Jose 'Pepito' Timoner vs.

People of the Philippines and The Honorable Court

of Appeals, IV Division (G.R. No. L-62050, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA
830)

FACTS:
Petitioner is the mayor of the town of Daet in Camarines Norte. He ordered the
demolition of the stalls in Maharlika Highway, even showing himself up in those stalls
during the demolition, after these establishments had been recommended for closure by
the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and
sanitation requirements. Among the structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of
Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-
Rebustillos.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte
against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The
complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per
se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.

ISSUE:
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done
in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.

HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did
constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code,
to wit:

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of

property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any
body of water;

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a

community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare
and had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257,
declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus:

Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any
legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their
business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a
menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the
unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in
the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license,
permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number
of years does not lend legality to an act which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance
affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and the
general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that
place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights
the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere.
CASE DIGEST: Calma v. Court of Appeals and Pleasantville Development
Corporation
FACTS
Petitioner Restituto Calma is owner of a lot in a subdivision (City Heights Phase II)
developed by the respondent, wrote the president of the Association of Residents of
City Heights, Inc. complaining that the compound of the Ongs, fronting the lot of the
complainant, was being utilized as a lumber yard and that a "loathsome noise and
nervous developing sound" emanating therefrom disturbed him and his family and
caused them and their son to suffer nervous tension and illness. The president of the
association, referred the matter to Fabian Ong ordered the transfer of the lumber
cutting machine and by instructed his laborers not to do any carpentry or foundry works
in the early morning or afternoon and in the evening.

Unsatisfied with the actions taken by the association, Calma wrote and asked
PLEASANTVILLE, as its duty and obligation, to abate the nuisance emanating from the
compound of the Ong family. Petitioner failed to get an answer.

Petitioner filed with the National Housing Authority (which powers were taken over by
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission in the meantime) a complaint for
violation of PD 957. The complaint in HSRS was dismissed for lack of merit, but the
commission held PLEASANTVILLE responsible for the abatement of the alleged
nuisance.

Respondent PLEASANTVILLE filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction

with the Supreme Court asserting that the commission exceeded its jurisdiction in
requiring it to abate the alleged nuisance although the commission found that there was
no violation of PD 957. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals which, after
finding that the commissions conclusion was not well-founded with evidence, set aside
the assailed order

ISSUE
WON the Human Settlement Regulatory commission acted in grave abuse of discretion
in the assailed order requiring PLEASANTVILLE to abate the alleged nuisance.

RULING
The COMMISSION gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ordered PLEASANTVILLE to take appropriate measure for the
prevention/abatement of the nuisance complained of.

The Court finds in this case a complete disregard of the cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings when it assumed the existence of the nuisance, without
receiving evidence on the matter, to support its decison.

Moreover, the parties before the COMMISSION were petitioner and PLEASANTVILLE
only, although the persons who would be directly affected by a decision favorable to
petitioner would be the Ong spouses. Certainly, to declare their property or the
activities being conducted therein a nuisance, and to order prevention and abatement,
without giving them an opportunity to be heard would be in violation of their basic right
to due process.

24SEP
Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked
with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care
of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project
(MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother of
all scams).

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.

Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make
such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are
the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.
 Republic v Pagadian City Timber | Sept 16, 2008 | G.R. No. 159308 |
Nachura, J.
Doctrine
- License agreements is a privilege granted by the State to a person, and are not
contracts within the purview of the due process and non-impairment of contracts
clauses enshrined in the Constitution
- Filipinos have the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, with the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment
- The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, to explain
ones side, or to seek a reconsideration of the ruling complained of.

Summary
The Republic of the Philippines and Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. executed Industrial
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-040, authorizing PCT to utilize, develop,
and manage 1,999.4 hectares of land in Zamboanga del Sur according to the
Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) approved by the DENR.
Some years passed, and in response to several complaints filed by members of the
Subanen tribe, the DENR decided to conduct an evaluation and assessment of the area.
The assessment revealed that PCT failed to comply with the CDMP and thus it was
recommended that the IFMA should be cancelled. This was done by the DENR, and
affirmed by the Office of the President, but the CA ruled that the IFMA was a contract
that could not be unilaterally cancelled. However, the Court held that license
agreements are not contracts, and PCT was not denied due process.

FACTS
Oct. 14, 1994: Petitioner and respondent execute IFMA
Aug. 17, 1995: CDMP is approved by DENR
Oct. 8, 1998: DENR Region IX creates team to evaluate and assess IFMA in response to
several complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding PCTs failure to
implement the CDMP, disrespecting the IPs rights, and constant threat and harassment
by armed men.
Oct. 22, 1998: DENR sends letter giving notice of the evaluation to be conducted
Oct. 23, 1998: DENR Evaluation Team go to IFMA site and conduct assessment,
revealing the ff:
- only 98 out of 2,008 seedling hills survived
- some areas planted on belong to the Certificates of Stewardship Contracts
(CSC)
- only 1 look-out tower, 1 bunkhouse, 1 stockroom, 1 dilapidated billboard
poster, 1 multi-purpose shed, 2 concrete monuments
- facilities generally below par
- only 28% of the target goal area planted
Oct. 29, 1998: DENR Evaluation Team holds exit conference, explaining findings, and
asking Santiago (the Operations Manager of PCT) if he had any questions. He had none,
but only requested a copy of the assessment.
The Evaluation Team recommended that PCT explain why they failed to develop IFMA
according to the CDMP, as well as hiring a full-time forester, and amending the
boundary to exclude the areas covered by the CSC. However, RED Mendoza submitted
a memorandum to DENR Secretary Cerilles recommending that IFMA be cancelled for
PCTs failure to implement the CDMP and adopt agreements w/ communities and
relevant sectors. DENR Sec. Cerilles thus issued an Order canceling IFMA, which was
affirmed by the OP. Respondent went to the CA, which ruled in its favor, thus this
petition.

ISSUES
1. W/N the CA erred in ruling that the IFMA is a contract and not a mere privilege
granted by the State
2. W/N the CA erred in ordaining that PCT can invoke prior resort to arbitration or
the option to mend its violations under IFMA

RATIO
1. YES. IFMA is a license agreement under PD 705, which defines a license as a
privilege granted by the State to a person and such is evident in the IFMA itself.
Jurisprudence also supports such a view (the various cases mentioned in Alvarez
v PICOP Resources, Inc.). But even assuming the IFMA could be a contract, the
alleged property rights are not absolute. Moreover, all Filipino citizens have the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which has the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. The DENR is the instrumentality of the
State mandated to actualize the policy, and private rights must yield when they
conflict with public policy and common interest.
 2. YES. Sec. 35 of the IFMA uses the word may which is interpreted to mean that
petitioner has the discretion whether or not to give notice and allow the option
to remedy the breach. PCT is not entitled to arbitration (under Sec. 36 of IFMA)
as the cancellation was based on Sec. 26 of DAO No. 97-04 (failure to
implement CDMP and agreements w/ communities and relevant sectors).
Respondents were given the opportunity to contest the findings when the filed
the appeal and MR before the Office of the President. A party cannot feign
denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
side.

HELD
The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
and the DENR Order as well as the Resolutions of the Office of the President are
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City
from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the
said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172678, March 23, 2011

FACTS:

In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac, Palawan,

a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials conducted
search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion anchored three
nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five boats and a long fishing
net already spread over the water. The team boarded the vessel and apprehended her
captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of three Filipinos and three Chinese. Also
arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion. The Provincial Prosecutor of
Palawan dismissed the charges except those against the 17 Chinese fishermen. This
was after it was found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the illegal
acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea Lion
from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor concluded that the crew, unarmed,
outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of uncontrollable fear
of imminent danger to their lives and property which hindered them from asserting their
authority over these Chinese nationals.

With the crew of F/V Sea Lion now exculpated, F/V Sea Lion was thus, recommended to
be released to the petitioner upon proper showing of evidence of its ownership of the
aforesaid vessel. Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with said Resolutions.
The Seventeen (17) accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
for the crime of Violation of Section 88, sub-par. (3) of R.A. 8550 and sentenced them
to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS TO SIX (6) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS AND
SEVEN (7) DAYS. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion I as well as the fishing paraphernalia
and equipments used by the accused in committing the crime was ordered confiscated
in favor of the government.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to delete from said Sentences the
confiscation of F/V Sea Lion but was denied by RTC and CA, thus this petitioner was
filed.
Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the
registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members were not among
those accused of and convicted invoking Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code. The OSG
contends that even if Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, still the present
petition must fail due to petitioner's failure to present its third-party claim at the earliest
opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid.

HELD: YES. The petition has no merit.

The CA did not find either lack or error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
There was no jurisdictional error because based on the Informations, the offenses were
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. The penalties imposable
under the law were also within its jurisdiction. As a necessary consequence, the trial
court had the authority to determine how the subject fishing vessel should be disposed
of. Likewise, no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the trial court's
order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion considering the absence of evidence showing
that said vessel is owned by a third party.

Evidently, the remedial relief pursued by the petitioner was infirm and improper.
Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership was not
cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial court.
At that point, evidence should have been adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so
that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been
prayed for, rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.)

There is firstly the factual issue - to be proved by proper evidence in order to be

properly considered by the court - that the vessel is owned by a third party other than
the accused. Article 45 required too that proof be adduced that the third party is not
liable for the offense. After the admission by the accused through their guilty plea that
the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime , we believe and so hold that this
additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from the mere fact that the
alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court.

Given the absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the failure
to comply with the additional Article 45 requirement, the court's order to confiscate the
F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87 of R.A. No. 8550 cannot be incorrect to the point of
being an act in grave abuse of discretion.

Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest

Leonardo Paat
vs
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
266 SCRA 167

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR
personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner
Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to
explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR
Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC
against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action
for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could
not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones
cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity
and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is
purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to
nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject
truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant
to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause
of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the
truck.

Celestial Nickel Mining Corporation v Macro-asia (Environmental Law)

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING CORPORATION v MACRO-ASIA

G.R. No. 169080
December 19, 2007

FACTS:

On September 24, 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Infanta Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease
Contract (V-1050) for a term of 25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode
claims covering an area of 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brooke's Point, Palawan.

Infanta's corporate name was changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation on January

26, 1994 and subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation, on November 6,
1995.

Sometime in 1997, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts
and other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract
No. V-1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences
Bureau (MGB) of the DENR. The petition was docketed as DENR Case No. 97-01.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to
Infanta's (now Macroasia) mining lode claims.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasia's lease contracts on the following

grounds: (1) the nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational fees and municipal
taxes; (2) the non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations; (3) the
failure of Macroasia to provide improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the
concentration of Macroasia on logging; (5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by
Macroasia of nickel ore from Celestial's property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject
the mining areas to commercial production; and (7) the willingness of Celestial to pay
fees and back taxes of Macroasia.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* POA: the POA found that Macroasia and Lebach not only automatically abandoned
their areas/mining claims but likewise had lost all their rights to the mining claims. The
POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the following Mining Lease Contracts *
MAB: affirmed POA. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply with its work
obligations from 1986 to 1991.

However, contrary to the findings of the POA, the MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that
had prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial.
In case Blue Ridge defaults, Celestial could exercise the secondary priority and
preferential rights, and subsequently, in case Celestial also defaults, other qualified
applicants could file.
(motion for reconsideration) Macroasia, in its Motion for Reconsideration, reiterated that
it did not abandon its mining claims, and even if mining was not listed among its
purposes in its amended Articles of Incorporation, its mining activities were acts that
were only ultra vires but were ratified as a secondary purpose by its stockholders in
subsequent amendments of its Articles of Incorporation.

(special motion for reconsideration) Macroasia averred that the power and authority to
grant, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements is exclusively lodged with the DENR
Secretary. Macroasia further pointed out that in arrogating upon itself such power, the
POA whimsically and capriciously discarded the procedure on conferment of mining
rights laid down in Republic Act No. (RA) 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
DENR Administrative Order No. (AO) 96-40.

* MAB (on issue of jurisdiction): The MAB further held that the power to cancel or
revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a
petition for cancellation is not a mining dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate claims or
contests during the MPSA application and not when the claims and leases were already
granted and subsisting.

IRONIC DECISIONS OF THE CA

* CA (Celestial appeal): affirmed the November 26, 2004 MAB Resolution which
declared Macroasia's seven mining lease contracts as subsisting; rejected Blue Ridge's
claim for preferential right over said mining claims; and upheld the exclusive authority
of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements.

* CA (Blue Ridge's appeal): granted Blue Ridge's petition; reversed and set aside the
November 26, 2004 and July 12, 2005 Resolutions of the MAB; and reinstated the
October 24, 2000 Decision in MAB Case Nos. 056-97 and 057-97. The Special Tenth
Division canceled Macroasia's lease contracts; granted Blue Ridge prior and preferential
rights; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining dispute
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942, explaining that
the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily includes
the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE: who has authority and jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral agreements under
RA 7942 in relation to PD 463 and pertinent rules and regulations?

HELD: DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease
contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons:
1. The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from
his administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral
resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987;

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that a. manages, supervises, and regulates the
use and development of all mineral resources of the country; b. has exclusive
jurisdiction over the management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral
resources and deposits from said lands; c. has the power to oversee, supervise, and
police our natural resources which include mineral resources.

Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the
Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and
necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.

2. RA 7942 confers to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral resources.

To enforce PD 463, the CMAO containing the rules and regulations implementing PD
463 was issued. Sec. 44 of the CMAO provides:

SEC. 44. Procedure for Cancellation.Before any mining lease contract is cancelled for
any cause enumerated in Section 43 above, the mining lessee shall first be notified in
writing of such cause or causes, and shall be given an opportunity to be heard, and to
show cause why the lease shall not be cancelled.

If, upon investigation, the Secretary shall find the lessee to be in default, the former
may warn the lessee, suspend his operations or CANCEL THE LEASE CONTRACT
(emphasis supplied).

Sec. 4 of EO 279 provided that the provisions of PD 463 and its implementing rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with the executive order, continue in force and effect.

When RA 7942 took effect on March 3, 1995, there was no provision on who could
cancel mineral agreements. However, since the aforequoted Sec. 44 of the CMAO
implementing PD 463 was not repealed by RA 7942 and DENR AO 96-40, not being
contrary to any of the provisions in them, then it follows that Sec. 44 serves as basis for
the DENR Secretary's authority to cancel mineral agreements.

Historically, the DENR Secretary has the express power to approve mineral agreements
or contracts and the implied power to cancel said agreements.
3. Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over
the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the
authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral
agreements.

Sec. 7. Organization and Authority of the Bureau (MGB). e. To CANCEL OR TO

RECOMMEND CANCELLATION AFTER DUE PROCESS, MINING RIGHTS, mining
applications and mining claims for non-compliance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations.

It is explicit from the foregoing provision that the DENR Secretary has the authority to
cancel mineral agreements based on the recommendation of the MGB Director. As a
matter of fact, the power to cancel mining rights can even be delegated by the DENR
Secretary to the MGB Director. Clearly, it is the Secretary, not the POA, that has
authority and jurisdiction over cancellation of existing mining contracts or mineral
agreements.

4. The DENR Secretary's power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the
MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation,
revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/ FTAA.

As the MGB is under the supervision of the DENR Secretary, then the logical conclusion
is that it is the DENR Secretary who can cancel the mineral agreements and not the
POA nor the MAB.

5. Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the stipulations in the Mining Lease
Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52,[50] the cancellation of which they sought from the
POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that the parties are the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now
DENR Secretary) as lessor, and Infanta (Macroasia) as lessee. [which declares that the
lessor can order the lease cancelled)

RATIO: (1) RA 7942, The Philippine Mining Act of 1995 enacted on March 3, 1995,
repealed the provisions of PD 463 inconsistent with RA 7942. Unlike PD 463, where the
application was filed with the Bureau of Mines Director, the applications for mineral
agreements are now required to be filed with the Regional Director as provided by Sec.
29 of RA 7942. The proper filing gave the proponent the prior right to be approved by
the Secretary and thereafter to be submitted to the President. The President shall
provide a list to Congress of every approved mineral agreement within 30 days from its
approval by the Secretary. Again, RA 7942 is silent on who has authority to cancel the
agreement.
Compared to PD 463 where disputes were decided by the Bureau of Mines Director
whose decisions were appealable to the DENR Secretary and then to the President, RA
7942 now provides for the creation of quasi-judicial bodies (POA and MAB) that would
have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the applications and mineral agreements.
Secs. 77, 78, and 79 lay down the procedure, thus:

SEC. 77. Panel of Arbitrators.There shall be a panel of arbitrators in the regional

office of the Department composed of three (3) members, two (2) of whom must be
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing and one [1] licensed mining engineer or
a professional in a related field, and duly designated by the Secretary as recommended
by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Director. Those designated as members of the
panel shall serve as such in addition to their work in the Department without receiving
any additional compensation. As much as practicable, said members shall come from
the different bureaus of the Department in the region. The presiding officer thereof
shall be selected by the drawing of lots. His tenure as presiding officer shall be on a
yearly basis. The members of the panel shall perform their duties and obligations in
hearing and deciding cases until their designation is withdrawn or revoked by the
Secretary. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and
decide on the following:

(a) DISPUTES INVOLVING RIGHTS TO MINING AREAS;

[NOTE: The phrase disputes involving rights to mining areas refers to any adverse
claim, protest, or opposition to an APPLICATION FOR MINERAL AGREEMENTS. The POA
therefore has the jurisdiction to resolve any adverse claim, protest, or opposition to a
pending application for a mineral agreement filed with the concerned Regional Office of
the MGB.

Clearly, POA's jurisdiction over disputes involving rights to mining areas has nothing to
do with the cancellation of existing mineral agreements.]

(b) DISPUTES INVOLVING MINERAL AGREEMENTS OR PERMITS;

[A petition for the cancellation of an existing mineral agreement covering an area

applied for by an applicant based on the alleged violation of any of the terms thereof, is
not a dispute involving a mineral agreement under Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942. It does
not pertain to a violation by a party of the right of another. The applicant is not a real
party-in-interest as he does not have a material or substantial interest in the mineral
agreement but only a prospective or expectant right or interest in the mining area. He
has no legal right to such mining claim and hence no dispute can arise between the
applicant and the parties to the mineral agreement. The court rules therefore that a
petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement anchored on the breach thereof even if
filed by an applicant to a mining claim, like Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the
jurisdiction of the DENR Secretary and not POA. Such petition is excluded from the
coverage of the POA's jurisdiction over disputes involving mineral agreements under
Sec. 77 (b) of RA 7942.]

(c) Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and

claimholders/concessionaires; and

(d) Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the
effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 78. Appellate Jurisdiction.The decision or order of the panel of arbitrators may
be appealed by the party not satisfied thereto to the Mines Adjudication Board within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof which must decide the case within thirty (30) days
from submission thereof for decision.

SEC. 79. Mines Adjudication Board.The Mines Adjudication Board shall be composed
of three (3) members. The Secretary shall be the chairman with the Director of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the Undersecretary for Operations of the
Department as members thereof.

(2) SEC. 8. Authority of the Department.The Department shall be the primary

government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the States mineral resources including those in reservations, watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain. THE SECRETARY SHALL HAVE THE AUTHORITY
TO ENTER INTO MINERAL AGREEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT UPON THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR, promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to implement the intent and provisions of this Act.

SEC. 29. Filing and approval of Mineral Agreements.x x x.

The filing of a proposal for a mineral agreement shall give the proponent the prior right
to areas covered by the same. THE PROPOSED MINERAL AGREEMENT WILL BE
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY and copies thereof shall be submitted to the President.
Thereafter, the President shall provide a list to Congress of every approved mineral
agreement within thirty (30) days from its approval by the Secretary. (Emphasis
supplied.)

OBITER DICTA:
(1) a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority in the
grant of a mining agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a legal and vested
right unless approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary. Even if Blue Ridge has a
preferential right over the subject mining claims, it is still within the competence and
discretion of the DENR Secretary to grant mineral agreements to whomever he deems
best to pursue the mining claims over and above the preferential status given to Blue
Ridge. Besides, being simply a preferential right, it is ineffective to dissolve the pre-
existing or subsisting mining lease contracts of Macroasia.

G.R. No. 169080

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v. MACROASIA
CORPORATION , et al.

G.R. No. 172936 December 19, 2007

BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORP. v. HON. ANGELO REYES, et al.

G.R. No. 176226

CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION v. BLUE RIDGE
MINERAL CORPORATION and MACROASIA CORPORATION

G.R. No. 176319

MACROASIA CORPORATION v. BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION and
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION

FACTS: In 1973, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta
Mineral and Industrial Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract (V-
1050) for a term of 25 years up to September 23, 1998 for mining lode claims covering
an area of 216 hectares at Sitio Linao, Ipilan, Brookes Point, Palawan. Infantas
corporate name was changed to Macroasia Corporation. In 1997, Celestial sought the
cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts on the following grounds: (1) the
nonpayment of Macroasia of required occupational fees and municipal taxes; (2) the
non-filing of Macroasia of Affidavits of Annual Work Obligations; (3) the failure of
Macroasia to provide improvements on subject mining claims; (4) the concentration of
Macroasia on logging; (5) the encroachment, mining, and extraction by Macroasia of
nickel ore from Celestials property; (6) the ability of Celestial to subject the mining
areas to commercial production; and (7) the willingness of Celestial to pay fees and
back taxes of Macroasia. Blue Ridge also wrote the Director of Mines to seek
cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and Lebach
Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.
 The POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the following Mining Lease
Contracts of Macroasia. It gave Celestial the preferential right to Macroasias mining
areas. It upheld Blue Ridges petiotion only as against the Mining Lease Contract areas
of Lebach and the said leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It gave
Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and
Macroasia appealed before the MAB. Lebach did not file any notice of appeal and the
resolution became final and executory. The MAB affirmed the POA findings that
Macroasia abandoned its mining claims. The MAB found that Macroasia did not comply
with its work obligations from 1986 to 1991. The MAB found that it was Blue Ridge that
had prior and preferential rights over the mining claims of Macroasia, and not Celestial.
Celestial and Macroasia moved for reconsideration. In 2004, MAB issued a Resolution
holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement
duly entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel
or revoke a mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary; that a
petition for cancellation is not a mining dispute under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
POA pursuant to Sec. 77 of RA 7942; and that the POA could only adjudicate claims or
contests during the MPSA application and not when the claims and leases were already
granted and subsisting.
In 2005, Celestial assailed the Resolution before the CA. Blue Ridge filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. The CA Twelfth Division affirmed the
MAB Resolution. Celestial filed a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 169080). The CA Special
Tenth Division canceled Macroasias lease contracts and granted Blue Ridge prior and
preferential rights. It treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a mining
dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942. Upon
inquiry with the DENR, Blue Ridge discovered that sometime in December 2005 two
MPSAs, duly approved and signed by the DENR Secretary, were issued in favor of
Macroasia. The Blue Ridge filed a Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 172936) to invalidate
the MPSAs issued to Macroasia. Macroasia and Celestial filed petition (G.R. No. 176319,
G.R. No. 176226) to assail the CAs Resolution granting Blue Ridge prior and preferential
rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not POA and MAB have jurisdiction to cancel Mineral Agreements.

HELD: In G.R. Nos. 169080, 176226 and 176319, RA 7942 or The Philippine Mining Act
of 1995 is silent on who has authority to cancel the agreement. RA 7942 is also silent
as to who is empowered to cancel existing lease contracts and mineral agreements.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its
implementing rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, the Court ruled
that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral
lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following reasons: (a) The power of
the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his administrative
authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter
I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987; (b) RA 7942 confers
to the DENR Secretary specific authority over mineral resources, particularly Sections 8
and 29 of; (c) Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR
Secretary over the MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly
demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation
of mineral agreements; (d) The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or
agreements through the MGB can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO
96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a permit/mineral
agreement/FTAA; (e) Celestial and Blue Ridge are not unaware of the stipulations in the
Mining Lease Contract Nos. V-1050 and MRD-52, the cancellation of which they sought
from the POA. It is clear from said lease contracts that the parties are the Republic of
the Philippines represented by the DENR Secretary as lessor, and Infanta (Macroasia) as
lessee, thus, the DENR Secretary has the power to cancel the lease contracts for
violations of existing laws, rules and regulations and the terms and conditions of the
contracts. The court ruled that a petition for cancellation of a mineral agreement
anchored on the breach of the mineral agreement even if filed by an applicant to a
mining claim, like Celestial and Blue Ridge, falls within the jurisdiction of the DENR
Secretary and not POA.
In G.R. No. 172936, the records showed that the DENR Secretary did not
gravely abuse his discretion in approving and signing MPSA in favor of Macroasia.
Moreover, a preferential right would at most be an inchoate right to be given priority in
the grant of a mining agreement. It has not yet been transformed into a legal and
vested right unless approved by the MGB or DENR Secretary. RA 7942 further confers
exclusive and primary jurisdiction on the DENR Secretary to approve mineral
agreements, which is purely an administrative function within the scope of his powers
and authority. In exercising such exclusive primary jurisdiction, the DENR Secretary,
through the MGB, has the best competence to determine to whom mineral agreements
are granted. Settled is the rule that the courts will defer to the decisions of the
administrative offices and agencies by reason of their expertise and experience in the
matters assigned to them pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, while it is true that the subject mining claims are under litigation, this
does not preclude the DENR and its Secretary from carrying out their functions and
duties without a restraining order or an injunctive writ. Otherwise, public interest and
public service would unduly suffer by mere litigation of particular issues where
government interests would be unduly affected. In the instant case, it must be borne in
mind that the government has a stake in the subject mining claims. Also, Macroasia
had various valid existing mining lease contracts over the subject mining lode claims
issued by the DENR. Thus, Macroasia has an advantage over Blue Ridge and Celestial
insofar as the administrative aspect of pursuing the mineral agreements is concerned.
The petitions under G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, and 176229 are dismissed while
the petition under G.R. No. 176319 is granted.
Universal Robina v LLDA

FACTS: Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal
Robina Corporation (URC) failed to comply with government standards provided under
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders
(DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved
that URC is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to
reconsider, however, the LLDA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders
before the Court of Appeals. The appellant court went on to chide petitioner's petition
for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decision or orders
of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which
should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy
or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies

RULING: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of

our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that Courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had
thus available remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show
that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter
merely adopts the LLDA's findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.

The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative

proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strictest judicial sense for it is enough that the
party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Shell Philippine Exploration v Jalos

The Supreme Court has ruled that fishermen from Northwestern Palawan could sue
Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. for possible physical disruption of marine environment
resulting in the pollution and decline of their livelihood.

All the elements of a cause of action are present. First, [the fishermen] undoubtedly
had the right to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources which is
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Second, Shell had the correlative duty to
refrain from acts or omissions that could impair [the fishermens] use and enjoyment of
the bounties of the seas. Lastly, Shells construction and operation of the pipeline which
is an act of physical intrusion into the marine environment is said to have disrupted and
impaired the natural habitat of fish and resulted in considerable reduction of fish catch
and income for [the fishermen, the high court first division said in a 48-page decision
penned by Associate Justice Roberto Abad.

In this case, a valid judgment for damages can be made in favor of [the fishermen] if
the construction and operation of the pipeline indeed caused fish decline and eventually
led to the fishermens loss of income, the high court added.
However, the high court said the fishermen should have filed their complaint with the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) not the regional trial court because Republic Act
3931 as amended by Presidential Decree 984 or the Pollution Control Law, the PAB has
primary jurisdiction over pollution cases and actions for related damages. It added that
the PABs decision may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
In 1990, Shell and the Philippine government entered into Service Contract 38 for the
exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan. After two years, Shell
discovered Natural Gas in the Camago-Malampaya and pursued its development of the
well under the Malampaya Natural Gas project. This led to the construction of pipelines
that spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea.

In 2003, fishermen Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 others filed a
complaint for damages before the Pinamalayan Mindoro regional trial court, saying that
due to the construction of the pipeline, the sea became polluted and their income per
month fell from P4,848 to P573.

Shell said the fishermen have no cause of action against them and could not be sued,
citing state immunity because they are agents of the Philippine government under
Service Contract 38.

The lower court dismissed the case filed by the fishermen. It went to the Court of
Appeals who reversed the lower courts ruling.

The Supreme Court also pointed out that Shell has no state immunity because it was
not an agent but a service contractor for the exploration activity.

The high court said that while they affirmed the lower courts decision dismissing the
complaint by the fishermen, it could still pursue its complaint against Shell before the
PAB.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US

Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
 diplomaticclearance for the said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the
Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January 6, 2013, the ship left
Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in
Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the
Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha
Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident,
and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging

operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo,
Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.

3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given

question. Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged,
and calls for more than just a generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is
a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
 In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public
right of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in
Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for
the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own
and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding

officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings
the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the
UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail
to complywith the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they

continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request
forcompliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave
the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the
coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship
operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this
Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and

31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized
entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is
one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI)
which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing
out that such has nothing to do with its the US acceptance of customary international
rules on navigation.

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting
the countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its
obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal
waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to
cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly
or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is

beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships
from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial
sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately
if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be
liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel
operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal

jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a
writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be
filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-

application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be
found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant
damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules
allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under
R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila

Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay
had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that
ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively
ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for
swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will
adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take
such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water
to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.
It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up
water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so,
the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and
clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against
the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.

HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17
requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as
long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for
specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of
such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line
between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus.
While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law
exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by
mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing
mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives
with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by
administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized

in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v.

Secretary Angelo Reyes

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract
No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service
contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait during which it
performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was
brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon Strait by two individuals
acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition
was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk,
along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil
exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began
drilling in the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually
terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme
Court consolidated the cases for the purpose of review.

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of
whether the case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The
Court declared that mootness is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional
violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the
actions complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the
merits of the case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.
Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed
them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal
standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine
Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural
and juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine
jurisprudence moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access
in environmental cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, the need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil
extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements.
Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil
exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress.
Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not
reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp.
24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation
of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected
area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact
assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any
EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore,
the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources
can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because
Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the Court declared
that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.