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NEWS & VIEWS doi:10.

1038/nature17307

BE H AVIO URAL ECO NO MICS were neither fully honest nor fully dishonest.
Reported outcomes clustered around the

Corruption corrupts justified-dishonesty benchmark, especially in


countries with a high PRV score. This suggests
that high exposure to rule violations turns
people into truth stretchers, but not brazen
A cross-cultural experiment involving thousands of people worldwide shows that liars. The authors also identify a positive cor-
the prevalence of rule violations in a society, such as tax evasion and fraudulent relation between a countrys PRV score and
politics, is detrimental to individuals intrinsic honesty. participants earnings in the task, suggesting
that participants from more-corrupt countries
lied more than those from less-corrupt ones.
S H A U L S H A LV I Participants rolled a standard six-sided dice Given that participants were not involved in

D
to determine their earnings in the experiment3. activities that could affect their countrys score
oes society affect intrinsic moral Operating in private, they rolled the dice, on the PRV index, the probable causal path is
values? In a paper online in Nature, peeked at the outcome, then rolled and peeked from society-level rule violations to individ-
Gchter and Schulz 1 address this a second time, and were asked to report the ual-level dishonesty. Gchter and Schulz pro-
question with an experiment involving outcome of the first roll only. Higher reported vide multiple tests that assess the robustness of
2,568 participants in 23 countries. The numbers translated to higher earnings, with the findings; for example, they show that use of
authors show that a countrys prevalence of the exception of reporting a six, which meant the earliest available data related to PRV score,
rule violations, which for this study included getting nothing. such as corruption levels in 1996, also predicts
tax evasion, corruption and political fraud, is Because rolls were done in private, partici- participants dishonesty.
positively associated with the tendency for res- pants could easily misreport the outcome (lie) The underlying assumption of Gchter and
idents of that country to lie for a small amount to increase their earnings. Although the task Schulzs work is that country-level PRV score
of extra cash. The finding rejects the idea that does not allow individual honesty or dishon- shapes country members honesty, which is
intrinsic honesty levels are similar in countries esty to be pinpointed, the reports can be used intrinsic and thus stable across situations.
around the globe, and suggests that corruption to assess the degree and pattern of lying at the However, ample work suggests that the same
corrupts. country level. In an honest country, given a person may be both honest and dishonest,
Experimental research on human moral large enough sample and a fair dice, the dis- according to situation58. For example, when
behaviour, for which intrinsic honesty is a tribution of reported outcomes should be flat. people interact with a lying partner, they are
proxy, is not overly concerned with how people The authors refer to this as the full-honesty likely to lie as well9. This elusive dynamic is
should behave. Instead, economists, psychol- benchmark. In a country in which people missing when considering only snapshots of
ogists and other researchers are descriptively maximize profit at all costs, even by lying, (dis)honesty.
mapping the situations in which people are only the most profitable value for the dice roll Several intriguing questions remain open
likely to violate moral rules. The goal of such (five) should be reported the full-dishonesty for future work. How long does it take for
attempts is to craft useful interventions for benchmark. Many people, however, like to feel an individuals honesty to be shaped by their
encouraging moral conduct. moral even when lying, and thus prefer to shuf- countrys PRV score? According to a survey by
Indeed, peoples deviant behaviour is fle facts rather than invent them. That is, peo- Transparency International10, corruption levels
influenced by their immediate environment. ple often report the higher observed outcome fell significantly in several countries, includ-
For example, people are more likely to drop of the two rolls4, not the value that appears on ing Britain, Greece and Senegal, between 2012
litter, avoid returning their shopping trol- the first roll, as the rules dictate the justified- and 2015. When should we expect to see more
leys and even trespass on private property dishonesty benchmark. honesty in these countries? Furthermore,
when there are evident signs of disorder in Gchter and Schulz found that participants people are not confined to interacting with
their surroundings, such as graffiti2. But the
extent to which corrupt societal norms trickle
JONATHAN SCHULZ & SIMON GCHTER

down to shape peoples intrinsic standards


of honesty remained unknown, until now.
Tackling this fascinating issue, Gchter and
Schulz used existing indices for the democratic
quality of a countrys political practices, its
illicit economic activity and levels of corrup-
PRV
tion, to create a prevalence of rule violations Low
(PRV) index (Fig.1).
The authors then used this index to Average
classify 159 countries for which PRV-index
data were available as of 2003, and investigated High
23 representative countries. In each country,
No data
they sampled adult participants who were too
young to have influenced the computed index.
This is an essential ingredient in suggesting a Figure 1 | Rule violations across the globe. Gchter and Schulz1 developed a prevalence of rule
causal path that low exposure to rule viola- violations (PRV) index on the basis of a countrys political democracy, illicit economic activity and levels
tions increases peoples intrinsic honesty, not of corruption. They assigned a PRV score to 159 countries, and investigated the effect of the relative
viceversa. prevalence of societal rule violations on individuals honesty in 23 of those countries.

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RESEARCH NEWS & VIEWS

members of their own society. They travel the costs are not just financial. Corruption not 11, 525547 (2013).
abroad, do business internationally, attend only deprives people of economic prosperity 4. Shalvi, S., Dana., J., Handgraaf, M. J. J. &
De Dreu, C. K. W. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis.
student-exchange programmes and migrate. and growth, but also jeopardizes their intrinsic Processes 115, 181190 (2011).
The impact of interacting with members of honesty. 5. Shu, L. L., Mazar, N., Gino, F., Ariely, D. &
other countries on peoples honesty remains Bazerman, M. H. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 109,
an intriguing puzzle. Shaul Shalvi is in the Center for Research 1519715200 (2012).
6. Cohn, A., Fehr, E. & Marchal, M. A. Nature 516,
Most importantly, this study demonstrates in Experimental Economics and Political 8689 (2014).
that behavioural economic experimentation Decision Making (CREED) and the Psychology 7. Schweitzer, M. E., Ordez, L. & Douma, B. Acad.
can provide insight into how to tackle burn- Department, University of Amsterdam, Mgmt J. 47, 422432 (2004).
ing global problems. A European Union anti- 1018WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 8. Maggian, V. & Villeval, M. C. Exp. Econ. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s10683-015-9459-7 (2015).
corruption report11 estimated that corruption e-mail: s.shalvi@uva.nl 9. Weisel, O. & Shalvi, S. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 112,
costs the EU 120billion (US$132billion) 1065110656 (2015).
1. Gchter, S. & Schulz, J. F. Nature http://dx.doi.
each year, just shy of its annual budget. The 10. Transparency International. www.transparency.org/
org/10.1038/nature17160 (2016). cpi2015#results-table (2015).
report concluded that corruption seriously 2. Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S. & Steg, L. Science 322, 11. European Commission. EU Anti-Corruption
harms the economy and society as a whole. 16811685 (2008). Report; available at go.nature.com/vsboih
Gchter and Schulzs work makes it clear that 3. Fischbacher, U. & Fllmi-Heusi, F. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. (2014).

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