G.R. No.

183591 October 14 2008

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to
disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding
itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local government units
or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover,
the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any
alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite
locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said
to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern
(Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)
including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the
same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order.
In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to
conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace
partners and concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status
of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever
granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely
an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down
in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a state than
an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-
AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these
changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress
or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao
to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or
original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of
conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The
MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice
consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the
ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the
recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not
grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-
AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great
number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It
illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading
(G.R. No. L-14279)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the

Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with

Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such

non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST

questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated

to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the

Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements

and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They

sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements

or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether

denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready

ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded

from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have

been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under

the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history,

to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They

cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft,

customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and

copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies
declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those

with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000. 342 SCRA
449
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena (Iglesia
Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr.
Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela,
Prolabor, and The Public Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado, Brig.
Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas
Ople, Senator Rodolfo Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military
Bases Agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a
possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine
Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in
effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18,
1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific
Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino Jr., to exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States
and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President
Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary
Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph
E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6,
1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the
VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not
established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On
this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII,
and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in
either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental
law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict
constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the
rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs
purely executive and legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out
the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which each of the three political
branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by
law.

Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane,

Jr.G. R. No. 167919 February 14, 2007
G. R. No. 167919
February 14, 2007
Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.

FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante
Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract
for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the
improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818
kilometers, in the island province of Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs
Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective governments.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is a
kind of a treaty.

HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December 27,
1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private
law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in
the possession of the one signed by the representative of the other.
treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding,
modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to international instruments binding at international
law.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of
Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent
Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical
evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be
addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition
request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on
the following grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that
point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements
under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition
Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the
documents.

3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an

extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that
every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion
favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as
conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.

Ruling/s:

No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of
the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila, respondents.

Facts:

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative
enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process,
police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the
conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a
deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate
national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for
national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer
from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a
supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified
simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a
higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of
American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a
basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

Issue:

Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into
account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged
therein?

Held:

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business
and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in
the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made
less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the
law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty,
however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not
transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies
against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and
jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R.

No. 151445) Case Digest
Facts:

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of Balikatan-02-1. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed
suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand,
claimed that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will
be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between
the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military
assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Petitioners
also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in
combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue:

Is the Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling:

The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and it is the VFA
which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercise.

The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging war on Philippine
territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The
issues that were raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of
Reference.

Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of Balikatan-02-1 joint military
exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for the correction on its
part.

The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary Digest
G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines
through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however
require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory
state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and

international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive
Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of
the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign
nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the
2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec.
21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in

the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and
growth

CONSTANTINO v. CUISA
GR 106064

g the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The
solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the
program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs).
Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan
contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the
President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power
to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue
that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President
alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity
specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like
Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract
or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes
no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other
hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made
manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is
to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign
debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing
power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing
among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor
representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending
the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign
the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper
the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque GR 173034

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28,
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of
the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued
by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of
the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect
to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can
be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

Bayan Muna vs Romulo

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to
represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to
this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute

establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered
grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and crimes of aggression.

On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo,
signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant
petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed
the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not
among the 92.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

On May 9, 2003, then Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy

Note No. 0470 to the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) proposing the
terms of the non-surrender bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter)
between the USA and the RP.
Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO-028-037 dated May 13, 2003 (E/N BFO-028-
03, hereinafter), the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, agreed with
and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note
adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. In esse,
the Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the
RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against
them in international tribunals.8 It is reflective of the increasing pace of the
strategic security and defense partnership between the two countries. As of
May 2, 2003, similar bilateral agreements have been effected by and between
the US and 33 other countries.

The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, persons are current or former

Government officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel
or nationals of one Party.

2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent
the express consent of the first Party,

(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal

for any purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council, or

(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third

country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or
transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council.

3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the

Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or
transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent
the express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
[GRP].

4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of

the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or
transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal,
unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent
the express consent of the Government of the [US].

5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which
one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The
provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act
occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.

In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the

status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his
letter of October 28, 2003 that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a
legally binding agreement under international law; and that, under US law,
the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to
respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be
struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and
effect.

Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void

ab initio for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at
variance with universally recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit.
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement

Petitioners initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its

threshold posture being that E/N BFO-028-03 cannot be a valid medium for
concluding the Agreement.

Petitioners contentionperhaps taken unaware of certain well-recognized

international doctrines, practices, and jargonsis untenable. One of these is
the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental
agreements, which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty Reference Guide)
defines the term as follows:
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the
exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the
one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the
accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The
signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or
departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted
to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the process
of legislative approval.

In another perspective, the terms exchange of notes and executive

agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times
that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols. As
former US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis B. Sayre observed in
his work, The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts:

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other

governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive
agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. x x x
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03be it
viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of
acceptance thereof or as consent to be boundis a recognized mode of
concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.

THE PAQUETE HABANA, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)

Facts:
These are two appeals from decrees of the district court of the United States for the southern district of
Florida condemning two fishing vessels and their cargoes as prize of war.

Each vessel was a fishing smack, running in and out of Havana, and regularly engaged in fishing on the
coast of Cuba. It sailed under the Spanish flag and was owned by a Spanish subject of Cuban birth, living
in the city of Havana. It was commanded by a subject of Spain, also residing in Havana. Her master and
crew had no interest in the vessel, but were entitled to share her catch.

Her cargo consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the sea, put on board as they were caught, and
kept and sold alive. Until stopped by the blockading squadron she had no knowledge of the existence of
the war or of any blockade. She had no arms or ammunition on board, and made on attempt to run the
blockade after she knew of its existence, nor any resistance at the time of the capture.
The Paquete Habana (1st vessel) was a sloop and had a crew of three Cubans, including the master, who
had a fishing license from the Spanish government, and no other commission or license. She left Havana
and was captured by the United States gunboat Castine.

The Lola (2nd vessel) was a schooner and had a crew of six Cubans, including the master, and no
commission or license. She was stopped by the United States steamship Cincinnati, and was warned not
to go into Havana, but was told that she would be allowed to land at Bahia Honda. She then set for Bahia
Honda, but on the next morning, when near that port, was captured by the United States steamship
Dolphin.

Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key West. A libel for the condemnation of each
vessel and her cargo as prize of war was filed. Each vessel was sold by auction (the Paquete Habana for
the sum of $490 and the Lola for the sum of $800). There was no other evidence in the record of the
value of either vessel or of her cargo.

Issue:

Whether or not the fishing smacks were subject to capture during the war with Spain.

Held:

No. By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a
rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh
fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war

This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that
at the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of any
express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations
of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of belligerent states,
that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed and honestly
pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of
war.

The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if employed for a warlike
purpose, or in such a way as to give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military or naval
operations create a necessity to which all private interests must give way.

Nor has the exemption been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in taking whales or
seals or cod or other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise cured and
made a regular article of commerce.

This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the law of nations are bound to take
judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own
government in relation to the matter.

By the practice of all civilized nations, vessels employed only for the purposes of discovery or science are
considered as exempt from the contingencies of war, and therefore not subject to capture. It has been
usual for the government sending out such an expedition to give notice to other powers; but it is not
essential.
 Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016

Facts:
Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the
SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an
agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on
June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access
and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside
from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake
the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security
cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian and
disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by
the parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of

agreement with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25
since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry
into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The
Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA
needs congressional ratification.

Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the
Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is
in the form of a mere executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution,
the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign
military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument
that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing
law or treaty.

EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves

adjustments in detail in the implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are
existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been
concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of
the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.