Republic v. Rosemoor Mining department head.

We also stress the clear prerogative of the Executive

FACTS: Four respondents were granted permission to look for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato. When they discovered marble
deposits in Mount Mabio, they applied for license to exploit said marble
deposits and they were issued such license. However, in a letter,
Ernesto Maceda (newly-appointed Minister of DENR) cancelled their
license. Proclamation No. 84 was then issued, confirming the
cancellation of the license.
RTC ruled that the privilege granted under respondents license already
became a property right, which is protected under the due process
clause. License cancellation, without notice and hearing was unjust.
Moreover, the proclamation, which confirmed the cancellation of the
license was an ex post facto law.
CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. It adds that the Constitution
provides for the non-impairment of obligations and contracts, which
implies that the license of the respondents must be respected.
ISSUES + RULING:
1. WON the license was valid - NO
Petitioners: License was issued in violation of PD 463 a quarry license
should cover not more than 100 hectares in any given province. The
license was issued to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation
and covered a 330-hectare land.
Respondents: The license was embraced by 4 separate applications,
each for an aread of 81 hectares. Also, the issue has been mooted
because PD 463 has already been repealed by RA 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
SC: THE LICENSE IS NOT VALID
The issue has not been mooted because while RA 7942 has expressly
repealed provisions of mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it
respects previously issued valid and existing licenses.
Department in the evaluation and the consequent cancellation of
licenses in the process of its formulation of policies with regard to their
utilization. Courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion
without any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, granting that respondents license is valid, it can still be validly
revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of
such power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura
regalia, which reserves to the State ownership of all natural resources.
This Regalian doctrine is an exercise of its sovereign power as owner of
lands of the public domain and of the patrimony of the nation, the
mineral deposits of which are a valuable asset.
A mining license that contravenes a mandatory provision of the law
under which it is granted is void. Being a mere privilege, a license does
not vest absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending the due
process and the non- impairment clauses of the Constitution, it can be
revoked by the State in the public interest.
Also, since the license is not a contract, the non-impairment clause may
not be invoked. Even if it were, the non-impairment clause must yield to
the police power of the State.
The proclamation cannot also be said to be a bill-of-attainder, which is
a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The
proclamation only declares the nullity of the license. It does not declare
guilt or impose punishment.
The proclamation can also be said to be an ex post facto law because it
does not fall under any of the six recognized instances when a law is
considered as such. It is not even criminal or penal in nature.
Lastly, when President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84, she was still
validly exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of
1986.
Tbe Petition is GRANTED. SC set aside the decision of the CA and TC.

When the license was issued, the governing law was PD 463. Thus, it
was subject to the terms and conditions of PD 463, including the part
where it says that the quarry license shall cover an area of not more
than 100 hectares in any one province and not more than 1000 hectares
in the entire Philippines. The license in question was issued in the name
of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation and not the 4 individual
stockholders. It clearly violates PD 463 because the license covered an
area of 330-hectares.
2. WON Proclamation No. 84 which confirmed the cancellation of the
license, is valid.
COLLADO v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Edna Collado applied for registration of a parcel of
land (120 hectares in Antipolo, Rizal) with the land registration court.
She attached a technical description of the Lot, signed by Robert
Pangyarihan (Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands),
stating this survey is inside IN-12 Marikina Watershed. About a year
later, Collado amended the application to include additional co-
applicants and more applicants joined (petitioners).

The Republic through the SG, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through
Petitioners: The license was validly declared a nullity and terminated.
the Municipal Attorney and Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to
Macedasletter did not cancel or revoke the license, but merely declared
petitioners application.
its nullity. Also, the respondents waived their right to notice and hearing
in their license application.
RTC: Petitioners presented sufficient evidence to establish their
registrable rights over the Lot.
Respondents: Their right to due process was violated because there was
no notice and hearing. Proclamation No. 84 is not valid because it
violates the clause on non-impairment of contracts, it is an ex post facto CA: annulled the decision of the RTC. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all
law and/or a bill of attainder, and it was issued by the President after lands of public domain belong to the State. An applicant for registration
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. of a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. The
petitioners failed to present evidence that the Lot has been segregated
SC: PROCLAMATION NO. 84, CONFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
from the public domain and declared by competent authority to be
LICENSE, IS VALID.
alienable and disposable.
The determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested
The technical description which the petitioners attached to their
in the State as owner of all mineral resources. That determination was
application said that the survey is inside in the Mariquina Watershed.
based on policy considerations formally enunciated in the letter dated
This has been confirmed by the Administrator of the National Land Titles
September 15, 1986, issued by then Minister Maceda and, subsequently,
and Deeds in a Report.
by the President through Proclamation No. 84. As to the exercise of
prerogative by Maceda, suffice it to say that while the cancellation or
revocation of the license is vested in the director of mines and
geosciences, the latter is subject to the formers control as the
ISSUES + RULING:
1. WON Petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
Petitioners: They have occupied the Lot for a long time and their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of
owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of one of their predecessors-
in-interest1 as early as 1902. There have been 9 transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest. Also, they have
declared the Lot for taxation and paid all the real estate taxes.
The land is not covered by any form of title or any public land
application. It is also not within any government reservation.
Private rights were vested on Leyva before the issuance of EO 33
(establishing the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR)). Since EO 33
contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing
private rights, the Lot is excluded from such reservation.
Assuming no private rights attached prior to the issuance of EO 33, the
President had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public domain
and made the Lot alienable and disposable through Proclamation No.
1283. They say that the proclamation expressly excluded an area of
3780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-Boso
Townsite Reservation. They contend that the Lot in question is part of
the excluded town site are and that under CA 141, town sites are
considered alienable and disposable.
SC: PETITIONERS HAVE NO REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE LOT.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource. The most important
product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important
human necessities. The protection of watershed ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that
not only damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an "intergenerational" responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides that
any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the DENR as a protected
area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department
to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof
within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration
of the surface water or ground water or interfere with the investigation,
use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters.
Petitioners failed to complete the require period of possession under CA
1412 (Public Land Act) or under the amendment by RA 19423 and PD
10734 (the law prevailing at the time the petitioners applied for
registration).
When EO 33 was issued (1904), Leyva had been in possession of the
Lot for only 2 years. There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO
33, the petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by
deed, acquisitive prescription, or any other mode of acquisition from the
State.
Also, even if the Lot were alienable and disposable prior to the issuance
of EO 33, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Thus, ever since, the
land has become non-disposable and inalienable public land. The period
of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 could no longer be counted
because the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. CA 141 only applies to alienable and
1 Sesinando Leyva
2
Possession and occupation of lands of public domain since July 26, 1894.
3
A simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title.
disposable public agricultural land and not to forest lands, including
watershed reservations. Possession of forest lands or other inalienable
public lands cannot ripen into private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1283 has been amended by Proclamation No. 1637,
revising the area and location of proposed townsite. The new
proclamation excluded the Lot in question and reverted it to MWR
coverage.
The certification presented by the petitioners that says that the Lot is
covered by the reclassification is contradicted by the several documents
submitted by the Solicitor General. In a Report, the Administrator of
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration confirmed
that the Lot forms part of MWR and re commended the dismissal of the
application for registration. Also, in a Letter, the Deputy Land Inspector
of the DENR, confirmed that it is within the MWR. Lastly, Collados
application attached a technical description stating that the Lot is inside
the Mariquina Watershed. Once a parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, there
is the presumption that the land continues to be part of such Reservation
until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is
shown.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly
populated and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The
following ruling may be applied to this case by analogy:
"A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators
or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. WON the petition for annulment of judgment should have been given
due course.
Petitioners: The petition for annulment of judgment was filed long after
the decision of the land registration court had become final and executor
and is no longer available because of res judicata. The land registration
court had jurisdiction over the case, which involves private land. The
Republic is stopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction because the
Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
Solicitor General: The decision of the land registration court was null and
void because the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the
case. The land in question was not alienable and disposable.
SC: ALL PROCEEDINGS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT
INVOLVING THE LOT ARE NULL AND VOID.
The Lot is proven to be not alienable and disposable public land. The
Land Registration court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties.
The doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the Government
sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental ights. Estoppel or laches
does not validate an act that contravenes law or public policy. Res
judicata must be disregarded if its application would sacrifice justice to
technicality. Also, the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of
4
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application
for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
Petition is DENIED.
Torres v. Garchitorena
FACTS: Susana Realty, Incorporated (SRI) is the registered owner of 2
parcels of land in Noveleta, Cavite. Such parcels of land are adjacent to
the sea and over time, portions thereof were submerged by sea water.
Domingo Fernandez was assigned by SRI to be the caretaker.
Mayor Dionisio Torres of Noveleta, caused the leveling and reclamation
of the submerged portion to relocate displaced squatters from Tirona,
Cavite. The caretaker protested but the mayor ignored him and
continued with the leveling and reclamation of the property. SRI formally
protested and demanded that the leveling and reclamation be stopped.
Mayor and representatives of SRI had a conference during which the
Mayor informed SRI that he had already spent P1,000.000,00 for the
reclamation and offered to help SRI in connection with its other projects
in Cavite provided that SRI will no longer file the suit to enjoin the
reclamation. SRI requested for the deferment of the reclamation project
to enable it to study the offer of the Mayor. However, SRI learned that
in the interim, five families of squatters had already occupied portions
of the reclaimed area; and that more squatters were due to arrive.
SRI filed a petition with the RTC for prohibition with a plea for injunctive
relief against the Mayor, the Municipal Building Official and Municipal
Engineer Enrico Alvarez to enjoin them from reclaiming and leveling the
property.
Petitioners alleged that they were not aware that the subject property
was titled in the name of SRI and that the records of the Assessors
Office failed to show that the property had been declared for taxation
purposes under the name of SRI. They insisted that SRI abandoned the
property and justified his acts on the ground that the reclamation of the
property was for the socialized housing program of his constituents.
SRI filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against Torres and
Alvarez for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After
due preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found probable cause
against the two for violation of said law. He filed with the Sandiganbayan
an Information for violation of the said Act.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed with
the RTC of Cavite City a complaint against SRI and the Register of Deeds
of Cavite for the reversion of the property issued in favor of SRI. The
Republic alleged that said property had been ascertained by the DENR
as part of the Manila Bay per Classification Map. Hence, it formed part
of the inalienable mass of the public domain owned by the State.
In the meantime, negotiations for an amicable settlement ensued.
However, no settlement materialized between the parties. Petitioners
filed in the Sandiganbayan motion for suspension of the proceedings but
it was denied.
Petitioners aver that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their
motion to quash the information on their claim that the material
averments contained therein do not constitute the offense of violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019. (Not related to Land Titles)
ISSUE + RULING: WON SRI is the owner of the disputed property -
YES
Under the information, the disputed area is alleged to be the submerged
portion of the lot owned by SRI. Thus, in resolving the motion to quash
on the ground that the allegations in the information do not constitute
an offense, said factual allegations must be hypothetically admitted, and
the subject property under the information must be considered private
property of SRI.
The barefaced fact that under the information, the subject property is
alleged to be submerged in sea water does not necessarily make the
said property foreshore land and hence part of the public domain that
can be reclaimed by the Municipality of Noveleta, Cavite.
In People vs. Melitona Alagad, et al., we held that submerged land is
not necessarily foreshore land. Where the rise in water level is due to
ordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated
thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water
in question. Said portions are outside of public domain and hence,
capable of registration as private property. We defined foreshore land in
said case as part of the land which is between the high and low water
and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. If the submergence of
the land is due to precipitation, it does not become a foreshore land
despite its proximity to the waters. The issue of whether the submerged
property is foreshore land or not is an issue of fact, which can be
resolved by the Sandiganbayan only after trial. But for the present, the
submerged portion is titled to SRI. Until the subject property is declared
foreshore land by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding and
the title of SRI over said property is declared null and void, the subject
property remains the private property of SRI, and the latter is entitled
to the possession thereof.
Petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan subject of the
petition are AFFIRMED.
Pagkatipunan v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners predecessorsininterest, filed with the CFI an
application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title of the
lands. The CFI promulgated a decision confirming petitioners title to the
property.
Almost 18 years later, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the IAC
an action to declare the proceedings as null and void, and to cancel OCT
and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. They
claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration case and of
rendition of the decision, the subject land was classified as timberland;
hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, petitioners
title thereto can not be confirmed for lack of showing of possession and
occupation of the land in the manner and for the length of time required
by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did
petitioners have any fee simple title which may be registered under Act
No. 496, as amended.
Meanwhile, petitioners raised the special defenses of indefeasibility of
title and res judicata. They argued that due to the lapse of a considerable
length of time, the judgment of the CFI in the land registration case has
become final and conclusive against the Republic. Moreover, the action
for reversion of the land to the public domain is barred by prior
judgment.
IAC held that the land in question was forestral land; hence not
registrable. There was no evidence on record to show that the land was
actually and officially delimited and classified as alienable or disposable
land of the public domain. Therefore, the Court of First Instance did not
acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for registration
and to decide the same.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but denied by the IAC. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and
indefeasible one (1) year after issuance of the decree of registration.
Hence, the Republics cause of action was barred by prescription and res
judicata, proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 years
from the time the decree of registration was made. Contrary to the
appellate courts findings, the land is agricultural and the inclusion and
classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as timberland
can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners predecessorsin
interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of the land in question since time immemorial and for more
than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application for registration
in 1960. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed grave error when it
denied their motion to set aside entry of judgment in the land
registration case.
but most importantly, he must prove that the land is alienable public
land. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to do so.
Moreover, it is a basic precept that prescription does not run against the
State. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioners cannot
be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property
of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and
indisposable.

ISSUE + RULING: WON the petitioners have better right to the subject Wherefore, CA decision AFFIRMED.
land NO

Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a

private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the

application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title
over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was
timberland and formed part of the public domain, as per certification
issued by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown
by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.

In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has
been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of
Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
deemed waived. It calls for proof.

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary

and "forest or timber land" as a classification of land of the public domain
in the Constitution. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while
the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. The "forest
land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense
growths of trees and underbrush. However, the cutting down of trees
and the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the
land of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable
agricultural land.

The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive
of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what
the land actually looks like. A person cannot enter into forest land and
by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government
must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act, which took effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided
that only agricultural land of the public domain are subject to acquisitive
prescription.

Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed therein,