1. Baranda v Gustillo, GR No.

81163

GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:
EduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitaliawerethepetitionersinG.R.No.64432andtheprivaterespondentsinG.R.No.62042.Thesubject
matterofthesetwo(2)casesandtheinstantcaseisthesameaparceloflanddesignatedasLotNo.4517oftheCadastralSurveyofSta.
Barbara,IloilocoveredbyOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.6406.
Thepresentpetitionarosefromthesamefactsandeventswhichtriggeredthefilingoftheearlierpetitions.Thesefactsandeventsarecitedin
ourresolutiondatedDecember29,1983inG.R.No.64432,asfollows:
...ThiscasehasitsoriginsinapetitionforreconstitutionoftitlefiledwiththeCourtofFirstInstanceofIloiloinvolvingaparcelofland
knownasLotNo.4517oftheSta.BarbaraCadastrecoveredbyOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.6406inthenameofRomanaHitalia.
Eventually,OriginalCertificateofTitleNo.6406wascancelledandTransferCertificateofTitleNo.106098wasissuedinthenamesof
AlfonsoHitaliaandEduardoS.Baranda.TheCourtissuedawritofpossessionwhichGregorioPerez,MariaP.GoteraandSusanaSilao
refusedtohonoronthegroundthattheyalsohaveTCTNo.25772overthesameLotNo.4517.TheCourt,afterconsideringtheprivate
respondents'oppositionandfindingTCTNo.25772fraudulentlyacquired,orderedthatthewritofpossessionbecarriedout.Amotionfor
reconsiderationhavingbeendenied,awritofdemolitionwasissuedonMarch29,1982.PerezandGoterafiledapetitionforcertiorariand
prohibitionwiththeCourtofAppeals.OnAugust6,1982,theCourtofAppealsdeniedthepetition.PerezandGoterafiledthepetitionfor
reviewoncertioraridenominatedasG.R.No.62042beforetheSupremeCourt.Asearlierstatedthepetitionwasdeniedinaresolutiondated
January7,1983.ThemotionforreconsiderationwasdeniedinanotherresolutiondatedMarch25,1983,whichalsostatedthatthedenialis
final.ThisdecisioninG.R.No.62042,inaccordancewiththeentryofjudgment,becamefinalonMarch25,1983.Thepetitionersinthe
instantcaseG.R.No.64432contendthatthewritsofpossessionanddemolitionissuedintherespondentcourtshouldnowbeimplemented;
thatCivilCaseNo.00827beforetheIntermediateAppellateCourtwasfiledonlytodelaytheimplementationofthewrit;thatcounselforthe
respondentshouldbeheldincontemptofcourtforengaginginaconcertedbutfutileefforttodelaytheexecutionofthewritsofpossession
anddemolitionandthatpetitionersareentitledtodamagesbecauseofprejudicecausedbythefilingofthispetitionbeforetheIntermediate
AppellateCourt.OnSeptember26,1983,thisCourtissuedaTemporaryRestrainingOrder'tomaintainthestatusquo,bothinthe
IntermediateAppellateCourtandintheRegionalTrialCourtofIloilo.Consideringthat(l)thereismeritintheinstantpetitionforindeedthe
issuesdiscussedinG.R.No.64432asraisedinCivilCaseNo.00827beforetherespondentcourthavealreadybeenpasseduponinG.R.No.
62042;and(2)theTemporaryRestrainingOrderissuedbytheIntermediateAppellateCourtwasonlyintendednottorenderthepetitionmoot
andacademicpendingtheCourt'sconsiderationoftheissues,theCourtRESOLVEDtoDIRECTtherespondentIntermediateAppellateCourt
nottotakecognizanceofissuesalreadyresolvedbythisCourtandaccordinglyDISMISSthepetitioninCivilCaseNo.00827.Immediate
implementationofthewritsofpossessionanddemolitionislikewiseordered.(pp.107108,RolloG.R.No.64432)
OnMay9,1984,theCourtissuedaresolutiondenyingwithfinalityamotionforreconsiderationoftheDecember29,1983resolutioninG.R.
No.64432.Onthissamedate,anotherresolutionwasissued,thistimeinG.R.No.62042,referringtotheRegionalTrialCourtofIloilothe
expartemotionoftheprivaterespondents(BarandaandHitalia)forexecutionofthejudgmentintheresolutionsdatedJanuary7,1983and
March9,1983.Inthemeantime,thethenIntermediateAppellateCourtissuedaresolutiondatedFebruary10,1984,dismissingCivilCase
No.00827whichcoveredthesamesubjectmatterastheResolutionsabovecitedpursuanttoourResolutiondatedDecember29,1983.The
resolutiondatedDecember29,1983inG.R.No.64432becamefinalonMay20,1984.
Uponmotionsofthepetitioners,theRegionalTrialCourtofIloilo,Branch23presidedbyJudgeTitoG.Gustiloissuedthefollowingorder:
SubmittedarethefollowingmotionsfiledbymovantsEduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitaliathroughcounseldatedAugust28,1984:
(a)ReiteratingMotionforExecutionofJudgmentofResolutionsdatedJanuary7,1983andMarch9,1983PromulgatedbyHonorable
SupremeCourt(FirstDivision)inG.R.No.62042;
(b)MotionforExecutionofJudgmentofResolutiondatedDecember29,1983PromulgatedbyHonorableSupremeCourt(FirstDivision)in
G.R.No.64432;
(c)TheDutiesoftheRegisterofDeedsarepurelyministerialunderAct496,thereforeshemustregisterallorders,judgment,resolutionsof
thisCourtandthatofHonorableSupremeCourt.
Findingthesaidmotionsmeritoriousandtherebeingnooppositionthereto,thesameisherebyGRANTED.
WHEREFORE,TransferCertificateofTitleNo.T25772isherebydeclarednullandvoidandTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T106098is
herebydeclaredvalidandsubsistingtitleconcerningtheownershipofEduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitalia,allofSta.BarbaraCadastre.
TheActingRegisterofDeedsofIloiloisfurtherorderedtoregistertheSubdivisionAgreementofEduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitaliaas
prayedfor."(p.466,RolloG.R.No.64432)
TheaboveorderwassetasideonOctober8,1984uponamotionforreconsiderationandmanifestationfiledbytheActingRegistrarofDeeds
ofIloilo,Atty.HelenP.Sornito,onthegroundthattherewasapendingcasebeforethisCourt,anActionforMandamus,Prohibition,
InjunctionunderG.R.No.67661filedbyAtty.EduardoBaranda,againsttheformerwhichremainedunresolved.
Inviewofthisdevelopment,thepetitionersfiledinG.R.No.62042andG.R.No.64432expartemotionsforissuanceofanorderdirecting
theRegionalTrialCourtandActingRegisterofDeedstoexecuteandimplementthejudgmentsofthisCourt.Theyprayedthatanorderbe
issued:
1.OrderingboththeRegionalTrialCourtofIloiloBranchXXIII,underHon.JudgeTitoG.GustiloandtheactingRegisterofDeedsHelenP.
SornitotoregistertheOrderdatedSeptember5,1984ofthelowercourt;
2.TocancelNo.T25772.LikewisetocancelNo.T106098andoncecancelledtoissuenewcertificatesoftitletoeachofEduardoS.Baranda
andAlfonsoHitalia;
Plusotherreliefandremediesequitableunderthepremises.(p.473,64432Rollo)
Actingonthesemotions,weissuedonSeptember17,1986aResolutioninG.R.No.62042andG.R.No.64432grantingthemotionsas
prayedfor.Actingonanothermotionofthesamenaturefiledbythepetitioners,weissuedanotherResolutiondatedOctober8,1986referring
thesametotheCourtAdministratorforimplementationbythejudgebelow.
Incompliancewithourresolutions,theRegionalTrialCourtofIloilo,Branch23presidedbyJudgeTitoG.Gustiloissuedtwo(2)orders
datedNovember6,1986andJanuary6,1987respectively,towit:
ORDER
ThisisanExparteMotionandManifestationsubmittedbythemovantsthroughcounselonOctober20,1986;theManifestationofAtty.
HelenSornito,RegisterofDeedsoftheCityofIloilo,andformerlyactingregisterofdeedsfortheProvinceofIloilodatedOctober23,1986
andtheManifestationofAtty.AvitoS.Saclauso,ActingRegisterofDeeds,ProvinceofIloilodatedNovember5,1986.
ConsideringthatthemotionofmovantsAtty.EduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitaliadatedAugust12,1986seekingthefullimplementation
ofthewritofpossessionwasgrantedbytheHonorableSupremeCourt,SecondDivisionperitsResolutiondatedSeptember17,1986,the
presentmotionisherebyGRANTED.
WHEREFORE,theActingRegisterofDeeds,ProvinceofIloilo,isherebyorderedtoregistertheOrderofthisCourtdatedSeptember5,1984
asprayedfor.
xxxxxxxxx
ORDER
ThisisaManifestationandUrgentPetitionfortheSurrenderofTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T25772submittedbythepetitionersAtty.
EduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitaliaonDecember2,1986,incompliancewiththeorderofthisCourtdatedNovember25,1986,a
MotionforExtensionofTimetoFileOppositionfiledbyMariaProvidoGoterathroughcounselonDecember4,1986whichwasgrantedby
theCourtpursuanttoitsorderdatedDecember15,1986.ConsideringthatnoOppositionwasfiledwithinthethirty(30)daysperiodgranted
bytheCourtfindingthepetitiontenable,thesameisherebyGRANTED.
WHEREFORE,MariaProvidoGoteraisherebyorderedtosurrenderTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T25772tothisCourtwithinten(10)
daysfromthedateofthisorder,afterwhichperiod,TransferCertificateofTitleNo.T25772isherebydeclaredannulledandtheRegisterof
DeedsofIloiloisorderedtoissueanewCertificateofTitleinlieuthereofinthenameofpetitionersAtty.EduardoS.BarandaandAlfonso
Hitalia,whichcertificateshallcontainamemorandumoftheannulmentoftheoutstandingduplicate.(pp.286287,Rollo64432)
OnFebruary9,1987,Atty.HectorTeodosio,thecounselofGregorioPerez,privaterespondentinG.R.No.64432andpetitionerinG.R.No.
62042,filedamotionforexplanationinrelationtotheresolutiondatedSeptember17,1986andmanifestationaskingforclarificationonthe
followingpoints:
a.AstotheprayerofAtty.EduardoBarandaforthecancellationofTCTT25772,shouldthesamebereferredtotheCourtofAppeals(as
mentionedintheResolutionofNovember27,1985)orisitalreadydeemedgrantedbyimplication(byvirtueoftheResolutiondated
September17,1986)?
b.DoestheResolutiondatedSeptember17,1986includenotonlytheimplementationofthewritofpossessionbutalsothecancellationof
TCTT25772andthesubdivisionofLot4517?(p.536,Rollo4432)
Actingonthismotionandtheothermotionsfiledbytheparties,weissuedaresolutiondatedMay25,1987notingallthesemotionsand
statingtherein:
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SinceentryofjudgmentinG.R.No.62042wasmadeonJanuary7,1983andinG.R.No.64432onMay30,1984,andallthatremainsisthe
implementationofourresolutions,thisCOURTRESOLVEDtoreferthemattersconcerningtheexecutionofthedecisionstotheRegional
TrialCourtofIloiloCityforappropriateactionandtoapplydisciplinarysanctionsuponwhoeverattemptstotriflewiththeimplementationof
theresolutionsofthisCourt.NofurthermotionsinthesecaseswillbeentertainedbythisCourt.(p.615,Rollo64432)
Inthemeantime,incompliancewiththeRegionalTrialCourt'sordersdatedNovember6,1986andJanuary6,1987,ActingRegisterofDeeds
AvitoSaclausoannotatedtheorderdeclaringTransferCertificateofTitleNo.T25772asnullandvoid,cancelledthesameandissuednew
certificatesoftitlesnumbersT111560,T111561andT111562inthenameofpetitionersEduardoS.BarandaandAlfonsoHitaliainlieuof
TransferCertificateofTItleNo.T106098.
However,anoticeoflispendens"onaccountoforbyreasonofaseparatecase(CivilCaseNo.15871)stillpendingintheCourtofAppeals"
wascarriedoutandannotatedinthenewcertificatesoftitlesissuedtothepetitioners.Thiswasupheldbythetrialcourtaftersettingasideits
earlierorderdatedFebruary12,1987orderingthecancellationoflispendens.
ThispromptedthepetitionerstofileanothermotioninG.R,No.62042andG.R.No.64432toorderthetrialcourttoreinstateitsorderdated
February12,1987directingtheActingRegisterofDeedstocancelthenoticeoflispendensinthenewcertificatesoftitles.
InaresolutiondatedAugust17,1987,weresolvedtoreferthesaidmotiontotheRegionalTrialCourtofIloiloCity,Branch23for
appropriateaction.
SincerespondentJudgeTitoGustilooftheRegionalTrialCourtofIloilo,Branch23deniedthepetitioners'motiontoreinstatetheFebruary
12,1987orderinanotherorderdatedSeptember17,1987,thepetitionersfiledthispetitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswith
preliminaryinjunctiontocompeltherespondentjudgetoreinstatehisorderdatedFebruaryl2,1987directingtheActingRegisterofDeedsto
cancelthenoticeoflispendensannotatedinthenewcertificatesoftitlesissuedinthenameofthepetitioners.
TherecordsshowthataftertheActingRegisterofDeedsannotatedanoticeofispendensonthenewcertificatesoftitlesissuedinthename
ofthepetitioners,thepetitionersfiledinthereconstitutioncaseanurgentexpartemotiontoimmediatelycancelnoticeoflispendens
annotatedthereon.
InhisorderdatedFebruary12,1987,respondentJudgeGustilograntedthemotionanddirectedtheActingRegisterofDeedsofIloiloto
cancelthelispendensfoundonTransferCertificateofTitleNos.T106098;T111560;T111561andT111562.
RespondentActingRegisterofDeedsAvitoSaclausofiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheFebruary12,1987orderstatingtherein:
ThattheundersignedherebyasksforareconsiderationofthesaidorderbasedonthesecondparagraphofSection77ofP.D.1529,towit:
"Atanytimeafterfinaljudgmentinfavorofthedefendantorotherdispositionoftheactionsuchastoterminatefinallyallrightsofthe
plaintiffinandtothelandand/orbuildingsinvolved,inanycaseinwhichamemorandumornoticeofLisPendenshasbeenregisteredas
providedintheprecedingsection,thenoticeofLisPendensshallbedeemedcancelledupontheregistrationofacertificateoftheclerkof
courtinwhichtheactionorproceedingwaspendingstatingthemannerofdisposalthereof."
ThatthelispendensunderEntryNo.427183wasannotatedonT106098,T111560,T111561andT111562byvirtueofacasedocketedas
CivilCaseNo.15871,nowpendingwiththeIntermediateCourtofAppeals,entitled,"CalixtaProvido,RicardoProvido,Sr.,MariaProvido
andPerfectoProvido,Plaintiffs,versusEduardoBarandaandAlfonsoHitalia,Respondents."
ThatundertheabovequotedprovisionsofP.D.152,thecancellationofsubjectNoticeofLisPendenscanonlybemadeordeemedcancelled
upontheregistrationofthecertificateoftheClerkofCourtinwhichtheactionorproceedingwaspending,statingthemannerofdisposal
thereof.
ConsideringthatCivilCaseNo.1587,uponwhichtheNoticeofLisPendenswasbasedisstillpendingwiththeIntermediateCourtof
Appeals,onlytheIntermediateCourtofAppealsandnotthisHonorableCourtinamerecadastralproceedingscanorderthecancellationof
theNoticeofLisPendens.(pp.6869,Rollo)
AdoptingtheseargumentsandonthegroundthatsomeifnotalloftheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.15871werenotpriviestothecaseaffected
bytheSupremeCourtresolutions,respondentJudgeTitoGustilosetasidehisFebruary12,1987orderandgrantedtheActingRegisterof
Deeds'motionforreconsideration.
TheissuehingesonwhetherornotthependencyoftheappealinCivilCaseNo.15871withtheCourtofAppealspreventsthecourtfrom
cancellingthenoticeoflispendensinthecertificatesoftitlesofthepetitionerswhichwereearlierdeclaredvalidandsubsistingbythisCourt
inG.R.No.62042andG.R.No.64432.AcorollaryissueisonthenatureofthedutyofaRegisterofDeedstoannotateorannulanotice
oflispendensinatorrenscertificateoftitle.
CivilCaseNo.15871wasacomplainttoseekrecoveryofLotNo.4517ofSta.BarbaraCadastreIloilo,(thesamesubjectmatterofG.R.No
62042andG.R.No.64432)frompetitionersBarandaandHitaliafiledbyCalixtaProvido,RicardoProvido,MaximaProvidoandPerfecta
ProvidobeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofIloilo,Branch23.AttheinstanceofAtty.HectorP.Teodosio,theProvides'counsel,anoticeofis
pendenswasannotatedonpetitioners'CertificateofTitleNo.T106098coveringLotNo.4517,Sta.BarbaraCadastre.
Actingonamotiontodismissfiledbythepetitioners,thecourtissuedanorderdatedOctober24,1984dismissingCivilCaseNo.15871.
TheorderwasthenappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.ThisappealisthereasonwhyrespondentJudgeGustilorecalledtheFebruary12,1987
orderdirectingtheActingRegisterofDeedstocancelthenoticeoflispendensannotatedonthecertificatesoftitlesofthepetitioners.
Thispetitionisimpressedwithmerit.
MariaProvidoGoterawasoneofthepetitionersinG.R.No.62042.AlthoughCalixtaProvido,RicardoProvido,MaximaProvidoand
PerfectaProvido,theplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.15871werenotimpleadedasparties,itisveryclearinthepetitionthatMariaProvidowas
actingonbehalfoftheProvidoswhoallegedlyarehercoownersinLotNo.4517,Sta.BarbaraCadastreasshownbyTransferCertificateof
TitleNo.T25772issuedinhernameandthenamesoftheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.15871,amongothers.(Annex"E"G.R.No.62042,p.
51,Rollo)Infact,oneoftheissuesraisedbypetitionersMariaProvidoGoteraandGregoriaPerezinG.R.No.62042wasasfollows:
xxxxxxxxx
2.Whetherornot,inthesamereconstitutionproceedings,respondentJudgeMidpantaoL.Adilhadtheauthoritytodeclareasnullandvoid
thetransfercertificateoftitleinthenameofpetitionerMariaProvidoGoteraandherothercoowners.(p.3,Rollo;Emphasissupplied)
ItthusappearsthattheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.15871werepriviestoG.R.No.62042contrarytothetrialcourt'sfindingsthattheywere
not.
G.R.No.62042affirmedtheorderofthethenCourtofFirstInstanceofIloilointhereconstitutionproceedingsdeclaringTCTNo.25772in
thenameofProvidosoverLotNo.4517,Sta.BarbaraCadastrenullandvoidforbeingfraudulentlyobtainedanddeclaringTCTNo.106098
overthesameparcelLotNo.4517,Sta.BarbaraCadastreinthenameofpetitionersEduardoBarandaandAlfonsoHitaliavalidand
subsisting.
ThedecisioninG.R.No.62042becamefinalandexecutoryonMarch25,1983longbeforeCivilCaseNo.15871wasfiled.
Underthesecircumstances,itiscrystalclearthattheProvidos,privaterespondentsherein,infilingCivilCaseNo.15871weretryingtodelay
thefullimplementationofthefinaldecisionsinG.R.No.62042aswellasG.R.No.64432whereinthisCourtorderedimmediate
implementationofthewritsofpossessionanddemolitioninthereconstitutionproceedingsinvolvingLotNo.4517,Sta.BarbaraCadastre.
Thepurposeofanoticeoflispendensisdefinedinthefollowingmanner:
LispendenshasbeenconceivedtoprotecttherealrightsofthepartycausingtheregistrationthereofWiththelispendensdulyrecorded,he
couldrestsecurethathewouldnotlosethepropertyoranypartofit.For,noticeoflispendensservesasawarningtoaprospectivepurchaser
orincumbrancerthattheparticularpropertyisinlitigation;andthatheshouldkeephishandsoffthesame,unlessofcourseheintendsto
gambleontheresultsofthelitigation.(Section24,Rule14,RuIesofCourt;Jamorav.Duran,etal.,69Phil.3,11;IMartin,RulesofCourt,p.
415,footnote3,citingcases.)(Natanov.Esteban,18SCRA481,485486)
Theprivaterespondentsarenotentitledtothisprotection.Thefactsobtaininginthiscasenecessitatetheapplicationoftheruleenunciatedin
thecasesofVictorianov.Rovila(55Phil.1000),MunicipalCouncilofParanaquev.CourtofFirstInstanceofRizal(70Phil.,363)and
Sarmientov.Ortiz(10SCRA158),totheeffectthat:
Wehaveonceheldthatwhileordinarilyanoticeofpendencywhichhasbeenfiledinapropercase,cannotbecancelledwhiletheactionis
pendingandundetermined,thepropercourthasthediscretionarypowertocancelitunderpeculiarcircumstances,asforinstance,wherethe
evidencesofarpresentedbytheplaintiffdoesnotbearoutthemainallegationsofhiscomplaint,andwherethecontinuancesofthetrial,for
whichtheplaintiffisresponsible,areunnecessarilydelayingthedeterminationofthecasetotheprejudiceofthedefendant.(Victorianov.
Rovira,supra;TheMunicipalCouncilofParanaquev.CourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,supra)
ThefactsofthiscaseinrelationtotheearliercasesbroughtallthewaytotheSupremeCourtillustratehowtheprivaterespondentstriedto
blockbutunsuccessfulythealreadyfinaldecisionsinG.R.No.62042andG.R.No.64432.
Parenthetically,respondentJudgeTitoGustiloabusedhisdiscretioninsustainingtherespondentActingRegisterofDeeds'standthat,the
noticeoflispendensinthecertificatesoftitlesofthepetitionersoverLotNo.4571,BarbaraCadastrecannotbecancelledonthegroundof
pendencyofCivilCaseNo.15871withtheCourtofAppeals.InupholdingthepositionoftheActingRegisterofDeedsbasedonSection77
ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1529,heconvenientlyforgotthefirstparagraphthereofwhichprovides:
Cancellationoflispendens.Beforefinaljudgment,anoticeoflispendensmaybecancelleduponOrderoftheCourtafterpropershowing
thatthenoticeisforthepurposeofmolestingtheadverseparty,orthatitisnotnecessarytoprotecttherightsofthepartywhocausedittobe
registered.ItmayalsobecancelledbytheRegisterofDeedsuponverifiedpetitionofthepartywhocausedtheregistrationthereof.
ThisCourtcannotunderstandhowrespondentJudgeGustilocouldhavebeenmisledbytherespondentActingRegisterofDeedsonthis
matterwheninfacthewasthesameJudgewhoissuedtheorderdismissingCivilCaseNo.15871promptingtheprivaterespondentstoappeal
saidorderdatedOctober10,1984totheCourtofAppeals.Therecordsofthemaincasearestillwiththecourtbelowbutbasedontheorder,
itcanbesafelyassumedthatthevariouspleadingsfiledbythepartiessubsequenttothemotiontodismissfiledbythepetitioners(the
defendantstherein)touchedontheissueofthevalidityofTCTNo.25772inthenameoftheProvidosoverLotNumber4571,Sta.Barbara
CadastreinthelightofthefinaldecisionsinG.R.No.62042andG.R.No.64432.
ThenextquestiontobedeterminedisonthenatureofthedutyoftheRegisterofDeedstoannotateand/orcancelthenoticeoflispendensina
torrenscertificateoftitle.
Section10,PresidentialDecreeNo.1529statesthat"ItshallbethedutyoftheRegisterofDeedstoimmediatelyregisteraninstrument
presentedforregistrationdealingwithrealorpersonalpropertywhichcomplieswithalltherequisitesforregistration.....Iftheinstrumentis
notregistrable,heshallforthwithdenyregistrationthereofandinformthepresentorofsuchdenialinwriting,statingthegroundorreasons
therefore,andadvisinghimofhisrighttoappealbyconsultainaccordancewithSection117ofthisDecree."
Section117providesthat"WhentheRegisterofDeedsisindoubtwithregardtothepropersteptobetakenormemorandatobemadein
pursuanceofanydeed,mortgageorotherinstrumentpresentedtohimforregistrationorwhereanypartyininterestdoesnotagreewiththe
actiontakenbytheRegisterofDeedswithreferencetoanysuchinstrument,thequestionshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionofLand
RegistrationbytheRegisterofDeeds,orbythepartyininterestthrutheRegisterofDeeds....."
Theelementaryruleinstatutoryconstructionisthatwhenthewordsandphrasesofthestatuteareclearandunequivocal,theirmeaningmust
bedeterminedfromthelanguageemployedandthestatutemustbetakentomeanexactlywhatitsays.(Aparriv.CourtofAppeals,127
SCRA231;InsularBankofAsiaandAmericaEmployees'Union[IBAAEU]v.Inciong,132SCRA663)Thestatuteconcerningthefunction
oftheRegisterofDeedstoregisterinstrumentsinatorrenscertificateoftitleisclearandleavesnoroomforconstruction.Accordingto
Webster'sThirdInternationalDictionaryoftheEnglishLanguagethewordshallmeans"oughtto,must,...obligationusedtoexpressa
commandorexhortation,usedinlaws,regulationsordirectivestoexpresswhatismandatory."Hence,thefunctionofaRegisterofDeeds
withreferencetotheregistrationofdeedsencumbrances,instrumentsandthelikeisministerialinnature.TherespondentActingRegisterof
DeedsdidnothaveanylegalstandingtofileamotionforreconsiderationoftherespondentJudge'sOrderdirectinghimtocancelthenotice
oflispendensannotatedinthecertificatesoftitlesofthepetitionersoverthesubjectparcelofland.Incaseofdoubtastothepropersteptobe
takeninpursuanceofanydeed...orotherinstrumentpresentedtohim,heshouldhaveaskedtheopinionoftheCommissionerofLand
Registrationnow,theAdministratoroftheNationalLandTitleandDeedsRegistrationAdministrationinaccordancewithSection117of
PresidentialDecreeNo.1529.
Intheultimateanalysis,however,theresponsibilityforthedelaysinthefullimplementationofthisCourt'salreadyfinalresolutionsinG.R.
No.62042andG.R.No.64432whichincludesthecancellationofthenoticeoflispendensannotatedinthecertificatesoftitlesofthe
petitionersoverLotNo.4517oftheSta.BarbaraCadastrefallsontherespondentJudge.Heshouldneverhaveallowedhimselftobecome
partofdilatorytactics,givingasexcusethewrongimpressionthatCivilCaseNo.15871filedbytheprivaterespondentsinvolvesanotherset
ofpartiesclaimingLotNo.4517undertheirownTorrensCertificateofTitle.
WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisGRANTED.TheFebruary12,1987orderoftheRegionalTrialCourtofIloilo,Branch23is
REINSTATED.AllsubsequentordersissuedbythetrialcourtwhichannulledtheFebruary12,1987orderareSETASIDE.Costsagainstthe
privaterespondents.
SOORDERED.

2. Balbin v RD Ilocos Sur, GR No. 20611

MAKALINTAL,J.:
AppealfromtheresolutionoftheCommissionerofLandRegistrationinLRCConsultaNo.366.
OnNovember15,1961petitionerspresentedtotheregisterofdeedsofIlocosSuraduplicatecopyoftheregisteredowner'scertificateoftitle
(OCTNo.548)andaninstrumententitled"DeedofDonationintervivos,"withtherequestthatthesamebeannotatedonthetitle.Underthe
termsoftheinstrumentsoughttobeannotatedoneCornelioBalbin,registeredowneroftheparceloflanddescribedinOCTNo.548,appears
tohavedonatedintervivosanundividedtwothirds(/)portionthereofinfavorofpetitioners.Theentireareaofthelandis11.2225hectares.
Theregisterofdeedsdeniedtherequestedannotationforbeing"legallydefectiveorotherwisenotsufficientinlaw."Itappearsthatpreviously
annotatedinthememorandumofencumbrancesonthecertificatearethreeseparatesalesofundividedportionsofthelandearlierexecutedby
CornelioBalbininfavorofthreedifferentbuyers.Thepertinententriesread:
EntryNo.5658.Sales.
SaleforthesumofP400.00executedbytheregisteredowner,conveyinganundividedportionofanareaof3,710squaremetersonlyinfavor
ofFlorentinoGabayan,thisOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.548isherebycancelledwithrespecttosaidareaof3,710squaremetersandin
lieuthereof,thenameofthevendee...isherebysubstitutedtosucceedtoallrights,participationininterestofthevendor....
DateofInstrument:January25,1955,...
xxxxxxxxx
EntryNo.5659.Saleofportion.
SaleforthesumofP100.00executedbytheregisteredowner,conveyinganundividedportionofanareaof16,713squaremetersinfavorof
RobertoBravo,thisOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.548isherebycancelledwithrespecttosaidundividedportion...andinlieuthereofthe
nameofthevendee...isherebysubstitutedtosucceedtoallrights,participationandinterestofthevendor...
DateofInstrument:June9,1953....
EntryNo.5660.Saleofportion.
SaleforthesumofP400.00executedbytheregisteredowner,conveyinganundividedportionofanareaof15,000squaremetersinfavorof
JuanaGabayan,thisCertificateofTitleNo.548isherebycancelledwithrespecttosaidundividedportion...andinlieuthereofthenameof
thevendee...isherebysubstitutedtosucceedtoallrights,participationandinterestofthevendor...
DateofInstrument:February12,1952....
Thefinalpartoftheannotationsreferringtotheabovementionedsalescontainsanadditionalmemorandumstatingthat"threecoowner's
duplicatecertificatesoftitleNo.548havebeenissued(bytheregisterofdeedsofIlocosSur)inthenameofFlorentinoGabayan,Roberto
BravoandJuanaGabayanuponverbalrequestofMr.AndresCabeldo,NotaryPublicofCaoayan,I.Sur,forandinthenameofthevendees,
this5thdayofJanuary,1956atVigan,I.Sur."Mainlybecausethesethreeothercoowner'scopiesofthecertificateoftitleNo.548hadnot
beenpresentedbypetitioners,theRegisterofDeedsrefusedtomaketherequestedannotation.
Unsatisfied,petitionersreferredthemattertotheCommissionerofLandRegistration,whosubsequentlyupheldtheactionoftheRegisterof
DeedsinaresolutiondatedApril10,1962.Withrespecttotheprincipalpointincontroversy,theCommissionerobserved:
(1)ItappearsthatthedonorisnowmerelyacoownerofthepropertydescribedintheOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.548,havingpreviously
soldundividedportionsthereofonthreedifferentoccasionsinfavorofthreedifferentbuyers.Consequently,asidefromtheowner'sduplicate
issuedtoCornelioBalbin,therearenowthreecoowner'sduplicateswhicharepresumablyinthepossessionofthethreebuyers.Accordingly,
inadditiontotheowner'sduplicateofOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.548,thethreecoowner'sduplicatesmustlikewisebesurrendered.The
claimofcounselforthedoneesthattheissuanceofthethreecoowner'sduplicateswasunauthorizedisbesidethepoint.Unlessanduntila
courtofcompetentjurisdictionrulestothecontrary,thesetitlesarepresumedtohavebeenlawfullyissued.
Withoutpresentingthosethree(3)otherduplicatesofthetitle,petitionerswouldwanttocompelannotationofthedeedofdonationuponthe
copyintheirpossession,citingsection55ofAct496,whichprovidesthat"theproductionoftheowner'sduplicatecertificateoftitle
wheneveranyvoluntaryinstrumentispresentedforregistrationshallbeconclusiveauthorityfromtheregisteredownertotheregisterofdeeds
tomakeamemorandumofregistrationinaccordancewithsuchinstrument."Underthisprovision,accordingtopetitioners,thepresentationof
theothercopiesofthetitleisnotrequired,first,becauseitspeaksof"registeredowner"andnotonewhoseclaimtoorinterestintheproperty
ismerelyannotatedonthetitle,suchasthethreevendeescoownersinthiscase;andsecondly,becausetheissuanceoftheduplicatecopiesin
theirfavorwasillegalorunauthorized.
Wefindnomeritinpetitioners'contention.Section55,supra,obviouslyassumesthatthereisonlyoneduplicatecopyofthetitleinquestion,
namely,thatoftheregisteredownerhimself,suchthatitsproductionwheneveravoluntaryinstrumentispresentedconstitutessufficient
authorityfromhimfortheregisterofdeedstomakethecorrespondingmemorandumofregistration.Inthecaseatbar,thethreeothercopies
ofthetitlewereinexistence,presumablyissuedundersection43*ofAct496.AscorrectlyobservedbytheLandRegistrationCommissioner,
petitioners'claimthattheissuanceofthosecopieswasunauthorizedorillegalisbesidethepoint,itslegalitybeingpresumeduntilotherwise
declaredbyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction.Therebeingseveralcopiesofthesametitleinexistence,itiseasytoseehowtheirintegritymay
beadverselyaffectedifanencumbrance,oranoutrightconveyance,isannotatedononecopyandnotontheothers.Thelawitselfrefersto
everycopyauthorizedtobeissuedasaduplicateoftheoriginal,whichmeansthatbothmustcontainidenticalentriesofthetransactions,
particularlyvoluntaryones,affectingthelandcoveredbythetitle.Ifthiswerenotso,ifdifferentcopieswerepermittedtocarrydiffering
annotations,thewholesystemofTorrensregistrationwouldceasetobereliable.
OneothergroundrelieduponbytheLandRegistrationCommissionerinupholdingtheactiontakenbytheRegisterofDeedsofIlocosSuris
thatsincethepropertysubjectofthedonationispresumedconjugal,thatis,propertyofthemarriageofthedonor,CornelioBalbin,andhis
deceasedwife,NemesiaMina,"thereshouldfirstbealiquidationofthepartnershipbeforethesurvivingspousemaymakesucha
conveyance."Thislegalconclusionmayappeartoogeneralandsweepinginitsimplications,forwithoutaprevioussettlementofthe
partnershipasurvivingspousemaydisposeofhisaliquotshareorinterestthereinsubjectofcoursetotheresultoffutureliquidation.
Nevertheless,itisnottobedeniedthat,iftheconjugalcharacterofthepropertyisassumed,thedeedofdonationexecutedbythehusband,
CornelioBalbin,bearsonitsfaceaninfirmitywhichjustifiedthedenialofitsregistration,namely,thefactthatthetwothirdsportionofsaid
propertywhichhedonatedwasmorethanhisonehalfshare,nottosaymorethanwhatremainedofsuchshareafterhehadsoldportionsof
thesamelandtothreeotherparties.
ItappearsthatthereisacasependingintheCourtofFirstInstanceofIlocosSur(CCNo.2221),whereinthecivilstatusofthedonorCornelio
Balbinandthecharacterofthelandinquestionareinissue,aswellasthevalidityofthedifferentconveyancesexecutedbyhim.Thematter
ofregistrationofthedeedofdonationmaywellawaittheoutcomeofthatcase,andinthemeantimetherightsoftheinterestedpartiescould
beprotectedbyfilingthepropernoticesoflispendens.
INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,thedecisionsoftheRegisterofDeedsofIlocosSurandthatoftheCommissionerofLandRegistrationare
affirmed.Nopronouncementastocosts.

3. Almirol v RD Agusan, GR No. 22486

CASTRO,J.:
OnJune28,1961TeodoroAlmirolpurchasedfromArcenioAbaloaparceloflandsituatedinthemunicipalityofEsperanza,province
ofAgusan,andcoveredbyoriginalcertificateoftitleP1237inthenameof"ArcenioAbalo,marriedtoNicolasaM.Abalo."Sometimein
May,1962AlmirolwenttotheofficeoftheRegisterofDeedsofAgusaninButuanCitytoregisterthedeedofsaleandtosecureinhisname
atransfercertificateoftitle.RegistrationwasrefusedbytheRegisterofDeedsuponthefollowinggrounds,interalia,statedinhisletterof
May21,1962:
1.ThatOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.P1237isregisteredinthenameofArcenioAbalo,marriedtoNicolasaM.Abalo,andbylegal
presumption,isconsideredconjugalproperty;
2.ThatinthesaleofaconjugalpropertyacquiredaftertheeffectivityoftheNewCivilCodeitisnecessarythatbothspousessignthe
document;but
3.Since,asinthiscase,thewifehasalreadydiedwhenthesalewasmade,thesurvivinghusbandcannotdisposeofthewholeproperty
withoutviolatingtheexistinglaw(LRCConsultaNo.46datedJune10,1958).
ToeffecttheregistrationoftheaforesaiddeedofabsoluteSale,itisnecessarythatthepropertybefirstliquidatedandtransferredinthe
nameofthesurvivingspouseandtheheirsofthedeceasedwifebymeansofextrajudicialsettlementorpartitionandthattheconsentofsuch
otherheirorheirsmustbeprocuredbymeansofanotherdocumentratifyingthissaleexecutedbytheirfather.
Inviewofsuchrefusal,AlmirolwenttotheCourtofFirstInstanceofAgusanonapetitionformandamus(sp.civ.case151),tocompel
theRegisterofDeedstoregisterthedeedofsaleandtoissuetohimthecorrespondingtransfercertificateoftitle,andtorecoverP5,000in
moraldamagesandP1,000attorney'sfeesandexpensesoflitigation.ItisAlmirol'sassertionthatitisbutaministerialdutyoftherespondent
toperformtheactsrequiredofhim,andthathe(Almirol)hasnootherplain,speedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw.
InhisanswerwithcounterclaimforP10,000damages,therespondentreiteratedthegroundsstatedinhisletterofMay21,1962,averred
thatthepetitionerhas"otherlegal,plain,speedyandadequateremedyatlawbyappealingthedecisionoftherespondenttotheHonorable
CommissionerofLandRegistration,"andprayedfordismissalofthepetition.
InitsresolutionofOctober16,1963thelowercourt,declaringthat"mandamusdoesnotlie...becausetheadequateremedyisthat
providedbySection4ofRep.Act1151",dismissedthepetition,withcostsagainstthepetitioner.
HencethepresentappealbyAlmirol.
Theonlyquestionoflawtenderedforresolutioniswhethermandamuswilllietocompeltherespondenttoregisterthedeedofsalein
question.
Althoughthereasonsrelieduponbytherespondentevinceasinceredesireonhisparttomaintaininviolatethelawonsuccessionand
transmissionofrightsoverrealproperties,thesedonotconstitutelegalgroundsforhisrefusaltoregisterthedeed.Whetheradocumentis
validornot,isnotfortheregisterofdeedstodetermine;thisfunctionbelongsproperlytoacourtofcompetentjurisdiction.1
Whetherthedocumentisinvalid,frivolousorintendedtoharass,isnotthedutyofaRegisterofDeedstodecide,butacourtof
competentjurisdiction.(Gabrielvs.RegisterofDeedsofRizal,etal.,L17956,Sept.30,1953).
...thesupposedinvalidityofthecontractsofleaseisnovalidobjectiontotheirregistration,becauseinvalidityisnoproofoftheirnon
existenceoravalidexcusefordenyingtheirregistration.Thelawonregistrationdoesnotrequirethatonlyvalidinstrumentsshallbe
registered.Howcanpartiesaffectedtherebybesupposedtoknowtheirinvaliditybeforetheybecomeaware,actuallyorconstructively,of
theirexistenceoroftheirprovisions?Ifthepurposeofregistrationismerelytogivenotice,thenquestionsregardingtheeffectorinvalidityof
instrumentsareexpectedtobedecidedafter,notbefore,registration.Itmustfollowasanecessaryconsequencethatregistrationmustfirstbe
allowed,andvalidityoreffectlitigatedafterwards.(GurbaxSinghPablo&Co.vs.ReyesandTantoco,92Phil.182183).
Indeed,aregisterofdeedsisentirelyprecludedbysection4ofRepublicAct1151fromexercisinghispersonaljudgmentanddiscretion
whenconfrontedwiththeproblemofwhethertoregisteradeedorinstrumentonthegroundthatitisinvalid.Forunderthesaidsection,when
heisindoubtastothepropersteptobetakenwithrespecttoanydeedorotherinstrumentpresentedtohimforregistration,allthatheis
supposedtodoistosubmitandcertifythequestiontotheCommissionerofLandRegistrationwhoshall,afternoticeandhearing,enteran
orderprescribingthesteptobetakenonthedoubtfulquestion.Section4ofR.A.1151readsasfollows:
ReferenceofdoubtfulmatterstoCommissionerofLandRegistration.WhentheRegisterofDeedsisindoubtwithregardtothe
propersteptobetakenormemorandumtobemadeinpursuanceofanydeed,mortgage,orotherinstrumentpresentedtohimforregistration,
orwhereanypartyininterestdoesnotagreewiththeRegisterofDeedswithreferencetoanysuchmatter,thequestionshallbesubmittedto
theCommissionerofLandRegistrationeitheruponthecertificationoftheRegisterofDeeds,statingthequestionuponwhichheisindoubt,
oruponthesuggestioninwritingbythepartyininterest;andthereupontheCommissioner,afterconsiderationofthemattershownbythe
recordscertifiedtohim,andincaseofregisteredlands,afternoticetothepartiesandhearing,shallenteranorderprescribingthesteptobe
takenormemorandumtobemade.HisdecisioninsuchcasesshallbeconclusiveandbindinguponallRegistersofDeeds:Provided,further,
ThatwhenapartyininterestdisagreeswiththerulingorresolutionoftheCommissionerandtheissueinvolvesaquestionoflaw,said
decisionmaybeappealedtotheSupremeCourtwithinthirtydaysfromandafterreceiptofthenoticethereof.
Theforegoingnotwithstanding,thecourtaquocorrectlydismissedthepetitionformandamus.Section4abovequotedprovidesthat
"whereanypartyininterestdoesnotagreewiththeRegisterofDeeds...thequestionshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionerofLand
Registration,"whothereaftershall"enteranorderprescribingthesteptobetakenormemorandumtobemade,"whichshallbe"conclusive
andbindinguponallRegistersofDeeds."Thisadministrativeremedymustberesortedtobythepetitionerbeforehecanhaverecoursetothe
courts.
ACCORDINGLY,theResolutionofthelowercourtofOctober16,1969,isaffirmed,atpetitioner'scost.1wph1.t
Reyes,J.B.L.,Dizon,Makalintal,Bengzon,J.P.,Zaldivar,AngelesandFernando,JJ.,concur.
Concepcion,C.J.,isonleave.
Sanchez,J.,concursintheresult.

4. Ong v Republic, GR No. 175746

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:(2008)
ThispetitionforreviewoncertiorariassailstheApril25,2006Decision 1oftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.76085,whichreversed
andsetasidetheJanuary16,2002Decision2oftheMunicipalTrialCourtofMangaldan,PangasinaninLandRegistrationCaseNo.99023,
andtheNovember20,2006Resolution3whichdeniedpetitionersmotionforreconsideration.
Theantecedentfactsareasfollows.
OnJuly1,1999,petitionerCharlesL.Ong(petitioner)inhisbehalfandasdulyauthorizedrepresentativeofhisbrothers,namely,Roberto,
AlbertoandCesar,filedanApplicationforRegistrationofTitle4overLot15911(subjectlot)situatedinBarangayAnolid,Mangaldan,
Pangasinanwithanareaoffivehundredseventyfour(574)squaremeters,moreorless.Theyallegedthattheyarethecoownersofthe
subjectlot;thatthesubjectlotistheirexclusivepropertyhavingacquiredthesamebypurchasefromspousesTonyBautistaandAlicia
VillamilonAugust24,1998;thatthesubjectlotispresentlyunoccupied;andthattheyandtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,
continuousandpeacefulpossessionofthesubjectlotintheconceptofownersformorethanthirty(30)years.
Afterduenoticeandpublication,onlyrespondentRepublicofthePhilippines(respondent),representedbytheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,
opposedtheapplicationforregistrationoftitle.Respondentassertedthatneitherapplicantsnortheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenin
open,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthesubjectlotsinceJune12,1945orearlierasrequiredbySection
48(b)ofCommonwealthActNo.141,asamendedbyPresidentialDecree(P.D.)No.1073;thatapplicantsfailedtoadduceanymunimentof
titletoprovetheirclaims;thatthetaxdeclarationappendedtotheapplicationdoesnotappeargenuineandmerelyshowspretendedpossession
ofrecentvintage;thattheapplicationwasfiledbeyondtheperiodallowedunderP.D.No.892;andthatthesubjectlotispartofthepublic
domainwhichcannotbethesubjectofprivateappropriation.
OnJanuary16,2002,thetrialcourtrenderedaDecisioninfavorofpetitionerandhisbrothers,viz:
Theforegoingevidencespresentedbytheapplicantindubitablyestablishedsufficientbasistogranttheapplicant(sic)forregistration.
Originally,thewholeparceloflandwasownedbyspousesTeofiloAbellaraandAbellaCharminewhoacquiredthesamebyvirtueofaDeed
ofSalefromCynthiaCacho,AgustinCacho,Jr.,JasminCacho,JoverCachoandLauroCacho.Later,theysoldthesameparceloflandto
spousesTonyC.VillamilandAliciaBautista,whointurnsoldthesamelandtohereinapplicants.
Thesameparceloflandhasbeendeclaredinthenameoftheapplicantandherpredecessorsininterestanditstaxeshas(sic)beenreligiously
paid.
Thesaidcircumstancesfurthershowthatthepossessionandownershipoftheapplicantandher(sic)predecessorsininterestoverthesame
parceloflandhas(sic)beencontinuousandpeacefulunderbonafideclaimofownershipbeforethefilingoftheinstantapplicationfor
registrationon[July1,1999].
WHEREFORE,afterconfirmingtheOrderofGeneralDefault,theCourtherebyordersanddecreestheregistrationofaparceloflandas
shownonplanap01004897approvedbytheBureauofLand(s)situatedinBarangayAnolid,Mangaldan,Pangasinan,containinganareaof
FiveHundredSeventyFour(574)squaremeters,subjectoftheapplicationforregistrationoftitle,inaccordancewithPresidentialDecreeNo.
1529,infavorofCHARLIEL.ONGinhisbehalfandasrepresentativeofhisbrothersnamely,ROBERTOL.ONG,ALBERTOL.ONGand
CESARL.ONG.
FurnishcopiesofthisDecisiontotheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral,MakatiCity,MetroManila,theOfficeoftheProvincialProsecutor,
DagupanCity,Atty.CelestinoDomingoJr.,theOfficeoftheLandRegistrationAuthority,QuezonCity,aswellastheapplicant.
SOORDERED.5
Aggrieved,respondentappealedtotheCourtofAppealswhichrenderedtheassailedDecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE,theinstantappealisGRANTED.Accordingly,thedecisionofthecourtaquograntingtheapplicationforregistrationoftitle
ofapplicantsappelleesisREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.6
Inreversingthedecisionofthetrialcourt,theCourtofAppealsfoundthatthesubjectlotispartofthealienableanddisposablelandsofthe
publicdomain.Thus,itwasincumbentuponpetitionertoprovethattheypossessedthesubjectlotinthenatureandforthedurationrequired
bylaw.However,petitionerfailedtoprovethatheorhispredecessorsininteresthavebeeninadversepossessionofthesubjectlotinthe
conceptofownersinceJune12,1945orearlierasmandatedbySection14(1)ofP.D.1529.Itnotedthattheearliesttaxdeclarationwhich
petitionerpresentedisdated1971.Consequently,petitionercouldnotfairlyclaimpossessionofthelandpriorto1971.Neitherwaspetitioner
abletoprovethatheorhispredecessorsininterestactuallyoccupiedthesubjectlotpriortothefilingoftheapplication.Thus,thetrialcourt
erredingrantingtheapplicationforregistrationoftitleoverthesubjectlot.
Hence,thispetitionraisingthefollowingissues:
1.WHETHERORNOTPETITIONER,TOGETHERWITHHISBROTHERS,NAMELY,ROBERTOL.ONG,ALBERTOL.ONGAND
CEZARL.ONG,HAVEREGISTRABLEOWNERSHIPOVERTHEREALPROPERTYSUBJECTMATTEROFLAND
REGISTRATIONCASENO.99023,AND
2.WHETHERORNOTTHEFINDINGSANDCONCLUSIONOFTHEFORMERSPECIALFOURTHDIVISIONOFTHECOURTOF
APPEALSTHATTHESUBJECTREALPROPERTYISAPUBLICLANDISCORRECT.7
Thepetitionlacksmerit.
Section14(1)ofP.D.1529("PropertyRegistrationDecree"),asamended,provides
SEC.14.Whomayapply.ThefollowingpersonsmayfileintheproperCourtofFirstInstanceanapplicationforregistrationoftitletoland,
whetherpersonallyorthroughtheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives:
(1)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomainunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,1945,orearlier.
Thus,pursuanttotheaforequotedprovisionoflaw,applicantsforregistrationoftitlemustprove:(1)thatthesubjectlandformspartofthe
disposableandalienablelandsofthepublicdomain,and(2)thattheyhavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofthesameunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,1945,orearlier. 8Theserequisitesinvolvequestionsoffactwhich
arenotproperinapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.FactualfindingsofthecourtaquoaregenerallybindingonthisCourtexceptforcertain
recognizedexceptions,asisthecasehere,wherethetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppealsarrivedatconflictingfindings. 9Afteracareful
reviewoftherecords,wesustainthefindingsandconclusionsoftheCourtofAppeals.
Thereisnodisputethatthesubjectlotisclassifiedasalienableanddisposablelandofthepublicdomain.TheReport10datedJanuary17,2000
oftheBureauofLandsstatedthatthesubjectlotis"withinthealienableanddisposablezoneasclassifiedunderProject50L.C.MapNo.698
andreleasedandclassifiedassuchonNovember21,1927."11Thisfindingis,likewise,embodiedintheReport12datedJanuary7,1999ofthe
DepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesCommunityEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesOffice(DENRCENRO)andtheblue
printCopy13oftheplancoveringthesubjectlot.However,petitionerfailedtoprovethatheorhispredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,
continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthesubjectlotsinceJune12,1945orearlier.
TherecordsshowthatpetitionerandhisbrothersboughtthesubjectlotfromspousesTonyBautistaandAliciaVillamilonAugust24,
1998,14whointurnpurchasedthesamefromspousesTeofiloAbelleraandAbellaSarmenonJanuary16,1997.15Thelatterboughtthesubject
lotfromCynthia,AgustinJr.,Jasmin,OmirandLauro,allsurnamedCacho,onJuly10,1979.16Theearliesttaxdeclarationwhichwas
submittedinevidencewasTaxDeclarationNo.2560617issuedin1971inthenamesofspousesAgustinCachoandEufrosiniaBaustista.
Whiletaxdeclarationsarenotconclusiveproofofownership,theyconstitutegoodindiciaofpossessionintheconceptofownerandaclaim
oftitleoverthesubjectproperty.18Evenifweweretotackpetitionersclaimofownershipoverthesubjectlottothatoftheiralleged
predecessorsininterest,spousesAgustinCachoandEufrosiniaBaustistain1971,stillthiswouldfallshortoftherequiredpossessionfrom
June12,1945orearlier.
Further,ascorrectlypointedbytheCourtofAppeals,possessionaloneisnotsufficienttoacquiretitletoalienablelandsofthepublicdomain
becausethelawrequirespossessionandoccupation.AsheldinRepublicv.Alconaba:19
Thelawspeaksofpossessionandoccupation.Sincethesewordsareseparatedbytheconjunctionand,theclearintentionofthelawisnotto
makeonesynonymouswiththeother.Possessionisbroaderthanoccupationbecauseitincludesconstructivepossession.When,therefore,the
lawaddsthewordoccupation,itseekstodelimittheallencompassingeffectofconstructivepossession.Takentogetherwiththewordsopen,
continuous,exclusiveandnotorious,thewordoccupationservestohighlightthefactthatforanapplicanttoqualify,hispossessionmustnot
beamerefiction.Actualpossessionofalandconsistsinthemanifestationofactsofdominionoveritofsuchanatureasapartywould
naturallyexerciseoverhisownproperty.20
PetitioneradmittedthatafterheandhisbrothersboughtthesubjectlotfromspousesTonyBautistaandAliciaVillamilin1998,neitherhenor
hisbrothersactuallyoccupiedthesubjectlot.21Noimprovementsweremadethereonandthemostthattheydidwastovisitthelotonseveral
occasions.22Petitionerspredecessorininterest,TonyBautistatestifiedthatheandhiswifeneveractuallyoccupiedthesubjectlotfromthe
timetheyboughtthesamefromspousesTeofiloAbelleraandAbellaSarmenin1997.23Asidefromthesetwotestimonies,nootherevidence
waspresentedtoestablishthecharacterofthepossessionofthesubjectlotbypetitionersotherallegedpredecessorsininterest.Clearly,
petitionersevidencefailedtoestablishspecificactsofownershiptosubstantiatetheclaimthatheandhispredecessorsininterestpossessed
andoccupiedthesubjectlotinthenatureanddurationrequiredbylaw.
Theburdenofproofinlandregistrationcasesrestsontheapplicantwhomustshowbyclear,positiveandconvincingevidencethathisalleged
possessionandoccupationofthelandisofthenatureanddurationrequiredbylaw.24Unfortunately,petitionersevidencedonotconstitutethe
"wellnighincontrovertible"evidencenecessaryincasesofthisnature. 25Accordingly,theCourtofAppealsdidnoterrinreversingthe
Decisionofthetrialcourtandindenyinghisapplicationforregistrationoftitleoverthesubjectlot.
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thepetitionisDENIED.TheApril25,2006DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.
76085whichreversedandsetasidetheJanuary16,2002DecisionoftheMunicipalTrialCourtofMangaldan,PangasinaninLand
RegistrationCaseNo.99023,andtheNovember20,2006Resolutiondenyingthemotionforreconsideration,areAFFIRMED.
Costsagainstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.

5. Canete v Genuino Ice Company, GR No. 154080

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
ThispetitionforreviewoncertiorariseekstosetasidetheDecision 1oftheCourtofAppealsdatedJanuary9,2002inCAG.R.SPNo.64337
entitled"GenuinoIceCompany,Inc.vs.Hon.VictorinoP.Evangelista,NelsieB.Caete,etal.,"anditsResolution2datedJune26,2002,
dismissingpetitioners"SecondAmendedComplaint"inCivilCaseNo.Q9936483filedinBranch223oftheRegionalTrialCourtof
QuezonCity.
RecordsshowthatonJanuary11,1999,petitionersfiledacomplaintforcancellationoftitletopropertycoveredbyTransferCertificateof
Title(TCT)Nos.N140441;314399;4RT94384(292245);5RT94794(292246);6and292247.7Petitionersallegedthatsaidtitlesarespurious,
fictitiousandwereissued"undermysteriouscircumstances,"consideringthattheholdersthereofincludingtheirpredecessorsininterest
wereneverinactual,adverseandphysicalpossessionoftheproperty,renderingthemineligibletoacquiretitletothesaidpropertyunderthe
FriarLandsAct.8PetitionersalsosoughttonullifyOriginalCertificateofTitle(OCT)No.614fromwhichtheforegoingtitlessoughttobe
cancelledoriginatedorwerederived.
RespondentGenuinoIceCo.,Inc.filedamotiontodismiss9onthegroundthatthecomplaintstatesnocauseofactionbecausepetitionersare
notrealpartiesininterest;thatnoreliefmaybegrantedasamatteroflaw;andthatpetitionersfailedtoexhaustadministrativeremedies,but
itwasdeniedbythetrialcourt.Respondentmovedforreconsiderationbutthesamewasdenied.
OnNovember4,1999,petitionersfileda"SecondAmendedComplaint"10whichsoughttoannul,inadditiontothetitlesalreadyallegedinthe
originalcomplaint,TCTNos.274095and274096;11274097and274098;12and274099.13
TheSecondAmendedComplaintallegedthefollowingcausesofaction,aswellastheremedysoughttobeobtained,thus:
4.Thatplaintiffs(petitioners)andtheirpredecessorsininterestareamongthosewhohavebeeninactual,adverse,peacefulandcontinuous
possessioninconceptofownersofunregisteredparcelsoflandsituatedatSitioMabilog,BarangayCuliat,QuezonCity,MetroManila,which
parcelsoflandaremoreparticularlydescribedasfollows:
(1)"AparcelofunregisteredlandknownasLot668,situatedatBarangayCuliat,QuezonCityxxx."
(2)"AparcelofunregisteredlandknownasLot669,situatedatBarangayCuliat,QuezonCityxxx."
5.Thattheabovedescribedrealpropertyisaportionofafriarlandknownas"PiedadEstate,"whichpropertyisintendedfordistribution
amongthebonafideoccupantsthereofpursuanttotheFriarLandsAct.
6.ThattransfercertificatesoftitleallegedlyhavingoriginatedorderivedfromOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.614wereissuedbythe
RegisterofDeedsofQuezonCity,whichtransfercertificatesoftitleareintruthandinfactfictitious,spuriousandnullandvoid,forthe
followingreasons:(a)thatnorecordofanyagencyofthegovernmentshowsastohowandinwhatmannerwasOCT614issued;(b)thatno
recordofanyproceedingswhatsoever,whetherjudicialoradministrative,cansupportdefendantsclaimthattheabovedescribedproperty
originatedfromOCT614;and(c)thatthetransfercertificatesoftitleovertheabovedescribedpropertywereissuedundermysterious
circumstancesfortheabovenameddefendantsandtheirsocalledpredecessorsininterestneverhadanyactual,adverse,physicalpossession
ofthesaidproperty,thus,notallowedtoacquiretitleoverthepropertyinlitigationpursuanttotheFriarLandsAct.
7.Thatdefendantsareholdersoftransfercertificatesoftitleoftheabovedescribedproperty,whichtransfercertificatesoftitlearenulland
void,forreasonsspecificallymentionedinParagraph6hereofxxx;
8.ThattheactsinacquiringandkeepingthesaidtransfercertificatesoftitleinviolationoftheFriarLandsActandotherexistinglawsare
prejudicialtoplaintiffsrightsovertheabovedescribedproperty.
9.ThatequitydemandsthatdefendantstransfercertificatesoftitleasspecifiedinParagraph7hereofbedeclaredfictitious,spuriousandnull
andvoidabinitio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,itismostrespectfullyprayedofthisHonorableCourtthatjudgmentberenderedinfavorofplaintiffs
andagainstdefendants:
(1)DeclaringasnullandvoidabinitioOCT614andalltransfercertificatesoftitlederivedtherefrom;
(2)Declaringasnullandvoiddefendantstransfercertificatesoftitleoverthepropertyinlitigation;
(3)OrderingdefendantRegisterofDeedsofQuezonCitytocanceldefendantstransfercertificatesoftitleandalltransfercertificatesoftitle
derivedtherefrom;
(4)DeclaringtheplaintiffsasbonafideoccupantsofthepropertyinlitigationpursuanttotheprovisionsoftheFriarLandsActandother
existinglaws.14
RespondentmovedtodismisstheSecondAmendedComplaintonthefollowinggrounds:
a)Thecomplaintstatesnocauseofactionbecause:(1)ontheallegationsalone,plaintiffs(petitioners)arenotrealpartiesininterestwhomay
bringsuittocanceldefendants(includingrespondent)titles;(2)basedontheallegationsandprayerofthecomplaint,norelief,asamatterof
law,maybegranted;
b)Prescriptionhassetin;
c)Thereareearliersimilarcomplaints(CivilCaseNos.Q9522834andQ9523111)filedbyadifferentsetofplaintiffsagainstadifferent
setofdefendantsbutwhichinvolvethesamesubjectmatter,causeofactionandallegationsoftheplaintiffs,withrespecttothecancellationof
OCT614andsucceedingtitlesderivedfromit.SaidcomplaintshavesincebeendismissedbyBranch93oftheRegionalTrialCourtof
QuezonCity,thedismissalofwhichisthesubjectofapendingcertiorariproceedingintheappellatecourt. 15
OnJanuary3,2001,16thetrialcourtdeniedrespondentsmotiontodismisstheSecondAmendedComplaint.Itsmotionforreconsideration
waslikewisedeniedhencerespondentfiledapetitionforcertiorariwiththeCourtofAppeals.
TheappellatecourtgrantedrespondentspetitionforcertiorarianddismissedpetitionersSecondAmendedComplaintforfailuretostatea
causeofaction.Hence,theinstantpetitionraisingthefollowingissues:
A.THATTHECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINDECLARINGTHATTHECOMPLAINTFILEDBYTHEPETITIONERSWITHTHE
REGIONALTRIALCOURTOFQUEZONCITYINCIVILCASENO.Q9936483DOESNOTSTATEAVALIDCAUSEOFACTION;
B.THATTHECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINDECLARINGTHATTHEPETITIONERSARENOTREALPARTIESININTEREST;
C.THATTHECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINAPPLYINGTHEDOCTRINEOF"EXHAUSTIONOFADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES";and,
D.THATTHECOURTOFAPPEALSACTEDWITHGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONANDDENIEDPETITIONERSRIGHTTO
DUEPROCESSWHENITDISMISSEDTHEIRCOMPLAINT.17
Wedenythepetition.
ThesubjectlotsarepartofthePiedadEstate,QuezonCity,aFriarLandacquiredonDecember23,1903bythePhilippineGovernmentfrom
thePhilippineSugarEstatesDevelopmentCompany,Ltd.,LaSociedadAgricoladeUltramar,theBritishManilaEstateCompany,Ltd.,and
theRecoletoOrderofthePhilippineIslands,asindicatedinPublicActNo.1120(FriarLandsAct)enactedonApril26,1904. 18
AfterthePiedadEstatewasregisteredinOCTNo.614inthenameofthePhilippineGovernmentin1910undertheprovisionsofAct496,the
areawassubdividedoriginallyinto874lots.Asaresultofsubsequentsurveysexecutedinthecourseofdisposition,thenumberoflots
increasedto1,305.DispositionoftheselotswasmadebytheBureauofLandsthrusales,undertheFriarLandsAct,asearlyas1910and
recordsshowthatevenbeforetheSecondWorldWar,alllotsinthePiedadEstatehavebeendisposedof.19ThePiedadEstatehaslongbeen
segregatedfromthemassofthepublicdomainandhasbecomeprivatelanddulyregisteredundertheTorrenssystemfollowingtheprocedure
fortheconfirmationofprivatelandsprescribedinAct496.ThusthelandsinsidethePiedadEstatearenolongerlandsofthepublicdomain.20
OnewhoacquireslandundertheFriarLandsAct,aswellashissuccessorsininterest,maynotclaimsuccessionalrightstopurchaseby
reasonofoccupationfromtimeimmemorial,asthiscontravenesthehistoricalfactthatfriarlandswereboughtbytheGovernmentofthe
PhilippineIslands,pursuanttoanActofCongressoftheUnitedStates,approvedonJuly1,1902,notfromindividualpersonsbutfrom
certaincompanies,asocietyandareligiousorder.UndertheFriarLandsAct,only"actualsettlersandoccupantsatthetimesaidlandsare
acquiredbytheGovernment"weregivenpreferencetolease,purchase,oracquiretheirholdings,indisregardofthesettlementandoccupation
ofpersonsbeforethegovernmentacquiredthelands.21
 Thebasicrulesofproperpleadingandprocedurerequirethateverypleadingshallcontaininamethodicalandlogicalform,aplain,concise
anddirectstatementoftheultimatefactsonwhichthepartypleadingreliesforhisclaimordefense,asthecasemaybe,omittingthe
statementofmereevidentiaryfacts.22Andinallavermentsoffraudormistake,thecircumstancesconstitutingfraudormistakemustbestated
withparticularity.23
Itisaxiomaticthattheavermentsofthecomplaintdeterminethenatureoftheaction,andconsequently,thejurisdictionofthecourts.Thisis
becausethecomplaintmustcontainaconcisestatementoftheultimatefactsconstitutingtheplaintiff'scauseofactionandmustspecifythe
reliefsought.Noruleisbetterestablishedthanthatwhichrequiresthecomplainttocontainastatementofallthefactsconstitutingthe
plaintiff'scauseofaction.Additionally,Section5,Rule8oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatinallavermentsoffraudormistake,the
circumstancesconstitutingfraudormistakemustbestatedwithparticularity.Inthecaseatbar,whilethereareallegationsoffraudinthe
abovequotedcomplaints,thesamearenotparticularenoughtobringthecontroversywithintheSEC'sjurisdiction.Thesaidallegationsare
notstatementsofultimatefactsbutaremereconclusionsoflaw.
Apleadingshouldstatetheultimatefactsessentialtotherightsofactionordefenseasserted,asdistinguishedfrommereconclusionsoffact,
orconclusionsoflaw.Generalallegationsthatacontractisvalidorlegal,orisjust,fairandreasonable,aremereconclusionsoflaw.
Likewise,allegationsthatacontractisvoid,voidable,invalid,illegal,ultravires,oragainstpublicpolicy,withoutstatingfactsshowingits
invalidity,aremereconclusionsoflaw.24
"Ultimatefacts"meanstheessentialfactsconstitutingtheplaintiff'scauseofaction,orsuchfactsasaresoessentialthattheycannotbe
strickenoutwithoutleavingthestatementofthecauseofactioninadequate. 25"Causeofaction"hasbeendefinedasanactoromissionofone
partyinviolationofthelegalrightorrightsoftheother;26anditsessentialelementsare:1)arightinfavoroftheplaintiffbywhatevermeans
andunderwhateverlawitarisesoriscreated;2)anobligationonthepartofthenameddefendanttorespectornottoviolatesuchright;and3)
anactoromissiononthepartofthenameddefendantviolativeoftherightoftheplaintifforconstitutingabreachoftheobligationof
defendanttotheplaintiffforwhichthelattermaymaintainanactionforrecoveryofdamages.Iftheseelementsarenotextant,thecomplaint
becomesvulnerabletoamotiontodismissonthegroundoffailuretostateacauseofaction. 27Intheresolutionofamotiontodismissbased
onfailuretostateacauseofaction,onlythefactsallegedinthecomplaintaswellasitsannexesmustbeconsidered. 28Thetestinsuchcaseis
whetheracourtcanrenderavalidjudgmentonthecomplaintbaseduponthefactsallegedandpursuanttotheprayertherein. 29
Corollarily,thequestionofwhetherornotacomplaintstatesacauseofactionagainstadefendantortheactionisprematureisoneoflaw.
Thetrialcourtcanconsiderallthepleadingsfiled,includingannexes,motionsandtheevidenceonrecord.Howeverinsodoing,thetrialcourt
doesnotruleonthetruthorfalsityofsuchdocuments.Itmerelyincludessuchdocumentsinthehypotheticaladmission.Anyreviewofa
findingoflackofcauseofactionbasedonthesedocumentswouldnotinvolveacalibrationoftheprobativevalueofsuchpiecesofevidence
butwouldonlylimititselftotheinquiryofwhetherthelawwasproperlyappliedgiventhefactsandthesesupportingdocuments.Therefore,
whatwouldinevitablyarisefromsuchareviewarepurequestionsoflaw,andnotquestionsoffact.
Thetrialcourtmustlikewiseapplyrelevantstatutesandjurisprudenceindeterminingwhethertheallegationsinacomplaintestablishacause
ofaction.Whileitfocusesonthecomplaint,acourtclearlycannotdisregarddecisionsmaterialtotheproperappreciationofthequestions
beforeit.Inresolvingamotiontodismiss,everycourtmusttakecognizanceofdecisionsthisCourthasrenderedbecausetheyareproper
subjectsofmandatoryjudicialnotice.Thesaiddecisions,moreimportantly,formpartofthelegalsystem,andfailureofanycourttoapply
themshallconstituteanabdicationofitsdutytoresolveadisputeinaccordancewithlaw,andshallbeagroundforadministrativeaction
againstaninferiorcourtmagistrate.30
Consideringtheforegoing,itisnotdifficulttoseetheneedforparticularityandincipientsubstantiationinthepetitionersSecondAmended
Complaint.
First,theirinitialclaimthatOCT614ofwhichalltheothersubjecttitlesarederivativesisnullandvoid,hasbeenprovenwrong.Ashas
beenheldinPinlacandothercases,OCT614didlegallyexistandwaspreviouslyissuedinthenameofthePhilippineGovernmentin1910
undertheprovisionsofAct496.
Second,theAdHocCommitteeofthethenMinistryofNaturalResources,whichwasspecificallytaskedtoinvestigatethehistorical
backgroundofthePiedadEstate,foundthatasearlyastheperiodpriortotheSecondWorldWar,alllotsinthePiedadEstatehadalready
beendisposedof.
Third,thePiedadEstatehasbeenplacedundertheTorrenssystemoflandregistration,whichmeansthatalllotsthereinaretitled.
Fourth,asheldintheBalicudiongcase,onewhoacquireslandundertheFriarLandsAct,aswellashissuccessorsininterest,maynotclaim
successionalrightstopurchasebyreasonofoccupationfromtimeimmemorial,whichmeansthatpetitionersclaimedactual,adverse,
peacefulandcontinuouspossessionofthesubjectpropertyisreallyofnomomentunlessitisshownthattheirpredecessorsininterestwere
actualsettlersandoccupantsatthetimesaidlandswereacquiredbytheGovernment,andwhoserightswerenotdisregardedeventhoughthey
wereinoccupationofthesamebeforethegovernmentacquiredtheland;yet,noperiodoftimeinrelationtoadversepossessionisalleged.
PetitionersSecondAmendedComplaintbetraysnomorethananincompletenarrationoffactsunsupportedbydocumentaryorotherexhibits;
theallegationsthereinpartakeofconclusionsoflawunsupportedbyaparticularavermentofcircumstancesthatwillshowwhyorhowsuch
inferencesorconclusionswerearrivedat.Itisrepletewithsweepinggeneralizationsandinferencesderivedfromfactsthatarenotfound
therein.Whilethereareallegationsoffraudupontheclaimthatthesubjecttitleswerefictitious,spuriousandobtainedunder"mysterious
circumstances,"thesamearenotspecifictobringthecontroversywithinthetrialcourtsjurisdiction.Thereisnoexplanationornarrationof
factsaswouldshowwhysaidtitlesareclaimedtobefictitiousorspurious,contrarytotherequirementoftheRulesthatthecircumstances
constitutingfraudmustbestatedwithparticularity;otherwise,theallegationoffraudwouldsimplybeanunfoundedconclusionoflaw.Inthe
absenceofspecificaverments,thecomplaintisdefective,foritpresentsnobasisuponwhichthecourtshouldact,orforthedefendanttomeet
itwithanintelligentanswer.
Astothesecondissueraised,petitionersclaimthattheyarebonafideoccupantsofthesubjectpropertywithinthecontemplationoftheFriar
LandsAct,havingallegedlybeeninactual,adverse,peacefulandcontinuouspossessionoftheproperty,althoughitisnotstatedforhowlong
andsincewhen.Intheirsecondamendedcomplaint,theyseekjudgment
(4)DeclaringtheplaintiffsasbonafideoccupantsofthepropertyinlitigationpursuanttotheprovisionsoftheFriarLandsActandother
existinglaws.(Emphasissupplied)
Theydonotpraytobedeclaredownersofthesubjectpropertydespitetheirallegedadversepossessionbutonlytobeadjudgedasthe
"bonafideoccupants"thereof.Inotherwords,petitionersconcedetheStatesownershipoftheproperty.
Beingso,petitionersmaynotbeconsideredtherealpartiesininterestforthepurposeofmaintainingthesuitforcancellationofthesubject
titles.TheCourtofAppealsiscorrectindeclaringthatonlytheState,throughtheSolicitorGeneral,mayinstitutesuchsuit.Jurisprudenceon
thematterhasbeensettledandtheissueneednotbebelabored.Thus
TheCourtalsoholdsthatprivaterespondentsarenottheproperpartiestoinitiatethepresentsuit.Thecomplaint,prayingasitdidforthe
cancellationofthetransfercertificatesoftitleofpetitionersonthegroundthattheywerederivedfroma"spurious"OCTNo.4216,assailedin
effectthevalidityofsaidtitle.Whileprivaterespondentsdidnotprayforthereversionofthelandtothegovernment,weagreewiththe
petitionersthattheprayerinthecomplaintwillhavethesameresultofrevertingthelandtothegovernmentundertheRegalian
doctrine.Gabilavs.Barrigaruledthatonlythegovernmentisentitledtothisrelief.TheCourtinthatcaseheld:
"ThepresentmotiontodismissisactuallypredicatedonSection1(g),Rule16oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,i.e.,failureofthecomplaintto
stateacauseofaction,foritallegesinparagraph12thereofthattheplaintiffadmitsthathehasnorighttodemandthecancellationor
amendmentofthedefendantstitle,because,evenifthesaidtitlewerecanceledoramended,theownershipofthelandembracedtherein,orof
theportionthereofaffectedbytheamendment,wouldreverttothepublicdomain.Inhisamendedcomplainttheplaintiffmakesnopretenseat
allthatanypartofthelandcoveredbythedefendantstitlewasprivatelyownedbyhimorbyhispredecessorsininterest.Indeed,itis
admittedthereinthatthesaidlandwasatalltimesapartofthepublicdomainuntilDecember18,1964,whenthegovernmentissuedatitle
thereoninfavorofdefendant.Thus,ifthereisanypersonorentitytorelief,itcanonlybethegovernment.
Inthecaseatbar,theplaintiffsownavermentsnegatetheexistenceofsuchright,foritwouldappeartherefromthatwhateverrightmight
havebeenviolatedbythedefendantbelongedtothegovernment,nottotheplaintiff.Plaintiffappellantarguesthatalthoughhiscomplaintis
captionedasoneforcancellationoftitle,hehasneverthelessstatedthereinseveralcausesofactionbasedonhisallegedrightsofpossession
andownershipovertheimprovements,ondefendantappelleesallegedfraudulentacquisitionoftheland,andonthedamagesallegedly
incurredbyhim(plaintiffappellant)inrelationtotheimprovements.Thesemattersaremerelyancillarytothecentralissueofwhetherornot
defendantappelleestitleshouldbecanceledoramended,andtheymaynotbeleaneduponinanefforttomakeoutacauseofactionin
relationtothesaidfocalissue.Indeed,theprincipalreliefprayedforintheamendedcomplaintisthecancellationoramendmentofdefendant
appelleestitle."31
UnderRule3,Section2oftheRulesofCourt,arealpartyininterestisthepartywhostandstobebenefitedorinjuredbythejudgmentinthe
suit,orthepartyentitledtotheavailsofthesuit."Interest"withinthemeaningoftherulemeansmaterialinterest,aninterestinissueandto
beaffectedbythedecree,asdistinguishedfrommereinterestinthequestioninvolved,oramereincidentalinterest.Theinterestoftheparty
mustalsobepersonalandnotonebasedonadesiretovindicatetheconstitutionalrightofsomethirdandunrelatedparty.Realinterest,onthe
otherhand,meansapresentsubstantialinterest,asdistinguishedfromamereexpectancyorafuture,contingent,subordinate,orconsequential
interest.32
Ifpetitionersaretobebelieved,theywouldpossessamereinchoateinterestinthepropertiescoveredbythesubjecttitles,amereexpectancy
conditioneduponthefactthatifthequestionedtitlesarecancelledandthepropertyisrevertedtotheState,they
wouldprobablyorpossiblybegivenpreferentialtreatmentasqualifiedbuyersorlesseesofthepropertyundertheFriarLandsAct.Butthis
certainlyisnotthe"interest"requiredbylawthatgrantsthemlicenseorthepersonalitytoprosecutetheircase.OnlytotheStatedoesthe
privilegebelong.
Ontheissueofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies,sufficeittostatethatsincepetitionersdonotpossessthenecessaryinterestto
prosecutethecaseforcancellationoftitleinthecourts,neitherdotheyhavetherighttopursueadministrativeremediesoutsidethereof.They
arenottheowners;noraretheyqualifiedapplicantstherefor.Ithasnotbeenshownbytheircomplaintthattheyhavepreviouslytakenstepsto
availofthebenefitsundertheFriarLandsAct,sincealltheyseek,shouldthequestionedtitlesbenullified,istobedeclaredbona
fideoccupantsofthepropertycoveredbythequestionedtitles.Neitheristhereanyindicationthattheypossessthequalificationsnecessaryto
enablethemtoavailofthepreferencegrantedundertheAct.
Finally,thereisnomeritinpetitionerscontentionthatrespondentbelatedlyfiledthepetitionforcertiorariwiththeCourtofAppeals,andthat
theappellatecourtgravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitentertainedandresolvedthesame.
TheOrderofthetrialcourtdatedJanuary3,2001denyingrespondentsmotiontodismisstheSecondAmendedComplaintwasreceivedby
therespondentonJanuary16,2001.RespondentfiledamotionforreconsiderationonJanuary18,2001whichwasdeniedonFebruary28,
2001.RespondentreceivedtheorderdenyingitsmotionforreconsiderationonMarch27,2001.Onthesameday,itfiledaNoticetoFile
PetitionforCertiorari.OnApril2,2001,thepetitionforcertiorariwasfiledwiththeCourtofAppeals.Clearly,thesamewastimelyfiled
hence,theappellatecourtcorrectlyentertainedthesame.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdatedJanuary9,2002inCAG.R.SPNo.64337dismissing
petitioners"SecondAmendedComplaint"inCivilCaseNo.Q9936483andtheResolutiondatedJune26,2002denyingthemotionfor
reconsideration,areAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.

6. Malabanan v Republic, GR No. 179987

TINGA,J.:(2009)
OnemainreasonwhytheinformalsectorhasnotbecomeformalisthatfromIndonesiatoBrazil,90percentoftheinformallandsarenot
titledandregistered.ThisisageneralizedphenomenoninthesocalledThirdWorld.Andithasmanyconsequences.
xxx
Thequestionis:Howisitthatsomanygovernments,fromSuharto'sinIndonesiatoFujimori'sinPeru,havewantedtotitlethesepeopleand
havenotbeenabletodosoeffectively?OnereasonisthatnoneofthestatesystemsinAsiaorLatinAmericacangatherproofofinformal
titles.InPeru,theinformalshavemeansofprovingpropertyownershiptoeachotherwhicharenotthesamemeansdevelopedbytheSpanish
legalsystem.Theinformalshavetheirownpapers,theirownformsofagreements,andtheirownsystemsofregistration,allofwhicharevery
clearlystatedinthemapswhichtheyusefortheirowninformalbusinesstransactions.
Ifyoutakeawalkthroughthecountryside,fromIndonesiatoPeru,andyouwalkbyfieldafterfieldineachfieldadifferentdogisgoingto
barkatyou.Evendogsknowwhatprivatepropertyisallabout.Theonlyonewhodoesnotknowitisthegovernment.Theissueisthatthere
existsa"commonlaw"andan"informallaw"whichtheLatinAmericanformallegalsystemdoesnotknowhowtorecognize.
HernandoDeSoto1
ThisdecisioninevitablyaffectsalluntitledlandscurrentlyinpossessionofpersonsandentitiesotherthanthePhilippinegovernment.The
petition,whileunremarkableastothefacts,wasacceptedbytheCourtenbancinordertoprovidedefinitiveclaritytotheapplicabilityand
scopeoforiginalregistrationproceedingsunderSections14(1)and14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.Indoingso,theCourtconfronts
notonlytherelevantprovisionsofthePublicLandActandtheCivilCode,butalsotherealityontheground.Thecountrywidephenomenon
ofuntitledlands,aswellastheproblemofinformalsettlementithasspawned,hasunfortunatelybeentreatedwithbenignneglect.Yetour
currentlawsarehemmedinbytheirowncircumscriptionsinaddressingthephenomenon.Still,thedutyonourpartisprimarilytodecide
casesbeforeusinaccordwiththeConstitutionandthelegalprinciplesthathavedevelopedourpubliclandlaw,thoughoursocialobligations
dissuadeusfromcastingablindeyeontheendemicproblems.
 I.
On20February1998,MarioMalabananfiledanapplicationforlandregistrationcoveringaparceloflandidentifiedasLot9864A,Cad452
D,SilangCadastre,2situatedinBarangayTibig,SilangCavite,andconsistingof71,324squaremeters.Malabananclaimedthathehad
purchasedthepropertyfromEduardoVelazco,3andthatheandhispredecessorsininteresthadbeeninopen,notorious,andcontinuous
adverseandpeacefulpossessionofthelandformorethanthirty(30)years.
TheapplicationwasraffledtotheRegionalTrialCourtof(RTC)CaviteTagaytayCity,Branch18.TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)
dulydesignatedtheAssistantProvincialProsecutorofCavite,JoseVelazco,Jr.,toappearonbehalfoftheState. 4Apartfrompresenting
documentaryevidence,Malabananhimselfandhiswitness,AristedesVelazco,testifiedatthehearing.Velazcotestifiedthatthepropertywas
originallybelongedtoatwentytwohectarepropertyownedbyhisgreatgrandfather,LinoVelazco.LinohadfoursonsBenedicto,Gregorio,
EduardoandEstebanthefourthbeingAristedessgrandfather.UponLinosdeath,hisfoursonsinheritedthepropertyanddivideditamong
themselves.Butby1966,Estebanswife,Magdalena,hadbecometheadministratorofallthepropertiesinheritedbytheVelazcosonsfrom
theirfather,Lino.AfterthedeathofEstebanandMagdalena,theirsonVirgiliosucceededtheminadministeringtheproperties,includingLot
9864A,whichoriginallybelongedtohisuncle,EduardoVelazco.ItwasthispropertythatwassoldbyEduardoVelazcotoMalabanan. 5
AssistantProvincialProsecutorJoseVelazco,Jr.didnotcrossexamineAristedesVelazco.Hefurthermanifestedthathe"also[knew]the
propertyandIaffirmthetruthofthetestimonygivenbyMr.Velazco." 6TheRepublicofthePhilippineslikewisedidnotpresentanyevidence
tocontroverttheapplication.
AmongtheevidencepresentedbyMalabananduringtrialwasaCertificationdated11June2001,issuedbytheCommunityEnvironment&
NaturalResourcesOffice,DepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(CENRODENR),whichstatedthatthesubjectpropertywas
"verifiedtobewithintheAlienableorDisposablelandperLandClassificationMapNo.3013establishedunderProjectNo.20Aand
approvedassuchunderFAO41656onMarch15,1982."7
On3December2002,theRTCrenderedjudgmentinfavorofMalabanan,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
WHEREFORE,thisCourtherebyapprovesthisapplicationforregistrationandthusplacesundertheoperationofAct141,Act496and/or
P.D.1529,otherwiseknownasPropertyRegistrationLaw,thelandsdescribedinPlanCsd040173123D,Lot9864Aandcontaininganarea
ofSeventyOneThousandThreeHundredTwentyFour(71,324)SquareMeters,assupportedbyitstechnicaldescriptionnowformingpartof
therecordofthiscase,inadditiontootherproofsadducedinthenameofMARIOMALABANAN,whoisoflegalage,Filipino,widower,
andwithresidenceatMuntingIlog,Silang,Cavite.
OncethisDecisionbecomesfinalandexecutory,thecorrespondingdecreeofregistrationshallforthwithissue.
SOORDERED.
TheRepublicinterposedanappealtotheCourtofAppeals,arguingthatMalabananhadfailedtoprovethatthepropertybelongedtothe
alienableanddisposablelandofthepublicdomain,andthattheRTChaderredinfindingthathehadbeeninpossessionofthepropertyinthe
mannerandforthelengthoftimerequiredbylawforconfirmationofimperfecttitle.
On23February2007,theCourtofAppealsrenderedaDecision8reversingtheRTCanddismissingtheapplicationofMalabanan.The
appellatecourtheldthatunderSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeanyperiodofpossessionpriortotheclassificationofthelots
asalienableanddisposablewasinconsequentialandshouldbeexcludedfromthecomputationoftheperiodofpossession.Thus,theappellate
courtnotedthatsincetheCENRODENRcertificationhadverifiedthatthepropertywasdeclaredalienableanddisposableonlyon15March
1982,theVelazcospossessionpriortothatdatecouldnotbefactoredinthecomputationoftheperiodofpossession.Thisinterpretationof
theCourtofAppealsofSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreewasbasedontheCourtsrulinginRepublicv.Herbieto.9
MalabanandiedwhilethecasewaspendingwiththeCourtofAppeals;10hence,itwashisheirswhoappealedthedecisionoftheappellate
court.Petitioners,beforethisCourt,relyonourrulinginRepublicv.Naguit,
11whichwashandeddownjustfourmonthspriortoHerbieto.
PetitionerssuggestthatthediscussioninHerbietocitedbytheCourtofAppealsisactuallyobiterdictumsincetheMetropolitanTrialCourt
thereinwhichhaddirectedtheregistrationofthepropertyhadnojurisdictioninthefirstplacesincetherequisitenoticeofhearingwas
publishedonlyafterthehearinghadalreadybegun.Naguit,petitionersargue,remainsthecontrollingdoctrine,especiallywhenthepropertyin
questionisagriculturalland.Therefore,withrespecttoagriculturallands,anypossessionpriortothedeclarationofthealienablepropertyas
disposablemaybecountedinreckoningtheperiodofpossessiontoperfecttitleunderthePublicLandActandthePropertyRegistration
Decree.
ThepetitionwasreferredtotheCourtenbanc,12andon11November2008,thecasewasheardonoralarguments.TheCourtformulatedthe
principalissuesfortheoralarguments,towit:
1.InorderthatanalienableanddisposablelandofthepublicdomainmayberegisteredunderSection14(1)ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1529,
otherwiseknownasthePropertyRegistrationDecree,shouldthelandbeclassifiedasalienableanddisposableasofJune12,1945orisit
sufficientthatsuchclassificationoccuratanytimepriortothefilingoftheapplicantforregistrationprovidedthatitisestablishedthatthe
applicanthasbeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionofthelandunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,
1945orearlier?
2.ForpurposesofSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreemayaparceloflandclassifiedasalienableanddisposablebedeemed
privatelandandthereforesusceptibletoacquisitionbyprescriptioninaccordancewiththeCivilCode?
3.Mayaparceloflandestablishedasagriculturalincharactereitherbecauseofitsuseorbecauseitsslopeisbelowthatofforestlandsbe
registrableunderSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeinrelationtotheprovisionsoftheCivilCodeonacquisitiveprescription?
4.ArepetitionersentitledtotheregistrationofthesubjectlandintheirnamesunderSection14(1)orSection14(2)oftheProperty
RegistrationDecreeorboth?13
Basedontheseissues,thepartiesformulatedtheirrespectivepositions.
WithrespecttoSection14(1),petitionersreiteratethattheanalysisoftheCourtinNaguitisthecorrectinterpretationoftheprovision.The
seeminglycontradictorypronouncementinHerbieto,itissubmitted,shouldbeconsideredobiterdictum,sincethelandregistration
proceedingsthereinwasvoidabinitioduetolackofpublicationofthenoticeofinitialhearing.PetitionersfurtherpointoutthatinRepublicv.
Bibonia,14promulgatedinJuneof2007,theCourtappliedNaguitandadoptedthesameobservationthatthepreferredinterpretationbythe
OSGofSection14(1)waspatentlyabsurd.Foritspart,theOSGremainsinsistentthatforSection14(1)toapply,thelandshouldhavebeen
classifiedasalienableanddisposableasof12June1945.ApartfromHerbieto,theOSGalsocitesthesubsequentrulingsinBuenaventurav.
15 16 17
Republic,FieldmanAgriculturalTradingv.Republic andRepublicv.ImperialCreditCorporation,aswellastheearliercaseofDirector
18
ofLandsv.CourtofAppeals.
WithrespecttoSection14(2),petitionerssubmitthatopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionofanalienablelandofthepublic
domainformorethan30yearsipsojureconvertsthelandintoprivateproperty,thusplacingitunderthecoverageofSection14(2).According
tothem,itwouldnotmatterwhetherthelandsoughttoberegisteredwaspreviouslyclassifiedasagriculturallandofthepublicdomainso
longas,atthetimeoftheapplication,thepropertyhadalreadybeen"converted"intoprivatepropertythroughprescription.Tobolstertheir
argument,petitionersciteextensivelyfromour2008rulinginRepublicv.T.A.N.Properties. 19
TheargumentssubmittedbytheOSGwithrespecttoSection14(2)aremoreextensive.TheOSGnotesthatunderArticle1113oftheCivil
Code,theacquisitiveprescriptionofpropertiesoftheStaterefersto"patrimonialproperty,"whileSection14(2)speaksof"privatelands."It
observesthattheCourthasyettodecideacasethatpresentedSection14(2)asagroundforapplicationforregistration,andthatthe30year
possessionperiodreferstotheperiodofpossessionunderSection48(b)ofthePublicLandAct,andnottheconceptofprescriptionunderthe
CivilCode.TheOSGfurthersubmitsthat,assumingthatthe30yearprescriptiveperiodcanrunagainstpubliclands,saidperiodshouldbe
reckonedfromthetimethepubliclandwasdeclaredalienableanddisposable.
Bothsideslikewiseofferspecialargumentswithrespecttotheparticularfactualcircumstancessurroundingthesubjectpropertyandthe
ownershipthereof.
II.
First,wediscussSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.Forafullunderstandingoftheprovision,referencehastobemadetothe
PublicLandAct.
A.
CommonwealthActNo.141,alsoknownasthePublicLandAct,has,sinceitsenactment,governedtheclassificationanddispositionoflands
ofthepublicdomain.ThePresidentisauthorized,fromtimetotime,toclassifythelandsofthepublicdomainintoalienableanddisposable,
timber,orminerallands.20Alienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomainarefurtherclassifiedaccordingtotheirusesinto(a)
agricultural;(b)residential,commercial,industrial,orforsimilarproductivepurposes;(c)educational,charitable,orothersimilarpurposes;or
(d)reservationsfortownsitesandforpublicandquasipublicuses.21
Mayaprivatepersonvalidlyseektheregistrationinhis/hernameofalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomain?Section11ofthe
PublicLandActacknowledgesthatpubliclandssuitableforagriculturalpurposesmaybedisposedof"byconfirmationofimperfector
incompletetitles"through"judiciallegalization."22Section48(b)ofthePublicLandAct,asamendedbyP.D.No.1073,suppliesthedetails
andunmistakablygrantsthatright,subjecttotherequisitesstatedtherein:
Sec.48.ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhilippines,occupyinglandsofthepublicdomainorclaimingtoownanysuchlandoran
interesttherein,butwhosetitleshavenotbeenperfectedorcompleted,mayapplytotheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewheretheland
islocatedforconfirmationoftheirclaimsandtheissuanceofacertificateoftitletherefor,undertheLandRegistrationAct,towit:
xxx
(b)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,sinceJune12,1945,
orearlier,immediatelyprecedingthefilingoftheapplicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeure.These
shallbeconclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantandshallbeentitledtoacertificateof
titleundertheprovisionsofthischapter.
Section48(b)ofCom.ActNo.141receiveditspresentwordingin1977whenthelawwasamendedbyP.D.No.1073.Twosignificant
amendmentswereintroducedbyP.D.No.1073.First,theterm"agriculturallands"waschangedto"alienableanddisposablelandsofthe
publicdomain."TheOSGsubmitsthatthisamendmentrestrictedthescopeofthelandsthatmayberegistered. 23Thisisnotactuallythecase.
UnderSection9ofthePublicLandAct,"agriculturallands"areameresubsetof"landsofthepublicdomainalienableoropento
disposition."Evidently,alienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomainarealargerclassthanonly"agriculturallands."
Second,thelengthoftherequisitepossessionwaschangedfrompossessionfor"thirty(30)yearsimmediatelyprecedingthefilingofthe
application"topossession"sinceJune12,1945orearlier."TheCourtinNaguitexplained:
WhenthePublicLandActwasfirstpromulgatedin1936,theperiodofpossessiondeemednecessarytovesttherighttoregistertheirtitleto
agriculturallandsofthepublicdomaincommencedfromJuly26,1894.However,thisperiodwasamendedbyR.A.No.1942,which
providedthatthebonafideclaimofownershipmusthavebeenforatleastthirty(30)years.Thenin1977,Section48(b)ofthePublicLand
Actwasagainamended,thistimebyP.D.No.1073,whichpeggedthereckoningdateatJune12,1945.xxx
ItbearsfurtherobservationthatSection48(b)ofCom.ActNo,141isvirtuallythesameasSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.
SaidDecreecodifiedthevariouslawsrelativetotheregistrationofproperty,includinglandsofthepublicdomain.ItisSection14(1)that
operationalizestheregistrationofsuchlandsofthepublicdomain.Theprovisionreads:
SECTION14.Whomayapply.ThefollowingpersonsmayfileintheproperCourtofFirstInstanceanapplicationforregistrationoftitleto
land,whetherpersonallyorthroughtheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives:
(1)thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomainunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,1945,orearlier.
NotwithstandingthepassageofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeandtheinclusionofSection14(1)therein,thePublicLandActhasremained
ineffect.Bothlawscommonlyrefertopersonsortheirpredecessorsininterestwho"havebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotorious
possessionandoccupationofalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomainunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,1945,
orearlier."Thatcircumstancemayhaveledtotheimpressionthatoneortheotherisaredundancy,orthatSection48(b)ofthePublicLand
Acthassomehowbeenrepealedormooted.Thatisnotthecase.
TheopeningclausesofSection48ofthePublicLandActandSection14ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreewarrantcomparison:
Sec.48[ofthePublicLandAct].ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhilippines,occupyinglandsofthepublicdomainorclaimingto
ownanysuchlandoraninteresttherein,butwhosetitleshavenotbeenperfectedorcompleted,mayapplytotheCourtofFirstInstanceofthe
provincewherethelandislocatedforconfirmationoftheirclaimsandtheissuanceofacertificateoftitletherefor,undertheLand
RegistrationAct,towit:
xxx
Sec.14[ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree].Whomayapply.ThefollowingpersonsmayfileintheproperCourtofFirstInstancean
applicationforregistrationoftitletoland,whetherpersonallyorthroughtheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives:
xxx
ItisclearthatSection48ofthePublicLandActismoredescriptiveofthenatureoftherightenjoyedbythepossessorthanSection14ofthe
PropertyRegistrationDecree,whichseemstopresumethepreexistenceoftheright,ratherthanestablishingtherightitselfforthefirsttime.
ItispropertoassertthatitisthePublicLandAct,asamendedbyP.D.No.1073effective25January1977,thathasprimarilyestablishedthe
rightofaFilipinocitizenwhohasbeen"inopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofalienableanddisposable
landsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,sinceJune12,1945"toperfectorcompletehistitleby
applyingwiththepropercourtfortheconfirmationofhisownershipclaimandtheissuanceofthecorrespondingcertificateoftitle.
Section48canbeviewedinconjunctionwiththeaforequotedSection11ofthePublicLandAct,whichprovidesthatpubliclandssuitable
foragriculturalpurposesmaybedisposedofbyconfirmationofimperfectorincompletetitles,andgiventhenotionthatbothprovisions
declarethatitisindeedthePublicLandActthatprimarilyestablishesthesubstantiveownershipofthepossessorwhohasbeeninpossession
ofthepropertysince12June1945.Inturn,Section14(a)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreerecognizesthesubstantiverightgrantedunder
Section48(b)ofthePublicLandAct,aswellprovidesthecorrespondingoriginalregistrationprocedureforthejudicialconfirmationofan
imperfectorincompletetitle.
ThereisanotherlimitationtotherightgrantedunderSection48(b).Section47ofthePublicLandActlimitstheperiodwithinwhichonemay
exercisetherighttoseekregistrationunderSection48.Theprovisionhasbeenamendedseveraltimes,mostrecentlybyRep.ActNo.9176in
2002.Itcurrentlyreadsthus:
Section47.Thepersonsspecifiedinthenextfollowingsectionareherebygrantedtime,nottoextendbeyondDecember31,2020within
whichtoavailofthebenefitsofthisChapter:Provided,Thatthisperiodshallapplyonlywheretheareaappliedfordoesnotexceedtwelve
(12)hectares:Provided,further,ThattheseveralperiodsoftimedesignatedbythePresidentinaccordancewithSectionFortyFiveofthisAct
shallapplyalsotothelandscomprisedintheprovisionsofthisChapter,butthisSectionshallnotbeconstruedasprohibitinganysaidpersons
fromactingunderthisChapteratanytimepriortotheperiodfixedbythePresident.24
Accordinglyunderthecurrentstateofthelaw,thesubstantiverightgrantedunderSection48(b)maybeavailedofonlyuntil31December
2020.
B.
DespitethecleartextofSection48(b)ofthePublicLandAct,asamendedandSection14(a)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree,theOSGhas
adoptedthepositionthatforonetoacquiretherighttoseekregistrationofanalienableanddisposablelandofthepublicdomain,itisnot
enoughthattheapplicantandhis/herpredecessorsininterestbeinpossessionunderabonafideclaimofownershipsince12June1945;the
alienableanddisposablecharacterofthepropertymusthavebeendeclaredalsoasof12June1945.FollowingtheOSGsapproach,alllands
certifiedasalienableanddisposableafter12June1945cannotberegisteredeitherunderSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeor
Section48(b)ofthePublicLandActasamended.TheabsurdityofsuchanimplicationwasdiscussedinNaguit.
PetitionersuggestsaninterpretationthatthealienableanddisposablecharacterofthelandshouldhavealreadybeenestablishedsinceJune12,
1945orearlier.ThisisnotborneoutbytheplainmeaningofSection14(1)."SinceJune12,1945,"asusedintheprovision,qualifiesits
antecedentphrase"underabonafideclaimofownership."Generallyspeaking,qualifyingwordsrestrictormodifyonlythewordsorphrases
towhichtheyareimmediatelyassociated,andnotthosedistantlyorremotelylocated. 25Adproximumantecedentsfiatrelationnisiimpediatur
sentencia.
Besides,wearemindfuloftheabsurditythatwouldresultifweadoptpetitionersposition.Absentalegislativeamendment,therulewould
be,adoptingtheOSGsview,thatalllandsofthepublicdomainwhichwerenotdeclaredalienableordisposablebeforeJune12,1945would
notbesusceptibletooriginalregistration,nomatterthelengthofunchallengedpossessionbytheoccupant.Suchinterpretationrenders
paragraph(1)ofSection14virtuallyinoperativeandevenprecludesthegovernmentfromgivingiteffectevenasitdecidestoreclassify
publicagriculturallandsasalienableanddisposable.Theunreasonablenessofthesituationwouldevenbeaggravatedconsideringthatbefore
June12,1945,thePhilippineswasnotyetevenconsideredanindependentstate.
Accordingly,theCourtinNaguitexplained:
[T]hemorereasonableinterpretationofSection14(1)isthatitmerelyrequiresthepropertysoughttoberegisteredasalreadyalienableand
disposableatthetimetheapplicationforregistrationoftitleisfiled.IftheState,atthetimetheapplicationismade,hasnotyetdeemedit
propertoreleasethepropertyforalienationordisposition,thepresumptionisthatthegovernmentisstillreservingtherighttoutilizethe
property;hence,theneedtopreserveitsownershipintheStateirrespectiveofthelengthofadversepossessionevenifingoodfaith.However,
ifthepropertyhasalreadybeenclassifiedasalienableanddisposable,asitisinthiscase,thenthereisalreadyanintentiononthepartofthe
Statetoabdicateitsexclusiveprerogativeovertheproperty.
TheCourtdeclaresthatthecorrectinterpretationofSection14(1)isthatwhichwasadoptedinNaguit.Thecontrarypronouncementin
Herbieto,aspointedoutinNaguit,absurdlylimitstheapplicationoftheprovisiontothepointofvirtualinutilitysinceitwouldonlycover
landsactuallydeclaredalienableanddisposablepriorto12June1945,evenifthecurrentpossessorisabletoestablishopen,continuous,
exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionunderabonafideclaimofownershiplongbeforethatdate.
Moreover,theNaguitinterpretationallowsmorepossessorsunderabonafideclaimofownershiptoavailofjudicialconfirmationoftheir
imperfecttitlesthanwhatwouldbefeasibleunderHerbieto.Thisbalancingfactissignificant,especiallyconsideringourforthcoming
discussiononthescopeandreachofSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.
PetitionersmakethesalientobservationthatthecontradictorypassagesfromHerbietoareobiterdictasincethelandregistrationproceedings
thereinisvoidabinitiointhefirstplaceduetolackoftherequisitepublicationofthenoticeofinitialhearing.Thereisnoneedtoexplicitly
overturnHerbieto,asitsufficesthattheCourtsacknowledgmentthattheparticularlineofargumentusedthereinconcerningSection14(1)is
indeedobiter.
ItmaybenotedthatinthesubsequentcaseofBuenaventura,26theCourt,citingHerbieto,againstatedthat"[a]nyperiodofpossessionpriorto
thedatewhenthe[s]ubject[propertywas]classifiedasalienableanddisposableisinconsequentialandshouldbeexcludedfromthe
computationoftheperiodofpossession"Thatstatement,inthecontextofSection14(1),iscertainlyerroneous.Nonetheless,thepassageas
citedinBuenaventurashouldagainbeconsideredasobiter.Theapplicationthereinwasultimatelygranted,citingSection14(2).Theevidence
submittedbypetitionersthereindidnotestablishanymodeofpossessionontheirpartpriorto1948,therebyprecludingtheapplicationof
Section14(1).Itisnotevenapparentfromthedecisionwhetherpetitionersthereinhadclaimedentitlementtooriginalregistrationfollowing
Section14(1),theirpositionbeingthattheyhadbeeninexclusivepossessionunderabonafideclaimofownershipforoverfifty(50)years,
butnotbefore12June1945.
Thus,neitherHerbietonoritsprincipaldiscipularrulingBuenaventurahasanyprecedentalvaluewithrespecttoSection14(1).Ontheother
hand,theratioofNaguitisembeddedinSection14(1),sinceitpreciselyinvolvedsituationwhereintheapplicanthadbeeninexclusive
possessionunderabonafideclaimofownershippriorto12June1945.TheCourtsinterpretationofSection14(1)thereinwasdecisivetothe
resolutionofthecase.AnydoubtastowhichbetweenNaguitorHerbietoprovidesthefinalwordoftheCourtonSection14(1)isnowsettled
infavorofNaguit.
WenotedinNaguitthatitshouldbedistinguishedfromBracewellv.CourtofAppeals 27sinceinthelatter,theapplicationforregistrationhad
beenfiledbeforethelandwasdeclaredalienableordisposable.ThedissentthoughpronouncesBracewellasthebetterrulebetweenthetwo.
YettwoyearsafterBracewell,itsponente,theesteemedJusticeConsueloYnaresSantiago,pennedtherulinginRepublicv.Ceniza, 28which
involvedaclaimofpossessionthatextendedbackto1927overapublicdomainlandthatwasdeclaredalienableanddisposableonlyin1980.
CenizacitedBracewell,quotedextensivelyfromit,andfollowingthemindsetofthedissent,theattemptatregistrationinCenizashouldhave
failed.Notso.
Toprovethatthelandsubjectofanapplicationforregistrationisalienable,anapplicantmustestablishtheexistenceofapositiveactofthe
governmentsuchasapresidentialproclamationoranexecutiveorder;anadministrativeaction;investigationreportsofBureauofLands
investigators;andalegislativeactorastatute.
Inthiscase,privaterespondentspresentedacertificationdatedNovember25,1994,issuedbyEduardoM.Inting,theCommunity
EnvironmentandNaturalResourcesOfficerintheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesOfficeinCebuCity,statingthatthe
lotsinvolvedwere"foundtobewithinthealienableanddisposable(sic)BlockI,LandClassificationProjectNo.32A,permap29624I555
datedDecember9,1980."Thisissufficientevidencetoshowtherealcharacterofthelandsubjectofprivaterespondentsapplication.
Further,thecertificationenjoysapresumptionofregularityintheabsenceofcontradictoryevidence,whichistrueinthiscase.Worthnoting
alsowastheobservationoftheCourtofAppealsstatingthat:
[n]ooppositionwasfiledbytheBureausofLandsandForestrytocontesttheapplicationofappelleesonthegroundthatthepropertystill
formspartofthepublicdomain.Noristhereanyshowingthatthelotsinquestionareforestalland....
Thus,whiletheCourtofAppealserredinrulingthatmerepossessionofpubliclandfortheperiodrequiredbylawwouldentitleitsoccupant
toaconfirmationofimperfecttitle,itdidnoterrinrulinginfavorofprivaterespondentsasfarasthefirstrequirementinSection48(b)ofthe
PublicLandActisconcerned,fortheywereabletoovercometheburdenofprovingthealienabilityofthelandsubjectoftheirapplication.
AscorrectlyfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,privaterespondentswereabletoprovetheiropen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossession
ofthesubjectlandevenbeforetheyear1927.Asarule,weareboundbythefactualfindingsoftheCourtofAppeals.Althoughthereare
exceptions,petitionerdidnotshowthatthisisoneofthem. 29
WhydidtheCourtinCeniza,throughthesameeminentmemberwhoauthoredBracewell,sanctiontheregistrationunderSection48(b)of
publicdomainlandsdeclaredalienableordisposablethirtyfive(35)yearsand180daysafter12June1945?Thetellingdifferenceisthatin
Ceniza,theapplicationforregistrationwasfilednearlysix(6)yearsafterthelandhadbeendeclaredalienableordisposable,whilein
Bracewell,theapplicationwasfilednine(9)yearsbeforethelandwasdeclaredalienableordisposable.Thatcrucialdifferencewasalso
stressedinNaguittocontradistinguishitfromBracewell,adifferencewhichthedissentseekstobelittle.
III.
WenextascertainthecorrectframeworkofanalysiswithrespecttoSection14(2).Theprovisionreads:
SECTION14.Whomayapply.ThefollowingpersonsmayfileintheproperCourtofFirstInstanceanapplicationforregistrationoftitle
toland,whetherpersonallyorthroughtheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives:
xxx
(2)Thosewhohaveacquiredownershipoverprivatelandsbyprescriptionundertheprovisionsofexistinglaws.
TheCourtinNaguitofferedthefollowingdiscussionconcerningSection14(2),whichwedideventhenrecognize,andstilldo,tobeanobiter
dictum,butwenonethelessrefertoitasmaterialforfurtherdiscussion,thus:
DidtheenactmentofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeandtheamendatoryP.D.No.1073precludetheapplicationforregistrationofalienable
landsofthepublicdomain,possessionoverwhichcommencedonlyafterJune12,1945?Itdidnot,consideringSection14(2)oftheProperty
RegistrationDecree,whichgovernsandauthorizestheapplicationof"thosewhohaveacquiredownershipofprivatelandsbyprescription
undertheprovisionsofexistinglaws."
PrescriptionisoneofthemodesofacquiringownershipundertheCivilCode.[30]Thereisaconsistentjurisprudentialrulethatproperties
classifiedasalienablepubliclandmaybeconvertedintoprivatepropertybyreasonofopen,continuousandexclusivepossessionofatleast
thirty(30)years.[31]Withsuchconversion,suchpropertymaynowfallwithinthecontemplationof"privatelands"underSection14(2),and
thussusceptibletoregistrationbythosewhohaveacquiredownershipthroughprescription.Thus,evenifpossessionofthealienablepublic
landcommencedonadatelaterthanJune12,1945,andsuchpossessionbeingbeenopen,continuousandexclusive,thenthepossessormay
havetherighttoregisterthelandbyvirtueofSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.
NaguitdidnotinvolvetheapplicationofSection14(2),unlikeinthiscasewherepetitionershavebasedtheirregistrationbidprimarilyonthat
provision,andwheretheevidencedefinitivelyestablishestheirclaimofpossessiononlyasfarbackas1948.Itisinthiscasethatwecan
properlyappreciatethenuancesoftheprovision.
A.
TheobiterinNaguitcitedtheCivilCodeprovisionsonprescriptionasthepossiblebasisforapplicationfororiginalregistrationunderSection
14(2).Specifically,itisArticle1113whichprovideslegalfoundationfortheapplication.Itreads:
Allthingswhicharewithinthecommerceofmenaresusceptibleofprescription,unlessotherwiseprovided.PropertyoftheStateoranyofits
subdivisionsnotpatrimonialincharactershallnotbetheobjectofprescription.
ItisclearundertheCivilCodethatwherelandsofthepublicdomainarepatrimonialincharacter,theyaresusceptibletoacquisitive
prescription.Ontheotherhand,amongthepublicdomainlandsthatarenotsusceptibletoacquisitiveprescriptionaretimberlandsand
minerallands.TheConstitutionitselfproscribesprivateownershipoftimberorminerallands.
ThereareinfactseveralprovisionsintheCivilCodeconcerningtheacquisitionofrealpropertythroughprescription.Ownershipofreal
propertymaybeacquiredbyordinaryprescriptionoften(10)years,32orthroughextraordinaryprescriptionofthirty(30)years. 33Ordinary
acquisitiveprescriptionrequirespossessioningoodfaith,34aswellasjusttitle.35
WhenSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeexplicitlyprovidesthatpersons"whohaveacquiredownershipoverprivatelandsby
prescriptionundertheprovisionsofexistinglaws,"itunmistakablyreferstotheCivilCodeasavalidbasisfortheregistrationoflands.The
CivilCodeistheonlyexistinglawthatspecificallyallowstheacquisitionbyprescriptionofprivatelands,includingpatrimonialproperty
belongingtotheState.Thus,thecriticalquestionthatneedsaffirmationiswhetherSection14(2)doesencompassoriginalregistration
proceedingsoverpatrimonialpropertyoftheState,whichaprivatepersonhasacquiredthroughprescription.
TheNaguitobiterhadadvertedtoafrequentlyreiteratedjurisprudenceholdingthatpropertiesclassifiedasalienablepubliclandmaybe
convertedintoprivatepropertybyreasonofopen,continuousandexclusivepossessionofatleastthirty(30)years. 36Yetifweascertainthe
sourceofthe"thirtyyear"period,additionalcomplexitiesrelatingtoSection14(2)andtohowexactlyitoperateswouldemerge.Forthereare
infacttwodistinctoriginsofthethirty(30)yearrule.
ThefirstsourceisRep.ActNo.1942,enactedin1957,whichamendedSection48(b)ofthePublicLandActbygrantingtherighttoseek
originalregistrationofalienablepubliclandsthroughpossessionintheconceptofanownerforatleastthirtyyears.
ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhilippines,occupyinglandsofthepublicdomainorclaimingtoownanysuchlandsoraninterest
therein,butwhosetitleshavenotbeenperfectedorcompleted,mayapplytotheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewherethelandis
locatedforconfirmationoftheirclaimsandtheissuanceofacertificateoftitletherefor,undertheLandRegistrationAct,towit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofagriculturallandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,foratleastthirtyyears
immediatelyprecedingthefilingoftheapplicationforconfirmationoftitle,exceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeure.Theseshallbe
conclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovernmentgrantandshallbeentitledtoacertificateoftitleunder
theprovisionsofthisChapter.(emphasissupplied)37
Thisprovisionwasrepealedin1977withtheenactmentofP.D.1073,whichmadethedate12June1945thereckoningpointforthefirsttime.
Nonetheless,applicationsforregistrationfiledpriorto1977couldhaveinvokedthe30yearruleintroducedbyRep.ActNo.1942.
ThesecondsourceisSection14(2)ofP.D.1529itself,atleastbyimplication,asitappliestherulesonprescriptionundertheCivilCode,
particularlyArticle1113inrelationtoArticle1137.NotethattherearetwokindsofprescriptionundertheCivilCodeordinaryacquisitive
prescriptionandextraordinaryacquisitiveprescription,which,underArticle1137,iscompleted"throughuninterruptedadversepossession
forthirtyyears,withoutneedoftitleorofgoodfaith."
Obviously,thefirstsourceofthethirty(30)yearperiodrule,Rep.ActNo.1942,becameunavailableafter1977.Atpresent,theonlylegal
basisforthethirty(30)yearperiodisthelawonprescriptionundertheCivilCode,asmandatedunderSection14(2).However,thereisa
materialdifferencebetweenhowthethirty(30)yearruleoperatedunderRep.ActNo.1942andhowitdidundertheCivilCode.
Section48(b)ofthePublicLandAct,asamendedbyRep.ActNo.1942,didnotrefertoorcallintoapplicationtheCivilCodeprovisionson
prescription.Itmerelysetfortharequisitethirtyyearpossessionperiodimmediatelyprecedingtheapplicationforconfirmationoftitle,
withoutanyqualificationastowhetherthepropertyshouldbedeclaredalienableatthebeginningof,andcontinueassuch,throughoutthe
entirethirty(30)years.ThereisneitherstatutorynorjurisprudentialbasistoassertRep.ActNo.1942hadmandatedsucha
requirement,38similartoourearlierfindingwithrespecttothepresentlanguageofSection48(b),whichnowsets12June1945asthepointof
reference.
Then,withtherepealofRep.ActNo.1942,thethirtyyearpossessionperiodasbasisfororiginalregistrationbecameSection14(2)ofthe
PropertyRegistrationDecree,whichentitledthose"whohaveacquiredownershipoverprivatelandsbyprescriptionundertheprovisionsof
existinglaws"toapplyfororiginalregistration.Again,thethirtyyearperiodisderivedfromtheruleonextraordinaryprescriptionunder
Article1137oftheCivilCode.Atthesametime,Section14(2)putsintooperationtheentireregimeofprescriptionundertheCivilCode,a
factwhichdoesnotholdtruewithrespecttoSection14(1).
B.
UnlikeSection14(1),Section14(2)explicitlyreferstotheprinciplesonprescriptionunderexistinglaws.Accordingly,weareimpelledto
applythecivillawconceptofprescription,assetforthintheCivilCode,inourinterpretationofSection14(2).Thereisnosimilardemandon
ourpartinthecaseofSection14(1).
ThecriticalqualificationunderArticle1113oftheCivilCodeisthus:"[p]ropertyoftheStateoranyofitssubdivisionsnotpatrimonialin
charactershallnotbetheobjectofprescription."TheidentificationwhatconsistsofpatrimonialpropertyisprovidedbyArticles420and421,
whichwequoteinfull:
Art.420.Thefollowingthingsarepropertyofpublicdominion:
(1)Thoseintendedforpublicuse,suchasroads,canals,rivers,torrents,portsandbridgesconstructedbytheState,banks,shores,roadsteads,
andothersofsimilarcharacter;
(2)ThosewhichbelongtotheState,withoutbeingforpublicuse,andareintendedforsomepublicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthe
nationalwealth.
Art.421.AllotherpropertyoftheState,whichisnotofthecharacterstatedintheprecedingarticle,ispatrimonialproperty
Itisclearthatpropertyofpublicdominion,whichgenerallyincludespropertybelongingtotheState,cannotbetheobjectofprescriptionor,
indeed,besubjectofthecommerceofman.39Landsofthepublicdomain,whetherdeclaredalienableanddisposableornot,arepropertyof
publicdominionandthusinsusceptibletoacquisitionbyprescription.
LetusnowexploretheeffectsundertheCivilCodeofadeclarationbythePresidentoranydulyauthorizedgovernmentofficerofalienability
anddisposabilityoflandsofthepublicdomain.Wouldsuchlandssodeclaredalienableanddisposablebeconverted,undertheCivilCode,
frompropertyofthepublicdominionintopatrimonialproperty?Afterall,byconnotativedefinition,alienableanddisposablelandsmaybe
theobjectofthecommerceofman;Article1113providesthatallthingswithinthecommerceofmanaresusceptibletoprescription;andthe
sameprovisionfurtherprovidesthatpatrimonialpropertyoftheStatemaybeacquiredbyprescription.
Nonetheless,Article422oftheCivilCodestatesthat"[p]ropertyofpublicdominion,whennolongerintendedforpublicuseorforpublic
service,shallformpartofthepatrimonialpropertyoftheState."Itisthisprovisionthatcontrolshowpublicdominionpropertymaybe
convertedintopatrimonialpropertysusceptibletoacquisitionbyprescription.Afterall,Article420(2)makesclearthatthoseproperty"which
belongtotheState,withoutbeingforpublicuse,andareintendedforsomepublicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth"are
publicdominionproperty.ForaslongasthepropertybelongstotheState,althoughalreadyclassifiedasalienableordisposable,itremains
propertyofthepublicdominionifwhenitis"intendedforsomepublicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth".
Accordingly,theremustbeanexpressdeclarationbytheStatethatthepublicdominionpropertyisnolongerintendedforpublicserviceor
thedevelopmentofthenationalwealthorthatthepropertyhasbeenconvertedintopatrimonial.Withoutsuchexpressdeclaration,the
property,evenifclassifiedasalienableordisposable,remainspropertyofthepublicdominion,pursuanttoArticle420(2),andthusincapable
ofacquisitionbyprescription.ItisonlywhensuchalienableanddisposablelandsareexpresslydeclaredbytheStatetobenolongerintended
forpublicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealththattheperiodofacquisitiveprescriptioncanbegintorun.Suchdeclaration
shallbeintheformofalawdulyenactedbyCongressoraPresidentialProclamationincaseswherethePresidentisdulyauthorizedbylaw.
ItiscomprehensiblewitheasethatthisreadingofSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreelimitsitsscopeandreachandthusaffects
theregistrabilityevenoflandsalreadydeclaredalienableanddisposabletothedetrimentofthebonafidepossessorsoroccupantsclaiming
titletothelands.YetthisinterpretationisinaccordwiththeRegaliandoctrineanditsconcomitantassumptionthatalllandsownedbythe
State,althoughdeclaredalienableordisposable,remainassuchandoughttobeusedonlybytheGovernment.
RecoursedoesnotliewiththisCourtinthematter.ThedutyoftheCourtistoapplytheConstitutionandthelawsinaccordancewiththeir
languageandintent.Theremedyistochangethelaw,whichistheprovinceofthelegislativebranch.Congresscanverywellbeentreatedto
amendSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeandpertinentprovisionsoftheCivilCodetoliberalizetherequirementsforjudicial
confirmationofimperfectorincompletetitles.
Theoperationoftheforegoinginterpretationcanbeillustratedbyanactualexample.RepublicActNo.7227,entitled"AnActAccelerating
TheConversionOfMilitaryReservationsIntoOtherProductiveUses,etc.,"ismorecommonlyknownastheBCDAlaw.Section2ofthelaw
authorizesthesaleofcertainmilitaryreservationsandportionsofmilitarycampsinMetroManila,includingFortBonifacioandVillamorAir
Base.Forpurposesofeffectingthesaleofthemilitarycamps,thelawmandatesthePresidenttotransfersuchmilitarylandstotheBases
ConversionDevelopmentAuthority(BCDA)40whichinturnisauthorizedtoown,holdand/oradministerthem.41ThePresidentisauthorized
tosellportionsofthemilitarycamps,inwholeorinpart.42Accordingly,theBCDAlawitselfdeclaresthatthemilitarylandssubjectthereof
are"alienableanddisposablepursuanttotheprovisionsofexistinglawsandregulationsgoverningsalesofgovernmentproperties." 43
FromthemomenttheBCDAlawwasenactedthesubjectmilitarylandshavebecomealienableanddisposable.However,saidlandsdidnot
becomepatrimonial,astheBCDAlawitselfexpresslymakesthereservationthattheselandsaretobesoldinordertoraisefundsforthe
conversionoftheformerAmericanbasesatClarkandSubic.44Suchpurposecanbetiedtoeither"publicservice"or"thedevelopmentof
nationalwealth"underArticle420(2).Thus,atthattime,thelandsremainedpropertyofthepublicdominionunderArticle420(2),
notwithstandingtheirstatusasalienableanddisposable.ItisupontheirsaleasauthorizedundertheBCDAlawtoaprivatepersonorentity
thatsuchlandsbecomeprivatepropertyandceasetobepropertyofthepublicdominion.
C.
Shouldpublicdomainlandsbecomepatrimonialbecausetheyaredeclaredassuchinadulyenactedlawordulypromulgatedproclamation
thattheyarenolongerintendedforpublicserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenationalwealth,wouldtheperiodofpossessionpriortothe
conversionofsuchpublicdominionintopatrimonialbereckonedincountingtheprescriptiveperiodinfavorofthepossessors?Weruleinthe
negative.
ThelimitationimposedbyArticle1113dissuadesusfromrulingthattheperiodofpossessionbeforethepublicdomainlandbecomes
patrimonialmaybecountedforthepurposeofcompletingtheprescriptiveperiod.Possessionofpublicdominionpropertybeforeitbecomes
patrimonialcannotbetheobjectofprescriptionaccordingtotheCivilCode.AstheapplicationforregistrationunderSection14(2)falls
whollywithintheframeworkofprescriptionundertheCivilCode,thereisnowaythatpossessionduringthetimethatthelandwasstill
classifiedaspublicdominionpropertycanbecountedtomeettherequisitesofacquisitiveprescriptionandjustifyregistration.
ArewebeinginconsistentinapplyingdivergentrulesforSection14(1)andSection14(2)?Thereisnoinconsistency.Section14(1)mandates
registrationonthebasisofpossession,whileSection14(2)entitlesregistrationonthebasisofprescription.RegistrationunderSection14(1)is
extendedundertheaegisofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeandthePublicLandActwhileregistrationunderSection14(2)ismadeavailable
bothbythePropertyRegistrationDecreeandtheCivilCode.
Inthesamemanner,wecandistinguishbetweenthethirtyyearperiodunderSection48(b)ofthePublicLandAct,asamendedbyRep.Act
No.1472,andthethirtyyearperiodavailablethroughSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecreeinrelationtoArticle1137ofthe
CivilCode.Theperiodundertheformerspeaksofathirtyyearperiodofpossession,
whiletheperiodunderthelatterconcernsathirtyyear
periodofextraordinaryprescription.RegistrationunderSection48(b)ofthePublicLandActasamendedbyRep.ActNo.1472isbasedon
thirtyyearsofpossessionalonewithoutregardtotheCivilCode,whiletheregistrationunderSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistration
DecreeisfoundedonextraordinaryprescriptionundertheCivilCode.
ItmaybeaskedwhytheprinciplesofprescriptionundertheCivilCodeshouldnotapplyaswelltoSection14(1).Notwithstandingthe
vauntedstatusoftheCivilCode,itultimatelyisjustoneofnumerousstatutes,neithersuperiornorinferiortootherstatutessuchasthe
PropertyRegistrationDecree.ThelegislativebranchisnotboundtoadheretotheframeworksetforthbytheCivilCodewhenitenacts
subsequentlegislation.Section14(2)manifestsaclearintenttointerrelatetheregistrationallowedunderthatprovisionwiththeCivilCode,
butnosuchintentexistswithrespecttoSection14(1).
IV.
Oneofthekeystounderstandingtheframeworkwesetforthtodayisseeinghowourlandregistrationprocedurescorrelatewithourlawon
prescription,which,undertheCivilCode,isoneofthemodesforacquiringownershipoverproperty.
TheCivilCodemakesitclearthatpatrimonialpropertyoftheStatemaybeacquiredbyprivatepersonsthroughprescription.Thisisbrought
aboutbyArticle1113,whichstatesthat"[a]llthingswhicharewithinthecommerceofmanaresusceptibletoprescription,"andthat
[p]ropertyoftheStateoranyofitssubdivisionsnotpatrimonialincharactershallnotbetheobjectofprescription."
TherearetwomodesofprescriptionthroughwhichimmovablesmaybeacquiredundertheCivilCode.Thefirstisordinaryacquisitive
prescription,which,underArticle1117,requirespossessioningoodfaithandwithjusttitle;and,underArticle1134,iscompletedthrough
possessionoften(10)years.ThereisnothingintheCivilCodethatbarsapersonfromacquiringpatrimonialpropertyoftheStatethrough
ordinaryacquisitiveprescription,noristhereanyapparentreasontoimposesucharule.Atthesametime,thereareindispensablerequisites
goodfaithandjusttitle.TheascertainmentofgoodfaithinvolvestheapplicationofArticles526,527,and528,aswellasArticle1127ofthe
CivilCode,45provisionsthatmoreorlessspeakforthemselves.
Ontheotherhand,theconceptofjusttitlerequiressomeclarification.UnderArticle1129,thereisjusttitleforthepurposesofprescription
"whentheadverseclaimantcameintopossessionofthepropertythroughoneofthemodesrecognizedbylawfortheacquisitionofownership
orotherrealrights,butthegrantorwasnottheownerorcouldnottransmitanyright."Dr.Tolentinoexplains:
Justtitleisanactwhichhasforitspurposethetransmissionofownership,andwhichwouldhaveactuallytransferredownershipifthegrantor
hadbeentheowner.Thisviceordefectistheonecuredbyprescription.Examples:salewithdelivery,exchange,donation,succession,and
dacioninpayment.46
TheOSGsubmitsthattherequirementofjusttitlenecessarilyprecludestheapplicabilityofordinaryacquisitiveprescriptiontopatrimonial
property.Themajorpremisefortheargumentisthat"theState,astheownerandgrantor,couldnottransmitownershiptothepossessorbefore
thecompletionoftherequiredperiodofpossession."47ItisevidentthattheOSGerredwhenitassumedthatthegrantorreferredtoinArticle
1129istheState.Thegrantoristheonefromwhomthepersoninvokingordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionderivedthetitle,whetherbysale,
exchange,donation,successionoranyothermodeoftheacquisitionofownershiporotherrealrights.
Earlier,wemadeitclearthat,whetherunderordinaryprescriptionorextraordinaryprescription,theperiodofpossessionprecedingthe
classificationofpublicdominionlandsaspatrimonialcannotbecountedforthepurposeofcomputingprescription.Butafterthepropertyhas
beenbecomepatrimonial,theperiodofprescriptionbeginstoruninfavorofthepossessor.Oncetherequisiteperiodhasbeencompleted,two
legaleventsensue:(1)thepatrimonialpropertyisipsojureconvertedintoprivateland;and(2)thepersoninpossessionfortheperiods
prescribedundertheCivilCodeacquiresownershipofthepropertybyoperationoftheCivilCode.
Itisevidentthatoncethepossessorautomaticallybecomestheowneroftheconvertedpatrimonialproperty,theidealnextstepisthe
registrationofthepropertyundertheTorrenssystem.Itshouldberememberedthatregistrationofpropertyisnotamodeofacquisitionof
ownership,butmerelyamodeofconfirmationofownership.48
LookingbackattheregistrationregimepriortotheadoptionofthePropertyRegistrationDecreein1977,itisapparentthattheregistration
systemthendidnotfullyaccommodatetheacquisitionofownershipofpatrimonialpropertyundertheCivilCode.Whatthesystem
accommodatedwastheconfirmationofimperfecttitlebroughtaboutbythecompletionofaperiodofpossessionordainedunderthePublic
LandAct(either30yearsfollowingRep.ActNo.1942,orsince12June1945followingP.D.No.1073).
TheLandRegistrationAct49wasnoticeablysilentontherequisitesforalienablepubliclandsacquiredthroughordinaryprescriptionunderthe
CivilCode,thoughitarguablydidnotprecludesuchregistration.50Still,thegapwaslamentable,consideringthattheCivilCode,byitself,
establishesownershipoverthepatrimonialpropertyofpersonswhohavecompletedtheprescriptiveperiodsordainedtherein.Thegapwas
finallyclosedwiththeadoptionofthePropertyRegistrationDecreein1977,withSection14(2)thereofexpresslyauthorizingoriginal
registrationinfavorofpersonswhohaveacquiredownershipoverprivatelandsbyprescriptionundertheprovisionsofexistinglaws,thatis,
theCivilCodeasofnow.
V.
Wesynthesizethedoctrineslaiddowninthiscase,asfollows:
(1)InconnectionwithSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree,Section48(b)ofthePublicLandActrecognizesandconfirmsthat
"thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionand
occupationofalienableanddisposablelandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership,sinceJune12,1945"
haveacquiredownershipof,andregistrabletitleto,suchlandsbasedonthelengthandqualityoftheirpossession.
(a)SinceSection48(b)merelyrequirespossessionsince12June1945anddoesnotrequirethatthelandsshouldhavebeenalienableand
disposableduringtheentireperiodofpossession,thepossessorisentitledtosecurejudicialconfirmationofhistitletheretoassoonasitis
declaredalienableanddisposable,subjecttothetimeframeimposedbySection47ofthePublicLandAct.51
(b)TherighttoregistergrantedunderSection48(b)ofthePublicLandActisfurtherconfirmedbySection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistration
Decree.
(2)IncomplyingwithSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree,considerthatundertheCivilCode,prescriptionisrecognizedasa
modeofacquiringownershipofpatrimonialproperty.However,publicdomainlandsbecomeonlypatrimonialpropertynotonlywitha
declarationthatthesearealienableordisposable.Theremustalsobeanexpressgovernmentmanifestationthatthepropertyisalready
patrimonialornolongerretainedforpublicserviceorthedevelopmentofnationalwealth,underArticle422oftheCivilCode.Andonly
whenthepropertyhasbecomepatrimonialcantheprescriptiveperiodfortheacquisitionofpropertyofthepublicdominionbegintorun.
(a)Patrimonialpropertyisprivatepropertyofthegovernment.Thepersonacquiresownershipofpatrimonialpropertybyprescriptionunder
theCivilCodeisentitledtosecureregistrationthereofunderSection14(2)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.
(b)Therearetwokindsofprescriptionbywhichpatrimonialpropertymaybeacquired,oneordinaryandotherextraordinary.Underordinary
acquisitiveprescription,apersonacquiresownershipofapatrimonialpropertythroughpossessionforatleastten(10)years,ingoodfaithand
withjusttitle.Underextraordinaryacquisitiveprescription,apersonsuninterruptedadversepossessionofpatrimonialpropertyforatleast
thirty(30)years,regardlessofgoodfaithorjusttitle,ripensintoownership.
B.
Wenowapplytheabovestateddoctrinestothecaseatbar.
ItisclearthattheevidenceofpetitionersisinsufficienttoestablishthatMalabananhasacquiredownershipoverthesubjectpropertyunder
Section48(b)ofthePublicLandAct.ThereisnosubstantiveevidencetoestablishthatMalabananorpetitionersashispredecessorsin
interesthavebeeninpossessionofthepropertysince12June1945orearlier.Theearliestthatpetitionerscandatebacktheirpossession,
accordingtotheirownevidencetheTaxDeclarationstheypresentedinparticularistotheyear1948.Thus,theycannotavailthemselves
ofregistrationunderSection14(1)ofthePropertyRegistrationDecree.
NeithercanpetitionersproperlyinvokeSection14(2)asbasisforregistration.Whilethesubjectpropertywasdeclaredasalienableor
disposablein1982,thereisnocompetentevidencethatisnolongerintendedforpublicuseserviceorforthedevelopmentofthenational
evidence,conformablywithArticle422oftheCivilCode.Theclassificationofthesubjectpropertyasalienableanddisposablelandofthe
publicdomaindoesnotchangeitsstatusaspropertyofthepublicdominionunderArticle420(2)oftheCivilCode.Thus,itisinsusceptibleto
acquisitionbyprescription.
VI.
Afinalword.TheCourtiscomfortablewiththecorrectnessofthelegaldoctrinesestablishedinthisdecision.Nonetheless,discomfitureover
theimplicationsoftodaysrulingcannotbediscounted.For,everyuntitledpropertythatisoccupiedinthecountrywillbeaffectedbythis
ruling.Thesocialimplicationscannotbedismissedlightly,andtheCourtwouldbeabdicatingitssocialresponsibilitytotheFilipinopeopleif
wesimplyleviedthelawwithoutcomment.
Theinformalsettlementofpubliclands,whetherdeclaredalienableornot,isaphenomenontiedtolongstandinghabitandcultural
acquiescence,andiscommonamongthesocalled"ThirdWorld"countries.Thisparadigmpowerfullyevokesthedisconnectbetweenalegal
systemandtherealityontheground.Thelawsofarhasbeenunabletobridgethatgap.Alternativemeansofacquisitionofthesepublic
domainlands,suchasthroughhomesteadorfreepatent,have
provenunattractiveduetolimitationsimposedonthegranteeintheencumbranceoralienationofsaidproperties. 52Judicialconfirmationof
imperfecttitlehasemergedasthemostviable,ifnotthemostattractivemeanstoregularizetheinformalsettlementofalienableordisposable
landsofthepublicdomain,yeteventhatsystem,asrevealedinthisdecision,hasconsiderablelimits.
TherearemillionsuponmillionsofFilipinoswhohaveindividuallyorexclusivelyheldresidentiallandsonwhichtheyhavelivedandraised
theirfamilies.ManymorehavetilledandmadeproductiveidlelandsoftheStatewiththeirhands.Theyhavebeenregardedforgenerationby
theirfamiliesandtheircommunitiesascommonlawowners.Thereismuchtobesaidaboutthevirtuesofaccordingthemlegitimatestates.
YetsuchvirtuesarenotfortheCourttotranslateintopositivelaw,asthelawitselfconsideredsuchlandsaspropertyofthepublicdominion.
ItcouldonlybeuptoCongresstosetforthanewphaseoflandreformtosensiblyregularizeandformalizethesettlementofsuchlandswhich
inlegaltheoryarelandsofthepublicdomainbeforetheproblembecomesinsoluble.Thiscouldbeaccomplished,tocitetwoexamples,by
liberalizingthestandardsforjudicialconfirmationofimperfecttitle,oramendingtheCivilCodeitselftoeasetherequisitesfortheconversion
ofpublicdominionpropertyintopatrimonial.
Onessenseofsecurityoverlandrightsinfusesintoeveryaspectofwellbeingnotonlyofthatindividual,butalsotothepersonsfamily.
Oncethatsenseofsecurityisdeprived,lifeandlivelihoodareputonstasis.Itisforthepoliticalbranchestobringwelcomeclosuretothelong
pesteringproblem.
WHEREFORE,thePetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdated23February2007andResolutiondated2October2007
areAFFIRMED.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.