LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
HEIRS OF unless exempted by the court, files with the court
SEVERINO LISTANA 649 SCRA 416
FACTS:
Severino Listana voluntarily sold the property to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian
Reform under R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
DAR commenced summary administrative
proceedings to determine the amount of just
compensation for the property and ordered Land
Bank of the Philippines to pay Listana of the
amount, of which the Land Bank refused to pay.
Listana filed a motion for contempt against Loyares
of LBP; subsequently a warrant of arrest was issued
against the latter. The LBP filed a petition for
injunction and an application for writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing the
warrant of arrest. RTC ruled in favor of the Land
Bank. Listana filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 and reversed the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in not allowing the withdrawal of
cash bond.
RULING:
No. Rule 58 Section 4(b) states that an applicant for
preliminary injunction is required to file a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, to the
effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason
of the injunction.
The purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the
defendant against loss or damage by reason of the
injunction in case the court finally decides that the
plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly." A preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order may be
granted only when, among others, the applicant,
where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, to the effect that the
applicant will pay such party or person all damages
which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should
finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
thereto.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. Vs FIL-ESTATE
LAND, INC., et al.
FACTS:
Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc.
(JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions,
instituted a complaint for damages, in its own behalf
and as a class suit representing the regular
commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and
neighboring subdivisions who were deprived of the
use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the
immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction
(WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and
intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road. Fil-
Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action and
that it was improperly filed as a class suit. They
claim that the excavation of La Paz Road would not
necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of
action for JCHA, et al. against them since each of
them has a separate and distinct purpose and each
may be affected differently than the others. With
regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants
averred that JCHA, et al. failed to show that they
had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La
Paz Road; and further claimed that La Paz Road was
a torrens registered private road and there was
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neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted and twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of cross-arms
over it. needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project.

ISSUE: 2. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their

financial bids where privat e respondent [Nerwin]
Whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction is
emerged as the lowest bidder for all
warranted.
schedules/components of the contract. NEA then

HELD: conducted a pre-award inspection of private

No.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites
RULE 58 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION its issuance
are: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
For the writ to issue, the right sought to be
protected must be a present right, a legal right
which must be shown to be clear and positive. This
means that the persons applying for the writ must
show that they have an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in their complaint.
JCHA failed to establish a prima facie proof of
violation of their right to justify the issuance of the
writ. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is
disputable since they have no clear legal right
therein.
NERWIN vs PNOC
APRIL 11, 2012
FACTS:
1. In 1999, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) published an invitation to
pre-qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise
known as IPB No. 80, for t he supply and delivery of
about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of wood poles
respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and
facilities, including its identified supplier in
Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and
deliver NEAs requirements.
3. Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No.
FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a
civil action in the RTC in Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries
Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman,
Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 was an attempt to
subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80
to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the
wooden poles.
4. Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no
cause of action, violated the rule that government
infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to
TROs, contravened the mandatory prohibition
against non-forum shopping, and the corporate
president had no authority to sign and file the
complaint.
5. Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of
Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-
GR SP No. 83144), alleging that the RTC had thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Nerwin
had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction despite the express
prohibition from the law and from the Supreme
Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the
Rules of Court and established jurisprudence; in
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declaring respondents in default; and
disqualifying respondents counsel from
representing them.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the
issuance of temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the
Supreme Court, on government projects.
HELD:
1. The petition fails. In its decision of October 22,
2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set
aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on July
20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it
altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as
follows: a. It is beyond dispute that the crux of the
instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges
issuance of a preliminary injunction, or the earlier
TRO, for that matter; b. Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in entertaining an application
for T/preliminary injunction, and worse, in issuing a
preliminary injunction through the assailed order
enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW
Project. The same is a palpable violation of RA 8975
which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus,
already existing at the time respondent Judge issued
the assailed Orders dated Jul y 20 and December 29,
2003. 2. The said proscription is not entirely new. RA
8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which underscored
the prohibition to courts from issuing restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development
projects of, and public utilities operated by, the
government. This law w s, in fact, earlier upheld to
have such a mandatory nature by the Supreme
Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
MIAA v. RIVERA LESSEE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATIONS
in FACTS:
The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was
entrusted with the administration of Manila Intl
Airport (now MIAA). CAA entered into a 25-year
contract of lease of 4 hectares of land in Rivera
Village. On January 1995, MIAA stopped accepted
rental payments from the lessees. As a result, Rivera
Village Lessee Homeowners Association
(homeowners association) requested MIAA to sell
the leased property to its members. MIAA denied
the request because the property is intended for
airport-related activities. Homeowners association
filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
RTC denied the petition. CA issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining MIAA from
evicting the members of Rivera Village Association
from their lots.
ISSUE:
W/N the Rivera homeowners association is entitled
to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
No. Preliminary injunction is a mere ancillary
remedy which cannot stand separately or proceed
independently of the main case. Having declared
that the petition filed before the trial court was
correctly dismissed, the determination of the
homeowners associations entitlement to a writ of
preliminary injunction is already moot and
academic.
Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the
members of the homeowners association to possess
and purchase the subject property is still uncertain
considering that they have not completed the
process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in
PD 1517.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at
protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ
of preliminary injunction is issued by the court to
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prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury
to parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to
preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
can be heard fully. The writ is issued upon the
satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the
existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts
which are violative of said right. In the absence of a
clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is
not designed to protect contingent or future rights.
Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of
irreparable damage without proof of actual existing
right is not a ground for an injunction.
CITY GOVT OF BUTUAN vs CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM December 1, 2010
FACTS:
In 2002, the City of Butuan denied the application
for mayors permit of respondent Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS),
and to eventually close down CBSs radio station. It
justified its decision by claiming that CBSs
operating its broadcasting business within the
Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had
violated the Citys zoning ordinance. CBS and its
manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for
prohibition, mandamus, and damages against the
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan
City (RTC), with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the petitioners from closing its station. The
case was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge
Dabalos who initially inhibited from the case citing
previous conflicts with CBS. CBS prayed for a writ
of preliminary injunction which the RTC eventually
granted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred when it issued the
writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
No. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court,
an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a
particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case
it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be
issued only at the instance of a party who possesses
sufficient interest in or title to the right or the
property sought to be protected. It is proper only
when the applicant appears to be entitled to the
relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver
the existence of the right and the violation of the
right, or whose averments must in the minimum
constitute prima facie showing of a right to the final
relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the
issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right
to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse,
or a right which is merely contingent and may never
arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to
a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an
act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be
protected by injunction means a right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable
as a matter of law