Republic v Sin
Unless public land
G.R. No. 157485, March 16, 2014 Leonardo de Castro
Facts:
Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs
of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a
parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New
Washington, Aklan. On August 26, 1991, they respondent
heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint
against Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF) for
recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration
of ownership with damages claiming that the latter
usurped their rights over the property.
ANCF countered that the subject land was the
subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating the area of said property
as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF.
The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the
subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not
susceptible of private ownership.
The respondents presented evidence that they
inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother who
acquired it by virtue of a deed of sale. That in 1988 a
potion thereof was occupied by ANCF and converted into
a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs
asserted that they were previously in possession of the
disputed land in the concept of an owner. To prove
possession, respondents presented several tax
declarations, the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
unanimously held that respondents retain private rights to
the disputed property by virtue of their and their
predecessors open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession amounts to an imperfect title, which should be
respected and protected.
Issue: Whether or not the claim of the respondents
amounts to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Held:
No. At the outset, it must be noted that
respondents have not filed an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act
or the Property Registration Decree. Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree provide the requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title: (1) open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land by himself or through his predecessors
ininterest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied
in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to
any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural
land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.
is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public
domain is beyond the commerce of man and not
susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner
no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming
the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject
of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable
and disposable.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents
which have the burden to identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents
failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by
their predecessorsininterest is inconsequential and
could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to
prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject
property.
Republic vs Remman Enterprises
G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014; REYES, J.
FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an
application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title
over two parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila,
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D,
Taguig Cadastre, with an area of 29,945 square meters
and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in
form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May
30, 2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in
the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a
conspicuous places.
On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor.
Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its
comment/opposition to the respondents application for
registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its Opposition,
alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
During the trial, the testimonies of the respondents
witnesses showed that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of
land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent
purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado
Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The
subject properties were originally owned and possessed
by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different
kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and
hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold
the said parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who
continued to cultivate the lots until the same were
purchased by the respondent in 1989. The respondent
likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as
evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia,
presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and
Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the
subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the
subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineers Certificate; (5)
tax declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and
(6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by
Corazon D. Calamno, Senior Forest Management
Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and
3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain
For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondents
application for registration should be denied since the
subject parcels of land are not part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that
pursuant to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands
which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr.
Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed
that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties,
based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was
prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then
Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April
1966, he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068
and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area
verification of the subject properties on September 25,
2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of
the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes,
who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey
of the subject properties he conducted upon the request
of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties,
contrary to LLDAs claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly,
Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation
ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot
No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed
out that LLDAs claim that the elevation of the subject
properties is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same
was merely based on the topographic map that was
prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that
nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was
indeed conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of
gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of
land does not always remain the same; that the elevations
of the subject properties may have already changed since
1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the
topographic map used by LLDA was based, was
conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by
Engr. Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the
subject properties.
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject
properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that
the same could not be considered part of the bed of
Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of
R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas
that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the
average annual maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence,
the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are
adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna Lake form
part of its bed and not those that are already far from it,
which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC
pointed out that the subject properties are more than a
kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that
they are dry and waterless even when the waters of
Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject
properties as early as 1943.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the
subject properties?
HELD: NO
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the
lower courts, which this Court, generally may not
disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not
disturb the factual findings of the lower courts unless there
are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject
properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
however, does not necessarily mean that they already
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to
prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, that the
subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
While deference is due to the lower courts finding that the
elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part
of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds
that the respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement
to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration, who must prove that
the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable."
The respondent filed its application for registration of title
to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section,
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently
establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To
prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, the
respondent presented two certifications issued by
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
"under Project No. 27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per
LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the
respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable. In Republic of
the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court
clarified that, in addition to the 1) certification issued by
the proper government agency that a parcel of land is
alienable and disposable, applicants for land registration
must 2) prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of public domain
as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records.
In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to
reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did
not present evidence that the land she applied for has
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the
public domain. She submitted only the survey map and
technical description of the land which bears no
information regarding the lands classification. She did not
bother to establish the status of the land by any
certification from the appropriate government agency.
Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all
requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the
respondent in support of its application for registration are
thus not sufficient to prove that the subject properties are
indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and
disposable. It is still imperative for the respondent to
present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal
custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower
courts erred in granting the application for registration in
spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Courts
ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on
June 26, 2008, must be applied prospectively, asserting
that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land
and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall
have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that
its application for registration of title was filed and was
granted by the RTC prior to the Courts promulgation of
its ruling in T.A.N. Properties.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondents application for
registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the
Courts ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements
in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not
antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant
to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the
interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that
law from the date it was originally passed, since this
Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not
amount to the passage of a new law, but consists merely
of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds
that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence
to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject properties since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties since 1943, the respondent presented the
testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and
self-serving assertions of the possession and occupation
of the subject properties by the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and
occupation of the subject properties required by Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony
of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and
occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the
subject properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must
be presented to substantiate the claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application.
Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than
factual evidence of possession. Actual possession
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his
own property.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed
planted crops on the subject properties, it does not
necessarily follow that the subject properties have been
possessed and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in
the subject properties may only have amounted to mere
casual cultivation, which is not the possession and
occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from
the state. The possession of public land, however long the
period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the
subject properties presented by the respondent were only
for 2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its
claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as
1989, and that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only
in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership." That the subject properties were declared for
taxation purposes only in 2002 gives rise to the
presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year.
WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is
denied.
LOZADA V BRACEWELL
G.R. No. 179155 April 2, 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Case law instructs that for as long as a final decree
has not been entered by the (Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the
control and sound discretion of the court rendering it
FACTS: Petitioner filed an application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land which was
granted by the RTC of Makati City acting as a land
registration court. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the
LRA issued a Decree in the name of petitioner, who later
obtained an OCT.
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of
the aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr.
(Bracewell) filed a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, before the RTC of Las Pias City claiming that a
portion of such land was his as absolute owner and
possessor and us fraudulently included in the Decree.
He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed
the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners,
and left him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings
involving said lots. Instead of impleading him, petitioner
listed Bracewells grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an
adjoining owner, although she had already died by that
time.
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree and OCT in bad
faith, the Las Pias City-RTC rendered a Decision in favor
of Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of the
case and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his
heirs.
The Las Pias City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately
preventing respondents from participating and objecting
to his application for registration when the documentary
evidence showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had
been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he
(Bracewell) was recognized as the owner thereof in the
records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well
as in the City Assessors Office.
Petitioner argues that the Las Pias City-RTC had no
jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should
be filed in the same branch of the court that rendered the
decision and ordered the issuance of the decree (Makati
City)
The CA held that, since the petition for review was filed
within one (1) year from the issuance of the questioned
decree, and considering that the subject lot is located in
Las Pias City, the RTC of said city had jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Las Pias City-RTC has
jurisdiction over the petition for review of decree,
which was issued as a result of the judgment
rendered by the RTC of Makati City.
HELD: Under the Land Registration Act, which was the
law in force at the time of the commencement by both
parties of their respective registration proceedings
jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was
conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now
RTCs) of the respective provinces in which the land
sought to be registered is situated.
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[39]
otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, was enacted and took effect on August 14, 1981,
authorizing the creation of RTCs in different judicial
regions, including the RTC of Las Pias City as part of the
National Capital Judicial Region. As pointed out by the
court, the RTC of Las Pias City was established in or
about 1994. Understandably, in February 1998,
Bracewell sought the review of the Decree before the Las
Pias City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this
case is situated in Las Pias City.
It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage
of PD 1529, the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated.
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.The decree of registration shall not
be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority,
or other disability of any person adversely affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date
of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree
of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such
decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy
by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
As such, case law instructs that for as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court
rendering it.
VALIAO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170757. November 28, 2011 PERALTA
Nature: Rule 45 - Petition for review on certiorari.
Facts:
Valiao et al. filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of in
Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
However it was opposed the registration by the private
oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay and the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).
In support of their claim of possession over the subject
property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 9562 dated September 29, 1976 under
the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
RTC Decision: Granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property.
Thus private oppositors and the Republic appeal with the
CA.
CA Decision: Reversed the trial court's findings and
DECLARE the subject parcel of land to be inalienable
and indisposable land belonging to the public
domain.
Accordingto CA, the classification of lands of the public
domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive
department of the government and in the absence of such
classification, the lands remain as unclassified until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the
same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which
ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA
held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars
a subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that
the subject property is part of the inalienable land of the
public domain and petitioners failed to prove that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier
Issues:
1. WON the subject lot is alienable and disposable
land of public domain.
2. WON the claim of prescription by the applicant
will lie on the subject lot.
3. WON the CAs decision constitutes res judicata
as far as this application is concerned.
4. WON the alleged possession of the applicants
through predecessors-in-interest is sufficient to
sustain their claim for prescription.
Held:
1. NO. The subject lot is not alienable and
disposable land of public domain.
Sec 14(par 1) of PD 1529 requires the petitioners to prove
that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. These the petitioners must prove by no less than
clear, positive and convincing evidence.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove
that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is
alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such evidence was offered by the
petitioners to show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to
prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as
still inalienable public domain.
2. NO. The claim of prescription by the applicant
will not lie on the subject lot.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as
alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property
of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.
3. NO. The judgment does not constitute res
judicata that bars a subsequent action for
land registration.
In this case, was cited the case of Director of Lands v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that a judicial
declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not
preclude even the same applicant from subsequently
seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same
land, provided he thereafter complies with the
provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, and as long as said public lands
remain alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, not
only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject land
is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have possessed and occupied the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
4. NO. The alleged possession of the applicants
through predecessors-in-interest is not
sufficient to sustain their claim for
prescription.
The petitioners possession of the land in question from
1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same
with a tax declaration dated September 29, 1976. At best,
petitioners can only prove possession since said
date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
subject properties in the concept of an owner even before
June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to
declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by any other
evidence. The disputed property may have been
declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration, or of their predecessors-in-
interest, but it does not necessarily
prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim
of ownership.
Supreme Court Ruling: Denied the Petition.
HEIRS OF PALANCA VS REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 151312 Azcuna
Antecedent Facts
The subject properties in this case are namely: a 239,980
sqm land in Busuanga and a 176,588 sqm land in New
Busuanga. These parcels of land are claimed by the heirs
of Palanca onthe grounds of open possession without
opposition for 40yrs and a CFI decision naming herein
petitioners as owners.
After 23yrs, herein respondents pray for the annulment of
aforementioned decision and reversion.
Petitioners presented tax declarations and witnesses of
their possession while respondents presented a Land
Classification Map and CENRO certification.
CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Petitioners' Contention
The subject properties were openly possessed and
occupied by
Pedro Palanca since 1934.
The ownership was transferred to his heirs, herein
petitioners,
upon his death on 1943 and the lands were openly
possessed
and occupied by his heirs thereafter.
The properties were declared for taxation purposes and
such
taxes were religiously paid for over 40yrs.
The respondents are barred by laches and res judicata.
A particular land need not be formally released by an
act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private
ownership.
Respondents' Contention
The testimonies presented by the petitioners are
products of collusion and therefore of a fraudulent nature.
The properties are unclassified forest land.
Executive Proclamation No. 209 stated that the small
islands off the main island of Palawan are national
reserves.
Res judicata and laches does not bar the State from
exercising its power of reversion.
The CFI did not have jurisdiction to make a disposition
of the subject properties.
Issue/s
Whether or not the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca have
ownership rights over the subject properties in the instant
case?
Decision The petitioners failed to provide proof that the
disputed parcels of land were of an alienable nature,
therefore res judicata does not apply in this case due to
the absence of the power of the CFI to dispose lands of
the same nature. The courts lost the authority to classify
lands of public domain upon the effectivity of CA 141
which clearly stated that such power exclusively rests with
the President. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
SEC OF DENR ET AL VS. YAP ET AL
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008 Reyes
FACTS: On November 10, 1978, then President Marcos
issued Proc. No. 1801declaring Boracay Island, among
other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the
administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to
implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No
3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and
others filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC
in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc.
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on
their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes
and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants
posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, they had the right to have
the lots registered in their names through judicial
confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay
Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as public
forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant
to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-
claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of
title was governed by Public Land Act and Revised
Forestry Code, as amended. Since Boracay Island had
not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, declaring that, PD 1810 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA. On In
2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it
was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the
trial court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island partly
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly
agricultural land (alienable and disposable).
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Sacay,and
other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an
original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that
the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights
over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time
immemorial.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have
a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles,
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such
unclassified lands are considered public forest under
PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all
unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public
forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has
not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not. Applying
PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in
Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered public
forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already
existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or timber, such
classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks. Of
these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
had never been expressly and administratively classified
under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act
of the government, such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators;
and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land
claimed to have been possessed for the required number
of years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof
in overcoming such presumption is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or
reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable
land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island
as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would
have identified the specific limits of each, as President
Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
1. Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De
Aldecoa is misplaced. Ankron and De Aldecoa were
decided at a time when the President of the Philippines replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
had no power to classify lands of the public domain into commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
were free to make corresponding classifications in
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do
they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation
so, depending upon the preponderance of the
of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as
evidence. Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster
reproduced in Section 6 of Public Land Act, gave the from the residential, commercial, and other areas they
Executive Department, through the President, possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this
the exclusiveprerogative to classify or reclassify public
mean the loss of their substantial investments on their
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. Since
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the
public domain. For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim
good faith as builders of improvements. They can take
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
particular case, having regard for its present or future
another, they may look into other modes of applying for
value for one or the other purposes. We believe,
original registration of title, such as by homestead or sales
however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle
to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or
that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the to exempt them from certain requirements under the
contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral the House of Representatives.
land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its
superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each CRUZ VS SECRETARY OF DENR
particular case Natural Resources and Environmental Law;
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
Constitutionclassifying lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v.
FACTS:
Director of Forestryis particularly instructive:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
domain does not lose such classification simply because
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do
assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
may also be classified as forest land. The classification
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
Article XII of the Constitution.
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that ISSUE:
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a HELD:
dictionary and forest or timber land as a classification of
lands of the public domain as appearing in our No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is
a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State. However, the right of
ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does
not include the right to alienate the same.
Republic vs Naguiat
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of
title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan,
Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired them by
purchase from its previous owners and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession
thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best
of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person
having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession
thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither
the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June
1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been
declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and
disposable property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of
forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The
issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous
possession of the parcels of land in question is of little
moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. The
classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like.
LIGON v. CA
FACTS: The Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP),
by virtue of an absolute deed, sold to Iglesia ni Kristo
(INK) 2 parcels of land in Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat,
QC. It was stipulated therein that IDP shall undertake to
evict all squatters in the property within 45 days from
the execution of the contract. IDP failed to do this,
hence, INK sued for specific performance with damages.
IDP, on the other hand, alleged that it was INK which
violated the contract by delaying the payment of the
purchase price and sought to have the contract of sale
rescinded.
Thereafter, INK filed a motion for partial summary
judgment on the ground that there was actually no
genuine issue as to any material fact; the TC granted.
A year after, INK filed a motion in the same case
seeking to compel Leticia Ligon (petitioner), who was in
possession of the certificates of title over the properties
as mortgagee of IDP, to surrender said certificates to the
RD of QC for the registration of the absolute deed of sale
in its name. Ligon allegedly refused and/or failed to
deliver the certificates despite repeated requests.
To this, Ligon opposed saying that (a) IDP was not served
copy of the motion, (b) ownership of INK over the
property was still in issue, (c) and that the trial court had
no jurisdiction as the motion involved the registrability of
the document of sale, and she was not made a party in
the main case.
The TC granted INKs motion and ordered petitioner to
surrender the certificates of title in open court for the
registration of the absolute deed of sale in the latters
name and the annotation of the mortgage executed in
favor of petitioner on the new certificates (to be issued
to INK). Upon Ligons motion, the TC redirected her to
deliver the documents to the RD of QC.
ISSUE: W/N INK has a superior right to the possession of
the owners copies of the certificated of title.
HELD: YES. Under our land registration law, no
voluntary
instrument shall be registered by the Register of
Deeds
unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented
together with such instrument, except in some cases
or
upon the order of the court for cause shown. In case the
person in possession refuses or fails to surrender the
same to the RD so that a voluntary document may be
registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107 of P.D.
No. 1529 states:
Where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to
surrender the owners duplicate, the party in
interest may file a petition in court to compel
surrender of the same to the RD. The court, after
hearing, may order the registered owner or any
person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If
the person withholding the duplicate certificate is
not amenable to the process of the court, of if for
any reason the outstanding owners duplicate cannot
be delivered, the court may order the annulment of
the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate
of title in lieu thereof.
Pursuant to Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, the distinction
between the RTCs general and the limited jurisdiction
when acting merely as a cadastral court has been
eliminated. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the RTCs the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also over
petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine all questions arising upon
such applications or petitions.
Even while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of a petition
which can be filed by one who wants to compel another
to surrender the certificates of title to the RD, this does
not preclude a party to a pending case to include as
incident therein the relief stated under said section,
especially if the subject certificates of title to be
surrendered are intimately connected with the
subject
matter of the principal action. The principal action is
based on expediency and in accordance with the policy
against multiplicity of suits.
The order directing the surrender of the certificates to
the RD in order that the deed be registered in favor of
INK cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests
as mortagee, since any lien annotated on the previous
certificates which subsists shall be incorporated or
carried over to the new certificates of title.
Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)
FACTS:
The case involves two petitions which were consolidated
by the court in its decision.
1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of
Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for recovery of real
property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction against private defendants
Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the
subject estate by employing fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation.
RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the
defendants are already the registered owners covered by
the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the
alleged Spanish Title of San Pedro. The Spanish Title
also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the
coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court
ordered Plaintiff Intestate to pay each defendant the
amount of 5,000 and atty fees.
Motion for Recon was denied. Petitioner filed an
appeal, CA dismissed.
2. GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for
letter of administration over the intestate to be appointed
as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri
appointed San Pedro as administrator and the court
issued letter of administration in his favor upon posting a
bond of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention
and opposition to the petition, claiming that the Titulo de
Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of
ownership in court and it is invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but
the Republics opposition to the petition for letter of
administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for
Recon.
The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void
and excluded all lands covered from the inventory of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the
issue of ownership of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136?
Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original Titulo
nor a genuine copy thereof (only an alleged illegible copy
was presented). Even the secondary evidence presented
was also not admissible.
RULING:
The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can
be derived therefrom. All lands covered by said Titulo are
excluded from inventory of the estate. The petition for
letter of administration closed and terminated. The heirs
are disallowed to exercise any act of possession or
ownership and ordered to vacate.

2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in

excluding from the inventory of the estate all lands
covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the ground
that it is null and void?

RATIO:

1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court

functioning as probate court. The jurisdiction of the
Probate Court is not limited to the determination of who
the heirs are and what shares are due them. Their main
function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the
deceased so as to rule on whether the inventory of the
estate properly included them for distribution of the net
assets estate to lawful heirs.

2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it
declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void,
consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title
from the inventory of the estate.

Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish

Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
Titles should cause their lands to be registered under
Land Registration Act within 6 months from date of
effectivity or until August 16, 1976.
In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to
show that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 was brought
under the operation of PD 892. There was no certificate
of title shown.

Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is

inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private
ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo
was not registered under Land Registration Act, said
Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants
Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter
enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity.