Professional Documents
Culture Documents
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter
was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer
of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court
the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
PEOPLE VS FERRER
FACTS:
Co-respondents herein were charged in violation of RA 1700 or Anti Subversion
Law by instigating, recruiting, inciting others to rise up and take arms against the
Government with the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines.
The Law punishes any person who "knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Party or of any other similar
"subversive organization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law in question or the RA 1700/ Anti Subversion Law is a bill of
attainder.
HELD:
No.Article 3 Section 22 of the Constitution provides:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its
essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The
constitutional ban against bill of attainders serves to implement the principle of
separation of powers by confining the legislatures to rule-making and thereby
forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
The singling our of a definite class, the imposition of burden on it, and a legislative
intent to stigmatise statute as a bill of attainder.
1. The Supreme Court held that when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it
will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the
member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simple to declare
the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines
but also to "any organisation having the same purpose and their successors." Its
focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,
inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as
a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is
a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
Osmena v Pendatun G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
J. Bengzon
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme
Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen
other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that
Sergio Osmea, Jr., made a privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There,
he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been
selling free things at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for
sale regardless of the gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and
without basis in truth, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the
presidential office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents
to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman
Osmea a chance to defend himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly
behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him
from office for fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its
members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?
Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate"
in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words
uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate."
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action
against him, because after his speech it had taken up other business. Respondents
answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such
approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to
standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not,
however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already
lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of
actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts
are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
the action taken by a deliberative body when the required number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held
that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive
their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as
security against hasty action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was
censured by the House, despite the argument that other business had intervened
after the objectionable remarks.
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated
Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its
action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, due to the
Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power
of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may
deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body;
that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that
the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may
justify and require its exercise. Given the exercise of the power committed to it,
the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature,
or either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise
legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign
nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it
then exercisedthe power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not
impair.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the
most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement
of lack of jurisdiction.
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs Sandiganbayan (2001)
In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application
for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was
tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive
Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens
legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other
criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest
against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed
with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator
by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend
Santiago from office for 90 days.
HELD: Yes. it is true that the Constitution provides that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose
all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power
of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may
be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can
she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer
concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have
committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be
suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-
suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it
contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal
on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.
Bondoc v Pineda
FACTS:
- Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc,
member of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for
4TH district of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest
at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
- After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
- Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted
for Bondoc because he was consistent with truth, justice and self-respect and
that they would abide by the results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was
leading.
- Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a
complete betrayal to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
- HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from
the tribunal.
- Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET
from its resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF
AN ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN
THE TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS
NOMINATION IS VALID
HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL
VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS
JUDGE TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF
THE MEMS OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID. ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:
1. IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE
HRET TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND
BONDOC. TO SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE
TRIBUNAL AS TOOL FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
2. MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS
DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT
VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
3. IT VIOLATES CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF
HRET ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE
TERMINATED W/O UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE,
DEATH, PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL
AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!
Aquino v COMELEC (1995)
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola
Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be
for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his
residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on
Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against
Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May
15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile
to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just
residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with
domicile not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning
of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances
existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given
area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through assent of voters those
most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls
short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running
in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he
established a domicile of choice and not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates
that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that
Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter
of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a
bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his
lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in
the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case
after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum
which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the
one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created
political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of
new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support
the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot be better.
MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al
G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992
Facts:
On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking
to disqualify respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing
to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a greencard
holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16,
1974.Petitioners allege that Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent
resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a petition before
the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11,
1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that
the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by
respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House
of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?
Held:
No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot
and academic for the reason that petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his
position forthe duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and
ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to
the House Electoral Tribunal and a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued
against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as
a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed
during his term of office becaus e his acts are as valid as those of
a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered.
Guingona v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
Campos, Jr., J.
Facts:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator.
To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the
CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a
formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members
for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor
leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and
that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This
is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed
that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.
Issue:
Held:
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague
as the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the
office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom
the President shall appoint:
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following
the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only
those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.