Republic of the Philippines The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were declared by the

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO TANEDO, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO
BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN,
ROMEO HUERTO and VITALIANO PANGUE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and MAGSAYSAY LINES,
INC., respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA,
ANTONIO TANEDO, RAYMUNDO PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA,
DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO
PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO
MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN,
ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO CRISTOBAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration), and MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pe;a and Nolasco for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These petitions ask for a re-examination of this Court's precedent setting
decision in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al. (125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On constitutional, statutory, and
factual grounds, we find no reason to disturb the doctrine in Vir-Jen
Shipping and to turn back the clock of progress for sea-based overseas workers.
The experience gained in the past few years shows that, following said doctrine,
we should neither deny nor diminish the enjoyment by Filipino seamen of the
same rights and freedoms taken for granted by other working-men here and
abroad.
defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of breaching their employment
contracts with the private respondent because they demanded, upon the
intervention and assistance of a third party, the International Transport
Worker's Federation (ITF), the payment of wages over and above their
contracted rates without the approval of the NSB. The petitioners were ordered
to reimburse the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency representing the said over-payments and to be suspended from the
NSB registry for a period of three years. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of the petitioners
to return the overpayments made to them upon demand by the former, filed
estafa charges against some of the petitioners. The criminal cases were
eventually consolidated in the sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo.
Hence, these consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and
58143-53, which respectively pray for the nullification of the decisions of the
NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of the criminal cases against the
petitioners.
The facts are found in the questioned decision of the NSB in G.R. No. 64781-99.
From the records of this case it appears that the facts
established and/or admitted by the parties are the following:
that on different dates in 1977 and 1978 respondents
entered into separate contracts of employment (Exhs. "B" to
"B-17", inclusive) with complainant (private respondent) to
work aboard vessels owned/operated/manned by the latter
for a period of 12 calendar months and with different
rating/position, salary, overtime pay and allowance,
hereinbelow specified: ...; that aforesaid employment
contracts were verified and approved by this Board; that on
different dates in April 1978 respondents (petitioners)
joined the M/V "GRACE RIVER"; that on or about October 30,
1978 aforesaid vessel, with the respondents on board,
arrived at the port of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port
respondent received additional wages under rates
prescribed by the Intemational Transport Worker's
Federation (ITF) in the total amount of US$98,261.70; that
the respondents received the amounts appearing opposite
their names, to wit: ...; that aforesaid amounts were over and
above the rates of pay of respondents as appearing in their
employment contracts approved by this Board; that on
November 10, 1978, aforesaid vessel, with respondent on
board, left Vancouver, Canada for Yokohama, Japan; that on
 December 14, 1978, while aforesaid vessel, was at Yura,
Japan, they were made to disembark. (pp. 64-66, Rollo)
Furthermore, according to the petitioners, while the vessel was docked at
Nagoya, Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department
boarded the vessel and called a meeting of the seamen including the
petitioners, telling them that for their own good and safety they should sign an
agreement prepared by him on board the vessel and that if they do, the cases
filed against them with NSB on November 17, 1978 would be dismissed. Thus,
the petitioners signed the. "Agreement" dated December 5, 1978. (Annex C of
Petition) However, when they were later furnished xerox copies of what they
had signed, they noticed that the line "which amount(s) was/were received and
held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNERS" was inserted therein,
thereby making it appear that the amounts given to the petitioners
representing the increase in their wages based on ITF rates were only received
by them in trust for the private respondent.
When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent demanded from the
petitioners the "overpayments" made to them in Canada. As the petitioners
refused to give back the said amounts, charges were filed against some of them
with the NSB and the Professional Regulations Commission. Estafa charges
were also filed before different branches of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila which, as earlier stated, were subsequently consolidated in the sala of
the respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo and which eventually led to G.R. Nos.
57999 and 58143-53.
In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary to
the private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any illegal act nor
stage a strike while they were on board the vessel; that the "Special Agreement"
entered into in Vancouver to pay their salary differentials is valid, having been
executed after peaceful negotiations. Petitioners further argued that the
amounts they received were in accordance with the provision of law, citing
among others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code which provides that "the basic minimum salary
of seamen shall not be less than the prevailing minimum rates established by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in the country
whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is higher ..."; and that the
"Agreement" executed in Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon them and that
intercalations were made to make it appear that they were merely trustees of
the amounts they received in Vancouver.
On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners breached
their employment contracts when they, acting in concert and with the active
participations of the ITF while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged an illegal
strike and by means of threats, coercion and intimidation compelled the
owners of the vessel to pay to them various sums totalling US$104,244.35; that
the respondent entered into the "Special Agreement" to pay the petitioners'
wage differentials because it was under duress as the vessel would not be
allowed to leave Vancouver unless the said agreement was signed, and to
prevent the shipowner from incurring further delay in the shipment of goods;
and that in view of petitioners' breach of contract, the latter's names must be
removed from the NSB's Registry and that they should be ordered to return the
amounts they received over and above their contracted rates.
The respondent NSB ruled that the petitioners were guilty of breach of contract
because despite subsisting and valid NSB-approved employment contracts, the
petitioners sought the assistance of a third party (ITF) to demand from the
private respondent wages in accordance with the ITF rates, which rates are
over and above their rates of pay as appearing in their NSB-approved contracts.
As bases for this conclusion, the NSB stated:
1) The fact that respondents sought the aid of a third party
(ITF) and demanded for wages and overtime pay based on
ITF rates is shown in the entries of their respective Pay-Off
Clearance Slips which were marked as their Exhs. "1" to
"18", and we quote "DEMANDED ITF WAGES, OVERTIME,
DIFFERENTIALS APRIL TO OCTOBER 1978". Respondent
Suzara admitted that the entries in his Pay-Off Clearance Slip
(Exh. "1") are correct (TSN., p. 16, Dec. 6,
1979).lwph1.t Moreover, it is the policy (reiterated very
often) by the ITF that it does not interfere in the affairs of
the crewmembers and masters and/or owners of a vessel
unless its assistance is sought by the crewmembers
themselves. Under this pronounced policy of the ITF, it is
reasonable to assume that the representatives of the ITF in
Vancouver, Canada assisted and intervened by reason of the
assistance sought by the latter.
2) The fact that the ITF assisted and intervened for and in
behalf of the respondents in the latter's demand for higher
wages could be gleaned from the answer of the respondents
when they admitted that the ITF acted in their behalf in the
negotiations for increase of wages. Moreover, respondent
Cesar Dimaandal admitted that the ITF differential pay was
computed by the ITF representative (TSN, p. 7, Dec. 12,
1979)
3) The fact that complainant and the owner/operator of the
vessel were compelled to sign the Special Agreement (Exh.
"20") and to pay ITF differentials to respondents in order
not to delay the departure of the vessel and to prevent
 further losses is shown in the "Agreement" (Exhs. "R-21") ...
(pp. 69-70, Rollo)
The NSB further said:
While the Board recognizes the rights of the respondents to
demand for higher wages, provided the means are peaceful
and legal, it could not, however, sanction the same if the
means employed are violent and illegal. In the case at bar,
the means employed are violent and illegal for in demanding
higher wages the respondents sought the aid of a third party
and in turn the latter intervened in their behalf and
prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or
operator of the vessel acceded to respondents' demand for
higher wages. To avoid suffering further incalculable losses,
the owner and/or operator of the vessel had no altemative
but to pay respondents' wages in accordance with the ITF
scale. The Board condemns the act of a party who enters into
a contract and with the use of force/or intimidation causes
the other party to modify said contract. If the respondents
believe that they have a valid ground to demand from the
complainant a revision of the terms of their contracts, the
same should have been done in accordance with law and not
thru illegal means. (at p. 72, Rollo).
Although the respondent NSB found that the petitioners were entitled to the
payment of earned wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978
to December 14, 1978, it nevertheless ruled that the computation should be
based on the rates of pay as appearing in the petitioners' NSB-approved
contracts. It ordered that the amounts to which the petitioners are entitled
under the said computation should be deducted from the amounts that the
petitioners must return to the private respondent.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the NSB's findings. Hence, the petition in G.R. Nos.
64781-99.
Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 moved to quash
the criminal cases of estafa filed against them on the ground that the alleged
crimes were committed, if at all, in Vancouver, Canada and, therefore,
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction. The respondent judge denied the
motion. Hence, the second petition.
The principal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not the
petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from the private
respondent representing additional wages as determined in the special
agreement. If they are, then the decision of the NLRC and NSB must be
reversed. Similarly, the criminal cases of estafa must be dismissed because it
follows as a consequence that the amounts received by the petitioners belong
to them and not to the private respondent.
In arriving at the questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the petitioners are not
entitled to the wage differentials as determined by the ITF because the means
employed by them in obtaining the same were violent and illegal and because
in demanding higher wages the petitioners sought the aid of a third party,
which, in turn, intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing
unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to respondents'
demand for higher wages. And as proof of this conclusion, the NSB cited the
following: (a) the entries in the petitioners Pay-Off Clearance Slip which
contained the phrase "DEMANDED ITF WAGES ..."; (b) the alleged policy of the
ITF in not interfering with crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention is
sought by the crewmembers themselves; (c), the petitioners' admission that
ITF acted in their behalf; and (d) the fact that the private respondent was
compelled to sign the special agreement at Vancouver, Canada.
There is nothing in the public and private respondents' pleadings, to support
the allegations that the petitioners used force and violence to secure the special
agreement signed in Vancouver. British Columbia. There was no need for any
form of intimidation coming from the Filipino seamen because the Canadian
Brotherhood of Railways and Transport Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian
labor union, backed by an international labor federation was actually doing all
the influencing not only on the ship-owners and employers but also against
third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower wages and cheaper
accommodations, were threatening the employment and livelihood of seamen
from developed nations.
The bases used by the respondent NSB to support its decision do not prove that
the petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the ITF or deliberately sought its
assistance in order to receive higher wages. They only prove that when ITF
acted in petitioners' behalf for an increase in wages, the latter manifested their
support. This would be a logical and natural reaction for any worker in whose
benefit the ITF or any other labor group had intervened. The petitioners admit
that while they expressed their conformity to and their sentiments for higher
wages by means of placards, they, nevertheless, continued working and going
about their usual chores. In other words, all they did was to exercise their
freedom of speech in a most peaceful way. The ITF people, in turn, did not
employ any violent means to force the private respondent to accede to their
demands. Instead, they simply applied effective pressure when they intimated
the possibility of interdiction should the shipowner fail to heed the call for an
upward adjustment of the rates of the Filipino seamen. Interdiction is nothing
more than a refusal of ITF members to render service for the ship, such as to
load or unload its cargo, to provision it or to perform such other chores
ordinarily incident to the docking of the ship at a certain port. It was the fear of
ITF interdiction, not any action taken by the seamen on board the vessel which
led the shipowners to yield.
The NSB's contusion that it is ITF's policy not to intervene with the plight of
crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention was sought is without basis.
This Court is cognizant of the fact that during the period covered by the labor
controversies in Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Minister of Labor (102
SCRA 835 [1981]; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC (supra) and
these consolidated petitions, the ITF was militant worldwide especially in
Canada, Australia, Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting
foreign vessels and demanding wage increases for third world seamen. There
was no need for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF intervention. The ITF was
waiting on its own volition in all Canadian ports, not particularly for the
petitioners' vessel but for all ships similarly situated. As earlier stated, the ITF
was not really acting for the petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF was
merely protecting the interests of its own members. The petitioners happened
to be pawns in a higher and broader struggle between the ITF on one hand and
shipowners and third world seamen, on the other. To subject our seamen to
criminal prosecution and punishment for having been caught in such a struggle
is out of the question.
As stated in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra):
The seamen had done no act which under Philippine law or
any other civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive,
or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild
compared to accepted and valid modes of labor activity. (at
page 591)
Given these factual situations, therefore, we cannot affirm the NSB and NLRC's
finding that there was violence, physical or otherwise employed by the
petitioners in demanding for additional wages. The fact that the petitioners
placed placards on the gangway of their ship to show support for ITF's
demands for wage differentials for their own benefit and the resulting ITF's
threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The petitioners were
exercising their freedom of speech and expressing sentiments in their hearts
when they placed the placard We Want ITF Rates." Under the facts and
circumstances of these petitions, we see no reason to deprive the seamen of
their right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution
and the fundamental law of Canada where they happened to exercise it.
As we have ruled in Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor, et al. supra:
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents
was justified because the latter threatened the ship
authorities in acceding to their demands, and this constitutes
serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code. This
contention is now well-taken. The records fail to establish
clearly the commission of any threat. But even if there had
been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for them to employ some
means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who refused
to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor
and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise
of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of
expression is contrary to law and public policy. ... (at page
843)
We likewise, find the public respondents' conclusions that the acts of the
petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over and above the rates
appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in effect an alteration of their
valid and subsisting contracts because the same were not obtained through.
mutual consent and without the prior approval of the NSB to be without basis,
not only because the private respondent's consent to pay additional wages was
not vitiated by any violence or intimidation on the part of the petitioners but
because the said NSB-approved form contracts are not unalterable contracts
that can have no room for improvement during their effectivity or which ban
any amendments during their term.
For one thing, the employer can always improve the working conditions
without violating any law or stipulation.
We stated in the Vir-Jen case (supra) that:
The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board
are designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign
shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard
forms embody the basic minimums which must be
incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section
15, Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code).lwph1.t They are not collective bargaining
agreements or immutable contracts which the parties cannot
improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period
of time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot
petition their employer for higher salaries during the 12
months duration of the contract runs counter to estabhshed
principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations
Commission, as the appellate tribunal from the decisions of
the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen
 did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal. (at
page 589)
It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a
labor struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway
around the world in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure the approval of
the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement which the employer was willing
to sign. It is also totally unrealistic to expect the petitioners while in Canada to
exhibit the will and strength to oppose the ITF's demand for an increase
in their wages, assuming they were so minded.
An examination of Annex C of the petition, the agreement signed in Japan by the
crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and a certain M. Tabei, representative of
the Japanese shipowner lends credence to the petitioners' claim that the clause
"which amount(s) was received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for
SHIPOWNER" was an intercalation added after the execution of the agreement.
The clause appears too closely typed below the names of the 19 crewmen and
their wages with no similar intervening space as that which appears between
all the paragraphs and the triple space which appears between the list of
crewmembers and their wages on one hand and the paragraph above which
introduces the list, on the other. The verb "were" was also inserted above the
verb "was" to make the clause grammatically correct but the insertion of
"were" is already on the same line as "Antonio Miranda and 5,221.06" where it
clearly does not belong. There is no other space where the word "were" could
be intercalated. (See Rollo, page 80).
At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have pretended to
accept the increased wages while in Vancouver but returned them to the
shipowner when they reached its country, Japan, has already been answered
earlier by the Court:
Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as
seamen from any other country in the world. Otherwise,
there would not be so many of them in the vessels sailing in
every ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and
reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly
in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same
high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United
Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But certainly
they are entitled to government protection when they ask
for fair and decent treatment by their employer and when
they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of
employment, especially when they feel that these are sub-
standard or are capable of improvement according to
internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there
are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for
their employees one in keeping with minimum wages and
the other recording the sub-standard wages that the
employees really receive. The reliable employers, however,
not only meet the minimums required by fair labor
standards legislation but even go away above the minimums
while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The same
is true of international employment. There is no reason why
this court and the Ministry of Labor and Employment or its
agencies and commissions should come out with
pronouncements based on the standards and practices of
unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they
cannot survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive
schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable,
competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign.
(Vir-Jen Shipping, supra, pp. 587-588)
It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the Intemational Labor Organization
(ILO) set the minimum basic wage of able seamen at US$187.00 as early as
October 1976, it was only in 1979 that the respondent NSB issued Memo
Circular No. 45, enjoining all shipping companies to adopt the said minimum
basic wage. It was correct for the respondent NSB to state in its decision that
when the petitioners entered into separate contracts between 1977-1978, the
monthly minimum basic wage for able seamen ordered by NSB was still fixed at
US$130.00. However, it is not the fault of the petitioners that the NSB not only
violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for a
shortcoming of NSB itself.
Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it created the NSB, mandated the Board
to "(O)btain the best possible terms and conditions of employment for seamen."
Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code provides:
Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. The NSB shall
devise a model contract of employment which shall embody
all the requirements of pertinent labor and social legislations
and the prevailing standards set by applicable International
Labor Organization Conventions. The model contract shall
set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions to
govern the employment of Filipinos on board vessels
engaged in overseas trade. All employers of Filipinos shall
adopt the model contract in connection with the hiring and
engagement of the services of Filipino seafarers, and in no
case shall a shipboard employment contract be allowed
 where the same provides for benefits less than those
enumerated in the model employment contract, or in any
way conflicts with any other provisions embodied in the
model contract.
Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules and Regulations provides:
Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-seamen. The basic
minimum salary of seamen shall be not less than the
prevailing minimxun rates established by the International
Labor Organization or those prevailing in the country whose
flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is higher.
However, this provision shall not apply if any shipping
company pays its crew members salaries above the
minimum herein provided.
Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 8. Use of standard format of service agreement.
The Board shall adopt a standard format of service
agreement in accordance with pertinent labor and social
legislation and prevailing standards set by applicable
International Labor Organization Conventions. The standard
format shall set the minimum standard of the terms and
conditions to govern the employment of Filipino seafarers
but in no case shall a shipboard employment contract (sic),
or in any way conflict with any other provision embodied in
the standard format.
It took three years for the NSB to implement requirements which, under the
law, they were obliged to follow and execute immediately. During those three
years, the incident in Vancouver happened. The terms and conditions agreed
upon in Vancouver were well within ILO rates even if they were above NSB
standards at the time.
The sanctions applied by NSB and affirmed by NLRC are moreover not in
keeping with the basic premise that this Court stressed in the Vir-Jen
Shipping case (supra) that the Ministry now the Department of Labor and
Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the workingman's interest
and the nation's as a whole.
Implicit in these petitions and the only reason for the NSB to take the side of
foreign shipowners against Filipino seamen is the "killing the goose which lays
the golden eggs" argument. We reiterate the ruling of the Court in Vir-Jen
Shipping (supra)
There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but
the common thread running through all of them is the
contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent
seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill
the hen that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino
seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should
remain satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest,
international rates of compensation, should not agitate for
higher wages while their contracts of employment are
subsisting, should accept as sacred, iron clad, and immutable
the side contracts which require: them to falsely pretend to
be members of international labor federations, pretend to
receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to return
the increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should stifle
not only their right to ask for improved terms of
employment but their freedom of speech and expression,
and should suffer instant termination of employment at the
slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from their
Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners
contend that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as
seamen, those employed would lose their jobs, and the still
unemployed would be left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the interests of
labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their terms of employment would
be characterized as prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole.
xxx xxx xxx
Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages,
workmen's compensation, social security and collective
bargaining to name a few were all initially opposed by
employers and even well meaning leaders of government
and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden
eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as
outrageously injurious not only to the employer but more so
to the employees themselves before these claims or
demands were established by law and jurisprudence as
"rights" and before these were proved beneficial to
management, labor, and the national as a whole beyond
reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any major advance in
the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private
respondents merely sought rights already established. No
 matter how much the petitioner-employer tries to present
itself as speaking for the entire industry, there is no evidence
that it is typical of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that
it can speak for them.
The contention that manning industries in the Philippines
would not survive if the instant case is not decided in favor
of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem
case was decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no
severe repercussions, no drying up of employment
opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire consequences
repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-Jen
be an exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are
shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office
is an agent whose primary function is recruitment and who
usually gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the
salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen and the
determination of their compensation is subject to the
interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how
much in terms of profits the local manning office and the
foreign shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage
are met. And costs include salaries of officers and crew
members. (at pp. 585-586)
The Wallem Shipping case, was decided in 1981. Vir-Jen Shipping was decided in
1983. It is now 1989. There has'been no drying up of employment
opportunities for Filipino seamen. Not only have their wages improved thus
leading ITF to be placid and quiet all these years insofar as Filipinos are
concerned but the hiring of Philippine seamen is at its highest level ever.
Reporting its activities for the year 1988, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) stated that there will be an increase in demand for
seamen based overseas in 1989 boosting the number to as high as 105,000.
This will represent a 9.5 percent increase from the 1988 aggregate. (Business
World, News Briefs,January 11, 1989 at page 2) According to the POEA,
seabased workers numbering 95,913 in 1988 exceeded by a wide margin of
28.15 percent the year end total in 1987. The report shows that sea-based
workers posted bigger monthly increments compared to those of landbased
workers. (The Business Star, Indicators, January 11, 1988 at page 2)
Augmenting this optimistic report of POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso is
the statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon that the Philippines has
a big jump over other crewing nations because of the Filipinos' abilities
compared with any European or westem crewing country. Drilon added that
cruise shipping is also a growing market for Filipino seafarers because of their
flexibility in handling odd jobs and their expertise in handling almost all types
of ships, including luxury liners. (Manila Bulletin, More Filipino
Seamen Expected Development,December 27, 1988 at page
29).lwph1.t Parenthetically, the minimum monthly salary of able bodied
seamen set by the ILO and adhered to by the Philippines is now $276.00 (id.)
more than double the $130.00 sought to be enforced by the public respondents
in these petitions.
The experience from 1981 to the present vindicates the finding in Vir-Jen
Shipping that a decision in favor of the seamen would not necessarily mean
severe repercussions, drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and
other dire consequences predicted by manning agencies and recruiters in the
Philippines.
From the foregoing, we find that the NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal
means in breaching their contracts of employment and punishing them for
these alleged offenses. Consequently, the criminal prosecutions for estafa in
G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The decisions of the National
Seamen Board and National Labor Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners
not guilty of the offenses for which they were charged. The petitioners'
suspension from the National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is
LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners their earned
but unpaid wages and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to
December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the Special Agreement that the
parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53,
are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D.
442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance
of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent
herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder
of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment
agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in
Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article
16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not
charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one
person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he
claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more
persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. " 2
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders
of the trial court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is
now before us on certiorari. 3
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted
under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b)
is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of
recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge
embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and
placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and
placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with
two or mre persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the
petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only
where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other
acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and
are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should
speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply
the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic
rule. For its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more
persons are needed where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer
or promise of employment but not when it is done through "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the
basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment
is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic
rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one
prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity
dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for
example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful
demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima
facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be
deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word
"shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable
presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and
placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned

provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise
have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than
a presidential decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could
be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or
consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his
close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are
rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the
instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the
background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the
campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized
many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing
hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to
be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of theirown
countrymen.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set
aside and the four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION recruitment, penalized under Art. 38 in relation to Art[s]. 34
and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 176264 Presidential Decree No. 1412, committed as follows:
Appellee, Present:
That in or about and during the months of May and June
CARPIO MORALES, J., 2000, in the municipality of Bulacan, province of Bulacan,
Chairperson, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
BRION, Court, the above-named accused, knowing that they are non-
BERSAMIN, licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., and Labor to recruit and/or place workers in employment either
SERENO, JJ. locally or overseas, conspiring, confederating together and
helping each other, did then and there wi[l]lfully, unlawfully
TERESITA TESSIE LAOGO, Promulgated: and feloniously engage in illegal recruitment, placement or
Appellant. deployment activities for a fee, which they received from
January 10, 2011 complainants Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday, Rogelio Enriquez y
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Buenavidez, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. y Fernandez, Dante Lopez y
Enriquez, Teodulo dela Cruz y Mendoza, Edwin Enriquez y
DECISION Panganiban and Gary Bustillos y de Guzman by recruiting
and promising them job placement abroad, more
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: particularly in Guam, which did not materialize, without first
having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment.

This petition assails the July 31, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in That the crime is committed in a large scale tantamount to
economic sabotage as the aforementioned seven persons
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
were [recruited] individually or as a group.
Court (RTC), Branch 12, of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 693-M-2001.
Contrary to law.
The RTC found appellant Teresita Tessie Laogo guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

The charge stemmed from the following set of facts.

Appellant Teresita Tessie Laogo was the proprietor and manager of Laogo

Travel Consultancy, a travel agency firm located along Padre Faura Street in Sometime during the second week of March 2000, Susan invited

Manila. On March 7, 2001, an Information[3] was filed against appellant and a several individuals including six of the seven complainants namely, Teodulo

certain Susan Navarro (Susan) in Malolos, Bulacan charging them of the crime dela Cruz, Billy dela Cruz, Jr., Dante Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, Rogelio Enriquez,

of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale). The information reads: and Gary Bustillos to her house in Bulacan, Bulacan to celebrate the town fiesta.

Appellant was among the several guests in Susans house during the said
INFORMATION
occasion.
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Susan
Navarro and Tessie [Teresita] Laogo of the crime of illegal
 According to Teodulo dela Cruz, during the fiesta, Gary Bustillos wrong, Billy decided to report the matter to the authorities in Bulacan, Bulacan

introduced him to Susan as somebody who could help him find work abroad. and filed the complaint against Susan and appellant.[13]

Since Susan was Garys aunt, Teodulo immediately trusted Susan. Susan told

him he can apply as assistant cook and can work in Guam, USA. Upon Susans Dante Lopez testified that he was also introduced by Gary Bustillos to appellant

instruction, Teodulo filled up an application form[4] and gave her P3,000.00 and Susan. Susan identified herself as an employee of appellants travel

after the latter promised to process his application to work abroad. [5] On May agency. The two told him that they can send him and his companions to Guam

22, 2000, Susan accompanied Teodulo to appellants travel agency office in within the span of three months.[14] Lopez paid both accused P6,000.00 to

Ermita where he paid an additional P15,000.00 for his placement fee.[6] A process his papers, covered by a receipt dated May 19, 2000 showing

receipt bearing the logo and name of Laogo Travel Consultancy was issued to appellants signature.[15] Appellants promise, however, turned sour after three

him signed by Susan.[7] Months later, when Susans promise to send him abroad months. When he confronted appellant, the latter told him that he would be

remained unfulfilled, Teodulo, along with several other applicants, went to sent to a different country. Left without a choice, Lopez waited. Again, the

appellants office and to Susans house to follow up their application, but the two promise remained unfulfilled.[16]

always told them that their visas have yet to be released.[8]

According to Rogelio Enriquez, he also met appellant during the town fiesta

Similarly, Billy dela Cruz, Jr. also met Susan through Gary, who himself when Susan invited him to cook for her guests. Susan introduced appellant as

was seeking help from Susan to work in Guam. At Susans house, Billy saw Dante someone who could send him to work abroad. Eager about the prospect,
Lopez, Edwin Enriquez, and Rogelio Enriquez. Like him, the three were also Rogelio immediately gave hisP3,000.00 cash to Susan for the processing of his

seeking Susans help to work abroad.[9] Susan introduced Billy to appellant, who visa and employment documents.[17] He saw Susan hand the money to

promised him that she will send them abroad within three months.[10]After the appellant.[18] A week later, Rogelio gave an additional P900.00 to Susan.[19] No

meeting, Billy issued to Susan two Metrobank checks, dated March 11 and May receipts were issued on both payments since Rogelio failed to complete the

10, 2000, bearing the amounts P23,000.00 and P44,000.00, respectively, as required P6,000.00 placement fee.[20] Months passed but Rogelio heard nothing

partial payment for his placement fee.[11] On May 19, 2000, Billy also went to from either Susan or appellant. Apprehensive, Rogelio verified the status of the

appellants travel agency in Ermita and personally handed an additional cash Laogo Travel Consultancy with the Philippine Overseas Employment

of P6,000.00 to Susan, who thereafter gave the money to appellant. Appellant Administration (POEA). From the POEA, Rogelio learned that neither of the

issued a corresponding receipt[12] for the P6,000.00 cash bearing her signature accused nor Laogo Travel was licensed to recruit workers for employment
and the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy. After several months, no abroad. Aggrieved, Rogelio, together with his six companions, filed the

word was heard from either Susan or appellant. Sensing that something was complaint against Susan and appellant.
Edwin Enriquez also paid P12,000.00 to Susan as processing fee for his
application to work in Guam. According to him, Susans husband and appellant
were present when he gave the money to Susan during the town
fiesta.[21] Susan issued a receipt dated May 16, 2000 to Edwin. The receipt
contained the logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy and was signed by Susan with a
description which says Payment was for Placement Fee.[22]
Two other persons, namely Edith Bonifacio-Ulanday and Gary Bustillos, Susans
nephew, were among the seven who filed the complaint against Susan and
appellant. The two, however, later decided to withdraw their complaints after
executing their respective affidavits of desistance.[23]
On March 15, 2001, warrants of arrest[24] were issued against Susan
and appellant. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. [25] Susan,
meanwhile, remained at large. An alias warrant of arrest[26] was issued by the
trial court against her but to no avail.
During the trial, appellant denied any participation in the illegal activities
undertaken by Susan. She insisted that Susan was not in any way connected
with her travel agency and that she confronted the latter when she came to
know of Susans recruitment activities. Appellant claimed that she even had to
rename her travel agency to Renz Consultancy and Employment Services to
avoid being associated with Susans recruitment activities.[27]
Appellant admitted having met Rogelio at Susans house during the town fiesta,
but denied knowing the other complainants. According to appellant, she came
to know Rogelio when Susan specifically identified him as the one who cooked
the dishes after some guests prodded Susan.[28]
Unsatisfied with appellants explanation, the trial court promulgated a
Decision[29] finding her guilty of large scale illegal recruitment. The fallo of the
trial courts July 16, 2002 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein accused Teresita (Tessie)
Laogo y Villamor guilty as principal beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and pay a fine of P500,000.00 as imposed by law[;] to
indemnify the private offended parties x x x actual damages,
as follows: Teodulo dela Cruz P15,000.00, Billy dela
Cruz P73,000.00, Dante Lopez P6,000.00, Rogelio
Enriquez P3,000.00, and Edwin Enriquez P12,000.00[;] and
to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In the service of her sentence the said accused, a detention
prisoner, shall be credited with the full time during which
she had undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to
the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Pending the actual apprehension of the other accused Susan
Navarro, [who is] still at-large, on the strength of the
warrant of arrest earlier issued, let the record be committed
to the archives subject to recall and reinstatement, should
circumstances so warrant for due prosecution against her of
this case.
SO ORDERED.[30]
Appellant filed an appeal before this Court, but said appeal was transferred to
the CA following our pronouncement in People v. Mateo.[31]
In her Appellants Brief[32] before the CA, appellant insisted that she
had no hand in the recruitment of the complainants and maintains that the
recruitment activities were made solely upon the initiative of accused Susan
Navarro.[33] Appellant anchored her defense on the testimonies of the
complainants who declared that the transactions and the payments were made
not with her but with Susan.[34] Appellant admitted that her consultancy firm are deemed illegal and punishable by law. And when the illegal recruitment is

was merely engaged in the business of assisting clients in the procurement of committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group, then it is

passports and visas, and denied that her agency was involved in any deemed committed in large scale and carries with it stiffer penalties as the

recruitment activity as defined under the Labor Code, as amended.[35] same is deemed a form of economic sabotage.[40]

On July 31, 2006, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision But to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without

affirming appellants conviction.[36] The CA noted that although at times, it was being duly authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he

Susan with whom the complainants transacted, the records nevertheless bear had the power or ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter

that appellant had a hand in the recruitment of the complainants. The CA were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[41] It is

pointed out that appellant, together with Susan, repeatedly assured the private important that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from

complainants that her consultancy firm could deploy them for overseas the person posing as a recruiter, whether locally or abroad.[42]

employment,[37] leading the appellate court to conclude that appellant

consciously and actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants. [38] Here, both the trial court and the CA found that all the five complainants were

promised to be sent abroad by Susan and herein appellant[43] as cooks and

Aggrieved, appellant brought the case to us on appeal, raising the same assistant cooks. The follow up transactions between appellant and her victims

arguments she had raised at the CA. were done inside the said travel agency. Moreover, all four receipts issued to
the victims bear the name and logo of Laogo Travel Consultancy,[44] with two of

We affirm appellants conviction. the said receipts personally signed by appellant herself.[45] Indubitably,

appellant and her co-accused acting together made complainants believe that

Recruitment and placement refers to the act of canvassing, enlisting, they were transacting with a legitimate recruitment agency and that Laogo

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes Travel Consultancy had the authority to recruit them and send them abroad for

referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or work when in truth and in fact it had none as certified by the POEA. [46] Absent

abroad, whether for profit or not. When a person or entity, in any manner, any showing that the trial court and the CA overlooked or misappreciated

offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, that person or certain significant facts and circumstances, which if properly considered, would

entity shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.[39] change the result, we are bound by said findings.[47]

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that Appellants contention that she had to change the name of her travel agency to

recruitment activities undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority disassociate herself with Susans recruitment activities is too lame to deserve
serious consideration. In light of the testimonies of the complainants that

appellant with her co-accused promised them employment abroad, we find

appellants act of closing Laogo Travel Consultancy and establishing a new one

under her husbands name[48] as just an afterthought, a belated decision which

cannot undo the damage suffered by the private offended parties. It could

indeed hardly be construed as a simple reaction of an innocent person, as it in

fact smacks of a desperate attempt of a guilty individual to escape liability or to

confuse and dishearten her victims.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31,

2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01664 is AFFIRMED in

toto.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.