1. ROLITO GO v. CA
That same day,
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M.,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation
Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along
Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St.
Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started
travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson
and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped
each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the
scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round
of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa
Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to
find out where the suspect had come from; they were informed that
petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting.
The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the
bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified
him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that
the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a
manhunt for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail
himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign
a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and
before an information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan,
died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an
information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder 3
before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the
bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute
and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner
filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
proper preliminary investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also prayed that
he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the
motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special
raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail
recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge,
who, on the same date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner
and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same
day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a
motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation8 and prayed that
in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated
that petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro, who also agreed to recommend cash bail of
P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy
of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave
to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelling the arraignment set
for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an
Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July 1991 Order which
granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of
the Order to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which
granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation
was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991
was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order,
contending that the information was null and void because no
preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of
his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all
proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of
his petition; this motion was, however, denied by respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court
setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order
directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his
custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was
arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal
case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11
and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in
the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of public respondent's
failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after
the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was
entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas
corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the
one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution
denying petitioner's motion to restrain his arraignment on the ground
that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the
prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated
decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for
which he was arrested and charged had been "freshly committed." His
identity had been established through investigation. At the time he
showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt
for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one
witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any
irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to preliminary
investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the
Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17
July 1991 Order because the trial court had the inherent power to
amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner
and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner
surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the
custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could
not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more
witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of
Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was
filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing
respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case
below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be
addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been
effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second,
whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the
facts of the case, petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant.
Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan
on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police
Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station
Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases consolidated
with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil,
etc., v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a
warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after
the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested.
Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because
petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the
information for murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested
without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after
the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had
been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none
had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a
warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest.
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only
exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in
respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v.
Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v.
Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the
warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days
after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such
offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like the New
People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner
was arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced
and completed at one definite location in time and space. No one had
pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of
petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with
Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of
Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the
meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had]
in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take
down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not,
however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too
that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by
the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit
of the offended party or arresting office or person
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may
apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation
must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from
the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the
manner prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When
he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2)
lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the
police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the
latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in
court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of
Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out
a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner
was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have
been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner
had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled
to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his
right to preliminary investigation, we note that petitioner had from the
very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information
for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with
the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that
omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with
the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to
have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe
that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may
be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was
to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is
true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the
information for murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial
Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of
this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the
Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of
determining whether a prima facie case exists to warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in
Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After
such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal
should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had
already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the
right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case [such] as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and
control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. .
. . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for
preliminary investigation and not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul
involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file
with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder,
a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his
motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that
petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What
was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such
preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later
apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's
prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the
(mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section
7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day
reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a
preliminary investigation. While that right is statutory rather than
constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound
over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably
exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of
expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to any
one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny
petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him
the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a
preliminary investigation in the instant case considering that he was
already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to
preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it
before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 22 In the instant
case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment,
petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by
posting bail petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, 23 we did hold that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their
arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming
that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 24 In
the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on
bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had
thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent
Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply
waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when
the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct
preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that
petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the
failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of
the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal
justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect
the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that
petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent to an
acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt
then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17
July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting
bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48)
hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no evidence at
all and certainly no new or additional evidence had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his
order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact
that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has already commenced, the
Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon,
firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled
to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge
against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that
petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial
on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of
the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that
probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably
could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant
a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that
petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of
procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to undergo
arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary
investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the
audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at
trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking
. During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991,
the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment,
counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to
the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's
counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and
prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him
with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its
first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his
objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's
counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had
promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to
challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to
undergo and the lawfulness of his detention.30 If he did not walk out on
the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was
because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio
selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have
waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in
the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that
petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be,
in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may
move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then
be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the
evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's
rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail were effectively
obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be
to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the
Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and
effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the
vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord petitioner
his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could
turn out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is
not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not be idle
ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights
and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and
determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby
SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct
forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against
petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a
period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon
posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful
order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
2. MIRANDA v. TULIAO
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion
of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and
GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for
Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered
UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June
25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok
Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies
of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio
Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander
Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC
of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two
counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this
Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the
accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27
April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners
Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio,
a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible
for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against
petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn
confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash
the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan
noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said
urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by
the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State
Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order
of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the
warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied
this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent
Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed
for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration
was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for
inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint
Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001,
16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to
grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after
the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against
petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents
cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001,
and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition
to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public
Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations
for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the
Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied
in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this
Court the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001
and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523
and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the
Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge
Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek
any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524
in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional
Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-
3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch
36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against
herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become
final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the
body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with
the Court of Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as
warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when
he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may
invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act
on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief
since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at
the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of
arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in
applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act
on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction
over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the
above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case
or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized
under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a).
In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on
motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused
having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA
307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest
in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson
vs. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case
transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually
ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners
invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in
Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since
the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as
a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant
where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the
law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law
but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such
as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be
subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in
the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and
liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody
of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of
Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case,
which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the
custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico
reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the
processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the
application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano
v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones
release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on
bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to
post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the
jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether
or not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person.
The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the
court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except
in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes
of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction
of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody
of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general
rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the
custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where
we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of
the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the
jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the
application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant
of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with
the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants
of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease
and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer
the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in
a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the
criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law
in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant
of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody
of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail
will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the
commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand,
if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the
custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely
entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same
judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and
he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable
cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions,
the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and
therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day
and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can
be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight
is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it
is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before
asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of
rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the
deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered
by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions
of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing
the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the
standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a
subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of
his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political
climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of
a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so
two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners,
petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution
before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming
office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal.
According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and
because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable
to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to
comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just
because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant
prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the
petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of
the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of
arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail
as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the
ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of
the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been
quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the
warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence,
Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the
above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill
of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to
the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep
perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-
movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution
as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including
the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his
determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest
of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which
clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was based on
the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate
determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of
regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly
showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no
such indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification.
The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the
Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by
personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement
under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda
and Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente
Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on
the part of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution.
Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of said
section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable
cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is
incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two
years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was
given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward
of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the
election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago
City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda
camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and
allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no
reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a
witness is not within the province of the determination of probable
cause. As we held in Webb33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while
probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less
than evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable
cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a
part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in
another case with different accused constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among
other things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant
prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. However, after
the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge
Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano,
et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements,
he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the
other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001
Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder,
certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and
lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were
likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without
probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of
what use is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the
prosecutions evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No.
97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these
two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the
probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda
dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two
(2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court
in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886,
acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the
evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the
two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right
to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal,
who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao
case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the
accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of
criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder
of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that
the crime did not happen; we just found that there was reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in
that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not
even the situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at
bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in
Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of
respondent Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable
doubt in Leao, "it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made
untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same
is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the
use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of
the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a
bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able
to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such
abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to
issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the
motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement
of the orders set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by
Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to issue
apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners, it was
an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal
determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of
new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of
scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be
allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001
Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the proceedings
conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order
quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore those
warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of
new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it
would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The records of
the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of
Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of
Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case
and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have
ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria.
As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable
cause of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
in the same vein, we can also overrule the decision of a judge reversing
a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case
dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order
of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According
to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge
Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which
were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the
Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the
assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad
were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad,
which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524
is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence,
the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity
of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case
because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three
weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing
with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt,
alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On
21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in
view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the
issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that
Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14
November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge
Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November
2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the
effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001
Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases
upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of
P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November
2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt,
seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court
processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the granting of
opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite
public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy
cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it
was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for
certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify
Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to
convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We
further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41 by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524
to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,

1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the
RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the
transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten
(10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10)
days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to
act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith
warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal,
conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August
2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
3. IVLER v. SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to
the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two
cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in
a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought
from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners
absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later,
the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5
Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought
in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of
standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No.
2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing
to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration
but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No.
2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line
of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action
seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of
conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition
in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his
constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime
are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs
decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A.
2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries)
cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with
grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution
was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide
and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor
Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is
represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner
forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain
the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from
custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule
125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court
or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to
review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the
Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs
reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling.
There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was
sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she
jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia.
The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences
under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule
124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at
his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of
standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders
his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the
defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-
day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation
why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is
belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought
the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366
in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the
MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this
petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from,
among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with
the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a
valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in
Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question
whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting
that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the
[latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would
have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause
some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light
felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article
shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-
groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of
"imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty
scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3)
a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and
(4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the
framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of
the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition
that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of
punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the
legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed
to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent)
and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional
crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that
"reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability
is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by
their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder,
treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence
in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed
in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore,
the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed
in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed
willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way
from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series,
of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is
to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or
property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without
jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless
Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious
Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the
element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present
day penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid
conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in
People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x
x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two
decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of
committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from
an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous
conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-
crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act
but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single
quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes
such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence
on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the
same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier.
Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court
unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.),
Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.),
People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966
by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31
(promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting
C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the
Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33
(promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases
uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional
protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was
best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring
a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior
acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted
of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely
extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this
unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El
Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial
Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an
accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from
the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war
Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate,
all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There,
we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior
conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge
was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed
on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this
Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November
14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held
that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted
of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the
Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in
the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are
derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled
Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of
his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which
did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea
of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated
January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner
guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be
set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then
the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless
act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries.
Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision
cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts
erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not
be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny.
There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was
charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries
thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the
accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration,
found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In
affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2,
1959 and dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of
double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited,
Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two
automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid
complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in
connection with the same collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one
of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were
filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted
of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his
acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the
injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of
the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted.
The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was
convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through
reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved
in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court
of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by
the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga
who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in
the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent
prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property
through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30,
1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City
with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law,
for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty
the case was dismissed in that court for failure of the Government to
prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same
accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be 249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government
we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr.
Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense
of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City
Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the
tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test
is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is
to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have
been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether
one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the
contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with
the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might
be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the
accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence
of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior
court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine
Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing
the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the
acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the
ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the
lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose
of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that
further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the
facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will
yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is
nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has
reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case
of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which
the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules
in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the
Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in
lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the
penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act
defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article
365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works
to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling
under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper;
Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can
produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models that of
a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less
grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious:
how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple
(non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately
following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none
of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless
one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were
split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or
less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts
and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and
filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the
approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce
invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has
now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty
under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting
acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a
single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy
arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the
other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case
Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light
offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or
less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in
one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage
to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are
also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter.
The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries,
and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme
under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable.
Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by
breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present
framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and
Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-
crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book
II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in
the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and
severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article
365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication
in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government
denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the
conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies
under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-
offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be
joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with
the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only
the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument
was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious
charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out
of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has
been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by
the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the
second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty
of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses"
(or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).
If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect
of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders
dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case
No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of
double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the

splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and
severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed

from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365,
and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge
a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent