
hw

in every soul but they do not describe the particular.


is
rA

O
(6) The Vaisesika philosophers believe that if there is existence, there must be non-
fo
ed

N
existence, but even they do not synthesize the two. Actually, they are not prepared to
is
al
on

A
adopt the cosmological viewpoint in their consideration of the category although this
rs
pe
s

view is above the ordinary viewpoint. From the point of view of scientific analysis their
ti
en
m

concept of the category, which, in effect, is their metaphysics, is very important. But
cu
do

then they have failed to adjust among these different categories. In this respect, Samkhya
is
Th

and the Vedanta systems are above them.

Samkitras Objection against Samavaya:


Vaisesika philosophy looks upon inherence as a category. Against It Samkara has
raised the following fundamental objections:

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(1) It is incorrect to speak of conjunction as a quality and of inherence as another Notes:

quality because even though one in yutsiddha and the other ayutsiddha they are
interrelated.
(2) Inherence is other than the objects which it relates and another relation of inherence
is required to relate this relation of inherence and there is no end to this chain.
(3) If inherence is separated from both the objects that it relates then wherein does it
exist ? If it is in the first objects then it cannot relate it to the second and if it is in the
second then it cannot relate it to the first and one inherence cannot remain in both
because it is indivisible. Hence inherence is impossible.

Vaisesika Paramanuvada or Atomism:

Y
According to the Vaisesika thinkers, all composite objects of the universe are composed

H
PH
of the atoms of earth, water, air and fire. Hence the view of the Vaisesika concerning

G
creation is called atomism or paramanuvada. Atomism postulates the cycle of creation

)
om
O I
and destruction of the non-eternal or temporary substances of the universe. The eternal

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
categories of substances of the universe namely, ether, space, time, earth and physical

8@
elements are neither created nor destroyed.
O Y R 11
00
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.1
Creation:
ce
.e
ya

H
The Vaisesika atomism is spiritual. God is the one who directs the motion of atoms,
ar
w
sh

P U
God is the guiding principle controling the motion of atoms. He creates motions in the
ai
y(
ya

K
material particles in order that the living beings may be rewarded or punished according
dh
pa

to their past tendencies. Creation and destruction of the universe takes place in agreement

P
U
ya

with the wishes of God. Maheswara is the ruler and owner of the entire universe which
ar

O
hw
is

is all he surveys. This cycle of creation and destruction is continuing over entire time.
rA

O
fo
ed

Creation of Atoms:

N
is
al
on

Creation is the name given to phenomenon whereby the old order is destroyed and the

A
rs
pe

new created. Upon God deciding to create the universe, the bodies and external
s
ti
en

substances appear as the means of rewarding the past tendencies of the living beings,
m
cu

and they are even formed according to these past tendencies of the souls. These past
do
is
Th

tendencies then start instigating the souls of those directions. These are the result of the
universe, its four substances which are effects, the dyad, the triad and its various
conjunctions. Atoms combine because of their motion. The motion is due to adrsta or
past tendency and the activity of the adrsta is inspired by God. The combination or
conjunction of two atoms is inferred. Being microscopic or infinitesimal it cannot be

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perceived. The triad or the triangular is the smallest particle of matter that can be Notes:

perceived, It is formed by the conjunction of three dyads. Then, in this same time
period, the elements have their origin. The elements formed out of these atoms are air,
water, earth and fire. Once air is created it starts flowing in the external ether. Water is
also mixed with the air and starts flowing. In the same way, earth and fire live in water.
In this way, the entire universe comes into existence by the mere thought process of the
God. It is the seed form of the material and fiery atoms. This universe in guided by
Brahman or the world soul, who is the very manifestation of knowledge, detachment
and excellence. Brahman guides the creation in such a manner that the individual souls
continue to experience pain and pleasure according to their previous action. All this
vast machinery is put into action by the desire of God.

Y H
Destruction

PH G
The circle of creation and destruction has no beginning. The souls get lest and space in

)
om
O I
destruction only after they have passed through many births and deaths, continually

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
experiencing pain and pleasure. One creation between two destructions is called

8@
kalpa. When the time is ripe, the World soul also relinquishes its body like the common
O Y R 11
00
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souls. God desires to bring destruction on the universe. The moment Maheswara so .1
ce
.e

desires the past tendencies of the souls vanish for some time and their bodies breakup
ya

H
ar
w

into their composite atoms. Similarly, the physical elements also vanish
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
When their composing atoms are dispersed. In the residuam are the atoms of the four
dh
pa

elements, live eternal substances and tendencies created by the meritorius or notorious

P
U
ya

activities of the souls. They form the constitutive elements of the following creation.
ar

O
hw
is

The Nyaya Vaisesikas are asatkaryavadins and their view is also called the arambhavada
rA

O
fo

or parmanukaranvada.
ed

N
is
al
on

Vaisesika and Greek Atomism

A
rs
pe

The Vaisesikas are agreed with the Greek atomism of Leucippus and Democritus that
s
ti
en

the atom is indvisible, partless, imper-ceptible, ultimate and eternal and it is the material
m
cu

cause of this physical universe. But further the two views differ in the following respects:
do
is
Th

(1) According to the Greek atomism, the atoms are similar in quality, but they differ
in respect of quantity or number. The Vaisesikas attitute a difference of both quantity
and quality in the itoms.

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(2) Greek atomists do not attribute any secondary qualities to atoms but the Vaisesikas Notes:

accept these qualities in the atoms.


(3) The Greek atomists believe that atoms are by their nature dynamic but the
Vaisesikas accept them as static by nature.
(4) According to the Greek view, souls are composed of atoms but according to the
Vaisesikas souls and atoms are different and both are individually but equally eternal
and independent.

Criticism of Atomism:

Samkara has criticised the Vaisesika atomism in the following manner :

(1) If there is qualitative difference in the atoms there should also be some difference in
their weights. Y H
PH G
(2) If the atoms have qualities then how can they be eternal . If the qualities of atoms

)
om
O I
are also eternal then how can it be accepted that there are no qualities in free souls and

l.c
ai
S
gm
substances etc.
S
8@
O Y R
(3) If the qualities of the cause are transferred , to the effect then why is it that the
11
00
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.1
ce
spherical nature of the atom is not transferred to the dyad and the minuteness and
.e
ya

H
destructibility of the dyad is not transferred to the triad ?
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

(4) If the effect is not in the cause then anything should be caused by anything else and
y(
ya

K
dh

not by some particular cause?


pa

P
U
ya

(5) Atoms are neither active nor inactive nor both nor neither. If they are active then
ar

O
hw

creation will become permanent. If they arc inactive creation will be impossible. They
is
rA

O
cannot both active as well as inactive since these qualities are mutually contradictory
fo
ed

N
is

and cannot stay together, as is the case with light and darkness. If atoms are neither
al
on

A
active nor inactive, then motion or activity should be introduced by some external
rs
pe
s

cause.
ti
en
m
cu

(6) Now, is this external cause past tendency or present tendency (drsta) , If it is past
do
is

tendency then it cannot have existed before creation. If it is present tendency then it
Th

will always accompany the atoms and creation will become permanent, and if the
atoms are not postulated to be in close proximity with past tendency creation becomes
impossible. In this way, it is impossible for there to be creation with atoms in any
manner.

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Mimansa Philosophy Notes:

Validity of Knowledge:
Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubhuti). All apprehension is
direct and immediate and valid per se. A cognition which apprehends an object cannot
be intrinsically invalid. Memory arise from the impression of a prior cognition and
therefore cannot be treated as valid knowledge. Kumarila defines valid knowledge as
apprehension of an object which is produced by causes free from defects and which is
not contradicted by subsequent knowledge. Parthasarathi defines it as apprehension
of an object which has not been already apprehended, which truly represents the
object, which is not produced by defective causes, and which is free from contradiction.

Y H
A valid cognition therefore must fulfil four conditions. Firstly, it must not arise from

H G
defective causes (karanadosarahita). Secondly, it must be free from contradiction. It

P N

)
must be self-consistent and should not be set aside by subsequent knowledge

om
O I

l.c
(badhakajnanarahita). Thirdly, it must apprehend an object which has not already been

ai
S
gm
S
8@
apprehended. Novelty is an essential feature of knowledge (agrhitagrahi). Thus memory

O Y R
is excluded from valid knowledge Kumarila also. Fourthly, it must truly represent the
11
00
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ce

object (yathartha).
.e
ya

H
ar
w

The Mimamsaka upholds the theory of Svatahpramanyavada which may be translated


sh

P U
ai
y(

as the theory of self-validity or intrinsic validity of knowledge. All apprehension is


ya

K
dh

intrinsically valid. All knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other
pa

P
U
ya

knowledge. Its validity arises from those very causes from which knowledge itself
ar

O
hw

arises. Validity of knowledge arises from the essential nature of the causes of knowledge.
is
rA

O
fo

It is not due to any extraneous conditions. Prabhakara and Kumarila both uphold the
ed

N
is

intrinsic validity of knowledge. Prabhakara says: All cognitions as cognitions are valid;
al
on

A
rs

their invalidity is due to their disagreement with the real nature of their object. Kumarila
pe
s
ti

also says: The validity of knowledge consists in its apprehending an object; it is set
en
m
cu

aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of the object.All
do
is

knowledge, therefore, is presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth on account
Th

of this belief. A need for explanation is felt only when knowledge fails to be valid. And
its invalidity is inferred either from some defect in the instrument of knowledge or from
a subsequent contradicting knowledge. If a person suffering from jaundice sees a conch
yellow, the knowledge of the yellow conch is invalidated on account of the defect in

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the organ of vision, i.e., on account of the presence of the bile in the eye. If a rope is Notes:

mistaken for a snake, the knowledge of the rope-snake is invalidated by the subsequent
knowledge of the rope. Though the invalidity of knowledge is inferred, yet knowledge
itself is intrinsically presumed to be valid. Its validity is not subject to inference. Truth is
normal; error is abnormal. Belief is natural; disbelief is an exception. The Mimamsaka
advocates the self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (utpatti) and
ascertainment (jnapti). The validity of knowledge arises together with that knowledge
and it is also known as soon as that knowledge is known. The very conditions which
give rise to knowledge also give rise to its validity as well as to the belief in that validity.
Validity of knowledge and knowledge of that validity arise together with that knowledge

Y
and from those very conditions which give rise to that knowledge. Neither validity nor

H H
belief in that validity is due to any external condition and neither requires any verification

P G
by anything else. The theory of self-validity of knowledge is advocated in these two

)
om
O I
aspects. If the necessary conditions which give rise to knowledge, e.g., absence of

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
defeats in the instruments of knowledge and absence of contradiction, are present,

8@
O Y R
knowledge arises and it arises with a belief in its validity. The conditions which give rise
11
00
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.1
to knowledge also give rise to its validity (pramanyam svatah utpadayate). And this
ce
.e
ya

validity is known as soon as the knowledge has arisen (pramanyam svatah jnayate

H
ar
w

cha).
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
Madhavacharya in his Sarvadarshanasanagraha has mentioned four theories of the
dh
pa

P
validity and invalidity of knowledge. According to Sankhya, both the validity
U
ya
ar

(pramanyam) and the invalidity (apramanya) of knowledge are self-evident. According


O
hw
is
rA

to some schools of Buddhism, knowledge is intrinsically invalid and becomes valid

O
fo
ed

through extraneous conditions. According to Nyaya-Vaishesika, both the validity and

N
is
al
on

the invalidity of knowledge are due to extraneous conditions. According to Mimamsa,

A
rs
pe

knowledge is intrinsically valid, though its invalidity is due to extraneous conditions.


s
ti
en
m

The Mimamsaka criticizes the Sankhya view by pointing out that the same knowledge
cu
do

cannot be both intrinsically valid and invalid. It would be clear self-contradiction to


is
Th

maintain that. If it is said that the same knowledge is not regarded as valid and invalid,
but what is maintained is only this that valid knowledge reveals its validity and invalid
knowledge reveals its invalidity without depending on external conditions, then it would
be difficult distinguish between valid and invalid knowledge, because invalidity cannot

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be known without external conditions. The Buddhist view is criticized by pointing out Notes:

that if knowledge is not intrinsically valid it can never be validated afterwards, for the
second knowledge which is said to validate the first, being itself knowledge is intrinsically
invalid and requires another knowledge to validate itself and so on an infinitum.

The controversy between the Mimamsaka and the Naiyayika regarding the validity of
knowledge has become classic. Nyaya advocates the theory of extrinsic validity of
knowledge called Paratahpramanyavada. According to it, knowledge is neither valid
or invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of its validity or invalidity arises only after
knowledge has arisen. The nature of knowledge is its correspondence with its object.
And the test of truth is fruitful activity (samvadipravrtti). If knowledge leads to fruitful

Y H
activity, it is valid; if is does not, it is valid. Validity and invalidity are not intrinsically

H G
connected with knowledge. They are the result of a subsequent test. Validity is due to

P N
excellence (guna) in the causes of knowledge and invalidity is due to defeat (dosa) in

)
om
O I

l.c
the causes of knowledge. Knowledge arises simply as knowledge and afterwards

ai
S
gm
S
becomes valid or invalid due to extraneous conditions. The Mimamsaka agrees with

8@
O Y R
the Naiyayika so far as the invalidity of knowledge (apramanya) is concerned, because
11
00
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.1
ce
both regard it as due to extraneous conditions. But he criticizes the Naiyayika in regard
.e
ya

H
to the validity (pramanya) of knowledge. All knowledge is intrinsically valid. If the
ar
w
sh

P U
validity of knowledge also, like is invalidity, depends on extraneous conditions, no
ai
y(
ya

K
knowledge would ever become valid. The Naiyayika contends that knowledge arises
dh
pa

P
simply as knowledge, that it is neutral and that the question of its validity or invalidity
U
ya
ar

arise afterwards and depends on external test. The Mimamsaka points out that the so-
O
hw
is
rA

called neutral knowledge is an impossibility. We always experience either valid or

O
fo
ed

invalid knowledge. There is no third alternative; we never experience neutral knowledge.

N
is
al
on

To say so is to maintain the absurd position that knowledge when it arises is devoid of

A
rs
pe

all logical value. Hence neutral knowledge is not knowledge at all. All knowledge must
s
ti
en

be either valid or invalid. We admit that the invalidity of knowledge is due to extraneous
m
cu
do

conditions, e.g., due to some defect in the causes which produce knowledge or due to
is
Th

some contradiction. But the validity cannot be due to any extraneous condition. Nothing
an validate knowledge if knowledge is not self-valid. The presence of any excellence
(guna) in the causes of knowledge cannot make it valid, for no such excellence is
known. There is no necessity of assuming any excellence in the causes of knowledge.
Freedom from defeat and contradiction is sufficient to account for the rise of valid
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knowledge. It the validity of knowledge is due to an external condition like some Notes:

excellence in the causes of knowledge or correspondence or fruitful activity, then this


second knowledge of excellence or correspondence or fruitful activity would require a
third knowledge to validate itself before it can validate the first knowledge and so on
ad infinitum. The fallacy of infinite regress cannot be avoided since the knowledge of
the external condition which is said to validate any knowledge, being itself knowledge,
would require another external condition to validate it. Hence all knowledge must be
regarded as self-valid. The so-called extraneous conditions like excellence or
correspondence or fruitful activity are really neither extraneous nor mere conditions.
Excellence means only freedom from defect. Fruitful activity means absence of

Y
contradiction. Correspondence means true representation of the object. Now, these

H H
things are the necessary conditions which give rise to valid knowledge. These are the

P G
essential prerequisites of any valid knowledge. In their absence valid knowledge would

)
om
O I
not arise at all. They are internally and intimately connected with the causes which

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
produce knowledge. Hence they are neither extraneous nor mere conditions for tests

8@
O Y R
of the validity of knowledge. They are the essential and necessary causes which produce
11
00
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.1
valid knowledge. These causes being present, knowledge would arise and it would
ce
.e
ya

arise together with its validity and the belief in that validity.

H
ar
w
sh

P U
The Nyaya theory of Paratahpramanya and the Mimamsa theory of Svatahpramanya
ai
y(
ya

K
are respectively compared to the theory of Correspondence and the theory of
dh
pa

P
Coherence in Western logic. According to Western realism, the nature and criterion of
U
ya
ar

truth is correspondence with external reality, while according to Western idealism, it is


O
hw
is
rA

coherence or self-consistency. The theory of Correspondence advocates that truth is

O
fo
ed

a determinate and external relation between two distinct and independent things. It is a

N
is
al
on

one-one relation between ultimately simple elements. Our knowledge in order to be

A
rs
pe

true must correspond to the external reality as it is. The theory is criticized on the
s
ti
en

ground that a purely external relation is meaningless as well as impossible. If the terms
m
cu
do

related are conceived as ultimately simple and independent entities, there can be no
is
Th

relation between them. The entities, being independent, the relation cannot inhere in
either or in both, and if the relation falls outside them both, then the relation itself
becomes a third entity and needs another relation to relate it to the first two and so on
ad infinitum. Moreover, relation is possible only within a whole and a mere juxtaposition
of the so-called atomic or independent entities does not constitute a real whole. Again,
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the external substance is unknown and unknowable. It is, what Locke has said, a I- Notes:

know-not-what. Then, how can we compare our knowledge with the unknowable
substance? If we do not know the original, how can we even say that our knowledge
is a copy of the real? How can we know that it corresponds to the real? Again
correspondence itself must exist for a mind which actively discovers truth and does not
invent it. Thus the so-called correspondence becomes a subsequent experience and
when we that our knowledge corresponds with reality what we really mean is that our
two experience glides away in coherence. The coherence theory is advocated by the
idealists who believe that Reality is a concrete Identity-in-difference, a real Whole
which is immanent in all its diverse parts which are organically related to it. Reality is

Y
the ultimate subject of all our judgments and a judgment is defined as an ideal content

H H
referred to reality. Thought is neither an abstract identity nor a mere difference, but a

P G
living process, a significant whole which is an Identity-in-difference. It is self-consistent

)
om
O I
and coherent. Reality is free from contradictions not because it has annihilated them

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
but because it has overcome their antagonism in its harmonious bosom. And truth is

8@
O Y R
the systematic coherence which is a characteristic of a significant whole. This theory is
11
00
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.1
criticized on the ground that according to it no truth is completely true, because
ce
.e
ya

coherence, being in discursive judgments, fails to concrete coherence which is the

H
ar
w

absolute truth. Coherence may be the test of truth, but if it is regarded as the nature of
sh

P U
ai
y(

truth, then no truth can be completely true. Coherence is mediacy and if validity is
ya

K
dh
pa

mediate, then no cognition can be absolutely valid. Prof. Stout remarks: In the absence

P
U
ya

of immediate cognition the principle of coherence would be like a lever without a


ar

O
hw
is

fulcrum It mediate cognition could only be mediated by cognitions which are


rA

O
fo

themselves merely mediate, knowledge could never get a start. It is as if one should
ed

N
is
al

say that, in building a wall, every brick must be laid on the top of another brick and
on

A
rs

none directly on the ground.


pe
s
ti
en

The Nyaya theory may be compared to the theory of Correspondence. The Nyaya
m
cu
do

advocates realistic pluralism and believes like the Western realists that correspondence
is
Th

with external reality is the nature of valid knowledge. But whereas the Western realists
make correspondence also the test of truth, the Nyaya realizes the difficulty and falls
back on an indirect test, that of consistent (samvadi) and fruitful activity or practical
efficiency (arthakriyajnana). Here it accepts pragmatism. The Mimamsa, rightly points
out that fruitful activity really means freedom from contradiction. It is, as the Nyaya
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itself half-heartedly admits, self-consistency (samvada). The Mimamsa theory of Notes:

svatahpramanya bears resemblance with the theory of Coherence, but there are striking
differences also. The coherence theory can be really advocated by idealism alone. The
Mimamsa is a system of rank realism and believes, like the Nyaya, that every knowledge
points to an external and independent object beyond it. It admits like the Nyaya that
valid knowledge should truly represent the external object, that correspondence with
the external object is the nature of valid knowledge (yathartham jnanam pramanam). It
also agrees with Nyaya in maintaining that invalidity is due to extraneous conditions. It
only says that all knowledge is intrinsically valid. The conditions of freedom from defects
and non-contradiction being satisfied, all knowledge arises as self-valid. Coherence

Y
and self-consistency is the nature of valid knowledge. But this coherence of the Mimamsa

H H
is not a real coherence which is a characteristic of a significant whole. Reality is not

P G
regarded as a concrete Whole, but only a juxtaposition of the distinct independent

)
om
O I
atomic entities. The realism of the Mimamsa does not allow it to rise to real coherence

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
and taking all knowledge as intrinsically valid it simply dispenses with the need of

8@
O Y R
finding out any test for it. But by accepting non-contradiction as well as correspondence
11
00
IL B MA
.1
with the external object as the nature of truth and further by accepting the view that
ce
.e
ya

cognition in immediate apprehension, the Mimamsa avoids the criticism levelled against

H
ar
w

the Coherence theory.


sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Source of Knowledge Notes:

Perception and Inference:


BOTH Prabhakara and Kumarila regard knowledge itself as pramana or means of
knowledge. Jaimini admits three pramanas perception, inference and testimony.
Prabhakara adds two more comparison and implication. Kumarila further adds non-
apprehension. Let us consider these one by one. Both Prabhakara and Kumarila
recognize two kinds of knowledge immediate and mediate. Perception is regarded
as immediate knowledge by both and both admit two stages in perception
indeterminate and determinate. Prabhakara defines perception as direct apprehension
(saksat pratitih pratyaksam). Kumarila defines it as direct knowledge produced by the

Y
proper contact of the sense-organs with the presented objects, which is free from

H H
defects. Mimamsa broadly agrees with Nyaya in its view of perception. The self comes

P G
into contact with the mind (manas); the mind comes into contact with the sense-organ;

)
om
O I
and the sense-organ comes into contact with external object. We have already dealt

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
with the account of perception in the Nyaya system and need not repeat it here. We

8@
O Y R
may only note the main differences between the Nyaya and the Mimamsa account of
11
00
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.1
perception. The Mimamsaka regards the auditory organ as proceeding from space
ce
.e
ya

(dik) while the Naiyayika regards it as proceeding from ether (akasha). Again afterwards

H
ar
w

as a hypothesis to account for the determinate perception. All perception is determinate


sh

P U
ai
y(

and indeterminate perception serves no fruitful purpose; it is inferred as a necessary


ya

K
dh
pa

earlier stage in the complex process of perception. But the Mimamsaka regards it as

P
U
ya

part of normal experience. It is the vague, indefinite and primitive stage of perception,
ar

O
hw
is

the awareness of the that without its relation to the what, which gain clarity and
rA

O
fo

definiteness when it becomes determinate. But like the determinate perception,


ed

N
is
al

indeterminate perception also serves a fruitful purpose. It is the basis of activity for
on

A
rs

children and animals and even adults whose mental growth is imperfect. Even normal
pe
s
ti

adults act upon it when they are in a hurry and confusion. In determinate perception,
en
m
cu

the self apprehends the pure object (shuddha vastu) and though the genuine and the
do
is

specific characters are given in it, their relation to the object is not perceived. It is the
Th

bare awareness (alochana matra) which is non-relational and therefore indeterminate.

The Mimamsa account of inference also generally agrees with that of the Nyaya and
need not be repeated here. There are certain minor differences also, e.g., the Mimamsaka

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recognizes only three members of a syllogism, either the first three or the last three, Notes:

thus bringing the Indian syllogism in conformity with the Aristotelian one.

Comparison:
THE Mimamsa view of comparison or Upamana differs from the Nyaya view. According
to Nyaya, comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object
denoted by that word (samjnasamjnisambandhajnana). It is the knowledge of similarity
of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known object like a cow. The knowledge
is like this the perceived wild cow is like the remembered cow (gosadrsho gayayah).
The Mimamsaka refutes this account of comparison. He points out that the knowledge
of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by

Y H
verbal authority (e.g., by the words of the person who tells that a wild cow is similar to

H G
a cow) and not by comparison. It is known through the recollection of what was learnt

P N
from the verbal authority of the person. And the knowledge of the wild cow itself is

)
om
O I

l.c
due to perception and not comparison. Hence comparison, according to Mimamsa,

ai
S
gm
S
apprehends the similarity of the remembered cow to the perceived wild cow. This

8@
O Y R
knowledge is like this: the remembered cow is like the perceived wild cow
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
(gavayasadrshi gauh). It is the cow as possessing similarity with the wild cow that is
.e
ya

H
known by comparison. A person need not be told by anybody that a wild cow is
ar
w
sh

P U
similar to a cow. Any person who has seen a cow and happens to see a wild cow
ai
y(
ya

K
himself remembers the cow as similar to the wild cow he is perceiving. This knowledge
dh
pa

P
of similarity is comparison. It is distinguished from inference because the vyapti or the
U
ya
ar

invariable concomitance is not needed here.


O
hw
is
rA

O
Verbal Testimony:
fo
ed

N
is

SHABDA-PRAMANA has got the greatest importance in Mimamsa. Testimony is


al
on

A
verbal authority. It is the knowledge of supra-sensible objects which is produced by
rs
pe
s

the comprehension of the meanings of words. Kumarila divides testimony into personal
ti
en
m

(pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). The former is the testimony of the trustworthy
cu
do

persons (aptavakya). The latter is the testimony of the Veda (Vedavakya). It is valid in
is
Th

itself. It has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred
from the trustworthy character of the person. It may be vitiated by doubt and error
and may be contradicted afterwards. The Veda is eternal and authorless. It is not the
work of any person, human or divine. The sages are only the seers not the authors of

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the Veda. The Veda is not composed or spoken even by God. The Veda deals with Notes:

Dharma and the objects denoted by it cannot be known by perception, inference,


comparison or any other means of valid knowledge. Hence the Vedic injunctions can
never be contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. And there can be not internal
contradictions in the Veda itself. Hence the Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Prabhakara
admits only Vedic testimony as real testimony and reduces human testimony to inference
because its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person. Again,
testimony may give us knowledge of the existent objects (Siddhartha vakya) or may
command us to do something (vidhayaka vakya). Kumarila admits the distinction
between existential and injunctive propositions and limits the scope of the Veda to the

Y
latter (abhihitanvayavada). The Veda deals with injunctions. Prohibitions are injunction

H H
in disguise. The Veda commands us to do certain things and to refrain from doing

P G
certain things. It deals with the supra-sensible dharma or duty. If we follow the Vedic

)
om
O I
commands we incur merit and if we do not, we incur demerit. Action, therefore, is the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
final import of the Veda. The Veda is broadly divided into Vidhivada or injunctions and

8@
O Y R
Arthavada or explanations. The existential or the assertive propositions of the Veda
11
00
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are merely explanatory passages which explain the injunctions of the Veda which are
ce
.e
ya

its final import. Prabhakara takes a strictly pragmatic view of all knowledge. Knowledge

H
ar
w

leads to successful activity. Action is the only import of knowledge. He therefore,


sh

P U
ai
y(

refuses to accept that knowledge deals with existent things. All propositions must be
ya

K
dh
pa

injunctive. All knowledge, whether Vedic or secular, points to activity. To so-called

P
U
ya

assertive or explanatory propositions in the Veda are authoritative only when they help
ar

O
hw
is

persons to perform their duties (anvitabhidhanavada).


rA

O
fo
ed

Testimony is verbal cognition and is derived from the meanings of words which compose

N
is
al
on

sentences. To uphold the eternality and the authorlessness of the Veda. The Mimamsaka

A
rs
pe

puts forward the theory that words and meanings as well as their relation are all natural
s
ti
en

and eternal. A word (shabha) is made of two or more letters (varna) and is a mere
m
cu
do

aggregate of the letters and not a whole (avayavi), though the letters must occur in a
is
Th

particular order. A varna is regarded as an articulated sound. It is eternal (nitya),


omnipresent (sarva-gata) and integral (niravayava). It is different from its sound (dhvani)
if it is spoken and also different from its symbolic form (rupa) if it is written. The sound
and the form are merely its accidental features which reveal it. A varna is eternal and

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immutable, while its dhvani and rupa are momentary and changing. If many varnas are Notes:

spoken, they are manifested through a temporal series of utterances; if they are written,
they are manifested through a spatial series of written symbols. The sound and the
symbol are only the vehicles of the manifestation of the eternal varna. When a varna is
pronounced or written in ten different ways, there are not ten different varnas, but only
ten different manifestations of the same varna. Therefore a word which is an aggregate
of two or more eternal varnas is itself eternal. A word does not signify the particular
things which come into existence and pass away, but the eternal universals underlying
these particulars. Hence the meanings or the objects denoted by words, being universals,
are eternal and unchanging. And the relation between a word and its meaning also,

Y
being natural, necessary, inseparable and internal, is eternal and unchanging. This relation

H H
is not conventional. It is due neither to Gods will nor to convention as the old and the

P G
modern schools of Nyaya respectively believe. It is natural and eternal. Language is

)
om
O I
not a creation of the human or even the divine mind. Philology is a natural science. The

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
conventional element in language is secondary (sahakari) and helps the manifestation

8@
O Y R
of the eternal words and their meanings, just as light helps the manifestation of sight.
11
00
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.1
The Naiyayika also believes in the authority of the Veda, but he regards the Veda as
ce
.e
ya

the work of God and so challenges the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda.

H
ar
w

According to him, words are not eternal and language is due to the divide will or to
sh

P U
ai
y(

convention. The Mimamsaka refutes this view and points out that only the sounds and
ya

K
dh
pa

the symbols are created and destroyed, while the real words are eternal. Words are

P
U
ya

manifested through human efforts. The sounds and the symbols are the vehicles of the
ar

O
hw
is

manifestation of the eternal words.


rA

O
fo
ed

But even the permanence of the word and its meaning and the relation between the

N
is
al
on

two does not make the Veda eternal. The Veda is a literacy work consisting of sounds

A
rs
pe

and symbols. According to the Mimamsa view, all the uttered or written words are
s
ti
en

really permanent, though the sounds and the symbols through which they are manifested
m
cu
do

may be evanescent and changing. Then what is the difference between the Veda and
is
Th

any other literacy work? The Mimamsaka answers this questions by saying that the
Veda is authorless, while all other works are the creation of authors. The order in
which the words occur in the literacy works in determined by their authors and therefore
the works are subject to defects, doubts and errors. But the order in which the words

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occur in the Veda is self-determined and therefore intrinsically valid. The Veda is not Notes:

the creation of any author, human or divide. It is self-proved and self-manifesting. The
particular order in which the words occur in the Veda (anupurvi) is self-determined
and external. It is the permanence of the text of the Veda which is emphasized by the
Mimamsaka. The Veda together with its text is eternal and authorless because the
words, their meanings and their relation are all eternal and because long-standing tradition
is silent on the authorship of the Veda. This view of the Mimamsa cannot supported by
any rational argument and remains more or less a theological dogma.

Implication:
PRABHAKARA and Kumarila both, unlike the Naiyayika, admit Arthapatti as an

Y H
independent means of valid knowledge. It is presumption or postulation or implication.

H G
It is the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently

P N
inconsistent perceived facts. If Devadatta is alive and he is not in his house, we presume

)
om
O I

l.c
that he is elsewhere. Being alive and not being in the house are two perceived facts

ai
S
gm
S
which appear to be inconsistent. Their apparent inconsistency is removed when we

8@
O Y R
presume the fact of being elsewhere. If Devadatta is fat and he does not eat during
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
day, we presume that the must be eating during night, otherwise the inconsistency
.e
ya

H
between being fat and not eating during day cannot be explained. The Naiyayika
ar
w
sh

P U
reduces presumption to inference. The Mimamsaka regards it as an independent
ai
y(
ya

K
pramana. Prabhakara holds that the element of doubt distinguishes presumption from
dh
pa

P
inference. In presumption, there must be a doubt regarding the truth of the two perceived
U
ya
ar

facts which doubt is removed by presumption, while in inference there is no such


O
hw
is
rA

doubt. Kumarila believes that doubt is not the basis of presumption. This basis is the

O
fo
ed

mutual consistency of the two perceived facts. This inconsistency is removed by

N
is
al
on

presumption. In inference there is no such inconsistency. Prabhakara and Kumarila

A
rs
pe

both agree in holding that in presumption there is no term at all which is the basis of
s
ti
en

inference. Neither of the two perceived and apparently inconsistent facts can separately
m
cu
do

serve as a middle term. Both the facts combined appear to be the middle term. But
is
Th

then this combination already includes the conclusion, while a valid middle term should
not include the conclusion. Hence presumption is different from inference. But the
Naiyayika points out that presumption is disjunctive reasoning which might be reduced
to categorical form also. If alive Devadatta is not at his house, the fact of his being
elsewhere is inferred thus:
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Alive Devadatta is either in his house or elsewhere, Notes:

Alive Devadatta is not in his house,


Therefore alive Devadatta is elsewhere.

Similarly, if fat Devadatta does not each during day, then the fact of his eating
during night is inferred thus:
Fat Devadatta eats either during day or night,
Fat Devadatta does not eat during day,
Therefore fat Devadatta eats during night.

Negation:
KUMARILA admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as the sixth independent pramana.

Y H
The Naiyayika and Prabhakara reject it. The Naiyayika, like Kumarila, admits negation

H G
as an independent ontological category, but he, unlike Kumarila, does not believe in

P N

)
om
non-apprehension as an independent means of knowledge to know negation. According

O I

l.c
ai
S
to him negation is known either by perception or by inference according as the correlate

gm
S
8@
(pratiyogi) of negation is a subject of perception or of inference. The same sense-

O Y R
organ which perceive any object perceives its non-existence also, and the same inference
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

which infers the existence of any object infers its non-existence also. Thus according
ya

H
ar

to the Naiyayika, though negation is a separate category, non-apprehension as a


w
sh

P U
ai

separate pramana is not required as its means. He reduces non-apprehension either to


y(
ya

K
dh

perception or to inference. Prabhakara does not admit negation itself as an independent


pa

P
U

category and hence has no need to admit non-apprehension as its means. Prabhakara
ya
ar

O
hw

agrees with the Naiyayika, against Kumarila, in rejecting non-apprehension as a separate


is
rA

O
pramana. But he differs from the Naiyayika inasmuch as he rejects negation itself as a
fo
ed

N
is

separate category. To him negation can be represented as a positive entity. There is no


al
on

A
non-existence over and above existence. Existence may be perceived either in itself or
rs
pe
s

as related to something else. The apprehension of bare existence, of the locus in itself,
ti
en
m

is wrongly called non-existence. Thus the so-called non-existence of the jar on the
cu
do

ground is nothing but the apprehension of the ground itself. The so-called non-existence
is
Th

of a jar before its production is nothing but the clay itself. Kumarila, siding with the
Naiyayika, refutes Prabhakaras view and maintains that non-existence or negation
exists as a separate category and is different from bare existence or locus itself. Negation
is not mere nothing. When we perceive the bare ground, we perceive neither the jar

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nor its non-existence. Hence the perception of the bare ground is different from the Notes:

non-existence and the non-cognition of the jar. Kumarila also refutes the Naiyayikas
view that non-apprehension may be reduced to perception or inference. Negation
cannot be perceived, for there is no sense-object-contact. Negation cannot be inferred,
for the invariable concomitance is not known here. Negation cannot be known by
testimony, for there is no verbal cognition here. Nor can it be known from comparison
or presumption. Hence negation which is an independent category is known by an
independent pramana called non-apprehension.

Nature of Knowledge:
WE have discussed the Mimamsakas theory of the intrinsic validity of knowledge and

Y H
also the different means of valid knowledge. Before we come to the problem of error,

H G
we may add a few words to explain the nature of knowledge according to Prabhakara

P N
and Kumarila. Prabhakaras theory of knowledge is known as triputipratyaksavada.

)
om
O I

l.c
He regards knowledge as self-luminous (svaprakasha). It manifests itself and needs

ai
S
gm
S
nothing else for its manifestation. Though self-luminous, it is not eternal. It arises and

8@
O Y R
vanishes. Knowledge reveals itself and as it does so, it also simultaneously reveals its
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
subject and its object. In every knowledge-situation we have this triple revelation. The
.e
ya

H
subject and the object both are manifested by knowledge itself simultaneously with its
ar
w
sh

P U
own manifestation. Cognition is known as cognition. The self is known as the knower
ai
y(
ya

K
and it can never be cognized as an object. An object is known as a known object. The
dh
pa

P
triputi of the jnata, jneya and jnana is simultaneously revealed in every act of cognition.
U
ya
ar

The subject, the object and the knowledge are simultaneously manifested in every act
O
hw
is
rA

of knowledge which is self-luminous. It does not need any other knowledge for its

O
fo
ed

revelation. The self and the object both depend on knowledge for their manifestation.

N
is
al
on

The self, therefore, is not self-luminous. The self is not cognized in deep sleep because

A
rs
pe

there is no knowledge to manifest it. Every knowledge has a triple manifestationthe


s
ti
en

cognition of the self as the knower (ahamvitti), the cognition of the objects as the
m
cu
do

known (visayavitti) and the self-conscious cognition (svasamvitti).


is
Th

Kumarilas theory of knowledge is known as jnatatavada. He differs from Prabhakara


and does not regard knowledge as self-luminous. Knowledge is not perceptible. It
cannot be known directly and immediately. Kumarila regards knowledge as a mode of
the self and it is essentially an act (kriya) or a process (vyapara). It cannot reveal itself

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nor can it be revealed by another cognition as the Nyaya-Vaishesika believes. It can Notes:

only be inferred. And it is inferred from the cognizedness (jnatata) or manifestness or


illuminedness (prakatya) of its object. It is the means of knowing the object and is
inferred as such because without it the object could never have become known by the
subject. Cognition relates the self to the object and enables it to know the object. It is
the act of the self by which it known an object and it is inferred by the fact that an
object has become known by the self. The cognitive act is inferred from the
cognizedness of the object. An act involves four thingsan agent (karta), an object
(karma), an instrument (karana) and a result (phala). An action is found in the agent,
but its result is found in the object. Let us take an illustration, that of rice being cooked.

Y
The cook is the agent. The rice-grain is the object. The fire is the instrument. The

H H
cookedness or softness of the rice is the result. The act of cooking is found in the

P G
agent, but its result, the cookedness or softness (vikleda) is found in the object

)
om
O I
cooked. Similarly cognition arises in the self, but its resultcognizednessis seen in

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
the object known. Just as a person who has not seen the rice being cooked can very

8@
O Y R
well infer from the cookedness or softness of the rice that it has been cooked, that
11
00
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.1
the fact of cooking must have been taken place before softness has arisen in the rice,
ce
.e
ya

similarly the act of cognition is inferred to have taken place in the self by the fact that

H
ar
w

the object has become cognized. Knowledge is the tertium quid between the knower
sh

P U
ai
y(

and the known. It is a modal change (parinama) in the self and as such it is adventitious
ya

K
dh
pa

(agantuka) and not essential. It produces a peculiarity, a result (at shaya) in its object.

P
U
ya

It is inferred from the cognizedness of the object. Cognition manifests the object and is
ar

O
hw
is

inferred by this fact. It cannot manifest itself nor can be manifested by any other cognition.
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Theory of Error Notes:

Prabhakara's Theory of Error:


WE have seen that according to the theory of intrinsic validity of knowledge, all
knowledge is held to be self-valid by the Mimamsaka. Validity is inherent in knowledge,
while invalidity is inferred on account of some defect or contradiction in the causes of
knowledge. But it all knowledge is self-valid, how can error at all arise? Prabhakara
and Kumarila give different answers to this question. Prabhakaras view is known as
Akhyati and Kumarilas as Viparitakhyati.

Prabhakara, in strict accordance with his view of intrinsic validity of knowledge, does
not admit error in the logical sense. All knowledge is valid per se. To experience is

Y H
always to experience validity. Error, therefore, is only partial truth. It is imperfect

H G
knowledge. All knowledge, as knowledge, is quite valid, though all knowledge is not

P N
necessarily perfect. Imperfect knowledge is commonly called error. But error is true

)
om
O I

l.c
so far as it goes; only it does not go far enough. All knowledge being true, there can be

ai
S
gm
S
no logical distinction between truth and error. Prabhakara is true to his realistic position

8@
O Y R
in maintaining that knowledge can never misrepresent its object. Error is one of omission
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
only, not of commission. It is only non-apprehension, not mis-apprehension. It is not a
.e
ya

H
unitary knowledge, not a single psychosis, but, in fact, it consists of two psychoses, it
ar
w
sh

P U
is a composite of two cognitions which really fall apart unrelated. Error is due to non-
ai
y(
ya

K
discrimination between these two cognitions and their separate objects. It is a mere
dh
pa

P
non-apprehension of the distinction between the two cognitions and their objects.
U
ya
ar

Hence this view of error is called akhyati or non-apprehension. Error arises when we
O
hw
is
rA

forget the fact that instead of one cognition there are really two cognitions denoting

O
fo
ed

two separate objects and further forget the fact that these two cognitions as well as

N
is
al
on

their objects are distinct and unrelated. The factors are involved in error. One is positive

A
rs
pe

and the other is negative. The positive consists in the presence of two cognitions which
s
ti
en

reveal their respective objects only partially. Two negative factor consists in overlooking
m
cu
do

the distinction between these two cognitions and their objects. Both these cognitions
is
Th

may be presentative or both may be representative or one may be presentative and the
other representative. If both the cognitions are presentative, error is due to non-
discrimination between perception and perception; if both are representative, error is
due to non-discrimination between memory and memory; if one is presentative and the

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other representative, error is due to non-discrimination between perception and Notes:

memory. In all cases error is due to non-discrimination which means non-apprehension


of the distinction between two cognitions and their objects. It is called vivekakhyati or
bhedagraha or asamsargagraha. Let us take some illustrations. When a person suffering
from jaundice sees a white conch yellow, two cognitions arise. There is a cognition of
the conch as the this minus its white colour, and there is also a cognition of the yellow
colour alone of the bile. Both these cognitions are partial and imperfect, though quite
valid as far as they go. The conch is perceived as the this and not as the conch. The
bile is perceived as the yellowness and not as the bile. And the distinction between
the this of the conch and the yellowness of the bile is not apprehended. Here, there

Y
is non-discrimination between perception and perception, as both the cognitions are

H H
presentative in character. Similarly, when a white crystal is perceived as red on account

P G
of a red flower placed near it, there is non-apprehension of the distinction between

)
om
O I
two cognitions which are partial and imperfect- the cognition of the crystal its whiteness

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
and the cognition of the redness alone of the flower. Here also, there is non-discrimination

8@
O Y R
between two partial perceptions. Again, if person recollects that he saw yesterday a
11
00
IL B MA
.1
long snake lying on the road when really he saw only a piece of rope, here also imperfect
ce
.e
ya

cognitions arisethe recollection of the rope as the that minus its ropeness and the

H
ar
w

recollection of the snake robbed of its thatness. Here, there is non-discrimination


sh

P U
ai
y(

between two memory-images. Again, when is non-discrimination between two memory-


ya

K
dh
pa

images. Again, when a person mistakes a shell for a piece of silver and says, this is

P
U
ya

silver, two imperfect cognitions arise. The thisof the shell is actually perceived together
ar

O
hw
is

with certain qualities like whiteness and brightness which the shell shares in common
rA

O
fo

with silver, but minus its shellness. The common qualities revive in memory the impression
ed

N
is
al

of silver which the person has perceived previously elsewhere. Silver is imported in
on

A
rs

memory merely as silver, robbed of its thatness (pramustatattakasmarana). Silver is


pe
s
ti

represented as a memory-image, though at the time the fact of its being only a memory-
en
m
cu

image and not perception is forgotten due to certain defect (smrtipramosa). And the
do
is

discrimination between the perceived this of the shell and the remembered silver
Th

without its thatness is not apprehended. Here, there is non-discrimination between


perception and memory, between a presented thing and a represented image. There is
only non-apprehension of the distinction between these two imperfect cognitions and
their partially presented objects. But there is no misapprehension because the shell is

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not mis-perceived as silver, as the shell never enters consciousness. The this is Notes:

never sublated for when the error is known, the person says: this is shell.

Kumarila's Theory of Error:


KUMARILA agrees with Prabhakara in maintaining the intrinsic validity of knowledge.
But he differs from Prabhakara inasmuch as he maintains the logical distinction between
truth and error. He recognizes error as such and regards it as misapprehension and not
as mere non-apprehension. He further holds that error is a single psychosis, a unitary
knowledge and not a composite of two imperfect cognitions. Error is not only of
omission, but also of commission. Kumarila agrees with Prabhakara in maintaining that
in the erroneous perception of this is silver, two things are present. The shell is

Y H
perceived as the this bereft of its shellness and silver is imported in memory merely as

H G
silver bereft of its thatness, on account of the qualities of whiteness and brightness

P N
which are common to both shell and silver. But he differs from Prabhakara and maintains

)
om
O I

l.c
that there is positive wrong synthesis of these two elementsthe perceived and the

ai
S
gm
S
remembered, and that error is not due merely to the non-apprehension of the distinction

8@
O Y R
between them. The two elements are not united in fact. But they appear to be so in
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
error. Error is partial misrepresentation. Error is not akhyati or non-apprehension but
.e
ya

H
viparita-khyati or misapprehension. It is not due to non-discrimination between two
ar
w
sh

P U
imperfect cognitions (vivekakhyati or bhedagraha or asamsargagraha), but it is due to
ai
y(
ya

K
positive wrong synthesis of the two imperfect cognitions which, though in fact unrelated,
dh
pa

P
are welded together as a unitary knowledge in error (samsargagraha or viparitagrapha).
U
ya
ar

Thus error becomes a single psychosis, a unitary cognition, a positive misapprehension


O
hw
is
rA

and therefore one of commission. The shell is misperceived as silver. Error is a wrong

O
fo
ed

apprehension of one object as another object which in fact it is not. This misapprehension

N
is
al
on

arises due to some defect in the causes of knowledge and is set aside by a subsequent

A
rs
pe

sublating knowledge. But as long as error is experienced it is valid as a cognition per


s
ti
en

se. Its intrinsic validity is set aside by extraneous conditions like defects in the causes
m
cu
do

of cognition or a contradicting cognition. Kumarila gives up his realism to the extent the
is
Th

admits the subjective or the ideal element in error. When error is regarded as
misapprehension, the subjective element creeps into it. Though the two relata are
separately real, yet the relation between them is not so.

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Nyaya Theory of Error: Notes:

KUMARILAS Viparita-khyati is much similar to Anyatha-khyati of the Nyaya-


Vaishesika, though there are certain differences in details. The Nyaya-Vaishesika also
believes like Kumarila that error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the
represented objects. The represented object is confused with the presented one. The
word anyatha means elsewise and elsewhere and both these meanings are brought
out in error. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented object
exists elsewhere. The shell and the silver are both separately real; only their synthesis,
their relation as shell-silver, is unreal. The shell is misperceived as silver which exists
elsewhere, e.g., in the market (apanastha). The Nyaya-Vaishesika, like Kumarila,

Y
recognizes the subjective element in error. Error is due to a wrong synthesis of the

H H
presented objects. Vatsyayana says: What is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong

P G
apprehension, not the object. Uddyotakara remarks: The object all the while remains

)
om
O I
what it actually is the error lies in the cognition. Gangesha observes: A real object

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
is mistaken as another real object which exists elsewhere. The difference between the

8@
O Y R
Naiyayika and Kumarila is that while Kumarila is boldly prepared to forsake his realism
11
00
IL B MA
.1
to the extent of maintaining the ideal element in error, the Naiyayika in order to preserve
ce
.e
ya

his realism vainly falls back upon extraordinary perception to explain the revival of

H
ar
w

silver in memory. He maintains that the revival of silver in memory is due to a


sh

P U
ai
y(

complicated perception (jnanalaksanapratyaksa) which is a variety of extraordinary


ya

K
dh
pa

(alaukika) perception. Thus he wants to make the represented silver as actually

P
U
ya

perceived, though in an extraordinary way. Kumarila admits no such extraordinary


ar

O
hw
is

perception. The Naiyayika further differs from Kumarila in maintaining that knowledge
rA

O
fo

is not intrinsically valid but becomes so on account of extraneous conditions. He regards


ed

N
is
al

correspondence as the nature of truth. But realizing the difficulty that correspondence
on

A
rs

cannot serve as the best of truth, he proposes successful activity (samvadipravrtti), as


pe
s
ti

the test of truth and accepts pragmatism so far as the criterion of truth is concerned.
en
m
cu

Kumarila holds non-contradiction to be the nature of truth and regards all knowledge
do
is

as intrinsically valid. Knowledge becomes invalid when some defects are discovered
Th

in the causes of knowledge or when it is set aside by a subsequent sublating knowledge.


Thus Kumarila takes a detached and scientific view of truth as well as of error.
Prabhakara, rejecting alike the Naiyayikas theory of extrinsic validity of truth and the
Naiyayikas and Kumarilas account of error as positive misapprehension and

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maintaining no logical distinction between truth and error, falls back on the Naiyayikas Notes:

pragmatic test of truth agreeing with him that truth is that which works and error is
that which does not and lacks practical worth.

Ramanuja's Theory of Error:


THE view of error in earlier Sankhya and in Ramanuja technically called sat-khyati is
similar to the view of Prabhakaras akhyati. Earlier Sankhya, Prabhakara and Ramanuja
all believe that error is non-apprehension and not misapprehension. Error is only partial
truth. Cognition as such is never invalid. Error means imperfect and incomplete truth.
The way to remove error is to acquire more perfect and complete knowledge. There
is no subjective or ideal element in error. Truth only supplements error and does not

Y H
cancel it. Ramanuja adopts Prabhakaras theory with some modification and his theory

H G
is called yatharthakhyati or satkhyati or akhyati-samvalitasatkhyati or Non-

P N
apprehension -cum-apprehension of Reality. Ramanuja goes to the extent of saying

)
om
O I

l.c
that the shell appears as silver because there are some particles of silver in it and

ai
S
gm
S
explains this by his interpretation of triplication or quintuplication (trivrt-karana or panchi-

8@
O Y R
karana). All apprehension is real (yathartam sarvavijnanam). Error is right so far as it
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
goes; only it does not go sufficiently far enough. The distinction between error and
.e
ya

H
truth, therefore, is not logical, but only practical. The difference between Prabhakara
ar
w
sh

P U
and Ramanuja is that while the former is content with the non-apprehension of the
ai
y(
ya

K
distinction between perceived shell and remembered silver, the latter advocates real
dh
pa

P
perception of the element of silver in the shell, and while the former takes a fully pragmatic
U
ya
ar

view of knowledge, regarding knowledge as only a means to successful activity,


O
hw
is
rA

Ramanuja values knowledge more for the light it brings than for the fruits it bears.

O
fo
ed

The later Sankhya, like the Sankhya-sutra, and Jainism believe in Sadasatkhyati which

N
is
al
on

agrees mainly with the view of Kumarila and need not be repeated. Error is here

A
rs
pe

regarded as misapprehension and is held as due to a wrong synthesis of two cognitions


s
ti
en

which are separately real (sat), though the synthesis itself is unreal (asat).
m
cu
do

Theory of Error in Mahayana and Advaita Vendanta:


is
Th

WE have thus far considered the theories of error in those schools which claim to be
realistic in one way or the other. These realistic schools are divided in their view of
error and may be broadly classified under two groups according as they regard error
as mere non-apprehension or as misapprehension-the fact which divides Prabhakara

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and Kumarila. The akhyati of Prabhakara, the satkhyati of earlier Sankhya and the Notes:

akhyatisamvalitasatkhyati or the yathartha-khyati of Ramanuja fall under one group


which holds error as mere non-apprehension and rejects and subjective element in
error altogether. Error is here treated as partial truth. The viparitakhyati of Kumarila,
the anyathakyhyati of Nyaya, and the sadasatkhyati of later Sankhya and of Jainism
fall under the second group which regards error as misapprehension and admits the
subjective element in error. Error is here treated as partial misrepresentation.

But all these theories fail to account satisfactory for the fact of error. Error cannot be
taken as mere non-apprehension, for there is definitely a subjective element involved
in error which is late on contradicted by the sublating cognition. This view ignores the

Y H
fact that as long as error lasts, it is taken as true and prompts activity though it may

H G
result in failure. There is actual presentation of silver to consciousness and not a mere

P N
memory-image. If the two cognitions stand apart unrelated and if error is due to mere

)
om
O I

l.c
non-apprehension of their distinction, the natural question which arise is-Do these two

ai
S
gm
S
cognitions appear in consciousness or not? It they do, then there must be the cognition

8@
O Y R
of their distinction also; if they do not, they are unreal. Again, neither correspondence
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
can be taken to be the nature of truth nor pragmatic activity its test. Again, Prabhakara
.e
ya

H
at least has no right to maintain non-apprehension, when he rejects negation itself as an
ar
w
sh

P U
independent category. The other group which regards error as misapprehension equally
ai
y(
ya

K
fails to explain error. It error is purely subjective, if knowledge can mispresent its
dh
pa

P
object, then realism stands rejected. How can the shell be misperceived as silver?
U
ya
ar

Silver cannot be perceived because it is not there and there can be no sense-contact
O
hw
is
rA

with it. It cannot be a mere memory-image, because as long as error lasts, there is

O
fo
ed

actual presentation of silver to consciousness. The extraordinary jnanalaksana

N
is
al
on

perception admitted by Nyaya is a mere arbitrary assumption. The dilemma before the

A
rs
pe

realist in this: If silver is real, it cannot be contradicted afterwards by the sublating


s
ti
en

cognition of shell; and if silver is unreal, how can it appear to consciousness during
m
cu
do

error? Realism cannot give any satisfactory answer to this. This question is answered
is
Th

by the idealist schools of Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta. Shunyavada,


Vijnanavada and Advaita Vedanta advocate the view known as anirvachaniyakhyati.
Orthodox tradition, probably due to the fact that the original works of Shunyavada
and Vijnanavada were not available to it, ascribes to Shunyavada the view of asatkhyati

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which means that the object of cognition is unreal for reality itself is void, and to Notes:

Vijnanavada the view of atmakhyati which means that error is the superimposition of
the form of cognition on the so-called external object which is unreal, for the real is
only the momentary cognition. But it is a great blunder to ascribe these views to these
schools. Neither Shunyavada is nihilism nor is Vijnanavada subjective idealism. Our
account of these schools has clearly proved that they believe in Absolute Idealism and
are the forerunners of Advaita Vedanta. They advocate anirvachaniyakhyati. Of course
the school of Svatantra-Vijnanavada may be rightly charged with subjective idealism
and may therefore be regarded as an advocate of atmakhyati. The theory is clearly
absurd for according to it, instead of this is silver we should have the cognition I am

Y
silver or at least the idea of this is the idea of silver. Let us now consider the true

H H
solution of the problem of error given by the above-mentioned three schools of Absolute

P G
Idealism. Reality is pure consciousness which is direct, immediate and self-luminous

)
om
O I
and is the transcendental background of the world of phenomena which is its appearance

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
due to the power of beginningless Ignorance. Affirmation and negation are the phases

8@
O Y R
of the same reality. The distinction between truth and error is relative and empirical.
11
00
IL B MA
.1
Reality transcends this distinction. Error is of two kinds. One is the transcendental or
ce
.e
ya

the universal error and the other is the subjective or the individual error. The former is

H
ar
w

called by Shunyavada as tathya-samvrti, by Vijnanavada as paratantra and by Vedanta


sh

P U
ai
y(

as vyavahara. The latter is called by Shunyavada as mithya-samvrti, by Vijnanavada


ya

K
dh
pa

as parikalpita and by Vedanta as pratibhasa. Both are based on contradiction, negativity,

P
U
ya

limitation and relatively. For convenience we call the former appearance and the
ar

O
hw
is

latter error. Both battle all description and are the offspring of the real and the unreal.
rA

O
fo

Both are indescribable for they can be called neither as real nor as unreal. Contradiction
ed

N
is
al

is the essence of all appearances, for non-contradiction belongs only to reality which is
on

A
rs

of the nature of pure knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, removes contradiction and


pe
s
ti

the moment contradiction is removed, error vanishes. When the shell is mistaken for
en
m
cu

silver, the shell-delimited consciousness is the ground on which silver and its cognition
do
is

are illusorily imposed by beginningless Ignorance. This silver is not real, because it is
Th

contradicted afterwards when the shell is known; and it cannot be unreal, because it
appear as silver as long as illusion lasts. It is therefore called anirvachaniya or
indescribable either as real or as unreal. Avidya hides the nature of the shell and makes
it look like silver. Negatively it covers shellness (avarana) and positively it projects

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(viksepa) silver on it. Error is indescribable superimposition which does not really Notes:

affect the ground and is removed by right knowledge. Error is true as long as it lasts
and becomes unreal only when it is contradicted by a higher knowledge. The illusory
is sublated by the phenomenal and the latter by the transcendental.

Y H
PH G
N

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Non-Dualism of Samkara Notes:

What is the nature of Brahman according to Samkara? Why is his


philosophy negatively called as Advaita?
Compare the views of Samara and Ramanuja regarding Brahman.
Explain clearly what Samara means by "Brahman Satyam jaganmithya".
What, according to Samkara, is the nature of Brahman and how is Maya
related to it?
Cleary explain the nature of Brahman, Jiva and their relation in Advaita
Vedanta.

Y
The whole of the Vedanta philosophy can be summarised in a line "Brahman is true, the

H
PH
world is false and the Jiva and Brahman are not different." According to Samkara,

G
Brahman is the highest transcendental truth. It is perfect and the only truth. It is ultimate

)
om
O I
summum bonum of human efforts and the basis of knowledge. The ultimate truth is

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
non-contradictory. It is existent, beginningless and unchanging. It is the highest

8@
O R
knowledge. By the knowledge of Brahman the knowledge of the world, which is really

Y 11
00
IL B MA
.1
ignorance, disappear, because the knowledge of the Brahman is the basis of the
ce
.e
ya

knowledge of the world. Hence the knowledge of the Brahman is the eternal truth.
H
ar
w
sh

P U
Brahman is the knowledge, the knower and the known. These distinctions of the process
ai
y(
ya

K
of the knowledge do not apply in the case of Brahman knowledge. Brahman is the
dh
pa

P
U

essence of all things. It is the only ultimate existence. It is conditioned and self-illumined.
ya
ar

Hence it is non-dual, attributeless, unconditioned.


O
hw
is
rA

O
According to Samkara, only the Nirguna Brahman is the ultimate truth. The Upanisads
fo
ed

N
is

have described Brahman both as Saguna and Nirguna. The former has been called as
al
on

A
rs

the Apara Brahman while the latter has been called Para Brahman. The Para is
pe
s

unconditioned, without particulars and without qualities. The Apara Brahman is


ti
en
m

conditional, wih particulars and qualities. Existence, Consciousness and Bliss are the
cu
do

characteristics of Para Brahman. Ramanuja has accepted both Saguna and Nirguna to
is
Th

be the ultimate Brahman. But, according to Samkara, it is ignorance to admit two


forms of Brahman since in reality only the Nirguna form is true. Due to ignorance it
appears as saguna Iswara and limited Jiva. The distinction of devotee and deity is only
on the pragmatic level. On the transcendental level, Brahman is all power and beyond

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the karmas and intellect. It is the object of attibuteless knowledge. Religion in Samakara's Notes:

philosophy has only pragmatic value. The Nirguna cannot be worshipped. The human
heart cannot be satisfied through Nirguna. This is the argument of Ramanuja against
the non-dualism of Samakara.

According to Samkara, there is no distinction between the self and Brahman. Both are
beyond the senses, the mind and the intellect. Whatever is in the self, is also in the non-
self. By this synthesis of the Brahman and Atman, Samkara negated all types of dualism
and established a methaphysical, epistemological and axiological non-dualism. Brahman
is present everywhere in the form of the soul. Whatever is in the macrocosm is also in
the microcosm. This identity of the self and the Brahman is based on the logic of infinite

Y H
as described in the Upanishads. In the limited world, nothing remains when equal

H G
comes out of equal. But in the world of infinite as described in the Upanishads. In the

P N
limited world, nothing remains when equal comes out of equal. But in the world of

)
om
O I

l.c
infinite the perfect remains when the perfect is taken out of the perfect. As a matter of

ai
S
gm
S
fact, according to Samkara the creation and the destruction of the world have only

8@
O Y R
pragmatic importance. From the transcendental standpoint only the Brahman is the
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
ultimate reality. It is the self. Due to ignorance, it is seen as the individual, the world and
.e
ya

the god.
H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

Brahman is existence as well as consciousness. According to Samkara, the existence


y(
ya

K
dh

is also consciousness and whatever is conscious, it alone exists. The knowledge is the
pa

P
U

knowledge of existence and existence is itself of the form of knowledge. Thus Samkara
ya
ar

O
hw

does not make distinction between metaphysical and the epistemological reality.
is
rA

O
Brahmanhood is said to be the liberation. Samkara has described Brahman, liberation
fo
ed

N
is

and soul in the same terms. As a matter of fact, all these three are one and the same.
al
on

A
This metaphyiscal, epistemological and exiological synthesis of Advaita Vedanta is
rs
pe
s

unrivalled in the history of philosophy. There are no distinctions in Brahman. There is


ti
en
m

no distinction of the knower, knowledge and known in it, nor any distinction of the
cu
do

waking, dreaming and sleeping; consciousness and unconsciousness and sub-


is
Th

consciousness etc. Brahman is beyond the world of name and form. In it there is no
appearance and disappearance. In spite of thus admitting Brahman to be beyond all
distinctions, Samkara has not taken it to be a negation or nihil. Brahman can nature of
bliss. But this bliss is merely an object of experience. Hence by calling Him bliss,

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Brahman does not become attributed Really speaking Samkara's distinction of Brahman Notes:

here is in the sense of "Neti Neti". Brahman is existent, because it is not non-existent,
conscious, because it is not unconscious, and bliss, because it is not of the nature of
pain. It is identical because it is beyond time. It is unchanging, since it is beyond space.
Knowledge is not its attribute, but its nature. It is Nirguna because it is beyond all
gunas.

In spite of calling Brahman Nirguna Samkara has denied that it is nihil, though some
have called him "Crypto-Buddhist." The Upanisads have called the Brahman
attributeless-attributed ("Nirgunoguni"). According to Samkara only they call the
Nirguna Brahman as Sunya who are deficient in intelligence. There is no distinction of

Y H
space, time, qualities, movements and consequences etc., in Brahman. It is beyond all

H G
the distinctions of present, past, future, cause and effect etc. It is beyond the physical

P N
world. Thus Brahman is beyond the senses, mind and intellect, though it does not

)
om
O I

l.c
mean that he is unknowable. He is the object of immediate experience. In fact, all

ai
S
gm
S
knowledge has two aspects, where it makes the objects known, it also gives the

8@
O Y R
knowledge of the knower, since without the knower the knowledge is impossible. This
11
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knowledge of the world is due to the light of Brahman. In the words of Swetaswatara
.e
ya

H
Upanisad. "By its light all this is lighted. By its illumination all this illumined." Brahman is
ar
w
sh

P U
perfect. It has no separate divisions. It is one and homogeneous. The word Brahman
ai
y(
ya

K
has been derived from the root 'Brh', hence literally also Brahman transcends the
dh
pa

P
world. According to Ramanuja there is self-distinction in Brahman. The worldly objects
U
ya
ar

are distinguished from the objects of their own species as well as that of the other
O
hw
is
rA

species. But being non-dual, Brahman is beyond all self-distinctions as well as the

O
fo
ed

distinctions in one's own species and from that of others. It is not non-existent and yet

N
is
al
on

it is absolutely opposted to all knowable objects. Brahman being transcended is beyond

A
rs
pe

all differences.
s
ti
en
m

According to Taittriya Upanishad, "that from which all the physical world has been
cu
do

born, that from which born, all these live and that to which all these return, desire to
is
Th

know it, that alone is Brahman. Brahman is the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer
of the world. He is infinite, omnipotent and omnipresent. He is the substratum of all the
physical universe," Samkara has taken Brahman as cause, precisely in this sense. The
world is the reflection of Brahman. It is not its creation or effect. The reflection does

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not affect Brahman, just as the Maya influences only those who are ignorant and never Notes:

the magician (Mayavi) himself. He is the highest generality, because all is in it and by its
knowledge everything else is known. It is due to ignorance that the Brahman is seen as
the world of many names and forms. In fact, the whole world is Brahman itself. He is
immutable and eternally contented. The world is mortal, material and painful. Hence
Brahman is the only truth and all else is false.

Brahman is indsecribable. The Upanishads have described it by calling "Neti Neti". To


call it indescribable means that it cannot be described in the pragmatic language,
because it is beyond the senses, mind and intellect. Indescribable does not mean
unknowable, since Brahman can be realised. Only it is not subject of intellectual

Y H
concepts. He is the knower, the light of the lights, the conscious light and the soul of all.

H G
He its self-illimined, Like the sun he illumines himself and also illumines everything else.

P N
It is not object. Its knowledge is the knower's knowledge, It is only by going beyond

)
om
O I

l.c
the universe that the jiva realises the real nature of Brahman and that of his own inner

ai
S
gm
self.
S
8@
O Y R
In personality there is the distinction of self and not-self, According to Ramanuj, Brahman
11
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.e

has personality. He is the ultimate person. But Samkara admits Brahman as beyond all
ya

H
ar

distinctions and impersonal. He is beyond personality. He is neither knower nor does


w
sh

P U
ai

but pure knowledge. According to Samkara knowledge is not an activity, but


y(
ya

K
dh

Brahmanhood, since in activity or evolution there is imperfection, change or motion,


pa

P
U

while Brahman is beyond all these. Brahman is beyond pleasure, pain, attachment,
ya
ar

O
hw

aversion, good and evil. H is infinite. He is being, not Becoming. In him there is no
is
rA

O
change or evolution. He is immutable. In him there is no change or evolution. He is
fo
ed

N
is

immutable. He is beyond the desires and purposes. Hence the Brahman of Samkara is
al
on

A
beyond the God of Ramanuja.
rs
pe
s
ti

In Samkara's philosophy, the main proof for the existence of Brahman is the spiritual
en
m
cu

experience, But as a philosopher. Samkara has tried to give systematic testimony ot


do
is

prove the existence of Brahman. If these the main are as follows:


Th

1. Proof from Scriptures Samkara has developed his philosophy on the basis of
the Upanishads, Gita and Brahman Sutra. Hence the verses of these scriptures are
the greatest proof to admit Brahman as the ultimate truth. Samkara has called

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himself a commentator, and non a philosopher. He has tried to give systematic Notes:

form to the savings of all the Upanisads. The numerous great sentences like "I am
Brahman", "All is Brahman" etc., scattered in different Upanisads are proofs of the
concept of Brahman in Advaita Philosophy. The scriptures is the proof of the
existence of Brahman, and Brahman is the eternal source of the scriptures. In the
sequence of time Brahman precedes. Vedas, while in the epistomological sequence
Vedas precede Brahman. Hence there no fallacy of circular reasoning here.

2. Etymological Proof Brahman is a substratum of the universe, since as Samkara


points out, 'because it is according to the root Brh". The rooth Brh means evolution.
Hence literally speaking Brahman means all transcending existence. Like the

Y H
ontological proof of Descartes, Samkara has tried to prove the existence of

H G
Brahman by the lateral meaning of the word. It goes without saying that Deussen

P N
was not true when he said that there is no such proof in Indian philosophy. By

)
om
O I

l.c
attributing infinity and other similar qualities to Brahman, Samkara has referred to

ai
S
gm
S
its literal meaning.

8@
O Y R
3. Psychological Proof After giving the etymological proof Samkara has said that
11
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.e

being the self of ll the existence. Brahman is known to everyone. Duessen calls this
ya

H
ar

psychological proof. But further emphasizing the above statement. Samkara points
w
sh

P U
ai

out that every man feels the existence of this own self and no one is ignorant of it.
y(
ya

K
dh

Thus it becomes a complete scientific argument, since it not only point out to
pa

P
U

positive evidence, but also negates all evidence in opposition.


ya
ar

O
hw
is

4. Telelogical Proof The world is so systematic that its origin cannot admitted as
rA

O
fo

material. Hence the very system of the universe is a proof of its conscious cause as
ed

N
is
al

Brahman.
on

A
rs
pe

5. Regresses and infinitum by not admitting Brahman as the original cause According
s
ti
en

to the Upanisads the world has no beginning. It is the reflection of the ultimate
m
cu
do

reality. This ultimate reality is the original cause of Brahman. If it is asked that what
is
Th

is the cause of the Brahman, it will be subject to the fallacy of regressing to infinity
since the question of the cause of cause will always arise. Hence the existence of
Brahman as the ultimate cause of the universe is self proved.

6. The proof of immediate experience The intellectual proofs regarding the existence

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of Brahman are only helpful to understand Him intellectually. But beyond the mind, Notes:

intellect and senses, the only valid proof for the existence of Brahman in immediate
experience. By immediate experience all dualism disappears and one realises the
non-dual Brahman. It is the object of Sadhana. It is not proper to try to understand
the entire Advaita philosophy by means of intellect alone. It is only after direct
experience that one can grasp the essential meaning of Vedanta. It has been rightly
said that Vedanta cannot tell us what is Brahman, but only what Brahman is not.
Brahman is described so that one may not take it to be a nihil. According to
Upanisads. Brahman is an object of experience, the intellect should not reason
about it. It is hence that the saying goes: "Silence is Brahman".

Y H
Explain the place of Iswara is the Vedanta of Samkara.

H G
In the philosohy of Samkara, the world is merely a reflection of the ultimate reality. In

P N
fact, neither the individual nor the universe nor God have existence apart from Brahman.

)
om
O I

l.c
From the question of creation it is merely a pragmatic problem and God has been

ai
S
gm
S
brought in only to solve it, otherwise there is neither a creation nor a creator. It is the

8@
O Y R
Nirguna Brahman itself that has been admitted as Saguna for the pragmatic purposes
11
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of worship etc. Samkara's philosophy advocates Satkaryavada and in that too the
.e
ya

H
Vivartavada and not Parinamavada. In fact, the Brahman is the only material and efficient
ar
w
sh

P U
cause. The world of name and form is merely an imposition on Brahman. This illusion
ai
y(
ya

K
is due to ignorance and to remove this ignorance is the aim of Vedanta. Hence it is plain
dh
pa

P
that God is also a merely pragmatic poslutate.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

In fact, the Nirguna Brahman is the only truth. Brahman is pure, transcendental, free,
is
rA

O
eternal and unconditional. Brahman covered with Maya, is Iswara. He is reflection of
fo
ed

N
is

Brahman. Besides Braman, He is nothing. Brahman is impersonal, while Iswala is the


al
on

A
ultimate person. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the physical universe. He
rs
pe
s

is the mediating link between the Brahman and the universe. The world of name and
ti
en
m

form is present in Him in the seed form. He is becoming while Brahman is being.
cu
do

Brahman realisation leads to liberation while living. The worship of Iswara leads to
is
Th

gradual liberation, Brahman is the object of immediate experience. Iswara is the object
of worship. Brahman is the transcendental truth while Iswara is merely a pragmatic
truth. On the transcendental level there is no distinction between Iswara and Brahman,
since in it all the dualisms of the individual, universe and God disappear.

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Creation is the expression of the self-power of God in the world of space and time. Notes:

Before creation the world of name and form is present in God. After destruction it
again merges into God But because the Karmas of the Jivasare not destroyed, they
have to return again to the world of the creation and become inevitable. Otherwise the
world is beginningless. Prakrti is God's power. Creation and destruction are different
stages of the beginningless universe. Iswara requires no instrument to create the world.
He creates the world by His power of Maya. He has no purpose in creation, because
He is perfect. The world is His Lila. The creation is His nature.

By calling the creation beginningless, Samkara escapes the question that whether there
were merit and demerit of the individual in the beginning Without Individual there can

Y H
be no merits and demerits, while without merits and demerits there is no cause of the

H G
individual. Hence the world is beginningless, and the karmas are also beginningless. As

P N
one sows, so he reaps. Hence the pains, sufferings and evils present in the world are

)
om
O I

l.c
not due to Iswara, but results of the past karmas of the jivas. Thus moral problem

ai
S
gm
S
cannot be raised against Iswara, nor can He be called to be imperfect as creator. The

8@
O Y R
gross, material and divided universe assumes seeds form and levels its particular
11
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characteristics, while returning to its original causethe Iswara. Hence purity is not
.e
ya

H
affected by it. Externally, the universe is absolutely different from Isvara, but essentially
ar
w
sh

P U
it is the same. Hence, it is relevant to ask how the material universe is created by the
ai
y(
ya

K
conscious Isvara. Like the waking, dreaming and sleeping stages of man, the world is
dh
pa

P
also manifested in different forms due to ignorance. The materiality and other limitations
U
ya
ar

of the world and individual do not affect the Isvara since though Samkara is
O
hw
is
rA

Satkaryavadin in he is no Parinamavadin. The world is the reflection of Isvara, hence,

O
fo
ed

it's nature does not affect Him. God is the controller of the actions, the Karmadhyakas.

N
is
al
on

He is all knower. His knowledge in intuitive, direct, without senses and beyondignorance.

A
rs
pe

He is the witness of the universe. He creates bodies of different Jivas according to their
s
ti
en

actions and so also the objects of their enjoyment.


m
cu
do

He is beyond merit and demerit.In Him there are no imperfections of attachment and
is
Th

aversion, pleasures and pains and sins etc. He is the basis of morality. He is immanent
and omnipresent. He is the ultimate infinity. He is eternal, one and pure consciousness.

In spite of being omnipresent, Isvara also assumes particular forms and thus he can be
worshipped. He is kind to his devotees and helps them in their spiritual efforts. He is

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the ultimate person He is the helper in the attainment of liberation. He is the basis of all Notes:

dharmas.

The above mentioned conception of God is different from that of Nyaya philosophy in
the following aspects:

1. The God of Nyaya is an individual creator like Visvamitra. Samkara's God, in


spite of being a creator, is infinite and perfct. The God of Nyaya to without demerits,
ignorance, pramada etc. He is the basis of merit, knowledge and samadhi, the
existence, consciousness and bliss, omnipotent and the controller of the karmas
and yet he creates and sustains the world like a father and is guided by the actions
of the individual He is omniscient, eternal consciousness and pure bliss and yet he

Y H
has desires. Hence he is an individual. He creates the universe due to compassion

H G
His purpose is the spiritual evolution of the individual. Samkara has criticised such

P N

)
om
a conception of God. If the creation is according to karmas, such a conception of

O I

l.c
ai
S
God. If the creation is according to karmas, there is hardly any place for compassion

gm
S
8@
and if the compassion has still the same role to play, God becomes partial and

O
imperfect.
Y R 11
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ce
.e
ya

2. The God of Samkara is immanent as well as transcendent. The God of Nyaya is

H
ar
w

beyond the universe. In both God is an instrumental cause, but in Samkara's


sh

P U
ai
y(

philosophy. God is also the material cause.


ya

K
dh
pa

P
3. Nyaya tries to prove God on the basis of the Samanyatodrsta inference. Samkara
U
ya
ar

like Kant admits that the existence of God cannot be proved by an intellectual
O
hw
is
rA

argument, but its only proof is the scripture.

O
fo
ed

N
is

4. According to Nyaya philosohy every efficient cause requires necessary knowledge,


al
on

A
desires and efforts as in the case of human action. But according to Samkara, only
rs
pe
s

knowledge s sufficient. There is no need of desire and efforts of the creator in


ti
en
m

creation, because if it is so it will need an earlier desire and earlier effort, since
cu
do

there is a problem of creator and so on and thus one arrives on the fallacy of
is
Th

regressus ad infinitum.

Though Samkara does not accept Iswara as ultimate reality, yet like a systematic
philosopher he gives proofs for the existence of God. These arguments are as follows:

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1. Cosmological Argument The valid and systematic world of multiple names and Notes:

forms cannot be a creation of material Prakrti as that in Samkhya philosphy or that


of the movements of atoms in Vaisesika philosophy. In the Tarkapad of his famous
commentary on the Brahman Sutra of Badarayana, Samkara has elaborately
criticized the theories of creation in samkhya and Vaisesika pholosophies. It goes
without saying that the traditional argument against the theory of creation do not
apply not apply on Samkara's views.

2. Teleological Argument In the creation of the world there appears a syatem, an


order, a harmony. The structure of various animals and above all that of the human
beings can puzzle even the greatest minds. Even the best artist finds satisfaction in

Y H
attempting to copy Nature, hence how can this beautiful world be the work of

H G
some unconscious material Prakrti? Only conscious God can be the creator of this

P N
universe. He creates the world to fulfil te purposes of the individuals. He is omniscient

)
om
O I

l.c
and so he creates the universe according to the deserts of the individuals. Taking

ai
S
gm
S
the seeds of names and forms of the Maya he creates a systematic world. The

8@
O Y R
system explicit everywhere in the creation testifies to the purpose of the creator.
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This is teleological argument to prove the existence of a conscious God as creator
.e
ya

H
of the world.
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

3. Moral Argument One finds a wide difference in the status of different individuals
y(
ya

K
dh

in the world. One enjoys pleasure while another suffers pain. One is born with a
pa

P
U

silver spoon in his mouth another cannot make both ends meet, even after much
ya
ar

O
hw

labour. If the world is a moral order, why is there all this injustice? If the creator
is
rA

O
and sustainer of the world is not a wicked spirit, why is there so much pain, misery
fo
ed

N
is

and sins? It is to gven a moral interpretation of this inequality that Kant has taken
al
on

A
resort to the postulate of God. Samkara brings here the doctrine of karmas. All the
rs
pe
s

inequality in the lots of the individual is due to their past karmas. Only the doctrine
ti
en
m

of karma can satisfactorily give a moral interpretation of such wide differences


cu
do

found among the individuals and beings. According to Mimamsa philosophy, this
is
Th

karma is an imperceptible power, named Apoorva which creates the good and
bad consequences. But if this Apoorva is itself an unconscious power, how can it
create the good and oad consequenses? It can be done only by some conscious
power. Hence according to Samkara it is only God who awards and punishes the

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individuals according to their karmas. He is the controller of all actions. This is the Notes:

moral argument to prove the existence of conscious God who systematicaslly


awards and punishes different individuals according to their deeds.

This moral argument has also been presented in a somewhat differentform, It is the
Sruti which formulates the moral principles, but the validity of Sruti is based upon its
creator the God. It is only because they are the commands of God, that the principles
laid down in Sruti are categorical. It is He who decides about moral principles since
He is the ultimate end of all. The actions opposed to him are wrong while those according
to him are right Hence the existence of God is proved as the ultimate end and the
source of the moral principles.

Y H
Both God and individuals are mere worldly realities. Both are the reflections of Brahman,

H G
both possess pure consciousness. Both are Brahman itself from the transcendental

P N

)
om
standpoint. Thus from the transcendental standpoint both are same, but from the practical

O I

l.c
ai
S
standpoint there is a whole world of difference between them. The Jivas have also

gm
S
8@
been held as parts of God, though God is without parts. The knowledge, power and

O Y R
existence of the Jivas is limited. The God is omnipresent, omniscient, infinite, all bliss
11
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ce
.e

and perfect. The Jivas are related by merits and demerits. God is beyond both and
ya

H
ar

controls them. The Jivas make efforts for liberation. God is eternally liberated and
w
sh

P U
ai

helps the Jivas in their efforts. The Jivas are active, while it is God who gives them
y(
ya

K
dh

initiative. The Jivas are enjoyers, the God is free. Thus the Jivas are worldly while the
pa

P
U

God is beyond the world. But ultimately all this dualism is meaningful only on the
ya
ar

O
hw

practical plane. By the realisation of Brahman all this dualism disappear. According to
is
rA

O
Ramanuja's however, this dualism is not due to ignorance, but eternal. Between Jiva
fo
ed

N
is

and God there is the relation of part and whole, controlled and controller, mode and
al
on

A
substance. Of these two views regarding the relation of individuals and God, Samkara's
rs
pe
s

philosophy, does satisfy the demands of reason, while in Ramanuja philosophy, on the
ti
en
m

other hand, there is no place for immediate mystic experience and intellectual philosophy.
cu
do
is

Discuss fully Samkara's account of the nature of self.


Th

What is the nature of Jiva according to Samkara? How is it related to


Brahma?

Samkara has not admitted any dualism between the sefl and the Brahman. Self is
without particular characteristics. It is itlse Brahman. It is all prevading and omnipresent.
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It is one, non-dual, partless, beyond space-time, ultimate and true. As a matter of fact, Notes:

Samkara has described Brahman, self and liberation almost in the same terms.
According to Dr. R.P. Singh, Samkara has established an exiological harmony in all
these. According to different temperaments, different in interpreters have emphasized
different aspects of this synthesis. Dr. Radhakrishnan has emphasized the Brahman
aspect of this trinity. Prof. A.C. Mukerjee lays empasis on the self aspect. Prof. Ranade,
on the other hand, specially emphasized the mystic experienced. But Samkara has
established and Advita which is the same from all sides. According to Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad, the Brahman and self., both are perfect. If the self is taken out of Brahman.
Brahman still remains perfect. "That is full, this is full, from that full this full has been

Y
taken and yet whatever remains is also full." Full Brahman is omnipresent in the form of

H H
self. In the psychological argument to prove the existence of Brahman Samkara has

P G
emphasized pricesely this unity of the self and Brahman. According to Samkara Brahman

)
om
O I
exists, since everyone of us feels the existence of self and none denies its existence.

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Both self and Barhman have been described as Existence, Consciousness and Bliss,

8@
O Y R
eternal, omnipresent, self of all, self-established, immutable etc.
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According to Samkara self is present in every stage of consciousness. Man passes
.e
ya

H
through different stages of consciousness i.e. waking, dreaming and sleeping but in
ar
w
sh

P U
every stage he experiences that he exists. By an analysis of the state of deep sleep
ai
y(
ya

K
Samkara has proved the Vedanta's view regarding the nature of self. This analyis seems
dh
pa

P
to be more cogent than then solutions found by the Western philosophers, including
U
ya
ar

James and Bradley etc. Most of the arguments against the eternal nature of self are
O
hw
is
rA

based on the hypothesis that the stage of deep sleep is unconscious. But according to

O
fo
ed

Samakara's analysis is this external unconsciousness is due to the non existence of the

N
is
al
on

objects of consciousness itself. Samkara has dintinguished between self-consciousness

A
rs
pe

and pure consciousness. Pure consciousness is eternal but in the absence of objects it
s
ti
en

is not experienced in the form of self-consciousness. Consciousness is the nature of


m
cu
do

self. The self perceives even in the state of deep sleep, though in the absence of the
is
Th

external objects, it appears not to be perceiving, The consciousness is not an activity


to the self, but this is just as the light is the nature of the sun and not its quality. In the
absence of objects, the sun will not enlighten anything and per this makes no difference
in its light. The eye cannot see the eye, it can only be seen in the mirror. Similarly, some

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external object is required for self-consciousness. The Western Vedantins like Deussen Notes:

etc. failed to evaluate the real importance of Samkara's analysis of deep sleep. Like
Kant, Samkara has particularly emphasized the epistemological aspect of self. The
experience "I hope" is sufficient to establish the continuity of self in man. Without self
no experience or knowledge is possible. The knowledge of change is possible only
through ans unchanging knower.

Samkara has called the self conscious or knowledge. According to him it is a universal
truth that knowledge is not possible without knower. It is this fact which he has
emphasized in the III chapter of his Upadesa Sahastrari and the commentary on the
Prasponisad. Knowledge does create the objects as is sometimes supposed by the

Y H
idealists like Berkele. But without knowledge the existence of the of ject is almost

H G
equal to non-existence, because it is meaningless. Like the realists Samkara admits

P N
that the object is outside the mind, but then like Kant he thinks that mind alone gives

)
om
O I

l.c
meaning to the external world. Modern psychology also supports his vies. It is impossible

ai
S
gm
S
to prove that the object exists without its being known. It is impossible that there may

8@
O Y R
be colour without some eye to perceive it. The knowledge of an object must precede
11
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before some judgement about its existence. According to Samkara no one can prove
.e
ya

H
that there is some object which is not known and the effort to prove that there is as
ar
w
sh

P U
much meaning less as to admit that there is colour without the existence of eyes. Taking
ai
y(
ya

K
this argument further, Samkara says, "Even the non-existence of any object cannot be
dh
pa

P
established in the absence of knowlede." According to Sureswara all objects are by
U
ya
ar

self.
O
hw
is
rA

O
The self cannot be denied. It is non-contradictory. It is beyond all activities. It is always
fo
ed

N
is

present. It is neither external nor internal. It is the centre of the mind, senses and the
al
on

A
world of external objects. The meaning of the objects depends on their relation with
rs
pe
s

this centre. It is the power of consciousness and the seer of all the concepts. In his
ti
en
m

Naiskarmyasiddhi, Sureswara has supported this by saying that the self and not self in
cu
do

world depend upon the source of knowledge like perception etc., but the not-self
is
Th

always depends on the existence of self. The self in the witness of the universe.

The self is the basis of all testimonies. Hence it is proved even before the use of any
testimony. The self is Swayamsiddha while the not-self is Agantuka. The self is beyond
all testimonies. It is not effect, because every effect has it cause. It is the cause or

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substratum of all the objects and itself beyond the cause and effect etc. Agains the Notes:

Western philosophers, like James and Hume and the Buddhist philosophers, Samkara
agrues that the self cannot be a process or changing, because the knowledge of every
change requires on unchanging knower. Against the materialists like Lokayatika etc.
Samkara says that they confuse the Swayamsiddha self with Agantuka. The self is the
source of all testimonies and hence cannot be condemend by any testimony. Even the
negation of the self is impossible in the absence of self. It goes without saying that this
argument as laid by Samkara is a strong reasoning against the view of the modern
materialists, including Holt, Watson and Russell as well as against the old materialistic
including John Toland, Diderot and Cabanis etc. According to Samkara there are two

Y
elements in perceptionBodha and Vrtti is Agantuka, changing, unstable and object.

H H
In the states of deep sleep and Turiya there is no Vrtti, but Bodha. Hence they are not

P G
unconscious states. They are conscious, but not self-conscious because of the absence

)
om
O I
of Vrtti. This analysis of Samkara finds support in the views of the Western philosophers,

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
like Green and Kant.

8@
O Y R 00
Self is without attribute, without parts, all pervading and non-dual. The Jiva is conditional,
11

IL B MA
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possesses parts like Antahkarana etc., limited and many. The self is ultimate and
.e
ya

H
transcendental, while the Jiva is pragmatic and psychological. Due to the mind intellect
ar
w
sh

P U
and ego, the Jiva is personal. The self is impersonal. The Jiva is not a part of mode of
ai
y(
ya

K
self, but it is a reflection. Its instruments are due to ignorance and Maya.
dh
pa

P
U

The Jiva is the doer, enjoyer and seer. The self is non-doer. It it there is no distinction
ya
ar

O
hw

of the cause, action and consequences. All distinctions are due to ignorance. The self
is
rA

O
is eternally liberated. It is not caught in the enjoyments of the world. It is conscious and
fo
ed

N
is

of the nature of light. It is attributeless consciousness as such. It is beyond the merit


al
on

A
and the demerit, pleasure and pain, attachment and aversion, desire and volition, action,
rs
pe
s

bondage, liberation and transmigration etc., the characteristics of Jiv.a The Jiva is caught
ti
en
m

in right and wrong, profit and loss, fame and defame etc., while the self is free from all
cu
do

these. The Jiva has a subtle body and a causal body. Its external body is composed of
is
Th

the five elements, sense organs, and vital powers, while the subtle body is composed
of the five sense organs, five motor organs, five pranas, mind and the intellect. It remains
in the waking, sleeping and dreaming stage. The self is Turiya which is unconditional,
homogenous and immortal, Jiva is the object of the concept of the 'I'. The self is

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known through immediate experiences. The self is beyond space, time and casuaility. Notes:

It is of the nature of bliss, conscious and divine. But this distinction of the Jiva and self
is valid only on the pragmatic level. On the transcendental level in the philosophy of
Samkara all dualism disappears. The distinction of Jiv and self is due to ignorance and
Maya. As they disappear on the transcendental level this distinction also disappears
and the real essence of the Jiva, i.e., the self alone remains. Thus ultimately the self or
the Brahman is the only eternal truth, all else is ignorance and adventitious.

Among the Western philosophers, John Locke, like the Nyaya Vaisesika philsophers
of India, maintained that consciousnes is the quality of self. In this view self is merely an
unconscious substance. The consciousness is a quality originated by the contact of the

Y H
self with the mind and sense organs. According to Jayanta, in the contact of mind the a

H G
self is conscious, while without it, it is unconscious. In the Tarkpada of his commentary

P N
on Brahman Sutra, Samkara has indicated that according to some followers of Kanada

)
om
O I

l.c
consciousness is born in the same way, just as the red colour is created in the jug by

ai
S
gm
S
the contact of the fire. According to Samkara the main fallacy in such a view is to

8@
O Y R
misunderstand the Swayamsiddha self as Agantuka. If the self is always joined with the
11
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mind, the memory, perception, etc., should always happen, out such is not the case in
.e
ya

H
experience. The self is attributesless, without particulars, unique and unattached.
ar
w
sh

P U
Scriptures are against the Nyaya view. The consciousness is not the quality of self but
ai
y(
ya

K
its nature. The self is of the nature of consciousness, right witness, always existent and
dh
pa

P
pure eternal Bodh. It is always conscious.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

The above arguments also apply against the conceptions of the materialistics and the
is
rA

O
Vijanavad in Buddhists. All objects depend upon the consciousness. Hence
fo
ed

N
is

consciousness itself cannot be an object and while matter is one of the objects of self
al
on

A
the self cannot be matter. The self is of the nature of bodh. All the concepts are its
rs
pe
s

objects and the mental modifications are its concept. Hence the self camnnot be
ti
en
m

Alayavijnana. It is rather the witness of changing states of the Alayavijnana. According


cu
do

to Kumarila the self is the generator of knowledge. Samkara, on the other hand, maitains
is
Th

that it is beyond activity and enjoyment. The knowledge is created and destroyed,
hence if the self is based on it, it becomes with part non-eternal, impure and pragmatic.
But the self is eternal. It is without distinctions of knower, known and knowledge. It is
not adventitious but self-evident.

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Like the Western philosopher Bradley, Nagarjuna admits the self as Sunya. By utilizing Notes:

his fourfold logic, Nagarjuna has tried to prove the self as non-existent like the son of
a barren woman. Though Samkara has been sometimes called a Crypto-Buddhist, but
he was vehemently criticised nihilism and warned against the confusion of Brahman or
self with Sunya. Against nihilism he has gone to the extent of saying that since nihilism
is opposed to all testimonies, it is not worthy of getting the respect of even being
criticised. But then he has not left this topic here, he has further pointed out that in the
basis of every logical denial there must be some affirmation. If all the objects are
negated even the negation becomes impossible and consequently the objects which
are negated are affirmed. In his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, Samkara

Y
has indicated this fact by emphasizing the epistomological aspect of self. Even it is left

H H
un-decided, whether the subject of knowledge is existent or non existent, the

P G
consciousness of Jnana must be pre-supposed by every object. In his commentary on

)
om
O I
Prasponisad, Samkara has pointed out that the nihilists should at least admit that the

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
knower is knowable and eternal. In the absence of the knower, even the negation of

8@
O Y R
knowledge is un-imaginable. Without knowledge even the existence of ignorance cannot
11
00
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be conceived. Hence Jnana, consciousness and self is self-evident and the source of
ce
.e
ya

all testimonies.

H
ar
w
sh

P U
What is Adhyasa? How does Samkaracharya put this concept to a
ai
y(
ya

K
metaphysical use?
dh
pa

State and examine Samkara's theory of Super-imposition.


P
U
ya
ar

O
hw

In an argument in his famous commentary on Brahman Sutra, Samkara has dittinguished


is
rA

O
between the self and the not-self and warned against confusing the two to be one. "In
fo
ed

N
is

the field of 'I' and 'thou', subject and object which are opposed to each other in nature
al
on

A
like light and darkness, when it is proved that they cannot exist inter-dependently, it
rs
pe
s

appears to be still more illogical that their characteristics can be imposed on one another."
ti
en
m

Thus neither the self nor its characteristics can be imposed on one another. This false
cu
do

imposition is known as Adhyasa. In the worlds of Samkara, "The imposition of something


is
Th

in the form of memory that has been seen earlier on somewehre else is Adhyasa." Thus
Adhyasa is an illusive perception. The cause of the illusion is the confusion of the
imposed with that on which itis imposed. Samkara, has defined adhyasa as "Smrti
Rupah Paratra Pnrva Drstavabhasah." In this definition of Adhyasa Avabhasa means

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false perception of some object. The use of the word Drsta according to Vachaspati Notes:

Misra shows that the object is not real, but merely imaginary. The present object
cannot be imposed, hence the imposition is of some object seen earlier. The object of
imposition is somewhere else and that is why imposition is illusion. Thus the adhyasa is
the result of the mixture of truth and untruth.

1. Atmakhyativada While defining adhyasa, Samkara has indicated some other


vies about it. As he says, "some other persons defined adhyasa as the imposition
of some dharmas, at some where else." According to Vijnanvadins the external
world has no independent existence, but due to ignorance there appears to be an
external world. The imposition of the idea on this external world is adhyasa. This

Y H
view is known as Atmakhyativada.

H G
2. Anyathakhyapativada According to Sautantrika Buddhists, the imposition of

P N
the mental concept on the external world is adhyasa. This views is known as

)
om
O I

l.c
Anyathakyativada. The Nyaya philosophy has also presented a view similar to

ai
S
gm
this.
S
8@
O Y R
3. Akhyativada Some other philosophers define adhyasa "as the imposition of an
11
00
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object an another, due to illusion caused by the failure to understand the distinction
.e
ya

H
between the two objects." Such is the akhyativada of the Mimamsa philosopher
ar
w
sh

P U
Prabhakara Misra.
ai
y(
ya

K
4. Asatkhyativada According to some other philosophers when an object is imposed
dh
pa

P
on another, then the existence of a quality in the second as opposed to that of the
U
ya
ar

first, is imagined. This view is known as Asatkhyativada.


O
hw
is
rA

By a survey of the above definitives of Adhyasa, Samkara arrives at a common element

O
fo
ed

in them and concludes that in adhyasa an object is imposed can another. This definition

N
is
al
on

is not merely for the students of philosophy, but also for the common man. It proves

A
rs
pe

Samkara's view about adhyasa which has already been explained.


s
ti
en
m

Beside the definition of adhyasa already given, Samkara gives yet another definition of
cu
do

adhyasa saying that "the appearance of something in something other than that is known
is
Th

as adhyasa." Thus when one sees rope as snake and the silver as nacre, it is adhyasa.
Here something has been perceived as something else. Similarly, when a man sees the
self in the not-self i.e., body, intellect, etc., which are entirely different in their nature
from the former, it is said to be adhyasa.

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It may be questioned here that if the self is always a subject, how can anything be Notes:

imposed on it? How can any object or its characteristics be imposed on the self?
Similarly, it may be said that if the self is not the reality and the not-self is merely in
illusion or reflection, how can adhyasa be possible since adhyasa needs at least two
objects.

To this Samkara replies that the self is not a known object, because it is the object of
the concept of 'I'. In the concept of 'I' the self is seen as the doer and the enjoyer. The
self is object of immediate experience, because by its disappearance the whole universe
will be in dark. Hence ultimately Samkara maintains that the self is the object of
immediate experience. It goes without saying that the first answer is merely a preface

Y H
to the second reply, because Samkara has followed the Upanisadic successive method

H G
of showing the Arundhati Star. Instead of putting the whole truth at once he reveals it

P N
only gradually. In this philosophy also, there is an effort to take the enquirer gradually

)
om
O I

l.c
to the transcendental level through the Pratibhasika and pragmatic levels.

ai
S
gm
S
8@
Now the question remains that if the self is the only truth, how can adhyasa be possible?

O Y R
To this, Samkara replies that there is no such principle that only an existent object
11
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ce
.e

should be imposed on another object. Thus the imposition is possible even in the
ya

H
ar

absence of one of the objects, just as while the sky is said to be blue, the blue colour
w
sh

P U
ai

is imposed on the sky though we do not see the sky but only the blue colour. Similarly,
y(
ya

K
dh

in spite of the self being the only reality, the not self can be imposed upon it. This
pa

P
U

adhyasa is the basis of the working of Maya.


ya
ar

O
hw
is

In brief, the adhyasa is of the nature of ignorance, Its work is to create the sense of
rA

O
fo

doer and enjoyer in the self. Its proof is the common experience of everyone.
ed

N
is
al
on

According to Samkara the scholars have called the above behaviour as ignorance,

A
rs
pe

while the understanding of the real essence of things after knowledge is said to be
s
ti
en

Vidya. Ignorance or Avidya is neither existent nor non-existent. It is indescribable. All


m
cu
do

the objects of the empirical world are due to Avidya. Avidya is false knowledge. It is
is
Th

the cause of the power of Maya. It overshadows the self and the Brahman. It remains
in the Jivas in the form of karmas. It is due to Avidya that the Jiya does not know his
real form. Avidya is eternal and natural, but it can be destroyed through knowledge. It
is the worldly behaviour.

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Adhyasa is not Avidya, but its consequence. But Avidya and Jiva are eternal. Liberation Notes:

from Avidya is necessary for the destruction of Adhyasa. This leberation from Avidya
is precisely the aim sought by the study of the Vedanta scriptures.

Explain and exmaine the Advaita concept of Maya.


Show how Samkara uses the concept of Maya.
What is Maya according to Samkara? Determine its significance in his
philosophy.
What according the Sam ara is the relation between Brahman and the
world? Is the world? Is the world illusory? Give reasons for your answer.
What according to Samkara is the relation between Brahman and the
world? Discuss.
Y H
PH
How do the Advaintins distinguish Mithya from Sat on the one hand and
G
N
Asat on the other? How do they porve the Mithyatva of the world.

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
Avidya and Maya are the subjective and objective forms of the same phenomenon.

gm
S
8@
Avidya is in the Jiva; it is the characteristic of its intellect. As the knowledge dawns, the

O Y R
Avidya disappears, but Maya is eternal like Brahman, since it is the power of qualified
11
00
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ce
.e

Brahman i.e., Iswara. But in another context Avidya has also been said to be eternal,
ya

H
ar

since the Maya exists in it in the seed form. As a matter of fact just as there is identity
w
sh

P U
ai

between the self and the Brahman, similarly the Maya and Avidya are the same. Both
y(
ya

K
dh

are personal and both are universal. Really speaking, Samkara has used following
pa

P
U

terms in almost similar meaning:


ya
ar

O
hw
is

Maya, Avidya, Ajnana, Adhyaropa, Vivarta, Bhranti, Bhrama, Nama Rupa, Avyakta,
rA

O
fo

Aksara, Beeja Sakti, and Moola-Prakrti etc. The worlds Maya, Avidya, Adhyasa and
ed

N
is
al

Vivarta have been perticularly used in almost the same sence. But some of the post-
on

A
rs

Samkarite Vedantins have distinguished between Avidya and Maya, According to them,
pe
s
ti

Avidya is negative and in the individual, while Maya is positive and all-pervading.
en
m
cu
do

Brahman together with Maya is Iswara. Maya is its power. It is the origin of the world
is
Th

of name and form. Names and forms are neither eixstent nor nor-existent, they are the
seed forms of the universe. They are the constituents of the Prakrti of ISwara, The
creatorship of God depends upon the sprouting of these seeds of Avidya. He knows
them even before creation. It is due to them that he is omniscient. His omnipotence
depends upon them. It is through them again that the creates all the elements and
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beings Apart from God there is no existence of names and form, though, God himself Notes:

is different and pure-consciousness. The world is merely a play or Lila Iswara. Due to
this Maya the inactive God becomes active. Maya is said to be Maha Maya. God is
called Maha Mayin. Maya is not independent like the Prakrti of Samkhya, it depends
on God. It is due to Avidya of Maya than one God is seen in many forms. Maya is
deep sleep or universal ignorance in which the ignorant Jivas remains sleeping. This is
the condition before creation. It is from this that God creates the unvierse.

Samkara has described the following characteristics of Maya or Avidya:

1. Maya is enternal (Anadi) Maya is the power of God. It is through it that God
creates the universe. Hence like God it is also eternal. Even after destruction it

Y H
remains in the God in seed-form.

PH G
2. Maya is God's power (Iswara-Sakti) Maya is the power of God. It absolutely

)
om
O I
depends on him and cannot exist separate. It is not separate from God and there

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
is a relation of identity betwee the two,

8@
O Y R
3. Maya is material and unconscious Like the Prakrti of Samkhya, Maya is material
11
00
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ce
and unconscious. It is opposed to the nature of Brahman in the same way just as
.e
ya

H
Samkhya Prakrti is different from Samkhya purusa. But unlink Prakrti is it neither
ar
w
sh

P U
real nor independent.
ai
y(
ya

K
dh

4. Maya is Bhavarupa Maya is Bhavarupa, though it is not real. By calling it


pa

P
U

Bhavarupa, i.e., of the nature of existence, it is shown that it is not negative. As a


ya
ar

O
hw

matter of fact, Maya has two aspects. In the negative aspect is is the covering of
is
rA

O
reality and keeps it covered. In the positive aspect it creates the universe as the
fo
ed

N
is

reflection of Brahman. It is ignorance as well a false knowledge.


al
on

A
rs

5. Maya is destructible through knowledge As the knowledge dawns, Maya


pe
s
ti

disappears. the liberated soul is beyond the influence of Maya. The disappearance
en
m
cu

of Avidya leads to the appearance of Vidya. As the rope is known the snake
do
is

disappears. Similarly as the real nature of the self is known the world of name and
Th

form i.e., Maya ceases to have any existence.

6. Maya is Vyavaharika Maya is Vyavarahika or merely pragmatic reality. It is of


the nature of reflection. On the transcendental level only the Brahman is true, Maya
is its reflection in the practical world.
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7. Maya is Indescribable Maya is existent, because it is eternal like God and the Notes:

creative power of the universe. It is non-existent, because a part from God it has
no existence. It is real since it is existent in the state of ignorance. It is unreal since
it disappears with the dawn of knowledge and does not limit the Brahman. Lastly,
it can neither be said as existent-non-existent (sad-Asad), because these are
mutually contradictory. Hence Samkara has called the Maya to be "existent-non
existent indescribable." Thus Maya cannot be described.

8. Maya is of the nature of Adhyasa (Adhyasa Roopa) Just as the snake is imposed
on rope and the silver on nacre, similarly the Jivas engroessed by Maya see the
attributeless Brahman as the world of many names and forms. Adhyasa is due to

Y H
Maya or Avidya. Hence the Maya is said to be Mool Avidya or the basic ignorance.

H G
In the form of Avidya, it is also said to be Tool-Avidya.

P N

)
om
9. Maya is the substratum and object of Brahman The Maya is the subtratum and

O I

l.c
ai
S
object of Brahman, though just as the imposition of the blue colour on the colourless

gm
S
8@
sky does not affect the sky itself or just as the magician is not influenced by his

O Y R
magic, similarly, the Brahman is not influced by Maya.
11
00
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.1
ce
.e
ya

10. Maya is Avidya Avidya is unmanifested and God-dependent. It is of the nature

H
ar
w

of Maya, the eternal sleep. All the distinctions are due to Avidya. Maya is of the
sh

P U
ai
y(

nature of false conceptions. The nature of Avidya is to cover knowledgge. This is


ya

K
dh
pa

done in three ways:

P
U
ya

(a) In the form of false knowledge.


ar

O
hw
is

(b) In the form of doubt.


rA

O
fo

(c) In the form of ignorance.


ed

N
is
al
on

But it does not affect Brahman. Avidya is not non-existent like the son of a barren

A
rs
pe

woman. Since it is experienced, it is absolutely existent even as it is destroyed by


s
ti
en

immediate experience. Had it been non-existent, nothing could come out of it. Had it
m
cu
do

been existent, all the objects created by it should also have been existent. Hence, like
is
Th

Maya, Avidya, also cannot be called existent, non-existent, both or neither. Avidya is
indescribable. What is Avidya? How, when and why is the Jiva caught in it? How do
the Brahman and Avidya go together? Whose Avidya is it? There are the questions
which Samkara has not answered, because they are beyond the limits of philosophy

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Ultimately the human being cannot claim complete knowledge. At least it is not possible Notes:

through reason since Brahman is the object of immediate experience. The expression
of this immediate experience has its own limitations in philosophy. Not only the Indian
philosophers, but also the Western philosophers, like Bergson, Bradley and Kant etc.,
admit these limitations. As a matter of fact there is identity between the world and the
Brahman, and they are the same. Hence the questions of their relation does not arise.
The world is a reflection of Brahman. The reflection is not independenctly existent. It is
the Real itself, though in essence it is seen as separate. Samkara has ligically criticized
all other explanations of the relation of Brahman and the world and proved that this
reletion is indescribable and beyond the limits of logic. The causal relation cannot be

Y
applied in the case of the Brahman and the world. Samkara admits the doctrine the

H H
'Ajati' or Gaudapada. Evolution, change, progress and becoming, all are mere illusions.

P G
The word Maya represents the limits of human knowledge. Human knowledge is limited

)
om
O I
to this world alone. The eternal Brahman is an object of immediate experience. The

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
solution of this 'Why' is beyond the limits of philosophy. The world is not Parinama, but

8@
O Y R
Vivarta. In Parinama, the cause and effect have the same nature while in-Vivarta, they
11
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.1
are different. Maya is not a substance, hence it cannot be the material cause of the
ce
.e
ya

universe. It is merely the instrumental cause of the universe. Like the warmth in the

H
ar
w

fire, it remains with God. It can be inferred by its effects.


sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
Samkara has used different analogies to explain the nature of the world. Of these the
dh
pa

P
most important are Rope and Snake, Nacre and Silver, the city of Gandhara, the
U
ya
ar

dream, form, the Maya, the Alat Chakra, the seeing of double moon, the illusory
O
hw
is
rA

elephant and the jugglery etc. These analogies have been used to point out that the

O
fo
ed

Brahman is the only truth and whatever is different from Brahman is false. According

N
is
al
on

to the logic of the Advaita philosophy, Brahman cannot be One and Many, Being and

A
rs
pe

Becoming at the same time. As Samkara points out, if both were true, the worldly man
s
ti
en

should not be caught in the mire of untruth. Nor can it be said that the liberation is
m
cu
do

attained by knowledge and in that condition the knowledge of one should not surpass
is
Th

the knowledge of many. But this does not mean that Samkara has taken the world as
mere dream or mental concept. Samkara's efforts for social and religious reformation
in India are ample proofs that he did not believe the world to be a dream. To understand
the real meaning of Maya, Samkara's doctrine of Vivarta should be clearly understood.
Samkara has clearly distinguished between the philosophical and the worldly standpoint
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and also syntheized both. He is not prepared for any compromise in the field of Notes:

philosophy. The world is unreal and hence it canot find any place in reality. But then the
unreal too has its degrees. There is distinction between the Vyavaharika and the
Pratibhasika unreality.

Thus according to Samkara all the objects can be divided into three categories:

1. Pratibhasika The objects belonging to Pratibhasika level are those which manifest
in the dreams or illusions, but are contradicted by the experiences of the waking
stage.

2. Vyavaharika The objects belonging to Vyavaharika level are those which manifest

Y
in the waking state, but it cannot be said to be real due to their contradiction with

H H
logic, e.g., the cloth, the jug, etc.

P G
N
3. Paramarthika The Paramarthika level is the transcendental level or pure existence

)
om
O I

l.c
which appears in all other states which is uncontradicted and whose contradiction

ai
S
gm
S
cannot be imagined.

8@
O Y R
Hence Samkara has clearly distinguished between the dream and the worldly
11
00
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ce
.e

experience. The ignorance resulting from both has also been distinguished. The
ya

H
ar

experience of the Pratibhasika objects is personal and due to immediate ignorance,


w
sh

P U
ai

called Avidya. The experience of the Vyavaharika objects is universal and due to
y(
ya

K
dh

relatively permanent ignorance, called Maya. As a matter of fact, the world is between
pa

P
U

reality and unreality. According to Samkara just as the existence of the causal Brahman
ya
ar

O
hw

remains in all the three times, similarly, the universe also does not lose its essence,
is
rA

O
because the effect is non-differrent from the cause. Again, the multiple objects of name
fo
ed

N
is

and form are real so far as their esssence is concerned. But in their particular form they
al
on

A
are unreal.
rs
pe
s
ti

The real modification of any substance is known as parinama, e.g., the conversion of
en
m
cu

milk into curd. As against this the appearance of the modification of a substance is
do
is

known as Vivarta, e.g., the appearance of rope as a snake. Both these views are
Th

Satkaryavadi as they bilieve that the effect has existence in the cause. The Samkhya
and the qualified monism believe in Parinamavad while Advaita Vedanta maintains the
theory of Vivarta. Thus Samkara maintains Satkaryavada in the from of Vivartavada.
The effect according to him is non-different from the cause. The earthenware is nothing

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else than earth. The golden ornaments are the gold itself. Again, the effect and its Notes:

material cause are invariably related. The effect cannot exist without cause. The ware
cannot be separated from the clay, nor can the ornaments be conceived apart from
godl. It is illusion to maintain but that the effect is something new which was non-
existent earlier and which has been newly born. Essentially, it was always existent in tis
material cause. The creation of the reality from the unreal cannot be imagined. The
substance can change one form for another. If the real could come out of unreal, the oil
should be extracted from the sand and not only from oil seeds. Due to the activity of
the instrumental cause no new substasnce is born, but the form latent in the substance
is manifested. Hence the effect is non-different from the cause and exists in it. The

Y
effect is merely a form of the cause. Hence the causal relation is not a real change. The

H H
changing world is merely a reflection is not a rela change. This reflection is due to

P G
adhyasa. Adhyasa is due to Avidya. Both adhyaya and avidya are eternal, hence the

)
om
O I
world also seems to be eternal.

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
According to Samkara the Samkhya philosophers have failed to understand the real

8@
O Y R
meaning or Satkaryavada. According to Samkhya philosophy, in spite of the presence
11
00
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ce
of the effect in the material cause, it is the real modification or parinama of it, since it
.e
ya

H
assumes as new form. According to Samkara this means that what was unreal has
ar
w
sh

P U
become real. Thus the very doctrine of Satkaryavada is negated. This change of the
ai
y(
ya

K
form is not a real modification. The form is merely a state of the substance or the
dh
pa

P
material cause which is inseparable from the substance. The existence of the form is
U
ya
ar

due to substance. In spire of the change of the form the substance remains the same.
O
hw
is
rA

While waking, dreaming and sleeping Devadatta remains Devadata. Again, the form is

O
fo
ed

not separate from the substance. If the form and substance are different, it is impossible

N
is
al
on

to related them, because to separate two objects the help of a third thing is imperative.

A
rs
pe

Then to relate this third thing with the first and the second, the forth and the fifth objects
s
ti
en

will be required. Thus the fallacy of regressus and infinitum will follow. Hence the form
m
cu
do

is not different from the substance. Thus the change of the form is merely a reflection.
is
Th

In the independent Advaita books, like Chitsukhi, Advaita Siddhi and Khandan Khand
Khadya many brilliant arguments in favour of Vivartavada have been presented.

Where Samkara has proved his Vivartavada by arguments from scriptures, he has
also shown that by admitting the theory, many difficulties regarding creation can be

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removed. By admitting it is parinama, it is impossible to explain creation. If the God is Notes:

conceived as a creator, and the world is taken as a creation out of the unconscious
prakrti as separate from Him, it is also accepted. The assumption of prakriti as real
and dependent of God has also its dificulties. In this hypothesis, either the prakrti is
merely a part of God or non-different from Him. If like Ramanuja, the former alternative
is accepted, the God also becomes mortal and with parts like the physical objects. If
prakrti is taken as non-different from God, then the evolution of prakrti means the
conversion of God into world. Thus after creation there remains no God different from
creation. Hence it is clear that if a partial or complete modification in it is accepted, He
goes remain worthy of being called God. According to Samkara all these difficulties

Y
are removed when the doctrine of Vivarta is accepted.

H H
G
It is on the basis of the doctrine of Vivarta that the Advaita philosophy maintains the

P N
relation of reflection (Pratibimba) between the Jiva and Brahman. The reflection of

)
om
O I

l.c
infinite consciousness on the mirror or Adivya is Jiva. Just as the moon causes many

ai
S
gm
S
reflections in different pools of water and the reflections differ in their cleanlines according

8@
O Y R
to the degree of cleanliness of the water and also appear to be stable or moving if the
11
00
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.1
ce
water is stable or moving, similarly due to the nature of Avidya, the Jivas, the reflections
.e
ya

H
of the infinite, appear to have different forms and types. Two things are clear by the
ar
w
sh

P U
analogy of reflection. First, it is one Brahman which reflects differently in different
ai
y(
ya

K
Antahkaranas due to different Avidya, and secondly it also points out that the clearness
dh
pa

P
of the reflection of the Brahman will be porportionate to the clearness of the
U
ya
ar

Antahkarana.
O
hw
is
rA

O
But there is one grave detect in the theory of reflection. If this theory is admitted, the
fo
ed

N
is

liberation of Jiva means its destruction, because when the mirror of Avidya is destroyed,
al
on

A
its reflection should also disappeaer. Hence to save the existence of the Jiva some
rs
pe
s

Advaita philosophers have established Avacchedavada. In this theory, the analogy of


ti
en
m

the space in the jug (Ghatakasa) has been used. As a matter of fact, the space is all-
cu
do

pervading and one, but with this distinction of the jug etc., it appears to be in diferent
is
Th

forms and from the practical point of view this itself is admitted to be real. Similarly, in
spite of Brahman being ali-pervading and one, it appears to be many in the form of the
Jivas and the objects due to Avidya. Thus though the Jiva is limited an finite, it is non-
different from the Brahman. The meaning of the liberation is to break all the limitations

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imposed by Avidya and to become the unconditional Brahman. This view is known as Notes:

Avacchedavada.

Explain in detail the theory of Moksha in Advaida Vedanta.

In his commentary on Brahman Sutra, Samkara has given an elaborate distinction of


the nature of liberation. Liberation of Moksa is the transcendental truth, immutable,
eternal, all prevading like the space, devoid of all activities, eternally contented, partless,
of the nature of self light, that where there is no distribution of the merits and demerits,
cause and effect, the present, the past and the future that disembodied state is liberation.
The liberated self ragains is real form. In the Advaita Brahman Sidhi, Moksa is said to
be liberation of the self from Avidya. According to Chitsukhacharya. Moksa is the

Y H
attainment of incessant bliss. Moksa is eternal. The self is eternally liberated. Hence

H G
nothing new is gained in liberation since otherwise it shall be non-eternal.

P N

)
om
O I
As a matter of fact there is hardly any demarcation line between the achievement of

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
knowledge and liberation. The Upanisads have maintained that the knower of the

8@
O Y R
Brahman becomes Brahman. Moksa means seeing the self in all. It is the status of
11
00
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.1
identity with Brahman. The Brahman's knowledge cultinates into the experience of
ce
.e
ya

Brahman. It is eternally liberated. From the transcendental standpoint the self, the

H
ar
w

Brahman and the liberation are the same. The self is Brahman. It is eternally liberated.
sh

P U
ai
y(

The liberation is the annihilation of the awareness of multiplicity. It is not the destruction
ya

K
dh
pa

of worldly names and forms, since really speaking, the transcendental self has no relation

P
U
ya

with the universe. As it has been said in the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad. "This purusa is
ar

O
hw
is

non-attached." The Moksa means the identity of Brahman on the Atman. This identity
rA

O
fo

is not the imposition of Brahman on Atman. According to Samkara knowledge is not


ed

N
is
al

an activity. Hence the attainment of liberation is not an activity. As the covering of


on

A
rs

Avidya is removed from the liberated soul, one known one's real essence. This is
pe
s
ti

liberation. Liberation is not due to knowledge, but is knowledge itself. In the words of
en
m
cu

Padmapada Moksa is liberation from the false knowledge. False knowledge breeds
do
is

misery. As it disappears, the misery also disappears.


Th

Just as Samkara's Brahman is different from the Sunya of the Madhyamika philosophy,
similarly Moksa is different from Nirvana. Moska is not negative. It is bliss. Like the
Apavarga of Nyaya, the self does not become conscious in the Moksa of Vedanta, but
rather appears as the pure consciousness which it its real nature. According to qualified
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monism, in liberation the self does not become Iswara, but appears like Him, lives in Notes:

His contasct, dwells in His country and remains attached to Him. But in Advaita the
liberated self sees everyone in the self and nothing else. Unlike the Buddhist's conception
of Nirvana the self is not annihilated in the Moksa of Advaita, but only its conditions
are destroyed. The liberated self is non-different from Brahman. For the liberated
individual the names and forms of the world disappear and elsewhere he sees the same
Brahman. The Moksa is not attained through self-purification since self-purification is
an activity. The Moksa is attained through knowledge which is not an activity. The
Moksa is attained through knowledge which is not an activity, but its self existence.
Moksa is eternal, pure and of the nature of Brahman.

Y H
Samkara believes in the possibility of gradual liberation. Commenting on a verse in

H G
Prasnopanisad regarding the concentration on Om, he says that such concentration

P N
leads to Brahma Loka where we gradually attain complete knowledge. On another

)
om
O I

l.c
place, Samkara has maintained that the worship of the attributed Iswara leads to

ai
S
gm
S
purification from sins, the attainment of bliss and gradual liberation.

8@
O Y R
According to Samkara Moksa does not mean the cessation of body, but the extinction
11
00
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ce
.e

of ignorance. Hence he believes in liberation while living (Jivan Mukti). Just as the
ya

H
ar

wheel of a potter remains moving even after the pot is made, similarly the man goes on
w
sh

P U
ai

living even after continuity of life. Samkara has here given the example of a man who
y(
ya

K
dh

sees double moon due to some defect in the eye and cannot stop seeing like this in
pa

P
U

spite of knowing that in fact there is only one moon. For a liberated person all the
ya
ar

O
hw

activities are in Brahman. The post-Samkarite Vedantins have presented several views
is
rA

O
regarding liberation while living. According to some Avidya remains for some time
fo
ed

N
is

even after being extinguished. According to others for the liberated person there is no
al
on

A
existence of the body or the world. The state of liberation is while living is also known
rs
pe
s

as disembodied liberation (Videha Mukti).


ti
en
m
cu

According to Samkara, Moksa or the disembodied state of the self is eternal. It is


do
is

questioned here that if the self is eternally liberated, what is the need of efforts for
Th

liberation. On the other hand, if the liberation is achieved by efforts it seems meaningless
to call the self as always existing, established in its own glory, eternally liberated etc. A
subtle analysis here will further show that in Vedanta everywhere two types of self
have been conceived. Of these Empirical Self (Vijnana Atma) is the enjoyer and bound

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while the methaphysical self (Paramatma) is immutable and eternally liberated. Forgetting Notes:

his eternal self the Jiva identifies himself with the empirical form. The essential nature of
the Jiva is however the metaphysical self. The meaning of Avidya is the dualism of the
Jiva and metaphysical self. To remove this dualism by establishing the identity of the
self is the aim of Vedanta. Hence the metaphysical self is eternally liberated, but the
empirical self requires study, meditation and concentration etc., to achieve liberation.
By this means the Jiva leaves the dualism and recognises the true nature of the
metaphysical self and thus attains liberation But some persons have raised an enquiry
as to why the Jiva is caught in Advaita. According to Deussen and Parth Sarathi Misra
Samkara does not explain the cause of Avidya. But as a matter of fact it is impossible

Y
to exaplain the cause of Avidya. Avidya is eternal just as the self is eternal. To question

H H
why there is Avidya is like questioning why there is self? Ultimately, even the philosophical

P G
solutions have got a limit. Beyond that limit, the human intellect keep silent and follow

)
om
O I
the path of spiritual experience.

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Thus without bothering to enquire about the nature of Avidya Jiva should make efforts

8@
O Y R
to attain liberation. In this effort Samkara has admitted the knowledge of Brahman not
11
00
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.1
ce
as means, but as the end in itself. It is ultimate end. Those who point out that there is no
.e
ya

H
place for morality in Samkara' philosophy forget that the Indian philosophers have
ar
w
sh

P U
never given the ultimate status to morality. Most of the Indian philosophers believed
ai
y(
ya

K
that beyond the moral level there is the religious level and beyond the religious level
dh
pa

P
there is the spiritual level. To reach this spiritual level is the ultimate end of human
U
ya
ar

beings. But spiritual aim does not deny, still less negate, the moral aim. It takes to it and
O
hw
is
rA

proceeds further after its fulfilment. Hence upto a certain limit the Advaita Vedanta

O
fo
ed

exhibits the importance of moral and religious means to attain the ultimate end of life.

N
is
al
on

Samkara has himself considered the fourfold means (Sadhana Chatustaya) as necessary

A
rs
pe

for a man to become worthy of studying Vedanta. These fourfold means are as follows:
s
ti
en
m

1. Discrimination between eternal and ephermal The enquirer in the philosophy of


cu
do

Vedanta should have the capacity to distinguish between eternal and ephemeral
is
Th

object as a necessary prerequisite for his study.

2. Detachment towards worldly and other-worldly enjoyment The second condition


required for the student of Vedanta is detachment towards all atypes of enjoyments
and their desires, worldly as well as other worldly.

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3. Sama, Dama, etc. Along with discrimination of eternal and ephemeral and Notes:

detechment from the enjoyments, the enquirer should process the means of Sama,
Dama, Shraddha, Samadhan, Uparati and Ttiksa. The meaning of Sama is to
control the mind while Dama means the control of the senses. Shraddha means
keeping faith in the scriptures. Samadhana means concentration of the mind in the
attainment of knowledge. Uparati means aversion from the disturbing actions. Titiksa
means the practice of bearing heat and cold etc.

4. Desire for liberation (Mumuksatva) The last, though by no means the least
condition for the Sadhana of Vedanta is a strong determination for the attainment
of liberation and a burning desire for it.

Y H
After conquering the passions etc., by the above mentioned fourfold means. Samkara

H G
prescribes the necessity of hearing (Shravana), of the concentration (Manana) and

P N

)
om
meditation (Nididhyasana) Thus the aspirant for the knowledge of Brahman should

O I

l.c
ai
S
take to hearing the teachings of Guru. After the annihilation of the false impressions and

gm
S
8@
the establishment of strong faith in the reality of the Brahman, the teacher teaches the

O Y R
aspirant the secret of Tattvamasi (That Thou Art). Then the aspirant concentrates on
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

this truth with one pointed mind and mediates upon it again and a gain. By this he
ya

H
ar

gradully begins to reaslise the truth and the real nature of the self. Such a complete
w
sh

P U
ai

realisation is the culmination of the knowledge of Brahman. This is liberation By this all
y(
ya

K
dh

the dualism disappears, the doubts and attachments are removed and the supremre
pa

P
U

bliss is attained. This liberated man serves the society and living beings, while he is
ya
ar

O
hw

alive and does not return to bondage after leaving the body.
is
rA

O
fo

The advaitavada of Samkara has no place for ethics. Discuss.


ed

N
is
al
on

According to some critics, "the Advaitavada of Samkara has no place for ethics as it

A
rs
pe

raises the supreme ideal of life above good and evil". Thus it has been pointed out that
s
ti
en

there is no place for ethics in Samkara's philosophy. According to Samkara, Brahman


m
cu
do

is the self, while the world is unreal. The ultimate end of man, according to Vedanta, is
is
Th

the attainment of Brahman consciousness. Thus Brahman is beyond the dualism of


right and wrong. It is beyond all dualism. Thus according to Advaita Vedanta, man's
aim is to reach a status of non-dualism which is beyond all dualism, because dualism is
Maya or Avidya while non-dualism is the Brahman or Reality. This end undoubtedly is

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beyond ethics, since as Kant has pointed out, moral is the level of the dualism of right Notes:

and wrong. On the moral level man must have both the alternatives of right and wrong,
and he must have both the alternatives of right and wrong, and he must vulutarily
choose the right one of the two, if he cannot choose the wrong, if he is bound to
choose the right due to his innate nature, if there is no conflict regarding the two in his
mind, he is not on the moral level. Thus as a moral philosopher pointed out, 'Virtue lies
in its antagonist." This analysis amply clarifies that the summum bonum of man in
Samkara's philosophy is beyond ethics.

But this does not means that there is no place for ethics in Samkara's philosophy. The
aim of life, according to Samkara, is beyond what is achieved through life. Again, even

Y H
after the realisation of the ultimate end, the liberated person does not leave society or

H G
the world, nor become interested in it. Samkara's life itself is a galring example of this

P N
fact. He was not only a great philosopher but an equally great social reformer. It is only

)
om
O I

l.c
on the transcendental level that Samkara has negated all dualism. On the pragmatic

ai
S
gm
S
level, the dualism of the right and wrong is as much true as all other dualism. Before the

8@
O Y R
achievement of liberation man must have due consideration for the right and wrong,
11
00
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.1
ce
and after liberation is achived such a consideration becomes superfluous because the
.e
ya

H
liberated person, essentially established in the Brahman consciousness, does only that
ar
w
sh

P U
which is always right as it directly follows from the ultimate good, the Brahman. Thus,
ai
y(
ya

K
though the right and wrong, the sympathy, pity, forgiveness and other virtues might be
dh
pa

P
relative and of the lower level for the liberated person, but neither he acts against them
U
ya
ar

because that too is also due to dualism and nor has he to make effort to act according
O
hw
is
rA

to them, since it becomes spontaneous.

O
fo
ed

N
is

As a matter of fact, Samkara has not admitted knowledge and Niskama Karma as
al
on

A
mutually opposed. The action opposed to knowledge is the action due to desire. It is
rs
pe
s

that which leads to ignorance, Avidya and bondage. Samkaras has emphasized the
ti
en
m

importance of Nisakam Karma.By knowledge and detachment the practical efficiency


cu
do

is even more increased because after being relieved from attachment and aversion, the
is
Th

liberated man remains balanced, even in the face of greatest misfortunes. The aspirant
works for self-purification before being liberated and after liberation he works for the
purification of those who are still in bondage. In this work he has no vested interest of
his own, because all his interests have been fulfilled. This work is not guided by any

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other worldly motive as name, fame, etc. This gives him a wonderful power of action. Notes:

Attainment of liberation transforms all his life. By the transformation, the moral values
are even more glorified and spiritualised. This gives a new insipiration, energy, peace
and stability in the practical life. Thus the ultimate end in Vedanta philsophy is undoubtedly
beyond right and wrong but instead of negating them, it rather leads to their ultimate
fulfilment.

Y H
PH G
N

)
om
O I

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
8@
O Y R 11
00
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.1
ce
.e
ya

H
ar
w
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

P
U
ya
ar

O
hw
is
rA

O
fo
ed

N
is
al
on

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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Qualified Monism of Ramanuja Notes:

Compare and contrast Ramanuja's conception of God with Samkara's.


Discuss the relationship between the Individual self and God in the
Visistadvaita school of Vedanta.
What is Ramanuja's conception of the Absolute? Compare it with that of
Samkara.
Explain the relation between Jiva and Isvara in the system of Ramanuja.
Explain the the relation between Brahman and Jiva in Ramanuja's theory.

Iswara is aUlilitarian Concept:

Y
In Samkara's philosophy Iswara is only a utilitarian concept, the question of creation is

H
PH
an academic problem and Iswara has been postulated only in order to solve it.

G
Otherwise, there is neither a creator nor is there any creation. In actual fact, Brahman

)
om
O I
is the sole matarial as well as efficient cause. The world of names and forms is merely

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
a disfigurement of the absolute Brahman. This illusion is due to ignorance and it is the

8@
O R
aim of Vedanta to remove this ignorance. Thus, it is only natural that Iswara be only an

Y 11
00
IL B MA
.1
empirical or utilitarian concept.
ce
.e
ya

H
Iswara and Brahman:
ar
w
sh

P U
According to the philosophy of Samkara, absolute Brahman is the only truth. It is
ai
y(
ya

K
pure, transcendental, free, eternal and absolute. Brahman covered by ignorance is
dh
pa

P
U

Iswara. It is the distorted image of Brahman. It is nothing other than Brahman. Brahman
ya
ar

is impersonal, Iswara is the highest being or person. He is the link between the universe
O
hw
is
rA

and Brahman. He rewards the living beings according to their actions. He is effect of
O
fo
ed

Brahman whereas Brahman is above all actions. Brahman is being wheres Iswara is
N
is
al
on

becoming. The worship of Iswara brings relief from the cycle of life and death whereas
A
rs
pe

the worship of Brahman brings freedom from life itself. Brahman is the object of
s
ti
en

realisation while God or Iswara is teh object of worship. Brahman is the transcendental
m
cu
do

reality whereas Iswara is only the empirical reality. On the transcendental level there is
is
Th

no difference between Brahman and Iswara, because at this level all dualism is resolved.

Creator of Universe:
Iswara is the creator of the universe. Creation in the manifestation of the will power of
Iswara in the spatio-terporal universe. Before creation the universe of names and forms

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exists in seed form At the time of dissolution it settles in or dissolves in Iswara. But as Notes:

the actions and the resultant past tendencies of the Jivas are not destroyed they ahve to
come into the world again, and for this reason there must be creation. Prakrti exists in
Iswara. Creation and dissolution are different states of the beginningless world. Iswara
does not stand in need of any efficient cause of creating the world. He creates the
world by his power of Maya. He also has no purpose in creation because he himself is
complete. The world in his play. Creation in his nature.

Iswara is Perfect:
Iswara is above merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma). He is not disfigured by
imperfections such as attachment, aversion pleasure, suffering, sin etc., which mar His

Y H
perfefction. He is the protector of all and the basis of morality. He is all pervading and

H G
omniscient. He is perfect and without an end. He is eternal, one and pure consciousness.

P N

)
Iswara is to be Abored:

om
O I

l.c
ai
S
Even though, He is all-pervading, Iswara assumes specific forms And in this way He

gm
S
8@
can be worshipped. He helps his worshippers and assitss them in their prayer. He is

O Y R
the perfect person. He also helps in the attainment of liberation. He is the basis of
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

religion.
ya

H
ar
w

Effect of actions and their Results:


sh

P U
ai
y(

By postulating creation as without beginning, Samkara avoids the objection as to who


ya

K
dh
pa

was the first, the Jiva or merit and demerit (dharmadharma)? Without the Jiva there

P
U
ya

can be no award of actions in the form of merit or demerti and without there being the
ar

O
hw
is

result of actions there is no reason why the soul should assume the form of Jiva. Hence,
rA

O
fo

the universe is beginningless. Actions also have no begining. As one sows, so he reaps.
ed

N
is
al

Thus the pain, suffering, vice and other undesirable elements that one sees in the world
on

A
rs

are caused by the results of the asction of Jivas and not by God of Iswara. Hence the
pe
s
ti

moral problem cannot be raised against Iswara and neither can He said to be imperfect
en
m
cu

because He is the Creator. The gross, unconsious and heterogenous world loses these
do
is

qualities when it reassumes its original seed form. Hence, it does not affect the purity
Th

or perfection of Iswara. In its eternal form the universe is entirely differen from Iswara.
But in its fundamental form it is the same. Hence, the question as to how did the
unconscious originate in the conscious Iswara is meaningless. The avious forms that
the world assumes because of ignorance are comparable to the waking dreaming and

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unconsious conditions for human beings. The material nature of the universe and the Notes:

Jivas does not affect Iswara because although Samkara does accept asatkaryavada
or the theory of the reality of the effect before its emergence, he is not an atomist. The
world is only the distorted image of Iswara, hence its nature does not affect Iswara.
Iswara is the one who gives the rewards, he is the one who controls them He is
omniscient. His knowledge is intuitive, non perpetual, without the senses and above
ignorance. He witnesses the world. He gives bodies to the different Jivas according to
their actions and creates substances according to their actions.

Relation of Jiva and Iswara:


According to Samkara, both Iswara and the Jiva have only empirical reality but even

Y H
among them, Iswara is the director and Jiva the directed, Iswara is the benefactor and

H G
Jiva and benefacted. Both are the distortions of Brahman, both are pure consciosness,

P N
both are Brahman from the transcendental viewpoint. In this way, on the transcendental

)
om
O I

l.c
level both have the same nature but on the empirical level there is a great difference

ai
S
gm
S
between the two. Jivas have also been accepted as a part of Iswara although He is

8@
O Y R
said to have actually no parts. The knowledge, power, existence, etc. that the Jivas
11
00
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ce
possess are limited. Iswara is all-pervading, all, knowing, without end, happiness and
.e
ya

H
perfect. The Jivas are influenced by the authority of merit and demerit and are controlled
ar
w
sh

P U
by it, whereas Iswara is above both of them and is their determinant. Jiva makes
ai
y(
ya

K
efforts for attaining liberation and Iswara is his inspiration. The jiva is bound while
dh
pa

P
Iswara is free. The cause of enjoyment of experience (bhog) is worldliness and Iswara
U
ya
ar

is not worldly. But ultimately the entire dualism is on the empirical level. According to
O
hw
is
rA

Ramanuja, this distinction is not generated by ignorance but is perpetual. The relation

O
fo
ed

between Iswara and Jiva is one of substance and attributes, whole and part, controller

N
is
al
on

and controlled. Samkara's philosophy does not statisfy the requirements of religion

A
rs
pe

while in Ramanuja's philosophy there is resolution of mysterious intutiuon and


s
ti
en

philosophical intellectuality.
m
cu
do

Brahman is Iswara According to Ramanuja:


is
Th

According to Samkara, Brahman is the transcendental reality and Iswara is only an


empirical reality. Thus, Samkara postulates as distinction between Brahman and Iswara.
But according to Ramanuja, Brahman and Iswara are one. According to Samkara
Brahman is without qualities, but Ramanuja conceives of this absence of qualities in the

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sense that Brahman does not possess any impure qualities. He is the perfect personality Notes:

'purusottama.' He is possed of perfect and eternal qualities such as truth, knowledge


and happiness. He is eternal and unchancing. There is no difference between the
Brahman who is possessed of qualities and the Brahman who is not.

Nature of Brahman or Iswara:


Brahman is eternal, all-prevading subtle, all-knowing, without end, all-powerful and
possessed of innumerable qualities. He is the basis of the entire universe. He is its
material as well as its efficient cause. He is the Lord (Iswara). He is the highest good.
He rewards all. He directs activity. He is the protector or worshippers. He is of nature
of unending knowledge and happiness. His qualities are eternal, unlimilited, innumerable,

Y H
without designation, incomparable and completely pure. He is the soul in all. He is the

H G
bridgeor link leading to immortality. He is eternal, immoral and unity. He possesses the

P N
knowledge and power to create, sustain and destroy the world, possesses power,

)
om
O I

l.c
excellence, indpendence, action and concentration. He gives knowledge to the ignorant,

ai
S
gm
S
power to the weak, pity to the suffering, forgiveness to the criminal or guilty, energy to

8@
O Y R
the dimwitted, simplicy to the crooked, goodness to the bad, and rewards to the
11
00
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ce
worshippers. His body is glorified by the six qualitiesknowledge, power or stengths,
.e
ya

H
excellence, virility (virya), energy and fire (teja).
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

Five Forms of Iswara:


y(
ya

K
dh

According to Ramanuja, the forms of God are the five kinds(1) para, (2) vyuha, (3)
pa

P
U

vibhava, (4) antaryami, (5) archavatara.


ya
ar

O
hw

1. Para This is also called vasudeva-svarupa. This is above the notion of time. This
is
rA

O
never has any product, and in it there is undisturbed happiness. It is this form
fo
ed

N
is

which is called sadgunyavigraha. The saints in heaven see it with their eyes and
al
on

A
knowledge.
rs
pe
s
ti

2. Vyuha It is the efficient cause of the drama of then universe. It is present in


en
m
cu

'Sankarsana', 'Pradyumna' and 'Aniruddha'. Is is for evincing love towards the


do
is

worshippers and devotees and for protecting the worldly. In this form apparently
Th

there are only two qualities. In Pradyumna there is excellence while in Vyuha and
Aniruddha there are stength and fire. Sankarsana leads to military preparation and
destruction of the world, Pradyumna to religious preaching and Aniruddha to the
creation of the four varnas and other pure classes and the substance of temporal

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creation. Notes:

3. Vibhava It is of two types even though it has no end, primary and secondary.
Mukhya (primary) vibhava is a part of God and conjoined to the body. Devotees
worship this form. This is the manifestation of God. Secondary manifestation, is
the name given the 'svarupavesa' and 'saktyavesa' manifestation This manifestation
of God takes place in order to punish the wicked, to estalish reliigon and to award
the meritorious saints.

4. Antaryami It this form, God enters into the soul of the Jivas and controls all their
tendencies. It is though the medium of this form that God helps the Jivas in all
situations in places like heaven and hell.

Y H
H
5. Archavatara This is the adorable image of God which lives in the idol which

P G
concurs with the interst of the worshipper.

)
om
O I

l.c
Criticism:

ai
S
gm
S
According to Ramanuja, consious and the unconscious are the bodies of God, but the

8@
O Y R
difference between that body of God and its soul is not clear. Actually, if conscious and
11
00
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ce
unconscious is the body of God then He should be susceptible to pains, sufferings,
.e
ya

H
imperfection and defects etc. Ramanuja asserts that God is not influenced by the changes
ar
w
sh

P U
of this world by the sufferings or short-comings of the body in the same manner in
ai
y(
ya

K
which the soul is not affected by the vicissitudes of the body. But in such a state the
dh
pa

P
soul becomes the soul of the universe and not of an individual body, and it cannot
U
ya
ar

therefore be considered to be many. The assertion that the soul of God is unchancing
O
hw
is
rA

and perfect while His body is changing and defective cannot be as logical.

O
fo
ed

N
is

Ramanuja has ought to combine the Brahmanvada of the Upanishads with the theism
al
on

A
of Pancharatra. But if God is pervading the entire universe then how can He be the
rs
pe
s

soul of the universe at the same time that he is the supreme personality residing in
ti
en
m

heaven? Actually, the very task of synthesizing theism with the Vedantic tradition is so
cu
do

difficult that it is inevitable that some difficulties should creep in. Then, Ramanuja has
is
Th

also employed Vaishnava Purana, Pancharatra and Agama etc., in addition to


'prasthanatrayi'. Not all the theories of the Vaishnava view can be synthesized with the
monism of the Upanisads. One of the two must either be distorted or given a secondary
position. One of the two must either be distorted or given a secondary position.

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Ramanuja tried to synthesize the two while maintaining them intact. It need hardly be Notes:

pointed out that any other attempting the same would have met with even greater
failure. Ramanuja in his philosophy tried to fulfil the demands of both religion as well as
philosophy. Because of Samkara's Bhasya being existent he was compelled to refute it
at every step in order to establish or strengthen his own opinion. In actual fact, the only
way of achieving a synthesis between Advaita and Vaisnava views is to accept the
former as transcendental truth and the latter as an empirical truth. This does not prove
or imply the falsity of the empirical truth. It has only to be accepted as secondary and
relative. Sarvajnatma muni says that Ramanuja's philosophy (parinamavada) is only
the elementary stage of Samkara's philosophy (vivartavada) and the two are not mutually

Y
contradictory. If Samkara's view is studied from the view point of a commentator like

H H
Kokiliswar Shastri, then there would be no objection to accepting this fact.

P G
What is the distinction between Samkara's Advaita Vedanta and
N

)
om
O I

l.c
Ramanuja's Visistadvaita Vedanta the nature of Brahman. Explain.

ai
S
gm
S
State and explain the points of disargeement between Ramanuja and

8@
Samkara.
O Y R 11
00
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.1
ce
Explain the the nature of Brahman after Ramanuja. Why is the system
.e
ya

H
called Visistadvaita?
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

According to Samkara, Brahman is both have the universe and also pervading it.
y(
ya

K
dh

From the practical or empirical standpoint Brahman is within the universe but from the
pa

P
U

metaphysical or transcendental viewpoint Brahman is above the universe. This is the


ya
ar

O
hw

real form of Brahman. This is Parabrahman. There can be two standpoints for reflecting
is
rA

O
upon Brahmanthe practical or empritical, and the transcendental or cosmological.
fo
ed

N
is
al

1. Empirical viewpoint From the worldly viewpoint the world is real. From this
on

A
rs

viewpoint, Brahman is possesed of qualities and the root cause of creation is creator,
pe
s
ti

sustainer, destroyer, all-knowledge and allo-powerful. It is in this form that Brahman


en
m
cu

is the Iswara of the worshippers.


do
is
Th

2. Transcendental viewpoint From this viewpoint, Brahman is without qualities


and his characteristics are truth, knowledge and happiness. Brahman is of the
nature of truth and unlimited knowledge. In order to clarify this point, Samkara has
adduced the example of a cowherd who when he enacts the part of a king on

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stage is the victor and the administrator but in actual fact he is neither a king nor a Notes:

victor.

In explaining Brahman as He Himself is, and not in relation to the world, Samkara
makes frequent use of the example of magician (mayavi). Only those individuals regard
the magician as inexplicable or wonderful, who are unable to fathom his magic and
become ensnared in it. But those who are not astonished by the magician's tricks but
are able to understand them, are not prone to consider him as anything out of the
ordinary. In the same manner those who ae deceived by the world are wont to consider
it as real and to look upon Brahman as the creator of it. But for those who have solved
the mystery of the universe, it is only an illussion and for them there is neither any actual

Y
creation nor any creator.
H
H G
But how can synthesis between these who forms of Brahman the worldy and the one

P N

)
om
which is beyond the world be established? If Brahman is withing the confines of this

O I

l.c
ai
S
world and pervades it, then how can He avoid the impefections that are inherent in it?

gm
S
8@
According to Samkara, just as the actors are not in reality influenced by the parts they

O Y R
depict on the stage and their personal life remains independent of their stage roles, in
11
00
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.1
ce
.e

the same manner, Brahman is not influenced by pleasure, pain and other flux of the
ya

H
ar

world.
w
sh

P U
ai
y(

Brahman with and without Quantities:


ya

K
dh
pa

In this way, the universe and the qualities to be found in it when viewed from the

P
U
ya

practical viewpoint are real and its creator is also true. Iswara or Branman possessed
ar

O
hw
is

of qualities is the object of worship of decotees. In his real form as beyond the universe
rA

O
fo

Brahman is without qualities and is indeterminable. Brahman is not untruth and


ed

N
is
al

unconscious. His real nature cannot be determined. He is beyond all distinctions whether
on

A
rs

of class or of kind.
pe
s
ti
en

Implication of Negation:
m
cu
do

To employ adjectives to describe Brahman or to say anything positively about Him is


is
Th

to limit him. All that can be said of Brahman is that he is not this, not that, viz., negative.
There are not two Brahman, one with quaslities and the other without qualities, There
is only one Brahman. Just as the stage actor of an acting company does not become a
different man on coming out of the theater, 'in the same way, while appearing possessed

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of qualities to one who perceives Him from the empirical standpoint, Brahman at the Notes:

transcendental level is absolutely devoid of qualities.

Importance of Iswara:
Samkara does not deny the importance of Iswara even though he regards him as
illusory from the transcendental viewpoint, Samkara has spoken of three levels. At the
lowest level the universe appears to be real true. At the second level, the universe and
Iswara both appear to be real and true. At the highest level, Brahman is the only
realitu. But the knowledge of a absolute Brahman possessed of qualities acts as a
stepping stone to the ultimate relization of the absolute Brahman.

Ramanaju's Brahman Possesses Quality:

Y H
According to Ramanunja, Brahman is the treasure house of qualities, is possessed of

H G
qualities and particulars. When the Upanisads say that Brahman is without qualities

P N

)
om
they do not mean that there is absence of form or qualities, but rather that the qualities

O I

l.c
ai
S
characteristic of being whose power is limited are not to be found in Brahman. The

gm
S
8@
Vedanta philosophers accept three kings of dintinction:

O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
.1
1. Sajatiya distinction of classes such as between human beings and elephants,
ce
.e
ya

H
2. Vijatiya distinction such as between one individual and another,
ar
w
sh

P U
ai

3. Svagat distinction such as between the hands and feet of the same person.
y(
ya

K
dh
pa

According to Ramanuja, of these three kinds of distinctions those that do not apply to

P
U
ya

Brahman are the first and second distinctions because there is no other substance
ar

O
hw
is

which belongs to the same class or different class compared to Brahman. But Brahman
rA

O
fo

is characterised by the third kind of distinction. Even though Brahman is the sole existent,
ed

N
is
al

no substance exists independently of or separated from Brahman. But in Brahman


on

A
rs

there are elements of Jiva and matter. Both these elements are real. Ramanuja's view
pe
s
ti

its 'Visistadvaita'. According to him, Brahman is one in spite living of being differentiated
en
m
cu

from the conscious and unconscious or living and material elements.


do
is
Th

Brahman: Cause and Effect:


According to Ramanuja, Brahman or Iswara is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of
the world. In the states of dissociation the physical world is destroyed and both the
conscious and the material elements exist in seed form inherent in Brahman, This has

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been called Brahman as the cause. After reaction, Brahman is manifested in the form Notes:

of bodied jivas. This is said to be Brahman as the effect.

Implication of Upanishadic Negation:


The negation of Brahman in the Upanisads has been interpretedly Ramanuja in a manner
differing from the interpretation that Samkara placed upon it. According to Ramanuja,
where the Upanisads have denied the existence of physical objects and have described
Brahman an unknowable, in effect negating Brahman thereby, they have spoken of
Brahman as the cause, and not denied His possession of qualities as interpreted by
Samkara.

Ramanuja's Iswara:

Y H
Ramanuja's Iswara is possessed of qualities. He both inheres in the universe as well as

H G
transcend it. He has a specific personality which consists of desires and purpose. He is

P N

)
om
the object of worship and prayer. He grants liberation to the devotees and is the sea of

O I

l.c
ai
S
benevolence. Ramanuja's view concerning God resembles Western Theism.

gm
S
8@
Iswara (Ramanuja) Unqualified Brahman (Samkara)

O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
(1) Iswara himself is the Brahman (1) Brahman is without qualities. He is non-
.1
ce
.e

possessed of qualities. dual, pure consciousness, beyond space


ya

H
ar
w

He is the supreme person and time.


sh

P U
ai
y(

(2) Iswara, Jiva and universe all have (2) Brahman is the only ontological reality.
ya

K
dh

traanscendental reality. Other objects are only empirically real.


pa

P
U
ya

None of them is unreal.


ar

O
hw

(3) Iswara has self-distinctions. He is (3) Brahman is beyond distinctions.


is
rA

O
fo

identity-in-differences. Truth, consci- Brahman, rising above the distinction of


ed

N
is

ousness and happiness are among. His knower, knowledge and known, is Himself
al
on

A
rs

qualities and attributes. perfect knowledge and pure conscious-


pe
s
ti

ness which is true and of the nature of


en
m
cu

happiness.
do
is

(4) Brahman and Iswana are not different. (4) Iswara is Brahman coupled with
Th

Iswara is Brahman. ignorance. Iswara is conditioned


Brahman. Iswara does not have
ontological reality.
(5) Iswara in the form of Brahman is the (5) The creator of the universe is Iswara.

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material and efficient cause of the It is He who is also its protector and Notes:

universe. destroyer as well a moral governor.


Brahman is above all these functions.
(6) Iswara is the object of worship, he (6) Liberation can be attained by achieving
liberates Jivas out of benevolence when knowledge of Brahman.
they worship Him.
(7) Even after having attained liberation (7) Having achieved salvation the jiva
jiva cannot become Iswara. attains his mature of Brahman.

(8) Ramanuja's view is Visistaavaita in (8) Samkara's view is monistic in which

Y
which Iswara is sullied with qualities. Brahman has been accepted as the only

H H reality.
Criticism:
P G
N

)
om
O I
According to Ramanuja, conscious (chid) and material (achid) are real parts of

l.c
ai
S
gm
S
Brahman. In that case, Brahman should be affected by the distortions of the physical

8@
O Y R
world. In trying to solve this dilemma Ramanuja has had recourse to many assumptions.
11
00
IL B MA
.1
First of all, by means of the example of the body and the soul he tries to communicate
ce
.e
ya

that just as the soul is immune to the flux taking place in the body (because it is distinct

H
ar
w

from the body), in the same way Brahman is not susceptible to the variations of the
sh

P U
ai
y(

universe because he is distinct from it. Ramanuja his further adduced the example of
ya

K
dh
pa

king and in subjects in solving the same problem. The subjects suffer pain or enjoy

P
U
ya

pleasure as they carry out or neglect the orders of the king. Similarly, Brahman remains
ar

O
hw
is

unaffected by the modification in the physical or mental world, because Brahman is


rA

O
fo

unchangeable. Ramanuja conceives of Brahman as a particular and the universe as his


ed

N
is
al

quality (visesana).
on

A
rs
pe

None of these three analogies is successful in adequately conveying the relation between
s
ti
en

the jiva and Iswara because the relation of the soul to the body or of the king ot his
m
cu
do

subjects is not the relation that holds between the whole and the part. Ramanuja is
is
Th

himself aware of these difficulties. At one stage he has gone so far as to accept that the
real nature of Brahman is indeterminate and He is not influenced or distorted by the
modifications of the univese. If this statement is accepted as authoritative then the
variable physical element will no longer be the nature or internal characteristic of Brahman

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but will instead become Brahman or the absolute characteristic. But such a course Notes:

would weaken Ramanuja's central thesis that consious and the uncounscious elements
are real or actual parts of Brahman.

What is the status of the physical world in the philosophy of Samkara and
Ramanuja.
Compare and contrast the views of Samkara and Ramanuja regarding the
relation of Brahman and the world.
State and examine Ramanuja's refutation of Samkara's theory of
nescience.

Unconscious (Achid) Element:

Y H
Ramanuja has given the name achid to prakrti or material substance. The unconscious

H G
element is material and devoid of deformation and distortion. There are three distinctions

P N

)
in it the following:

om
O I

l.c
ai
S
1. Sudha sattva In this, rajas and tamas do not exist. It is eternal and creates

gm
S
8@
knowledge and happiness. Its qualities are sound, touch, etc.

O Y R 11
00
IL B MA
.1
2. Misra (mixe ) sattva In this all the three gunas exist. In is this which is called
ce
.e
ya

H
prakrti, ignorance and maya. The five objects of perception, five organs, five physical
ar
w
sh

P U
elements, five pranas, prakrti, mahat, ego and mind are among its transformed
ai
y(
ya

products.
K
dh
pa

P
U

3. Sattva sunya Time has been said to be the unconscious element devoid of sattva.
ya
ar

O
hw

There is no guna in it. Eternity, efficiency and creation and dissolution are
is
rA

O
comprehended by this 'time.' It is the cause of the products of prakrti and natural
fo
ed

N
objects.
is
al
on

A
rs

Pure and mixed sattva are the constituents of the objects of experience of jiva and
pe
s
ti

Iswara, places of experience and the substance of experience.


en
m
cu

Evolution of Creation:
do
is
Th

All physical objects arise out of the unconscious and material elements. Ramanuja
considers the Upanishadic description of the evolution of creation to be true in every
detail. The all-powerful Iswara creates the universe of diverse objects out of Himself
of His independent volition. Both conscious and unconscious elements are present in

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Brahman. Agreeing with Samkhya philosophy Ramanuja accepts prakrti as an Notes:

indestructible and eternal existence. But in contradiction of Samkhya, he believes prakrti


to be a part of God and to be guided or motivated by Him. In the state of dissolution
prakrti exists in a subtle unmanifested form. Iswara creates the universe out of this
prakrti according to the past actions of the jivas. Prakrti is divided into three elements
by the will of Iswara -fire, water and earth. All gross objects emerge upon the gradual
mixture of the three elements. These elements are the invariable constituents of all the
objects in the world. This process of gradual mixing is called 'nivrta-karana.'

World is Real:
According to Ramanuja creation is as much real as Brahman. Sentences which propound

Y H
the Upanishadic negation of multiplicity and establish unity mean no more than that

H G
objects have no place independently of Brahman. They are real in the form of being

P N
dependent upon Brahman. They are real in the form of being dependent upon Brahman.

)
om
O I

l.c
Prakrti is Brahman's power, Brahman is its material as well as efficient cause The

ai
S
gm
S
effect is not the distortion or the illusion of its cause but its product. All evidence tends

8@
O Y R 00
to establish the reality of the universe. The universe is real although its material or gross
11

IL B MA
.1
ce
objects are not eternal. The effect is inherent in its cause. How can the effect be unreal
.e
ya

H
or illusory if the cause in true. Conscious and unconscious are the attributed of Brahman.
ar
w
sh

P U
Between them and Brahman, a relation of part and whole exists. They are in Brahman,
ai
y(
ya

K
Between them and Brahman there is 'aprthaksiddhi' or inseparability. Indivisible Brahman
dh
pa

P
can assume the form of the diversified universe by His power, Brahma is creator, to
U
ya
ar

Visnu falls the duty of sustaining the world while Rudra is its destroyer. All these are the
O
hw
is
rA

various aspects of Brahman In His form of the all-pervading, Iswara is the creator,

O
fo
ed

sustainer as well as destroyer. All these activities are only His play. His mere desire is

N
is
al
on

sufficient to transform his energy into the universe. According to Samkara, Brahman is

A
rs
pe

real while the universe is unreal of false, and there is no difference between the two.
s
ti
en

According to Ramanuja there cannot be correspondence between true and false


m
cu
do

elements. If it were so, then Brahman is false. Thus Ramanuja refutes Samkara's view.
is
Th

Brahman Parinama Vada:


According to Ramanuja it is Brahman who creates, destroys and sustains the universe.
In a state of dissolution, both conscious and unconscious elements exist within Brahman
in seed from. The consciousand the unconscious are always existing although their

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objects and forms are susceptible to continuous change In the absence of objects in Notes:

the condition iof dissolution. Brahman exists and is possessed of pure consciousness
and unmanifest unconsciousness. This is called 'karana Brahman' or Brahman as the
cause. It is contended by Ramanuja that wherever in the Upanisads objects have been
denied real existence and the negatives have been employed in describing Brahman it
is thius Brahman, as the cause, that is implying. When creation takes place Brahman is
manifested in the form of bodied jivas and physical objects, in this condition being
known as 'karya Brahman' or Brahman as the effect is existent before it is manifested
(Satkaryabada), but the differs in accpeting Brahman as the original cause (Brahman
parinamavada) and not prakrti, as accepted by Samkhya in their doctrine of prakrti

Y
parinamavada.

H H
The World is the Sport of Iswara:

P G
The creation of the universe is no more than a matter of sport of Iswara. According to

)
om
O I

l.c
Ramanuja, Iswara does not indulge in the creation of the world because of some

ai
S
gm
S
external necessity because he is perfect. All this desires are satisfied. He is unprejudiced

8@
O Y R
and creates the objects of the world according to the action of the jivas He rewards
11
00
IL B MA
.1
them with pleasure or pain according to their actions.
ce
.e
ya

H
Meaning of Maya:
ar
w
sh

P U
Iswara has been described as a magician (mayavi) in the Upanisads. Ramanuja interprets
ai
y(
ya

K
it thus: the power of Iswara for creating the universe is as astonishing as the power of
dh
pa

P
the magician. Maya means the power of Iswara which creates unusual objects.
U
ya
ar

O
hw

In this way Ramanuja's description of Maya differes from the explanation put forward
is
rA

O
by Samkara.
fo
ed

N
is

Prakrti and Maya


al
on

A
rs
pe

Prakrti (Ramanuja) Maya (Samkara)


s
ti
en

(1) Prakrti is real. It is not unreal and (1) Maya is indeterminate. It is neither real
m
cu

indeterminate. of unreal.
do
is
Th

(2) The knowledge of prakrti as the (2) Knowledge of Maya as the universe
universe is true No subject is unreal. is illusory, not real.
The universe is real.
(3) The sentence ostensibly denying the (3) According to this sentence of the
reality of the world means only that there Upanisad multiplicity is unreal.
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is one Brahman at the root of all multiplicity Notes:

not that the world does not exist.


(4) Prakrti is the unconscious element (4) Maya is the power of Iswara. It does
present in Iswara. It exists in subtle not exist in Iswara in element form. It is
seed form and it is with this that Iswara merely His desire of wish.
cretes the universe It is the unconscious
element.
(5) The unconscious element existing in (5) This power of creation appears to
God is susceptible to distortion (hence is prakrti. of the world only to those persons
Iswara also) and this is real. who see it as the world and not its funda-

Y
mental Brahman nature.

H H
(6) Prakrti itself appears in the form of its (6) The universe itself is not Maya. Maya

P G
past remaining elements and the entire is not trans-formed or changed, but it isd

)
om
O I
universe is pervaded by it. only he magical power of Iswara which

l.c
ai
S
gm
S due to ignorance reflects Brahman in the

8@
O Y R form of the universe.
11
00
IL B MA
.1
(7) According to Parinamavada, Prakrti (7) According to vivartavada. Maya is the
ce
.e
ya

changes into the world. object of intuition The universe is the

H
ar
w

illusion of Brahman.
sh

P U
ai
y(
ya

K
Explain fully why Ramanuja's system of thought is known as Modified
dh
pa

P
Non-Dualism (Visistadvaita).
U
ya
ar

O
hw

Ramanuja's philosophy is described as quaslified Monism. It is monistic because in it


is
rA

O
the universe and Jiva is postulated to be a part of the supreme Brahman and the
fo
ed

N
is

supreme reality has been accepted as only one. But it is a unique kind of monism
al
on

A
because in its supreme reality distinctions of Brahman, soul and the world are also
rs
pe
s

accepted. In Ramanuga's philosophy, a particular kind of relation between soul and


ti
en
m

Iswara, and between the world and Iswara is believed to exist.


cu
do
is

Jiva and Iswara:


Th

The relation between Jiva and Iswara is that of the part to the whole. Just as the part
cannot be separated from the whole or the perfect, or just as the hand or the foot or
other part of the body has no existence apart from body, similarly the relation between
the Jiva and Iswara is one of inseparability. But Ramanuja has not accepted identity

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between the soul and Brahman, as is accepted by Samkara, because the part can Notes:

never be the whole. According to Ramanuja, even in the highest state of the soul, viz.,
liberation, the difference between it and Brahman continues to exist. The Jiva can live
in the domain of Brahman, can live in proximity can live near Him, can attain His form
but it can never be Iswara itself. The relation between Iswara and he Jiva is one of
substance and quality, whole and part, controller and the controlled. In this way in
Ramanuja's philosophy, the relation between the Jiva and Iswara can be explained by
calling it qualified monism.

Iswara and the Universe:


Similarly, the relation between Iswara and the universe can also be said to be a qualified

Y H
monism. Iswara is pervading every thing. The universe is made of one part of Iswara.

H G
Conscious and unconscious, Jiva and the universe are the self-distinctions of Iswara

P N
and hence both are related by non-dualism. But then Iswara is also beyond conscious

)
om
O I

l.c
and unconscious. He is above Jiva and universe and is the supreme person. Ramanuja's

ai
S
gm
S
is not a Pantheist.

8@
O Y R
In this way, in Ramanuja's philosophy, the relation between soul or Jiva and Iswara
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

and that between universe and Iswara, as well as the state of liberation or Moksa can
ya

H
ar

be explained by calling it qualified monism. He has interpreted statements of the


w
sh

P U
ai

Upanisads in this same relation. For this reason, Ramanuja's philosophy is called
y(
ya

K
dh

qualified monism.
pa

P
U
ya

Distinguish carefully between the views of the two systems of Vedanta


ar

O
hw
is

about the nature of Ultimate Reality? Which do you prefer? Justify your
rA

O
fo

preference.
ed

N
is

What are the main differences between the viewpoints of Samkara and
al
on

A
rs

Ramanuja regarding the nature of reality?


pe
s
ti

What is bondage according to Ramanuja? Explain the means suggested


en
m
cu

by him to get rid of bondage.


do
is

Write short note onRamanuja's conception of Moksha.


Th

Monism (advaita) and qualified monism (visistadvaita) are two distinct schools of thought
in Vedanta philosophy. The proponents of the two were Samkaracharya and Ramanuja.
The most authoritative text of monism is 'Sariraraka Bhasya' while that of qualified
monism is 'Sri Bhasya'. As is evident from the difference between the two schools,
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they entertain, differing views regarding the ultimate reality. According to monism, the Notes:

ultimate existent in non-dual and one. According to qualified monism, on the other
hand, the ultimate reality is of course non-dual there is scope for quality within this non
duality. It is for this reason that this view is called qualified monism.

Opinion Concerning Brahman:


Roughly speaking, the ultimate reality is studied in there forms Self, World, and
God. According to the view held by the monistic school, Brahman is not possessed of
any qualities or of any distinctions. According to the qualified school of monism, Brahman
possesses both qualities and distinctions. In the monism opinion, Brahman is belived to
be above God, as according to Samkara, there is difference between to be above

Y H
God, as according to Samkara, there is difference between Iswara and Brahman.

H G
Brahmna is without qualities, is the only reality, and thus, in the end even Iswara is

P N
unreal. In the quaslified monism it is held that Brahman does possess qualities and

)
om
O I

l.c
hence no distinction is made between Brahman and Iswara. Iswara is Brahman, or in

ai
S
gm
S
other words it is Brahman Himself who, in the form of Iswara, creates the world.

8@
O Y R
Views Concerning Self:
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
.e

In the monistic school of thought, there is no distinction between Self and Brahman.
ya

H
ar

Samkara has interpreted different authoritative sentences from the Upanisads in the
w
sh

P U
ai

sense that they deny all duality between Self and Brahman. In this way, Self is nothing
y(
ya

K
dh

other that Brahman. Ignorance, according to Samkara, consists in nothing other than
pa

P
U

in considering the Self to be an entity distint from Brahman. And it is the aim of Vedanta
ya
ar

O
hw

to remove this ignorance. On the other hand, Ramanuja has acepted non-duality
is
rA

O
between Self and Brahman but this non-duality is of a qualified kind. In this, the Self is
fo
ed

N
is

a partof Brahman but is itself notBrahman because the part can never be the whole.
al
on

A
According to Ramanuja, the sentences from Upanisads interpreted by Samkara as
rs
pe
s

negating the duality between Self and Brahman imply not an identity between Self and
ti
en
m

Brahman but the unbreakable relation between them, In fundamental forms Self and
cu
do

Brahman are alike just as the part and the whole are one but by reason of this, part and
is
Th

whole cannot be said to the identical.

Views on Liberation:
Difference in opinion regarding the relation between the Self and Brahman leads to
differing opinions on the subject of liberation. It is conceived differently by the monistic

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school. According to Samkara, the monist, Self is eternally free because it is Brahman. Notes:

To think of it as differing form Brahman is the display of ignorance. Liberation or


moksa consists of getting rid of this ignorance, or, in other words, realizing the identity
of Self and Brahman. Brahman is happiness, hence liberation is a state of happiness.
On the other hand, in Ramanuja's quaslified monism, the identity between Self and
Brahman is not postulated. Hence, Ramanuja accepts four kind of liberationsayuja
or becoming attached with Iswara, samipya or existing in the vicinity of Iswara, sannidhya
or existing in the proximity of Iswara and the one that should have been mentioned first
instead of last, salokya or living in the valley of Iswara. In one of these states does the
Self become Iswara or Brahman.

Y H
Opinions Regarding the World:

H G
Similarly, the opinions of monistic and the qualified monistic schools concerning the

P N
world differ. According to Samakra the world is Maya and false or unreal, it has

)
om
O I

l.c
nothing to do with Brahman. According to Ramanuja the world is the sport of Iswara

ai
S
gm
S
and is constituted of its part. Both the conscious and the unconscious elements are

8@
O Y R
self-distinctions of Brahman. In this way, the world is not unreal. It is real because
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
nothing created by Iswara is unreal.
.e
ya

H
ar

It depends upon one's own choice as to which one of the two is preferred or found
w
sh

P U
ai

more concurrent with one's own viewpoint. One can however make a generalisation
y(
ya

K
dh

that the logically minded person will find the monistic viewpoint more agreeable whereas
pa

P
U

the individual in whose mental make-up it emotion which is purpoderant will find the
ya
ar

O
hw

view of qualified monism more acceptable. This tendency is due to the fact that while
is
rA

O
the monistic school satisfies the intellect and mind of student, the view presented by the
fo
ed

N
is

qualified monistic school will appeal more to the emotions and feeling. From the
al
on

A
philosophic and purely logical standpoint the more adequate or proper view is that of
rs
pe
s

Samkara although. in being logical, it has not paid the least regard to feelings. On the
ti
en
m

other hand, Ramanuja's view satisfies the demands of religional although from the
cu
do

point of view of logic it is open to many logical objections and is even probably logically
is
Th

encompatible. The demand of religions is that the devotee should always enjoy the
happiness of worship. The worshipper himself never desires to become God, he wants
to live near God, wants to exist in his vicinity, wants to live the land of God. In this is his
salvation. The view of qualified monism concerning liberation satisfies desire of the

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devotee. Similarly, Ramanuja's conception of self and the Brahman is superior to Notes:

Samkara's view from the religious viewpoint If even Iswara is false and unreal, then
religion is reduced to mere wishfulfilment. It is not possible to worship that which is
devoid of qualities. the dualism between the devotee and Iswara is necessary for the
purpose of love. Pringle Pattison, a Western scholar, has written correctly, "It requires
two to love and to be loved, two to worship and to be worshipped." It is for this
reason, that the religious individual tends to look upon the world as an act of God. On
the other hand, there are many difficulties in regarding the world as the result of divine
action. In Ramanuja's opinion, there is no place for mystic experience in which the
devotee experiences as identity with the object of devotion. This satisfaction can be

Y
derived from Samkara's philosophy.

H H
G
In this way, it can roughly be said that in considerations of ultimate reality Samakra's

P N
philosophy offers satisfaction to the demands of logic and philosophy while the view

)
om
O I

l.c
propounded by Ramanuja affords satisfaction to demands of religion, Samkara's view

ai
S
gm
S
of monism is not likely to satisfy the religious and emotional individual. On the other

8@
O Y R
hand, Ramanuja's concept of qualified monism is not likely to satisfy the logical minded
11
00
IL B MA
.1
ce
men. But there are very few individuals who can be classed as purely rational and
.e
ya

H
intellectual or purely emotional. Most individuals possess both the emotional and the
ar
w
sh

P U
rational strains in them, and this is as it should be because otherwise the man will
ai
y(
ya

K
become one sided. Philosophy and logic cannot replace religion and neither can religion
dh
pa

P
to this for philosophy or logic. Human beings need both of them, which are, in fact,
U
ya
ar

complementary. Thus we like not one of the order of monism of qualified monism but
O
hw
is
rA

rather both of them, because if even one of the two, the heart and the intellect, remains

O
fo
ed

unsatisfied, the individual will be dissatisfied and his developmnent will be one sided

N
is
al
on

and incomplete.

A
rs
pe
s
ti
en
m
cu
do
is
Th

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