An Analysis of Love and Virtue in Platos Symposium

Menos paradox, as outlined in 80d of the Meno, raises the question of how one who is
truly ignorant could go about seeking knowledge of what he/she does not know: for not
only is one who is in this state unable to define the object of their search, but also (due to
their ignorance) incapable of recognizing the answer when they find it. As many
commentators have argued1, Menos posing of this question indicates his view on the nature
of knowledge; that knowledge is not a unified whole, but rather discrete and disconnected,
and hence one is incapable of discovering itnot just additional information about
something specific, but of even of the general ideas, concepts and things that one is ignorant
of. Socrates response the Menos paradox is to bring forth his theory of recollection. During
the course of our past lives, our soul has learned everything, and learning is the process of
recollecting what the soul has forgotten. Hence knowledge is not a set of disconnected ideas,
but rather a unified continuum. Our ignorance consists of gaps on that continuum2. Hence
our state of ignorance is not one of total ignorance, but rather is characterized by its relation
to what we do know. Therefore, the discussion in the Meno following Menos paradox can be
understood as one about parts and wholes. More precisely, since all nature is akin, and the
soul has learned all things (81c-d), one can move from ignorance to knowledge by
examining the parts of the whole that he/she does know, and through the relationship of
those parts to the gaps in ones knowledge, recollect those parts that one is ignorant of. This
method of knowing/learning does require one to adopt the idea of a unified and continuous
whole rather than viewing knowledge as consisting of disconnected entities; the latter being
the unstated assumption that underlies Menos paradox.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the speeches on love in Platos Symposium as
parts of a certain whole. The whole in question is Diotimas account of love that is
described by Socrates in his speech. The other speechesboth those that precede Socrates
(i.e. that of Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon) and the speech
that follows Socrates (i.e. Alcibiades speech)are the parts. We will show that each of
these parts make us aware of all of the different ingredients that are involved in giving a
full account of love. Along the way we will synthesize Socrates account of virtue in the
Symposium with his account in the Meno. In particular, we will defend the following claims:

(1) Either both knowledge and an appreciation for beauty, or divine dispensation are
sufficient conditions for the birth of virtue. [Section II]
(2) Phaedrus speech serves as an introduction to how love leads to virtuous
actiona central theme that runs through Diotimas entire account of love.
[Section III]
(3) Pausanias speech presents the idea that there are higher and lower forms of love,
and how laws and customs may facilitate the expression of one form over
another. This anticipates the different rungs in Diotimas ladder of love and
beauty. [Section IV]
(4) Eryximachus speech is a scientific explanation of love. Its presence in the
dialogue serves to emphasize how such account is at its heart completely
vacuousit fails to capture the essence of the experience of love. [Section V]

1 See Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, 3E, p. 78
2 Cf. ibid., p. 78-79
 (5) Aristophanes speech captures the experience of being in loveits power and
irrationality, as well as the sense of incompleteness and desire that we feel when
separated from our loved one. The notion of desire turns out to be a crucial
component of Diotimas theory of love. [Section VI]
(6) Agathons speech demonstrates how beautiful prose can conceal a complete lack
of knowledge. If truth is to be given primacy in an account, then a careful
examination of the content of that account, regardless of how captivating its
presentation is essential. [Section VII]
(7) Alcibiades speech serves to provide us with an explicit example (i.e. Socrates) of
how ones character is affected by pursuing a lifestyle of serious philosophical
examination, including contemplating the form of Beauty. [Section VIII]

Before we develop each of the claims listed above, we will first provide an overview of
Diotimas theory of love, as recounted by Socrates in his speech. This overview, given below
in Section I, will enable us to see more clearly how the other speeches in the dialogue
connect to her account.

I. Socrates Speech: Diotima on Love

Socrates describes Diotimas theory of love by recalling his conversation with her when he
was a young boy. According to Diotima, love is a desire for something which one does not
possess, for one cannot desire what one already has. Since what one loves is invariably
beautiful (at least in their own eyes), it follows that the lover does not fully possess beauty, at
least in the form possessed by the object of their desire. Further, since all that is good is
necessarily beautiful, the lover does not fully possess the good (at least in the form possessed
by what he loves).3

Diotima points out that the love and desire for happiness is one that we all share.
Happiness is obtained through possession of the good. Therefore people desire what is good
for them. Hence the object of ones love is what is good for him. Since the lover would
undoubtedly wish to possess what is good for him forever, love is not just the desire for the
good, but also the desire for immortality. For permanent possession necessarily requires
permanence, and permanence--in the sense of being everlastingis inextricably linked with
immortality. Thus, to love is to desire immortality as well.

Now, in the human body new cells are constantly replacing old cells, and in the
human mind new knowledge and opinion are constantly revising or replacing old knowledge
and opinion. Diotima notes that [t]his is the way all fleeting, mortal things are preserved
and maintained (208a). Thus mortals who wish to achieve immortality must find a way of
forever reproducing [themselves] generation after generation (206e). Indeed, according to
Diotima, all human beings are pregnant or fertile in body and soul and therefore, upon
reaching a certain age, desire to give birth (206c). Since the creation resulting from giving
birth is a continuation of ones self into the future, there is something godlike in both the
act of conception and in giving birth (206c). The divine nature of the act of giving birth (in
body or soul) makes this act harmonious with beauty and incompatible with ugliness. So the

3 Diotima then goes on to describe the nature of the spirit Love, which we will not elaborate on here.
act of giving birth, whether in body or in soul, can only occur in the presence of beauty. And
a mortals path toward immortality lies in such acts of giving birth.

When a mans vitality is primarily physical, he will eventually become pregnant in

body i.e. he will seek to achieve immortality by having children, in the hopes that through
them and their descendants he can secure undying repute and happiness as well as glory
in [his] name (208e). However, if his power is primarily mental, he will become pregnant in
soul. Pregnancy of this form leads one to seek immortality through the birth and
perpetuation of wisdom and virtue, namely: the kind of wisdom that leads to proper
managing of cities and households: good judgment and a sense of right (209a). So the man
who is pregnant in soul will want to give birth to the virtues of prudence and justice, as a
way of securing his immortality. This raises several questions: in what form are wisdom and
virtue born? Are they expressed through physical deeds such as justly governing a city, or
through accomplishments such as those which the poets have begotten (209a)? And even
more fundamentally, are wisdom and virtue of such a nature that anyone who desires them
can acquire them, or do they only come to be only in those with the correct temperament
and makes them potent with these virtues in [their] soul (209b)? Diotima turns to
addressing (some of) these questions next.

When a young man who is pregnant of soul seeks to express his desire for
immortality i.e. when he yearns to be a (psychic) father and produce children, he must seek
the company of a beautiful younger companion. Recall that the act of conception is divine in
nature and thus cannot take place in the presence of ugliness. However, the attraction and
resulting affection felt for a younger companion would lead one to share all that he knows
with his partner. Hence he will express to his beloved all the wise and virtuous thoughts that
he is filled with. In this way he will cultivate virtue in the beloved and educate him/her.4
When the beloved is beautiful in soul, this process will be even more fruitful. And in this
way the lover is immortalized, since the best part of himhis wisdom and virtueis
instilled in another; one who will presumably repeat the process someday with a beloved of
his own. But sometimes the wisdom and virtue of the lover is not expressed by him in
conversations, but through creative works such as poems, epics, legal writings, etc. Diotima
invokes the examples of Homer, Hesiod, Lykourgos, and Solon (209d-e) to show how these
psychic children (the plays, poems, constitutions, etc.) bring their parents immortality in a
way that biological children simply cannot.

Diotima believes that love is the companion of ones desire for immortality via the
creation of a good. And those who are pregnant in soul can follow a specific path in life to
best realize this desire. And since human creations with the potential for immortality are
conceived in the presence of beauty5, Diotima describes this way of life as one of ascending
a ladder of beauty, each rung of which facilitates the conditions for the creation of psychic
children. The higher the rung at which these children are conceived, the greater their
potential for immortalizing their father.

4 This might lead us to believe that virtue can be cultivated in anyone, provided they can find a lover who
regards them as attractive (in body or soul). But this is not the message of the dialogue, as we will see from
Alcibiades speech.
5 Recall that conception of the soul and its act of giving birth are divine in nature (206c-d).
 The first rung of this ladder represents the stage where one falls in love with the
physical beauty of a single individual. And for a lover pregnant in soul, the mere sight of
such a boy should fill him with ideas and eloquence on the subject of virtue, on what a good
man is like and how one may become so, and soon he will begin to teach the youngster all he
knows (209c). In this way, the lover plants the seeds of his immortality through the
cultivation of virtue in a single individual.

The second rung of the ladder is the stage where the lover comes to appreciate
physical beauty generally, and falls in love with all physical beauty. An individual at this stage
is not driven by a love for the physical beauty of a single individual; rather he is inspired by
all beautiful bodies. Therefore, the lovers obsessive attraction to any single boy should
begin to diminish and will soon seem trivial (210b). While Diotima is not explicit as to how
the desire for immortality is expressed in deed at this particular stage, it is reasonable to
conclude that, as in the first stage, the expression takes the form of cultivating virtue in all
the beautiful young people that the lover interacts with, who grant him audience.

The third rung of the ladder of love is the stage where the lover falls for beautiful
souls6 (210b-c). Here, the physical appearance of his beloved is of no concern to the lover;
rather what captures his attention and affection is the presence of a beautiful mind (210c).
The presence of such mental beauty would suffice to kindle his feelings of love [and]
incline him to cherish the boy and give birth in his company to the sort of rich conversation
which improves a young man (210c). We see at this stage that by moving past the physical,
and instead cultivating virtue in the soul of those with the right mental attitude and
inquisitiveness, the lover has expanded the base of people through whom he may realize his
quest for immortality; for while physical beauty may partake in a few, the desire for
knowledge and education lies in many young people.

The fourth rung of the ladder represents a more dramatic shiftthe lover moves out
of the realm of the corporeal to an appreciation of the beauty of many different laws and
customs (210c)7. He will come to see the beauty of all these different institutions [as] one
and the same (210c). He also comprehends the complete unimportance of physical beauty
(210c). Diotima provides numerous examples of individuals who, through their spiritual
creations in the areas of law and custom, have achieved immortality (209d). This
immortality is manifest in the endless glory and perpetual repute brought to them by their
works. There is Solon, the Athenian politician who helped write the laws for the city in the
early 6th century; also there is Lykourgos, the traditional founder of the Spartan
constitution (p. 61, footnote 1)8. Diotima points out that men such as these are honored to
this day and some are even worshipped in sanctuaries because of their immortal progeny

6 There is some ambiguity on precisely what the third rung of the ladder is. In 211c, we have Diotima stating
that if [you] [t]ake another step up [from the second rung] you will reach the beauty of law and custom.
But Diotima also says that once the initiate [becomes] a lover of all beautiful bodies without distinction, the
lover must begin to transfer his love of beauty from the body to the soul (210b-c). So the focus on the soul
of the individual takes place sometime after the second rung described in 211c and before the next rung
described there. While this shift in focus (from the body to the soul) could be explanatorily subsumed into the
second rung, we have chosen to treat it as a separate rung in Diotimas ladder.
7 The soul, even though incorporeal, does reside in a body.
8 In addition there are the great poets Homer and Hesiod who through their poems, provided a beautiful

description of ancient Greek law, custom, epic wars and heroic acts, and thereby secured their place in history.
(209e). Hence, at this stage of his ascension in the appreciation of beauty, the lover, through
his high regard for different laws and customs, gives birth to works on these disciplines.
These works, through their impact, may go down in history as creations of great value and
so bring immortality to themselves and to their creator.

The move up to the fifth rung of the ladder represents the climbers shift from a love
of laws, customs, and ethics to a love, study and appreciation of the various branches of the
sciences (210c). A lover of the beauty of the different branches of knowledge (211c)
would have transcended both the beauty of any particular individual and the goodness of
any one law (210d). Contemplation of the beauty of knowledge as such will cause the
pregnant lover to give birth to countless beautiful ideas and speeches (210d).

Now the lover is prepared for the climb to the sixth and final rung of the ladder,
whereupon he sees and contemplates a most beautiful and singular kind of knowledge
that of the Form of Beauty (210d). Diotimas description of the Form of Beauty bears
quoting in its entirety:

And it will be eternal and infinite, not something that is born and dies or waxes and
wanes, but whole and independent. Not something beautiful in this way but ugly in
that, or beautiful at one time but ugly at another, or beautiful to one man but not to
another. During this vision, Beauty will not appear to him as a face or a hand or any
other part of the human body. It will not appear as any single argument or branch of
knowledge. It will not appear as any single being we know on earth or in heaven.
What he will see is Beauty, in itself and by itself, alone, endless and whole. And only
then will he understand how all beautiful things derive their beauty from this alone,
and that while all beautiful things may come and go and change, this beauty will
neither grow nor diminish nor suffer any change, but will remain always one and the
same. (211a-b)

The lover, by contemplating the Form of Beauty, comes to understand how the
entities of the sensible world derive their beauty due to the participation of this Form in
them. He is able to grasp the transient nature of beauty in the sensible world, as well as the
eternal and unchanging nature of the Form of Beauty.

The final rung of this ladder provides the lover with the conditions for achieving
immortality in the sense that it is through his connection with Beauty and Truth itself that
the lover is able to give birth to true virtue, virtue itself (212a). This progeny is not a copy
or an image of virtue, as are the progeny resulting from those residing in the lower rungs of
the ladder; rather this progeny is virtue itself, its purest form. And Diotima asserts that [t]he
man who could give birth to and nourish true virtue in this way would certainly be dear to
the gods, and [i]f anyone would reach immortal godhead , he would be the one (212a).

From Socrates description of Diotimas ladder, we may conclude that for Diotima
knowledge is one of the conditions sufficient for the creation of virtue. But, as discussed
before, giving birth (in body or in soul) is divine in nature and hence cannot occur in the
presence of ugliness. Thus we may initially posit that for Diotima:
 Knowledge and (the appreciation of) beauty are sufficient conditions for the birth of
virtue (by mortals).

In the fourth and higher rungs of the ladder, one learns to appreciate the beauty present in
various disciplines of knowledge. The recognition of beauty in knowledge now allows
knowledge to act as the facilitator of birth; such enlightened knowledge allows one to give
birth to better images of virtue than was possible in the preceding rungs, where beauty was
only recognized in its physical exemplars. So one who has contemplated the beauty of all the
different forms of knowledge (in the fifth rung of the ladder) is in a position to give birth to
the best images of virtue. This ability to recognize beauty in all its various instantiations
prepares one for their ascent to the final rung of the ladder, where they are in the presence
of the Form of Beauty itself. Here, one has knowledge of the Beautiful itself and so is in the
presence of the ultimate facilitator of the birth of virtue. And what can but one give birth to, when
(a) his understanding of beautiful knowledge is causally linked to the quality of the images of
virtue that he produces, and (b) he is in the presence of Beauty itself? He must give birth not
to images or copies of virtue but to true virtue, virtue itself [emphasis mine] (212a). Diotima is very
clear in her choice of wordsthe lover gives birth to virtue itself; this can only mean the
Form(s) of Virtue, which by nature are timeless and eternal9. And hence, through what he
has birthed, the lover has achieved the godlike, the ultimate form of immortality.

II. Virtue in the Meno and the Symposium

So what of our hypothesis that Diotimas believes that knowledge and beauty are
sufficient conditions for the birth of virtue? In the Meno, Socrates claims that if virtue (V)
were a form of knowledge (K), then it would be teachable (T) (Meno, 87b-c). If we denote
the claim that virtue is a form of knowledge symbolically as V K10, and the claim that
virtue is something teachable by V T, then symbolically Socrates posits that:

(V K) (V T) (1)

where denotes logical implication. Now Socrates does not justify this claim; rather, he
only posits (1). He then proceeds to show that since there are no teachers of virtue, virtue is
not teachable i.e. he shows that ~(V T) holds, where ~ denotes the logical negation.
Therefore if we accept hypothesis (1) that (V K) (V T), then Socrates demonstration
that ~(V T) holds would imply (through the logical equivalence of contrapositives) that

9 This does call into question claims made by some scholars that the Forms reside in a completely different
realm that that of the sensible world.
10 The symbol is the mathematical notation for set containment. For example, if X denotes the set of all

animals, and Y denotes the set of all human beings, then Y X. In the context above in the Meno, a claim such
as virtue is knowledge may be conservatively interpreted as virtue is a kind of knowledge. So if V denotes
the set of all virtues and K denotes the set of all knowledge, then the statement virtue is a kind of knowledge
can be written as V K. Similarly, if T denotes the set of all teachable things, then the statement virtue is
teachable can be written as V T. If one wishes to interpret the statement virtue is knowledge as virtue
implies the presence of (a type of) knowledge, then we may write V K instead of V K. Then expression
(1) would become (V K) (V T). Under either interpretation, the substance of the discussion above
would still hold.
~(V K) holds. Thus we must reject the possibility that V K i.e. that virtue is a kind of
knowledge.

To review, we have the following positions concerning virtue and knowledge:

(a) We have argued above that in the Symposium, Diotimas theory implies that
knowledge and an appreciation of beauty are sufficient conditions for the birth of
virtue.
(b) In the Meno, Socrates argues that if we accept the claim: if virtue were a form of knowledge
then it must be teachable, then it follows that virtue is not a form of knowledge (since it
is not teachable).

In order to give a cogent reconciliation of (a) and (b), it is useful to first observe that in (a),
Diotima is not claiming that virtue is a form of knowledge. Rather, she is saying that,
whatever virtue may be, the presence of both knowledge and beauty are sufficient to
guarantee its creation. So even if we accept the italicized claim in (b) and the conclusion
which follows from that claimthat virtue is not a form of knowledge, that in no way
contradicts the claim in (a) that knowledge and beauty are sufficient conditions for virtue.

Second, suppose did we accept the italicized claim in (b). Then, as noted before, a successful
demonstration that virtue is not teachable would imply that virtue is not a form of
knowledge (because of the logical equivalence of contrapositive statements). Socrates tells
Meno that the reason virtue cannot be teachable is because there are no teachers of virtue.
But just because there are no teachers of virtue, it does not follow that virtue is not
teachable. The apparent absence of teachers could be explained by the fact that a person
might know how to facilitate recollection in people but have poor students, or a person
could be virtuous because their virtuous actions are the result of true opinion and not
knowledge, in which case they are not capable to teaching it to even the best students. But
none of this refutes the hypothesis that if a person possessed knowledge (as opposed to true
opinion) then that person could teach it to (i.e. facilitate its recollection in) the right students.
Thus we have ample reason to doubt that Socrates has successfully demonstrated that virtue
is not teachable. So it does not follow that virtue is not a form of knowledge11.

Third, the conclusion in (b) that virtue is not a form of knowledge follows only if we accept
the legitimacy of the italicized claim in (b). But Socrates does not give us any reason to give it
such legitimacy. Indeed, he is quite clear with Meno that to answer the question of whether
virtue is teachable, one would need to have an understanding of what virtue is in the first
place (Meno, 87a-c). It is only to stop Menos unrelenting questioning of whether virtue is
teachable that Socrates posits the italicized claim in (b), so that Meno may see how one
might go about answering the question of whether virtue is teachable from an understanding
of what virtue is. Socrates is in fact careful to state that they are only looking at the question
hypothetically (Meno, 87b).

Thus the positions on virtue and knowledge in (a) and (b) above are not incompatible.

11It is safe to conclude that Socrates would have been aware of this, and that he tailored his arguments to the
level of his interlocutor Meno.
Now, towards the end of the Meno, Socrates argues that virtue comes to reside in an
individual through divine dispensation:

We could, therefore, rightly call divine those about whom we were just know
speaking, soothsayers and diviners and all poetic people; and the political people are not least
of whom we might affirm to be divine and divinely inspired, being inspired and possessed by
the god, whenever by their speaking they set straight many great affairs, without knowing those
things about which they speak (Meno: 99d, emphasis mine)

and

if we in this whole account both searched rightly and were speaking rightly, virtue
would be neither by nature, nor something teachable, but has come by divine dispensation
without intelligence in those to whom it might come, unless there should be that sort of man among
political men who could also make someone else politic. And if there should be one, he could almost
be said to be among the living what Homer said Tiresias was among the dead, saying about
him that he alone of those in Hades had his wits about him, but the others flit about as
shadows. The same would hold here too, such a man would be as a true thing alongside
shadows, in regard to virtue (Meno: 99e-100a, emphasis mine).

So, when a person possesses knowledge, as opposed to just true opinion without
intelligence, they have the ability to pass on their knowledge to the right sort of men. In the
various stages of Diotimas ladder, the lover comes to possess more knowledge (and not just
true opinion) and due to his appreciation of the beauty in the subject of his knowledge, is
able to give birth to virtuein the right kind of student. This is why as the lover ascends
from the second to the third rung of the ladder, a beautiful soul is more important to him
than a beautiful body in a beloved, and why, as he proceeds even higher up the ladder, his
virtuous productions take the shape of creative works (speeches, laws, books, etc.) which
have the potential of affecting all the right students and individuals, and not just any
individual person (a beloved). So the creation of virtuous acts comes about either because of
the presence of both beauty and knowledge, or because of true opinion divinely dispensed.
Thus, we may summarize Socrates position on virtue in the Symposium and the Meno as
follows:

Either [Knowledge and (the appreciation of) beauty] or [true opinion divinely dispensed]
are sufficient conditions for the birth of virtue.

We now go on to explain how the speeches of the other characters in the Symposium either
form parts of Diotimas whole account of love as described in Socrates speech, or, pave
the way for Socrates speech. We begin with the first speech on love, given by Phaedrus.

III. Phaedrus Speech

Phaedrus speech introduces love as a guide that shows us how to live a good life (178c).
Love does this by instilling in us a piercing shame when we act ignobly and is the
yearning that incites us toward any noble pursuit (178d). He then proceeds to demonstrate
that love leads mortals to engage in the virtuous actions of courage and sacrifice for the sake
of their lover or beloved. He gives numerous examples, including that of Alcestis taking her
husband Admetus place when he was slated for execution (179b-c), and Achilles avenging
Patroclus death by Hector even though he knew that Hectors death would soon be
followed by his own. Achilles did so because he cherished Patroclus love and wanted to join
him in the afterlife (179e-180a). The gifts bestowed by the gods on Alcestis and Achilles
show that there is no valor more admired by the gods than that which springs from love
(180a-b), and that they esteem any courage or self-sacrifice displayed in deeds of love
(179d).

We stated above that according to Diotima, knowledge and an appreciation of beauty leads
to virtuous acts. Indeed, the knowledge and appreciation of (i) physical beauty in the first
two rungs of the ladder, and (ii) a beautiful mind in the third rung of the ladder (210c)
facilitates the birth of the acts of courage and self-sacrifice. Pheadrus speech vividly brings
to mind the kinds of virtuous acts that lovers and their beloveds are capable of, even if their
understanding of love and beauty rest on the lower rungs of Diotimas ladder.

But while Phaedrus speech posits love as the reason for acts of courage and sacrifice by
lovers and beloveds alike, it does not give an account of why this is so. What is it about love
that leads people to such acts? Describing love as the yearning that incites us toward any
noble pursuit is hardly an explanation, nor is saying that it fills us with a piercing shame
when we act ignobly (178d). Again, Diotimas account fills in this gap: Love, then, is really
the desire we all have to live forever and be immortal (207a). Further, she explicitly points
out to Socrates that Alcestis would never have sacrificed herself to save Admetus, nor would
Achilles would have sacrificed his future to avenge Patroclus murder if each of them hadnt
believed that their actions would bring them everlasting glory and guarantee their
immortality, since future generations would always associate their names with courage and
virtue (208d). Thus Diotimas account answers the question raised but unanswered in
Phaedrus speech: what is love, or what is it about love that leads to virtue.

We now consider the second speech on love, given by Pausanias.

IV. Pausanias Speech

In his speech Pausanias introduces two crucial characteristics of love: (i) the notion that
there are different types of love, and (ii) the role of laws and customs in shaping the
behavior of potential lovers and beloveds alike.

Pausanias claims that there are two gods of love: Heavenly Love and Common Love (180e).
He states that not all forms of love are worthy of our praise but only that kind which
causes us to act in an honorable manner (181a). While Pausanias does not carefully
distinguish between all the different kinds of love that one can have (for people, arts,
knowledge, etc.), he points out that certain behaviors are the result of the guidance of
Common Love as opposed to Heavenly Love. Men guided by the former desire women as
much as boys, prefer the body to the mind and often choose the dumbest mates since
they are interested only in the physical act itself (181b). But a man guided by Heavenly Love
will pursue only those youngsters who have already begun to think for themselves [and]
will doubtless be prepared to share everything he has with the one he loves (181d).
Pausanias is interested in the form of love that leads to the cultivation of virtue in a
relationship. For him Heavenly Love is of the greatest value to both cities and individuals.
For he compels both the lover and the beloved to treat with the utmost gravity both the
teaching and the learning of virtue, while any other sort of lover is in the hands of the
other goddess, the vulgar one i.e. Common Love (185b-c). Thus Pausanias speech is the
first to introduce the idea that different forms of love can be ranked. Of course Pausanias
ranking is much cruder than Diotimas: he has only two categoriesthe merely physical or
vulgar love and the more mature love that leads to the teaching and learning of virtue
(181c, 185b). Furthermore, in Diotimas theory even the pursuit of purely physical beauty
has an important role in the cultivation of virtue, for the appreciation of the physical beauty
in one individual, and then in many different people, is a stepping stone toward higher forms
of love, which in turn enable the creation of more lasting forms of virtuous acts. However,
Pausanias speech does contain the rudiments of Diotimas theory.

Pausanias speech also introduces the importance of law and customs in deciding which
form of love (Heavenly or Common) will be the norm in a society. According to him, in
cities like Elis and Boeotia where people use an elementary language there are no norms of
what constitutes honorable gratification of love (182b). But in cities under tyrannical rule,
the tyrants are fearful of the allegiances, loyalties and bonds that people may form, such as
the ones created by loving and caring for another. Therefore, to exercise social control,
tyrants brand any act of gratifying a lover as disgraceful (182b-c). But the laws, customs and
traditions of Athens perfectly balance these two extremes. By encouraging the youth of
Athens to resist the advances of older men and by encouraging the ridiculing of such men
when the boys anticipate their amorous intentions (183c), the Athenian traditions test the
persistence of the lover and the boy in order to determine the type of love fueling their
actions (184a). For only Heavenly Love fosters the teaching and learning of virtue (185b).
Therefore, it is only by combining [the] two customs, the one governing the love of boys
and the other governing boyhood education and virtue in general, that one may create the
proper conditions in which any boy may honorably gratify his lover (184c-d).

The discussion of laws, customs, and traditions in Pausanias speech, however problematic,
does forcefully make the point that societal rules do play a very important role in the
cultivation of virtue. In her speech, Diotima discusses how the lover who has ascended to
the fourth rung of her ladder appreciates the beauty of different laws and customs. This is
not just a scholarly, intellectual aesthetic appreciation. The inclusion of Pausanias speech in
the dialogue suggests that the appreciation of different laws and customs refers to an
appreciation of how these laws and customs foster the teaching and creation of virtue. It is
in the ability of different societal rules and traditions to do this that is indicative of how
beautiful they are.

Next, we consider the third speech on love, given by the medical doctor Eryximachus.

V. Eryximachus Speech

Eryximachus speech makes the case that love is the science of bringing opposing or
contrary elements into harmony and moderation. He defines medicine as the science which
studies the love and desire which the body experiences vis--vis its depletion and repletion
(186c), and how Asclepius founded the medical science by understanding how to engender
love and harmony among opposing and enemy somatic elements (186d-e). He describes
music as the science of love as applied to harmony and rhythm (187c) and notes that
[r]hythm is produced when fast and slow tempos, initially in opposition, are later brought
into agreement with one another (187b). He agrees with Pausanias belief that there are two
gods of love, and posits a causal relationship between Heavenly Love and the presence of
harmony and moderation, and between crude and impulsive species of Love and the
presence of excess and debauchery (188a). With respect to the seasons he says:

[When] opposing elements such as hot and cold, or dry and wet, are united by the more
orderly species of Love, they sing in harmony with each other and their mixture is temperate
and so is the climate. In such lovely weather harvests are full and all living matter is in good
health. But when the crude and impulsive species of Love gains control of the seasons, he
brings ruin and destruction. In this context, knowledge of Love and its effects is called
astronomy. (188a-b)

Eryximachus then provides a similar account of the science of prophecy. Impiety is the
result of yielding to the sick form of Love in questions of duty or in obligations to ones
parents and the gods or from refusing to honor or give priority to the healthy form of
Love (188c). Prophecy is defined as the science that studies the effects of Love on justice
and piety and is that which produces love and friendship between gods and men (188c-
d). He concludes his speech by commenting on the omnipresent power of Love, and that
when Love is directed, with restraint and justice, simply toward the good in itself that it
truly has the most power of all and is the source of our greatest happiness [for] it enables
the bonds of human fellowship and harmony with the gods above (188d).

So how is Eryximachus speech connected to Diotimas? The most striking feature of

Eryximachus speech is its sterility and its passionless depiction of love. It does not capture
the experience of the intensity and emotional power of love, nor does it in any way explicate
how the omnipresent power of love is the source of our greatest happiness (188d). Cast
in the role of the materialist philosopher in the dialogue, his speech is marked by clinical
detachment: he describes the sometimes irrational and chaotic nature of love as the
intemperate effects of the greedy and disorderly sort of Love and describes impiety as
resulting from yielding to the other Love, the sick one (188c). His account of love, as
opposed to Diotimas, and even Phaedrus and Pausanias accounts, does not say anything
about how love can lead to virtuous actions, nor does it provide any non-physicalist
explanation for why lovers and beloveds act in certain ways. The presence of his speech is
marked by what is absent in itan account of love that actually reflects its role in the human
condition, and how it motivates us and leads us to seek whatever it is that we are searching
for12.

We now consider the comic playwright Aristophanes speech.

12In many ways Eryximachus account of love is similar to Timaeus account of health in the Timaeus. Both
accounts emphasize the importance of harmony and the balance of various elements in their respective
explanations. Timaeus speech has the same sort of mechanistic sterility that Eryximachus speech does.
Further, Timaeus account, which begins with the creation of the universe and concludes with the nature of
man, also does not address questions of virtue. For more on the Timaeus from this point of view, see Timaeus
Speech as a Prologue to Platos Myth of Atlantis: A Dramatic Approach to Timaeus as Philosopher by Scott
Hemmenway.
 VI. Aristophanes Speech

The myth that Aristophanes describes in his speech outlines the evolution of human beings
from their primordial condition to their current condition, and it presents love as a state of
longing, lack, and incompleteness. As entities who were initially whole and then were divided
into two, we spend our lives seeking out our other half in order to fill this lack and make
ourselves complete. While sex may be a temporary way of satiating this longing, there is no
long-term solution short of finding ones partner. When a human is lucky enough to find his
other half, the lucky couple is suddenly shrouded by such a degree of affection and intimacy
and love that they refuse to be separated for even a moment (192b-c). Thus, for
Aristophanes what is missing from our lives and what we long for is another human being.
But since most of us dont know about our primordial condition, as wholes who were
divided by Zeus, we are unable to articulate why it is that we long for another person. Even
the few people who are lucky enough to find their other halves and are able to spend their
lives together will never be able to explain just what it is that they hope to get from one
another (192c). Aristophanes observes that [s]urely it isnt the pleasure of sex alone that
causes them to take such joy in being with each other. Each of us must desire something more,
something which he cant put into words. Yet we all have a prophetic sense of what we want and
express this wish sometimes in riddles. (192c, emphasis mine)

He then gives an example of how we cryptically express this wish--if the god Hephaestus
were to ask two partners, What is it that you two mortals really want from one another?
I can weld the two of you together, solder you into a single form. Then for as long as you
live you will share this one life together then no partner would refuse, for hed finally
been offered what he had long desired: for two to be joined forever into one, lover and
beloved together in love Love alone inspires in us that wild craving to come together and
restore our original state. (192d-e)

Aristophanes focuses primarily on the link between love and the search for our other halves.
Interestingly, he does not address the role of beauty when it comes to love. People often
court another person because they find them beautiful or attractive. Even when it comes to
objects, such as a painting, or a certain field of study, such as history or physics, people are
attracted to these objects or subjects because they see a certain aesthetic beauty to them.
This in turn leads them to make a closer inspection of the object or a more in-depth study of
the discipline, and the deeper knowledge and appreciation obtained nurtures love for the
object/subject. This is addressed in some depth in Diotimas account.13

13 Diotima criticizes explanations of love which claim that all lovers are constantly searching for their missing
half because true love is no search for any half or any whole unless that half or whole happens to be good for
its own sake (205e). As a criticism of an Aristophanes-type account, it doesnt ring completely true. For
example, people may fall deeply in love with someone who they later discover has a serious psychological
illness, such as bipolar disorder. People with bipolar disorder can be highly manipulative, and it can be very
unhealthy for the psychologically healthy individual to stay in such a relationship. Yet people in these situations
do not fall out of love upon a discovery of this sort. They stay in the relationship and try to help their partner
despite their awareness of the fact that staying in a manipulative relationship is not good for its own sake.
They dont stay in the relationship out of ignorance (at least not always) but rather because they love their
partner. Aristophanes attempts to answer the criticisms of his account that are raised by Socrates in his speech,
but he doesnt get a chance to do so (212c). This brings to mind the fact that Socrates did not have a forum
either to rebut Aristophanes caricature of him in the play The Clouds.
Aristophanes speech powerfully captures the intense feeling of longing, seeking, and feeling
of incompleteness that characterizes humans who are searching for their partners. This
feeling of longing exists even between partners when they are separated from each other for
a length of time. Our inability to describe what it is that makes us feel whole and complete
when we are with our partners is also given vivid expression in the Hephaestus example.
And in this way, Aristophanes prepares us for Diotimas account of love. For in her account,
she answers the more general form of the question that Hephaestus poses to the two lovers;
that is, what it is that we truly desire and long for.

We now consider the final speech that precedes Socrates, that of the tragic playwright
Agathon.

VII. Agathons Speech

In Book X (as well as in other places) of Platos Republic, Socrates strongly criticizes the
ability of poets to cultivate virtue in people. He asks if its not the case that all those skilled
at poetry, starting from Homer, are imitators of phantoms of virtue and of other things they
write about, and dont get hold of the truth (Republic, 600e). According to Socrates,

someone skilled at poetry understands nothing other than how to imitate in a way that
makes it seem, to others like him who look at things through his words, that a character
speaking metrically, rhythmically, and melodically seems to be speaking very well, whether
hes talking about leathercraft, about commanding an army, or about anything else whatever.
Thus these things have in them by nature some great enchantment, because, when the
words of the poets are stripped of their musical colorings and they themselves are spoken by
themselves, [they are] like the faces of people in their prime who arent beautiful (Republic,
601a-b).

So, according to Socrates, the skilled imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about the
things he imitates, that imitation is a kind of amusement and not serious, and that those who
dabble in tragic poetry, whether in iambic or epic verse, are all imitators as much as its
possible to be (Republic, 602b). The contents of Agathons speech in the Symposium, and
Socrates response to it suggest that for Socrates, Agathon is a paradigmatic example of the
imitator that Socrates discusses in the comments above from the Republic.

Agathons speech shows an exceptional use of language with all its musical colorings on
the one hand, and a complete ignorance of the topic of his speech on the other. He
describes the god Love as being the most beautiful because Love is the youngest of the
gods (195a). According to Agathon, love detests the state of being old and shuns it with all
his heart (195b). This claim on Agathons part is rather strangeit has the implication that
the only kind of love is that which exists among young people, which is often impetuous and
fleeting, as opposed to the love which one finds between older partners, love that has
matured, and withstood the test of time and struggle. Agathon describes Love as being
delicate in his divine youth and tender and making his home in the hearts and minds of
men (195c-e). The best evidence for the goodness of Love is, according to Agathon, that
he never injures nor is ever injured by any god or man. He is the victim of no violent act
[and he] is never the cause of any violence to others, nor has he any need to, since people are
always willing to become slaves for love (196b-c). If the description of the god Love is
supposed to mirror the feelings of a lover or beloved toward their partner, then the
description would seem to be grossly incomplete. While love for a partner may give birth to
feelings of tenderness, it can also cause feelings of intense anger, betrayal, hate, and self-
deception. In the Iliad, Achilles, hurt and angry due to Patroclus death, goes on the
battlefield and slaughters many Trojan soldiers before confronting Hector. His actions as
described by Homer were not those of a soldier but those of an avenger. And few would
regard the desire for vengeance as a virtue. A more contemporary example linking love to
violence and to self-deception would be cases where victims of domestic abuse continue to
stay in harmful relationships because they love their partners and believe that the violence
was an aberration or that their partners can change. These examples and many others
challenge Agathons description of the god Love as being tender and never being the cause
of any violence14. Agathons claim that Love is also temperate and restrained also does not
reflect the emotions of many who are in love. When people first fall in love, the
intemperateness of their emotions, the feelings of excitement, fear, vulnerability and hope
that seizes them and doesnt let gothe very antithesis of emotional temperance and
restraintis what characterizes their love for each other.

This is not to say that Agathon gets everything about love wrong. While his description of
Love as such a wise and gifted poet that he can even make poets of others is belied by
Eryximachus speech (196d), Agathons claim that if Love inspires and teaches someone,
that mans repute increases and shines with success is in line with Diotimas account that
love does have the power to move one to engage in virtuous acts (196e-197a). But even here,
Diotimas account refers to earthly creatures in particular, for her account is based on the
definition of love as the desire for immortality. Agathon mentions Apollo (who invented
archery), Athena (who invented weaving), and Zeus (who invented the art of piloting gods
and men) as examples of those who were inspired by Love to create an art form (197a-b).
But Apollo, Athena, and Zeus are divine beings and therefore are immortal. Hence their
reason for acting virtuously cannot be based on the same conception of love as Diotimas.

Agathon concludes his speech with a series of poetic statements about the god Love. He
says Love provides us with mildness and deprives us of wildness and shares with us his
benevolence and spares us his malevolence; is the father of elegance and luxury, delicacy
and grace, longing and desire; is the [c]aretaker of good men and forsaker of bad; and in
adversity or anxiety, in yearning or learning, Love is our finest guide and guard (197d).
Given that every one of these statements, though beautifully phrased, is easily disputed, one
cant help but recall Socrates criticism of poets from the Republicthat when the statements
of a poet are deconstructed, we see his ignorance exposed; the poet is in fact not
knowledgeable about the subject of his poem, but is just a skilled imitator knows nothing
worth mentioning about the things he imitates (Republic, 602b). And it is precisely such a
deconstruction that Socrates proceeds to undertake when he questions Agathon about some
of his statements. And in the process Socrates both exposes Agathons cluelessness and sets
the stage for his own speech, in which he recalls Diotimas account of love.

14This is why Diotimas requirement that one needs both the appreciation of beauty and knowledge in order to
be virtuous is important; in the examples listed a lack of knowledge (e.g. we dont hurt those we love, or that an
eye for an eye makes the world go blind) could explain how love can lead to poor decisions and disastrous
consequences.
We now consider the final speech of the dialogue, the one which follows Socrates speech
and which is delivered by the Athenian politician Alcibiades.

VIII. Alcibiades Speech

Of the seven speeches in the Symposium, Alcibiades speech is the only one which is
dedicated, not to love, but to Socrates. In the context of the dialogue, this speech serves as a
exaltation to one who has contemplated the form of Beauty, and who leads his life according
to virtues resulting from such contemplation.

Alcibiades describes Socrates as akin to the satyr Marsyas, who played an old reed pipe to
charm his listeners (215c). But unlike Marsyas, Socrates charms people with his logos; he
requires no musical instruments. For Alcibiades, the effect of Socrates speeches is erotic
his heart starts pounding and tears go streaming down [his] face (215e); even the finest
orators do not have such an effect on him. Further, his conversations with Socrates make
Alcibiades feel the very emotion that Phaedrus describes in his speech i.e. shame for having
acted ignobly. Socrates gets Alcibiades to acknowledge that he neglects what is most
important, while busying himself with the political affairs of Athens (216a).

Alcibiades explains that the public impression that Socrates gives of himself, as one who
desires young men, is a faade and that in fact a wise and temperate man lies beneath this
act (216d). For Socrates couldnt give a damn whether a boy is beautiful or rich or famous
[and] he has contempt for all that; indeed his public life is one endless game of irony
(216d-e). But according to Alcibiades, he did once get a look at the real Socrates, and what
he saw was golden and divine, radiant and beautiful and so amazing that he was
completely taken with Socrates. The description of Socrates as not caring about the physical
beauty of people implies that he has ascended above at least the first two rungs of Diotimas
ladder. His conversations about virtue with the young men of Athens are not because their
beauty compels him to so engage them.

Alcibiades description of Socrates as golden and divine, radiant and beautiful and so
amazing is reminiscent of Diotimas description of the form Beauty as perfect, pure,
undilute[d] Beauty, untained by human flesh or color or any other mortal nonsense, just
Beauty itself, singular and divine 15 (211d-e). So perhaps what Alcibiades saw was a glimpse
of a man who has grasped and contemplated the form of the Beautiful, and it is this
knowledge and appreciation of Beauty that compels Socrates to reach out to the youth of
Athens and engage them in conversations about virtue. It would also explain why Socrates is
not moved by Alcibiades exceptional beauty or his wealth.

Unfortunately, Alcibiades does not understand what motivates Socrates. Alcibiades believes
that if he were to gratify Socrates desires or give him money, then Socrates would help him
become the best that [he] possibly can (218d). But Alcibiades fails to grasp that in order

15 Diotimas description of the form Beauty explicitly rules out particular physical instantiations of beauty such
as color, etc. Alcibiades description of Socrates as golden and radiant does not invalidate the comparison
with the form of Beauty, for Alcibiades is describing Socrates as he is in his real state (216e)the person his
is underneath the image he cultivates in public; Alcibiades is not describing anything physical about Socrates.
for him to become the best that he could be, he needs to genuinely desire what that best
is. Indeed Socrates has been advising him freely on many occasions, yet Alcibiades has never
taken his advice and has felt ashamed for it. He believes that if only Socrates would try
harder (as a result of Alcibiades gratifying his desires if they became lovers, or for monetary
benefit), then he would absorb Socrates wisdom and become a virtuous manthe best
that [he] possibly can. But such belief is an illusion. Socrates knows this, why is why (as a
virtuous man) he spurns Alcibiades physical advances and his pecuniary incentiveshe
cannot teach to a student a type of knowledge that the student does not desire.

In line with the thesis that Socrates has both knowledge and appreciation for the form of the
Beautiful, we can interpret the rest of Alcibiades speech as a description of how such
knowledge manifests itself in ergon (deed). Alcibiades describes Socrates exceptional ability to
withstand hunger, cold and the other physical challenges that arose during their military
service. The connection between Socrates physical fortitude and his philosophical
contemplations is made explicit in Alcibiades recounting of an incident during their military
tour. According to Alcibiades:

One morning at dawn Socrates began to dwell on some question. He walked outside to the
field to be alone and stood there trying to figure it out. When the answer didnt come he
didnt give up but kept right on standing there in the very same spot. By midday, word had
reached the other soldiers. They refused to believe that Socrates had been standing
motionless all day long, thinking. In the evening, after dinner, several recruits moved their
bunks outside to sleep Their real motive, obviously, was to keep watch on Socrates, to
see if he would go on standing there all night. And sure enough, he stood in that same spot
till dawn the next day, and when the sun came up, Socrates greeted it with a prayer and
walked away. (220c-d)

This example illustrates how Socrates philosophical contemplations are correlated with his
tolerance for physical hardship. In addition to this incident, Alcibiades also describes
Socrates courage during the battle of Delium, when he saved Alcibiades life and that of the
general Laches. Alcibiades notes that while one may compare a great warrior like Achilles to
a contemporary warrior such as Brasidas, or Nestor and Antenor to a great orator like
Pericles to get some measure of what Achilles, Nestor, and Antenor were like, one has no
one from the past or present to compare to Socrates because his ideas are so unusual
(221c). Yet careful analyses of his arguments reveal that no other arguments make any
sense (221e-222a). And these arguments are made in the service of cultivating virtue since
they are of the most singular importance for anyone who has any hope of becoming a good
man (222a).

Alcibiades speech is a tribute to the lifestyle of one who has contemplated the Beautiful, and
as a result is strong, just, courageous, and is driven to cultivate virtue in his fellow human
beings.

IX. Conclusion

We have examined how Diotima's account of love and beauty brings together the many
themes touched upon in the other speeches of the dialogue. These themes include the
virtues of courage and sacrifice born out of love (Phaedrus' speech), to the importance of
laws and customs in the cultivation of higher and lower forms of love (Pausanias' speech);
from the emptiness of a scientific description of love (Eryximachus' speech), to a mythic
description of how love is connected to longing and partiality, and is driven by a search for
completeness (Aristophanes' speech); and we have Socrates speech giving a theory on love
that unites all these different ideas in a coherent way. Agathon's poetic yet incoherent speech
is a reminder to us to focus on the arguments of an account rather than the prose used to
deliver it. And Alcibiades' concrete and down-to-earth speech about Socrates gives us an
idea of how a life spent in philosophical contemplation manifests itself in deed. Thus the
Symposium lends itself naturally to being characterized as a dialogue about parts and wholes.
The parts which are the other speeches prepare us for a more lucid understanding of the
whole i.e. in anticipating all the different components that would be needed for a full
account of love, we are able to better grasp Diotima's more sophisticated account of love
and beauty. And we are provided with a vivid example of what we might be like if we
climbed to the top of her ladder.