DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA
LINESES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131442. July 10, 2003]
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA
BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO
CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO,
ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE
DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN,
CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON
BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS,
NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN
QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents
FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR
MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her
parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO
BINAY, minor, represented by his parents EFRENITA and
CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and
other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES Region IV, represented by its Regional
Executive Director and its Regional Director for
Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA,
PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE
MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN
ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY
DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS,
MARCELINO BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN
MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER
RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Order[2] dated 7 November
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 (Manila RTC),
dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe (RED Principe) of Region IV, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a
temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San
Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.[3]
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of
NAPOCORs power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former
mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a
safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would
provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental
Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid
for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999.[4]
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro,
Puerto Galera,[5] sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED
Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July
1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance
of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED
Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment
Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative
(ORMECO), which is engaged in the distribution of electricity in
1
Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto
Galera.[6] Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include
as additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro
represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further
prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had
already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the
trial court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the
construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the
same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCORs manifestation that the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the
construction of the mooring facility.[7]
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents
ORMECO and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to
dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint
without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has
no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in
Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the
issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No.
1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,[9] and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO
96-37) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also
claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of
its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion
and dismissed petitioners complaint.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial courts order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss
tenable and meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before
taking this legal action in Court x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may
still be x x x elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully
comply with the process of exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well
settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or
resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of administrative character
affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be
exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27,
1978). And petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his
[sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA
755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action
(Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil.
643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002, May
23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975;
Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La
Trinidad, et al. vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable
and bereft of merits that the controverted act in question is patently illegal and
there was an immediate need for judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which
has jurisdiction and authority over the same x x x. And corollary to this, the
issue as to whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and
waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a
clear question of fact which the DENR may appropriately resolve before
resorting to [the] Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the
enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only
be enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts
which are being or about to be committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled: Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their
writs of injunction within their respective designated territories. Furthermore,
we find the issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against the
Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from
Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance
2
now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their writs of injunction within
their respective designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application
in the case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380
dated November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that
the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under
special legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution of electric
power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro is one of its infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of
Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation
vs. Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without
jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against [the] National Power
Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular
No. 2-91).
xxx
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action
itself together with the Annulment of the Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can
the latter enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental
Mindoro which was impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party together
with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the government officials
of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being
performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably,
the injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are
inseparable x x x.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to
exhaust all the available administrative remedies and this Court has no
jurisdiction to issue the injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended
[Complaint].[10]
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
reliefs sought.[11]
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners
principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the
ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local
government participation in the implementation of environmentally
critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCORs
ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence,
NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not
construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance
with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring
facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners main
prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it
has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners complaint.
Petitioners complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. It falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether
petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be
determined by the residence of the parties.[12]
Petitioners main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The
principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S
Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.Regional Executive Director
Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office
there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners
filed their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to
issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be
committed within their judicial region.[13]Moreover, Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (PD No. 1818) prohibited[14] courts from issuing injunctive
writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility
in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA No. 8975), which took
3
effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates
more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to
issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for
its violation.[15] Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental
Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of
the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and
later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila
RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive
writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive
writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction
of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the
validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving
petitioners complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the
courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative
processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is
still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first
exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature
invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause
of action and dismissible on such ground.[16]
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC
based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD No. 1586) and its
implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement
System, (2) DAO 96-37[17] and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-
37. Section 4[18] of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an
environmentally critical project, or a project located within an
environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an
ECC prior to the projects operation.[19]NAPOCOR thus secured the
ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an
environmentally critical project, is located within an environmentally
critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14
December 1981.[20]
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR
Regional Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in
Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by
the final decision of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such
decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the
Secretary shall be immediately executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to
grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which
would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous
appeals shall not be countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including
but not limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an
appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these
provisions thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those
relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines
and penalties. By inference, the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or
non-issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision. Resort
to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellants action
dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the
requisite period will result in the finality of the REDs or Secretarys
decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the REDs decision, unless the
Secretary directs otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to
the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an
opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed
the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the
Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review
the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural
Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners
omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of
4
action.[21] Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing
petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing
an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC
was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1)
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections
26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991),
and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements
for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility.
Petitioners contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of
an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies,[22] this does not apply in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 (PD No. 1605),[23] as amended by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically
threatened zone the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera
Bay as protected by Medio Island. This decree provides in part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
construction of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial structures;
commercial or semi-commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking within the
enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the
devastation of its corals and coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat
propellers, and any form of destruction by other human activities are hereby
prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and
other commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior
approval of the Office of the President upon the recommendation of the
Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of Puerto
Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island,[24] PD No. 1605 does not
apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one
of the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera[25] and thus protected under PD
No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should
have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR
will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4
megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro,
including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a
government-owned public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need
of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a
commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
commercial docking as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No.
1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No.
1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves,
marinas, hotels and restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government
Code to emphasize the legislative concern for the maintenance of a
sound ecology and clean environment.[26] These provisions require
every national government agency or government-owned
and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local
government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of
its sanggunian before implementing any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of
animal or plant species. Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of
Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or
government-owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss
of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government units, non-governmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and
objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures
that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be
implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Section x x x 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the
sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where
such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate
5
relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[27] the Court interpreted these provisions in
this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof
x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be
interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those
enumerated in Sections 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution;
(2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-
renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest
cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and (6) other projects
or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in the locality where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as
petitioners admit,[28] the mooring facility itself is not environmentally
critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects
mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring
facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at
issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the
operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the
construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power
barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and
27 of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for
ECC Applications
Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within
an environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial
Environment Examination, which must contain a brief description of the
environmental setting and a documentation of the consultative process
undertaken, when appropriate.[29] As part of the description of the
environmental setting, the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of
locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the
ECC, did not submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents
proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a locational
clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission
renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are
part of the submissions required from a project proponent, their mere
absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To
justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent
illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC
[without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply,
with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without
jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave
abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of
any color of authority.[30]
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly
authorized under DAO 96-37[31] to issue ECCs for projects located
within environmentally critical areas.RED Principe issued the ECC on
the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the
Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with
full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal
presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority. [32] This clothes
RED Principes acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim
that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his
discretion. While petitioners may present proof to the contrary, they
must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to
judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately
seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the
conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for
the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR
to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building
permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that
NAPOCORs ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its
conditions does not justify petitioners conduct in ignoring the procedure
prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR
Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should
6
comply with the requirements of consultation and locational clearance
prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to
abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions
laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to
address complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of
DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an
administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit
his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who
will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to
the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist
orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under
DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating
the conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address
petitioners complaint on NAPOCORs alleged violations and not the
filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to
safeguard and maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This
Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the
environment.[33] Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of
violators of environmental laws.[34] Legal actions to achieve this end,
however, must be done in accordance with established rules of
procedure that were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and
efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001]
ANTONIO M. BERNARDO, ERNESTO A. DOMINGO, JR. and JESUS
C. CRUZ, petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
BENJAMIN "BENHUR" D. ABALOS, JR., DR. EDEN C.
DIAZ, ROMEO F. ZAPANTA, ARCADIO S. DE VERA and
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking the nullification of Resolution
No. 98-3208 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc promulgated on December 1, 1998 dismissing the complaint for vote
buying filed by petitioners against respondents.
On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A.
Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a criminal
complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos,
Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in
violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of
the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-110,[2] alleged that:
1. On April 14, 1998 (Tuesday), respondent Mandaluyong City Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., and his son respondent Benjamin "Benhur" C.
Abalos, Jr., candidate for City Mayor of the same city in the May 11, 1998
elections, conspiring with respondents Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Schools Division
Superintendent, Romeo F. Zapanta, Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, and Arcadio de Vera, President, Mandaluyong Federation of
Public School Teachers, sponsored, arranged and conducted an all-expense-
free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City public
school teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach
Resort, Sariaya, Quezon Province.
2. Among the identified public school teachers present, brought in around
twelve (12) buses, were Corazon Mayoya, Principal of Highway Hills
Elementary School, her Assistant Principal and Mr. Dante del Remigio; Mrs.
Diaz, Principal of Mandaluyong City High School and Mr. Alvia; Mrs.
Parillo, Andres Bonifacio Elementary School; Mrs. Gregoria Ignacio,
Principal of Doa Pilar Gonzaga Elementary School and Mrs. Bolantes; Mrs.
Diaz, Principal, Nueve de Febrero Elementary School; Ms. Magsalin,
Principal of Mandaluyong Science High School and Mrs. Rita Bondayril; Mrs.
De Vera, Fabella Elementary School; Ms. Anselmo, Principal of Isaac Lopez
Elementary School and Mrs. Fayton; Mrs. Sylvia Liwanag, District
Supervisor, District II, Mrs. Nalaonan, Principal of Amado T. Reyes
Elementary School; Mrs. Teresita Vicencio, Mandaluyong City Elementary
School; Officers of the Mandaluyong Federation of Public School Teachers
namely: Mrs. Erlinda Ilagan, Treasurer; Ms. Nancy de Leon, Auditor; Ms.
Fortunata Gondran, PRO; Mr. Nenito Pumariga, Business Manager; Mr. Jose
Guerrero, Sgt.-at-arms; and Board Members Ms. Virginia Carillo, Ms. Wilma
Fernandez, Mr. Arturo Morales and Mr. Teddy Angeles.
7
3. During the whole-day affair, the background music loudly and repeatedly
played over the sound system was the political jingle advertisement of
Mandaluyong City candidate for Mayor, Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr., sang to
the tune of the song SHA LALA LALA.
4. Some of the participants wore T-shirts with the name of candidate Benhur"
Abalos, Jr.," printed in over-sized colored letters.
5. Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wherein he offered and
promised the Mandaluyong City public school teachers and employees a
hazard pay of P1,000.00, and increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to
P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of P3,000.00 which they will get by the end
of the month.
6. The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who are members of
the Board of Election Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered voters
thereat, were made a few weeks before the election to induce or unduly
influence the said teachers and the public in general (the other guests) to vote
for the candidacy of Benjamin "Benhur" Abalos, Jr..
7. The offers and promises of Mayor Abalos, Sr., and the enthusiastic
acceptance of said monetary increase of allowances by the public school
teachers and employees of Mandaluyong City, is a violation of Section 261
pars. (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code against vote-buying and
vote-selling.[3]
The Director[4] of the Law Department of the COMELEC conducted a
preliminary investigation. All the private respondents filed separate counter-
affidavits[5] with prayer to dismiss the complaint.
On November 26, 1998, the Director of the Law Department submitted
his findings to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that the complaint be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed
Resolution No. 98-3208[6] dismissing the complaint "for insufficiency of
evidence to establish a prima facie case,"
Considering that this complaint, being criminal in nature, must have all its
allegations supported by direct, strong, convincing and indubitable evidence;
and that the submitted evidence of the complainant are mere self-serving
statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recordings and a photograph;
and considering further that the evidence of the respondents have more
probative value and believable than the evidence of said complainants; and
that the burden of proof lies with the complainants and not with the
respondents.[7]
On February 09, 1999, petitioners, without first submitting a motion for
reconsideration, filed the instant petition with this Court.
They alleged therein that the COMELEC En Banc, in issuing Resolution
No. 98-3208 dated December 1, 1998, acted "with apparent grave abuse of
discretion."[8]
The petition must fail.
Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the
assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:
Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed. The following pleadings are not
allowed:
xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offense cases;
x x x. (Emphasis ours)
It is not disputed that petitioners complaint before the COMELEC
involves an election offense. But in this petition, they conveniently kept silent
why they directly elevated to this Court the questioned Resolution without
first filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. It was
only after the respondents had filed their comment on the petition and called
this Courts attention to petitioners' failure to comply with Section 1 of Rule 13
that they, in their Consolidated Reply, advanced the excuse that they "deemed
it best not seek any further dilatorymotion for reconsideration', even if
allowed by Sec. 1 (d) of COMELEC Rule 13." [9]
Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly
disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve
an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensivedetermination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." [10]
Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for
reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of the said
motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed
to it.[11] If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for
reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But
if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a
8
grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a
petition for certiorari.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."[12] Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the
challenged Resolution, petitioners' instant petition is certainly
premature.[13] Significantly, they have not raised any plausible reason for their
direct recourse to this Court.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC cited a valid reason for
dismissing petitioners' complaint against private respondents for vote
buying. The COMELEC found that the evidence of the respondents have
"more probative value and believable than the evidence of the complainants;"
and that the evidence submitted by petitioners are "mere self-serving
statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recording and a photograph."
Moreover, Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 provides:
SEC. 28. Prosecution of Vote-buying and Vote-selling. The representation
of a complaint for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by affidavits of complaining witnesses
attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voters acceptance of money
or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of
candidate, shall be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately
conducted by the Commission, directly or through its duly authorized legal
officers, under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Petitioners' complaint expressly states that no supporting affidavits were
submitted by the complaining witnesses[14] to sustain their charge of vote
buying. Suffice it to state that the absence of such supporting affidavits shows
the frailty of petitioners' complaint. Indeed, it is vulnerable to dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127139. February 19, 1999]
JAIME C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANILA and HON.
BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila,
Branch 39, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari, assails the Order[1] of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, promulgated on October 24, 1996,
dismissing Civil Case No. 96-77510 which sought the declaration of nullity of
City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894, filed by petitioner Jaime C. Lopez.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government
Code of 1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property as
follows:
General Revision of Assessments[2] and Property Classification -- The
provincial, city or municipal assessor shall undertake a general revision of real
property assessments within two (2) years after the effectivity of this Code
and every three (3) years thereafter.
Although R.A. 7160 took effect on January 1, 1992, the revision of real
property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of
Manila. However, the process of real property valuation had already been
started and done by the former city assessor.
In 1992, the schedule of real property values in the city was prepared and
submitted to the City Council of Manila, but for unknown reason, was not
acted upon. Nevertheless, despite the inaction of the City Council, there was a
continuous update of the fair market values of the real properties within the
city.
Until the year 1995, the basis for collection of real estate taxes in the
City of Manila was the old, year-1979, real estate market values.
Mrs. Lourdes Laderas, the newly appointed City Assessor of Manila,
received Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 dated March 20, 1995, from the
Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance. This
memorandum relates to the failure of most of the cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general
revision of real property. For this purpose, Mrs. Laderas embarked in a
working dialogue with the Office of the City Mayor and the City Council for
the completion of the task.
After obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City
Assessor began the process of general revision based on the updated fair
market values of the real properties.
In the year 1995, the increase in valuation of real properties compared to
the year-1979 market values ranges from 600% to 3,330%, but the City
Assessors office initially fixed the general average of increase to
9
1,700%. Mrs. Laderas felt that the increase may have adverse reactions from
the public, hence, she ended up reducing the increase in the valuation of real
properties to 1,020%.
In September 1995, the City Assessors Office submitted the proposed
schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its appropriate
action. The Council acting on the proposed schedule, conducted public
hearings as required by law. The proposed ordinance was subjected to the
regular process in the enactment of ordinances pursuant to the City Charter of
Manila. The first reading was held on September 12, 1995, the second on
October 28, 1995, and the third on December 12, 1995. In between these
dates, public hearings on the general revision, which included the schedule of
values of real properties, were had, viz.; on September 28, 1995, October 5, 12
and 19, 1995 and November 27 and 29, 1995.
The proposed ordinance with the schedule of fair market values of real
properties was published in the Manila Standard on October 28, 1995, and the
Balita on November 1, 1995. On December 12, 1995, the City Council
enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894, entitled: An Ordinance Prescribed as the
Revised Schedule of Fair Market Values of Real Properties of the City of
Manila. The ordinance was approved by the City Mayor on December 27,
1995, and made effective on Jan. 01, 1996. Thereafter, notices of the revised
assessments were distributed to the real property owners of Manila pursuant to
Sec. 223 of R.A. 7160.[3]
With the implementation of Manila Ordinance No. 7894, the tax on the
land owned by the petitioner was increased by five hundred eighty percent
(580%). With respect to the improvement on petitioners property, the tax
increased by two hundred fifty percent (250%).
As a consequence of these increases, petitioner Jaime C. Lopez, filed on
March 18, 1996, a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City
of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 with preliminary injunction and prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO). The petition alleged that Manila
Ordinance No. 7894 appears to be unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. The case was originally raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 5, which issued the TRO on April 10, 1996.
On the same date, Manila Ordinance No. 7905[4] took effect, reducing by
fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels[5] (depending on the use of property,
e.g., residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. The new
ordinance amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74,[6] paragraph
(A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794.
Moreover, Section 2 of Manila Ordinance No. 7905 [7] provides that the
amendment embodied therein shall take effect retroactively to January 1,
1996. The same provision indicates the maximum realty tax increases, as
follows:
Sec. 2 - x x x Provided, however, that the tax increase on residential lands and
improvements shall in no case exceed by two hundred percent (200%) of the
tax levied thereon in calendar year 1995 and the tax increase on commercial
and industrial land, buildings and other structures shall not exceed by three
hundred percent (300%) of the tax imposed thereon in calendar year 1995;
Provided further, that the tax on all lands and improvements shall in no case
be lower than the tax imposed thereon in calendar year 1995.
As a result, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 reduced the tax increase of
petitioners residential land to one hundred fifty-five percent (155%), while the
tax increase for residential improvement was eighty-two percent (82%).
The maximum tax increase on classified commercial estates is three
hundred percent (300%) but the tax increase on commercial land was only,
two hundred eighty-eight percent (288%), and seventy-two percent (72%) on
commercial portion of the improvement.
On April 12, 1996, respondent filed a motion for inhibition of the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 5, alleging that Judge Amelia Andrade had
shown markedly indulgent attitude towards the petitioner. Hence, Judge
Andrade inhibited herself and directed the forwarding of the case record to the
Clerk of Court for its re-raffle to another branch of the court.
Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905,
the controversy proceeded and the case was re-raffled to Branch 39 of the
court which acted on the motions submitted by the parties for resolution, viz.:
1) application for preliminary injunction by the petitioner, and 2) motion to
dismiss by the respondent. The reason relied upon by the City of Manila for
the dismissal of the petition was for failure of the petitioner to exhaust
administrative remedies.
On May 9, 1996, the court directed the issuance of a writ of injunction
and denied, in the meanwhile, the motion to dismiss by the respondent. The
reason for the denial of the respondents motion to dismiss was not detailed to
avoid a repetition of the unfortunate situation in RTC-Manila, Branch 5,
10
wherein the counsel for the respondent assumed bias on the part of Judge
Andrade.
On May 22, 1996, the respondent filed the instant motion for
reconsideration on the denial of its motion to dismiss. The movant-respondent
aside from reiterating the basic ground alleged in its motion to dismiss
underscored the additional premise, which is the happening of a supervening
event, i.e., the enactment and approval of the City Mayor of Manila Ordinance
No. 7905.
On October 24, 1996, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed
by the respondent. The dismissal order was justified by petitioners failure to
exhaust the administrative remedies and that the petition had become moot
and academic when Manila Ordinance No. 7894 was repealed by Manila
Ordinance No. 7905. Notwithstanding, the trial court likewise resolved all
other interlocking issues.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts order is as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the motion dated May 19, 1996 filed by the herein
respondent on May 22, 1996 sufficiently well-taken, the order dated May 9,
1996 is hereby set aside. Let the petition filed by the herein petitioner on
March 8, 1996 be, as it is, hereby DISMISSED. The order of preliminary
injunction dated May 9, 1996, is also set aside and the writ of injunction
likewise issued pursuant thereto, dissolved.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for
lack of merit.
Hence, the petitioner now comes before this Court raising in his petition
the following issues:
I. DID THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 96-77510 ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES, AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION OUGHT
TO BE DISMISSED? AND;
II. DID THE RESPONDENT COURT ERR IN FAILING TO
CORRECTLY APPLY SECTIONS 212 AND 221 OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
Petitioner contends that when the trial court ruled that it has jurisdiction
over the case, the question of whether he needs to resort to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies becomes moot and academic. He claims that resort to
administrative remedies on constitutionality of law is merely permissive as
provided by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, viz.:
x x x Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality
of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall
render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal.
x x x (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner further asserts that the question of the constitutionality of the
city ordinance may be raised on appeal, either to the Secretary of Justice or
the Regional Trial Court, both having concurrent jurisdiction over the case, in
accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. He states that at the time he
instituted this complaint, it was premature to resort to the remedies provided
by R.A. 7160 because he has not received the formal notice of assessment yet,
hence, he could not be expected to pay under protest and elevate the
exorbitant assessment to the Board of Assessment Appeals.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the adjustment of the fair
market values of real properties in the City of Manila was long overdue, being
updated only after fifteen (15) years.According to the respondent, petitioner
filed the case, merely to take advantage of the situation to gain political
mileage and help advance his mayoralty bid.
As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the
action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be
sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the
presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its
mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it
properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts,
not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter
by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
courts.[9] This rule, however, admits certain exceptions.[10]
With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies
available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of
R.A. 7160.
Section 187 of R.A. 7160 provides, that the taxpayer may question the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days
from effectivity thereof, to the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner after
finding that his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, must have
11
brought the case before the Secretary of Justice for questions of legality or
constitutionality of the city ordinance.
Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who is not
satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from
notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals. [11]
Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he
must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of R.A.
7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase paid under protest
and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a
petition under oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits
or documents to support his appeal.[12]
The rule is well-settled that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulations of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.[13] Furthermore, the crux of petitioners cause of
action is the determination of whether or not the tax is excessive, oppressive
or confiscatory. This issue is essentially a question of fact and thereby,
precludes this Court from reviewing the same. [14]
We have carefully scrutinized the record of this case and we found no
cogent reason to depart from the findings made by the trial court on this
point. As correctly found by the trial court, the petition does not fall under any
of the exceptions to excuse compliance with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, to wit:
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers
which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters coming primarily within the competence of other department. x x x
There are however a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed
with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately. Among these
exceptional cases are: (1) when the question raised is purely legal, (2) when
the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5)
when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be
suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (8)
when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of controversy is
private land; and (10) in quo-warranto proceeding (citation omitted).
In the courts opinion, however, the instant petition does not fall within any of
the exceptions above-mentioned. x x x
x x x Instant petition involves not only questions of law but more importantly
the questions of facts which therefore needed the reception of evidence
contrary to the position of the respondent before the hearing of its motion for
reconsideration
Now, on the second exception on the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, supra, there is no showing that administrative bodies, viz., The
Secretary of Justice, the City Treasurer, Board of Assessment Appeals, and
the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are in estoppel. On the third
exception, it does not appear that Ordinance No. 7894 or the amendatory
Ordinance No. 7905 are patently illegal. Re the fourth exception, in the light
of circumstances as pointed elsewhere herein, the matter does not need a
compelling judicial intervention. On the fifth exception, the claim of the
petitioner is not small. Re the sixth exception, the court does not see any
irreparable damage that the petitioner will suffer if he had paid or will pay
under protest as per the ordinance. He could always ask for a refund of the
excess amount he paid under protest or be credited thereof if the
administrative bodies mentioned in the law (R.A. 7180 [15]) will find that his
position is meritorious. Re the seventh exception, the court is of the opinion
that administrative relief provided for in the law are plain, speedy and
adequate. On the eight exception, while the controversy involves public
interest, judicial intervention as the petitioner would like this court to do
should be avoided as demonstrated herein below in the discussion of the third
issue. The ninth and tenth exception obviously are not applicable in the instant
case.[16]
Proceeding to the second issue, petitioner contends that the respondent
court failed to apply correctly Sections 212 and 221 of R.A. 7160. The
pertinent provisions are set forth below:
Sec. 212 Preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values -- Before any general
revision of property assessment is made pursuant to the provisions of this
Title, there shall be prepared a schedule of fair market values by the
provincial, city and the municipal assessors of the municipalities within the
Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated in
their respective local government units [LGU] for enactment by ordinance of
the sanggunian concerned. The schedule of fair market values shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or
municipality concerned, or in the absence thereof, shall be posted in the
12
provincial capitol, city or municipal hall and in two other conspicuous public
places therein.
Sec. 221. Date of Effectivity of Assessment or Reassessment -- All
assessments or reassessments made after the first (1st) day of January of any
year shall take effect on the first (1st) day of January of the succeeding
year: Provided, however, That the reassessment of real property due to its
partial or total destruction, or to a major change in its actual use, or to any
great and sudden inflation or deflation of real property values, or to the gross
illegality of the assessment when made or to any other abnormal cause, shall
be made within ninety (90) days from the date any such cause or causes
occurred, and shall take effect at the beginning of the quarter next following
assessment.
The petitioner claims that the effectivity date of Manila Ordinance No.
7894 and the schedule of the fair market values is January 1, 1996. He
contends that Sec. 212 of the R.A. 7160 prohibits the general revision of real
property assessment before the approval of the schedule of the fair market
values. Thus, the alleged revision of real property assessment in 1995 is
illegal.
Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the steps to be followed
for the mandatory conduct of General Revision of Real Property assessments,
pursuant to the provision of Sec. 219 of R.A. No. 7160 are as follows:
1. The preparation of Schedule of Fair Market Values.
2. The enactment of Ordinances:
a) levying an annual ad valorem tax on real property and an
additional tax accruing to the SEF.
b) fixing the assessment levels to be applied to the market values of
real properties;
c) providing necessary appropriation to defray expenses incident to
general revision of real property assessments; and
d) adopting the Schedule of Fair Market Values prepared by the
assessors.[17]
The preparation of fair market values as a preliminary step in the
conduct of general revision was set forth in Section 212 of R.A. 7160, to
wit: (1) The city or municipal assessor shall prepare a schedule of fair market
values for the different classes of real property situated in their respective
Local Government Units for the enactment of an ordinance by the sanggunian
concerned. (2) The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or municipality
concerned or the posting in the provincial capitol or other places as required
by law.
It was clear from the records that Mrs. Lourdes Laderas, the incumbent
City Assessor, prepared the fair market values of real properties and in
preparation thereof, she considered the fair market values prepared in the
calendar year 1992. Upon that basis, the City Assessors Office updated the
schedule for the year 1995. In fact, the initial schedule of fair market values of
real properties showed an increase in real estate costs, which ranges from
600% - 3,330% over the values determined in the year 1979. However, after a
careful study on the movement of prices, Mrs. Laderas eventually lowered the
average increase to 1,020%. Thereafter, the proposed ordinance with the
schedule of the fair market values of real properties was published in the
Manila Standard on October 28, 1995 and the Balita on November 1,
1995.[18] Under the circumstances of this case, there was compliance with the
requirement provided under Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160.
Thereafter, on January 1, 1996, the Sanggunian approved Manila
Ordinance No. 7894. The schedule of values of real properties in the City of
Manila, which formed an integral part of the ordinance, was likewise
approved on the same date.
When Manila Ordinance No. 7894 took effect on January 1, 1996, the
existing assessment levels to be multiplied by the market value of the property
in computing the assessed value (taxable value) subject to tax were those
enumerated in Section 74 paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance Number 7794.
Coming down to specifics, we find it desirable to lay down the
procedure in computing the real property tax. With the introduction of
assessment levels, tax rates could be maintained, although tax payments can
be made either higher or lower depending on their percentage (assessment
level) applied to the fair market value of property to derive its assessed
value which is subject to tax. Moreover, classes and values of real properties
can be given proper consideration, like assigning lower assessment levels to
residential properties and higher levels to properties used in business. [19] The
procedural steps in computing the real property tax are as follows:
1) Ascertain the assessment level of the property
2) Multiply the market value by the applicable assessment level of the
property
13
 3) Find the tax rate which corresponds to the class (use) of the 300,000.00 30% 15%
property and multiply the assessed value by the applicable tax 300,000.00 500,000.00 35% 17.5%
rates.[20] 500,000.00 750,000.00 40% 20%
For easy reference, the computation of real property tax is cited below: 750,000.00 1,000,000.00 50% 25%
Market Value P x x x 1,000,000.00 2,000,000.00 60% 30%
Multiplied by Assessment Level ( x %) 2,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 70% 35%
Assessed Value P x x x 5,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 75% 37.5%
Multiplied by Rate of Tax ( x %) 10,000,000.00 80% 40%
Real Property Tax P x x (3) On Machineries:
===== Class
On April 10, 1996, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 was enacted and Residential 50% 25%
approved to take effect, retroactively to January 1, 1996. As a result of this Commercial 80% 40%
new ordinance, the assessment levels applicable to the market values of real Industrial 66% 40%
properties were lowered into half. A comparative evaluation between the old (4) On special classes - The assessment levels for all lands, buildings,
and the new assessment levels is as follows: machineries and other improvements shall be as follows:
Assessment Levels Actual Use
Ordinance 7794 Ordinance 7905 Cultural 15% 7.5%
Old New Scientific 15% 7.5%
(1) On Lands: Hospital 15% 7.5%
Class Local Water Districts 15% 7.5%
Residential 20% 10% GOCC engaged in the supply and
Commercial 50% 25% and distribution of water and/or
Industrial 50% 25% degeneration and transmission of
(2) On Buildings and other structures: electric power 10% 5%
(a) Residential Fair Market Value Despite the favorable outcome of Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the
Over Not Over petitioner insists that since it was approved on April 10, 1996, it cannot be
P 175,000.00 0% 0% implemented in the year 1996. Using Section 221 of R.A. 7160 as basis for his
175,000.00 P 300,000.00 10% 5% argument, petitioner claims that the assessments or reassessments made after
300,000.00 500,000.00 20% 10% the first (1st) day of January of any year shall take effect on the first (1st) day
500,000.00 750,000.00 25% 12.5% of January of the succeeding year.
750,000.00 1,000,000.00 30% 15% Contrarily, the trial court viewed that Manila Ordinance No. 7905 affects
1,000,000.00 2,000,000.00 35% 17.5% the resulting tax imposed on the market values of real properties as specified
2,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 40% 20% in Manila Ordinance No. 7894.Therefore, this supervening circumstance has
5,000,000.00 10,000,000.00 50% 25% rendered the petition, moot and academic, for failure of the petitioner to
10,000,000.00 60% 30% amend his cause of action. The trial court said:
(b) Commercial/Industrial Fair Market Value A mere cursory reading of his petition that he questioned fair market values
Over Not Over and the assessment levels and the resulting tax based thereon as imposed by

14
Ordinance No. 7894. The petitioner, however, failed to amend his G.R. No. 191427
petition. Thus, it is clear that the petition has become moot and academic. As
correctly stated by the respondent, the facts, viz., the tax rates on level Present:
prescribed by Ordinance 7894 upon which the petition was anchored no
longer exist because the tax rates in Ordinance No. 7894 have been amended, CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
otherwise, impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 7905. If only for this, the BRION,
petition could be dismissed but this court followed the advice of the Supreme BERSAMIN,
Court in the case of National Housing Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. VILLARAMA, JR., and
(121 SCRA 777) that the case may be decided in its totality resolving all SERENO, JJ.
interlocking issues in order to render justice to all concerned and end litigation
once and for all.[21]
Although, we are in full accord with the ruling of the trial court, it is Promulgated:
likewise necessary to stress that Manila Ordinance No. 7905 is favorable toMay 30, 2011
the taxpayers when it specifically states that the reduced assessment levels
shall be applied retroactively to January 1, 1996. The reduced assessment DECISION
levels multiplied by the schedule of fair market values of real properties,
provided by Manila Ordinance No. 7894, resulted to decrease in taxes. To that
extent, the ordinance is likewise, a social legislation intended to soften the CARPIO MORALES, J.:
impact of the tremendous increase in the value of the real properties subject to
tax. The lower taxes will ease, in part, the economic predicament of the low The present petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals
and middle-income groups of taxpayers. In enacting this ordinance, the due Decision[1] dated October 27, 2009 and Resolution dated February 23, 2010 in
process of law was considered by the City of Manila so that the increase in
realty tax will not amount to the confiscation of the property. CA-G. R. SP No. 107449.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Order of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 96-
77510 is hereby AFFIRMED. COSTS against the petitioner. Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among other things, the
SO ORDERED.
manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City.
THIRD DIVISION

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION),

Petitioner, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through
its Pollution Control Division Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after
- versus -
conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratory analysis of petitioners corn oil
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, refinery plants wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government
Respondent.

15
standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.
LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring
petitioner to explain why no order should be issued for the cessation of its
operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and
why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the LLDA.
Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint conducted on
August 31, 2000, another analysis of petitioners wastewater, which showed its
continued failure to conform to its effluent standard in terms of Total
Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Color and
Oil/Grease.
Hearings on petitioners pollution case were thereafter commenced on
March 1, 2001.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the
LLDA, petitioners wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the
aforementioned DAOs.
In early 2003, petitioner notified LLDA of its plan to upgrade the wastewater
treatment facility (WTF) of its corn oil refinery plant in an effort to comply
with environmental laws, an upgrade that was completed only in 2007.
On May 9, 2007 on its request,[2] a re-sampling of petitioners
wastewater was conducted which showed that petitioners
plant finally complied with government standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties, by Manifestation and
Motion[3] filed on August 24, 2007 to which it attached copies of its Daily
Operation Reports and Certifications[4] to show that accrued daily penalties
should only cover a period of 560 days.
After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay[5] (OP)
dated January 21, 2008, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After careful evaluation of the case, respondent
is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater computed in
two periods reckoned from March 14, 2000 the date of
initial sampling until November 3, 2003 the date it
requested for a re-sampling covering 932 days in
consideration of the interval of time when subsequent
monitoring was conducted after an interval of more than 2
years and from March 15, 2006 the date when re-sampling
was done until April 17, 2007 covering 448
days[6] for a total of 1,247 days.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
hereby ordered to pay within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof the accumulated daily penalties amounting to a total
of Pesos: One Million Two Hundred Forty-Seven
(Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP 1,247,000.00) prior to
dismissal of the case and without prejudice of filing another
16
 case for its subsequent violations. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only
accumulated daily penalties in the sum of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand
(P560,000) Pesos[7] on grounds that the LLDA erred in first, adopting a
straight computation of the periods of violation based on the flawed
assumption that petitioner was operating on a daily basis without excluding,
among others, the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent
rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212
days); and second, in disregarding the Daily Operation Reports and
Certifications which petitioner submitted to attest to the actual number of its
operating days, i.e., 560 days.
By Order[8] of July 11, 2008, the LLDA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the aforestated penalties,
disposing of the issues thusly:
On the first issue, while it is true that the Authority
failed to state in its OP dated 21 January 2008 the basis for
actual computation of the accumulated daily penalties, the
Authority would like to explain that its computation was
based on the following, to wit:
The computation of accumulated daily penalties
was reckoned period [sic] from 14 March 2000 the date of
initial sampling to 03 November 2003 the date when its
letter request for re-sampling was received which covers
932 days computed at 6 days per week operation as
reflected in the Reports of Inspection. Since subsequent
inspection conducted after two (2) years and four (4)
months, such period was deducted from the computation.
Likewise, the period when the LLDA Laboratory was
rehabilitated from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 was
also deducted with a total of Two Hundred Twelve (212)
days.
On the second claim, the same cannot be granted
for lack of legal basis since the documents submitted are
self-serving. The period from 15 March 2006 to 17 April
2007 was computed from the date of re-sampling when it
failed to conform to the standards set by law up to the date
of receipt of its letter request for re-sampling prior to its
compliance on May 9, 2007. The period covers 342 days.
Hence, respondent is found to be discharging
pollutive wastewater not conforming with the standards set
by law computed from March 14, 2000 November 3, 2003
covering 932 days and from March 15, 2006 April 17, 2007
covering 342 days for a total of 1,274 days.
Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of
Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its
documentary evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDAs order justified such
recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to judicial action.
17
 By Decision of October 27, 2009 the appellate court affirmed both
LLDA orders, which it found to be amply supported by substantial evidence,
the computation of the accumulated daily penalties being in accord with
prevailing DENR guidelines. The appellate court held that while petitioner
may have offered documentary evidence to support its assertion that the days
when it did not operate must be excluded from the computation, the LLDA
has the prerogative to disregard the same for being unverified,
hence, unreliable.
The appellate court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari
as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of
the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy
which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial
intervention.[9]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution of February 23, 2010, it filed the present petition.
Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying
with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The petition fails.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must
allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence.[10] The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser
expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity
and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed.[11]
Executive Order No. 192[12] (EO 192) was issued on June 10, 1987
for the salutary purpose of reorganizing the DENR, charging it with the task
of promulgating rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land
pollution as well as of promulgating ambient and effluent standards for water
and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and
radiations. EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the
Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the powers and functions of
the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of
pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator for determining
reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.[13]
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the
DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR
Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the
LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.
18

As for petitioners invocation of due process, it fails too. The
appellate court thus aptly brushed aside this claim, in this wise:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
. . . Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it
is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard
before the case against him is decided.
Here, petitioner URC was given ample opportunities to be
heard it was given show cause orders and allowed to
participate in hearing to rebut the allegation against it of
discharging pollutive wastewater to the Pasig River, it was
given the chance to present evidences in support of its
claims, it was notified of the assailed Order to Pay, and it
was allowed to file a motion for reconsideration. Given
these, we are of the view that the minimum requirements
of administrative due process have been complied with
in this case.[14] (emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed LLDA orders of January 21, 2008 and July 11,
2008 correctly reckoned the two periods within which petitioner was found to
have continued discharging pollutive wastewater and applied the penalty as
provided for under Article VI, Section 32 of LLDA Resolution No. 33, Series
of 1996.[15]LLDAs explanation that behind its inclusion of certain days in its
computation of the imposable penalties that it had already deducted not just
the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation work
from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days) but had
also excluded from the computation the period during which no inspections or
compliance monitorings were conducted (a period covering two years and
four months) is well-taken.
It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave
petitioner the opportunity to submit within fifteen (15) days.any valid
documents to show proof of its non-operating dates that would be necessary
for the possible reduction of the accumulated daily penalties, [16] but petitioner
failed to comply therewith.
As earlier noted, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to
which it attached Daily Operation Reports and Certifications, which
voluminous documents were, however, unverified in derogation of Rule X,
Section 2[17] of the 2004 Revised Rules, Regulations and Procedures
Implementing Republic Act No. 4850. Absent such verification, the LLDA
may not be faulted for treating such evidence to be purely self-serving.
19
 Respecting LLDAs decision not to attach any evidentiary weight to
the Daily Operation Reports or Certifications, recall that the LLDA conducted
an analysis of petitioners wastewater discharge on August 31, 2000, upon
receiving a phone-in complaint. And it conducted too an analysis on May 3,
2002 in the course of periodic compliance monitoring. The Daily Operation
Reports for both August 31, 2000[18] and May 3, 2002[19] submitted by
petitioner clearly manifest that the plant did not operate on those dates. On the
other hand, LLDAs Investigation Report and Report of Inspection[20] dated
August 31, 2000 and May 3, 2002, respectively, disclose otherwise. Petitioner
never disputed the factual findings reflected in these reports. Thus spawns
doubts on the veracity and accuracy of the Daily Operation Reports.
Petitioner asserts that LLDA had not credited it for undertaking
remedial measures to rehabilitate its wastewater treatment facility, despite the
prohibitive costs and at a time when its income from the agro-industrial
business was already severely affected by a poor business climate; and that the
enforcement of the assailed LLDA orders amounted to a gross disincentive to
its business.
Without belaboring petitioners assertions, it must be underscored that
the protection of the environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent
or vital than the pressing concerns of private enterprises, big or small.
Everyone must do their share to conserve the national patrimonys meager
resources for the benefit of not only this generation, but of those to follow.
The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade its WTF (from 2003 to
2007), a move arrived at only under threat of continuing sanctions, militates
against any genuine concern for the well-being of the countrys waterways.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 27, 2009
Decision and the February 23, 2010 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 107449, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 142571 : May 5, 2006]
NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, v. LEONCIO C.
ENCISO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision
dated March 20, 20001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59681 affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141, in its
Civil Case No. 94-005, an action for a sum of money with
damages thereat commenced by the respondent against the
herein petitioner, its Administrator and its Assistant
Administrator for Systems and Operations and Equipment
Management.
Succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
decision are the following undisputed facts:
Records show that in 1984, defendant-appellant [petitioner]
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) commenced the
widening of the Binahaan River in Brgy. Cansamada, Dagami,
Leyte. This project was divided into small sections costing not
more than P50,000.00 each so as not to require public
bidding. However, pre-bidding was nevertheless conducted by
NIA and participated in by different contractors to determine
20
the possible lowest bid which shall serve as the cost of the
project. With this arrangement, contractors are assigned to
work on specific sections without formal contracts. When the
works for the assigned sections are completed to NIA's
satisfaction, NIA will then prepare the requisite contract and
other pertinent documents so that the contractor can collect
payment.
Plaintiff-appellant [respondent] Enciso, doing business as a
contractor under the name LCE Construction, worked on a
portion of the river from "station 16 + 400 to station 16 +
900". His first billing of P227,165.90 was paid by NIA.
However, his second and final billing of P259,154.01 was
denied on the ground that the work done on the right side of
the river was not accomplished. [Words in bracket supplied.]
Respondent finally instituted a complaint for collection of a
sum of money with damages and attorney's fees with the RTC
of Makati City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 94-005 and
eventually raffled to Branch 141 thereof. Petitioner and co-
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and lack of cause of
action. The RTC denied the motion and proceeded to trial.
In a decision dated February 27, 1998, the RTC rendered
judgment for respondent, as plaintiff, holding petitioner, as
defendant, liable, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay plaintiff
the sum of P259,154.01 with legal rate of interest of 12% per
annum effective on 1 August 1985 until fully paid;
P50,000.00, as and for attorney's fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties went up to the Court of Appeals (CA). For its
part, petitioner contended that the trial court erred in denying
its motion to dismiss and thereafter holding it liable to
respondent. On the other hand, respondent interposed that
the trial court erred in failing to hold petitioner's co-
defendants personally liable for damages and in adjudging
petitioner NIA solely liable based on the face value of the
work accomplished in 1985. The CA, however, found no
reversible error in the appealed decision and affirmed it as
follows:rbl r l l lbrr
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed
decision which is in accord with the evidence and
jurisprudential principle on the matter, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Only petitioner NIA came to this Court via this Petition for
Review raising the following issues for resolution:
the court of appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the
regional trial court denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
(annex "c" hereof) which averred, among other things, that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies
available to him under the law.
the court of appeals erred in declaring that petitioner is liable
to respondent for the alleged work at petitioner's project
though the alleged assignment was done in violation of
existing rules and regulations.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Petitioner raised the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies in its appeal before the CA, on account of
respondent's failure to file his claim before the Commission on
Audit (COA) prior to instituting a complaint for collection of
sum of money with the RTC. Instead of addressing the
question, however, the CA discussed NIA's separate and
distinct corporate personality from the government or the
State, which is a non-issue. What the CA failed to rule upon
is, given the fact that NIA is a government entity vested with
a separate corporate personality from the State, whether NIA,
being a government entity disbursing public funds or tax-
payers' money is subject to the jurisdiction of COA such that
any claim for collection of sum of money against it, specially
21
in this instance where it is not covered by any written
contract, must be initially lodged before the COA.
The issue should have been resolved in the affirmative.
Among the powers vested upon COA as provided for in
Section 26, Presidential Decree No. 1445, are the following:
SECTION 26. General jurisdiction. - The authority and powers
of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all
matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and
controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the
Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto
for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of
the books, records, and papers relating to those accounts;
and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit, and
settlement of all claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all
government-owned or controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions,
agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including non-governmental entities subsidized by the
government, those funded by donations through the
government, those required to pay levies or government
share, and those for which the government has put up a
counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
[Emphasis supplied.]
COA, as one of the three (3) independent constitutional
commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property owned or held in trust by the government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. To
ensure the effective discharge of its functions, COA has been
empowered, subject to the limitations imposed by Article
IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution, to define the scope of its audit
and examination and establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.2
In the instant case, when determining the regularity of
disbursement of public funds by the petitioner NIA for the
alleged services rendered by respondent in the widening
project involving a portion of Binahaan River in Barangay
Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte more specifically, from station 16
+ 400 to station 16 + 900 thereof, the accounting and
auditing principles, rules and regulations set by COA must be
taken into consideration. In this light, it is highly doubtful
whether respondent may compel petitioner NIA's officers to
release payment of his claims without any previously
approved contract for the supposed river-widening project in
violation of existing COA rules and regulations, without
subjecting said official to administrative and/or personal
liabilities and/or accountabilities.
Be that as it may, for the supposed refusal or failure by the
concerned public officials to act over respondent's money
claim or even the mere inaction for an unreasonable period,
the proper and immediate remedy of the respondent was to
file his claim with the COA, such inaction or refusal to pay
being tantamount to disallowance of the claim. Only after
COA has ruled on the claim, may the injured party invoke
judicial intervention by bringing the matter to this Court on
petition for certiorari .
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of long
standing and courts have clear guidelines on the matter. Paat
v. Court of Appeals3 wrote:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
22
it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver
or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not
an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of
the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when
the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the
part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there
is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Petitioner had timely raised this ground to dismiss the action
before the RTC, and since there is no showing that
respondent's case falls under any one of the accepted
exceptions, petitioner's motion to dismiss should have been
granted, forthwith dismissing the case for lack of cause of
action.
Anent the second issue, the legality or regularity of
petitioner's payment of respondent's claim may be best
addressed in a proper case before the COA, considering that
there might be factual matters involved therein, which is
definitely not within the province of the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari .
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
respondent's Complaint before the RTC is DISMISSED for lack
of cause of action, with costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
23