A.C. No.

5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke
to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other
half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the
Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of
Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising;
and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed
that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution
No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him
from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would
be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, "Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan,
Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This petition
was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed
his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or
evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain
the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort
to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that
an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he
in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained
from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made
in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus,
the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address
and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical
and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and
italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY
of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
[A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003]
LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Only recently, we stressed that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires
that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to the
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones good
standing in the profession.1[1] Furthermore, implicit in a vocation characterized by
professionalism is a certain level of competence and dedication.2[2] Far from measuring up to the
norms of conduct set in the Code, the respondent charged in this case, in fact, breached his avowed
duty as a lawyer and the ethical standards he was strictly bound to observe.
On March 22, 1994, Lothar Schulz, a German national filed a verified complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Marcelo G. Flores of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.3[3] He alleged that
sometime in December 1992, he engaged the services of respondent for the purposes of filing a
complaint against Wilson Ong for revocation of contract and damages for the latters failure to
deliver the jeep he sold to complainant within the stipulated period. Respondent advised him that
there was no need to refer the complaint for barangay conciliation. Three months later, respondent
instructed him to file his complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa of Tabuc-tubig, Dumaguete City.
Wilson Ong refused to appear at the conciliation hearings, arguing that the Lupon of Tabuc-tubig
had no jurisdiction over his person because he was a resident of Barangay Banilad. Complainant
thus brought the complaint before the Barangay Captain of Banilad. By that time, however,
complainant learned that Wilson Ong had already filed a case for Specific Performance against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Brang 31, entitled Rachel Lisa B. Ong, et
al. v. Lothar Schulz, docketed as Civil Case No. 10527. Complainant argued that respondents
inordinate delay in acting on his case resulted in his being defendant rather than a complainant
against Wilson Ong.
Complainant also charged respondent with collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and of
unjustifiably refusing to return his files. He undertook to pay respondent attorneys fees of
P5,000.00 if the case does not reach the court, and P10,000.00 attorneys fees and P500.00
appearance fees if it reaches the court. This notwithstanding, respondent alleged in the Answer
with Counterclaim which he prepared on behalf of complainant in Civil Case No. 10527 that his
attorneys fees was P50,000.00 and appearance fee was P1,000.00 per hearing. When complainant
questioned him about this, respondent explained that it was Wilson Ong who will be made to pay
for the said fees. This, complainant claimed, showed respondents deceit and lack of candor in his
dealings with the parties in court.
Further, complainant alleged that since he suspected respondent of not protecting his interest in
Civil Case No. 10527, he instructed respondent to withdraw his appearance as his counsel after
the filing of the answer. Thereafter, he asked respondent to return the amount of P12,000.00 out
of the total of P17,000.00 that he has paid to the latter, inasmuch as the amount of P5,000.00 should
be sufficient compensation for the minimal services rendered by him. Respondent, however,
refused to return the amount to complainant and, instead, demanded additional fees. Complainants
new counsel wrote a formal demand letter to respondent which, however, was ignored. This
prompted complainant to file a complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa of Barangay Bantayan
where respondent resided. After the parties failed to reach a settlement, complainant instituted an
action for sum of money against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 10645.
Complainant alleged that respondent offered to return his files provided that he signs a statement
acknowledging that respondent does not owe him anything. Complainant refused, for fear that it
would prejudice the collection suit he filed against respondent. Thus, respondent continued to
unreasonably retain his files.
In support of his charges against respondent, complainant pointed out that respondent was formerly
a Municipal Judge of Siaton, Negros Oriental who was dismissed from the service after the end of
the Marcos regime. He submitted a copy of an Order4[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental, , Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 9142 entitled Bishop of Dumaguete v. Fausta Pajunar, et
al. In that case, respondent sought the inhibition of the Presiding Judge, Rosendo Bandal, Jr. The
latter inhibited himself but cited in the said Order nine instances of anomalous, illegal and unethical
practices committed by respondent.
In his Comment,5[5] respondent alleged that upon accepting the case of complainant, he
immediately sent a letter to Wilson Ong demanding that he deliver the jeep to complainant for
road test.6[6] Ong complied with the demand and allowed complainant to road-test the vehicle,
during which he discovered that the jeep was defective.7[7] Respondent thereafter requested Ong
to cause the repairs on the jeep. It was only after the negotiations with Ong failed that he advised
complainant to proceed with the filing of his complaint before the Barangay Captain of Tabuc-
tubig. At the time, he believed Tabuc-tubig was the proper venue considering that the South Pacific
Metal Works owned by Wilson Ong was located there.
Respondent claims that complainant was to blame for the fact that Wilson Ong filed his complaint
in court first. He alleged that complainant failed to follow up his case because he was involved in
a traffic accident. Complainants inability to attend to his complaint with the Barangay Lupon in
Tabuc-tubig caused the delay thereof.
Anent the attorneys fees, respondent alleges that complainant agreed to pay him P50,000 as
attorneys fees, one-half of which is payable upon the filing of the Answer with Counterclaim8[8]
in Civil Case No. 10527 less the amount of P17,000.00 given as payment for past services.
Complainant also agreed to pay him P1,000.00 per appearance. Hence, respondent avers that
complainant still owed him P8,000.00 to complete the required one-half of the P50,000.00
attorneys fees, and P1,000.00 appearance fee for the hearing on April 15, 1993. Respondent further
explained that he was willing to return complainants files provided that he sign a receipt
acknowledging the turn-over, but complainant refused to sign.
Respondent admitted that he was once a Municipal Judge of Siaton, Negros Oriental but he decided
to go on optional retirement. During his 17-year stint in the judiciary, he was held in high esteem
by his colleagues and was elected President of the Municipal Judges League of Negros Oriental
for 14 consecutive terms. Out of the 15 RTC Judges in Negros Oriental, it is only Judge Bandal
who had shown animosity, hostility and hatred towards him. However, he added that he and Judge
Bandal have reconciled and are now on good terms.
On August 29, 1994, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.9[9]
On August 9, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion alleging that complainant had
long left the country, for which reason the case may be resolved on the basis of the
pleadings.10[10]
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report dated June 28, 2003 recommending
that: (1) respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; (2) he be ordered to return
to complainant the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest; and (3) he
return the papers of complainant which came under his custody during the period of his
engagement as counsel.
In justifying the recommended penalty, the IBP-CBD made the following observations:
[Respondent] was presumed to be knowledgeable on the laws, but in this case, it turned out that
Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that
all disputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong
not included), between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought
first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed.
He was not all certain if the complaint of Lothar Schulz falls under PD No. 1508 or not. As Lothar
Schulz narrated, Atty. Flores told him at first that there was no need for his complaint to be coursed
through the barangay authorities.
Not realizing the need and urgency to avail of PD No. 1508, Atty. Flores found it more important
to spend more than two months to dialogue and confer with Wilson and hope that he could get the
parties to come to an amicable settlement of their differences, an undertaking that only involves a
waste of time and effort as he later realized it because it turned out that Wilson Ong did not appear
to have any genuine intent to make good his obligation to put the jeep in good running condition
and fee from defects because Lothar Schulz and his mechanics found out from the result of the last
road test on the jeep that aside from several defects discovered during previous road tests and
which had remained uncorrected/unrepaired, there are twenty-six more new defects.
It was already March 8, 1992, more than two months after becoming Lothar Schulzs lawyer that
Atty. Flores reversed position and suddenly prepared a written complaint for the client which he
asked the latter to file with the Barangay Captain of Tabuc-tubig. However, that belated move did
not benefit the cause of his client at all. On the contrary, Atty. Flores even made the problem of
delay worse. Upon the misconception that the proper venue was Tabuc-tubig which was the place
where the assembly/motor shop of Wilson Ong is located, he directed Lothar Schulz to file his
complaint there. That was a wrong advice. Section 3 of PD No. 1508 states that the dispute should
be lodged for conciliation with the barangay where the respondent actually resides. Because PD
No. 1508 applies only to parties who are natural persons, the location of the assembly should of
Wilson Ong is of no consequence to the law. The respondent who could be made a party under PD
No. 1508 in this case is Wilson Ong and the complaint against him must be filed where he resides
which is Barangay Banilad in Dumaguete City. Thus, the complaint of Lothar Schulz was not able
to move at all for the entire duration that it was in Barangay Tabuc-tubig which had no authority
over it. Such was the situation until that barangay was impelled to dismiss the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. It is true that the complaint was eventually brought to the proper barangay
(Banilad), but the Lupon in that place was no longer in a position to assert its jurisdiction because
at that time there was already a case that Wilson Ong had succeeded to file against Lothar Schulz
on the subject of their failed contract.
xxx xxx xxx.
Between the conflicting versions given by the parties as to the reason why the papers of Lothar
Schulz had continued to be possessed by Atty. Flores, the version of the complainant appears more
deserving of credence. If the paper which was presented for the signature of Lothar Schulz is really
an acknowledgment to evidence the return of the papers of the case to Lothar Schulz, as the
respondent would have it appear, there is no reason why Lothar Schulz [should] hesitate or refuse
to sign the paper[s] as there is nothing prejudicial to his interest. But certainly if the contents of
the paper presented by Atty. Flores to Lothar Schulz for the purpose of signature involve[s] an
admission on the part of Lothar Schulz that the lawyer is clear on the matter of money
accountability, it is understandable that Lothar Schulz will not sign that paper because his signature
will have the effect of a desistance in his pending civil case for the recovery of the P12,000.00
which he alleged to be an overcharge on attorneys fee[s] by Atty. Flores. The continuing
possession by Atty. Flores of the papers of Lothar Schulz can only be compatible with the version
that Lothar Schulz presented. Atty. Flores would not release the papers for they serve as means to
harass and/or pressure Lothar Schulz until the latter is impelled to agree to give up his efforts to
pursue Civil Case No. 10645 which will provide Atty. Flores the assurance that a day may come
when he will be made to reimburse the amount of P12,000.00 previously collected from the former
client.11[11]
The findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD were thereafter approved and adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVI-2003-109 dated August 30, 2003.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the Committee on Bar Discipline, as approved by
the IBP Board of Governors. The breach of respondents sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical
standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established.
Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the Bar.
The pertinent Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
It is dismaying to note that respondent patently violated his duty as a lawyer in this case. He
committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability to give
entire devotion to his clients cause. His client had relied upon him to file the complaint with
dispatch so that he would not be preempted by the adverse party. But he failed him. As a
consequence of respondents indolence, his client was haled to court as a party-defendant. It
therefore behooves this Court to wield its corrective hand on this inexcusable infraction which
caused undeserved and needless prejudice to his clients interest, adversely affected the confidence
of the community in the legal profession and eroded the publics trust in the judicial system. As an
attorney, respondent is sworn to do his level best and to observe full fidelity to the court and his
clients.12[12]
The Court has time and again emphatically stated that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed
by clients requires in the lawyer a high standard and an appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public.13[13] Every case an attorney accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free.14[14] To be sure, any member of the legal fraternity worth his title cannot
afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical manner.
Likewise, respondent erred in not returning complainants money despite demands after his failure
to file the case and his devious act of compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he
has no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of complainants papers. This
conduct violated the following Canon:
CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand. x x
x.
Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an action, appeal
an adverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the purchase price of a parcel of land, the
lawyer should, upon failure to take such step and spend the money for it, immediately return the
money to his client.15[15] The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorneys fees on the money in
his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting.16[16] Neither is a lawyer entitled to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for
himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorneys fees.17[17]
The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption
that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client.18[18] It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.19[19] In short, it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belonging to his
client, as in this case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.20[20]
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith and fairness.21[21] Therefore, we agree with the evaluation of the
IBP-CBD and find that respondents acts warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
him. The recommended penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law is well-taken.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Atty. MARCELO G. FLORES is found
guilty of negligence and incompetence, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months effective immediately. He is ordered to RETURN to complainant Lothar Schulz
the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) with legal interest from the date of
promulgation of this Resolution, and all papers which came into his custody as a result of having
served as counsel for said complainant. Respondent is further STERNLY WARNED that a
commission of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the present case where
the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a
retired member of the Judiciary.
In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995, complainant Judge
Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the
Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and grave misconduct.1
After an answer2 and a reply3 were respectively filed by respondent and complainant, the Court,
in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to refer the administrative case to Associate
Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the following
recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of the aforesaid
Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent, former
Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing from the finality of
the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will
be dealt with more severely.
On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima summarized the antecedent
facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel should be reproduced hereunder so that his
disposition of this case may be duly appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, while
respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at the Presidential Anti Crime
Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada.
Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant commenced Special
Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree declaring the said Primitivo Mijares
presumptively dead, after an absence of sixteen (16) years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding
before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their
marriage was the culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when
respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro Manila, was trying a
murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares. Since then, respondent became a close
family friend of complainant (TSN, p. 14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their
guests at a German restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their
usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, respondent fetched
complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and reached the condominium unit of
respondent two hours later at which time, she answered the phone. At the other end of the line was
a woman offending her with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent
on the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been just a call at the
wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of harsh words, one word led to another,
to a point when respondent called complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang
gusto ko sa babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and have it
burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no choice but to leave in haste
the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been
living separately because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never
got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened (TSN, p. 13, April
10, 1996.
Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study session, the
complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a member of the Bible Group, that
he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a
certain Lydia Geraldez. Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no
time in gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the instant
Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document against respondent, the
complainant executed against respondent her "Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for
Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").
Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May 10, 1994, was offered
by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and
to show that the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her
married Lydia Geraldez. This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He
resorted to falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for complainant
were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B"); Order declaring her first
husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh. "E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim
Verano, who solemnized the marriage between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and
"F-1").
Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the complainant on
January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He explained that he agreed as, in fact, he
voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in
the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph
Gregorio Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with
complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with Librada Pea, his first
wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet
become final and executory, for the reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by
the Rules, the service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and
subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by Mrs. Nelia B.
Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Exh.
"4").
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and
recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding
respect and dignity.4 He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein complainant, the
decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife, Librada Pea, had not yet attained
finality. Worse, four months after his marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman,
Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license
that his previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham" marriage will not justify
his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which
amazes and befuddles but does not convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social
propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just an
ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a Justice of the
Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequences of a marriage
celebrated with all the necessary legal requisites.5
On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of Investigating Justice
Purisima which we quote with approval:
That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and signed a Marriage
Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite, competent under the law to solemnize a civil
marriage, is beyond cavil. As stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to
do anything not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).
That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by law and
the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles
2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e., legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and
a female; consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the
solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of Title
I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer, and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife, in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and
complied with.
The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was nothing but a "sham"
marriage is too incredible to deserve serious consideration. According to respondent, he entered
into subject marriage in an effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against
her. But, to repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with complainant
before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage were present. His consent thereto
was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage,
and both contracting parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.
Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will find in the
criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even assuming for the sake of argument
that the judgment in Civil Case No. 93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between
respondent and Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said
judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only made subject
marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage between complainant and
respondent void.
Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that his marriage with
Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment, when he (respondent) took Lydia
Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel,
from claiming that when he took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first
marriage with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled.
But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether or not respondent
can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts and circumstances, a crucial issue
pending determination in Criminal Case No. 142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional
Trial Court, even assuming arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January
7, 1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that what respondent
perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member of the Philippine Bar and as former
appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that the immorality charge against herein complainant in
the administrative case instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,
respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her (complainant) from
said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is surely conversant with the legal maxim
that a wrong cannot be righted by another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with
Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in ventilating
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have testified in her favor in said
administrative case, to assure all and sundry that what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained
of in said administrative case was without any factual and legal basis.
In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the sanctity of
marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one can make a mockery thereof
and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of
marriage is to court the wrath of the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent
that what was entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a "sham"
marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross misconduct, nay
sacrilege.
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness
for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.6 Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.7
However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his impulsive
conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant reactive behavior
probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of
commendable service in the Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty
in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would suffice as a
punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.
WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, GUILTY of
immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof,
with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the
same or a similar offense hereafter.

\
[AC-5365. April 27, 2005]
Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty. VICTOR V.
DECIEMBRE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility was the malevolent
act of respondent, who filled up the blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing
on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that the
loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre, filed by
Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners
charged respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment[2] on the Petition, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held
several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,[3] the parties
were able to present their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the
parties respective formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum,[4] the case was
considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government employees working at the
Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of
P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.[5]
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for a loan from Rodela
Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the loan, she issued and delivered to
respondent five Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served
as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future.[6]
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan
plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,[7] herein quoted as
follows:
August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes
Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99[8]
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of the five) blank PNB
Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with
different dates of maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November
15, 1999, respectively.[9]
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal an
Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He
alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they
personally approached him and requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated
PNB Check Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.[10]
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against petitioners another
Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He stated, among others, that on the same
day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him
and requested that he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling
P100,000.[11]
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went either to Cainta, Rizal,
or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the
time, as shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them
to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City,
especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places.[12]
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita Manaois, Honorata
Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.[13]
In his Comment,[14] respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called baseless and devoid of
any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring
their commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling
P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently
dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against them. He claimed
that the checks had already been fully filled up when petitioners signed them in his presence. He
further claimed that he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his
previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal transactions, which were
not in any way connected with his profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners
were allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation
of their obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this
administrative action.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not credible. Commissioner Dulay
rendered the following analysis and evaluation of the evidence presented:
In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to immediately exchange with
cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately
used by them in their business venture.
Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:
2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00
then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.
The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his testimony
before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003 hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed two
separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that
correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is that
correct?
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor, the first
two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And Check No. 46243
and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with number
0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you these checks
have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer. Thats why I am asking your
client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued here in Pasig.
What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth. The place, Your
Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check Nos. 0046243
and 0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in the place
of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.
Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the complainants.
As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find the story of complainant[s]
more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the
transaction involving the four checks took place. Such distortion on a very material fact would
seriously cast doubt on his version of the transaction with complainants.
Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place are also
obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made before the public
prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of respondents version of the transaction.
Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the payment of a
loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks in amounts not agreed
upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the Central Post
Office in Manila who had a previous loan of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since
been paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell
due such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by giving them
another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately release the amounts
under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear credible given the background
of the previous transaction and personal circumstances of complainants. That respondent who is a
lawyer would not even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor
bother to verify and ask them what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to
the lack of credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the
version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public prosecutors
notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the
complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result of respondents filing of the
criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also filed similar cases against the co-
employees of complainants in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints
in the IBP for his actions.[15]
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as approved and adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty should be more severe than what the IBP
recommended.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions.[16] It is
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good
moral character.[17] A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement
of the quest for truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader.[18]
By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an
indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.[19] Lawyers should
act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the publics faith in the legal profession.[20]
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following:
Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxxxxxxx
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of members of the bar.[21] Such
conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain with them, whether in their public or in their
private lives. As officers of the courts and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the
highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor.[22]
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred
trust that must be upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any
conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders them
unfit to continue to be officers of the court.[23]
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of petitioners, who said that
they had given five blank personal checks to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as
security for the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents
assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and
Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these
findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners.
According to Franklin Olbes testimony on cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank
checks after the loan had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with
him,[24] he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by abusing the
confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high regard for him as a member of the bar
that made them trust him with their blank checks.[25]
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by
his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed
upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the
checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document,
resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment, respondent had
the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile
intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had
wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three
months[26] because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and
professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not expected from,
and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law.
It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege.[27] Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[28] No
moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor.[29] The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not mislead the court or allow
it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.[31]
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable;[32] they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws.[33]
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-
up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,[34] the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA) by the respondent
to make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers property, as well as his fraudulent and
malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance
of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years.
Here, the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases for
maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely
SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy
to respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter
was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination,
and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge:
but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the
U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit
any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained
his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an
A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a
graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of
his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University,
it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.
And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and
the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to
the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly
carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City22[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children,
namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987,
however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship
with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that
they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa
City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited
respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged,
however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the
illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos
Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and
pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The
illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been
employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989
by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of
immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants
husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,23[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui
had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She
stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and
they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 198524[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did
not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact
of his second marriage before they would live together.25[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her
trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a
woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her
discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime
in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a
few days after she reported to work with the law firm26[5] she was connected with, the woman
who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know
if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were
married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status,
she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang,
and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent
who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that
the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.27[6] By way of counterclaim,
respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against
complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.
In her Reply28[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew
perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the
start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give
birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her
husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship"
between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter
part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at
No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly,
continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as
complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same
evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the
concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is
necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement
alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation
does not make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and
Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective
positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for
want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.29[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of
Justice, but the same was dismissed 30[9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her
allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos
Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 31[10] wherein she charged respondent with
making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was
altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated
Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and
attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage 32[11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the
Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General
in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in
her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent
wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.33[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles
18334[13] and 18435[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and
that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which
make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),36[15] respondent averred that
she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what
appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 37[16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2)
grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral
manner.38[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case
and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon
learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that
there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a
bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.39[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible
for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the
same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it
appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains
that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed
the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a
child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground,
and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the
garage,40[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value
according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and
who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of
the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 41[20]
and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice 42[21] to bolster her argument that
she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine,
respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral
indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her
discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 43[22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having
intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant
testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her
husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager.44[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married
man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission
for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum 45[24], respondent stated that complainant miserably
failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the
allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a
married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report
and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe
in the light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single,
separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio,
Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was
allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent
that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To
be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather
than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and
happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of
Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality
against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for
knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of
the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked,
subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal
ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in
court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.46[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice,
otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession
of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral
conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community." (7 C.J.S. 959).47[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as
a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only
far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what
it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs
with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not
have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more
vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions.
For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from
Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and
this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived
with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.48[27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.49[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."50[29] Respondents act of
immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no
credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.51[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we
find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of
the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a
marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is
difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when
she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her
pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith
of respondent on that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The
legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted
positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that
a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in
the future.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6585. April 21, 2005]

TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and JAKE M.
MAGCALAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR., respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas B. Yumol, Jr., Felix S. Ventic, Elmer L.
Maniego and Jake Magcalas against Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., for grave misconduct.
At all time material to the controversy, complainants were employees of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), Atty. Yumol as Officer-in-Charge,[1] Mr. Ventic, as Supervising Special
Investigator, Mr. Maniego as Special Investigator III and Mr. Magcalas as Special Investigator I.
Respondent Atty. Ferrer, Sr., held the position of Attorney IV, also of the Commission.
On 17 September 2001, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy sought the assistance of the CHR for the
alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy by her husband, John Burt Dy, and the coercive
act of the latter in the transfer of her account with the Porac Rural Bank. Acting on this, Atty.
Ferrer, a Senior Legal Officer of the CHR, issued the two (2) Orders quoted below.
The facts as above stated resulted in the heated altercation that took place on 28 September 2001
between respondent and one Mr. John Burt Dy, whereby the latter accused the CHR of conniving
with his wife, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Dy, and of destroying his reputation and good name at the Porac
Rural Bank. Atty. Yumol, being the OIC Head of the Office, asked Mr. Dy if he could substantiate
his accusations. The latter showed him two (2) alleged Office Orders dated 18 and 19 September
2001, both signed by respondent.
The Order dated 18 September 2001,[2] reads:
Acting on the Complaint of Ma. CECILIA M. DY, and pursuant to the provision of the Family
Code that children five (5) years and below should remain under the custody of the mother, in
relation to the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers unto this Commission and in
particular, Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the respondent is hereby ordered to
give custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY to the maternal custody of the aforementioned mother.
Wherefore, premises considered, pending investigation of the above-entitled case, the custody of
JIANZIL IRISH M. DY is hereby awarded to the mother MA. CECILIA M. DY.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 18, 2001.
(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel
The Order dated 19 September 2001,[3] reads:
Before this Commission is the Complaint filed by complainant wife for alleged kidnapping of her
child Jianzil Irish M. Dy which happened last August 22, 2001 and the coercive mean (sic) of
respondent JOHN BURT DY in the transfer of the complainants cash deposit with the Porac Rural
Bank.
Finding the allegations to (sic) sufficiently established, custody of the child was awarded to the
Complainant and properly executed with the aid [of] the Sangguniang Barangay of Sta. Cruz,
Porac, Pampanga and the elements of the Porac PNP.
Likewise, we find that there had been coercion in the transfer of complainant (sic) deposit in bank,
which was already effected by the aforementioned Rural Bank.
NOW, THEREFORE, pending the final determination of this above-entitled case and by virtue of
the powers and authority granted this Commission under Sec. 18, Article 13 of the Constitution,
the Rural Bank of Porac is hereby ordered to reinstate the account of complainant MA. CECILIA
M. DY.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 19, 2001.
(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel IV
Complainants Yumol and Magcalas, together with their staff, witnessed the incident and were
surprised to see the two (2) orders allegedly issued by respondent. Mr. Dy also informed Atty.
Yumol that the two (2) orders were already enforced by respondent himself and his co-employees
V. Rigor and E. Enolpe, Police Officer Larucom and the Barangay Captain of their place.
Concerned by the acts of respondent, Atty. Yumol tried to clarify the matter by writing a letter[4]
to the Bank Manager stating, thus:
In reference to the order of Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., Attorney IV of this Regional Office, the
undersigned would like to inform your good office that the Commissions participation on the
matter is limited only to extend legal guidance/assistance considering that the disagreement of
spouses John Burt Dy and Ma. Cecilia M. Dy is a family matter. Hence, you are being advised to
disregard Atty. Ferrers order dated September 19, 2001.
Moreover, the said case is not officially docketed as part of Human Rights cases handled by the
Commission.
I hope this will clarify any misinterpretation of the Commissions mandate.
On 28 September 2001, Yumol required[5] respondent to explain within seventy-two (72) hours
the unauthorized issuance of the said Orders.
It turned out later that respondent was engaged in private practice by handling private cases in
courts and other quasi-judicial bodies as shown by the following pleadings:
Pleadings Where Filed

Motion for Reconsideration in Sp. Proc. No. MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
01-01 Pampanga.[6]
Motion for Issuance of Mandatory Injunction MTC, San Fernando,
Pampanga[7]

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Issuance of RTC-58, Angeles City[8]

Preliminary Injunction
Petition MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
Pampanga[9]

Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent RTC-58, Angeles City[10]

Motion for Postponement
Motion for Reconsideration - do -[11]
 Motion for Reconsideration On Denial of the - do -[12]
Release of Vehicle
Addendum to Motion For Re-Investigation - do -[13]
Motion to Set Motion For Release of Vehicle - do -[14]
Several documents were also notarized by respondent, viz:
Documents Where Used

Reply of Norberto San Angel dated October MTC, Branch 1, San Fernando,
16, 2001 Pampanga[15]

Sworn Statement dated October 15, 2001 of Civil Case No. 8509 filed with
May Paule, et al. the MTC San Fernando,
Pampanga[16]
Criminal Complaint of Myrna Bulaon Criminal Case No. 01-1401 MTC
of Sta. Ana, Pampanga[17]
Reply Affidavit of Myrna Bulaon - do-[18]
Affidavit of Renato P. Canlas Special Proceeding No. 01-01 at
MTC, Sta. Ana, Pampanga[19]

Respondent also attended court hearings as shown in the following Minutes of Hearings, Orders,
and Transcripts of Stenographic Notes:
Date Time Case No. Court
March 2, 2001 9:00 A.M. 01-01 (Ejectment Case) MTC/Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[20]
April 23, 2001 1:30 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- RTC-58 Angeles
1164 City[21]
March 6, 2001 2:15 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- - do -[22]
1164
August 3, 2001 9:00 A.M. Crim. Case No. 01- MTC, Sta. Ana.
1401 Pampanga[23]

Sept. 7, 2001 - do - - do -[24]

October 15, 2001 8:30 A.M. Civil Case No. 17360 RTC 42, San Frdo.,
Pamp.[25]
 Nov. 5, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Branch 1, San
Fernando,
Pampanga.[26]
Nov. 27, 2001 Civil Case No. 8509 RTC 58, Angeles
City[27]
Dec. 6, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Br. I, San
Fernando,
Pampanga.[28]

During those times that respondent attended hearings, he declared in his Daily Time Records
(DTRs) that he was present at the Office as shown by the DTRs attached to the complaint.
The actuations of the respondent provoked the filing of several criminal cases against him, to wit:
(1) Falsification of Public Documents,[29]
(2) Usurpation of Functions,[30] and
(3) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713.[31]
Still, despite the cases filed against him, respondent continued attending hearings in different
courts as demonstrated by the following photostatic copies of the Minutes of the trials of the
cases:[32]
Dates Time Court
October 24, 2002 2:00 PM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[33]
November 7, 2002 2:00 PM - do -
January 17, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[34]
February 10, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[35]

March 10, 2003 9:00 AM - do -[36]

March 24, 2003 - do -[37]
March 28, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[38]
May 9, 2003 9:00 AM - do -[39]
May 29, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe,
Pampanga[40]
June 12, 2003 2:00 PM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[41]
 June 17, 2003 MTC-4, San Frdo.,
Pampanga[42]
July 17, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe,
Pampanga[43]
August 26, 2003 9:00 A.M. MTC-4, San Frdo.,
Pampanga[44]

Complainants maintained that all these acts constitute grave misconduct.

We referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and investigation.
On 04 November 2003, respondent filed a motion[45] for extension of twenty (20) days within
which to file his answer, which was granted by the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP, Pasig
City.[46]
In his answer,[47] respondent admitted that Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy dropped by at the CHR
to seek assistance regarding the recovery of her minor son and the restitution of her time deposit.
He also acknowledged having issued the two orders but maintained that the same were in
consonance with the powers and functions granted to all CHR lawyers. He argued that CHR
lawyers, pursuant to CHR Resolution No. A-88-056 dated 8 October 1988 and CHR Resolution
No. A89-109-A dated 19 July 1989, can file, appear, prosecute and represent the Commission for
underprivileged victims and persons whose human rights have been violated or in need of
protection in civil, criminal and administrative matters which are properly cognizable by the
Commission. He likewise claimed that he was allowed by the CHR to file a petition for
commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 01 December 2000. He denied having
falsified his DTRs as the same were certified by complainant Atty. Yumol as Officer-In-Charge
of their office and that his appearances in courts were for legal assistance as allowed in CHR
Resolution No. A-88-056. Lastly, respondent insisted that the instant complaint was an offshoot
of the administrative case filed by Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy against Atty. Yumol and the other
complainants, which prevented the issuance of a certificate of clearance to Atty. Yumol relative to
his impending retirement.
In their reply,[48] complainants claimed that respondents commission as notary public was granted
only by the CHR on 29 October 2001, and received by the CHR Region 3 on 07 November 2001,
hence, the belated authority granted to him cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents
which were all done before 07 November 2001. Complainants likewise argued that respondents
act of appearing in courts as counsel is a form of private practice which is expressly prohibited by
Republic Act No. 6713.[49] They further explained that the CHR has no authority to issue the
questioned orders as it cannot try and decide cases which courts of justice or quasi-judicial bodies
do. Finally, they pointed out that the complaint filed by Mrs. Dy against them was already
dismissed in an Order dated 15 October 2003.
After investigative hearings, IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala
submitted her report, the dispositive portion of which reads:[50]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, there is merit in the complaint and it is hereby recommended
that respondent ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR. be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2)
YEARS from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the bar.
On 30 July 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty imposed: [51]
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent can be held liable for falsification for making it appear that he was at the CHR office
by logging in at the DTR when actually he was attending a hearing in some courts, Atty. Roberto
R. Ferrer, Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent has committed gross misconduct
arising from the following alleged acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government employee;
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for engaging
in private practice.
Relative to the first ground, respondent contends that CHR lawyers are authorized to engage in
private practice by invoking CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133.
CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice
(adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to the following conditions,[52] to
wit:
NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby resolves to adopt
the following policy:
Lawyers employed in the Civil Service Commission, upon written request, may be authorized to
practice their profession subject to the following conditions:
1. It shall not entail any conflict of interest insofar as the functions of the Commission are
concerned;
2. It shall not be in representation of a client whose cause of action is against the government;
3. It shall not involve the use of government funds or property;
4. It shall not impair the lawyers efficiency in the discharge of his/her regular functions in the
office, and absences incurred, if any, shall be covered by duly approved vacation leaves and pass
slips;
5. It shall be subject to the provisions of RA No. 6713 and such other relevant Civil Service Laws
and Rules;
6. The lawyers can appear only in courts of law, offices of state prosecutors (Department of
Justice), Office of the Ombudsman and quasi-judicial agencies decisions of which are rendered by
presidential appointees;
7. Authority is for one year subject to renewal after review of the lawyers office performance;
8. Provided, that, the commission reserves its right to revoke the said authority.
...
Recognizing that the dearth of lawyers committed to the civil service is due to the . . . huge disparity
in the income of government lawyers as compared to those employed in the private sector, the
Commission on Human Rights is convinced that CHR lawyers may be authorized to engage in the
practice of their profession to augment their income so as to encourage them in the government
service.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Human Rights adopts the above-cited conditions to
authorize, upon written request, to practice their profession. However, it is the Commission (sic)
position that said authority should be strictly construed to maintain efficient and effective delivery
of Commission programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)
Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a
matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a
written request and approval thereof, with a duly approved leave of absence for that matter are
indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any such written request or duly approved
leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of absence
by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.
As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied[53] for commission
as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01
December 2000.[54] However, the CHR authorized[55] respondent to act as notary public only on
29 October 2001.[56] Considering that acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term practice
of law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required,
the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the
approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.
Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[57] Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainants,
the belated authority granted to respondent cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents
dated prior thereto.
As to the alleged falsification of DTRs, records show that respondent has been actually attending
hearings in different courts as shown by the minutes of hearings and/or orders issued by different
courts. Since it has been amply established that he was not properly authorized to do so as no
written request by him and approval thereof of his request and of his leave of absence was made
by the CHR, it is an ineluctable conclusion that he falsified his DTRs when he certified thereon
that he was at the office on the same days and time. Needless to say, he could not be at two different
places at the same time.
We shall now discuss respondents authority to issue the two (2) Orders. The following are
instructive:
. . . The [1987] Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission [on Human Rights]
the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. .
.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-
judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the
technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate, commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an
official inquiry. The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by
the inquiry.
The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: to follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy;
to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry; to inquire;
to make an investigation, investigation being in turn described as (a)n administrative function, the
exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing . . .
Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: x x act as judge. And adjudge means to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x.
In the legal sense, adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense; and adjudge means: To pass on judicially,
to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x Implies a judicial determination of a
fact, and the entry of a judgment.[58]
The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate, cannot and should not
try and resolve the subject matters involved in the Order dated 18 September 2001, which awarded
the custody of the child to her mother, and Order dated 19 September 2001, which ordered the
Rural Bank of Porac to reinstate the account of the mother of the child. These matters are
undoubtedly and clearly within the judicial and adjudicatory powers of a regular court.
As to the fourth charge, suffice it to state that despite the cases filed against respondent in courts,
he continued without the proper authority and approved leave of absence, to engage in the private
practice of his profession as shown by certified true copies of the minutes and orders of the
different courts where he attended hearings.
In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion, Sr.,[59] we explained
the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the
part of the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of
the parties or to the right determination of the cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply
corruption or criminal intent.
To our mind, respondents acts of issuing the subject orders, engaging in private practice without
prior written request and authority of the CHR and duly approved leave of absence, notarizing
documents even before being so authorized by the CHR and falsifying his DTRs, constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended, per the dictates of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. . . .
The question now arises as to the penalty to be imposed.
Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. On imposing the supreme penalty of disbarment,
the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.[60] While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for
it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[61]
In the case at bar, the IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca V. Maala recommended the
suspension of respondent for two (2) years while the IBP Board of Governors recommended a
lighter penalty of six (6) months suspension. Taking our cue therefrom, we find one (1) year
suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent - suspension being primarily intended not
as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.[62]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Sr., is hereby found guilty of Gross Misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the
IBP, as well as to the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information
and guidance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 944 July 25, 1974
FLORA NARIDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J:
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far
from edifying, although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the defense of
ones client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of
opposing counsel. Some such reflection is induced by these two administrative cases wherein
respondents Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse parties in a
workmens compensation case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The charge against
respondent Linsangan filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorneys oath by
submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only did he deny the complaint but
he would also hold respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant,
Flora Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what respondent Linsangan called
embarrassment, humiliation and defamation of a brother in a profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative cases to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on
May 31 of this year.
1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is concerned, the report contains
the following: In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainant Narido
heavily relies on the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw despite warning the affidavit
of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios . . ., which affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. . . Mrs. Narido
and Atty. Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment should he insist in offering the
affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios. 1 Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found as a fact
that there was nothing improper in presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven.
Even if it were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having violated his attorneys
oath for submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the report continues: With respect to the other
allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty. Linsangans
awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed false. As testified by Atty.
Linsangan he has no intention whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating
his attorneys oath. 2
2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the following: This administrative
complaint stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma by virtue of his financial
interest in the Award, instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 in order to accomplish
a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of
due process and at the expense, embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned
brother-respondent. . . . It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more
apt to state that Atty. Rismas missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him
into filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Rismas dedication in
championing the cause of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman. She needed every
centavo of the award. To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant
deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the
challenge. In view of this, it is more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it must have
been the plight of Mrs. Narido rather than his alleged financial interest that compelled Atty.
Risma to advise his client to file the case against Atty. Linsangan. . . . There being no direct
evidence to show the alleged bad faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative
Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty.
Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of disbarment proceedings against a
brother attorney with improper motives and without just ground necessarily fails. 3
3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges, both respondents should be
exculpated. It being shown in the investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in
the counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect fifteen per
cent of the recovery obtained by his client, contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmens
Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case is
appealed, there was likewise a recommendation for admonition or reprimand. The aptness of such
a penalty was predicated on the fact that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from
the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for attorneys fees would not be enforced. In the
meanwhile, he had been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing
some of the necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for acceptance.
4. This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would be well-advised to heed
these words from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo: 4 It should be observed, in this
connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys
detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.
5
5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is characterized by thoroughness
and diligence, but its quality would have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor
concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from Justice
Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on secondary authorities, both Philippine and
American.
WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against respondent Jaime S.
Linsangan is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No.
1025 is exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit. He is,
however, admonished to exercise greater care in ascertaining how much under our law he could
recover by way of attorneys fees. The contract entered into between him and his client as to his
being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a workmens compensation suit is
declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only
because he had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced expenses for a poor
client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of both respondents