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HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF HUME'S NOTION OF
DISTINCTIONS OF REASON *
I
It is commonlyoverlookedthat Hume'ssectionon abstractideas in the
Treatise1 actually proposesanswersto two quite different,though inti-
mately related,questions.2Having endorsedBerkeley'snominalism,with
its conclusionthat generalityonly arisesbecauseparticularideas function
representatively,i.e., stand for or represent(denotatively)other particu-
lar ideas of the "same sort," Hume's first task was to explain how par-
ticularideas function "beyondtheir nature""as if (they)wereuniversal."
Hume'sanswerto this questionwas, of course,psychological.He ascribed
to generalnames the capacity to stimulatein the imaginationthe dispo-
sition to recall the other resemblingparticulars.And though there are
difficultiesin the notion of disposition which trouble both theoretical
psychologistsand philosophersof science, some recent commentatorson
Hume'stheory of generalideas have praisedthis dispositionaltheory.3
Hume's second problemin the section on abstract ideas - and this is
what is generallyoverlooked- is the following.Every particularidea is
to be presumedto be orderedundermany groupsof similarity,4yet each
time it functionsrepresentativelyit stands for ideas falling into only one
such group. The white cube resemblesboth the black cube and the white
sphere,yet the generalname "white"recalls only the image of the white
sphere,togetherwith otherimages of white objects, and not the image of
the black cube. Hume'ssecondproblemwas then the problemof showing
how it is that these similaritygroupsare not confusedin thinking,making
213
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214 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
II
What Hume wrote about the distinctio rations needs only summary
treatment here.6 Suppose we were to compare a white sphere with a black
sphere and then with a white cube. The comparison leads us to note two
different similarities. Through repeated comparisons of this sort, objects
come to be arranged for us into similarity groups, and we learn through
"habit" to "view them in different aspects." Thus, for example, when we
consider the color white, we consider its resemblance to the white cube,
together with all other remembered white objects, accompanying our
ideas "with a kind of reflection, of which custom renders us, in a great
measure, insensible." In this insensible reflection a white sphere appears
and there appears conjointly a resemblance with respect to the color, thus
ordering the white sphere in the similarity group of color. In this rather
special sense this kind of reflection can be said to "abstract" the dis-
tinguished property.
Thus, it is by means of a habitual comparing of simple objects, a habit
which eventually renders us insensible to the kind of reflection which
makes the comparing possible, that objects are thought together with
respect to just certain of their similarities, and it is to be presumed that
5 NormanKemp Smith, The Philosophyof David Hume, London, Macmillanand Co.,
1941, p. 264 ff.
6 This account follows Hume, op. cit., p. 25.
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HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF DISTINCTIONS OF REASON 215
this kind of reflection,of which we are now largely, if not wholly, in-
sensible,keepsus from confusingdifferentsimilaritygroups.In this way
Hume'stheory of the distinctionof reasonsupposedlyanswersthe second
questionwhichhis inquiryinto abstractideas poses. Here, as in the case
of fume's first problem,his answeris psychological,and this, as we shall
see, in great measureaccountsfor the unsatisfactorinessof his theory of
generalideas as a logical characterizationof this type of meaning.
III
I shouldlike now to turn to EdmundHusserl'sanalysisof Hume'suse
of the distinctio rationis as give in Logische Untersuchungen,7an analysis
which shows that Hume's attempt at an answerto his second question
is greatly unsatisfactory.
In Husserl'sestimation,Hume'sdistinctionsof reasondoctrineis stated
ambiguously,and can be given both a "moderate"and a "radical"in-
terpretation.On the "moderate"readingof this passage in the Treatise
Hume's view is that every concrete phenomenalobject (impressionor
simple idea) is absolutely simple in the sense that its characteristicsare
inseparablefrom it. If this was Hume'sintendedview, then a distinction
of reasonis merely a "mentalpointing"and generalizationis to be attri-
buted to the psychologicalpowerof attention.This, of course,was a part
of the theory of Berkeley. Though Husserl criticizes this "moderate"
interpretation at length in his considerationof Berkeley's theory of
attention,8 only the "radical"interpretationwill be dealt with in this
paper.
The second possible way of viewing Hume's theory of distinctionsof
reason(the "radical"interpretation)involves the quite paradoxicalimpli-
cation that different, mutually inseparablecharacteristicsof presented
contents (color,form, and the like), which we believe are apprehendedas
parts presentin the contents, are not really in them at all. Thereis only
one kind of real parts - those parts which can also appearseparatelyby
themselves, or Hume's "simple ideas." The "radical" interpretation
furthersuggeststhat abstractpartial contents, for example, color quali-
ties, are in a sense mere fictions, since though they can be consideredby
themselves (by means of distinctionsof reason) they cannot be or be
observedby themselves.Thus color is not in the coloredcontent, nor is
form in the content formed; there are only those similaritygroupsinto
which phenomenalobjects are grouped,and certainhabits which attend
7 Husserl, op. cit., p. 192 ff.
8 Ibid., p. 137 ff. Cf. Smith, op. cit., p. 266. Smith evidently thought this was Hume's
only intended view, and that it covertly admits the generality of abstract ideas, thus
destroying Hume's case for the particularity of abstract ideas.
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216 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
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HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF DISTINCTIONSOF REASON 217
IV
In order to see that Husserl's criticism of Hume's explanation by
distinctionsof reason does not involve the ordinaryform of the infinite
regressargument,considerthe line of thought proposedby R. I. Aaron.
He claims that the infinite regressargument(in its orthodoxform) has
been assumed to be a fatal objection to the resemblancetheory of uni-
versals, but continueswith the assertion:
. . . I should like to question the assumption. For admitting the infinite regress,
does this make the argument invalid? What the Resemblance theory needs by
way of presuppositionis that we should be able to recognize a resemblancewhen
we see one. Now we do see that the resemblancebetween a and b resembles the
resemblancebetween x and y. And we see this without having to attempt the
impossibletask of observing an infinite series of resemblances.Supposingwe have
a case where a is true if b is true, and b is true if c is true, and c is true if d is true,
and so on, ad infinitum. Then admittedly we could not know that a was true. But
our present case is a different one. The regress is there, but we can know the re-
semblance in question without observing the infinity of resemblances. Conse-
quently the argument does not refute the Resemblance theory.13
10 In general, the resemblancetheory simply states that, contrary to both realism
and conceptualism,there are no universals, but generalizationis possible because we
are able to note resemblancesbetween objects, which may or may not be viewed as
possessing identical common qualities. See Aaron, op. cit., p. 151 ff. General words
refer, denotatively, to the resemblingobjects in the given group. Forms of this theory
were advanced by both Berkeley and Hume.
11 Aaron,op. cit., p. 153; H. H. Price, Thinkingand Experience,Cambridge,Harvard
University Press, 1953, pp. 23-26.
12 Husserl, op. cit., p. 115.
13 Aaron, op. cit., p. 153.
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218 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICALRESEARCH
V
It followsfrom this line of approachthat Husserl'sform of the infinite
regressargumentas directed against Hume is not the ordinaryform of
this argument- that to allow resemblanceis covertly to allow universals
- and hence Aaron'sobjectiondoes not apply. The validity of Husserl's
argument must thereforebe judged independentlyof the demonstrated
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HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF DISTINCTIONS OF REASON 219
VI
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220 ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
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HUSSERL'S CRITIQUE OF DISTINCTIONS OF REASON 221
ROBERT E. BUTTS.
BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY.
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