Liberty of Abode and of Travel
(1) (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989)
(10) (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, May 30, 1986)
(14) (Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April 08, 1991)
(Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September
15, 1989)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA,
IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR
YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its
President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO
MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and
Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO
RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED. The right to return to one's
country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW. It is the court's well-
considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and under our Constitution, is part
of the law of the land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.]
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE
FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. It is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against
being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
4. ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE
BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL THE
POWERS INHERENT THERETO. As the Supreme
Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)]
pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means
a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the
judicial power means a grant of all the judicial
power which may be exercised under the
government." [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more
than two hundred members and of the judicial
power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it
can equally be said of the executive power which
is vested in one official the President.
1|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
5. ID.; PRESIDENT'S POWER UNDER THE 1987
Constitution; EXTENT AND LIMITATION.
Consideration of tradition and the development of
presidential power under the different constitutions
are essential for a complete understanding of the
extent of and limitations to the President's powers
under the 1987 Constitution. Although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum
of specific powers so enumerated.
6. ID.; PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE
GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE; THE POWERS
INVOLVED. The power involved is the President's
residual power to protect the general welfare of
the people. It is founded on the duty of the
President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase
Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the
President but also his duty to do anything not
forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the
needs of the nation demand. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the
day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times
when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling
presidential duties in times of peace is not in any
way diminished by the relative want of an
emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision.
7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL;
REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE
PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS ADDRESSED TO THE
RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of
case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one.
It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of
a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
8. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR
INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. The
present Constitution limits resort to the political
question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited
by petitioners show that the framers intended to
widen the scope of judicial review but they did not
intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions
are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned.
9. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL;
DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO
THE PHILIPPINES, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. We find that from the pleadings filed
by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the
facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Security Adviser,
wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, there exist factual bases for the
President's decision. The documented history of the
efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this
ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate
and intensify the violence directed against the
State and instigate more chaos. With these before
her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a
serious threat to the national interest and welfare
and in prohibiting their return.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS
PROVISIONS PROTECT ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND
UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. "The Constitution . .
. is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine involving more
pernicious consequences was ever invented by the
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed.
281 [1866]).
2. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. It is a well-settled
doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been
conferred on the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. It is not so easy, however,
to define the phrase political question, nor to
determine what matters fall within its scope. It is
2|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
frequently used to designate all questions that lie
outside the scope of the judicial power. More
properly, however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government.
4. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED
EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS,
BEYOND PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION BY THE
COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. For a
political question to exist, there must be in the
Constitution a power vested exclusively in the
President or Congress, the exercise of which the
court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of
plenary or inherent power against a civil right which
claim is not found in a specific provision is
dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving
commission allowing public officials to strike where
they please and to override everything which to
them represents evil. The entire Government is
bound by the rule of law. The authority implied in
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist
because no law has been enacted specifying the
circumstances when the right may be impaired in
the interest of national security or public safety. The
power is in Congress, not the Executive.
5. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL;
RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDES RIGHT TO TRAVEL OUT
OF OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES. Section 6 of the
Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of
abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a
lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer.
Not even by the President. Section 6 further
provides that the right to travel, and this obviously
includes the right to travel out of or back into the
Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
6. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER
UTILIZED BY THE COURT; COURT COMPELLED TO
DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987 Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution believed that the
free use of the political question doctrine allowed
the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on
prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of
issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear
that it was extravagantly extending judicial power
in the cases where it refused to examine and strike
down an exercise of authoritarian power.
Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and
their counsel were among the most vigorous critics
of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of
the political question doctrine. The Constitution was
accordingly amended. We are now precluded by
its mandate from refusing to invalidate a political
use of power through a convenient resort to the
political question doctrine. We are compelled to
decide what would have been non-justiceable
under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental
charters.

7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL;
DENIAL A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We do
not have to look into the factual bases of the ban
Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not
the respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon
judicial notice of the implications of a Marcos return
to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first
place, there has never been a pronouncement by
the President that a clear and present danger to
national security and public safety will arise if Mr.
Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the
Philippines. It was only after the present petition was
filed that the alleged danger to national security
and public safety conveniently surfaced in the
respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino
herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to
(1) national welfare and interest and (2) the
continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in
terms of recovery and stability. Neither ground
satisfies the criteria of national security and public
safety. The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor
General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect,"
which alone sustains the claim of danger to
national security is fraught with perilous implications.
Any difficult problem or any troublesome person
can be substituted for the Marcos threat as the
catalysing factor. It was precisely the banning by
Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators
Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of
other "undesirables" and "threats to national
security" during that unfortunate period which led
the framers of our present Constitution not only to
re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this
right.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national
importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E.
Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent "people power" revolution and forced
into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was
declared President of the Republic under a
revolutionary government. Her ascension to and
consolidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986
led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover
of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led
by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists"
and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries
aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987]
awakened the nation to the capacity of the
Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the
3|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the
country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution
enshrined the victory of "people power" and also
clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of
Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop
bloody challenges to the government. On August
28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major
players in the February Revolution, led a failed
coup that left scores of people, both combatants
and civilians, dead. There were several other armed
sorties of lesser significance, but the message they
conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that threatened civilian
supremacy over the military and brought to the fore
the realization that civilian government could be at
the mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not
only found in misguided elements in the military
establishment and among rabid followers of Mr.
Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency
and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which
gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the
extent that the communists have set up a parallel
government of their own in the areas they
effectively control while the separatists are virtually
free to move about in armed bands. There has
been no let up in these groups' determination to
wrest power from the government. Not only through
resort to arms but also through the use of
propaganda have they been successful in creating
chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political.
The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of
the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies
left the economy devastated. The efforts at
economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino
assumed office, have yet to show concrete results
in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the
recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the
nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a
precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of
office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country
and who within the short space of three years seeks
to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the
Court to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.

The Issue
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not,
in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the
case would depend on the resolution of the
following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the
return of former President Marcos and his family to
the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar
former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines, in the interest of
"national security, public safety or public health"
a. Has the President made a finding that the return
of former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national
security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding,
(1) Have the requirements of due process been
complied with in making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be
dispensed with, has the President's decision,
including the grounds upon which it was based,
been made known to petitioners so that they may
controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of
former President Marcos and his family to the
Philippines is a clear and present danger to national
security, public safety, or public health a political
question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to
whether the return of former President Marcos and
his family is a clear and present danger to national
security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing
the President's decision to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family, acted and would
be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in
performing any act which would effectively bar the
return of former President Marcos and his family to
the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-
7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.]
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion
that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
4|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within
the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so. They advance the view
that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority or agency of the government, there
must be legislation to that effect. llcd
The petitioners further assert that under international
law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of
each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject
to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (order public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the
present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal
argument is that the issue in this case involves a
political question which is non-justiciable.
According to the Solicitor General:

As petitioners couch it, the question involved is
simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these
constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to
attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation,
the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family have the right to return to the
Philippines and reside here at this time in the face
of the determination by the President that such
return and residence will endanger national security
and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by
petitioners, the question is not a political question as
it involves merely a determination of what the law
provides on the matter and application thereof to
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But
when the question is whether the two rights claimed
by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and
safety of its nationals, the question becomes
political and this Honorable Court can not consider
it. cdrep
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have
the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish
their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable
question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have
their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish
their residence here even if their return and
residence here will endanger national security and
public safety? This is still a justiciable question which
this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public
safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
shall return to the Philippines and establish their
residence here? This is now a political question
which this Honorable Court can not decide for it
falls within the exclusive authority and competence
of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum
for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of
the State to national security over individual rights.
In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people. The Government
may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to
render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order,
the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
5|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
promotion of the general welfare are essential for
the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban
Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and
public safety has international precedents. Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio
Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of
Guatemala, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, King Farouk
of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El
Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela
were among the deposed dictators whose return to
their homelands was prevented by their
governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in
Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp.
314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying
issue is one of the scope of presidential power and
its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different
light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its
narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to
view the case within the confines of the right to
travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles
[357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt. 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig
v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt. 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640)
which affirmed the right to travel and recognized
exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to
one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right
to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and
the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from
the "right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to
leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)]
which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or the separate rights and
freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished
from the "right to enter his own country" of which
one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the
limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty
of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the
right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of international law
and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is
distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against
being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig,
which refer to the issuance of passports for the
purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel
are not determinative of this case and are only
tangentially material insofar as they relate to a
conflict between executive action and the exercise
of a protected right. The issue before the Court is
novel and without precedent in Philippine, and
even in American jurisprudence. Cdpr
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-
debated issue of whether or not there can be
limitations on the right to travel in the absence of
legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary.
An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be
awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we
find now a need to explain the methodology for its
resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a
two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether
or not the President has the power under the
Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant
to the express power of the Court under the
Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not
the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided
to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the
separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)],
"the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." [At 157.] Thus, the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive
power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law"
6|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
[Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a
separation of powers by actual division [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer
plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers
subject only to limitations provided in the
Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo
v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a
grant of the legislative power means a grant of all
legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power
means a grant of all the judicial power which may
be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.] If
this can be said of the legislative power which is
exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership of more than two hundred members
and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the
executive power which is vested in one official
the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that
"[t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1].
However, it does not define what is meant by
"executive power" although in the same article it
touches on the exercise of certain powers by the
President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the
power to execute the laws, the appointing power,
the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or
guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into
treaties or international agreements, the power to
submit the budget to Congress, and the power to
address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. LLphil
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating
certain powers of the President did the framers of
the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are
these enumerated powers the breadth and scope
of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view
that the President's powers are limited to those
specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly
denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo p. 233.] This
argument brings to mind the institution of the U. S.
Presidency after which ours is legally patterned. **
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President
of the United States grappled with the same
problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the
Constitution. To those who think that a constitution
ought to settle everything beforehand it should be
a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think
that constitution makers ought to leave
considerable leeway for the future play of political
forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article II in its
opening words: "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of
America." . . . [The President: Office and Powers,
1787-1957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President
were exercised by the different persons who held
the office from Washington to the early 1900's, and
the swing from the presidency by commission to
Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the
presidency is at any particular moment depends in
important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger, who wrote in The
Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly
personal institution. It remained, of course, an
agency of government subject to unvarying
demands and duties no matter who was President.
But, more than most agencies of government, it
changed shape, intensity and ethos according to
the man in charge. Each President's distinctive
temperament and character, his values, standards,
style, his habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies,
compulsions, phobias recast the White House and
pervaded the entire government. The executive
branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon,
taking its color from the character and personality
of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact
on the constitutional order, therefore altered from
President to President. Above all, the way each
President understood it as his personal obligation to
inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold
the confidence of the electorate and to render an
accounting to the nation and posterity determined
whether he strengthened or weakened the
constitutional order. [At 212-213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs.
Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that
the consideration of tradition and the development
of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations to the
President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The
1935 Constitution created a strong President with
explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President.
The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the
system of government into the parliamentary type,
with the President as a mere figurehead, but
through numerous amendments, the President
became even more powerful, to the point that he
was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987
Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the
separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for
checks and balances. LexLib
It would not be accurate, however, to state that
"executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,
for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inhere in such
7|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself
provides that the execution of the laws is only one
of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power
over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although
the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the
landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of
who between the Governor-General of the
Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares
of stock held by the Government to elect directors
in the National Coal Company and the Philippine
National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding
the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:
. . . Here the members of the legislature who
constitute a majority of the "board" and
"committee" respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with the
doing of anything which is in aid of performance of
any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside
for the moment the question whether the duties
devolved upon these members are vested by the
Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that
they are not legislative in character, and still more
clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they
do not fall within the authority of either of these two
constitutes logical ground for concluding that they
do fall within that of the remaining one among
which the powers of government are divided . . .
[At 202-203; emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong
dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be
a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically
mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
establish and divide fields of black and white. Even
the more specific of them are found to terminate in
a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme
to the other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that
however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires.[At 210-211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding
principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government
is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy."
[Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people,
the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. But such does
not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the
exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan
of government, and in directing implementing
action for these plans, or from another point of
view, in making any decision as President of the
Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to
them. prcd
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time
is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution,
constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn
to defend and uphold the Constitution, the
President has the obligation under the Constitution
to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation of power is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common
good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government
exercising the powers delegated by the people
forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." [Art. II,
Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult
because the persons who seek to return to the
country are the deposed dictator and his family at
whose door the travails of the country are laid and
from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-
gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither
absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and of expression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits
and must be adjusted to the requirements of
equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7,
1988].
8|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
To the President, the problem is one of balancing
the general welfare and the common good against
the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is
not only the power of the President but also his duty
to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or
the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See
Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the
President's duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power
implicit in the President's duty to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The
American President, where the author advances
the view that an allowance of discretionary power
is unavoidable in any government and is best
lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of
the President's powers as protector of the peace.
[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief
powers in times of emergency or to leading the
State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is
also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion,
within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential
duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For
in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said
to exclude the President's exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of
the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public
order and security.
That the President has the power under the
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has
been recognized by members of the Legislature,
and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the
House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its
members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos
to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish
gesture for true national reconciliation and as
irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No.
1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not
question the President's power to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals
to the President's sense of compassion to allow a
man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or
demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied. llcd
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the
duty to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.]
Given this wording, we cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political
question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political
question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide. But
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's
jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively
for the President, for Congress or for the people
themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We
cannot, for example, question the President's
recognition of a foreign government, no matter
how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon
though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is
totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving
a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that
precludes our determination thereof on the political
question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show
that the framers intended to widen the scope of
judicial review but they did not intend courts of
justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination to whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
official concerned and decide a matter which by
its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
In this light, it would appear clear that the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution, defining "judicial power," which
9|CONSTI2_Section6_ Liberty of Abode and of Travel
specifically empowers the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, incorporates in
the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia
[G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448]
that:
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the
Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers
underlying our system of government, the Executive
is supreme within his own sphere. However, the
separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not
absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which
the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension
of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within
the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which,
in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of his act .. [At 479-
480.].
Accordingly, the question for the Court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual
bases for the President to conclude that it was in
the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do
exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts,
arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her
discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties,
from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, there exist factual
bases for the President's decision.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities
and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a
separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the
murder with impunity of military men, police officers
and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses
and their followers to destabilize the country, as
earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the
conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate
more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of
the State may be contained. The military
establishment has given assurances that it could
handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it
is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses
that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that
would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said
to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the
Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the
escalation of violence against the State, that would
be the time for the President to step in and exercise
the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the
Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence.
The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre-emptive action against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they
are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty
of government. The preservation of the State the
fruition of the people's sovereignty is an
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn
to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see
the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from
that responsibility. LLjur
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the
country is only now beginning to recover from the
hardships brought about by the plunder of the
economy attributed to the Marcoses and their
close associates and relatives, many of whom are
still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize
the country, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to
recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot
ignore the continually increasing burden imposed
on the economy by the excessive foreign
borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles
and stagnates development and is one of the root
causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant
ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is
of common knowledge and is easily within the
ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total
economic collapse. Given what is within our
individual and common knowledge of the state of
the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered
opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national
10 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to
the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
(Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100,
May 30, 1986)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.]
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON
and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M.
REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL;
PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. A court
has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in
People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the
result of the obligation assumed by appellee
(surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times
to the orders and processes of the lower court, was
to prohibit said accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise,
said orders and processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of
the Philippines they would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. Rule 114, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT. Its object is to relieve the
accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at
the same time, to put the accused as much under
the power of the court as if he were in custody of
proper officer, and to secure the appearance of
the accused so as to answer the call of the court
and do what the law may require of him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. The effect of a
recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or
filed of record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the
accused from the public officials who have him in
their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The
sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the
sureties have the right to prevent the principal from
leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and
whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal
remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the
latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is
recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding
his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for
permission to leave the country in the first place, if it
were otherwise.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHEPHERD CASE (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-
R, February 13, 1980) DIFFERENTIATED FROM CASE AT
BAR. To support his contention, petitioner places
reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in
People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R,
February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following
passage: ". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to
produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit
such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable
only when the appellants are in the territorial
confines of the Philippines and not demandable if
the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the
most important consequence of bail, albeit
provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty
operates as fully within as without the boundaries of
the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts
for the absence of any law or jurisprudence
expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not
transcend the territorial boundaries of the country."
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-
quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced.
The rather broad and generalized statement suffers
from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the
reason suggested by the appellate court. Also,
petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd
case. In the latter case, the accused was able to
show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the
duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties
to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court
that she would comply with the conditions of her
bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not
satisfactorily shown any of the above.
6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
11 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
WAS PREMISED ON THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO
SATISFY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE URGENCY OF HIS
TRAVEL. As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial
courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his
travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent
of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no
abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied
petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary
results, that We found no reversible error to have
been committed by the appellate court in allowing
Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied
itself that she would comply with the conditions of
her bail bond.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTY OF
ABODE AND TRAVEL; IMPAIRED BY ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT RELEASING PETITIONER ON BAIL. The
constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "The liberty of
abode and of travel shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public safety or
public health." To our mind, the order of the trial
court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above-
quoted constitutional provision.
DECISION
FERNAN, J p:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for
review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a
criminal indictment and provisionally released on
bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two
principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock
brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of
professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former
corporation. LexLib
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by
stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction,
petitioner, who was then in the United States, came
home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a
petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission for the appointment of a management
committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The
petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the
Matter of the Appointment of a Management
Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro
Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was
granted and a management committee was
organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the
Securities and Exchange Commission requested the
then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes,
not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the
Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of
the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by
Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal
complaints against petitioner and one Raul
Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president,
respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due
course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa
were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to
respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases
Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In
all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the
total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance
Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of
the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country", stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon
dated March 9, 1982, reads:
"Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for
the United States on the all embracing ground that
his trip is '. . . relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.'
"The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No
matter of any magnitude is discerned to warrant
judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
"In view thereof, permission to leave the country is
denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future
until these two (2) cases are terminated." 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove
dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
"6. Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's
contention that if the Court would allow the
accused to leave the Philippines the surety
companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf
might claim that they could no longer be held
liable in their undertakings because it was the Court
which allowed the accused to go outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should
the accused fail or decide not to return.
"WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED."
3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the
Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the
recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum
dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also
denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
12 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26,
1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively,
as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his
leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the
Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the
Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear
him for departure.
On October 5,1982, the appellate court rendered a
decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to
which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6
petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for
leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion,
petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana,
U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention
of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8
He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the
chief executive officer of the Exploration Company
of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting
his presence in the United States to "meet the
people and companies who would be involved in
its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that
on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos.
45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on
motion of the prosecution on the ground that after
verification of the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission . . . (he) was not in any way
connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of
the date of the commission of the offenses imputed
to him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however,
remained pending as Judge Camilon, when
notified of the dismissal of the other cases against
petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before
him, ordered merely the informations amended so
as to delete the allegation that petitioner was
president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder," 11 of Manotoc
Securities, Inc. prLL
On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en
banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to
bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty,
could prevent him from exercising his constitutional
right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is
a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail
as the security required and given for the release of
a person who is in the custody of the law, that he
will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment
and the state of the burden of keeping him,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as
if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the law
may require of him." 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. As we have held in People v.
Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by
appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at
all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving
the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the
courts from which they issued does not extend
beyond that of the Philippines they would have no
binding force outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when
fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner
released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of
the accused from the public officials who have him
in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The
sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state." 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal
from leaving the state, more so then has the court
from which the sureties merely derive such right,
and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of
bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the
court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total
liberty to leave the country, for he would not have
filed the motion for permission to leave the country
in the first place, if it were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance
upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs.
13 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980)
particularly citing the following passage:
". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the
person of the appellants at the pleasure of the
Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking
of the bondsmen as demandable only when the
appellants are in the territorial confines of the
Philippines and not demandable if the appellants
are out of the country. Liberty, the most important
consequence of bail, albeit provisional is indivisible.
If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as
without the boundaries of the granting state. This
principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any
law or jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty
under bail does not transcend the territorial
boundaries of the country."
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-
quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced.
The rather broad and generalized statement suffers
from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the
reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the
Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was
able to show the urgent necessity for her travel
abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of
her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying
the court that she would comply with the conditions
of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case
has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his
comment:
"A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to
Leave the Country' will show that it is solely
predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the
United States where he will, allegedly attend to
some business transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of
petitioner's motion, no urgent or compelling reason
can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial
imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently
shown that there is absolute necessity for him to
travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no
indication that the alleged business transactions
could not be undertaken by any other person in his
behalf. Neither is there any hint that petitioner's
absence from the United States would absolutely
preclude him from taking advantage of business
opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that
petitioner's non-presence in the United States would
cause him irreparable damage or prejudice." 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the
proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed
to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has
agreed to his plans as he had posted cash
indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to
leave the country without the assent of the surety
because in accepting a bail bond or
recognizance, the government impliedly agrees
"that it will not take any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or
affect their remedies against him. Under this rule,
the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be
discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the
conditions thereof, which is made without his
assent. This result has been reached as to a
stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until
after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit
the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus,
although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by
Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and
academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the
criminal cases pending before said judge, We see
the rationale behind said order.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and
the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the
duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety
to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial
discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion
for permission to leave the country, in much the
same way, albeit with contrary results, that We
found no reversible error to have been committed
by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to
leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she
would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health."
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing
petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in
accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court
finds that no gainful purpose will be served in
discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby
dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., no part.
14 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
(Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, April
08, 1991)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94284. April 8, 1991.]
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL,
DEFINED. "Bail is the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him
or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance
before any court when so required by the Court or
the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO
TRAVEL RESTRICTED BY CONDITIONS OF BAIL. The
condition imposed upon an accused on bail to
make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142
SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country
or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional
Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138).
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; A
PERSON RELEASED ON BAIL MAY BE RE-ARRESTED;
GROUND. An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON THE RESTRICTION ON
THE RIGHT. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They
can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as
may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.
263).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A LIMITATION ON THE INHERENT
POWER OF THE COURT TO USE ALL MEANS TO CARRY
THEIR ORDERS INTO EFFECT. Article III, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process
and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule
135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Holding an
accused in a criminal case within the reach of the
Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction
on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines.
It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio v. Hon. Benigno
C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as
well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities
Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for
his provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years
after the filing of the Information, respondent
People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a
hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner
on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval
resulting in postponements of the arraignment and
scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4
April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's
passport or to deny his application therefor, and
the Commission on Immigration to prevent
Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was
based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since
the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985,
"the accused has not yet been arraigned because
he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is
evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad
without the knowledge and permission of this Court"
(Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of
Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990.
Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the
Court were filed, we resolved to give due course
and to decide the case. Cdpr
15 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April
and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly
patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled
arraignments could not be held because there was
a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and
(2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired
upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds
other than the "interest of national security, public
safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to
Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is
apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the
Information in 1985 and only after several
arraignments had already been scheduled and
cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In
fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only
on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the
Trial Court and conformed to by respondent
Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following
circumstances:
"1. The records will show that the information was
filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July
1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several
scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset,
mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to
appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to
appear had invariably been because he is abroad
in the United States of America;
"2. Since the information was filed, until this date,
accused Silverio had never appeared in person
before the Court;
"3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been
cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been
issued against him all for the same reason failure
to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation
that it has given accused Silverio more than
enough consideration. The limit had long been
reached" (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-
6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders,
dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not
based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want
this Court to believe. To all appearances, the
pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only
after several settings for arraignment had been
scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's
non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent
Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the
right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of
the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest
of national security, public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by
Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued
against him by reason, in both instances, of his
failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him
for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he
should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned
upon his appearance before any court when so
required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1
and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused
to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986,
142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges
may be restrained by the Court from leaving the
country or, if abroad, compelled to return
(Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p.
138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail
may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the
Philippines without prior permission of the Court
where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par.]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the
1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the
Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits
prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of
interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as compared to the provisions on freedom
of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode
and of travel were treated under one provision.
Article III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads: prcd
"The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired."
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by
explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court or
when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health" (Article IV, Section
5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into
two distinct sentences and treats them differently,
to wit:
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
16 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law."
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987
Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel
only on the grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should
be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order,
the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on
the basis of "national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be provided by law," a
limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973
text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I,
First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction
to the ban on international travel imposed under
the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should
by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, process and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules
of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr.,
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that
the condition imposed upon an accused admitted
to bail to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence operates
as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer
holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from
tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has
remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the
1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc
ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that
laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted
bail but has violated the conditions thereof by
failing to appear before the Court when required.
Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those
orders and processes would be rendered nugatory
if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to
remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial
confines of the country. Holding an accused in a
criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the Philippines must
be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance
with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should
run their course and proceed to finality without
undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C.
Silverio.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.

17 | C O N S T I 2 _ S e c t i o n 6 _ L i b e r t y o f A b o d e a n d o f T r a v e l