FIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.118506.April18,1997]

NORMA MABEZA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

PETERNG/HOTELSUPREME,respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN,J.:

ThispetitionseekingthenullificationofaresolutionofpublicrespondentNationalLaborRelations
Commission dated April 28, 1994 vividly illustrates why courts should be ever vigilant in the
preservation of the constitutionally enshrined rights of the working class. Without the protection
accorded by our laws and the tempering of courts, the natural and historical inclination of capital to
rideroughshodovertherightsoflaborwouldrununabated.
The facts of the case at bar, culled from the conflicting versions of petitioner and private
respondent,areillustrative.
Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that around the first week of May, 1991, she and her co
employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were asked by the hotel's management to sign an
instrumentattestingtothelatter'scompliancewithminimumwageandotherlaborstandardprovisions
oflaw.[1]Theinstrumentprovides:[2]

JOINTAFFIDAVIT

We,SYLVIAIGANA,HERMINIGILDOAQUINO,EVELYNOGOY,MACARIAJUGUETA,
ADELAIDANONOG,NORMAMABEZA,JONATHANPICARTandJOSEDIZON,alloflegalages
(sic),FilipinosandresidentsofBaguioCity,underoath,deposeandsay:

1.ThatweareemployeesofMr.PeterL.NgofhisHotelSupremesituatedatNo.416MagsaysayAve.,Baguio
City

2.ThatthesaidHotelisseparatelyoperatedfromtheIvy'sGrillandRestaurant

3.Thatweareall(8)employeesinthehotelandassignedineachrespectiveshifts

4.ThatwehavenocomplaintsagainstthemanagementoftheHotelSupremeaswearepaidaccordinglyand
thatwearetreatedwell.

5.Thatweareexecutingthisaffidavitvoluntarilywithoutanyforceorintimidationandforthepurposeof
informingtheauthoritiesconcernedandtodisputetheallegedreportoftheLaborInspectoroftheDepartmentof
LaborandEmploymentconductedonthesaidestablishmentonFebruary2,1991.

INWITNESSWHEREOF,wehavehereuntosetourhandsthis7thdayofMay,1991atBaguioCity,
Philippines.
(Sgd.)(Sgd.)(Sgd.)
SYLVIAIGAMAHERMINIGILDOAQUINOEVELYNOGOY
(Sgd)(Sgd.)(Sgd.)
 MACARIAJUGUETAADELAIDANONOGNORMAMABEZA
(Sgd)(Sgd.)
JONATHANPICARTJOSEDIZON
SUBSCRIBEDANDSWORNtobeforemethis7thdayofMay,1991,atBaguioCity,Philippines.

Asst.CityProsecutor

Petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the City Prosecutor's Office to swear to the
veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. The affidavit was nevertheless
submitted on the same day to the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in
BaguioCity.
As gleaned from the affidavit, the same was drawn by management for the sole purpose of
refuting findings of the Labor Inspector of DOLE (in an inspection of respondent's establishment on
February2,1991)apparentlyadversetotheprivaterespondent.[3]
AftersherefusedtoproceedtotheCityProsecutor'sOfficeonthesamedaytheaffidavitwas
submitted to the Cordillera Regional Office of DOLE petitioner avers that she was ordered by the
hotelmanagementtoturnoverthekeystoherlivingquartersandtoremoveherbelongingsfromthe
hotelpremises.[4]Accordingtoher,respondentstronglychidedherforrefusingtoproceedtotheCity
Prosecutor'sOfficetoattesttotheaffidavit.[5]Shethereafterreluctantlyfiledaleaveofabsencefrom
herjobwhichwasdeniedbymanagement.WhensheattemptedtoreturntoworkonMay10,1991,
the hotel's cashier, Margarita Choy, informed her that she should not report to work and, instead,
continue with her unofficial leave of absence.Consequently, on May 13, 1991, three days after her
attempttoreturntowork,petitionerfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalbeforetheArbitrationBranch
oftheNationalLaborRelationsCommissionCARBaguioCity.Inadditiontohercomplaintforillegal
dismissal,sheallegedunderpaymentofwages,nonpaymentofholidaypay,serviceincentiveleave
pay,13thmonthpay,nightdifferentialandotherbenefits.ThecomplaintwasdocketedasNLRCCase
No.RABCAR05019891andassignedtoLaborArbiterFelipeP.Pati.
Responding to the allegations made in support of petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal,
privaterespondentPeterNgallegedbeforeLaborArbiterPatithatpetitioner"surreptitiouslyleft(her
job)withoutnoticetothemanagement"[6]andthatsheactuallyabandonedherwork.He maintained
thattherewasnobasisforthemoneyclaimsforunderpaymentandotherbenefitsasthesewerepaid
intheformoffacilitiestopetitionerandthehotel'sotheremployees.[7]PointingtotheAffidavitofMay
7, 1991, the private respondent asserted that his employees actually have no problems with
management.Inasupplementalanswersubmittedeleven(11)monthsaftertheoriginalcomplaintfor
illegal dismissal was filed, private respondent raised a new ground, loss of confidence, which was
supportedbyacriminalcomplaintforQualifiedThefthefiledbeforetheprosecutor'sofficeoftheCity
ofBaguioagainstpetitioneronJuly4,1991.[8]
OnMay14,1993,LaborArbiterPatirenderedadecisiondismissingpetitioner'scomplaintonthe
groundoflossofconfidence.Hisdisquisitionsinsupportofhisconclusionreadasfollows:
Itappearsfromtheevidenceofrespondentthatcomplainantcartedawayorstoleone(1)blanket,1
piecebedsheet,1piecethermos,2piecestowel(Exhibits'9','9A,''9B,''9C'and'10'pages1214
TSN,December1,1992).
Infact,thiswasthereasonwhyrespondentPeterNglodgedacriminalcomplaintagainstcomplainant
forqualifiedtheftandperjury.Thefiscal'sofficefindingaprimafacieevidencethatcomplainant
committedthecrimeofqualifiedtheftissuedaresolutionforitsfilingincourtbutdismissingthecharge
ofperjury(Exhibit'4'forrespondentandExhibit'B7'forcomplainant).Asaconsequence,complainant
waschargedincourtforthesaidcrime(Exhibit'5'forrespondentandExhibit'B6'forthe
complainant).
 Withthesepiecesofevidence,complainantcommittedseriousmisconductagainstheremployerwhich
isoneofthejustandvalidgroundsforanemployertoterminateanemployee(Article282oftheLabor
Codeasamended).[9]
On April 28, 1994, respondent NLRC promulgated its assailed Resolution[10] affirming the Labor
Arbiter's decision. The resolution substantially incorporated the findings of the Labor Arbiter.[11]
Unsatisfied,petitionerinstitutedtheinstantspecialcivilactionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRules
ofCourtonthefollowinggrounds:[12]
1.WITHALLDUERESPECT,THEHONORABLENATIONALLABORRELATIONS
COMMISSIONCOMMITTEDAPATENTANDPALPABLEERRORAMOUNTINGTO
GRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINITSFAILURETOCONSIDERTHATTHE
ALLEGEDLOSSOFCONFIDENCEISAFALSECAUSEANDANAFTERTHOUGHT
ONTHEPARTOFTHERESPONDENTEMPLOYERTOJUSTIFY,ALBEIT
ILLEGALLY,THEDISMISSALOFTHECOMPLAINANTFROMHEREMPLOYMENT
2.WITHALLDUERESPECT,THEHONORABLENATIONALLABORRELATIONS
COMMISSIONCOMMITTEDAPATENTANDPALPABLEERRORAMOUNTINGTO
GRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINADOPTINGTHERULINGOFTHELABOR
ARBITERTHATTHEREWASNOUNDERPAYMENTOFWAGESANDBENEFITSON
THEBASISOFEXHIBIT"8"(ANUNDATEDSUMMARYOFCOMPUTATION
PREPAREDBYALLEGEDLYBYRESPONDENT'SEXTERNALACCOUNTANT)
WHICHISTOTALLYINADMISSIBLEASANEVIDENCETOPROVEPAYMENTOF
WAGESANDBENEFITS
3.WITHALLDUERESPECT,THEHONORABLENATIONALLABORRELATIONS
COMMISSIONCOMMITTEDAPATENTANDPALPABLEERRORAMOUNTINGTO
GRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONINFAILINGTOCONSIDERTHEEVIDENCE
ADDUCEDBEFORETHELABORARBITERASCONSTITUTINGUNFAIRLABOR
PRACTICECOMMITTEDBYTHERESPONDENT.
TheSolicitorGeneral,inaManifestationinlieuofCommentdatedAugust8,1995rejectsprivate
respondent'sprincipalclaimsanddefensesandurgesthisCourttosetasidethepublicrespondent's
assailedresolution.[13]
Weagree.
It is settled that in termination cases the employer bears the burden of proof to show that the
dismissalisforjustcause,thefailureofwhichwouldmeanthatthedismissalisnotjustifiedandthe
employeeisentitledtoreinstatement.[14]
Inthecaseatbar,theprivaterespondentinitiallyclaimedthatpetitionerabandonedherjobwhen
she failed to return to work on May 8, 1991. Additionally, in order to strengthen his contention that
there existed sufficient cause for the termination of petitioner, he belatedly included a complaint for
lossofconfidence,supportingthiswithchargesthatpetitionerhadstolenablanket,abedsheetand
twotowelsfromthehotel.[15]Appendedtohislastcomplaintwasasuitforqualifiedtheftfiledwiththe
BaguioCityprosecutor'soffice.
From the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the circumstances upon which private
respondentanchoredhisclaimthatpetitioner"abandoned"herjobwerenotenoughtoconstitutejust
cause to sanction the termination of her services under Article 283 of the Labor Code. For
abandonmenttoarise,theremustbeconcurrenceoftwothings:1)lackofintentiontowork[16]and2)
thepresenceofovertactssignifyingtheemployee'sintentionnottowork.[17]
In the instant case, respondent does not dispute the fact that petitioner tried to file a leave of
absencewhenshelearnedthatthehotelmanagementwasdispleasedwithherrefusaltoattesttothe
affidavit. The fact that she made this attempt clearly indicates not an intention to abandon but an
intention to return to work after the period of her leave of absence, had it been granted, shall have
expired.
Furthermore, while absence from work for a prolonged period may suggest abandonment in
certaininstances,mereabsenceofoneortwodayswouldnotbeenoughtosustainsuchaclaim.The
overtact(absence)oughttounerringlypointtothefactthattheemployeehasnointentiontoreturnto
work,[18]whichispatentlynotthecasehere.Infact,severaldaysaftershehadbeenadvisedtotake
aninformalleave,petitionertriedtoresumeworkingwiththehotel,tonoavail.Itwasonlyaftershe
hadbeenrepeatedlyrebuffedthatshefiledacaseforillegaldismissal.Theseactsmilitateagainstthe
private respondent's claim that petitioner abandoned her job. As the Solicitor General in his
manifestationobserved:
Petitioner'sabsenceonthatdayshouldnotbeconstruedasabandonmentofherjob.Shedidnotreport
becausethecashiertoldhernottoreportanymore,andthatprivaterespondentNgdidnotwanttosee
herinthehotelpremises.Buttwodayslateroronthe10thofMay,afterrealizingthatshehadtoclarify
heremploymentstatus,sheagainreportedforwork.However,shewaspreventedfromworkingby
privaterespondents.[19]
We now come to the second cause raised by private respondent to support his contention that
petitionerwasvalidlydismissedfromherjob.
Lossofconfidenceasajustcausefordismissalwasneverintendedtoprovideemployerswitha
blank check for terminating their employees. Such a vague, allencompassing pretext as loss of
confidence, if unqualifiedly given the seal of approval by this Court, could readily reduce to barren
form the words of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Having this in mind, loss of
confidence should ideally apply only to cases involving employees occupying positions of trust and
confidenceortothosesituationswheretheemployeeisroutinelychargedwiththecareandcustody
of the employer's money or property. To the first class belong managerial employees, i.e., those
vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions and to the second class belong cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc., or
thosewho,inthenormalandroutineexerciseoftheirfunctions,regularlyhandlesignificantamounts
of money or property. Evidently, an ordinary chambermaid who has to sign out for linen and other
hotelpropertyfromthepropertycustodianeachdayandwhohastoaccountforeachandeverytowel
orbedsheetutilizedbythehotel'sguestsattheendofhershiftwouldnotfallunderanyofthesetwo
classes of employees for which loss of confidence, if ably supported by evidence, would normally
apply.Illustratingthisdistinction,thisCourt,inMarinaPortServices,Inc.vs.NLRC,[20]hasstatedthat:
Tobesure,everyemployeemustenjoysomedegreeoftrustandconfidencefromtheemployerasthat
isonereasonwhyhewasemployedinthefirstplace.Onecertainlydoesnotemployapersonhe
distrusts.Indeed,eventhelowlyjanitormustenjoythattrustandconfidenceinsomemeasureifonly
becauseheistheonewhoopenstheofficeinthemorningandclosesitatnightandinthissenseis
entrustedwiththecareorprotectionoftheemployer'sproperty.Thekeysheholdsarethesymbolof
thattrustandconfidence.
Bythesametoken,thesecurityguardmustalsobeconsideredasenjoyingthetrustandconfidenceof
hisemployer,whosepropertyheissafeguarding.Likethejanitor,hehasaccesstothisproperty.Hetoo,
ischargedwithitscareandprotection.
Notably,however,andlikethejanitoragain,heisentrustedonlywiththephysicaltaskofprotecting
thatproperty.Theemployer'strustandconfidenceinhimislimitedtothatministerialfunction.Heis
notentrusted,intheLaborArbiter'swords,'withthedutiesofsafekeepingandsafeguardingcompany
policies,managementinstructions,andcompanysecretssuchasoperationdevices.'Heisnotprivyto
theseconfidentialmatters,whicharesharedonlyinthehigherechelonsofmanagement.Itisthe
personsonsuchlevelswho,becausetheydischargethesesensitiveduties,maybeconsideredholding
positionsoftrustandconfidence.Thesecurityguarddoesnotbelonginsuchcategory.[21]
 More importantly, we have repeatedly held that loss of confidence should not be simulated in
ordertojustifywhatwouldotherwisebe,undertheprovisionsoflaw,anillegaldismissal."Itshouldnot
beusedasasubterfugeforcauseswhichareillegal,improperandunjustified.Itmustbegenuine,not
amereafterthoughttojustifyanearlieractiontakeninbadfaith."[22]
In the case at bar, the suspicious delay in private respondent's filing of qualified theft charges
againstpetitionerlongafterthelatterexposedthehotel'sscheme(toavoiditsobligationsasemployer
under the Labor Code) by her act of filing illegal dismissal charges against the private respondent
would hardly warrant serious consideration of loss of confidence as a valid ground for dismissal.
Notably, the Solicitor General has himself taken a position opposite the public respondent and has
observedthat:
Ifpetitionerhadreallycommittedtheactschargedagainstherbyprivaterespondents(stealingsupplies
ofrespondenthotel),privaterespondentsshouldhaveconfrontedherbeforedismissingheronthat
ground.Privaterespondentsdidnotdoso.Infact,privaterespondentNgdidnotraisethematterwhen
petitionerwenttoseehimonMay9,1991,andhandedhimherapplicationforleave.Ittookprivate
respondents52daysoruptoJuly4,1991beforefinallydecidingtofileacriminalcomplaintagainst
petitioner,inanobviousattempttobuildacaseagainsther.
Themanipulationsofprivaterespondentsshouldnotbecountenanced.[23]
Clearly,theeffortstojustifypetitioner'sdismissalontopoftheprivaterespondent'sschemeof
inducinghisemployeestosignanaffidavitabsolvinghimfrompossibleviolationsoftheLaborCode
taintswithevidentbadfaithanddeliberatemalicepetitioner'ssummaryterminationfromemployment.
Havingsaidthis,weturntotheimportantquestionofwhetherornotthedismissalbytheprivate
respondentofpetitionerconstitutesanunfairlaborpractice.
Theanswerinthiscasemustinevitablybeintheaffirmative.
Thepivotalquestioninanycasewhereunfairlaborpracticeonthepartoftheemployerisalleged
iswhetherornottheemployerhasexertedpressure,intheformofrestraint,interferenceorcoercion,
against his employee's right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions of
employment.Withoutdoubt,theactofcompellingemployeestosignaninstrumentindicatingthatthe
employerobservedlaborstandardsprovisionsoflawwhenhemighthavenot,togetherwiththeactof
terminatingorcoercingthosewhorefusetocooperatewiththeemployer'sschemeconstitutesunfair
laborpractice.Thefirstactclearlypreemptstherightofthehotel'sworkerstoseekbettertermsand
conditionsofemploymentthroughconcertedaction.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation in his manifestation that "[t]his actuation... is
analogous to the situation envisaged in paragraph (f) of Article 248 of the Labor Code"[24] which
distinctlymakesitanunfairlaborpractice"todismiss,dischargeorotherwiseprejudiceordiscriminate
againstanemployeeforhavinggivenorbeingabouttogivetestimony"[25]undertheLaborCode.For
innotgivingpositivetestimonyinfavorofheremployer,petitionerhadreservednotonlyherrightto
dispute the claim and proffer evidence in support thereof but also to work for better terms and
conditionsofemployment.
Forrefusingtocooperatewiththeprivaterespondent'sscheme,petitionerwasobviouslyheldup
asanexampletoallofthehotel'semployees,thattheycouldonlycausetroubletomanagementat
greatpersonalinconvenience.Implicitintheactofpetitioner'sterminationandthesubsequentfilingof
chargesagainstherwasthewarningthattheywouldnotonlybedeprivedoftheirmeansoflivelihood,
butalsopossibly,theirpersonalliberty.
This Court does not normally overturn findings and conclusions of quasijudicial agencies when
thesameareablysupportedbytheevidenceonrecord.However,wheresuchconclusionsarebased
on a misperception of facts or where they patently fly in the face of reason and logic, we will not
hesitatetosetasidethoseconclusions.Goingintotheissueofpetitioner'smoneyclaims,wefindone
moresalientreasoninthiscasetosetthingsright:thelaborarbiter'sevaluationofthemoneyclaims
inthiscaseincrediblyignoresexistinglawandjurisprudenceonthematter.Itsblatantonesidedness
simplyraisesthesuspicionthatsomethingmorethanthefacts,thelawandjurisprudencemayhave
influencedthedecisionattheleveloftheArbiter.
Labor Arbiter Pati accepted hook, line and sinker the private respondent's bare claim that the
reasonthemonetarybenefitsreceivedbypetitionerbetween1981to1987werelessthanminimum
wagewasbecausepetitionerdidnotfactorinthemeals,lodging,electricconsumptionandwatershe
receivedduringtheperiodinhercomputations.[26]Grantingthatmealsandlodgingwereprovidedand
indeedconstitutedfacilities,suchfacilitiescouldnotbedeductedwithouttheemployercomplyingfirst
with certain legal requirements. Without satisfying these requirements, the employer simply cannot
deduct the value from the employee's wages. First, proof must be shown that such facilities are
customarily furnished by the trade. Second, the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily
acceptedinwritingbytheemployee.Finally,facilitiesmustbechargedatfairandreasonablevalue.[27]
These requirements were not met in the instant case. Private respondent "failed to present any
companypolicyorguidelinetoshowthatthemealandlodging...(are)partofthesalary"[28]hefailed
toprovideproofoftheemployee'swrittenauthorizationand,hefailedtoshowhowhearrivedatthe
valuations.[29]
Curiously,inthecaseatbench,theonlyvaluationsrelieduponbythelaborarbiterinhisdecision
were figures furnished by the private respondent's own accountant, without corroborative evidence.
OnthepretextthatrecordspriortotheJuly16,1990earthquakewerelostordestroyed,respondent
failedtoproducepayrollrecords,receiptsandotherrelevantdocuments,wherehecouldhave,ashas
been pointed out in the Solicitor General's manifestation, "secured certified copies thereof from the
nearestregionalofficeoftheDepartmentofLabor,theSSSortheBIR."[30]
More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by the petitioner
werenotfacilitiesbutsupplements.Abenefitorprivilegegrantedtoanemployeefortheconvenience
oftheemployerisnotafacility.Thecriterioninmakingadistinctionbetweenthetwonotsomuchlies
inthekind(food,lodging)butthepurpose.[31]Considering,therefore,thathotelworkersarerequired
toworkdifferentshiftsandareexpectedtobeavailableatvariousoddhours,theirreadyavailabilityis
anecessarymatterintheoperationsofasmallhotel,suchastheprivaterespondent'shotel.
It is therefore evident that petitioner is entitled to the payment of the deficiency in her wages
equivalenttothefullwageapplicablefromMay13,1988uptothedateofherillegaldismissal.
Additionally, petitioner is entitled to payment of service incentive leave pay, emergency cost of
livingallowance,nightdifferentialpay,and13thmonthpayfortheperiodsallegedbythepetitioneras
theprivaterespondenthasneverbeenabletoadduceproofthatpetitionerwaspaidtheaforestated
benefits.
However,theclaimscoveringtheperiodofOctober1987uptothetimeoffilingthecaseonMay
13, 1988 are barred by prescription as P.D. 442 (as amended) and its implementing rules limit all
moneyclaimsarisingoutofemployeremployeerelationshiptothree(3)yearsfromthetimethecause
ofactionaccrues.[32]
We departfromthe settled rule that an employee who is unjustly dismissedfromworknormally
should be reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Owing to the strained
relations between petitioner and private respondent, allowing the former to return to her job would
only subject her to possible harassment and future embarrassment. In the instant case, separation
payequivalenttoonemonth'ssalaryforeveryyearofcontinuousservicewiththeprivaterespondent
wouldbeproper,startingwithherjobattheBelfrontHotel.
Inadditiontoseparationpay,backwagesareinorder.PursuanttoR.A.6715andourdecisionin
Osmalik Bustamante, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[33] petitioner is entitled to full
backwagesfromthetimeofherillegaldismissaluptothedateofpromulgationofthisdecisionwithout
qualificationordeduction.
 Finally,indismissalcases,thelawrequiresthattheemployermustfurnishtheemployeesought
tobeterminatedfromemploymentwithtwowrittennoticesbeforethesamemaybelegallyeffected.
Thefirstisawrittennoticecontainingastatementofthecause(s)fordismissalthesecondisanotice
informingtheemployeeoftheemployer'sdecisiontoterminatehimstatingthebasisofthedismissal.
During the process leading to the second notice, the employer must give the employee ample
opportunitytobeheardanddefendhimself,withtheassistanceofcounselifhesodesires.
Given the seriousness of the second cause (qualified theft) of the petitioner's dismissal, it is
noteworthy that the private respondent never even bothered to inform petitioner of the charges
againsther.Neitherwaspetitionergiventheopportunitytoexplainthelossofthearticles.Itwasonly
almosttwomonthsafterpetitionerhadfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissal,asanafterthought,that
the loss was reported to the police and added as a supplemental answer to petitioner's complaint.
Clearly, the dismissal of petitioner without the benefit of notice and hearing prior to her termination
violatedherconstitutionalrighttodueprocess.Underthecircumstances,anawardofOneThousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) on top of payment of the deficiency in wages and benefits for the period
aforestatedwouldbeproper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the RESOLUTION of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated April 24, 1994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs. For clarity, the
economicbenefitsduethepetitionerareherebysummarizedasfollows:
1)DeficiencywagesandtheapplicableECOLAfromMay13,1988uptothedateofpetitioner'sillegal
dismissal
2)Serviceincentiveleavepaynightdifferentialpayand13thmonthpayforthesameperiod
3)Separationpayequaltoonemonth'ssalaryforeveryyearofpetitioner'scontinuousservicewiththe
privaterespondentstartingwithherjobattheBelfrontHotel
4)Fullbackwages,withoutqualificationordeduction,fromthedateofpetitioner'sillegaldismissalup
tothedateofpromulgationofthisdecisionpursuanttoourrulinginBustamantevs.NLRC.[34]
5)P1.000.00.
SOORDERED.
Padilla,BellosilloandVitug,JJ.,concur.
Hermosisima,Jr.,J.,onleave.

[1]Rollo,p.5.PetitionerwasemployedbytheprivaterespondentoriginallyathisBelfrontHotelbutwaslaterpulledoutfor
workattheHotelSupreme,ownedbytheformer.
[2]Id.,at6.

[3]Rollo,p.6.

[4]Id.,at24.

[5]Rollo,p.7.

[6]Id.,at31.

[7]Id.,at2324.

[8]Rollo,p.22.

[9]Id.,at24.

[10]Id.,at3036.

[11]Ibid.
[12]Rollo,p.4.

[13]Id.,at6483.

[14]PolymedicGeneralHospitalvs. NLRC, 134 SCRA 420, 424 (1985) MolaveTours Corporation vs. NLRC, 250 SCRA
325,329(1995).
[15]Rollo,p.32.

[16]DagupanBusCo.,Inc.vs.NLRC,191SCRA328(1990).

[17]AsphaltandCementPavers,Inc.vs.Leogardo,Jr.,162SCRA312(1988).

[18]FlexoManufacturingCorporationvs.NLRC,135SCRA145(1985).

[19]Rollo,p.72.

[20]193SCRA420,426(1991).

[21]Ibid.

[22]GeneralBankandTrustCo.vs.CourtofAppeals,135SCRA569,578(1985).

[23]Rollo,p.73.

[24]Rollo,p.78.

[25]LaborCode,art.248(f).

[26]Rollo,p.26

[27]LaborCode,art.97(f).

[28]Rollo,p.80.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Rollo,p.80.

[31]StatesMarineCorporationvs.CebuSeamen'sAssociation,Inc.,7SCRA294,301(1963).

[32]OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCode,BookVII,RuleII,sec.1.

[33]G.R.No.111651,November28,1996.

[34]Ibid.