1.

NORTHWEST AIRLINES V CHIONG

January 31, 2008

Facts
Philimare, as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean, hired Chiong as third
engineer of TransOceans vessel M/V Elbia. Subsequently, Philmare dispatched a letter of
guarantee to CL Hutchins and Co., TranOceans agent at the San Diego Port, confirming
Chiongs arrival in time to board the vessel. For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong
a Northwest plane ticket for San Diego from Manila. Chiong, on queue at the check-in
counter, was informed that his name did not appear in the list of confirmed departing
passengers. He was directed to speak to a man standing outside the Northwests counters
from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached
the man but having no $100 to pay for the boarding pass he went on queue at the check-in
counter again and presented his ticket where he was made to wait. When Chiong
approached Calvo if she had money for the boarding pass, the latter found something amiss
because his plane ticket was already confirmed. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board
the flight and was unable to work at the M/V Elbia.
It appears that Chiongs name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in
Northwests Air Passenger Manifest.
Chiong demanded as recompense: (1) the amount equivalent to Chiongs salary under
the latters Crew Agreement with TransOcean; (2) P15,000 for Chiongs expenses in fetching
and bringing his family from Samar to Manila; (3) P500,000 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000
as legal fees. When Northwest demurred, Chiong filed a complaint for breach of contract of
carriage.
Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage with Chiong,
reiterating that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its records, Chiong was
a "no-show" passenger.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of Chiong, and
holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled that the evidence
adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was deliberately prevented
from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American
passenger by the name of W. Costine. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue
Whether Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong and if so, whether it is
liable for compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of
suit

Ruling
In addition to his testimony, Chiongs evidence consisted of a Northwest ticket, Chiongs
passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the
testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, and Philippine Overseas Employment and
Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the signature and stamp of the PCG on
Chiongs passport.
Northwest did not present any evidence to support its belated defense that Chiong
departed from the Philippines on April 17, 1989 to work as Third Engineer on board M/V Elbia
 under the original crew agreement. Its bare-faced claim that Chiong was a no-show
passenger was belied by the records.
Even if Chiong left the Philippines on April 17, 1989, it would not necessarily prove that
Chiong was a "no-show" on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already established fact
that Chiong had a confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed through the PCG counter
without delay, then reached and was at the Northwest check-in counters on time for the
scheduled flight.
Northwest breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.
Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport,
is primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest. The law
governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of conduct. As the
aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its
non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded compensatory and actual
damages.
Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in breaches
of contract, is in order upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It means breach of a known duty
through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
The award of exemplary damages is also correct given the evidence that Northwest acted
in an oppressive manner towards Chiong.
Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses
to protect his interest, or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing
to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

Northwest Airline v. Chiong

G.R. no. 155550, January 31, 2008

Facts:

In the course of a civil proceeding, Northwest, filed a separate criminal complaint for False
Testimony against Chiong based on the latters testimony that he did not leave the Philippines after
April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service record book that he had left the country
on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the same year. The RTC favored Chiong by the
evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was
accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.

Issue:

Is the faljsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applicable?

Ruling: No.
Analysis: The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive rule
of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the witness must
be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The principle presupposes
the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the
testimony. However, the records show that Chiongs testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what
occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to explain or impugn the evidence
that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly
stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.

2. ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ

GR No.143439. October 14, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez filed a criminal case for Arson against petitioner Maximo Alvarez, the
estranged husband of her sister Esperanza.
Esperanza was called to the witness stand to testify against Alvarez, her husband to whom she was
separated de facto for almost 6months before the incident happened.
Alvarez filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
The trial court issued the disqualified Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her
testimony from the records. The motion for reconsideration by Ramirez was denied as well. This
prompted her to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
On May 31, 2000, the CA nullified and set aside the Order of the trial court. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the
ground of marital privilege.

HELD: Yes, Esperanza may testify against her estranged husband in the criminal case.

Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband nor
the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)

The reasons given for the rule are: (1) There is identity of interests between husband and wife; (2) If one
were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; (3)The policy of the law is
to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice,
and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and (4)Where there is want of domestic tranquility
there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other
Such as when the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed.

The act of Alvarez in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law with the alleged intent of injuring his
wife is an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification
primarily seeks to protect. The offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation. Their marital and domestic relations have become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace or tranquility to be preserved so much so that identity is non-existent. Thus, there is no longer
any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.

Esperanza is allowed to testify against Alvarez, her husband, in Criminal Case for arson against him.

3. People v Quidato Jr.

297 SCRA 1

Topic: Marital Disqualification

Facts:

Herein accused- appellant was charged of the crime Parricide. He and two co-conspirators
allegedly attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab the victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellants
father and namesake, which caused the victims untimely demise.

Among those presented as witness were accuseds wife and brother. Also presented were the
extrajudicial confessions of appellants two other co-accused. Appellants wife testified that while the
accused were drinking tuba she overheard them saying that they were planning to go to the victims
house on the night of the incident in order to get money and that she had no idea of what later
transpired. Appellant objected to his wifes testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital
disqualification. Appellant likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who in their extrajudicial
confession pointed to the participation of appellant.

Issue:

W/N the testimony of the wife of accused-appellant is inadmissible in evidence as it violates the
Marital Disqualification Rule.
Ruling:

YES. The disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from
testifying when it involves other parties or accused. Hence, Gina Quidato could testify in the murder case
against Reynaldo and Eddie, which was jointly tried with accused-appellants case. This testimony cannot,
however, be used against accused-appellant directly or through the guise of taking judicial notice of the
proceedings in the murder case without violating the marital disqualification rule. What cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly is a rule familiar even to law students.

Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidatos testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddies
extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to
accused-appellant. Admittedly, accused-appellants defense, to put it mildly, is dubious. His alleged
acquiescence to the demand of the Malita brothers to accompany them to his fathers house on the strength
of the latters verbal threats, his incredulous escape from the clutches of the two, his inexplicable failure to
return home immediately, his failure to seek assistance from the authorities, the fact that Eddie stayed with
him immediately after the incident, and the nine-day lacuna between the killing and his pointing to the Malita
brothers as the culprits, all suggest a complicity more than that of an unwilling participant. Yet, suspicion,
no matter how strong, should not sway judgment, it being an accepted axiom that the prosecution cannot
rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must establish beyond reasonable doubt
every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused. This the prosecution has failed to demonstrate.

Sec. 23. Dead Mans Statute Rule.

5. ANNIE TAN vs. CA & BLOOMBERRY EXPORT MANUFACTURING, INC.

G.R. No. 130314

FACTS:

Petitioner Annie Tan, doing business under the name and style "AJ & T Trading," leased a portion of the
ground floor of her building in favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc. The lease was for a period of
five years starting on February 17, 1995 and ending on February 17, 2000, at a monthly rental of P20,000
for the first three years. For several alleged violations of the lease contract, petitioners filed against private
respondent a complaint for ejectment, as its rental payment was refused by petitioner, private respondent
instituted on July 13, 1995 a case for consignation.

The two cases were consolidated. However, she failed to substantiate her case with that degree of proof
required by law. For this reason, except for the costs of suit, the trial court orders the dismissal of the
complaint of petitioner. The counterclaim and damages sought by private respondent are likewise ordered
dismissed. The case for consignation has become moot and academic for failure of petitioner to appeal the
decision of the Metropolitan Court allowing the private respondent to consign rental payments to the Court
of Manila. Besides, the complaint for consignation being in conformity with law, is allowed to continue
consigning with this Court all rentals that may be due."

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2 affirmed the aforementioned MTC Decision finding
no cogent reasons to disturb the joint decision dated February 1, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 1, the Court sustains and affirms in toto the said decision.
In the assailed Decision, Respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Order setting for hearing
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent Court held that the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion in setting for hearing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, notwithstanding the fact that said
Motion contained no notice of hearing.

Citing a litany of cases, it ruled that petitioner's failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections
4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, reduced her motion to a mere scrap of paper which did not merit
the attention of the court. Respondent Court also held that those cases in which the Court allowed a motion
for reconsideration that had not been set for hearing -- Galvez v. Court of Appeals, -- were inapplicable.

Respondent Court held that the facts in Galvez drastically differ from those in the present case. Galvez
involved a motion to withdraw the information -- not a motion for reconsideration -- that was filed ex parte
before the arraignment of the accused. In that case, the Court held that there was no imperative need of
notice and hearing because, first, the withdrawal of an information rests on the discretion of the trial court;
and, second, the accused was not placed in jeopardy. On the other hand, the subject of the present
controversy is a motion for reconsideration directed against the Decision of the RTC; thus, the motion
affects the period to perfect an appeal.

Que is not applicable, either. In said case, the trial court set the Motion for Reconsideration (MR) for hearing,
which was actually attended by the counsel for the adverse party. This was not so in the case at bar;
petitioner's MR was set for hearing, because she belatedly moved for it upon the filing of private
respondent's Motion for Entry of Judgment. Likewise, the present case differs from Tamargo, wherein the
application of the aforesaid mandatory provisions was suspended. The Court did so in order to give
substantial justice to the petitioner and in view of the nature of the issues raised which were found to be
highly meritorious.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the omission through inadvertence of notice of hearing of a motion for reconsideration file
with the trial court is fatal defect which did not stop the running of the period to appeal, thus rendering the
assailed decision final and executory

HELD:

The petition is devoid of merit.

Omission of Notice of Hearing Fatal

Petitioner admits the categorical and mandatory character of the directives in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. -- Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

"Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.(4a)
"SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. -- The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall
specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion.(5a)"

The decision being adverse to him petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. For failing to mention the
date when the motion was to be resolved as required in Sec. 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court, the motion
for reconsideration was denied. A second motion for reconsideration met the same fate. On 2 July 1986
petitioner filed a notice of appeal but the same was denied for being filed out of time as 'the motion for
reconsideration which the Court ruled as pro forma did not stop the running of the 15-day period to appeal.

"In resolving the issue of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's notice
of appeal, this Court ruled -

'Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court requires that notice of motion be served by the movant on all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before its hearing. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that the
notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion. A motion which does not meet the requirements of Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no
authority to act upon. Service of copy of a motion containing notice of the time and place of hearing of said
motion is a mandatory requirement and the failure of the movant to comply with said requirements renders
his motion fatally defective.

"In New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho,20 [Supra.] defendant filed a motion for reconsideration which did
not contain any notice of hearing. In a petition for certiorari, we affirmed the lower court in ruling that a
motion for reconsideration that did not contain a notice of hearing was a useless scrap of paper. We held
further -

'Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, xxx a motion is required to be accompanied by a
notice of hearing which must be served by the applicant on all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing thereof. Section 6 of the same rule commands that "(n)o motion shall be acted upon by
the Court, without proof of service of the notice thereof xxx." It is therefore patent that the motion for
reconsideration in question is fatally defective for it did not contain any notice of hearing. We have already
consistently held in a number of cases that the requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rules 15 of the Rules
of Court are mandatory and that failure to comply with the same is fatal to movant's cause.

"In Sembrano v. Ramirez,22 [166 SCRA 30, September 28, 1988.] we declared that -

'(A) motion without notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. It does not toll the running of the period of
appeal. This requirement of notice of hearing equally applies to a motion for reconsideration. Without such
notice, the motion is pro forma. And a pro forma motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running
of the period to appeal.'

"In In re Almacen,23 [31 SCRA 562, February 18, 1970.] defendant lost his case in the lower court. His
counsel then filed a motion for reconsideration but did not notify the adverse counsel of the time and place
of hearing of said motion. The Court of Appeals dismissed the motion for the reason that 'the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore a useless piece of paper which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.' When the case was brought to us, we reminded
counsel for the defendant that -
'As a law practitioner who was admitted to the bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew -- or ought to
have known -- that [for] a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant
must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party x x x but also notify the adverse party of
the time and place of hearing x x x.'

"Also, in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Bath Construction and Company, we ruled-

'The written notice referred to evidently is that prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and
5 (formerly Rule 26), which provide that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing and shall be
served upon all the parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed, it has been
held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper. The reason is obvious; unless
the movant sets the time and place of hearing the court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules
themselves do not fix any period within [which] he may file his reply or opposition.

"In fine, the above cited cases confirm that the requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the
hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As
such the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the prescriptive period."

For failing to attach a notice of hearing to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner proffers the following
excuses: (1) her former counsel's messenger, due to an honest mistake, inadvertently omitted the fourth
page of the motion containing the crucial Notice of Hearing; and (2) because of the pressure of work, her
former counsel was unable to follow up such motion until the day said counsel requested the setting of a
hearing.

We are not in the least convinced. First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the messenger.
The burden of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsel's shoulders, not on the messenger's. The
counsel is ultimately responsible for the acts or omissions of his agents. Hence, the messenger's conduct
can neither justify the counsel's mistake nor warrant a departure from the mandate of the aforesaid
procedural rules.

Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing was left behind due to honest
mistake. In fact, there was no such page. Petitioner's claim is belied by the following pertinent portions of
the subject Motion for Reconsideration.

The normal practice is to note, at the end of the pleading, that a copy was furnished to the adverse party.
Thus, petitioner's motion ended exactly at the bottom of the third page as evidenced by the "copy-furnished"
notation. It is safe to conclude that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in not including a fourth
page in this case. In other words, petitioner's counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing.

Finally, the fact that petitioner's former counsel calendared the motion for hearing for belies the excuse
that an alleged fourth page had been left behind. In the first place, if a notice of hearing had been included
in the Motion for Reconsideration, there would have been no need for petitioner to file the Motion to set the
time and date of hearing. What is clear is that said counsel filed the latter Motion, only after private
respondent had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment -- with copy furnished petitioner's counsel30 --
on the ground that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper that did not stop the
period for appeal.
Petitioner pleads for liberal construction of the rule on notice of hearing, citing Tamargo, Galvez and Que.
In rebuttal, we adopt by reference the CA's excellent disquisition, cited earlier, on why these cases are
inapplicable.

Petitioner further alleges that, first, the non-admission of her Motion for Reconsideration would result in a
miscarriage of justice, as the main case (ejectment), which was tried under summary procedure, had been
unnecessarily prolonged; and, second, the tenant lessee would be occupying the premises without paying
rentals. She also relies on People v. Leviste.

"While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15, Rules of Court
should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, the Supreme Court has
likewise held that where rigid application of the rule will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case."

Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1) where a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,32 [Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 498, 504-505, August 11, 1992; Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 418, 426-
427, March 18, 1991.] especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein (2) where the
interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to
the sound and judicious discretion of the court; (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the case at bar falls under any of these exceptions.

Finally, petitioner claims that she will be deprived of property without due process, as private respondent
has accumulated P348,800 in unpaid rentals and accrued interests.

We disagree. Petitioner can obtain proper payment of rentals through a motion for execution in the case
below. The MTC may have dismissed her ejectment case, but it did not exculpate private respondent from
its liabilities. Petitioner is, therefore, not being deprived of her property without due process.

Indeed, there is no miscarriage of justice to speak of. Having failed to observe very elementary rules of
procedure which are mandatory, petitioner caused her own predicament. To exculpate her from the
compulsory coverage of such rules is to undermine the stability of the judicial process, as the bench and
bar will be confounded by such irritating uncertainties as when to obey and when to ignore the Rules. We
have to draw the line somewhere.

8. MERCADO VS. VITRIOLO

Facts:

Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly maliciously filed
a criminal case for falsification of public documents against her thereby violating the attoyrney
client privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she apparently made
false entries in the certificate of live birth of her children. More specifically she allegedly indicated
that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real husband is Ruben
Mercado. Mercado claims that by filing the complaint the attorney client privilege has been
violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney-
client when he filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate 11complainants allegations. Complainant
did not even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. Indeed, the complaint failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney client privilege. The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

9. In Re: Petition for Cancellation 625 scra 66

Emma Lee v CA GR No. 177861. July 13, 2010

Facts:
The respondents are children of LEE and KEH 11 Lee-Keh Children. They learned that their father
Lee, had children with their housemaid TUI 8 Lees Other Children, one of them is the Petitioner.
Lee-Keh Children filed an action for correction of birth certificates of Lees Other Children because
they (Other Children) are not children of Lee and Keh, but rather they are children of Tui who claims to
be their step-mother.
The stepmother of the Petitioner is being requested to testify in a special proceeding for the deletion
from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name
Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.

Issue:
Whether or not Tiu may be compelled to testify in the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner
Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter

Whether or not the stepmother Tui can properly invoke Section 25 Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on
Parental and Filial privilege

Ruling: YES. Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
Tui claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, the petitioner Emma
Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of Evidence, which reads: SECTION 25. Parental
and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other direct descendants.

The privilege covers all kinds of actions whether civil, criminal or administrative filed against parents
and other direct ascendants or descendants. But here, Tui who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she
is the stepmother of the petitioner, Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule
applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

10. Senate of the Philippines V Ermita

488 SCRA 1

Topic: Executive Privilege

Facts:

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The rule of confidentiality based on
executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.

They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on

Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null
and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance
of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive
election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from
the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By
the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE

11. ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995

Petitioners: Nerio Rogado, Chief Accountant; Elisa Rivera, Chief of the Records; Jose T. Almonte, EIIB
Commissioner; Villamor Perez, Budget and Fiscal Management Division Chief; Respondent: Honorable
Conrado M. Vasquez

FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of
funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and
Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide
documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.

RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount
importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence
reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited
to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which involve
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS. SECTION 27 OFFER AND COMPROMISE

15. People vs Dela Cruz

546 SCRA 703. February 26, 2008

Facts:
In the prosecution of criminal charges for rape against Juanito del Cruz, among the
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution to support the testimonies of their
witnesses is a LETTER WRITTEN BY DELA CRUZ in a Marlboro cigarette wrapper addressed to
the Victim, his daughter, asking her forgiveness.

The letter was given by dela Cruz to his wife when she visited him in jail. He instructed her to
give it to their daughter. In the letter, dela Cruz asked her to forgive him for what he did to her as he
was only drunk at that time.

Issue:
Whether or not the LETTER of dela Cuz asking for the victims forgiveness is admissible in evidence against
him

Ruling: YES. Dela Cruz's letter written on a Marlboro cigarette wrapper asking the victim's forgiveness is
admissible in evidence against him.
Evidence; Offer of compromise; Admissions. Verily, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he has
committed a wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to
compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant (dela Cruz) may be received in evidence
as an admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the said letter, appellant asked her to forgive him for what he did to her as he was only drunk at that
time. She knows that the letter was written by appellant because she is familiar with his handwriting and
signature. AAA positively identified the letter itself during her direct examination and this was formally
offered as documentary evidence for the prosecution.
More importantly, appellant himself readily admitted that the letter is the same letter he wrote for
AAA. He also confirmed that the handwriting therein is his. Although later, he would deny the same on
the basis that he does not use the Marlboro cigarette brand, but only Winston cigarette brand, we still
give more weight to his admission of the said letter since it was given voluntarily and spontaneously. His
subsequent denial is not only based on flimsy grounds but also an obvious attempt to cover-up his earlier
damaging testimony. As to the contents of the letter, verily, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he
has committed a wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to
compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt pursuant to Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

16. People V Galvez

Topic: Offer of Compromise

Facts:

Issue:

W/N an offer of compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt.

Ruling:

YES. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the
party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize,
that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever may
be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the
accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify
a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt or an
attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed
made such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to explain that
it was given for some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or an
attempt to avoid its legal consequences.
ADMISSION AND CONFESSIONS Sec. 27. Offering and compromise

17. LUCIO TAN vs. RODIL ENTERPRISES

(511 SCRA 162)

FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises is a lessee of the Ides ORacca Building since 1959 which is owned by the
Republic of the Philippines. Rodil and the Republic entered into a Renewal of a Conttract of Lease through
the DENR. A subsequent Supplementary Contract was similarly entered into extending the lease
agreement until September 1, 1997. The Court upheld the validity of the May 18 and 25, 1992 contracts
when it was placed in several actions involving Rodil, Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc.,
however, prior to that the office of the President rendered a decision declaring the Renewal of Contract of
Lease and the Supplementary Contract of no force and effect. Rodil appealed the saem to the CA and SC
and was dismissed by both courts. Rodil filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CA on the Order
of Execution in which case the CA annulled the Order and enjoined the Office of the President to abide by
the decision in the consolidated cases which upholds the validity of the Renewal of the Contract of Lease
and the Supplemental Contract.

A subsequent Contract of Lease was drawn between Rodil and the Republic , the same to be effective
retroactively from Sept 1, 1997 to August 21, 2012 at a monthly rental of P65, 206.67, subject to the
adjustment upon the approval of the new appraisal covering the building. Rodil subleased various units to
members of the Tenants Association among them is Tan who rented a space known as Botica Divisoria.
Rodil filed a compliant for Unlawful Detainer against Tan for not paying the monthly rentals despite repeated
oral and written demands.

A payment of rentals in arrears was similarly sought plus the attorneys fees and litigation costs including
the monthly rentals. Tan on the other hand alleged that he is a legitimate tenant of the government as owner
of the building and not Rodil, and as such he has the right to lease the said premises pending the disposition
and sale of the building. He based his claim from the fact that the Office of the President had declared the
Renewal Contract of Lease and Supplemental Contract between Rodil and Republic to be without force
and effect. Accordingly thee DENR was directed to award the lease contract on favor of the Association of
which Tan is a member. Thus he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

MeTC issued an order recognizing the an agreement entered into in open court by Tan and Rodil. Tan also
filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due
on the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due; the rental arrears and that he would like to deposit the
amount to the City Treasurer of Manila. However, the MeTC denied such deposit and rendered a decision
in favor of Rodil and held that Tan did not contest the sublease on a monthly basis and in fact admitted the
same. Tan appealed the decision to the RTC which reversed and dismiss the complaint finding that MeTC
erred in holding that the offer to compromise by Tans counsel was akin to an admission of the fact. Rodil
filed a Petiiton for Review with the appellate court which affirmed and reinstated the decision of the MeTC.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Tan however it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Luciano Tan made a judicial admission anent his liability as a sub lessee of Rodil
Enterprises?

RULING:
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his Motion to
Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability, citing Section 27, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil case is not a tacit
admission of liability.

The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror.
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the case
and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party denies the existence of a
debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an
indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to
prove such indebtedness.

Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering that the only question discussed was the
amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations.

In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that petitioner did not contest the existence
of the sublease, and his counsel made frank representations anent the formers liability in the form of
rentals. This expressed admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant
to Deposit Rentals was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the
subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence of the Contract of
Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner.

Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but also, as to
the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC dated 27 June 2000 was
clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount of P440,000.00, representing petitioners
unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000; and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed
at P13,750.00 on or before the 5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioners judicial admission
in open court, as found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular significance
when viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner stated that
the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the present amounted
to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to reject the same. An
admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should
be ignored whether objection is interposed by a party or not. A judicial admission is an admission made by
a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact,
which said party cannot thereafter disprove.

Sec. 32. Admission by Silence

23. Philippine First Insurance v. Wallem First Shipping

582 SCRA 457, G.R. No. 165647, March 26, 2009.

FACTS:
Anhui Chemicals Import & Export Corporation loaded on board M/S Offshore Master a shipment consisting
of 10,000 bags of sodium sulphate anhydrous 99 PCT Min. (shipment) to be delivered at the port of Manila
for L.G. Atkimson Import-Export, Inc. (consignee). The shipper of the shipment is Shanghai Fareast Ship
Business Company. Both are foreign firms doing business in the Philippines, thru its local ship agent,
respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. (Wallem). It was disclosed during the discharge of the
shipment from the carrier that 2,426 poly bags were in bad order and condition.

The consignee filed a formal claim with Wallem for the value of the damaged shipment. The former filed a
formal claim with petitioner for the damage and losses sustained by the shipment. Consequently, petitioner
paid the consignee the sum of P397, 879.69 and the latter signed a subrogation receipt. In this regard,
petitioner sent a demand letter to Wallem for the recovery of the amount paid by petitioner to the consignee
to which Wallem did not respond.
Consequently, petitioner instituted an action before the RTC for damages against respondents representing
the actual damages suffered by petitioner plus legal interest thereon.

ISSUE: Whether or not as a common carrier, the carriers duties extend to the obligation to safely discharge
the cargo from the vessel;

RULING: YES. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to
certain exceptions enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are responsible for
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier
lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier
for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or
to the person who has a right to receive them.

The responsibility of the carrier shall commence from the time when the goods are loaded on board the
vessel and shall cease when they are discharged from the vessel.
The Carrier shall not be liable of loss of or damage to the goods before loading and after discharging from
the vessel, howsoever such loss or damage arises.

On the other hand, the functions of an arrastre operator involve the handling of cargo deposited on the
wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship's tackle. Being the custodian
of the goods discharged from a vessel, an arrastre operator's duty is to take good care of the goods and to
turn them over to the party entitled to their possession.

Handling cargo is mainly the arrastre operator's principal work so its drivers/operators or employees should
observe the standards and measures necessary to prevent losses and damage to shipments under its
custody

The records show that the damage to the bags happened before and after their discharge and that it was
caused by the stevedores of the arrastre operator who were then under the supervision of Wallem.

It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under the
custody of the carrier. In the instant case, the damage or losses were incurred during the discharge of the
shipment while under the supervision of the carrier. Consequently, the carrier is liable for the damage or
losses caused to the shipment.