RULE 20 PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE:

IMBONG v OCHOA , GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014 (MENDOZA, J.) RH BILL CASE
(?)

(NOTE: same facts sa case under rule 4, pero inalis ko yung isang issue and
related lang sa right to life/ precautionary principle nilagay ko.)

FACTS:

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. From television debates to sticker campaigns,
from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the
society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as
presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life
of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products,
and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs
and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education
in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."
It ignores the management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray
for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case
or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2]
some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation
took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued
the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the
assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17,
2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.

ISSUES:

1) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

RULING:

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. Even
if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It
precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An
Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the
ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the
need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and
health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.

Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines"
and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were
legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program
has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

POLITICAL LAW: when life begins

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that
the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason,
it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or
when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from
fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum
are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in
the uterus.

POLITICAL LAW: the right to health

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section
15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the
health of the people, viz:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs
of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory
system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless
the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions.
It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when
they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician -be maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good
law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that
only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives
that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done
following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health
must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted
to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which
drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure
that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground
is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to
the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents
itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first
sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the
expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device
is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the
EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the
EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in
fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are
"safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the
law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive
health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception
must be made in life threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference,
considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service,
resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger.

POLITICAL LAW: due process

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other
parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other
parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

POLITICAL LAW: equal protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target
of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than
promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives
that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various
provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles and definition of terms of the law.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of
equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact
that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application
of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as

to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or "under include" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Our only guidepost is the Constitution.

While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the
Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the
law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural
right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a
law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained
that the Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms
with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only
in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life.
It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier
pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard
to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem
society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be
tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court
that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the
country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population
but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will
remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago, are
now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling
with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant
human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy.
These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For
one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not
use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious
objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the
wisdom of a law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow
a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of
pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation;

and

8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily"
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II
of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.

CONCURRING OF JUSTICE LEONARDO DE CASTRO

RULE 20
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Section 1. Applicablity. --- When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the
doubt.

Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the fol lowing factors, among
others. may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations:
or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.

The precautionary principle seeks to protect the rights of the present generation as well as to enforce
intergenerational responsibility, that is, the present generation should promote sustainable development and
act as stewards or caretakers of the environment for the benefit of generations yet unborn. In its essence,
the precautionary principle calls for the exercise of caution in the face of risk and uncertainty. It
acknowledges the peculiar circumstances surrounding environmental cases in that "scientific evidence is
usually insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation indicates that there are
reasonable grounds for concern" that there are potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human,
animal, or planet health. For this reason, the precautionary principle requires those who have the means,
knowledge, power, and resources to take action to prevent or mitigate the harm to the environment or to act
when conclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet availablc.32

The right to health, which is an indispensable clement of the right to life, deserves the same or even higher
degree of protection. Thus, if it is scientifically plausible but uncertain that any foreign substance or material
ingested or implanted in the woman's body may lead to threats or serious and irreversible damage to her or
her unborn child's right life or health, care should be taken to avoid or diminish that threat. The principle of
prudence requires that such a rule be adopted in matters concerning the right to life and health. In the face
of the conflicting claims and findings presented by the parties, and considering that the right to health is
inextricably intertwined with the right to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of prudence, which is the
principle relied on by the framers of the 1987 Constitution on matters affecting the right to life. Thus, any
uncertainty on the adverse effects or making contraceptives universally accessible on the Iife and health or
the people, especially of women, should be resolved in a way that will promote life and health.

In the same vein, the application by logical and actual necessity of the precautionary principle also gains
relevance in the discussion of the implications of the RH Law on the people's right to health. The unresolved
medical issue on the potentially life-threatening effects or hormonal contraceptives and IUDs demands a
cautious approach in the face of risk and uncertainty so as to prevent or mitigate the harm or threat of harm
to the people, particularly to women.

The principle of prudence and the precautionary principle in matters concerning the right to life and health
may be better promoted by continuing the regulation of the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices under Republic Act No. 472933:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic Act No. 4729 provides for a controlled access policy and requires that the sale, dispensation or
distribution of any contraceptive drug or device should be made only by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company pursuant to a doctor's prescription. On the other hand, with its thrust of providing
universal access to contraceptives, the RH Law gives the impression that it requires, under pain of criminal
prosecution, even persons other than doctors of medicine (such as nurses, midwives, public health workers ,
and barangay health workers) to distribute contraceptives.34

Considering the relevant medical issues and health concerns in connection with contraceptives and devices,
the regulated framework under Republic Act No. 4729 where contraceptive drugs and devices are sold,
dispensed or distributed only by duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical companies pursuant to a
doctor's prescription is no doubt more in harmony with the principle of prudence and the precautionary
principle than the apparently unrestricted or universal access approach under the RH Law. This is so as the
bodies of women may react differently to said drugs or devices depending on many factors that only a
licensed doctor is capable of determining. Thus, the universal access policy should be read as qualified by the
regulated framework under Republic Act No. 4729 rather than as impliedly repealing the said law.

The RH Law and the Freedom of Religion and freedom of Speech

Freedom of religion and freedom of speech are among our people's most cherished liberties. Petitioners
assert that these freedoms are seriously infringed by the RH Law.

Freedom of Religion

Religious freedom is guaranteed under Section 5, Article III or the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

According to petitioners, the RH Law compels them to act against their religious beliefs and threatens them
with criminal sanction if they insist on exercising the teachings of their faith. They point to Sections 7 and 23
(a)(3) of the RH Law as the provisions impinging on their religious freedom.

Petitioners assail Section 7's directive to extend family planning services to paying patients of private health
facilities with the exception of non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group. The exception is, however, subject to the alternative mandate of referring the person seeking
reproductive health care and services to another health facility which is conveniently accessible. Thus, while
private health facilities run by conscientious objectors have no duty to render the reproductive health care
and services required under the RH Law, such facilities are mandated to refer the patient to another health
facility which will perform the said services. This same obligation to refer to another health care provider is
found in Section 23 (a)(3), which imposes criminal sanctions on any private or public health care provider
which refuses to extend quality health care services and information to a person seeking reproductive health
service and information.
Petitioners claim that the RH Law does not truly respect the religious freedom of a conscientious objector
when it imposes upon the latter the duty to refer a person seeking reproductive health services to another
health care provider. The imposition of such duty to refer makes the referring objector complicit to the
methods and acts of the referred health care provider. Thus, petitioners assert that while the law does not
directly violate the religious freedom of the conscientious objector, there is still an indirect violation of
religious freedom.

For its part, the Government claims that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the RH Law does not violate
petitioners' religious freedom. Rather, the RH Law recognizes and accommodates a person's right to exercise
his or her religion. According to the Government, the mandate of Section 5, Article III of the 1987
Constitution is to protect and promote religious liberty; the freedom from any government compulsion to
adhere to a specific religion or to none at all. Congress, in enacting the RH Law, recognized and
acknowledged a person's right to his faith by expressly providing in Section 2 of the RH Law that the State
recognizes and guarantees the "right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions", particularly, the "right or spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood". Moreover, Section 3, which lays down the guiding
principles for the implementation of the RH Law, expressly provides in its paragraph (h) that the "State shall
respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments." Clearly, therefore, the RH Law was crafted within the context that each person
has a religious belief deserving of recognition and respect. The general direction of the RH Law therefore is to
accommodate. This principle of religious tolerance and acceptance is concretized in its Sections 7 and
23.35 According to the Government:

Based on Section 7, a private health facility owned and operated by a religious group has the option to
provide the full range of modern family planning methods. However, if due to its religious convictions it shall
opt not to do so, it is duty bound to immediately refer the person seeking such care to a conveniently
accessible health facility which is capable of doing so.

Section 23 (a)(3) similarly affords a health care provider the right to refuse to treat a person due to his
religious convictions, on the condition that he must also refer the person to another health care provider
who is capable and willing to extend the service.

The RH Law excludes from its coverage private health facilities owned and operated by religious groups and
health care providers, who have objections based on their religious convictions. The exemption provides that
these private health facilities and health care providers cannot be compelled or coerced to provide
reproductive health services when such would be in conflict with their religious beliefs.

Having the choice is the essence of religious liberty. Since these private health facilities and health care
providers are not compelled to disobey their religious beliefs, their freedom of religion is not offended.36

The Government further explains that the requirement to immediately refer a person to another health
facility and health care provider docs not offend religious freedom. Section 5, Article III of the 1987
Constitution is a protection against dogmatic compulsion and not a shield against civic obligations. Sections 7
and 23 (a)(3) of the RH Law generally allow private health facilities and health care providers to ref use, based
on religious grounds, to extend services and in formation to persons requesting for such. This "opt-out
clause" is the Government's accommodation to the religious beliefs of these private health facilities and
health care providers. There is therefore no burden on their religious freedom and the "opt-out clause" does
not offend the objector's religious freedom.37
For the Government, religious liberty is the freedom from coercion by the State to adhere either to a specific
religion or to none at all. The act of referring a person to another health facility or health care provider is not
a compulsion for the religious private health facility and health care provider either to violate their religious
beliefs or to accept another's beliefs. Moreover, the accommodation afforded by the State to religion is not a
shield against civic obligations, but must be balanced with another's right to health and information. That is
the very purpose of the proviso that a religious private health facility or a health care provider who has a
conscientious objection must nonetheless refer the patient to another non-objccting facility and health care
provider.38

The position of petitioners is correct.

Estrada v. Escritor39 established the test to be used in deciding cases involving freedom of religion:

x x x in resolving claims involving religious freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion clauses in our
Constitution; and (2) in deciding a plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause .... it is the compelling
state interest test the strictest test, which must be applied.

In addressing the constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom of the people, the Stale should adopt an
attitude or benevolent neutrality or accommodation. And on the matter of carving an exemption to the free
exercise aspect of religious freedom, a compelling state interest must be shown and the least restrictive
approach should be taken.

The Government essentially agrees with petitioners that the duty to refer is a condition imposed on
conscientious objectors or those, who on the basis of their religious beliefs, are exempted from the legal
obligations to provide a full range of modern family planning methods under Section 7. They are required to
immediately refer a person seeking reproductive health care and services to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible under Section 23 (a)(3) of the RH
Law. The contending parties, however, disagree on the implications of such duty to refer as a condition on a
conscientious objector's right to free exercise of religion. Petitioners posit that such a condition is
unconstitutional for being an undue burden on their right to freely exercise their religious beliefs, while the
Government maintains that it is a constitutionally valid limitation on the religious freedom of religious
objectors.

I join the majority in upholding the petitioners' position.

The duty to refer as a condition on conscientious objection is a restriction of a conscientious objector's

freedom to exercise his or her religious beliefs. While a conscientious objector is allowed, on grounds of
religious freedom, to be exempted from the legal obligations imposed under Sections 7 and 23 (a)(3) of the
RH Law, he or she is nonetheless imposed a substitute duty, that of referral of a person seeking reproductive
health care and services to another health care service provider who may be willing and able to provide a full
range of modern family planning methods or reproductive health care services.

Estrada v. Escritor, in recognition of freedom of religion as a preferred right, observed the standard of strict
scrutiny and required a showing by the Government of a compelling state interest to justify the curtailment
of the right to freely exercise one's religious beliefs. In these present cases, the Government failed to pass
strict scrutiny as it was not able to give any clear compelling state interest. Worse, as pointed out by the
ponencia of Justice Mendoza, during the oral arguments, the Government did not even see the need to show
a compelling state interest on the flimsy and off-tangent argument that the legal obligations imposed by the
law is "an ordinary health legislation" and not a "pure free exercise matter." Yet, by recognizing conscientious
objectors as constituting a class or group that is exempt from certain legal obligations under Sections 7 and
23 (a)(3), the RH Law itself acknowledges that the religious beliefs of conscientious objectors and their
constitutionally guaranteed right to the free exercise of such beliefs are entitled to respect and protection.
This recognition afforded by the RH Law to conscientious objectors is irreconcilable with the Government's
position that the imposition of the substitute duty to refer is outside the protection afforded to free exercise.
It also contradicts the Government's stance that the compelling interest test should not be applied because
the accommodation given by the RH Law to conscientious objectors is justified by the standard of the
balancing of the freedom of religion of conscientious objectors with the interests of patients to health and
information.

The guarantee of free exercise of religion proscribes the imposition of substantial burden upon the said right
absent any compelling state interest to justify the same. A governmental restriction substantially burdens
religious freedom when it bans behavior that the objectors sec as religiously compelled, or mandates
behavior that the objectors see as religiously prohibited.40 Requiring people to do something that "is
forbidden by [their] faith" qualifies as a substantial burden on religious practice.41 "While the compulsion may
be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial" and that is so even where the
relevant "conduct proscribed by a religious faith" is indirect complicity in other conduct, and the complicity
line that the religious claimant draws appears inconsistent or unsound to the reviewing court because "[i]t is
not for [secular courts] to say that the line [the claimant] drew was an unreasonable one."42 Thus, the law
recognizes that requiring a person to do something that he or she sincerely sees as sinful is a "substantial
burden" on his/her religion, and people's definition of "sinful" often includes sins of complicity and not just
sins of direct action.43

Viewed under the lens of the above substantial burden standard, the substitute duty to refer imposed on
conscientious objectors under Sections 7 and 23 (a)(3) is a substantial burden on a conscientious objector's
right to the free exercise of religious beliefs as it mandates behavior that the objectors see as religiously
prohibited even if done indirectly through complicity and not directly or personally. It places conscientious
objectors in an unconscionable dilemma - either to violate the law or to violate their faith. Therefore, the
substitute duty to refer under the said provisions of the RH Law violates the right to free exercise of religion
of conscientious objectors. In the matter of free exercise of religion, what cannot be compelled to be done
directly may also not be compelled to be done indirectly.

Religious or moral diversity in the health care profession is a public good. Preserving religious and moral
diversity within the health care profession helps to guard against the tragic ethical mi stakes that occur when
dissent is silenced.44 This is true as regards the free exercise of religion. This is also true as rega rd s the
freedom of speech of medical practitioners.
 GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA VS ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU
(I tried my best guys huhu pdf kasi yung full text nito tapos hindi talaga maconvert sa word docu kaya
ganito na lang ginawa ko)

FACTS:

ISSUE: W/N BT Talong field trials has violated the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology

HELD: Yes
Greenpeace Austria Ltd. V Redbank Power Co. Pty. Amd Singleton Council
(di ko mahanap full text nito. Meron sa book explanation page 666 )

CASE STUDY: HERNANDEZ VS NPC

PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO J.,
CAVEAT: CAN ALSO BE FOUND ON THE BOOK PP. 667

NAPOCOR began the construction of 29 decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to
support overhead high tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power
Transmission Project. Said transmission line passes through the Sergio Osmen a, Sr. Highway (South
Superhighway), the perimeter of Fort Bonifacio, and Dasmarin as Village proximate to Tamarind Road, where
petitioners homes are.
Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured the internet on the possible adverse
effects that such a structure could cause to their health and well-being. Petitioners got hold of published articles
and studies linking the incidence of a fecund of illnesses to exposure to electromagnetic fields. These illnesses
range from cancer to leukemia.

Thus, petitioners, on 9 March 2000 filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. Harping on the hazardous effects
of exposure to electromagnetic radiation to the health and safety to themselves and their families, petitioners,
through the instant case, sought what they had failed to achieve through amicable means with NAPOCOR and
prayed, inter alia, for damages and the relocation of the transmission lines to Lawton Avenue, Fort Bonifacio.

RTC DECISION: temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing and transmitting high voltage electric
current through the said project for 48 hrs.

NOTE: the trial court extended the restraining order for 18 more days.
CAS DECISION: REVERSED RTCS RULING

PETITIONERS CONTENTION: petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary injunction on the ground that
the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill consciousness among
them.

Petitioners adduced in evidence copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses such as cancer and leukemia
to exposure to electromagnetic fields. The records bear out, to boot, a copy of a brochure of NAPOCOR regarding
its Quezon Power Project from which will be supplying NAPOCOR with the power which will pass through the
towers subject of the controversy. The NAPOCOR brochure provides that because of the danger concomitant
with high voltage power, Philippine laws mandate that the power lines should be located within safe distances
from residences.

ISSUE:
WON there is a violation of petitioners constitutionally protected right to health that grants the issuance of
preliminary injunction

HELD:
YES. The court granted preliminary injunction holding that there is ample indicia to suggest to the mind of the
court that the health concerns of the petitioners are, at the very least, far from imaginary. (through Justice
Chico-Nazario)

True, the issue of whether or not the transmission lines are safe is essentially evidentiary in nature, and
pertains to the very merits of the action below. In fact, petitioners recognize that the conclusiveness of their
life, health and safety concerns still needs to be proved in the main case below and they are prepared to do so
especially in the light of some studies cited by respondent that yield contrary results in a disputed subject.
Despite the parties conflicting results of studies made on the issue, the possibility that the exposure to
electromagnetic radiation causes cancer and other disorders is still, indeed, within the realm of scientific scale
of probability.

Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires conference with the affected communities of a government
project. NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement. In fact, there appears a lack of exhaustive
feasibility studies on NAPOCORs part before making a go with the project on hand; otherwise, it should have
anticipated the legal labyrinth it is now caught in.

These are facts, which the trial court could not ignore, and form as sufficient basis to engender the cloud of
doubt that the NAPOCOR project could, indeed, endanger the lives of the petitioners. A preliminary injunction
is likewise justified prior to a final determination of the issues of whether or not NAPOCOR ignored safety and
consultation requirements in the questioned project. Indeed, the court could, nay should, grant the writ of
preliminary injunction if the purpose of the other party is to shield a wrongdoing. A ruling to the contrary would
amount to an erosion of judicial discretion.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do not require that the act complained of
be in violation of the rights of the applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of Court, probability is enough basis for
injunction to issue as a provisional remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one needs
to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction.

In hindsight, if, after trial, it turns out that the health-related fears that petitioners cleave on to have adequate
confirmation in fact and in law, the questioned project of NAPOCOR then suffers from a paucity of purpose, no
matter how noble the purpose may be. For what use will modernization serve if it proves to be a scourge on an
individuals fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but, ostensibly, to life preservation itself, in all of
its desired quality?

NOTE: copy-paste lang to sa book ni justice. Eto daw kasi relation netong case sa precautionary principle

Hernandez was decided in 2006, or four years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases in 2010. Yet, the case clearly expresses an implicit ethical and social responsibility to protect the public
from exposure to harm even if the act complained of (exposure to electromagnetic radiation causes cancer and
other disorders), is still to be proved, but is nevertheless within the realm of scientific probability. The decision
of the Court inclines closely to precautionary principle which stipulates that if an action or policy suspected
risk of causing harm to the public or to the environment, in the absence of scientific consensus that the action
or policy is harmful, the burden of proof that it is not harmful falls on those taking the action. Interestingly, the
Court expostulated that, whether or not the transmission lines are safe is essentially evidentiary in nature, the
health concerns of the petitioners are, at the very least, far from imaginary.

MOSQUEDA vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION et al

G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.:
Doctrine: The Precautionary Principle still requires scientific basis
FACTS:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely: Davao
Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition
in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs
through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that
the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to
Section 511 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

Contention of respondents:
The respondents lament that the ban was imposed without any scientific basis; that the report prepared
by a fact-finding team (composed of the Vice Mayor, the City Health Officer, The City Planning and Development
Coordinator and the Assistance City Planning and Development Coordinator) organized by the City of Davao
revealed that there was no scientific evidence to support the clamor for the ban against aerial spraying; that
furthermore, national government agencies like the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Health
(DOR) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) similarly concluded that there was no scientific
evidence to support the ban;60 that for four decades since the adoption of aerial spraying, there has been no
reported outbreak or any predisposition to ailment connected with the pesticides applied; that the testimonies
of the residents during the trial were mere "emotional anecdotal evidence" that did not establish any scientific
or medical bases of any causal connection between the alleged health conditions complained of and the
fungicides applied during aerial spraying;61 that the allegations of health and environmental harm brought by
the pesticides used to treat the banana plantations were unfounded; that the 2001 study of the International
Agency for Research on Cancer showed that, contrary to the claim of Dra. Panganiban, the by-product of
Mancozeb (Ethylenethiourea or ETU) was "non-genotoxic" and not expected to produce thyroid cancer; 62 that
Carlos Mendoza, a geo-hydrologist and geophysicist, testified that underground water contamination through
aerial spraying would be impossible because of the presence of latex, thick layers of clay and underlying rock
formations;63 that even the study conducted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) showed that the
rhinoceros beetle infestation in coconut plantations adjacent to the banana plantations was due to the farmer's
failure to observe phyto-sanitary measures, not to aerial spraying;64 that furthermore, aerial spraying is
internationally accepted as a "Good Agricultural Practice" (GAP)65 under the International Code of Conduct on
the Distribution and Use of Pesticides by the United Nations-Food and Agricultural Organization (UN-FAO);
that as such, they observe the standards laid down by the UN-FAO, and utilize aerial spraying equipment that
will ensure accuracy, safety and efficiency in applying the substances, and which more than complies with the
requirement under the Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001); 66 that in
addition, they strictly observe standard operating procedures prior to take-off,67 in-flight68 and post-
flight;69 that they substantially invested in state-of-the-art technology and equipment designed to ensure
safety, accuracy, and effectiveness of aerial spraying operations, to avoid aerial drift; 70 that their equipment
include: wind meters (to measure the wind velocity in a specific area), wind cones (to determine the wind
direction, and whether the wind is a headwind, tailwind or a crosswind); central weather station (to measure
wind speed, the temperature and relative humidity), Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS),71 Intellimap,72 Control and Display Unit,73 Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU 5000 Low-
Drift model),74 Intelliflow Spray Valve System,75 and Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System; 76 and that they
want to minimize, if not, eliminate the occurrence of spray drift in order to minimize wastage of resources and
reduced efficiency of spraying programs implemented to control the Black Sigatoka disease

RTC: Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional

CA reversed judgment of RTC

The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in
imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a
3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring
the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
RULING:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City

enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
under its corporate powers

The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground that the Sangguniang Bayan
of Davao City has disregarded the health of the plantation workers, contending that by imposing the ban against
aerial spraying the ordinance would place the plantation workers at a higher health risk because the
alternatives of either manual or truck-boom spraying method would be adopted; and that exposing the workers
to the same risk sought to be prevented by the ordinance would defeat its purported purpose.

We disagree with the respondents.

With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation workers are secured by
existing state policies, rules and regulations implemented by the FPA, among others, which the respondents
are lawfully bound to comply with. The respondents even manifested their strict compliance with these rules,
including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001).
We should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the pesticide applicators to observe the standards
provided therein to ensure the health and safety of plantation workers. As such, there cannot be any imbalance
between the right to health of the residents vis-a-vis the workers even if a ban will be imposed against aerial
spraying and the consequent adoption of other modes of pesticide treatment.

Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are privileges that do
not only advance the interests of a group of individuals. The benefits of protecting human health and the
environment transcend geographical locations and even generations. This is the essence of Sections 15 and 16,
Article II of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.107 we declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is
under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.

Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically the
health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of
Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates
authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.

By distinguishing authority from method we face this question: Is a prohibition against aerial spraying a
lawfully permissible method that the local government unit of Davao City may adopt to prevent the purported
effects of aerial drift? To resolve this question, the Court must dig deeper into the intricate issues arising from
these petitions.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and oppressive in that
it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. They allege that three months
will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of
efficient means to combat the Black Sigatoka disease.

We find for the respondents.

The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months can
readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources required
therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other modes of
spraying within three months in view of the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion.

This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 an invalid provision because the compulsion
thereunder to abandon aerial spraying within an impracticable period of "three (3) months after the effectivity
of this Ordinance" is "unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with."

VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes
inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the
ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of
pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring
about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment.141 A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
achieve.142 In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not
include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. 143 A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative
end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.144
The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift cannot likewise be sustained in view of the petitioners'
failure to substantiate the same. The respondents have refuted this claim, and have maintained that on the
contrary, manual spraying produces more drift than aerial treatment 145 As such, the decision of prohibiting
only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness.

Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be "overinclusive" because
its .impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the legislative
purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those
included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law. 146

It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the
substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents
admit that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances.
The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of the
agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the
purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to
address. The burden now will become more onerous to various entities including the respondents and even
others with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the ordinance.

The Precautionary Principle still requires scientific basis

The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the merits of the ordinance based on the
precautionary principle. They argue that under the precautionary principle, the City of Davao is justified in
enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order to prevent harm to the environment and human health despite the
lack of scientific certainty.

The petitioners' plea and argument cannot be sustained.

The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In the 1980s, the Federal
Republic of Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip ("foresight principle") to justify the implementation of vigorous
policies to tackle acid rain, global warming and pollution of the North Sea. 154 It has since emerged from a need
to protect humans and the environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but
possibly catastrophic risks such as those associated with Genetically Modified Organisms and climate
change,155 among others. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this principle, as follows:

In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty
in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect. 156 In such an event, the courts
may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment.157

It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three
elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In
situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and environmental
damage can be established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not
precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if there is no indication
of a threat of environmental harm; or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. 158

We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific study. Although the
precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection between the serious
or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still premised on empirical studies. Scientific
analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy choices under the precautionary principle. 159

Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific stage is
often considered synonympus with risk assessment.160 As such, resort to the principle shall not be based on
anxiety or emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based in ethics. 161 As much as possible, a complete and
objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should be conducted and made available
to decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of action. 162Furthermore, the positive and
negative effects of an activity is also important in the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting
from certain activities should always be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer, while the positive
and negative effects of potential precautionary measures should be considered. 163

The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary Report on the
Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.164 Yet, the fact-
finding team that generated the report was not a scientific study that could justify the resort to
the .precautionary principle. In fact, the Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the fact-
finding team that recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying. The recommendation was
in line with the advocacy of judicious handling and application of chemical pesticides by the DOH-Center for
Health Development in the Davao Region in view of the scarcity of scientific studies to support the ban against
aerial spraying.165

We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing
is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the residents within
and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of the environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume
that the effects of aerial spraying would be adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of
scientific data supporting a ban on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for being
unreasonable.

ADDITIONAL CASES

EFREN R. LEYNES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

PONENTE: PEREZ, J.

FACTS

An Information for violation of Section 94, R.A. No. 8550 otherwise known as the "Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998" was filed against petitioner Efren R. Leynes, Alan Leynes, and Javier
Leynes (collectively hereinafter referred to as "defendants") for cutting mangrove trees and
for excavating, constructing a dike, and installing an outlet (prinsa) in the mangrove forest
without a fishpond lease agreement.
During arraignment, petitioner Efren and Alan entered a plea of not guilty. While their co-
accused, Javier, remained at large. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

The defendants denied the charge against them. The defendants contend that they cannot be
convicted for improving and rehabilitating the mangrove forest because the act punishable
under Section 94 of R.A. No. 8550 is "conversion. According to defendants, the construction
of dikes and installation of an outlet (prinsa) do not amount to conversion, but a
rehabilitation and improvement of the mangrove forest. Moreover, prior to Efren's
introduction of improvements in the mangrove forest, it was already a fishpond since; 1970.
In fact, he was able to work in the aforesaid fishpond as a young man when it was still owned
by his grandfather Emilio Leynes, who has a tax declaration issued in his name, showing
ownership over the subject mangrove area.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted petitioner Efren. However, the RTC dismissed the
charge against Alan for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy between him and Efren
and/or participation in the commission of the offense.

On the other hand, the case against Javier was archived while he is still at large. The RTC
resolved that the fact that Efren's grandfather was issued a tax declaration does not justify
his continued possession and introduction of improvements. Besides, the issuance of a tax
declaration of a land not classified as alienable and disposable is a criminal act under Section
75 of P.D. No. 705.

On appeal, the CA affirmed Efren's conviction. The CA considered Efren's Letter of Appeal,
where he admitted to the destruction of the mangrove area, as a judicial admission.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was a conversion of the mangrove forest into a fishpond.

RULING
As stated, the law punishes "conversion" of mangrove forest into fishponds or for any other
purposes. Efren argues that he cannot be convicted of the offense because his act of
introducing improvements and rehabilitating the mangrove forest area do not amount to
conversion. Also, when he improved and rehabilitated the same, it was already a fishpond

Efren's contention must fail.

In any case, what the law prohibits is not only the conversion of the mangrove forest into
fishponds, but its conversion into any other purpose. Indeed, Efren may not have caused the
conversion of the mangrove forest into a fishpond, but his acts of cutting mangrove trees,
constructing a dike, installing an outlet (prinsa), and excavating in the mangrove forest
altered the natural structure and form of the mangrove forestan act punishable by Sec. 94
of R.A. No. 8550

As regards Efren's defense that the mangrove forest area is covered by a tax declaration, we
reiterate the findings of the lower court that the issuance of a tax declaration does not justify
Efren's continued possession and introduction of improvements. In fact, pursuant to Section
75 of P.D. No. 705,7 the issuance of a tax declaration of a land not classified as alienable and
disposable is a criminal act. The tax declaration issued in his favor cannot act as a shield from
criminal liability.

In any case, as correctly held by the lower court, Efren is estopped from claiming that he did
not convert the mangrove forest area. In his Letter of Appeal, Efren admitted that "he caused
the cutting of number of trees inside the old fishpond", which is deemed as a judicial
admission. A judicial admission, verbal or written, is made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case which does not require proof.8 To contradict one's own
admission, the person who made the same must show that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the
party making the admissions. In the case at bar, no denial was made on the part of Efren that
he cut a number of trees in the mangrove forest

Thus, Efren's judicial admission, in addition to the aforementioned grounds, is a sufficient

ground to sustain a conviction
It is high time, therefore, and to avoid confusion, that mangrove forests do not consists of the
typical mangrove trees only. As defined, mangroves are "a community of intertidal plants
including all species of trees, shrubs, vines and herbs found on coasts, swamps, or border of
swamps."12 Contrary to Efren's belief, "the word 'mangroves' refers to a group of plants
which may actually belong to several families (species that distinctly belong to their own
evolutionary group)."13 By cutting a tree in the mangrove forest, regardless of its species,
Efren caused conversion of the same.

Palawan Council for sustainable development vs Lim

Facts:

Petitioners were the public officials tasked with duty of executing and implementing A.O. No. 00-05 and
the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order, while the PCSD was the government agency responsible
for the governance, implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for
Pala wan. Respondent was the operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name and
style Bonanza Air Services. His business operation was primarily that of transporting live fish from
Palawan to fish traders.3

The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002 to ordain that the transport of live fish from
Palawan would be allowed only through traders and carriers who had sought and secured accreditation
from the PCSD. The respondent asserted that he had continued his trade without securing the PCSD-
required accreditation; that the PCSD Chairman had started harassing his clients by issuing
Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2002, which contained a penal clause imposing sanctions on the
availment of transfer services by unaccredited aircraft carriers such as cancellation of the PCSD
accreditation and perpetual disqualification from engaging in live fish trading in Palawan..

The respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA, which issued a temporary restraining order
(TRO). The petitioners countered that the petition for prohibition should have been dismissed because
A.O. No. 00-05 was in accord with the mandate of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7611

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in declaring A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolution No. 03-211;
and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order null and void for having been issued in excess of the
PCSD's authority.

Ruling: YES

To accord with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, therefore, the petition for prohibition should have
been originally brought in the proper Regional Trial Court as a petition for declaratory relief. We also
need to remind that a petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an administrative order
issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function.

Towards this end, the PCSD was established as the administrative machinery for the SEP' s
implementation. The creation of the PCSD has been set forth in Section 16 ofR.A. No. 7611. Accordingly,
the PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how to carry out the objectives of R.A. No.
7611 in protecting and enhancing Palawan's natural resources consistent with the SEP. In that task, the
PCSD could establish a methodology for the effective implementation of the SEP. Moreover, the PCSD
was expressly given the authority to impose penalties and sanctions in relation to the implementation of
the SEP and the other provisions of R.A. No. 7611. As such, the PCSD's issuance of A.O. No. 00-95 and
Resolution No. 03-211 was well within its statutory authority.

League of Provinces vs DENR (peralta)

FACTS:
Golden Falcon filed with the DENR an Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement in Bulacan.
Their subsequent applications and appeals were later denied by the DENR.

While Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and
Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application for Exploration
Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement.
Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board PMRB,
endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid Applications for
Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit of Eduardo
D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).
August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in favor of Eduardo
D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez
AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits
August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision14 in favor of AMTC. the Small-Scale Mining
Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary
declared that AMTC filed its Application for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other mining
applicants; thus, AMTCs Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that
the questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond
the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was never
proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional
for providing for executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
(2) Whether or not, the act of respondent in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-scale mining permits
amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD:
(1) No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits
issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the
implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the
duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's
natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the
supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by
the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies. The Court has clarified
that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of
the small-scale mining law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision,
control and review of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it
bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to
be valid. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however,
may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.
(2) No. The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power
of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of
R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The decision of the DENR Secretary,
declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and
canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
DENR Secretary's power to review and decide the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining
Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves
the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective
rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This
quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial
Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

APEX MINING CO., INC. VS SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. (2006)
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO J.,

FACTS:
The case involves the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area (Diwalwal), a rich tract of mineral land located inside the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve in Davao del Norte and Davao Oriental. Since the early 1980s, Diwalwal
has been stormed by conflicts brought about by numerous mining claims over it.

On March 10, 1986, Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) was granted an Exploration Permit (EP 133) by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMG). A long battle ensued between Apex and MMC with the latter seeking
the cancellation of the mining claims of Apex on the ground that such mining claims were within a forest
reservation (Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve) and thus the acquisition on mining rights should have
been through an application for a permit to prospect with the BFD and not through registration of a DOL with
the BMG.

When it reached the SC in 1991, the Court ruled against Apex holding that the area is a forest reserve and thus
it should have applied for a permit to prospect with the BFD.

On February 16 1994, MMC assigned all its rights to EP 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation
(SEM), a domestic corporation which is alleged to be a 100%-owned subsidiary of MMC. Subsequently, BMG
registered SEMs Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) application and the Deed of Assignment.
Several oppositions were filed. The Panel of Arbitrators created by the DENR upheld the validity of EP 133.

During the pendency of the case, DENR AO No. 2002-18 was issued declaring an
emergency situation in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area and ordering the stoppage of all mining
operations therein.

ISSUES:
1. WON EP 133 and its subsequent transfer to SEM is valid
2. WON the DENR Secretary has authority to issue DAO 66 declaring 729 hectares of the areas covered
by the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve as non-forest lands and open to small scale mining
purposes.
3. Who (among petitioners Apex and Balite) has priority right over Diwalwal?

HELD:
1. INVALID. One of the terms and conditions of EP 133 is: That this permit shall be for the exclusive use
and benefit of the permittee or his duly authorized agents and shall be used for mineral exploration
purposes only and for no other purpose. While it may be true that SEM is a100% subsidiary
corporation of MMC, there is no showing that the former is the duly authorized agent of the latter. As
such, the assignment is null and void as it directly contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant
of EP 133.
a. The Deed of Assignment was a total abdication of MMCs rights over the permit. It is not a mere
grant of authority to SEM as agent.
b. Reason for the stipulation. Exploration permits are strictly granted to entities or individuals possessing
the resources and capability to undertake mining operations. Without such a condition, non-qualified
entities or individuals could circumvent the strict requirements under the law by the simple
expediency of acquiring the permit from the original permittee.

c. Separate personality. The fact that SEM is a 100% subsidiary of MMC does not automatically make it
an agent of MMC. A corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Absent any clear proof to the contrary, SEM is a separate and distinct entity from MMC.

d. Doctrine of piercing the corporate veil inapplicable. Only in cases where the corporate fiction was used
as a shield for fraud, illegality or inequity may the veil be pierced and removed. The doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil cannot therefore be used as a vehicle to commit prohibited acts. The assignment of
the permit in favor of SEM is utilized to circumvent the condition of nontransferability of the
exploration permit. To allow SEM to avail itself of this doctrine and to approve the validity of the
assignment is tantamount to sanctioning an illegal act which is what the doctrine precisely seeks to
forestall.

e. PD 463 requires approval of Secretary of DENR. Also, PD 463 (Mineral Resources Development
Decree), which is the governing law when the assignment was executed, explicitly requires that the
transfer or assignment of mining rights, including the right to explore a mining area, must be with the
prior approval of the Secretary of DENR. Such is not present in this case.

f. EP 133 expired by non-renewal. Although EP 133 was extended for 12 months until July 6, 1994, MMC
never renewed its permit prior and after its expiration. With the expiration of EP 133 on July 6, 1994,
MMC lost any right to the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. SEM, on the other hand, has not acquired any right
to the said area because the transfer of EP 133 in its favor is invalid. Hence, both MMC and SEM have
not acquired any vested right over the area covered by EP 133.

2. NO. The DENR Secretary has no power to convert forest reserves into non-forest reserves. Such power
is vested with the President. The DENR Secretary may only recommend to the President which forest
 reservations are to be withdrawn from the coverage thereof. Thus, DAO No. 66 is null and void for
having been issued in excess of the DENR Secretarys authority.

3. (Since its been held that neither MMC nor SEM has any right over Diwalwal, it is thus necessary to
make a determination of the existing right of the remaining claimants, petitioners Apex and Balite, in
the dispute.) The issue on who has priority right over Diwalwal is deemed overtaken by the issuance
of Proclamation 297 and DAO No. 2002-18, both being constitutionally-sanctioned acts of the
Executive Branch. Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within
the full control of the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to Sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can
either:
(1) directly undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the area or
(2) opt to award mining operations in the mineral reservation to private entities including petitioners Apex
and Balite, if it wishes. The exercise of this prerogative lies with the Executive Department over which courts
will not interfere.

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE
G.R. No. 135190 April 3, 2002
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve
known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.", the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80's due
to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over
4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area. Marcopper's acquisition of mining
rights over Diwalwal under its EP No. 133 was subsequently challenged before this Court in "Apex Mining Co.,
Inc., et al. v. Hon. Cancio C. Garcia, et al.," 2 where Marcopper's claim was sustained over that of another mining
firm, Apex Mining Corporation (Apex). The Court found that Apex did not comply with the procedural requisites
for acquiring mining rights within forest reserves.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act.
DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring 729
hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining.
Subsequently, a petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive Director, docketed
as RED Mines Case No. 8-8-94 entitled, "Rosendo Villaflor, et al. v. Marcopper Mining Corporation."
while the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM),8 which in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land
covered by the permit.
In due time, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office accepted and registered the integrated MPSA
application of petitioner.
After publication of the application, many mining corporations/cooperative filed their oppositions
In the meantime, Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, was enacted. Pursuant to this statute,
the above-enumerated MAC cases were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve
disputes involving conflicting mining rights. The RPA subsequently took cognizance of the RED Mines case,
which was consolidated with the MAC cases.
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao passed Resolution authorizing the issuance of ore transport
permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages before RTC against the DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao. SEM alleged
that the illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000.00 worth of gold ore per
truckload from SEM's mining claim.
Meanwhile, RPA resolved the Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an Omnibus Resolution as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the validity of Exploration Permit No. 133 is hereby
reiterated and all the adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are DISMISSED. 9
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-0310 which provided, among others,
that:
1. The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying
and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both,
with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the
declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area;
such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said
parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of
royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations,
as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director
of the Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x x11
petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals
against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which
represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order
No. 97-03 on the ground that the "direct state utilization" espoused therein would effectively impair its vested
rights under EP No. 133; that the DENR Secretary unduly usurped and interfered with the jurisdiction of the
RPA which had dismissed all adverse claims against SEM in the Consolidated Mines cases; and that the
memorandum order arbitrarily imposed the unwarranted condition that certain studies be conducted before
mining and environmental laws are enforced by the DENR.
Meanwhile, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines cases: reversed RPA
CA: DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was
merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for solving the
Diwalwal conflict.
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER
petitioner insists that CA erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the
"direct state utilization scheme" in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. On the contrary, petitioner submits, said
memorandum order dictated the said recourse and, in effect, granted management or operating agreements as
well as provided for profit sharing arrangements to illegal small-scale miners.
According to petitioner, MO 97-03 was issued to preempt the resolution of the Consolidated Mines cases. The
"direct state utilization scheme" espoused in the challenged memorandum is nothing but a legal shortcut,
designed to divest petitioner of its vested right to the gold rush area under its EP No. 133.
RULING:
We are not persuaded.
We agree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt "direct
state utilization" as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate
that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioner's contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to
small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned
to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
With respect to the alleged "vested rights" claimed by petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably
based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. A reading of
the appealed MAB decision reveals that the continued efficacy of EP No. 133 is one of the issues raised in said
cases, with respondents therein asserting that Marcopper cannot legally assign the permit which purportedly
had expired. In other words, whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under
EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter. And until a positive pronouncement is made by the
appellate court in the Consolidated Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a source of any conclusive
rights that can be impaired by the issuance of MO 97-03.
Similarly, there is no merit in petitioner's assertion that MO 97-03 sanctions violation of mining laws by
allowing illegal miners to enter into mining agreements with the State. Again, whether or not respondent BCMC
and the other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a factual matter that has
yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated Mines cases. We cannot rightfully conclude at this point that
respondent BCMC and the other mining firms are illegitimate mining operators. Otherwise, we would be
preempting the resolution of the cases which are still pending before the Court of Appeals. 19
Petitioner's reliance on the Apex Mining case to justify its rights under E.P. No. 133 is misplaced. For one, the
said case was litigated solely between Marcopper and Apex Mining Corporation and cannot thus be deemed
binding and conclusive on respondent BCMC and the other mining entities presently involved. While petitioner
may be regarded as Marcopper's successor to EP No. 133 and therefore bound by the judgment rendered in
the Apex Mining case, the same cannot be said of respondent BCMC and the other oppositor mining firms, who
were not impleaded as parties therein.
Neither can the Apex Mining case foreclose any question pertaining to the continuing validity of EP No. 133 on
grounds which arose after the judgment in said case was promulgated. While it is true that the Apex Mining case
settled the issue of who between Apex and Marcopper validly acquired mining rights over the disputed area by
availing of the proper procedural requisites mandated by law, it certainly did not deal with the question raised
by the oppositors in the Consolidated Mines cases, i.e. whether EP No. 133 had already expired and remained
valid subsequent to its transfer by Marcopper to petitioner. Besides, as clarified in our decision in the Apex
Mining case:
x x x is conclusive only between the parties with respect to the particular issue herein raised and under
the set of circumstances herein prevailing. In no case should the decision be considered as a precedent
to resolve or settle claims of persons/entities not parties hereto. Neither is it intended to unsettle
rights of persons/entities which have been acquired or which may have accrued upon reliance on laws
passed by appropriate agencies.20
Clearly then, the Apex Mining case did not invest petitioner with any definite right to the Diwalwal mines which
it could now set up against respondent BCMC and the other mining groups.
Incidentally, it must likewise be pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioner's rights under
EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
decision, EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified or
rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since the exploration, development and
utilization of the country's natural mineral resources are matters impressed with great public interest. Like
timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right
within the purview of the non-impairment of contract and due process clauses of the Constitution, 21 since the
State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify or amend the same, in accordance with the
demands of the general welfare.22
Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an alternative which the State,
through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place.
the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the exploration, development
and utilization of the country's natural mineral resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by
entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR Secretary acted within his authority when he
ordered a study of the first option, which may be undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional
policy enunciated above. Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the
mines, if it is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As
implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for this option, as
well as its material and logistic feasibility.
In this regard, petitioner's imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR Secretary when the latter
issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. The avowed rationale of the memorandum order is clearly and plainly
stated in its "whereas" clauses. In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR Secretary violated the
law or abused his discretion, as in this case, he is presumed to have regularly issued the memorandum with a
lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions.
Given these considerations, petitioner's first assigned error is baseless and premised on tentative assumptions.
Petitioner cannot claim any absolute right to the Diwalwal mines pending resolution of the Consolidated Mines
cases, much less ask us to assume, at this point, that respondent BCMC and the other mining firms are illegal
miners. These factual issues are to be properly threshed out in CA G.R. SP Nos. 61215 and 61216, which have
yet to be decided by the Court of Appeals. Any objection raised against MO 97-03 is likewise premature at this
point, inasmuch as it merely ordered a study of an option which the State is authorized by law to undertake.
We see no need to rule on the matter of the OTPs, considering that the grounds invoked by petitioner for
invalidating the same are inextricably linked to the issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases.

APEX MINING CO. V. GARCIA (Paras, J.)

FACTS:

1. The controversy in this case involves conflicting mining claims between herein petitioners Apex
Mining Co., Inc., et al. (Apex for short) and private respondent Marcopper Mining Corporation (MARCOPPER
for short). The disputed area is inside a timberland area located at Moncayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao
Oriental, consisting of 4,941.0 hectares.

2. MARCOPPER was one of the first mining claimants in the disputed area, having registered its 16 claims
on January 19 and 20, 1984 through the filing of declarations of location pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
463, otherwise known as the Mineral Resources Development Decree. However, after knowing that said areas
covered by their mining claim is inside a forest reserve, they abandoned their mining claims and applied instead
for a prospecting permit in BFD. Discovering strong evidence of mineral deposits in the area, it applied for a
permit to explore with the then Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS). It was issued Permit to Explore;
however, upon verification from the records of the BMGS, Davao City Mineral District Office, it found that the
area covered by its Permit to Explore is also the subject of several claims/declarations of APEX.

3. MARCOPPER filed with the BMGS a "Petition for Cancellation of Mining Claims and/or Small Scale
Mining Permits" against APEX, alleging, among others and in substance, that the area covered by its Permit to
Explore No. 133 and the declarations of locations/mining claims belonging to APEX are within an established
and existing forest reservation.

4. APEX filed a Motion to Dismiss Marcopper's petition, alleging, in substance, that their mining claims
are not within any established or proclaimed forest reserve, and as such, the acquisition of mining rights
thereto must be undertaken through the registration of declaration of location with the BMGS and not through
the filing of an application for permit to prospect with the BFD; and that the permit to prospect and permit to
explore issued to MARCOPPER are inoperative and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: WON the registration of declaration of location filed by Apex is proper?

RULING: NO.

The disputed areas, being clearly within a forest reserve, are not open to mining location. Pursuant to P.D. No.
463, as amended, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves by initially applying for a permit to
prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development (BFD) and subsequently for a permit to explore with the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences (BMGS). Such procedural requisites were complied with and undertaken by
MARCOPPER after it had ascertained that its mining claims were found to be within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve. On the other hand, the mining claims and SSMPs of APEX being located within said forest
reserve are in violation of the law and therefore result in a failure to validly acquire mining rights.
 WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORP v FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORP, GR No. 194239,
June 16, 2015
Before the Court is the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed following the leak in the oil pipeline
owned by First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati City.
FACTS:
Respondent FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: ( 1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, which
covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in Manila and transports diesel,
gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline (BOPL) System which extends 105 kilometers and
transports bunker fuel from Batangas to a depot in Sucat, Paraaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of
the petroleum requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard safety allowance
against leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel that can withstand more than twice the
current operating pressure and are buried at a minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US
Department of Transportation standard of 0.9 meters. In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the
pipelines was suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell gas
within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium premises led to the
discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its inability to control the flow, West Tower's
management reported the matter to the Police Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city's Bureau
of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair. Eventually, the sump
pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati to prevent the discharge of contaminated
water into the drainage system of Barangay Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West
Tower to abandon their respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's power was shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of West Tower shouldered
the expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement, which eventually required the setting up of a
treatment plant in the area to separate fuel from the waste water. On October 28, 2010, the University of the
Philippines-National Institute of Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine
the source of the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower.
A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is the WOPL, which
was already closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing blame on the construction activities
on the roads surrounding West Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.) interposed the present
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the residents of West Tower and in representation
of the surrounding communities in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is
joined by the civil society and several people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and public
interest groups who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the environmental
issues involved.1
To bolster their petition, petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or failure to timely replace. its pipelines and
to observe extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in the City of Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the
continued use of the now 4 7-year old pipeline would not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and
property of those who live or sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also affect
the rights of the generations yet unborn to live in a balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed under Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a Temporary Environmental Protection
Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the members of their Boards of Directors to file their
respective verified returns. The TEPO enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL
until further orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-kilometer WOPL while
implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that may result from any leak of
the pipeline; and ( c) make a report thereon within 60 days from receipt thereof.
In compliance with the writ, FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier, Dennis Gamab and Willie Sarmiento
submitted a Joint Return3 praying for the dismissal of the petition and the denial of the privilege of the Writ of
Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation
that the environmental damage affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the
continued operation of the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply
to the public.
Respondents FPIC and its directors and officers, other than the aforementioned four ( 4) directors, also filed a
Verified Return4 claiming that not all requirements for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan are present and
there is no showing that West Tower Corp. was authorized by all those it claimed to represent. They further
averred that the petition contains no allegation that respondents FPIC directors and officers acted in such a
manner as to allow the piercing of the corporate veil.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 201-1, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and Officers filed a Joint
Compliance5 submitting the report required by the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither
own nor operate the pipelines, adding that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the
pipelines, much less to cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or
responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the Writ of Kalikasan/TEPO be
considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page "Report on Pipeline Integrity
Check and Preventive Maintenance Program."6 In gist, FPIC reported the following: (I) For the structural
integrity of the 117-kilometer pipeline, (a) the DOE engaged the services of UP-NIGS to do borehole testing on
81 pre-identified critical areas of the WQPL in eight cities and municipalities-all the boreholes showed negative
presence of petroleum vapors; (b) pressure tests were conducted after the repair of the leak and results showed
negative leaks and the DOE's pipeline expert, Societe General de Surveillance, New Zealand, has developed a
pressure test protocol requiring a 24-hour operation of running a scraper pig through the pipeline to eliminate
air gap; (c) In-Line Inspection Test, was conducted by NDT through MFL and ultrasonic. The NDT later cleared
the WOPL from any damage or corrosion.
On February 9, 2011, petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted, their Motion to Set the Case for
Preliminary Conference and Hearing7 pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
On April 15, 2011, the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the WOPL in the vicinity of West Tower to
determine the veracity of the claim that there were two (2) additional leaks on FPIC's pipeline. Results of the
ocular inspection belied the claim.
In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents arising from the same
incident or leakage from the WOPL.8
Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19, 2010, FPIC has ceased
operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011, however, the Court, answering a query of the
DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System
of FPIC; thus, FPIC can resume operation of its BOPL System.9
On July 7, 2011, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion10 assailing the Court's May 31, 2011 Resolution, praying
for the conduct of oral argument on the issue of reopening the BOPL System. This was followed, on September
9, 2011, by a Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion 11 wherein petitioners invoked
the precautionary principle12 and asserted that the possibility of a leak in the BOPL System leading to
catastrophic environmental damage is enough reason to order the closure of its operation. They likewise
alleged that the entities contracted by FPIC to clean and remediate the environment are illegally discharging
waste water, which had not undergone proper treatment, into the Paraaque River. Petitioners, thus, prayed
that respondents be directed to comply with environmental laws in rehabilitating the surroundings affected by
the oil leak and to submit a copy of their work plan and monthly reports on the progress thereof. To these
omnibus motions, respondents were directed to file their respective comments.
On September 28, 2011, respondent FPIC filed an Urgent Motion for Leave (To Undertake "Bangkal
Realignment" Project)13 in order to reduce stress on the WOPL System. FPIC sought to construct a new
realigned segment to replace the old pipe segment under the Magallanes Interchange, which covers the portion
that leaked. Petitioners were directed to file their comment on FPIC's motion.
The Court's Ruling
I.
Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
On the procedural aspect, We agree with the CA that petitioners who are affected residents of West Tower and
Barangay Bangkal have the requisite concern to be real parties-in-interest to pursue the instant petition.
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.39 Generally, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real parties-in-interest.40 In other words, the action must be brought by the person who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.41 Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.42
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit
owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee hours in the morning
of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and
residents of West Tower could still not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the
residents of West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its unit owners and
residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation
has limited powers under RA 4 726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, 43 it is empowered to pursue
actions in behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation .is the management body of
West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit owners or users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the filing of the petition
for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured
by the number of persons who signified their assent thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a
massive environmental disaster.
Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West Tower Corp. authorizing Manuel Dy
Chuaunsu, Jr. to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping is irrelevant. The records show
that petitioners submitted a notarized Secretary's Certificate44 attesting that the authority of Chuaunsu to
represent the condominium corporation in filing the petition is from the resolution of the total membership of
West Tower Corp. issued during their November 9, 2010 meeting with the requisite quorum. It is, thus, clear
that it was not the Board of West Tower Corp. which granted Chuaunsu the authority but the full membership
of the condominium corporation itself.
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners and residents of West
Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they so wish to join the petitioners.
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior Chambers International Philippines,
Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium
Corporation, as petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy
in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 45 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to the Court, including
the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the pending motions. Suffice
it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the
other recommendations of the CA, with a few modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the
DOE Certification of the WOPL's Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners' persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO into a Permanent
Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3,46 Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that regular testing, as well as the measures that
are already in place, will sufficiently address any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a) regular cleaning
scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG) tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as
in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years; (c) pressure monitoring valves; and ( d) 24-hour
patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole
testing/vapor tests; (b) leak tightness test, also known as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test;
(d) inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f) Pandacan
segment replacement.47Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging the headlines, FPIC hired NDT
Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI inspections through magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to,
respectively, detect wall thinning of the pipeline and check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and insufficient for purposes
of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence, considering the necessary caution and level of
assurance required to ensure that the WOPL system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the
CA recommended that FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial
operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of the adoption by
FPIC of the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the entire WOPL and the need to replace
portions of the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall
remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required FPIC to obtain the
adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed it proper to require said certification
from the DOE considering that the core issue of this case requires the specialized knowledge and special
expertise of the DOE and various other administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the
certification pursuant to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE
Secretary Carlos Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and the timetable for the
resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue between the concerned government agencies
and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the Court adopts the
activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014 to be complied with by FPIC as
conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed
with the implementation of the tests proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that
the results warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume
the operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a finding that the pipeline is no longer
safe for continued use and that its condition is irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life,
among others, the closure of the WOPL may be ordered.
The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC's proper implementation and compliance with its PIMS and to
evaluate the result of the various tests conducted on the pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(l), RA
7638 to formulate and implement policies for the efficient and economical "distribution, transportation, and
storage of petroleum, coal, natural gas."48 Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical
knowledge and special expertise with respect to practices in the transportation of oil through pipelines.
Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and proficiency available within
its offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other administrative agencies:
the ITDI49 of the DOST, which is mandated to undertake technical services including standards, analytical and
calibration services; the MIRDC,50 also of the DOST, which is the sole government entity directly supporting the
metals and engineering industry;51 the EMB52 of the DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others,
RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine
Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the DPWH, which is mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the
technical design aspects of projects of government agencies.53
The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore, be availed of to arrive at a
judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate resumption of the WOPL's operation. In a host of
cases, this Court held that when the adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the
expertise of an administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative body
equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise. 54 Hence, the courts, although they may
have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize the findings and recommendations of the administrative
agency on questions that demand "the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters
of fact."55
Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition should be denied and the TEPO immediately lifted
in light of the DOE's issuance of a certification attesting to the safety of the WOPL for continued commercial
operations, thereby rendering the instant petition moot and academic, seeking, as it does, the checking of the
pipeline's structural integrity. According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by the Court has already
served its functions and, therefore, is functus officio. Moreover, he argues that directing the DOE and FPIC to
repeat their previous procedures is tantamount to doubting the agency's performance of its statutorily-
mandated tasks, over which they have the necessary expertise, and implies that said DOE certification is
improper, a breach, allegedly, of the principle of separation of powers.
He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the procedures and tests already conducted on the
WOPL because of the fear and uncertainty on its safeness despite the finding of the DOE in favor of its reopening,
taking into consideration the occurrence of numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that
the precautionary principle should not be so strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of the benefits
of the activity to be inhibited, and to unduly create other risks.
The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that the writ of kalikasan has already
served its function, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may do more harm than good are anchored on
the mistaken premise that the precautionary principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and
the FPIC for the conduct of the various tests anew. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:
1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;
2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's structural integrity and in fact
imposes several conditions for FPIC's compliance;
3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned agencies, proposed the activities
to be conducted preparatory to the reopening of the pipeline; and
4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's structural integrity.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the
Precautionary Principle, provides that "[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal
link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in
resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the
application of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary principle
in deciding the issue on the WOPL's structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to
be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established with full scientific
certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence
of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage
of hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or
that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the environment
and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL's compliance with pipeline structure
standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that is to be determined on the basis of the
evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL's actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous
findings and recommendations of the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL' s present structure, and
not the cited pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC for the resumption of
the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the DOE of its proposed activities and
timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming from the DOE that the WOPL's soundness for resumption
of and continued commercial operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive
determination by the DOE of the pipeline's actual physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely
through a short-form integrity audit,56 that the factual issue on the WOPL's viability can be settled. The issue,
therefore, on the pipeline's structural integrity has not yet been rendered moot and remains to be subject to
this Court's resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that the DOE's issuance of the certification adverted to
equates to the writ of kalikasan being functus officio at this point.
The dissent is correct in emphasizing that We defer to the findings of fact of administrative agencies considering
their specialized knowledge in their field. And We, as a matter of fact, acceded to the DOE' s conclusions on the
necessity of the conduct of the various activities and tests enumerated in Sec. Petilla's letter to this Court dated
August 5, 2014. Hence, Our directive for the DOE to immediately commence the activities enumerated in said
Letter, to determine the pipeline's reliability, and to order its reopening should the DOE find that such is proper.
The dissent also loses sight of the fact that the petition not only seeks the checking of the WOPL's structural
integrity, but also prays for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by the leak, the creation of a special trust
fund, the imposition of liability upon the directors of FPIC, among others. These issues, undoubtedly, are
matters that are not addressed by the DOE certification alone. Furthermore, these are issues that no longer
relate to the WOPL' s structure but to its maintenance and operations, as well as to the residues of the incident.
It will, thus, be improper for Us to simply dismiss the petition on the basis solely of the alleged resolution of
only one of several issues, which purportedly renders the issue on the WOPL' s soundness moot, without
disposing of the other issues presented.
Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline
is commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its structural
integrity when experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the
agency tasked to oversee the supply and distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even
recommended the checking of the patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court
deems it best to take the necessary safeguards, which are not similar to applying the precautionary principle
as previously explained, in order to prevent a similar incident from happening in the future.
Other Matters
The CA's resolution on petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with
Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on
Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared by CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to
strictly comply with the stipulations embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification
from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken. DENR is the government agency tasked to implement
the state policy of "maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment"57 and to "promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air, and land pollution." 58 It
is indubitable that the DENR has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation of
Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.
With regard to petitioners' March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent possible leak in the
pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due to the devastating effect on the environs
in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the Court finds it fitting that the pipeline be closely and regularly
monitored to obviate another catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the affected people, and to
preserve and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the future generations to come.
Petitioner's January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA' s Report need not be discussed
and given consideration. As the CA' s Report contains but the appellate court's recommendation on how the
issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by this Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to
reconsider.
As to petitioner's October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification, the matters
contained therein have been considered in the foregoing discussion of the primary issues of this case. With all
these, We need not belabor the other arguments raised by the parties.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' recommendations,
embodied in its December 21, 2012 Report and Recommendation, are hereby ADOPTED with the following
MODIFICATIONS.

JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, CITY
TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS
Respondent Quezon City Council enacted an ordinance, Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, which will
collect 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php 100,000.00. This shall accrue to the Socialized
Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The special assessment shall go to the General Fund under
a special account to be established for the purpose. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235 and S-2013 was
enacted collecting garbage fees on residential properties which shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an
earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. Petitioner, a Quezon
City property owner, questions the validity of the said ordinances.

Issues:
 1. WON SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is valid.
a. WON the SHT is a tax which is within the QC government to impose.
b. WON the SHT violates the rule on equality.
c. WON the SHT is confiscatory or oppressive.
2. WON SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is valid.
a. WON the Ordinance on Garbage Fee violates the rule on double taxation.
b. WON it violates the rule on equality.

Ruling:

1. SP-2095, S-2011 on the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is VALID.

a. Yes. The SHT charged by the QC Government is a tax which is within its power to impose. Cities are
allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass
dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is
not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory
purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the
entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only
beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but advantageous to the real property
owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their property investments, fully enjoying
the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community, and will enhance the quality of life of the
poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better consumers of business products.

b. No, the SHT does NOT violate the rule on equality. For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive
and continuing urban development and housing program, the disparities between a real property
owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be discussed at
length. The differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not
discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably, the public purpose of a tax may
legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one over
another. It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select the subjects of taxation.
Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe
no constitutional limitation.

c. No, the SHT is NOT confiscatory nor oppressive. The reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095
cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below
what the UDHA actually allows. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an
assessed value of more than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an
assessed value exceeding P100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax
credit equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year
of its effectivity. Far from being obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.

2. SP-2235, S-2013 on Garbage Fee is INVALID. Although it does not violate the rule on double taxation,
it nonetheless violates the rule on equality.

a. SP-2235 does NOT violate the rule on double taxation.

The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the
regulation of an activity. In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared
that if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also
obtained does not make the imposition a tax. In a U.S. case, the garbage fee was considered as a
 "service charge" rather than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had
previously been provided at no cost to its citizens.

Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the
rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.

b. Yes, SP-2235 violates the rule on equality.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant
of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is
uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and equitable.

The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in
a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot
similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to
pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether
the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.

Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in
over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste. Instead of simplistically categorizing
the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the
amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others,
household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or
district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-
2095, S-2011, or the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, is SUSTAINED for being consistent with Section
43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual
garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected
relative to its enforcement.

Additional Cases
AQUINO v MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, GR No. 211356, Sept. 29, 2014
FACTS:

The Municipal Mayor of Aklan issued Executive Order 10, to close and demolish the Boracay West Cove Hotel.

The antecedents of the case reveal that Crisostomo, the president and CEO of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc applied for a zoning compliance to build a three-storey hotel with the municipal
government, which the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied because the construction violates the no-build
zone of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-131, which prohibits constructions 25 meters from the edge of the
mean high water mark.

Crisostomo filed an appeal with the Municipal Mayor, but no action was taken thereon.

On April 5, 2011, a Notice of Assessment was sent to Crisostomo demanding payment for unpaid real estate
estate taxes and other liabilities under pain of closure because of its continuous operation without the required
building permit, zoning permit, and business and mayors permit.
Crisostomo expressed willingness to pay the companys obligation but the municipal treasurer refused to
accept his tender of payment. After a Cease and Desist Order was issued to the hotel, the Municipal Mayor then
issued EO 10 which ordered the closure and demolition of the hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented
Crisostomo thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the order was issued with
grave abuse of discretion; that judicial proceedings are first necessary before the hotel may be closed and
demolished; that the hotel is a grantee of FLAGt., that the area is a forestland thus the DENR had jurisdiction
over it. In its comment, the municipality argued that the FLAGt does not excuse the company from compliance
with the Ordinance and the National Building Code, and that the mayor is granted express powers under the
Local Government Code to demolish illegally built structures.

CA:
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that the exercise of the power of the mayor was not done
as a quasi-judicial function, hence not correctible by certiorari; the proper remedy for Crisostomo was to file a
petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court. Crisostomo elevated his case to the Supreme Court,
alleging that the demolition of the hotel was beyond the municipal mayors powers.

SC:
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or
property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the
senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage
of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination that
constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they
pose a threat to public safety. No build zones are intended for the protection of the public because the stability
of the grounds foundation is adversely affected by the nearby body of water. The ever present threat of high
rising storm surges also justifies the ban on permanent constructions near the shoreline. Indeed, the areas
exposure to potential geo-hazards cannot be ignored and ample protection to the residents of Malay, Aklan
should be afforded.

Challenging the validity of the public respondents actuations, petitioner posits that the hotel cannot summarily
be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the
venture.

Citing Asilo, Jr. v. People, petitioner also argues that respondents should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.

Preliminarily, We agree with petitioners posture that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance
per se, but not for the reason he so offers. Property valuation, after all, is not the litmus test for such a
determination. More controlling is the propertys nature and conditions, which should be evaluated to see if it
qualifies as a nuisance as defined under the law.

As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is
recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public
health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The
second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of
fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance.

In the case at bar, the hotel, in itself, cannot be considered as a nuisance per se since this type of nuisance is
generally defined as an act, occupation, or structure, which is a nuisance at all times and under any
circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Here, it is merely the hotels particular incidentits
locationand not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been
constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue.
As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per
accidens.

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance
per se. So it was held in AC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp:
We agree with petitioners contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order
its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when
such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction
of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined
and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing, be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
(emphasis supplied)

Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the
general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their
local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers
not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with authority to
hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon.

In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to secure the necessary permits, clearances, and exemptions
before the construction, expansion, and operation of Boracay Wet Coves hotel in Malay, Aklan. To recall,
petitioner declared that the application for zoning compliance was still pending with the office of the mayor
even though construction and operation were already ongoing at the same time. As such, it could no longer be
denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal Ordinance 2000-131, which provides:

Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing the blame onto the respondent mayor and the latters failure
to act on his appeal for this does not, in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed with his infrastructure
projects.

On the contrary, this only means that the decision of the zoning administrator denying the application still
stands and that petitioner acquired no right to construct on the no build zone. The illegality of the construction
cannot be cured by merely tendering payment for the necessary fees and permits since the LGUs refusal rests
on valid grounds.

SR METALS, INC., SAN R MINING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP. AND GALEO EQUIPMENT AND
MINING COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ANGELO T. REYES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Respondent

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J

FACTS:
On March 9, 2006, each of the petitioners was awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining Permit4 (SSMP) by the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte; they were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-
Co) in a 20-hectare mining site in Sitio Bugnang, Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. These
permits were granted after the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, Environmental
Compliance Certificates5 with a validity period of one year.

The mining corporations ECCs contain a restriction that the amount of Ni-Co ore they are allowed to extract
annually should not exceed 50,000 MTs pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899

Subsequently, however, Agusan del Norte Governor, Erlpe John M. Amante (Governor Amante), questioned
the quantity of ore that had been mined and shipped by the mining corporations. In reply, the mining
corporations denied having exceeded the extraction limit of 50,000 MTs.

Having reservations with the mining corporations interpretation of the 50,000-MT restriction, Governor
Amante sought the opinion of the Department of Justice (D

Meanwhile, the EMB sent the mining corporations a Notice of Violation8 informing them that they had
exceeded the allowed annual volume of 150,000 MTs combined production as their stockpile inventory of
Nickeliferous ore had already total 177,297 dry metric tons (DMT).

On November 26, 2004, DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist Order10 (CDO) against
the mining corporations suspending their operations for their operations for the following reasons: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

1. The excess in 1) annual production of SR Metals, Inc., 2) maximum capitalization, and, 3) labor cost to
equipment utilization of 1:1 is, by itself, a violation of existing laws.

2. The ECCs issued in favor of San R Construction Corporation and Galeo Equipment Corporation have no legal
basis and [are] therefore considered null and void from the beginning. Similarly, the small scale mining
permits that were issued by reason of such ECCs are likewise null and void

DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez replied to Governor Amante cciting the definition of small scale mining
under R.A. No. 7076 is clear and categorical. Any mining activity that relies heavily on manual labor without
use of explosives or heavy mining equipment falls under said definition. It does not mention any annual
production quota or limitation. On the contrary, Section 12 thereof is explicit that the contractor, or,
specifically, in this case, permit holders or permitees, are entitled not only to the right to [mine], but also to
"extract and dispose of mineral ores (found therein) for commercial purposes without specific limitation as
to the nature of the mineral extracted or the quantity thereof.
Even assuming that the 50,000-MT ore limit in PD 1899 is still in force, the DOJ categorically concluded that
the term ore should be confined only to Ni-Co, that is, excluding soil and other materials that are of no
economic value to the mining corporations.

The mining corporations then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of DENR in
issuing the CDO. The CA denied the mining corporations Petition, not only because the ECCs have been
mooted by their expiration, but also due to its recognition of the power of the DENR to issue the CDO as the
agency reposed with the duty of managing and conserving the country's resources under Executive Order
192.

ISSUES

Whether there is no substantial distinction between the miners covered under RA 7076, who can extract as
much ore as they can, and those covered under PD 1899 who were imposed an extraction limit.

RULING

Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an annual production of not more than
50,000 metric tons of ore and satisfying the following requisites:

1. The working is artisanal, whether open cast or shallow underground mining, without the use of
sophisticated mining equipment;

2. Minimal investment on infrastructures and processing plant;

3. Heavy reliance on manual labor; and

4. Owned, managed or controlled by an individual or entity qualified under existing mining laws, rules and
regulations.

On the other hand, under Section 3(b) of RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to 'mining activities which rely
heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
equipment. Significantly, this definition does not provide for annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899.

DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006 concluded that as nothing from RA 7076 speaks of an annual production
limit, Section 1 of PD 1899 should be considered impliedly repealed by RA 7076, the later law. PD 1899
applies to individuals, partnerships and corporations while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives.24 There are
other differences between the two laws, but we cannot hastily conclude that there is an implied repeal
because of the omission. Both laws may stand.

We do not, however, subscribe to the mining corporations averment that the 50,000-MTs production limit
does not apply to small-scale miners under RA 7076. Recognizing the DENRs mandate to regulate the
countrys natural resources under EO 192,25 both PD 1899 and RA 7076 delegated to the DENR, thru its
Secretary, the power to promulgate the necessary IRRs to give effect to the said laws

Narra Nickel Mining vs Redmont Consolidated Mines

Facts

Respondent (Redmont) took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of the province of Palawan.
After inquiring with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), it learned that the
areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities where already covered by Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

Petitioner McArthur, through its predecessor-in-interest Sara Marie Mining, Inc. (SMMI), filed an
application for an MPSA and Exploration Permit (EP). MPSA and EP were then transferred to Madridejos
Mining Corporation (MMC) and assigned to petitioner McArthur.2 Petitioner Narra acquired its MPSA.
Subsequently, PLMDC conveyed, transferred and/or assigned its rights and interests over the MPSA
application in favor of Narra. SMMI subsequently conveyed, transferred and assigned its rights and
interest over the said MPSA application to Tesoro.

In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra
are owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont
reasoned that since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind
petitioners filing of the MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since it knows that it can only
participate in mining activities through corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont
argued that given that petitioners capital stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise
disqualified from engaging in mining activities through MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino
citizens.

In their Answers, petitioners averred that they were qualified persons under Section 3(aq) of Republic
Act No. They stated that their nationality as applicants is immaterial because they also applied for
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAA) denominated as AFTA-IVB-09 for McArthur, AFTA-
IVB-08 for Tesoro and AFTA-IVB-07 for Narra, which are granted to foreign-owned corporations.

The POA issued a Resolution disqualifying petitioners from gaining MPSAs. The POA considered
petitioners as foreign corporations being "effectively controlled" by MBMI, a 100% Canadian company
and declared their MPSAs null and void.
the RTC issued an Order18 granting Redmonts application for a TRO and setting the case for hearing the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on September 19, 2008.

RTC issued an Order22 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the MAB from
finally disposing of the appeals of petitioners and from resolving Redmonts Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplement Motion for Reconsideration of the MABs September 10, 2008 Resolution..

In a Resolution dated February 15, 2011, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners.

The Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision was further denied by the OP in a Resolution30 dated
July 6, 2011. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the OPs Decision and Resolution
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 120409. In the CA Decision dated February 29, 2012, the CA
affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the OP. Thereafter, petitioners appealed the same CA decision
to this Court which is now pending with a different division.

Issue:

W/N the Grandfather test is applicable (YES)

W/N McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are Filipino nationals (NO)

Ruling

Grandfather test

The main issue in this case is centered on the issue of petitioners nationality, whether Filipino or
foreign. In their previous petitions, they had been adamant in insisting that they were Filipino
corporations, until they submitted their Manifestation and Submission dated October 19, 2012 where
they stated the alleged change of corporate ownership to reflect their Filipino ownership. Thus, there is
a need to determine the nationality of petitioner corporations.

The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the portion in said
Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, "but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the
corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality." Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule
Proper, the combined totals in the Investing Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced
(i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total percentage of Filipino ownership.

In other words, based on the said SEC Rule and DOJ Opinion, the Grandfather Rule or the second part of
the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases
where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders with less than 60% Filipino
stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-40% Filipino-alien or
the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity ownership is not in
doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply. (emphasis supplied)
After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for the application
of the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in
the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino
equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their common investor, the 100%
Canadian corporationMBMI, funded them. However, petitioners also claim that there is "doubt" only
when the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than 60%.43

Obviously, the instant case presents a situation which exhibits a scheme employed by stockholders to
circumvent the law, creating a cloud of doubt in the Courts mind. To determine, therefore, the actual
participation, direct or indirect, of MBMI, the grandfather rule must be used.

Concluding from the above-stated facts, it is quite safe to say that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and
Narra are not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity
interests. Such conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners corporate owners, namely: MMI,
SMMI and PLMDC. Going further and adding to the picture, MBMIs Summary of Significant Accounting
Policies statement regarding the "joint venture" agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic"
and "Alpha" groupsinvolves SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership of the
"layered" corporations boils down to MBMI, Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein
MBMI has joint venture agreements with, practically exercising majority control over the corporations
mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure or the underlying relationships between
and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and must be considered foreign
since 60% or more of their capital stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.

Application of the res inter alios acta rule

Petitioners question the CAs use of the exception of the res inter alios acta or the "admission by co-
partner or agent" rule and "admission by privies" under the Rules of Court in the instant case, by
pointing out that statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in this case since it is not a party to
the case and that it is not a "partner" of petitioners.

Petitioners claim that before the above-mentioned Rule can be applied to a case, "the partnership
relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact must be made by evidence other than the admission
itself."49 Thus, petitioners assert that the CA erred in finding that a partnership relationship exists
between them and MBMI because, in fact, no such partnership exists.

Partnerships vs. joint venture agreements

A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or
industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.50 On the other
hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be "akin" to partnerships since it is difficult to distinguish
between joint ventures and partnerships.

Obviously, as the intricate web of "ventures" entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI was
executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships, then the
relationship created should be deemed as "partnerships," and the laws on partnership should be
applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen as similar to
partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.
Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be
partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that "by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest" with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

Panel of Arbitrators jurisdiction

We affirm the ruling of the CA in declaring that the POA has jurisdiction over the instant case. The POA
has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas which definitely involve the petitions filed
by Redmont against petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro. Redmont, by filing its petition against
petitioners, is asserting the right of Filipinos over mining areas in the Philippines against alleged foreign-
owned mining corporations. Such claim constitutes a "dispute" found in Sec. 77 of RA 7942:

It is clear that POA has exclusive and original jurisdiction over any and all disputes involving rights to
mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA application to which an adverse claim, protest or opposition
is filed by another interested applicant.1wphi1 In the case at bar, the dispute arose or originated from
MPSA applications where petitioners are asserting their rights to mining areas subject of their respective
MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3 separate petitions for the denial of said applications, then a
controversy has developed between the parties and it is POAs jurisdiction to resolve said disputes.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil actions while what petitioners filed with the DENR
Regional Office or any concerned DENRE or CENRO are MPSA applications. Thus POA has jurisdiction.

SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P. CERICOS,

vs.
NESTOR M. CANDA
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-
an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc
River, and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six other municipalities. The
petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the DENR seeking to be exempt from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586.

On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Candas findings to respondent EMB Region 7 Director Bienvenido
L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from
the Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the DPWH that had recently been issued a CNC. 3
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental Examination document was
required for the project due to its significant impact in the area.5

RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit documents to enable the EMB to determine whether the project
was within an environmentally critical area or not.
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight certifications,7 including the certification issued by the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), as follows:

The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau
(RO-MGB) to the effect that the project area was not located along a fault line/fault zone or a critical slope
because RO-MGB did not have the data and expertise to render such finding, and thus had to forward the
petitioners request to the MGB Central Office.9
Upon the MGBs advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the required certification from PHIVOLCS, but the
certification did not state whether the project area was within a critical slope. Instead, the certification stated
that the project site was approximately 18 kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayons letter dated February 4, 2003 declared that
the project was within an environmentally critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC,
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Loay, Bohol,12 alleging that it was now entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with the
certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the DPWH for a similar waterworks
project in the same area.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONERS DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED
BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY
PETITIONER, IT IS NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER

Ruling:

Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the CNC application when he made
his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to the "procedural requirements for review" only. He had still to
decide on the substantive aspect of the application, that is, whether the project and the project area were
considered critical to the environment. In fact, this was the reason why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to
submit certifications from the various government agencies concerned. Surely, the required certifications were
not mere formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his decision on whether to grant or deny the
application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily complied with the requirement to
submit the needed certifications. For one, it submitted no certification to the effect that the project site was not
within a critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCSs certification showed that the project site had experienced an
Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place the site in the category of "areas frequently visited
and/or hard-hit by natural calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right to be
issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner grossly misunderstood the nature of the remedy
of mandamus. To avoid similar misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a short exposition on the nature and
office of the remedy is now appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It is believed that the writ was originally part of
the class of writs or mandates issued by the English sovereign to direct his subjects to perform a particular act
or duty.28 The earliest writs were in the form of letters missive, and were mere personal commands. The
command was a law in itself, from which there was no appeal. The writ of mandamus was not only declaratory
of a duty under an existing law, but was a law in itself that imposed the duty, the performance of which it
commanded. The King was considered as the fountain and source of justice, and when the law did not afford a
remedy by the regular forms of proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were invoked in aid of
the ordinary powers of the courts.
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the Kings name out of the court of Kings Bench that had a general
supervisory power over all inferior jurisdictions and officers, gradually supplanted the old personal command
of the sovereign.31 The court of Kings Bench, acting as the general guardian of public rights and in the exercise
of its authority to grant the writ, rendered the writ of mandamus the suppletory means of substantial justice in
every case where there was no other specific legal remedy for a legal right, and ensured that all official duties
were fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was properly within its control. Early on, the writ of mandamus was
particularly used to compel public authorities to return the petitioners to public offices from which they had
been unlawfully removed.
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ emanating from the King himself,
superintending the police and preserving the peace within the realm. It was allowed only in cases affecting the
sovereign, or the interest of the public at large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the necessity to compel the
inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial powers invested in them by restraining their excesses,
preventing their negligence and restraining their denial of justice.36
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly prerogative features and has been assimilated
to the nature of an ordinary remedy. Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an extraordinary remedy in the
sense that it is only issued in extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary modes of proceeding and
forms of remedy are powerless to afford redress to a party aggrieved, and where without its aid there would
be a failure of justice.
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart from the other remedial writs,
i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty. In fact, a
doctrine well-embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear
legal right to the performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to
perform the same. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies
to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

Magallona vs Ermita (carpio)

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic
State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then
in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements
complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty and
security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates
conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as
geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law
norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in lesser
footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state
can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the
Phils. total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of
the archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, well breach the rules: that it should follow
the natural configuration of the archipelago.
REYES VS REPUBLIC
PONENTE: CORONA J.,

FACTS:
It all began on July 17, 1961, when the spouses Dr. Casiano A. Sandoval and Luz Marquez de Sandoval applied
for the registration of title over Cadastral Lot 7453 of the Santiago Cadastral Survey 211, situated in Cordon,
Isabela.

Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. opposed the application claiming ownership over a portion of the
property.

The initial hearing was on March 30, 1962, during which the trial court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except for respondent Republic of the Philippines. For nearly 20 years thereafter,
nothing more transpired in the case.

On March 3, 1981, the heirs of Sandoval and Marquez, together with the Directors of the Bureau of Lands (now
the Lands Management Bureau) and the Bureau of Forest Development, submitted a compromise agreement
dated February 6, 1981 to the trial court for approval. The parties to the agreement were the heirs of Sandoval,
represented by their attorney-in-fact Emmanuel Sandoval, the heirs of Clemencia Parasac, heirs of Liberato
Bayaua, Atty. Jose C. Reyes, petitioners predecessorin-interest, Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc.
Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development (with the last two represented by the provincial fiscal
of Nueva Vizcaya, Justino A.R. Vigilia).

RTCS DECISION:
Judge Andres B. Plan, presiding judge of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 2, rendered a decision
dated March 3, 1981, based on that agreement. In accordance therewith, the land was distributed to the
different parties in the following manner: to the Bureau of Lands 1,750 hectares; to the Bureau of Forest
Development 5,661 hectares; to the heirs of Clemencia Parasac and Liberato Bayaua 1,000 hectares; to the
Philippine Cacao and Farm Products, Inc. 4,000 hectares, and to the heirs of Casiano Sandoval 2,892.5928
hectares. Of the area adjudicated to them, the Sandoval heirs assigned 892.5928 hectares to Atty. Jose C. Reyes
as his attorneys fees.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul
the decision of the RTC under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners,
the heirs of Liberato Bayaua and Clemencia Parasac, and Philippine Cacao Farm Products, Inc. all filed separate
motions to dismiss.

CAS DECISION: denied these motions and annulled the decision of the RTC.
1. the adjudication of the lands in question through the compromise agreement was unconstitutional, the
concerned parcels of land being forest lands; the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it made the award;
2. no evidence was presented by petitioners to prove their ownership, the decision being based entirely
on the compromise agreement, and
3. the petition was not barred by laches or estoppel because the RTC was without jurisdiction to render
the decision based on the compromise agreement; also, the OSG was barred by estoppel because it did not give
its consent to the compromise agreement; neither did it deputize the provincial fiscal to enter into it.

ISSUE:
WON the complaint is barred by laches and estoppel

HELD: NO! A BIG NO NO.

Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available because it is barred by the
principle of res judicata. They insist that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which
involves private land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land registration
courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land.
The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the
Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for
annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and void.

Where the land applied for is part of the public forest, the land registration court acquires no jurisdiction over
it. Here, at the time the application was filed in 1961, the contested land was part of the public forest. This is
clear from the fact that Administrative Order No. 4-1246 of the Bureau of Forest Development reclassified the
land in question from forest land to alienable land only in 1979, or some 20 years after LRC Case No. II-N-36
was instituted. No doubt, at the time the RTC took cognizance of the case, it lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter and respondents petition for annulment of judgment was therefore justified.

REITERATING OPOSA VS FACTORAN, while the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuationaptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitionersthe advancement of which may be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they
are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation,
but also for those to comegenerations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.