Ong Chia vs.

Republic of the Philippines

(G.R. No. 127240. March, 27, 2000)

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Ponente: MENDOZA

FACTS:

The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State,
however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, among others for having failed to state all
his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in
his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been
fully published, with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial
compliance with 7.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelants brief without having been
presented and formally offered as evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence justified the reversal of of the Trial Courts decision.

HELD:

YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was denied.

RATIO:

It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of
the government and against the applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioners argument of substantial compliance with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot
claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted
to the appellate court by the State.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals

 253 SCRA 699 Gr No. 107383, February 20, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. That petitioner
accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982, petitioner went to the clinic of private
respondent, who is a doctor of medicine, without the consent of the latter. That on the same
date mentioned, petitioner opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157
documents and papers consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a case for
legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The RTC, decided in favor of private
respondent, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of properties described and ordering
petitioner to return the properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and moral damages and
attorneys fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents
and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision made by the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.

HELD:NO.

The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
(Sec.3, Par.2, Art.III,1987 Constitution)

A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law ensures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by makingit privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without consent of the affected spouse
while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22, Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
PETITION DENIED

PEOPLE V. YATAR

428 SCRA 504

FACTS:

Kathlyn Uba, was the niece of the wife of accused-appellant Joel Yatar. She used to stay with
her grandmother Isabel Dawang. On June 30, 1998, Yatar was seen by Judilyn, a cousin of
Kathlyn at the back of the Isabels house and saw him again at 12.30 descending from the
second floor of the said house and pacing back and forth. At 1.30, Judilyn saw Yatar wearing a
different shirt from earlier and noticed that his eyes were red and sharp. Accused-appellant
asked about the whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter.
Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived.

That night, Isabel Dawang went home and was surprised to see that the lights at her house
were off. She tried to ascend to the second floor of her house in an attempt to look for Kathlyn
but found that the door was locked and tied therein. Succeeded in opening it with a knife,
she went upstairs and felt Kathlyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding
out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein,
they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white
collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house.
Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When
subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is
identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga.

Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a
quos decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that:

(1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on
him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal;

(2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination;
and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as
evidence for Yatars conviction?

HELD:

The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a
precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE.
Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST. This case was decided three years prior to
the Rules on DNA evidence took effect.

At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of
the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to be considered
in assessing the probative weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from
DNA testing. Such factors are, to wit:

(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were
handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;

(b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;

(c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting
institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not
accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be
properly established; and

(d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

DAUBERT TEST:

The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of the DNA test result
yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained
from the cadavers vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and
relevant.

In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be determined whether or not
the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
In this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime;

In giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood
sample from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the victims vaginal canal, the
trial court considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the
DNA testing had been performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the
said case, the DNA test was done at the UP National Science Research Institute
(NSRI). The method used was Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method
by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to
be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours.

Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The
analyst who performed the procedure was Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly
qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.

Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly appreciated by the trial
court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be admitted as evidence to warrant
the accused-appellants conviction.

NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner, vs.

FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS
TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 155208 // March 27, 2007

FACTS:

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject
property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986
and 1988. However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to
transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses;
she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants
the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad,
Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered
the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are
demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of
Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.

Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the
TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the
heirs of Daniela.

RTC Ruled in favor of the Petitioner.

CA Affirmed RTC ruling. Denied MFR.

ISSUE:

W/N the sworn statement is admissible.

HELD: YES.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless
the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The Court finds that
both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC
and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation
that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the
subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove the material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Danielas sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence to prove their
claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA

G.R. No. 173476 / February 22, 2012

FACTS:

Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July
31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to
his uncle, Rodolfo B. Estao to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estao then
brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to
Estao about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain
Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At around 2:30am, despite receiving medical
attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

ISSUE:

Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

HELD:

Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the Court
has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the
incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.

Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be

admitted when the following requisites concur:

(a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death;

(b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death;

(c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and

(d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as
the person who had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his
impending death. Bolanon died in the emergency room a few minutes after admission, which
occurred under three hours after the incident.

Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence
when the following requisites concur:

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he gave the
identity of the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time to
contrive his identification. His utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to such
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.

Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae for
having borne the requisites of the both principles.