(21 pages)

Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data

(1)(Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155, September 07, 2010)

Rules on Writ of Amparo

(10) (Ladaga v. Mapagu, G.R. No. 189689, 189690, 189691, November 13, 2012)

Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

(17)(Padua v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-38570, May 24, 1988)
(19)(Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974)

(Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155,
September 07, 2010)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 189155. September 7, 2010.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR
OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,
mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to
continue/complete the investigation of this incident
with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to
provide protection to the Petitioner and her family
while in the Philippines against any and all forms of
harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be
relevant to the grant of these reliefs. 3
We begin with the petitioner's allegations.

MELISSA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN.
VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME
VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON
NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA,
PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND
ROSE, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1
assailing the Decision 2 dated 26 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a
petition that was commenced jointly under the
Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and
Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision,
the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner,
Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data but denied the latter's
prayers for an inspection order, production order
and return of specified personal belongings. The
fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS.
This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.
4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an
exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of
America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. 5
During the course of her immersion, petitioner
toured various provinces and towns of Central
Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join
members of BAYAN-Tarlac 6 in conducting an initial
health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission. 7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought
her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk,
IPOD, 8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer,
stethoscope and medicines. 9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner
and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo)
and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to
rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz,
Tarlac. 10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however,
petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were
startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at
the front door and a voice demanding that they
open up. 11

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain
from distributing or causing the distribution to the
public of any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner's
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties
to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioner's prayers for an
inspection order, production order and for the
return of the specified personal belongings are
denied for lack of merit. Although there is no
evidence that Respondents are responsible for the
abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner,
said Respondents pursuant to their legally
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Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly
opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground
face down. 12 The armed men were all in civilian
clothes and, with the exception of their leader,
were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.
13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of
the armed men ganged up on her and tied her
hands. 14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other
armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby
blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name. 15
Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged petitioner towards the van bruising her
arms, legs and knees. 16 Once inside the van, but
before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able
to see the face of one of the armed men sitting
beside her. 17 The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.
18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered
to alight. 19 After she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-
NPA), petitioner was separated from her
companions and was escorted to a room that she
believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal
doors. 20 From there, she could hear the sounds of
gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing
and some construction bustle. 21 She inferred that
she was taken to the military camp of Fort
Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija. 22
What followed was five (5) straight days of
interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of
the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning
to "the fold." 24 The torture, on the other hand,
consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner. 25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was
made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26
Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when
she was allowed to take a bath, during which she
became acquainted with a woman named "Rose"
who bathed her. 27 There were also a few times
when she cheated her blindfold and was able to
peek at her surroundings. 28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner
was still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her as
"Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner
that those who tortured her came from the "Special
Operations Group," and that she was abducted
because her name is included in the "Order of
Battle." 30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and
returned to her uncle's house in Quezon City. 31
Before being released, however, the abductors
gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM 32 card,
a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with
password, 33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and
books, 34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and
a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner was also sternly
warned not to report the incident to the group
Karapatan or something untoward will happen to
her and her family. 36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to
receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given
to her. 37 Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her
2|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone
with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm
as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this
Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons
of the military and police hierarchy as respondents,
on the belief that it was government agents who
were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner
likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."
39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that:
(1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even
approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order
be issued allowing the inspection of detention
areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay,
Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to
produce documents relating to any report on the
case of petitioner including, but not limited to,
intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th
Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its
subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be
ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected
to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be
ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer,
external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and
her P15,000.00 cash. 40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued
the desired writs and referred the case to the Court
of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action. 41 The Resolution also directed
the respondents to file their verified written return.
42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on behalf of the
public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the
public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioner's alleged
abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In
support of their accusation, the public respondents
principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as
contained in the Special Report 45 of the La Paz
Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo
disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction,
petitioner and her companions instructed him and
his two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this
statement, the public respondents drew the distinct
possibility that, except for those already inside Mr.
Paolo's house, nobody else has any way of knowing
where petitioner and her companions were at the
time they were supposedly abducted. 47 This can
only mean, the public respondents concluded, that
if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily
have been planned by, or done with the consent
of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.
48
Public respondents also cited the Medical
Certificate 49 of the petitioner, as actually belying
her claims that she was subjected to serious torture
for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that
while the petitioner alleges that she was choked
and boxed by her abductors inflictions that
could have easily produced remarkable bruises
her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her
wrists and knee caps. 50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies
put in question the very authenticity of petitioner's
alleged abduction and torture, more so any military
or police involvement therein. Hence, public
respondents conclude that the claims of abduction
and torture was no more than a charade
fabricated by the petitioner to put the government
in bad light, and at the same time, bring great
media mileage to her and the group that she
represents. 51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and
torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist
on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data
petition based on the following grounds: (a) as
against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from
suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the public
respondents, in general, in view of the absence of
any specific allegation in the petition that they had
participated in, or at least authorized, the
commission of such atrocities. 53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had
not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth
behind the allegations of the petitioner. 54 In both
the police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following
manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported
abduction around 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of
19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M.
Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police
Station to report the presence of heavily armed
men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian. 55 Acting
on the report, the police station launched an initial
investigation. 56
The initial investigation revolved around the
statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
investigators of an abduction incident involving
three (3) persons later identified as petitioner
Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward
Jandoc who were all staying in his house. 57 Mr.
Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred
3|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, and was
perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men
who forced their way inside his house. 58 Other
witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the
armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown
plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles
with no plate numbers. 59
At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the
investigators sent a Flash Message to the different
police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an
effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles
of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded
negative results. 60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial
investigation were included in a Special Report 61
that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial
Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt.
Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent
Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police
Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-
up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.
63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon
Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police
Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special
Investigation Task Group CAROJAN (Task Group
CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on
the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc. 64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making
a series of background examinations on the victims
of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the
motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the
identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task Group
CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan
and the Alliance for Advancement of People's
Rights organizations trusted by petitioner in the
hopes of obtaining the latter's participation in the
ongoing investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the letters
sent by the investigators requesting for the
availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left
unheeded. 67
The progress of the investigations conducted by
Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports 68 that it submitted to public respondent
General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police. However, as of their
latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding
as to the true identity and affiliation of the
abductors a fact that task group CAROJAN
attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of
her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative
efforts. 69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of
National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner
upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court
directing him and the other respondents to file their
return. 70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a
Memorandum Directive 71 addressed to the Chief
of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among
others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the
validity of the accusation of military involvement in
the abduction. 72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive,
public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP
Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message 73
addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General
Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding
General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an
investigation on the abduction of the petitioner. 74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in
the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen.
Bangit instructed public respondent Major General
Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army
based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an
investigation regarding the possible involvement of
any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn,
public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th
Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry
Division released an Investigation Report 77
detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the
report described petitioner's allegations as
"opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from
any involvement in her alleged abduction and
torture. 78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision, 79 the Court of Appeals gave due
weight and consideration to the petitioner's version
that she was indeed abducted and then subjected
to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate
court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the
petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in
open court, and was thereby convinced that the
latter was telling the truth. 80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner
was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an
unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the
time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of
Appeals further stressed that the Medical
Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the
existence of a true abduction, as its findings are
reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to
have sustained during her harrowing ordeal,
particularly when she was handcuffed and then
dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence
of an ongoing threat against the security of the
petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to
4|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
contact and monitor her, even after she was
released. 83 This threat, according to the Court of
Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure
of the police authorities to identify the material
perpetrators who are still at large. 84 Thus, the
appellate court extended to the petitioner the
privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the
public respondents to afford protection to the
former, as well as continuing, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction. 85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a
transgression of the right to informational privacy of
the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of
investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a
suspected member of the CPP-NPA. 86 The
appellate court derived the existence of such
records from a photograph and video file
presented in a press conference by party-list
representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and
Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the
petitioner participating in rebel exercises.
Representative Alcover also revealed that the
photograph and video came from a female CPP-
NPA member who wanted out of the organization.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation
of the photograph and video, as well as any form
of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the
CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the
right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further
strain on her already volatile security. 87 To this end,
the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ
of habeas data mandating the public respondents
to refrain from distributing to the public any records,
in whatever form, relative to petitioner's alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture. 88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court
of Appeals was not convinced that the military or
any other person acting under the acquiescence
of the government, were responsible for the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. 89 The
appellate court stressed that, judging by her own
statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that
the military was behind her abduction. 90 Thus, the
Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents
from any complicity in the abduction and torture of
petitioner. 91 The petition was likewise dismissed as
against public respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from
suit. 92
Accordingly, the petitioner's prayers for the return of
her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioner's
prayers for an inspection order and production
order also met the same fate. 94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture. 95
Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the
part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for
the return of her personal belongings. 96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her
abduction and torture was carried out, as well as
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes
that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in
open court, are already sufficient evidence to
prove government involvement. 97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner
invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military
authorities she impleaded as respondents in her
amparo petition. 98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this
Court a pronouncement holding the respondents
as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as
liable for the return of her belongings. 99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the
petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility
as the justification in impleading the public
respondents in her amparo petition, is legally
inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law
that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-
respondent in an amparo petition. 100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, 101 which was the
first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that
the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that: 102
The evolution of the command responsibility
doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest
terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict."
103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, 104 foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators 105 (as opposed to crimes he
ordered). (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is
5|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the
nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at
providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security. 106 While the
principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof
had transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law. 107 The
rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an
amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the
landmark case of The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo: 108
. . . The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings. 109
(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability
of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure,
preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained
acts in the petition were committed with their direct
or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded not actually on
the basis of command responsibility but rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct,
but interrelated concepts of responsibility and
accountability were given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo proceeding,
to wit:
. . . Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the
level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in
the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case
that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the
public respondents is to ascribe some form of
responsibility on their part, based on her assumption
that they, in one way or the other, had condoned
her abduction and torture. 111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted
to show that it was government agents who were
behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls
attention to the circumstances surrounding her
abduction and torture i.e., the forcible taking in
broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license
plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting
interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and
the infliction of physical abuse which, according
to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military
or other state forces. 112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held
inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay a
conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel
time required to reach the place where she was
actually detained, and also from the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while
thereat. 113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence
presented by the petitioner does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were
military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with those
surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry
sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar
as the present case is concerned, the perceived
similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of
the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving
the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct
evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based
on patterns and similarity, because the former
indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An
amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and
hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and
directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to
include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic
6|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
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sketches 115 of several of her abductors whose
faces she managed to see. To the mind of this
Court, these cartographic sketches have the
undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of
petitioner's abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in
view of the fact that the faces described in such
sketches remain unidentified, much less have been
shown to be that of any military or police personnel.
Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
part of either the military or the police chain of
command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was
taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately
established by her mere estimate of the time it took
to reach the place where she was detained and by
the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the
Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the
estimate and observations of the petitioner as
accurate on its face not only because they were
made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in
view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in
the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it
is in itself doubtful. 116 With nothing else but
obscure observations to support it, petitioner's claim
that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a
mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a
concrete point that her abductors were actually
affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the
military or the police organizations. Neither does the
evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed
taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the
exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in
turn, make it virtually impossible to determine
whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner
was in fact committed with the acquiescence of
the public respondents. On account of this
insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of
responsibility on the part of the public respondents,
therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the
return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the
above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the
failure of the latter to prove that the public
respondents were involved in her abduction and
torture. 117 We agree with the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason
used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the
prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether
there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the
petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public
respondents to return the personal belongings of
the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the
liability of the public respondents has been fixed in
a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already
discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo
proceeding. 118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in
denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the
fact that a person's right to be restituted of his
property is already subsumed under the general
rubric of property rights which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo. 119 Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule, 120 which defines the scope and
extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of
property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial
by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay. 121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely
pointing to any military involvement in petitioner's
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the
military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with
the appellate court that a contrary stance would
be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition,"
which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in
providing for the interim relief of inspection order.
122 Contrary to the explicit position 123 espoused
by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a
"fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to
give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner
in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court
before making a decision. 124 A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection
order is that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the allegations of
the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule
does not require that the place to be inspected be
identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an
inspection order that the supporting allegations of a
party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima
facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner
failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the
petitioner are not strong enough to make out
aprima facie case that she was detained in Fort
Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp
cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot
issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted
to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas
7|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
data, by enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public
any records in whatever form, reports, documents
or similar papers" relative to the petitioner's "alleged
ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture." Though not raised as an
issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass
upon and review this particular ruling of the Court
of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us,
an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used
by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of
the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the
relevant portion 125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the
records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to
be included in the Government's Order of Battle
under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political
opponents against whom false criminal charges
were filed based on made up and perjured
information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before
Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor
Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference
where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted
out of the organization, that Petitioner was a
communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said
information reached them thru a letter with photo
of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training
camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner's denial that
she was the person in said video, there were
records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas
or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy.
Without a doubt, reports of such nature have
reasonable connections, one way or another, to
petitioner's abduction where she claimed she had
been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts
which nearly caused her life precisely due to
allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be
continuously made available to the public,
Petitioner's security and privacy will certainly be in
danger of being violated or transgressed by persons
who have strong sentiments or aversion against
members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports
of Petitioner's alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public
consumption without evidence of its authenticity or
veracity certainly violates Petitioner's right to
privacy which must be protected by this Court. We,
thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis
supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals. 126 The writ operates to protect a
person's right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement
before the privilege of the writ may be extended is
the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 127
This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to
do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of
Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on
record that shows that any of the public
respondents had violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the
Court of Appeals to the public respondents that
would have violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the
petitioner's ties with the CPP-NPA, was not
adequately proven considering that the origin of
such records were virtually unexplained and its
existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows
that any of the public respondents had access to
such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive
by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public
respondents from "distributing or causing the
distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative
to the petitioner's "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA,"
appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was
not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public
respondents were found to be actually responsible
for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any
inference regarding the existence of reports being
kept in violation of the petitioner's right to privacy
becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of
the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while
telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form
of responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, revealed two important things that
can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case.
8|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
One, that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to
identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and
torture of the petitioner; and two, that the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political
rights and to provide appropriate legal measures
for the protection of human rights," 128 must be
tapped in order to fill certain investigative and
remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason
why the petitioner was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of
government complicity in her abduction and
torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and
one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein
the very persons alleged to be involved in an
enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at
the same time, the very ones tasked by law to
investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of
these proceedings and is the main source of the
"evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in
any amparo case. 129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo
Rule placed a potent safeguard requiring the
"respondent who is a public official or employee" to
prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty." 130
Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents
is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo
court that extraordinary diligence has been
observed in their investigations, they cannot shed
the allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary
diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not
fully observed in the conduct of the police and
military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by
Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the
part of the police investigators to identify the
perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said
reports are replete with background checks on the
victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time,
comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the
investigators have been taking to ascertain the
authors of the crime. Although conducting a
background investigation on the victims is a logical
first step in exposing the motive behind the
abduction its necessity is clearly outweighed by
the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in
light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no
longer in captivity, already came up with
allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of
their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the petitioner who, they
claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in
their investigative efforts. 131 While it may be
conceded that the participation of the petitioner
would have facilitated the progress of Task Group
CAROJAN's investigation, this Court believes that
the former's reticence to cooperate is hardly an
excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore
other means or avenues from which they could
obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed, while the
allegations of government complicity by the
petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as
adequate evidence before a court of law they
are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable
investigative leads that must be pursued and
verified, if only to comply with the high standard of
diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the
conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner,
Task Group CAROJAN's reports still failed to explain
why it never considered seeking the assistance of
Mr. Jesus Paolo who, along with the victims, is a
central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task
Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain
from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by
petitioner's account, was not wearing any mask.
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as
a comparative material to the sketches included in
petitioner's offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed
out, were prepared under the direction of, and first
submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter's
independent investigation on the abduction and
torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned
earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified
as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the
Court of Appeals that further investigation under
the norm of extraordinary diligence should be
undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to
this case, on the basis of an incomplete
investigation conducted by the police and the
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of
the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy
because of the deficient investigation that directly
contributes to the delay in bringing the real
perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court's directive,
however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift
the primary task of conducting further investigations
on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon
the CHR. 134 We note that the CHR, unlike the
police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and
confidence of the petitioner as evidenced by
her attendance and participation in the hearings
already conducted by the commission. 135
Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from
such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR
have advanced, or at the very least, bears the
most promise of advancing farther, in terms of
locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is
thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From
9|Consti2_Section15_Rules on Habeas Data and Rules on Writ of
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
this perspective, We also deem it just and
appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim
protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the
Appeals for further investigation, as follows
1.)Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked
with conducting further investigation regarding the
abduction and torture of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take
the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted
by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and
(b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner's
abduction and torture.
2.)Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his
successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records
circa the time of the petitioner's abduction and
torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent
with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.)Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP,
or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a
copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.)Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the
Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its
investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue
to provide protection to the petitioner during her
stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the
Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and
determining whether, in light of any recent reports
or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable.
After making such determination, the Court of
Appeals shall submit its own report with
recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction
over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under
this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:
1.)AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer
for the return of her personal belongings;
2.)AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner's prayer
for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.
3.)REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas
data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis
of the investigation reports and recommendations
submitted to it under this decision.
4.)MODIFYING the directive that further
investigation must be undertaken, as follows
a.APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as
the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture
of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on
Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary
diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner,
as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any
other leads relevant to petitioner's abduction and
torture.
b.DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to
the ongoing investigation of the Commission on
Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing
the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the
time of the petitioner's abduction and torture,
subject to reasonable regulations consistent with
the Constitution and existing laws.
c.Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the
Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish
to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the
reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
d.Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human
Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a
copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and (b) to
provide or continue to provide protection to the
petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines,
until such time as may hereinafter be determined
by this Court.
5.)REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of
Appeals for the following purposes:
a.To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken
by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b.To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and
recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and
torture of the petitioner was committed by persons
10 | C o n s t i 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 5 _ R u l e s o n H a b e a s D a t a a n d R u l e s o n W r i t o f
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
acting under any of the public respondents; and on
the basis of this determination
c.To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from
receipt of the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights its own report,
which shall include a recommendation either for
the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public
respondents who were found not responsible
and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE
REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE
UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible
and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain
personally impleaded in this petition to answer for
any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they
may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision
dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA
that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza and
Sereno, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., is on official leave.
(Ladaga v. Mapagu, G.R. No. 189689, 189690,
189691, November 13, 2012)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 189689. November 13, 2012.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O.
LADAGA:
LILIBETH O. LADAGA, petitioner, vs. MAJ. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU, COMMANDING GENERAL OF
THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH INFANTRY DIVISION (ID);
COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT.
COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC
AFFAIRS OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK
FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO,
DAVAO CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND
SEVERAL OTHER JOHN DOES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 189690. November 13, 2012.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF ANGELA A.
LIBRADO-TRINIDAD:
ANGELA A. LIBRADO-TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. MAJ.
GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH ID; COL.
LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL.
KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK FORCE-
DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO
CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER
JOHN DOES, respondents.
 [G.R. No. 189691. November 13, 2012.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF CARLOS
ISAGANI T. ZARATE:
CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE, petitioner, vs. MAJ.
GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, COMMANDING
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY'S 10TH ID; COL.
LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL.
KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK FORCE-
DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON APOLINARIO, DAVAO
CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER
JOHN DOES, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
The Cases
In each of these three (3) consolidated petitions for
review, the Court is tasked to evaluate the
substantially similar but separately issued Orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch
10, dated August 14, 2009 1 in the three (3) writ of
amparo cases, as well as, the Order dated
September 22, 2009 2 denying the joint motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
Petitioners share the common circumstance of
having their names included in what is alleged to
be a JCICC "AGILA" 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of
Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th
Infantry Division (10th ID), 3 which is a list containing
the names of organizations and personalities in
Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao City,
supposedly connected to the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New
People's Army (NPA). They perceive that by the
inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle
(OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings a real threat
to their life, liberty and security.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 189689, ATTY. LILIBETH O.
LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to know of the
existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source
on May 21, 2009. This was after the PowerPoint
presentation made public by Bayan Muna Party-List
Representative Satur Ocampo (Representative
Ocampo) on May 18, 2009 during the conclusion of
the International Solidarity Mission (ISM) conducted
by various organizations. The following entries
bearing specific reference to her person were
reflected therein: EaCDAT
7.ON 12 NOV 07, MEETING AT SHIMRIC BEACH
RESORT, TALOMO, DC PRESIDED BY ATTY. LILIBETH
LADAGA SEC GEN, UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYER
MOVEMENT (UPLM) AND KELLY DELGADO-SEC GEN,
KARAPATAN:
PRESENTED THE NATL GOAL/THEME WHICH STATES
THAT "THE STAGE IS SET, TIME TO UNITE AGAINST
ARROYO, STEP UP PROTESTS AND ARMED
OFFENSIVE."
11 | C o n s t i 2 _ S e c t i o n 1 5 _ R u l e s o n H a b e a s D a t a a n d R u l e s o n W r i t o f
Amparo_Section 16_Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
DISCUSSED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WHICH WILL BE
CAPITALIZED ON THEIR PLANNED ACTIVITIES ON 30
NOV 07:
ISSUES:
1.OUTREACH PROGRAMS/MEDICAL MISSION IN
RURAL AREAS;
2.OUT OF SCHOOL YOUTH RECRUITMENT;
3.P125 DAILY WAGE HIKE OR P3,000 ACROSS THE
BOARD HIKE;
4.SCRAP ANTI-TERRORISM BILL;
5.OIL DE-REGULATION LAW;
6.ANTI-LARGE SCALE MINING;
7.CORRUPTION AND ANTI-POVERTY/ZTE ISSUES AND
BRIBERY;
8.ANTI-POLITICAL AND EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS;
9.CARP ISSUES AND LAND DISPUTES; AND
10.LATEST GLORIETA BOMBING
COMPOSITION: CIVIC, RELIGIOUS, TRANSPORT,
LABOR AND PEASANT, YOUTH SECTOR,
PROGRESSIVE GROUPS, BUSINESS SECTOR, ANTI-
PGMA, BLACK AND WHITE MOVEMENT AND ANTI-
POVERTY MOVEMENT.
ULTIMATE GOAL: TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 07
4
In her Affidavit, 5 Atty. Ladaga substantiated the
threats against her life, liberty and security by
narrating that since 2007, suspicious-looking persons
have been visiting her Davao City law office during
her absence, posing either as members of the
military or falsely claiming to be clients inquiring on
the status of their cases. These incidents were
attested to by her law office partner, Atty. Michael
P. Pito, through an Affidavit 6 dated June 16, 2009.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No.
189690, Davao City Councilor ATTY. ANGELA
LIBRADO-TRINIDAD (Atty. Librado-Trinidad),
delivered a Privilege Speech 7 before the members
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao City on
May 19, 2009 to demand the removal of her name
from said OB List. Subsequently, the Davao City
Council ordered a formal investigation into the
existence of the alleged OB List. The Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), for its part, announced the
conduct of its own investigation into the matter,
having been presented a copy of the PowerPoint
presentation during its public hearing in Davao City
on May 22, 2009.
According to her, in the course of the performance
of her duties and functions as a lawyer, as a
member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Davao, as well as, of Bayan Muna, she has not
committed any act against national security that
would justify the inclusion of her name in the said
OB List. In her Affidavit, 8 she recounted that
sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men
on a motorcycle tailed her vehicle as she went
about her day going to different places. She also
recalled that on June 23, 2008, while she was away
from home, three unidentified men tried to barge
into their house and later left on board a plate-less,
stainless "owner type-vehicle." Both incidents were
duly reported to the police. 9 AHCcET
Meanwhile, the petitioner in G.R. No. 189691,
current Secretary General of the Union of Peoples'
Lawyers in Mindanao (UPLM) and Davao City
Coordinator of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG), ATTY. CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE (Atty.
Zarate), was informed sometime in May 2009 that
his name was also among those included in the OB
List made public by Representative Ocampo at a
forum concerning human rights violations in
Southern Mindanao. In Atty. Zarate's petition, 10 he
alleged that:
5.On May 19, 2009, during a press conference
marking the conclusion of an International Solidarity
Mission (ISM) attended by both local and
international delegates and organized to
investigate alleged human rights violations in
Southern Mindanao by state's forces Bayan
Muna Party-list Representative Satur Ocampo
revealed the existence of a "watch list," officially
known in military parlance as "Order of Battle"
prepared by the intelligence arm of Philippine
Army's 10th ID, headed by respondent Maj. Gen.
Reynaldo Mapagu. . . .;
6.The said "Order of Battle" was contained in a
[PowerPoint] presentation marked "SECRET" and
captioned "3rd Quarter 2007 OB Validation Result";
it was supposedly prepared by the "JCICC 'Agila'"
under the [O]ffice of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence of the 10th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army. It also mentioned a certain "JTICC
'LAWIN'" with the following as members: Task Force
Davao Chairman; Team Leader, SPOT11-3,
MIG11, ISAFP, NISU-Davao, NISG-EM, PN, 305th AISS,
PAF, TL, ISU 11, PA, S2, RCDG, PA; M2, DCPO; NICA
XI; S2, 104th DRC, PA, and, WACOM-
Researcher/Analyst MIG11, ISAFP[;]
7.The said [PowerPoint] presentation (which
Representative Ocampo said was "leaked" by a
"conscientious soldier"), revealed the names of
organizations and personalities in Southern
Mindanao, particularly Davao City, supposedly
"connected" to the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New
People's Army (NPA);
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8.The name of the herein petitioner was listed in the
categories of"human rights" and "Broad Alliance" . .
.; 11 (Emphasis in the original)
Asserting that the inclusion of his name in the OB List
was due to his advocacies as a public interest or
human rights lawyer, Atty. Zarate vehemently and
categorically denied that he was fronting for, or
connected with, the CPP-NPA. 12
In fine, petitioners were one in asserting that the OB
List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by
the fact that there have already been three victims
of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be
linked directly to the OB List, to wit: Celso B. Pojas,
who was assassinated in May 2008 13 purportedly
because he was Secretary General of the Farmers
Association of Davao City 14 and Spokesperson of
the Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP), 15
which organizations were identified as communist
fronts in the subject OB List; Lodenio S. Monzon, who
was a victim of a shooting incident in April 2009 16
due to his supposed connection to the known
activist party-list group Bayan Muna 17 as
Coordinator in the Municipality of Boston, Davao
Oriental; and Dr. Rogelio Peera, who was shot to
death in June 2009 allegedly because he was a
member of RX Against Erap (RAGE), 18 a sectoral
group also identified in the OB List.
Petitioners further alleged that respondents'
inconsistent statements and obvious prevarication
sufficiently prove their authorship of the subject OB
List. Supposedly sourced from their own Press
Releases, 19 respondents have been quoted in
several newspapers as saying: 1) that the "10th ID
has its Order of Battle, and, it is not for public
consumption"; 2) that the Order of Battle "requires
thorough confirmation and validation from different
law enforcement agencies, and from various
sectors and stakeholders who are the ones
providing the information about the people and
organizations that may in one way or the other,
wittingly or unwittingly, become involved in the
CPP's grand design"; 3) that an "order of battle does
not target individuals; it is mainly an assessment of
the general threat to national security"; 4) that
Representative Ocampo "utilized the material to
disrupt the ongoing government efforts in the area
by raising issues and propaganda against the
military"; 5) that "[t]he public viewing of the
"falsified" document of the OB was a deliberate act
of Representative Ocampo . . . to mar the image of
the military forces, gain media mileage and regain
the support of the masses and local executives"; 6)
that Representative Ocampo "'twisted' the data
and insinuated names as targets of the AFP/10ID
when in fact these are targets (for infiltration) by the
CPP/NPA"; and 7) that this "attempt of the CPP to
attribute human rights violations to the Philippine
government is a cover to mask their record of killing
people." According to petitioners, there is no
question that these Press Releases came from the
10th ID. Its source email address,
dpao10id@yahoo.com, has been identified by
regular correspondent of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer Jeffrey Tupas as the same one used by
respondent Lt. Col. Decapia in sending to him
previous official press statements of the 10th ID,
including the Press Release entitled, "CPP/NPA
demoralized, ISM on the rescue." 20
On June 16, 2009, petitioners separately filed before
the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with Application for a Production Order, 21
docketed as Special Proceeding Nos. 004-09, 22
005-09 23 and 006-09. 24 On June 22, 2009, the RTC
issued separate Writs of Amparo 25 in each of the
three (3) cases, directing respondents to file a
verified written return within seventy-two (72) hours
and setting the case for summary hearing on June
29, 2009.
In their Returns, 26 respondents denied authorship
of the document being adverted to and distributed
by Representative Ocampo to the media. They
claimed that petitioners miserably failed to show,
by substantial evidence, that they were responsible
for the alleged threats perceived by petitioners.
Instead, they asserted that petitioners' allegations
are based solely on hearsay, speculation, beliefs,
impression and feelings, which are insufficient to
warrant the issuance of the writ and, ultimately, the
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
In her Reply, 27 Atty. Librado-Trinidad averred that
the present petition substantially conformed with
the requirements of the Amparo Rule, as it alleged
ultimate facts on the participation of respondents in
the preparation of the OB List, which naturally
requires utmost secrecy. The petition likewise
alleged how the inclusion of their names in the said
OB List substantiates the threat of becoming easy
targets of unexplained disappearances and
extrajudicial killings. On the other hand, Attys.
Zarate and Ladaga commonly asserted 28 that the
totality of the events, which consists of respondents'
virtual admission to the media of the existence of
the OB List, as well as, the fact that known victims of
past extrajudicial killings have been likewise labeled
as communist fronts in similar orders of battle, more
than satisfies the standard required to prove that
petitioners' life, liberty and security are at risk.
HESCcA
During the scheduled summary hearing on June 22,
2009, Representative Ocampo's oral testimony on
the circumstances surrounding his obtention of the
alleged military document was dispensed with and,
instead, the Affidavit 29 he executed on June 30,
2009 was presented in the hearing held on July 1,
2009 to form part of the documentary exhibits of
petitioners. 30
After submission of the parties' respective Position
Papers, 31 the RTC issued on August 14, 2009 the
three separate but similarly-worded Orders finding
no substantial evidence to show that the perceived
threat to petitioners' life, liberty and security was
attributable to the unlawful act or omission of the
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respondents, thus disposing of each of the three
cases in this wise:
Prescinding therefrom, and in . . . light of all the
pieces of evidence presented, this Court is of the
considered views [sic] that petitioner failed to
prove, by substantial evidence, that indeed,
(her/his) perceived threat to (her/his) life, liberty
and security is attributable to the unlawful act or
omission of the respondents. Accordingly, this Court
has no other recourse but to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ is hereby
denied.
SO ORDERED. 32
The RTC rejected the sworn statement of
Representative Ocampo for being hearsay, holding
that with no direct or personal knowledge of the
authenticity of the subject OB List, even an oral
testimony from him on the circumstances
surrounding its obtention through a "conscientious
soldier" would still be of no probative weight. It
likewise found that the violent deaths of Celso
Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera,
and other incidents of threat have no direct relation
at all to the existence of the present OB List.
In their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, 33
petitioners argued that the existence and veracity
of the OB List had already been confirmed by
respondents themselves through their statements to
the media, hence, respondents' personal
authorship thereof need not be proven by
substantial evidence, as it is, after all, "not the crux
of the issue." Petitioners explicated that since
respondents were being impleaded as the
responsible officers of the 10th ID the military unit
that supposedly prepared the OB List PowerPoint
presentation, their general denials on the existence
of the OB List without taking serious steps to find the
persons actually responsible for the threat could not
discharge respondents from the standard of
diligence required of them under the Amparo Rule.
The RTC, however, rejected petitioners' arguments
in the September 22, 2009 Order, hence, these
petitions for review on certiorari raising the following
issues:
I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO ADDUCE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
WARRANT THE GRANT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT, I.E., PROTECTION;
II.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT THE RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE FAILED TO
DISCHARGE THE DILIGENCE REQUIRED BY THE
AMPARO RULES BY THEIR SWEEPING AND GENERAL
DENIALS; AND
III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
NATURE AND CONCEPT OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT. 34
Commenting on the petitions, respondents argue
35 that the purported OB List could not have come
from the military because it does not have the
"distinctive marks and security classifications" of
military documents. They quickly defend the
correctness of the RTC's denial of the privilege of
the writ and the interim relief of a protection order
as petitioners have not presented any adequate
and competent evidence, much less substantial
evidence, to establish that public respondents are
threatening to violate their rights to life, liberty and
security or that, at the very least, were involved in
the preparation of the OB List.
We deny the petitions.
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court
pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to
the alarming rise in the number of cases of
enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings.
36 It plays the preventive role of breaking the
expectation of impunity in the commission of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as
well as the curative role of facilitating the
subsequent punishment of the perpetrators. 37 In
Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 38 the Court has previously
held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary
remedy intended to address violations of, or threats
to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that,
being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not
one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds
but only upon reasonable certainty. Hence, every
petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be
supported by justifying allegations of fact on the
following matters:
(a)The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b)The name and personal circumstances of the
respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain,
the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c)The right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d)The investigation conducted, if any, specifying
the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well
as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
(e)The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
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(f)The relief prayed for. The petition may include a
general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
39 (Underscoring supplied)
The sole and common issue presented in these
petitions is whether the totality of evidence satisfies
the degree of proof required under the Amparo
Rule. Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo provide as follows:
SEC. 17.Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 18.Judgment. The court shall render
judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in
the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis
supplied)
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more
than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation
that would warrant a finding of liability against the
person charged. 40 The summary nature of amparo
proceedings, as well as, the use of substantial
evidence as standard of proof shows the intent of
the framers of the rule to address situations of
enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings,
or threats thereof, with what is akin to administrative
proceedings. 41
Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently
unique and informal treatment of amparo cases,
the Court eventually recognized the evidentiary
difficulties that beset amparo petitioners, arising as
they normally would from the fact that the State
itself, through its own agents, is involved in the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing that
it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate. Thus, in
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court laid down a new
standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to
enable amparo petitioners to meet the required
amount of proof showing the State's direct or
indirect involvement in the purported violations and
found it a fair and proper rule in amparo cases "to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality" and "to consider any evidence
otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be
admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced." 42 Put simply, evidence is not
to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible
under the rules for as long as it satisfies "the most
basic test of reason i.e., relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
with all other pieces of adduced evidence." 43
This measure of flexibility in the admissibility of
evidence, however, does not do away with the
requirement of substantial evidence in showing the
State's involvement in the enforced disappearance,
extrajudicial killing or threats thereof. It merely
permits, in the absence of hard-to-produce direct
evidence, a closer look at the relevance and
significance of every available evidence, 44
including those that are, strictly speaking, hearsay
where the circumstances of the case so require,
and allows the consideration of the evidence
adduced in terms of their consistency with the
totality of the evidence. 45
As emphasized by Justice Arturo D. Brion (Justice
Brion) during the deliberations on this case, in cases
of enforced disappearance, the evidence that
would directly establish a violation of the right to
life, liberty and security is indubitably in the State's
possession. The same is not equally true in cases
where the amparo petitioner alleges (as in this
case) a threatened violation of his/her rights since
the facts, circumstances and the link between
these that create an actual threat to his/her life are
measurably within the ability of the amparo
petitioner to prove. These include, among others,
the alleged documented human rights violations by
the military in Mindanao; documentary and/or
testimonial evidence on the military's counter-
insurgency operations; corroborative evidence to
support the allegations on the presence of
suspicious men; and presumptive evidence linking
the deaths of Celso Pojas, Ludenio Monzon and Dr.
Rogelio Peera to their political affiliation and the
similarity of their situation to those of petitioners. A
mere inclusion of one's name in the OB List, without
more, does not suffice to discharge the burden to
establish actual threat to one's right to life, liberty
and security by substantial evidence.
The statement of Representative Ocampo that the
respondents are the real source of the OB List is
unquestionably hearsay evidence because, except
for the fact that he himself received the OB List from
an unnamed source merely described as "a
conscientious soldier," he had no personal
knowledge concerning its preparation. But even if
the Court were to apply the appropriate measure
of flexibility in the instant cases by admitting the
hearsay testimony of Representative Ocampo, a
consideration of this piece of evidence to the
totality of those adduced, namely, the Press
Releases issued by the 10th ID admitting the
existence of a military-prepared Order of Battle, the
affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening
visits and tailing of their vehicles by menacing
strangers, as well as the violent deaths of alleged
militant personalities, leads to the conclusion that
the threat to petitioners' security has not be
adequately proven.
Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their
names in the OB List presented a real threat to their
security by attributing the violent deaths of known
activists Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and Dr.
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Rogelio Peera to the inclusion of the latter's names
or the names of their militant organizations in the
subject OB List. Petitioner Atty. Librado-Trinidad
even attributed the alleged tailing of her vehicle by
motorcycle-riding men and the attempted entry by
suspicious men into her home to the inclusion of her
name in the OB List. The RTC, however, correctly
dismissed both arguments, holding that the
existence of the OB List could not be directly
associated with the menacing behavior of
suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain
personalities, thus:
"Anent petitioner's revelation that sometime in 2008,
a number of unidentified men attempted to forcibly
enter the premises of her dwelling and that at one
occasion, the vehicle she was riding was tailed by
motorcycle-riding men, the same could not led [sic]
to the conclusion that indeed, those incidents were
related to the existence of the "OB List." There
appears not even an iota of evidence upon which
the same assumption can be anchored on. 46
This Court likewise sees no direct relation between
the violent deaths of Celso Pojas, Ludenio Monzon
and Dr. Rogelio Peera and the subject "OB List."
There is no evidence pointing to the claim that they
were killed because their names or the
organizations they were involved in were
mentioned in the same "OB List." More importantly,
there is no official finding by the proper authorities
that their deaths were precipitated by their
involvement in organizations sympathetic to, or
connected with, the Communist Party of the
Philippines, or its military arm, the New People's
Army. Lastly, and more telling, the existence of the
subject "OB List" has not been adequately proven,
as discussed heretofore, hence, reference to the
same finds no basis." 47
The Court holds that the imputed pattern of
targeting militants for execution by way of
systematically identifying and listing them in an
Order of Battle cannot be inferred simply from the
Press Releases admitting the existence of a military
document known as an Order of Battle and the
fact that activists Celso Pojas, Lodenio Monzon and
Dr. Rogelio Peera have become supposed victims
of extralegal killings. The adduced evidence tends
to bear strongly against the proposition because,
except for Celso Pojas, the names of the supposed
victims of extrajudicial killings are manifestly absent
in the subject OB List and the supposed connection
of the victims to the militant groups explicitly
identified in the OB List is nothing short of nebulous.
Moreover, while respondents may have admitted
through various statements to the media that the
military has its own Order of Battle, such an
admission is not equivalent to proof that the subject
OB List, which was publicly disclosed by
Representative Ocampo by way of a PowerPoint
presentation, is one and the same with the Order of
Battle that the military has in its keeping. And,
assuming that the Press Releases do amount to an
admission not only of the existence but also the
authenticity of the subject OB List, the inclusion of
petitioners' names therein does not, by itself,
constitute an actual threat to their rights to life,
liberty and security as to warrant the issuance of a
writ of amparo.
In the case of Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, 48 the Court ruled that a person's right to
security is, in one sense, "freedom from fear" and
that any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security
is an actionable wrong. The term "any threat,"
however, cannot be taken to mean every
conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one
to fear for his life, liberty or security. The Court
explicated therein that "[f]ear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear
caused by the same stimulus can range from being
baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus."
Certainly, given the uniqueness of individual
psychological mindsets, perceptions of what is
fearful will necessarily vary from one person to
another.
The alleged threat to herein petitioners' rights to life,
liberty and security must be actual, and not merely
one of supposition or with the likelihood of
happening. And, when the evidence adduced
establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to
a potential one, then, it goes without saying that
the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in
amparo proceedings has also been met. Thus, in
the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the
Amparo rule, only actual threats, as may be
established from all the facts and circumstances of
the case, can qualify as a violation that may be
addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their
names in the OB List is as real a threat as that which
brought ultimate harm to victims Celso Pojas,
Lodenio Monzon and Dr. Rogelio Peera without
corroborative evidence from which it can be
presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three
people were, in fact, on account of their militant
affiliations or that their violent fates had been
actually planned out by the military through its
Order of Battle.
The Court may be more yielding to the use of
circumstantial or indirect evidence and logical
inferences, but substantial evidence is still the rule to
warrant a finding that the State has violated, is
violating, or is threatening to violate, amparo
petitioners' right to life, liberty or security. No
substantial evidence of an actual threat to
petitioners' life, liberty and security has been shown
to exist in this case. For, even if the existence of the
OB List or, indeed, the inclusion of petitioners'
names therein, can be properly inferred from the
totality of the evidence presented, still, no link has
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been sufficiently established to relate the subject
OB List either to the threatening visits received by
petitioners from unknown men or to the violent
deaths of the three (3) mentioned personalities and
other known activists, which could strongly suggest
that, by some identifiable pattern of military
involvement, the inclusion of one's name in an
Order of Battle would eventually result to enforced
disappearance and murder of those persons
tagged therein as militants. caCSDT
Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the
amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the cases of
Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner's
failure to establish by substantial evidence the
involvement of government forces in the alleged
violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court
to order the conduct of further investigation where
it appears that the government did not observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of its
duty to investigate the complained abduction and
torture or enforced disappearance. The Court
directed further investigation in the case of Roxas
because the modest efforts of police investigators
were effectively putting petitioner's right to security
in danger with the delay in identifying and
apprehending her abductors. In Razon, Jr., the
Court found it necessary to explicitly order the
military and police officials to pursue with
extraordinary diligence the investigation into the
abduction and disappearance of a known activist
because not only did the police investigators
conduct an incomplete and one-sided
investigation but they blamed their ineffectiveness
to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives
to cooperate with the authorities. In both of these
cases, the incidents of abduction and torture were
undisputed and they provided the evidentiary
support for the finding that the right to security was
violated and the necessity for further investigation
into such violation. Unlike Roxas and Razon, Jr.,
however, the present petitions do not involve
actual cases of abduction or disappearance that
can be the basis of an investigation. Petitioners
would insist that respondents be investigated and
directed to produce the Order of Battle that they
have admitted to be in their safekeeping and
Justify the inclusion of petitioners' names therein.
However, without substantial evidence of an actual
threat to petitioners' rights to life, liberty and security
that consists more than just the inclusion of their
names in an OB List, an order for further
investigation into, or production of, the military's
Order of Battle, would have no concrete basis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are
hereby DENIED. The assailed Orders dated August
14, 2009 and September 22, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
 (Padua v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-38570, May 24, 1988)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-38570. May 24, 1988.]
DOMINGO PADUA, petitioner, vs. HON. VICENTE
ERICTA, etc., RUNDIO ABJAETO, and ANTONIO G.
RAMOS, respondents.
Antonio de los Reyes for petitioner.
Lazaro A. Marquez for private respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL AND HEARING,
ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE
COURT. Postponements of trials and hearings
should not be allowed except on meritorious
grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests
entirely in the sound discretion of the Judge.
However, that discretion must be reasonably and
wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the
end that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence by all the parties,
specially where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any party.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL;
SHOULD NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF RIGHT TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE OR TO BEING NON-SUITED. The
desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should
not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of
a party s right to present evidence and either in
plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; DENIAL OF A PARTY'S
FIRST MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT AFTER
OPPOSING COUNSEL HAD TWICE SOUGHT AND
OBTAINED CANCELLATION OF TRIAL CONSTITUTES
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The Trial Court
unaccountably ignored the fact that defendants'
counsel had twice applied for and been granted
postponements of the trial; that plaintiff's counsel
had filed a written motion for postponement five (5)
days prior to the hearing sought to be transferred,
and this was the very first such motion filed by him;
that although the motion for postponement could
have been objected to, no opposition was
presented by defendants, which was not surprising
considering that their counsel had himself already
obtained two (2) postponements; that the ground
for cancellation was not entirely without merit: the
counsel had a case in the Tarlac Court scheduled
on the same day, March 6, 1974, which had been
pending since 1964 and which the Tarlac Court
understandably was anxious to terminate; that the
Padua motion for postponement sought
cancellation of only one (1) of three settings,
leaving the case to proceed on the two (2)
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subsequent hearing dates; and the motion had
been verbally reiterated by plaintiff's wife on the
day of the hearing sought to be cancelled. Under
the circumstances, and in the light of the
precedents set out in the opening paragraphs of
this opinion, the respondent Judge's action was
unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and
should be as it is hereby annulled.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
Courts should not brook undue delays in the
ventilation and determination of causes. It should
be their constant effort to assure that litigations are
prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.
Postponements of trials and hearings should not be
allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the
grant or refusal thereof rests entirely in the sound
discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying,
however, that discretion must be reasonably and
wisely exercised, in the light of the attendant
circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the
end that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence by all the parties,
specially where the deferment would cause no
substantial prejudice to any party. The desideratum
of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all
possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's
right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's
being non-suited or the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.
LLjur
". . . (T)rial courts have . . . the duty to dispose of
controversies after trial on the merits whenever
possible. It is deemed an abuse of discretion for
them, on their own motion, 'to enter a dismissal
which is not warranted by the circumstances of the
case' (Municipality of Dingras v. Bonoan, 85 Phil.
458-59 [1950]). While it is true that the dismissal of an
action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule
17 of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their
discretion (Flores v. Phil. Alien Property
Administrator, 107 Phil. 778 [1960]; Montelibano v.
Benares, 103 Phil. 110 [1958]; Adorable v. Bonifacio,
105 Phil. 1269 [1959]; Inter-Island Gas Service, Inc. v.
De la Gerna, L-17631, October 19, 1966, 18 SCRA
390), such discretion must be exercised soundly with
a view to the circumstances surrounding each
particular case (Vernus-Sanciangco v. Sanciangco,
L-12619, April 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 1209). If facts obtain
that serve as mitigating circumstances for the
delay, the same should be considered and
dismissal denied or set aside (Rudd v. Rogerson, 15
ALR 2d 672; Cervi v. Greenwood, 147 Colo 190, 362
P. 2d 1050 [1961]), especially where the suit appears
to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably
negligent and no injury results to defendant (27
C.J.S. 235-36; 15 ALR 3rd 680)." (Abinales vs. Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga City, Br. I, 70 SCRA 590,
595).
"It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for
postponement and the setting aside of orders
previously issued, rest principally upon the sound
discretion of the judge to whom they are
addressed, but always predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere
convenience of the courts or of the parties of the
case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby (Camara Vda. de Zubiri v. Zubiri, et
al., L-16745, December 17, 1966). When no
substantial rights are affected and the intention to
delay is not manifest, the corresponding motion to
transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly,
it is sound judicial discretion to allow them (Rexwell
Corp. v. Canlas, L-16746, December 30, 1961)."
(Panganiban vs. Vda. de Sta. Maria, 22 SCRA 708,
712).
In the civil action at bar, the Trial Court rejected the
plaintiff's plea for cancellation of one of three (3)
hearing dates, the very first such plea made by that
party, upon a ground not entirely unmeritorious in
the premises, and under such circumstances as
would not be productive of any appreciable delay
in the proceedings or any substantial prejudice to
the defendants, and summarily dismissed the
complaint. Such a dismissal was unwarranted and
relief therefrom must be accorded. prLL
The action that was thus summarily dismissed had
been brought by Domingo Padua (petitioner
herein) in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City
1 In that action Padua sought to recover damages
for the injuries suffered by his eight-year old
daughter, Luzviminda, caused by her being hit by a
truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by
Antonio G. Ramos (private respondents herein).
Padua was litigating in forma pauperis.
Trial of the case having been set in due course,
Padua commenced presentation of his evidence
on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct
examination in the course of which reference was
made to numerous documents, marked Exhibits B,
B-1 to B-109. 2 At the close of his examination, and
on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously
scheduled hearing of December 12, 1973 was
cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was
reset on December 17, 1973. 3 However, the
hearing of December 17, 1973 was also cancelled,
again at the instance of defendants' counsel, who
pleaded sickness as ground therefor; and trial was
once more slated to "take place on March 6,
March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning." 4
After defendants' attorney had twice sought and
obtained cancellation of trial settings, as above
narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next
moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a
motion dated and filed on March 1, 1974, 5 copy of
which was personally served on defendants' lawyer,
6 Padua's counsel alleged that he had "another
hearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac Court of First
Instance entitled: Salud Dupitas vs. Mariano Abella,
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Civil Case No. 4904 which is of 1966 stint, and said
court in Tarlac is anxious to terminate said case
once and for all," and that the cancellation would
"at any rate . . . leave plaintiff and defendants two
(2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on
these premises, he asked "that the hearing on
March 6, 1974 . . . be ordered cancelled." No
opposition was filed by the defendants to the
motion, whether on the ground that the motion
had not been properly set for hearing, the clerk
having merely been requested to "submit the . . .
motion upon receipt . . . for the consideration of the
Court," 7 or some other ground. Apart from filing this
motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiff's counsel took the
additional step of sending his client's wife to the
Court on the day of the trial, March 6, 1974, to
verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of
the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The
respondent Judge however denied the application
and dismissed the case. His Honor's Order, dictated
on that day, March 6, 1974, reads as follows: 8
"When this case was called for hearing today,
neither plaintiff nor counsel appeared. The plaintiff's
wife, however, appeared in Court and informed
the Court that the plaintiff's counsel had to attend
to a very important case in the province.
"The hearing for today was fixed by the plaintiff
himself in open court after consulting his calendar
and hence the Court will not grant the
postponement on the ground that the plaintiff's
counsel had a very important case in the provinces.
Neither did the plaintiff himself appear.
"In view hereof, let this case be dismissed.
Padua moved for reconsideration, 9 but this was
denied. 10 Hence, this petition.
The Trial Court unaccountably ignored the fact that
defendants' counsel had twice applied for and
been granted postponements of the trial; that
plaintiff's counsel had filed a written motion for
postponement five (5) days prior to the hearing
sought to be transferred, and this was the very first
such motion filed by him; that although the motion
for postponement could have been objected to,
no opposition was presented by defendants, which
was not surprising considering that their counsel
had himself already obtained two (2)
postponements; that the ground for cancellation
was not entirely without merit: the counsel had a
case in the Tarlac Court scheduled on the same
day, March 6, 1974, which had been pending since
1964 and which the Tarlac Court understandably
was anxious to terminate; that the Padua motion
for postponement sought cancellation of only one
(1) of three settings, leaving the case to proceed
on the two (2) subsequent hearing dates; and the
motion had been verbally reiterated by plaintiff's
wife on the day of the hearing sought to be
cancelled. Under the circumstances, and in the
light of the precedents set out in the opening
paragraphs of this opinion, the respondent Judge's
action was unreasonable, capricious and
oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the
Order of the Court a quo dated March 6, 1974,
dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the Order
dated March 13, 1974 denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE; Civil Case No. Q-17563 is hereby REINSTATED
and the Regional Trial Court which has replaced
Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance in which
the action was pending at the time of dismissal, is
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of the
petitioner's action and decide the same on the
merits in due course.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.
(Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, December 10,
1974)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-25769. December 10, 1974.]
FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL,
petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.
Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor
Vicente A. Torres for respondent.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
A plea based on the constitutional right to a
speedy trial 1 led this Court to act affirmatively on a
certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a case
then pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering
the length of time that had elapsed, it is readily
discernible why an inquiry into the matter is well-
nigh unavoidable. The accusation for robbery
against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco
Angel was filed as far back as December 31, 1951.
The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found
them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of
appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For a
period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no
action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that
day, there was a resolution remanding the records
of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the
testimony of a certain witness deemed material for
the disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution was
amended by a second resolution dated August 5,
1959, which granted the motion for counsel of
appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the
decision so that evidence for the defense on
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certain new facts or matters may be received and
that a new decision in lieu of the old one may be
rendered in accordance with the facts as found. 4
Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower
court with the former decision set aside so that the
trial could be had, but nothing was done for about
a year because the offended party failed to
appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set
for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged that when
thereafter he did take the witness stand, his
testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized
as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember
the details of the alleged crime, there was even a
failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead of
rendering a new decision, the former one having
been set aside as required by the Court of Appeals,
the lower court merely sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years
having elapsed without anything being done,
petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against
them due to such inordinate delay in their
disposition, which covered the period of December
8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a
decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional
right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent Court of
Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the
vigorous plea on the part of counsel for petitioners,
its last order being a denial of a second motion for
reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the
answer on behalf of the People of the Philippines,
the facts as above set forth were substantially
admitted. However, a special and affirmative
defense raised was that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against
whom it is filed, is not a tribunal or an office
exercising Judicial functions and that without the
Court of Appeals being made a party to the
petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover,
on the merits, the view was expressed that under
the circumstances, it was not adequately shown
that the right to a speedy trial had been violated,
as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps
necessary to complete the transcript of
stenographic notes of the original trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than
sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right to
a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in both the
1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been
accorded due respect. There is thus merit in the
petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was
noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento,
9 "means one free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, . . ." 10 Thus, if the person
accused were innocent, he may within the shortest
time possible be spared from anxiety and
apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if
culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to
the fate in store for him, within a period of course
compatible with his opportunity to present any valid
defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The
remedy in the event of a non-observance of this
right is by habeas corpus if the accused were
restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition,
or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11
The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine
announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in
Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case,
Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the
trial, to comply with the requirement of the then
organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be
"free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal
proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the
trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of
his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935
Constitution took effect, People v. Castaeda, 15
where it was shown that the criminal case had
been dragging on for almost five years and that
when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted
by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed
decision of conviction and acquitted the accused.
As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel:
"The Government should be the last to set an
example of delay and oppression in the
administration of justice and it is the moral and legal
obligation of this court to see that the criminal
proceedings against the accused come to an end
and that they be immediately discharged from the
custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the
above judgment that the dismissal of a second
information for frustrated homicide was ordered by
this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the
first information had been dismissed after a lapse of
one year and seven months from the time the
original complaint was filed during which time on
the three occasions the case was set for trial, the
private prosecutor twice asked for postponements
and once the trial court itself cancelled the entire
calendar for the month it was supposed to have
been heard. 17 The same result followed in Esguerra
v. De la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was
filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been
criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of
chastity in a justice of the peace court but after
over a year and three months, with the lower court
twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for
the same offense on a new information, thus
compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to
compel the lower court to terminate the case was
his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy
deemed appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel
spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That was in
Mercado v. Santos. 19 Here, for a period of about
twenty months, the accused was arrested four
times on the charge of falsifying his deceased wife's
will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently
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withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on the
same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal.
Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a
motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a
receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard
on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but
he did not succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals,
but he failed again. He elevated the matter to this
Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice
Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a
trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be
oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial
for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial
itself is necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion likewise
considered as not decisive the fact that the
provincial fiscal did not intervene until an
information was filed charging the accused with
the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The
Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy
trial may be availed of only where the prosecution
for crime is commenced and undertaken by the
fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a
person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the
offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced." 21 The latest decision in point,
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 22 presented an even
clearer case. The information for damage to
property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the
matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the accused
moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the
motion in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years
elapsed, the period now covering almost eight
years, when the trial was commenced. When one
of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to
appear, the provincial fiscal sought the
postponement, but the accused countered with a
motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and
this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it
changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional
guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the
absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has
not been completed. In this case then, as of May
10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court
of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that
they had not been accorded their right to be tried
as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases
that should be deemed material. It is at times
unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even
with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to
them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside
of the previous decision in the resolution of August
5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea
for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is
the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us
considering the controlling doctrine announced
with such emphasis by this Court time and time
again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial
issue has been met. The decisive question has been
answered. There is an affirmation of the worth of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much
significance should be attached to the procedural
defect pointed out in the answer of the People of
the Philippines that the Court of Appeals should
have been made the party respondent. What
cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord
respect to this particular constitutional right. It did
amount at the very least to a grave abuse of
discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading
may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the
obvious disregard of one of the most important
safeguards granted an accused. To deny
petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt
form over substance. At any rate, the petition could
be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the defenses that
could have interposed to justify the action taken
were invoked by the People of the Philippines. They
certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to
a speedy Trial speak too categorically to be
misread. This is one of those situations then where, in
the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief
Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give way
to the realities of the situation." 23

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted,

and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No.
16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of
September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss
as well as its order of January 8, 1966 denying the
motion for reconsideration, and the order of
January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for
reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and
considered of no force and effect. The criminal
case against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No.
16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.

Makalintal, C.J., Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

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