Secs.
44 and 87, Judiciary Act country, or within any of the
of 1948 (Rep. Act No. 296)
Section 44. Original
jurisdiction. - Courts of First
Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:
(a) In all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation
(b) In all civil actions which
involve the title to or possession
of real property, or any interest
therein, or the legality of any
tax, impost or assessment,
except actions of forcible entry
into and detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction
of which is conferred by this Act
upon justice of the peace courts
and municipal courts;
(c) In all cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, or
the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more
than two thousand pesos;
(d) In all actions in admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction,
irrespective of the value of the
property in controversy or the
amount of the demand;
(e) In all matters of probate, both
of testate and intestate estates,
appointment of guardians,
trustees and receivers, and in all
actions for annulment of
marriage, and in all such special
cases and proceedings as are not
otherwise provided for;
(f) In all criminal cases in which
the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than
two hundred pesos;
(g) Over all crimes and offenses
committed on the high seas or
beyond the jurisdiction of any
(1) Gambling and management
navigable waters of the or operation of lotteries;
Philippines, on board a ship or
water craft of any kind (2) Assaults where the intent to
registered or licensed in the kill is not charged or evident
Philippines in accordance with upon the trial;
the laws thereof. The
jurisdiction herein conferred (3) Larceny, embezzlement and
may be exercised by the Court estafa where the amount of
of First Instance in any province money or property stolen,
into which the ship or water embezzled, or otherwise
craft upon which the crime or involved, does not exceed the
offense was committed shall sum or value of two hundred
come after the commission pesos;
thereof: Provided, That the court
first lawfully taking cognizance (4) Sale of intoxicating liquors;
thereof shall have jurisdiction of
the same to the exclusion of all (5) Falsely impersonating an
other courts in the Philippines; officer;
and
(6) Malicious mischief;
(h) Said courts and their judges,
or any of them, shall have the
(7) Trespass on Government or
power to issue writs of
private property; and
injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo
(8) Threatening to take human
warranto and habeas corpus in
life
their respective provinces and
districts, in the manner provided
Said justices of the peace and
in the Rules of Court.
judges of municipal courts may
also conduct preliminary
Section 87. Original
investigations for any offense
jurisdiction to try criminal
alleged to have been committed
cases. - Justices of the peace and
within their respective
judges of municipal courts of
municipalities and cities,
chartered cities shall have
original jurisdiction over: without regard to the limits of
punishment, and may release, or
commit and bind over any
(a) All violations of municipal
person charged with such
or city ordinances committed
offense to secure his appearance
within their respective territorial
before the proper court.
jurisdictions;
Justices of the peace in the
(b) All offenses in which the
capitals of provinces may, by
penalty provided by law is
assignment of the respective
imprisonment for not more than
district judge in each case, have
six months, or a fine of not more
like jurisdiction as the Court of
than two hundred pesos, or both
First Instance to try parties
such fine and imprisonment;
charged with an offense
committed within the province
(c) All criminal cases arising in which the penalty provided
under the laws relating to: by law does not exceed
imprisonment for two years and
four months, or a fine of two
thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, and, in
the absence of the district judge,
shall have like jurisdiction
within the province as the Court
of First Instance to hear
applications for bail.
o Secs. 20 and 32 (2\, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (1980), as
Section 20. Jurisdiction in
criminal cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter
Section 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in criminal cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all violations of
city or municipal ordinances
committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value, or amount
thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses
involving damage to property
through criminal negligence
they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof. (as
amended by R.A, No. 7691)
Dazon v. Yap, G.R. No.
157095,15 January 2010
MA. LUISA G. DAZON,
PETITIONER, VS.
KENNETH Y. YAP AND
PEOPLE OF THE
The primordial function of the
Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) is
the regulation of the real estate
trade and business. Though the
agency's jurisdiction has been
expanded by law, it has not
grown to the extent of
encompassing the conviction
and punishment of criminals.
The present Petition for Review
on Certiorari assails the Orders
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City,
Branch 54 dated October 2,
2002 and January 13,2003,
which granted the Motion to
Withdraw Information filed by
the public prosecutor and denied
the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner, respectively.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Kenneth Y. Yap
was the president of Primetown
Property Group, Inc.,
(Primetown) the developer of
Kiener Hills Mactan
Condominium, a low-rise
condominium project. In
November 1996, petitioner Ma.
Luisa G. Dazon entered into a
contract[1] with Primetown for
the purchase of Unit No. C-108
of the said condominium
project. Petitioner made a
downpayment and several
installment payments, totaling
P1,114,274.30.[2] Primetown,
however, failed to finish the
condominium project. Thus, on
March 22, 1999, petitioner
demanded for the refund of her
payments from Primetown,
pursuant to Section 23[3] of
Presidential Decree (PD) No.
957 (1976), otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers'
Protective Decree". Primetown
failed to refund petitioner's
payments.
On October
26,2000,[4] petitioner filed a
criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of
Lapu-Lapu City against
respondent as president of
Primetown for violation of
Section 23 in relation to Section
39[5] of PD 957. Subsequently,
after a finding of probable
cause, an Information[6] was
filed with the RTC of Lapu-
Lapu City docketed as Criminal
Case No. 015331-L.
Meanwhile, respondent, in
connection with the resolution
finding probable cause filed a
Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice
(DOJ). On June 14,2002, the
DOJ rendered a
Resolution[8]ordering the trial
prosecutor to cause the
withdrawal of the Information.
Hence, the prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw
Information[9] with the RTC.
The RTC disposed of the matter
as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the
foregoing, the Motion to
Withdraw Information filed by
[the] public prosecutor is hereby
granted. Accordingly, the
information' filed against the
herein accused is ordered
withdrawn and to be transmitted
back to the City Prosecutor's
Office of Lapu-Lapu City.
Furnish copies of this order to
Prosecutor Rubi, Attys. Valdez
and Pangan.
SO ORDERED.[10] Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was
denied.[11]
Issue
Hence, the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari raising the
following issue: ''Whether or not
a regional trial court has
jurisdiction over a criminal
action arising from violation of
PD 957".[12]
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that
jurisdiction is conferred by law
and that there is no law
expressly vesting on the
HLUKB exclusive jurisdiction
over criminal actions arising
from violations of PD 957.
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand,
contends that there is no error of
law involved in this case and
that petitioner failed to give due
regard to the hierarchy of courts
by filing the present petition
directly with the Supreme Court
instead of with the Court of
Appeals. He further argues that
the real issue is not of
jurisdiction but the existence of
probable cause. The Secretary
of Justice, according to
respondent, found no probable
cause to warrant the filing of the
Information, hence its directive
to cause the withdrawal of the
Information.
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.
The DOJ Resolution dated June
14, 2002 which ordered the
withdrawal of the information
was based on the finding that
the HLURB, and not the
regular court, has jurisdiction
over the case.
Both the respondent[13] and the
OSG[14] agree with the petitioner
that the regular courts and not
the HLURB have jurisdiction
over the criminal aspect of PD
957. The parties, however,
disagree on the basis of the
directive of the DOJ for the
withdrawal of the
Information. Was it, as argued
by petitioner, lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC or was it,
as argued by respondent, lack of
probable cause? We perused the
DOJ Resolution dated June 14,
2002 and we find that the basis
of the resolution was, not that
there was lack of probable cause
but, the finding that it is the
HLURB that has jurisdiction
over Hie case. Pertinent
portions of the said DOJ
Resolution provide:
The petition is impressed with
merit.
A perusal of the allegations in
the complaint-affidavit would
show complainant's grievance
against respondent was the
failure of the latter's firm to
refund the payments she made
for one of the units in the
aborted Mactan condominium
project in the total amount of
P1,114,274.30.
As early as in the case of Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177
SCRA 72, the Supreme Court
had ruled that the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving
real estate business and
practices under PD 957. This
ruling is reiterated in several
subsequent cases, to name a few
of them, Union Bank of the
Philippines-versus-HLURB,
G.R. No. 953364, June 29,
1992; C.T. Torres Enterprises
vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286;
Villaflor vs. Court of Appeals,
280 SCRA 297; Marina
Properties Coip. vs. Court of
Appeals, 294 SCRA 273; and
Raet vs. Court of Appeals, 295
SCRA 677. Of significant
relevance is the following
pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in Raet vs. Court of
Appeals (supra), as follows:
xxx The contention has
merit. The decision in the
ejectment suit is conclusive only
on the question of possession of
the subject premises. It does not
settle the principal question
involved in the present case,
namely, whether there was
perfected contract of sale
between petitioners and private
respondent PVDHC involving
the units in question. Under
8(100) of E.O. No. 648 dated
February 7, 1981, as amended
by E.O. No. 90 dated December
17, 1986 this question is for the
HLURB to decide. The said
provision of law gives that
agency the power to
Hear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business
practices; claims involving
refijnd filed against project
owners, developers, dealers,
brokers, or salesmen; and cases
of specific performance.
This jurisdiction of the HLURB
is exclusive. It has been held to
extend to the determination of
the question whether there is a
perfected contract of sale
between condominium buyers
and [the] developer x x x.

In fine, the Rule of Law dictates
that we should yield to this
judicial declaration upholding
the jurisdiction of the HLURB
over cases of this nature.
Hence, there is a need for the
Court to make a definite ruling
on a question of law - the matter
of jurisdiction over the criminal
aspect of PD 957.
Jurisdiction over criminal
actions
arising from violations of PD
957
is vested in the regular courts.
Jurisdiction is" conferred by law
and determined by the material
averments in the complaint as
well as the character of the relief
sought.15 The scope and
limitation of the jurisdiction of
the HLURB are well-defined.'6
Its precusor, the National
Housing Authority (NHA),17
was vested under PD 957 with
exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and
business,18 specifically the
registration of subdivision or
condominium projects and
dealers, brokers and salesmen of
subdivision lots or
condominium units, issuance
and suspension of license to sell;
and revocation of registration
certificate and license to sell. Its
jurisdiction was later expanded
under PD 1344 (1978) to
include adjudication of certain
cases, to wit:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its
functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided
for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing
Authority shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the
following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business
practices;
b) Claims involving refund and
any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific
performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the
owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman. (Italics supplied)
It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express
mention of one thing in the law
means the exclusion of others
not expressly mentioned. This
rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius[19]. Where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms
to statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those
expressly
mentioned.[20] Noticeably, cases
that are criminal in nature are
not mentioned in the
enumeration quoted above. The
primordial function of the
HLURB, after all, is
the regulation of the real estate
trade and business and not the
conviction and punishment of
criminals. "It may be conceded
that the legislature may confer
on administrative boards or
bodies quasi-judicial powers
involving the exercise of
judgment and discretion, as
incident to the performance of
administrative functions. But in
so doing, the legislature must
state its intention in express
terms that would leave no doubt,
as even such quasi-judicial
prerogatives must be limited, if
they are to be valid, only to
those incidental to or in
connection with the
performance of administrative
duties, which do not amount to
conferment of jurisdiction over
a matter exclusively vested in
the courts".[21]
Administrative agencies being
tribunals of limited jurisdiction
can only wield such powers as
are specifically granted to them
by their enabling statutes. PD
957 makes the following
specific grant of powers to the
NHA (now HLURB) for the
imposition
of administrative fines, and it
also mentions penalties for
criminal cases, to wit:
Sec. 38. Administrative
Fines.- The Authority may
prescribe and impose fines not
exceeding ten thousand pesos
for violations of the provisions
of this Decree or any rule or
regulation thereunder. Fines
shall be payable to the Authority
and enforceable through writs of
execution in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of
Court (Italics supplied)
Sec. 39. Penalties.- Any person
who shall violate any of the
provisions of this Decree and/or
any rule or regulation that may
be issued pursuant to this
Decree shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not
more than twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos and/or
imprisonment of not more than
ten years: Provided, That in the
case of corporations,
partnership, cooperatives, or
associations, the President,
Manager or Administrator or the
person who has charge of the
administration of the business
shall be criminally responsible
for any violation of this/Decree
and/or the rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto,
Having limited, under Section
38 of PD 957, the grant of power
to the former NHA, now
HLURB, over the imposition of
fines to those which do not
exceed ten thousand pesos, it is
clear that the power in relation
to criminal liability mentioned
in the immediately succeeding
provision, to impose, upon
conviction, fines above ten
thousand pesos
and/or imprisonment, was not
conferred on it. Section 39,
unlike Section 38,
conspicuously does not state
that it is the MIA that may
impose the punishment
specified therein.
Not having been specifically
conferred with power to hear
and decide cases which are
criminal in nature, as well as to
impose penalties therefor, we
find that the HLURB has no
jurisdiction over criminal
actions arising from violations
of PD 957.
On the other hand, BP Big. 129
states:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal
Cases. - Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those
now falling under the exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall PEOPLE OF THE
hereafter be exclusively taken PHILIPPINES Respondent.
cognizance of by the latter.
For review is the Decision of the
Based on the above-quoted Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
provision, it is the RTC that has CR No. 21879 dated September
jurisdiction over criminal cases 17, 2001,1 affirming the
arising from violations of PD September 23, 1997 Decision of
957. the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, in
In the present case, the affidavit- Criminal Case No. 91-5617
complaint[23] alleges the convicting petitioner Isidro
violation of Section 23 oFTD Pablito Palana with violation of
957 and asks for the institution Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22
of a criminal action against otherwise known as the
respondent Yap, as President of "Bouncing Checks Law".
Primetown. The Office of the
City Prosecutor found probable On August 19, 1991, petitioner
cause for the filing of was charged with violation of
an'Information for the subject B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information
offense. The DOJ made no which reads as follows:
reversal of such finding of
probable cause. Instead, it That on or about September
directed the withdrawal of the 1987, in the Municipality of
information on the erroneous Makati, Metro Manila,
premise that it is the HLURB Philippines, a place within the
which has jurisdiction over the jurisdiction of this Honorable
case. However, as above- Court, the above-named accused
discussed, and contrary to the did, then and there, willfully,
resolution of the Secretary of unlawfully and knowingly make
Justice, it is not the HLURB but or draw and issue to Alex B.
the RTC that has jurisdiction to Carlos to apply on account or for
hear the said criminal action. the value the check described
below:
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed
Check 326317P
October 2, 2002 and January 13, :
No. R
2003 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, Drawn : Asian
Branch 54, Agains Savings
are REVERSED and SET t Bank
ASIDE. The said Court Paseo de
is DIRECTED to proceed with Roxas
the arraignment of the Branch
respondent and to hear the case
with dispatch. In the
590,000
amoun :
.00
t of
o Palana v. People, G.R. No.
L49995,28 September 2O07 Postdat February
:
ed 15, 1988
ISIDRO PABLITO M. Payabl Dr. Alex
PALANA, Petitioner, :
e to B. Carlos
vs.
said accused well knowing that
at the time of issue, he did not
have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the
payment in full of the face
amount of such check when
presented for payment within
(90) days from the date thereof,
was subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for the reason
Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, the
accused failed to pay said payee
the face amount of said check or
make arrangement for full
payment within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice.2
On January 30, 1992, the case
was archived due to petitioners
non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his
arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the
warrant of arrest was recalled
and set aside4 after petitioner
posted the required bail. He was
arraigned on July 25, 1995 when
he pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.5
Private complainant Alex B.
Carlos testified that sometime in
September 1987, petitioner and
his wife borrowed money from
him in the amount of
590,000.00. To secure the
payment of the loan, petitioner
issued a postdated check for the
same amount in favor of the
complainant.6 However, when
the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by
the bank for insufficiency of
funds. Subsequent demand
notwithstanding, petitioner
failed to make good the said
dishonored check.7
Petitioner alleged that the
amounts given to him by private
complainant was an investment
by the latter who was his
business partner. He argued that
the subject check was not issued
in September 1987 to guarantee
the payment of a loan since his
checking account was opened
only on December 1, 1987.8 He
claimed that private
complainant cajoled him to
issue a check in his favor
allegedly to be shown to a textile
supplier who would provide the
partnership with the necessary
raw materials. Petitioner alleged
that when the check was issued
sometime in February
1988,9 complainant knew that
the same was not funded.10
After trial on the merits, the
Regional Trial Court rendered
on September 23, 1997 a
Decision11 finding petitioner
guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, this court finds the
accused Isidro Pablito M.
Palana guilty as charged and
sentences him to a prison term
of Six (6) months and to
indemnify the private
complainant the sum of
590,000.00 plus legal interest
from filing of this case until full
payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was
dismissed by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial
courts decision in toto.12
Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that the
check was issued as a guaranty
for the loan, thereby rejecting
petitioners "investment
theory". In ruling against the
existence of a partnership
between them, the trial court
noted that the so-called
partnership venture, Palanas
General Merchandising, was
registered on December 1, 1987
only in the name of
petitioner.13 The Court of
Appeals also held that the act of
lending money does not
necessarily amount to an
investment of capital.
Hence, the instant petition
raising the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE LOWER
COURT DISREGARDING
THE DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED THAT THE
ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT ASIAN BANK
CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A
CONSIDERATION OR FOR
VALUE, AS THE ACCUSED
WAS ONLY TRICKED BY
THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE
THE SAID CHECK AS A
MEANS OF BINDING THE
ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS
INVESTMENT IN THE
PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS
THEN SUFFERING FROM
BUSINESS REVERSALS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT AT THE TIME
THE ACCUSED WAS
ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25,
1995 R.A. 7691 EXPANDING
THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN
EFFECT.14
The issues to be resolved are: 1)
whether petitioner was guilty of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2)
whether the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioners argument that it is
the Metropolitan Trial Court and
not the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the
case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is
without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that
jurisdiction to try a criminal
action is determined by the law
in force at the time of
the institution of the
action15 and not during the
arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner
with violation of B.P. Blg. 22
was filed on August 19, 1991.
At that time, the governing law
determinative of jurisdiction is
B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal
cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those
now falling under the exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance by the latter.
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
1 (2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of
not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
punishable with imprisonment
of not less than 30 days but not
more than one year or by a fine
of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case
exceed 200,000.00, or both
fine and imprisonment17 at the
discretion of the court. In the
present case, the fine imposable
is 200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly
acquired jurisdiction over the
case.18 The Metropolitan Trial
Court could not acquire
jurisdiction over the criminal
action because its jurisdiction is
only for offenses punishable
with a fine of not more than
4,000.00.
The subsequent amendment of
B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
and the Metropolitan Trial
Court"19 on June 15, 1994
cannot divest the Regional Trial
Court of jurisdiction over
petitioners case. Where a court
has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to
proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not
affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal
unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending
before its enactment. Indeed,
R.A. No. 7691 contains
retroactive provisions.
However, these only apply to
civil cases that have not yet
reached the pre-trial stage.
Neither from an express proviso
nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691
has retroactive application to
criminal cases pending or
decided by the Regional Trial
Courts prior to its
effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of
the RTC over the case attached
upon the commencement of the
action by the filing of the
Information and could not be
ousted by the passage of R.A.
No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts,
the application of which to
criminal cases is prospective in
nature.21
After a careful review of the
records, this Court sustains
petitioners conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The
elements of the offense
penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are
as follows: (1) the accused
makes, draws, or issues any
check to apply on account or for
value; (2) the accused knows at
the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full
upon its presentment; and (3)
the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
Each element of the offense was
duly proven by the prosecution.
Petitioner admitted that at the
time he issued the subject check,
he knew that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of
such check. Consequently,
when the check was presented
for payment, it was dishonored
by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds.
Thereafter, he received demand
letters to pay the amount of the
check from private complainant
but he did not comply with it.22
In ruling that the amount of the
check was for consideration or
value, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals upheld private
complainants claim that the
check was issued as a guaranty
for the loan and rejected
petitioners "investment
theory". The issue as to whether
the amount of the subject check
represents the amount of the
money loaned by private
complainant to petitioner or as
an investment in the alleged
partnership is a factual question
involving the credibility of
witnesses. Where the issue is
one of credibility, the appellate
court will not generally disturb
the findings of the lower court
considering that it is in a better
position to settle that issue since
it had the advantage of hearing
the witnesses and observing
their conduct during the trial,
which circumstances carry great
weight in assessing their
credibility. In the present case,
we see no reason to reverse the
finding of the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of
Appeals that the amount of the
subject check was a loan and not
an investment.23
Upon issuance of a check, in the
absence of evidence to the
contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable
consideration, which may
consist either in some right,
interest, profit or benefit
accruing to the party who makes
the contract, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss or
some responsibility, to act, or
labor, or service given, suffered
or undertaken by the other side.
Since it was established that
petitioner received money from
private complainant in various
amounts,24 petitioner cannot
now claim that the checks were
not issued for value.25
The allegation that the check
was intended to be shown to
potential suppliers is not a valid
defense. In Cueme v.
People,26 the Court held thus:
The allegation of petitioner that
the checks were merely intended
to be shown to prospective
investors of her corporation is,
to say the least, not a defense.
The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is
the act of making or issuing a
worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. The
law has made the mere act of
issuing a bad check malum
prohibitum, an act proscribed by
the legislature for being deemed
pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Considering the
rule in mala prohibita cases, the
only inquiry is whether the law
has been breached. Criminal
intent becomes unnecessary
where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy, and the
defenses of good faith and
absence of criminal intent are
unavailing.
The checks issued, even
assuming they were not
intended to be encashed or
deposited in a bank, produce the
same effect as ordinary checks.
What the law punishes is the
issuance of a rubber check itself
and not the purpose for which
the check was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to
its issuance. This is not without
good reasons. To determine the
purpose as well as the terms and
conditions for which checks are
issued will greatly erode the
faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value
of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring about
havoc in the trading and banking
communities. Besides, the law
does not make any distinction as
to the kind of checks which are
the subject of its provisions,
hence, no such distinction can
be made by means of
interpretation or application.
What is important is the fact that
petitioner deliberately issued the
checks in question and those
checks were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement
surrounding the issuance of a
check is irrelevant to the
prosecution and conviction of
the petitioner.27
The alleged inconsistency in the
date of issuance of the subject
check is likewise
immaterial.1wphi1 Issuance,
as defined under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, is the first
delivery of the check.28 In the
case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was
postdated February 15, 1988
although issued in or about
September 1987. During trial,
petitioner testified that the
Checking Account was opened
only on December 1, 1987 and
that the check was issued
sometime in February 1988.
The rule is that a variance
between the allegation in the
information and proof adduced
during trial shall be fatal to the
criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so
much so that it affects his
substantial rights.29 In a September 17, 2001, finding
prosecution for violation of B.P.
22, the time of the issuance of
the subject check is material
since it forms part of the second
element of the offense that at the
time of its issuance, petitioner
knew of the insufficiency of
funds. However, it cannot be
said that petitioner was
prejudiced by such variance nor
was surprised by it. Records
show that petitioner knew at the
time he issued the check that he
does not have sufficient funds in
the bank to cover the amount of
the check. Yet, he proceeded to
issue the same claiming that the
same would only be shown to
prospective suppliers, a defense
which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in
petitioners allegation that
private complainant knew that
the check is not funded. Both the
trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that the subject
check was issued as guaranty for
payment of the loan hence, was
intended to apply for account or
for value. As such, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to see
to it that the check is duly
covered when presented for
payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000, as clarified by
Administrative Circular No. 13-
2001, the alternative penalty of
fine may be imposed in lieu of
imprisonment considering that
the prosecution failed to prove
or allege that petitioner is not a
first-time offender.30 Hence, in
lieu of imprisonment, a fine of
200,000.00 shall be imposed
upon petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated
petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO
M. PALANA guilty of violating
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, is
AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of
590,000.00, representing the
value of the check, with six (6%)
percent interest from date of
filing of the Information until
the finality of the decision, the
amount of which, inclusive of
the interest, is subject to twelve
percent (12%) interest, from
finality of the decision until
fully paid. In lieu of
imprisonment, petitioner is
ordered to pay a fine of
200,000.00.
o Morales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No' 126623,12
ERNESTO MORALES y
DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ALFREDO J.
GUSTILO, as Presiding Judge
of RTC, Pasay City, Branch
116 and PEOPLE OF THE
The key issue in this case is
whether, in light of R.A. No.
7659 1 as interpreted in People
v. Simon, 2 and R.A. No.
7691, 3 Regional Trial Courts
have jurisdiction over violations
of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended, when
the imposable penalty is not
more than six (6) years.
The petitioner was charged with
the violation of Section 15 in
relation to Section 20 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, in an information
filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City on
13 March 1996. The accusatory
portion of the said information
reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of
March 1996, in Pasay, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Ernesto
Morales y De la Cruz, without
authority of law, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to
another 0.4587 grams of
Metamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-8443 and
raffled to Branch 116 of the said
court.
Upon his arraignment, the
petitioner entered a plea of not
guilty. 5 Subsequently, on 30
April 1996, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss6 on the
ground that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try the case
considering that pursuant to
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 as
construed in People v.
Simon, 7 the penalty imposable
for the offense charged should
not exceed prision
correccional or six (6) years and
under R.A. No. 7691 it is the
Metropolitan Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order 8 of 9 May 1996, the
RTC denied the motion. It held:
It is true that under the
aforementioned provision, cases
punishable with penalties of not
more than six (6) years are
within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts. However, the
exceptions are "cases falling
within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. . ." Under Section
39 of Republic Act No. 6425,
the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, the Court of First Instance
now the Regional Trial Court
and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, which no
longer exist, "shall have
concurrent original jurisdiction
over all cases involving offenses
punishable under this Act." It is
therefore clear that this case,
which is a violation of Republic
Act No. 6425, although
punishable by a penalty of less
than six (6) years, falls within
the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.
His motion for the
reconsideration 9 of the order
having been denied, 10 the
petitioner filed with respondent
Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. 11 The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
40670.
In its Comment 12 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 40670, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) agreed
with the petitioner that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to try the
criminal case. It, however,
asserted that the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction over
the special civil action
for certiorari, as the same
involved only the question of
jurisdiction of an inferior court,
hence, cognizable by the
Supreme Court alone pursuant
to Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, in connection with
Section 5(2)(c), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution and
Section 17 of Republic Act No.
5440. The OSG then
recommended that the case be
elevated to the Supreme Court
for disposition, or that the Court
of Appeals grant the petition and
set aside the challenged order of
the RTC should it rule that it had
jurisdiction over petition.
In its Resolution 13 of 8 August
1996, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of
jurisdiction over the action.
Explaining its ruling, it
declared:
In his Comment to the petition,
the Solicitor General, inter alia,
contended that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the petition for
it properly falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
We fully agree.
Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers; . . .
(2) Review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of
lower courts in: . . .
(c) All cases in which the
jurisdiction of any lower court is
in issue. . . .
Section 17 of R.A. 5446
otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 says that
the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on certiorari final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in
all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court
is on issue. It is hereby stressed
that the issue in the petition at
bench is purely a question of
jurisdiction which is resolvable
on the basis of the records.
After the denial 14 on 13
September 1996 of his motion
for reconsideration, 15 the
petitioner came to this Court via
this petition for review wider
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS
JURISDICTION TO
ENTERTAIN A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT WHERE THE ISSUE
IS THE JURISDICTION OF
RESPOND NT RTC JUDGE
TO TRY THE ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425;
AND.
II. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT RTC
JUDGE/COURT HAS
JURISDICTION TO TRY
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SECTION 15, IN RELATION
TO SECTION 20, ART. III OF
R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED,
INVOLVING ONLY 0.4587
GRAMS OF SHABU.
As to the first, the petitioner
insists that respondent Court of
Appeals has concurrent original
jurisdiction with this Court over
petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
involving decisions or orders of
Regional Trial Courts pursuant
to Section 9(1) 16 of B.P. Blg.
129 in relation to Section
5(1) 17 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. He cites De Jesus
v. Court of Appeals 18 wherein
this Court held that the original
jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 129 is concurrent with that
of the Supreme Court, and with
that of Regional Trial Courts for
writs enforceable within their
respective regions. The
petitioner further maintains that
Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of
the Constitution and Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 5440,
relied upon by the Court
Appeals are not applicable
inasmuch as they relate to
the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court and not to an original
action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
As regards the second issue, the
petitioner asserts that the RTC
below has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged considering
that only 0.4587 grams of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) is
involved. In light of Section 20
of R.A. No. 7659, 19 as
interpreted in People
v. Simon 20 and further
explained in People
v. Santos 21 and Ordoez
v. Vinarao, 22 the imposable
penalty therefor would not
exceed prision correccional,
whose maximum period is six
(6) years. Hence, under R.A.
No. 7691 exclusive original
jurisdiction therein is vested in
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In its Comment on the petition,
the OSG submits that all
violations of R.A. No. 6425, as
further amended by R.A. No.
7659, which are punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six
years now fall under the
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts. Since on the basis
of the quantity of the regulated
drug involved in this case the
penalty imposable does not
exceed prision correccional, it
is the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasay City which has
jurisdiction over the case. It
disagreed with the opinion of
the RTC that violations of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, still fall
within the jurisdiction of the
RTC because the latter's
jurisdiction thereon mandated
by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425
has been preserved by the
exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. It
submits that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425 was repealed by
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7691,
which provides:
Sec. 6. All laws, decrees, and
orders inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act shall be
considered amended or
modified accordingly.
In support of its submission, it
cites this Court's resolution
in Gulhoran v. Escao, Jr. 23
The OSG further contends that
respondent Court of Appeals
was correct in dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of
jurisdiction in view of Section
9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129; Sec.
5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the
Constitution; and Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by R.A. No. 5440.
Nevertheless, it prays that this
petition "be given due course
and that Criminal Case No. 96-
8443 be remanded to the proper
metropolitan trial court for
further proceedings."
We resolved to give due course
to this petition.
The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that it had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's
special civil action
for certiorariunder Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129, the Court of Appeals has
concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 5(1) of
Article VIII of the Constitution
and Section 17(1) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, and with
the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 21(7) of
B.P. Blg. 129 to issue writs
of certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto. 24 These are
original actions, not modes
of appeals.
Since what the petitioner filed in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was a
special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, the
original jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals thereon is beyond
doubt.
This error of the Court of
Appeals was due to its
misapplication of Section
5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and of that portion
of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 vesting upon the
Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm
on certiorari as the law or rules
of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in all cases in
which the jurisdiction of any
inferior court is in issue. It
forgot that this constitutional
and statutory provisions pertain
to the appellate
not original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, as correctly
maintained by the petitioner.
An appellate jurisdiction refers
to a process which is but a
continuation of the original suit,
not a commencement of a new
action, such as that of a special
civil action for certiorari. The
general rule is that a denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash in
criminal cases is interlocutory
and cannot be the subject of an
appeal or of a special civil action
for certiorari. Nevertheless, this
Court has allowed a special civil
action for certiorari where a
lower court has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in
denying a motion to dismiss or
to quash. 25 The petitioner
believed that the RTC below did
so; hence, the special civil
action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals appeared to be
the proper remedy.
The next most logical step then
is for us to simply set aside the
challenged resolutions and to
direct the Court of Appeals to
resolve on the merits the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670. But,
that would further delay the
case. Considering the special
importance of the lone legal
issue raised, which can be
resolved on the basis of the
pleadings heretofore filed, and
the fact that this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction over
petitioner's special action in CA-
G.R. SP No. 40670, we deem it
more practical and in the greater
interest of justice not to remand
the case to the Court of Appeals
but, instead, to take direct
cognizance thereof and resolve
it once and for all. 26
We now address the second
issue.
Applying by analogy the ruling
in People v. Simon, 27 People
v. De Lara, 28 People
29
v. Santos, and Ordoez
v. Vinarao, 30 the imposable
penalty in this case which
involves 0.4587grams of shabu
should not exceed prision
correccional. We say
by analogy because these cases
involved marijuana, not
methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). In
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by Section 17 of R.A.
No. 7659, the maximum
quantities of marijuana and
methamphetamine
hydrochloride for purposes of
imposing the maximum
penalties are not the same. For
the latter, if the quantity
involved is 200 grams or more,
the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000 to P10
million shall be imposed.
Accordingly, if the quantity
involved is below 200 grams,
the imposable penalties should
be as follows:
a) reclusion temporal if the
quantity involved is
from 134 to 199 grams;
b) prision mayor if the
quantity involved is
from 66 to 133 grams;
c) prision correccional if the
quantity involved is 65
grams or below.
Clearly, the penalty which may
be imposed for the offense
charged in Criminal Case No.
96-8443 would at most be
only prision
correccional whose duration is
from six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Does it
follow then that, as the
petitioner insists, the RTC has
no jurisdiction thereon in view
of the amendment of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No.
7691, which vested upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts'
exclusive original jurisdiction
over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties? This section 32 as
thus amended now reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such
offender or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
The exception in the opening
sentence is of special
significance which we cannot
disregard. By virtue thereof, the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in criminal cases does not cover
those cases which by provision
of law fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of the
prescribed penalty. Otherwise
put, even if such cases are
punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six years (i.e., prision
correccional, arresto mayor,
or arresto menor), jurisdiction,
thereon is retained by the
Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan, as the case may
be.
The aforementioned exception
refers not only to Section 20 of
B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts in criminal cases,31 but
also to other laws which
specifically lodge in Regional
Trial Courts exclusive
jurisdiction over specific
criminal cases, e.g., (a) Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289
and 4363 on written defamation
or libel; (b) Decree on
intellectual Property (P.D. No.
49, as amended), which vests
upon Courts of First Instance
exclusive jurisdiction over the
cases therein mentioned
regardless of the imposable
penalty; and (c) more
appropriately for the case at bar,
Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended by P.D. No. 44, which
vests on Courts of First Instance,
Circuit Criminal Courts, and the
Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts concurrent
exclusive original jurisdiction
over all cases involving
violations of said Act.
Jurisdiction is, of course,
conferred by the Constitution or
by Congress. Outside the cases
enumerated in Section 5(2) of
Article VIII of the Constitution,
Congress has the plenary power
to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts. 32 Accordingly,
Congress may, by law, provide
that a certain class of cases
should be exclusively heard and
determined by one court. Such
would be a special law and must
be construed as an exception to
the general law on jurisdiction
of courts, namely, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 as amended, or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. In short, the special law
prevails over the general law.
R.A. No. 7691 can by no means
be considered another special
law on jurisdiction but merely
an amendatory law intended to
amend specific sections of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Hence, it does not have
the effect of repealing or
modifying Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code; Section 57
of the Decree on Intellectual
Property; and Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by P.D.
No. 44. In a manner of speaking,
R.A. No. 7691 was absorbed by
the mother law, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.
That Congress indeed did not
intend to repeal these special
laws vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in the Regional Trial
Courts over certain cases is
clearly evident from the
exception provided for in the
opening sentence of Section 32
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691. These special
laws are not, therefore, covered
by the repealing clause (Section
6) of R.A. No. 7691.
Neither can it be successfully
argued that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended by P.D.
No. 44, is no longer operative
because Section 44 of B.P. Blg.
129 abolished the Courts of First
Instance, Circuit Criminal
Courts, and Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts.
While, indeed, Section 44
provides that these courts were
to be "deemed automatically
abolished" upon the declaration
by the President that the
reorganization provided in B.P.
Blg. 129 had been completed,
this Court should not lose sight
of the fact that the Regional
Trial Courts merely replaced the
Courts of First Instance as
clearly borne out by the last two
sentences of Section 44, to wit:
Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease
to hold office. The cases
pending in the old Courts shall
be transferred to the appropriate
Courts constituted pursuant to
this Act, together with the
pertinent functions, records,
equipment, property and
necessary personnel.
In short, there was a change in
name only from Courts of
First Instance to Regional Trial
Courts. The Interim Rules and
Guidelines Relative to the
Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129
promulgated by this Court on 11
January 1983 also provides that
the reference to the courts of
first instance in the Rules of
Court shall be deemed changed
to the regional trial courts.
Consequently, it is not accurate
to state that the "abolition" of
the Courts of First Instance
carried with it the abolition of
their exclusive original
jurisdiction in drug cases vested
by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended by P. D. No. 44. If
that were so, then so must it be
with respect to Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code and Section
57 of the Decree on Intellectual
Property. On the contrary, in the
resolution of 19 June 1996
in Caro v. Court of
Appeals 33 and in the resolution
of 26 February 1997 in Villalon
v. Baldado, 34 this Court
expressly ruled that Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive
original jurisdiction over libel
cases pursuant to Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code. In
Administrative Order No. 104-
96 this Court mandates that:
LIBEL CASES SHALL BE
TRIED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THEM
TO THE EXCLUSION OF
THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT.
It likewise provides that
jurisdiction over cases involving
violations of intellectual
property rights are "confined
exclusively to the Regional Trial
Courts."
The same Administrative Order
recognizes that violations of
RA. No. 6426, as amended,
regardless of the quantity
involved, are to be tried and
decided by the Regional Trial
Courts therein designated as
special courts. As to the latter,
this Court in its Resolution of 15
April 1997 in A.M. No. 96-11-
421-RTC, 35 resolved as
follows:
. . . to AMEND Administrative
Order No. 104-96, dated
October 21, 1996, with respect
only to the violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
as amended, if the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Thus, if the imposable
penalty is below reclusion
perpetua the drug related cases
will be raffled among the regular
courts as ordinary criminal
cases.
Thereafter, in Circular No. 31-
97 dated 15 May 1997, the Court
Administrator directed Judges
of "special courts for
Kidnapping, Robbery,
Carnapping, Dangerous Drugs
and other Heinous Crimes" to
comply with the aforesaid
amendment to Administrative
Order No. 104-96. To avoid any
further confusion or
misunderstanding, we hereby
declare that the term "regular
courts" found in the above
amendment refers exclusively to
the Regional Trial Courts and
was not intended to include
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In view of the foregoing, the
Court hereby abandons the
resolution in Gulhoran
v. Escao 36 where, through the
Second Division, we ruled, in
effect, that Section 39 of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, was
repealed by virtue of the
repealing clause of R.A. No.
7691.
The RTC then did not commit
any error in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 96-8443.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED, but only insofar as
the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is
concerned. The Resolutions of 8
August and 13 September 1996
of the Court of Appeals are SET
ASIDE, while the challenged
orders in Criminal Case No. 96-
8443 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 116, are
AFFIRMED. The trial court is
hereby DIRECTED to proceed
with the trial of Criminal Case
No. 96-8443 with all reasonable
dispatch.
o People v. Hon. Eduarte, G.R.
No. 88232,25 February 1990
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.HON. HENEDINO P.
EDUARTE, in his capacity as
Acting Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Br. 22, Cabagan,
Isabela; ELVINO AGGABAO
and VILLA SURATOS,
Assailed in this petition is the
order of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabagan, Isabela,
Branch 22, dismissing the
criminal information for
concubinage filed against
private respondents, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are as
follows:
Upon complaint by Alma T.
Aggabao, the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan,
Isabela filed on July 25, 1986
with the Regional Trial Court of
Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an
information against private
respondents Elvino Aggabao
and Villa Suratos for the crime
of concubinage [Annex "A" to
the Petition; Rollo, p. 17.]
allegedly committed in
September 1983. Upon being
arraigned, private respondents
entered a plea of not guilty
[Annex "B" to the Petition;
Rollo, p. 19]. The complainant
was represented before the trial
court by a private prosecutor.
During the trial, private
respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. They argued that
concubinage, under Art. 334 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
is punishable with prision
correccional in its minimum
and medium periods, which is
equivalent to imprisonment of
six (6) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2)
months, well within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court, and
not of the Regional Trial Court.
The prosecution filed an
opposition to the motion
contending that the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the crime of concubinage
because destierro, the
imposable penalty on the
concubine [Art. 334, RPC] has a
duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years [Art.
27, RPC]. The trial court
sustained private respondent's
position and granted the motion
to dismiss.
Private prosecutor, together
with the assistant provincial
prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela,
filed on June 16, 1989 the
instant petition assailing the
order of the trial court granting
the motion to dismiss the
criminal information against
private respondents. In a
resolution dated July 17, 1989,
this Court denied the petition
due to late payment of docket
and legal research fees and for
lack of merit. The Solicitor
General filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of
the Court denying the petition.
Subsequently, the private
prosecutor filed a separate
motion for reconsideration. In
these motions, the Solicitor
General and the private
prosecutor submitted additional
arguments to support their
position that the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the
crime of concubinage.
At the outset, it must be stated
that the petition is defective
since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it was
filed by the private prosecutor
and the assistant provincial
prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela,
with the offended party, Alma
T. Aggabao, being named co-
petitioner of the People of the
Philippines. The Court has
already ruled that while it is the
fiscal who represents the People
of the Philippines in the
prosecution of offenses before
the trial courts, when such
criminal actions are brought to
the Court of Appeals or to the
Supreme Court, it is the
Solicitor General who must
represent the People of the
Philippines, not the fiscal [City
Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,
G.R. No. 83996, October 21,
1988, 166 SCRA 614] nor the
private prosecutor, even with
the conformity of the assistant
provincial prosecutor [People v.
Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389,
February 21, 1989].
Nevertheless, considering that
the Solicitor General has
intervened in this case by filing
a motion for reconsideration of
the Court resolution dated July
17, 1989 denying the petition,
the Court has decided to forego
technicalities and to resolve the
issues raised. Moreover, since it
is now apparent that the only
petitioner in this case is the
People of the Philippines as
represented by the Solicitor
General, payment of the legal
fees is not necessary in
accordance with Rule 141, Sec.
16 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner first contends that
private respondents are
estopped from raising the issue
of jurisdiction after the
prosecution has rested its case
and the defense has started to
present its evidence.
Furthermore, petitioner
complains that "it took two (2)
years and six (6) months before
anyone to take (sic) notice of the
jurisdictional infirmity
[Petition, p. 5; Rollo, p. 12].
Hence, according to petitioner,
private respondents are barred
from raising the issue of
jurisdiction, estoppel having
already set in.
The contention is without merit.
In our legal system, the question
of jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings
[Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure; U.S. v.
Castanares, 18 Phil. 210
(1911)]. It is true that in Vera
v. People, G.R. No. L-31218,
February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
711 and in People v.
Munar, G.R. No. L-37642,
October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA
278, cases cited by the Solicitor
General and private prosecutor
in their pleadings, the Court held
that jurisdiction cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.
However, these cases can
readily be distinguished from
the case at bar by the fact that
the issue of jurisdiction was
raised only on appeal. In the
instant case, the private
respondents made the
jurisdictional challenge pending
the trial and before the trial court
has rendered any judgment on
the merits.
Moreover, the ruling in Vera v.
People and People v.
Munar that jurisdiction may not
be raised for the first time on
appeal, is the exception rather
than the general rule.
The doctrine in those cases was
first enunciated in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-
21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29, 35-36, where the
Court stated that:
. . . a party can not invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136
Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question
whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-
matter of the action or of the
parties is barred from such
conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is
valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for
reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been
held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse
decision on the meats, it is too
late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the
court ... And in Littleton vs.
Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court
said that it is not right for a party
who has affirmed and invoked
the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards
deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez, G.R.
No. L-34362, November 19,
1982, 118 SCRA 399 [See also
Dy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 68544,
October 27, 1986, 145 SCRA
211], the Court held that the
ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy is an exception to
the general rule that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.
The Court stated further
that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an
exceptional case because of the
presence of laches. The Court
said:
A rule that had been settled by
unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous
to cite is that the jurisdiction of
a court over the subject-matter
of the action is a matter of law
and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction
of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent
pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated
therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved
in Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the accepted
concept of non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been
repeatedly upheld that rendered
the supposed ruling
in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general
rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored
principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver
or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction of the court
that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by
estoppel by laches. It was ruled
that the lack of jurisdiction
having been raised for the first
time in a motion to dismiss filed
almost fifteen (15) years after
the questioned ruling had been
rendered, such a plea may no
longer be raised for being barred
by laches. As defined in said
case, laches is "failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to
do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
The circumstances of the
present case are very different
from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy No
judgment has yet been rendered
by the trial court in this case.
And as soon as the accused
discovered the jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or
neglect to file the appropriate
motion to dismiss. Hence,
finding the pivotal element of
laches to be absent, the Court
holds that the ruling in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, Vera v.
People and People v.
Munar does not control the
present controversy. Instead, the
general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the
proceedings, must apply.
Private respondents are not
estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
Having disposed of the
procedural issue, the Court will
now proceed with the main issue
of whether or not the Regional
Trial Court has original
jurisdiction over the crime of
concubinage.
The crime of concubinage is
penalized by Art. 334 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads
as follows:
Art. 334. Concubinage. Any
husband who shall keep a
mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman
who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other
place shall be punished
by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The concubine shall suffer the
penalty of destierro. (Emphasis
supplied.)
According to Sec. 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (hereinafter
referred to as the inferior courts)
shall exercise "[e]xclusive
original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a
fine of not more than four
thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective
of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof . . ." On the other hand,
the "Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases
not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, or body. . ." [Sec. 20.
B.P. Blg. 129].
The penalty imposable on the
husband who commits
concubinage
is prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods,
which ranges from six (6)
months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months.
Hence, as regards the husband,
there is no question that
concubinage is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
the inferior courts. The problem
concerns the concubine upon
whom the imposable penalty
is destierro.
The Solicitor General and the
private prosecutor point out that
the duration of destierro, which
is between six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years [Art.
27, RPC], is beyond the
jurisdiction of the inferior courts
to impose. Thus, they conclude
that either (1) the Regional Trial
Courts and the inferior courts
have concurrent jurisdiction
over the crime of concubinage
[Solicitor General's Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 11; Rollo, p.
521; or (2) the Regional Trial
Courts and the inferior courts
have "split jurisdiction," the
latter having jurisdiction over
the crime as regards the husband
and the former as regards the
concubine [Private Prosecutor's
Motion for Reconsideration, p.
3; Rollo, p. 58].
These propositions are both
untenable. It has already been
held by the Court in Uy Chin
Hua v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617
(1950) and People v. Santos, 87
Phil. 687 (1950) that a crime
punishable with the penalty
of destierro is within the
jurisdiction of the inferior
courts. This is so because in the
scale of penalties outlined in
Art. 71, destierro comes
after arresto mayor. * And
since under the Judiciary Act of
1948 [Republic Act No. 296],
crimes punishable with arresto
mayor are within the
jurisdiction of the inferior
courts, it follows that crimes
punishable with destierro are
also within the jurisdiction of
such courts. In explaining its
conclusion that destierro is
lighter than arresto mayor and
therefore cognizable by the
inferior courts, the Court, in Uy
Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, supra at
p. 619, stated the following:
Destierro is not a higher penalty
than arresto mayor. Arresto
mayor means imprisonment or
complete deprivation of liberty,
whereas destierro means
banishment or only a prohibition
from residing within a radius of
25 kilometers from the actual
residence of the accused for a
specified length of time. The
respective severities of arresto
mayor and destierro must not
be judged by the duration of
each of these penalties, but by
the degree of deprivatin of
liberty involved. Penologists
have always
considered destierro lighter
than arresto mayor. Such
criterion is reflected both in the
old Spanish Penal Code and in
our Revised Penal Code. In the
graduated scale of article 71 the
lawmaker has placed destierro
below arresto mayor. There is,
therefore, no basis in fact or in
law for holding that destierro is
a higher penalty than arresto
mayor and that an offense
penalized with destierro falls
under the jurisdiction of the
court of first instance.
The Court is well-aware of the
fact that Uy Chin Hua v.
Dinglasan and People
v. Santos were decided under
the Judiciary Act of 1948
pursuant to which justices of the
peace and judges of municipal
courts of chartered cities had
original jurisdiction over "all
offenses in which the penalty
provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than
six months" [Sec. 87 (b)] while
Courts of First Instance had
original jurisdiction "in all
criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six
months" [Sec. 44 (f)]. There
being no mention in said Act of
crimes for which the penalty is
not imprisonment, these
aforecited cases were decided
on the premise that "there exists
a gap in the law as to which
court shall have original
jurisdiction over offenses
penalized with destierro or
banishment" [Uy Chin Hua v.
Dinglasan, supra, at p. 620].
Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129), the inferior
courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all
offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding
four (4) years and two (2)
months [Sec. 32 (2)] while the
Regional Trial Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction"
in all criminal cases not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body" [Sec.
20]. Ostensibly, Sec. 20 of B. P.
Blg. 129 would grant to the
Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction over crimes
punishable with destierro, such
as concubinage, since destierro
is not an offense punishable
with imprisonment of not
exceeding four (4) years and two
(2) months. However, the Court,
after a careful reading of B.P.
Blg. 129, is of the considered
opinion that there was no
intention to overturn the
doctrine laid down in Uy Chin
Hua v. Dinglasan and People v.
Santos. It is quite evident that
among the important factors
considered in the allocation of
jurisdiction between the
Regional Trial Courts and the
inferior courts are the gravity of
both the offense and the
imposable penalty. It is not,
therefore unreasonable to state
that the legislature granted to the
Regional Trial Courts
jurisdiction over crimes whose
penalties are harsher than those
vested in the inferior courts.
And since it is already a settled
rule that destierro, by its nature,
is a lighter penalty than
imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v.
Dingalasan, supra], it follows
that even under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,
jurisdiction over crimes
punishable with destierro is
vested not in the Regional Trial
Courts but in the inferior courts.
More particularly in this case,
the crime of concubinage has
two penalties, one for the
husband and another for the
concubine. The penalty for the
husband, prision correccional i
n its minimum and medium
periods, which ranges from six
(6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2)
months, is unquestionably
within the jurisdiction of the
inferior courts. Considering that
Art. 344 of the Revised Penal
Code states that "[t]he offended
party [in the crime of
concubinage] cannot institute
criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty
parties," it is clearly in the
interest of the orderly
administration of justice that the
concubine be tried with the
erring husband before the
inferior courts. The legislature
could not have intended to allow
the absurd situation wherein the
inferior court has jurisdiction
over the crime of concubinage
only as regards the husband
while the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the same
crime with respect to the
concubine.
In fine, the Court, after a careful
consideration of the pertinent
laws, as well as the
jurisprudence on the matter,
holds that the crime of
concubinage is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
the inferior courts. The Regional
Trial Courts have no original
jurisdiction over the said crime.
Hence, the court a
quo committed no reversible
error in dismissing the criminal
information against private
respondents. At any rate,
considering that the dismissal of
the case by the court a quo on
the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same
offense [Rule 117, Secs. 6 and 7,
Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure] and considering
further that the crime has not yet
prescribed [See Art. 90, RPC],
the offended wife is not
precluded from initiating the
filing of another criminal
information against private
respondents before the proper
court.
WHEREFORE, the Court
Resolved to DENY the petition
for lack of merit. The
reimbursement of the legal fees
paid by the private prosecutor
for the filing of this petition is
hereby ORDERED.
o Mobilia Products v.
Umezawa, G'R. No. 1'49357,4
March
MOBILIA PRODUCTS,
INC., Petitioners, vs.
HAJIME UMEZAWA,
G.R. No. 149403. March 04,
2005
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs. HON. JUDGE
RUMOLDO R.
FERNANDEZ and HAJIME
UMEZAWA,
Before the Court are two
consolidated petitions: a petition
for review on certiorari filed by
the People of the Philippines,
docketed as G.R. No. 149403 of
the Resolution1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 52440 which reversed its
decision and granted the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus filed by respondent
Hajime Umezawa; and the
petition for review
on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 149357 filed by petitioner
Mobilia Products, Inc. (MPI),
the intervenor in the CA,
assailing the same Resolution of
the appellate court.
The Antecedents
The antecedents were amply
summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) in the
petition at bar, to wit:
Mobilia Products, Inc. is a
corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of
quality furniture which caters
only to the purchase orders
booked and placed through
Mobilia Products Japan, the
mother company which does all
the marketing and booking.
After orders from customers are
booked at the mother company
in Japan, the same are coursed
through Mobilia Philippines for
implementation and production,
after which, the ordered items
are shipped to Japan through the
mother company.
Mobilia Products Japan sent
Hajime Umezawa to the
Philippines in order to head
Mobilia Products, Inc. as
President and General Manager.
To qualify him as such and as a
Board Director, he was
entrusted with one nominal
share of stock.
Sometime in the last week of
January 1995, Umezawa, then
the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., organized another
company with his wife Kimiko,
and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi,
to be known as Astem
Philippines
Corporation, without the
knowledge of the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer
Susumo Kodaira and the
other members of the Board of
Directors of Mobilia.
The said company would be
engaged in the same business as
Mobilia. Spouses Umezawa
recruited Justin Legaspi, former
Production Manager of Mobilia,
to act as Manager and one
Yoshikazu Hayano of Phoenix
Marble Corporation to serve as
investors [sic].
Pending formal organization,
Spouses Umezawa, Justin
Legaspi and Yoshikazu Hayano
wanted to accelerate the market
potentials of Astem by
participating in the International
Furniture Fair 1995 held at the
Word Trade Centre of
Singapore on March 6 to 10,
1995.
One of the requirements of such
Fair was that the furniture
exhibits must arrive and be
received at Singapore not later
than February 23, 1995. Pressed
for time, with less than one
month to prepare and while
Astem had yet no equipment
and machinery, no staff and no
ready personnel, Umezawa,
with grave abuse of the
confidence reposed on him as
President and General Manager
of Mobilia Products, Inc., and in
conspiracy with his wife, his
sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi,
Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin
Legaspi, all with intent to gain
for themselves and for their
company Astem Philippines
Corporation, stole prototype
furniture from petitioner
Mobilia so that the said pieces of
furniture would be presented
and exhibited as belonging to
Astem in the International
Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore.
In order to avoid detection,
Umezawa contacted Henry
Chua, the owner of Dew Foam,
one of the suppliers of Mobilia,
for that the latter to load several
pieces of prototype furniture
into a Dew Foam truck and store
them at the Dew Foam
warehouse. The first batch of
furniture was stolen on February
8, 1995, when Mr. Henry Chua,
upon the request of respondent
Umezawa, caused to be loaded
into his Dew Foam truck two
prototype sofa models worth
500,000.00, after which, the
same were spirited from the
Mobilia compound, then
transported and stored in Henry
Chuas warehouse.
Again, on February 18, 1995,
Umezawa, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking
advantage of his position as
President and General Manager,
unlawfully stole expensive
furniture from Mobilias factory
worth 2,964,875.00. In order to
avoid detection, the said
furniture were loaded in the
truck belonging to Dew Foam,
with respondent Umezawa
personally supervising the
loading, the carting and spiriting
away of the said furniture. Thus,
taking advantage of his position
as General Manager, he
managed to have the said
furniture taken out of the
company premises and passed
the company guard without any
problem and difficulty.
Further, on February 19, 1995,
around 1 oclock in the
afternoon, respondent Umezawa
again loaded into his motor
vehicle, and took away from
company premises under the
same irregular and unlawful
circumstances, an expensive
three-seater sofa worth
255,000.00.
The taking out of the said
furniture was effected in
violation of the standard
procedures established by
petitioner corporation which
requires that every shipment or
taking out of the furniture be
checked and reviewed by
Mobilias Production, Planning,
Inventory Costing and Control
(PPICC) Division. All the
foregoing furniture were
transported to and stored at
Henry Chuas warehouse. After
sometime, the foregoing
furniture were photographed for
slide photos at Photo Folio at the
Reclamation Area, Cebu City
and then finally catalogued for
use in the Singapore Fair for the
use of Astem and its supposed
owners, namely: spouses
Umezawa, Hayano and Legaspi.
The foregoing furniture models
were finally shipped for
exhibition at the International
Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore
as furniture belonging to Astem
Philippines Corporation.
Sometime in March 1995, based
on orders booked for Astem,
Umezawa, with unfaithfulness
and abuse of confidence reposed
on him as the President and
General Manager of petitioner
Mobilia, ordered and caused the
manufacture of eighty-nine (89)
pieces of furniture with a total
value of 17,108,500.00. The
said pieces of furniture were
made with Mobilia supplies,
materials and machineries, as
well as with Mobilia time and
personnel, all of which were
under the administration and
control of Umezawa as
President and General Manager.
The said materials and supplies,
the time and labor, were
supposed to be used for the
manufacture and production of
quality furniture for the
EXCLUSIVE USE of Mobilia.
However, Umezawa, in
violation of his duty to apply the
same for the use of Mobilia and
the duty to account for the same,
converted their use for the
benefit of Astem or for the use
and benefit of Umezawa, his
wife and sister, Yoshikazu
Hayano and Legaspi, much to
the damage and prejudice of
Mobilia Products.
The same furniture could also
have been taken out of the
company premises by Umezawa
and cohorts for shipment and
delivery to Astem customers
had it not been for the timely
discovery of the previous theft.
2 furniture, to wit:
The Board of Directors of MPI,
consisting of its Chairman
Susumo Kodaira and members
Yasushi Kato and Rolando
Nonato, approved a Resolution
on May 2, 1995 authorizing the
filing of a complaint against
Umezawa for two counts of
qualified theft allegedly
committed on February 18 and
19, 1995. Attached to the
complaint was the Joint
Affidavit of Danilo Lallaban,
George del Rio and Yasushi
Kato. The case was docketed as
I.S. No. 95-275.
On May 15, 1995, the public
prosecutor filed an Information
for qualified theft against
Umezawa with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu
City. The accusatory portion of
the Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013231-L,
reads:
That during or about the period
comprised between the 18th and
19th day of February 1995, in
the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, while being
then the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., a corporation engaged in
the manufacture and export of
furniture, holding office and
doing business in the Mactan
Export Processing Zone, Lapu-
Lapu City, with grave abuse of
the confidence reposed upon
him by his employer, with intent
to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry
away from the corporations
factory in Mactan Export
Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu
City, expensive pieces of
1) 1 set, Model No. 3, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
208,125.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 8, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
315,000.00
3) 1 set, Model No. 5, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
108,000.00
4) 1 set, Model No. 4, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
277,500.00
5) 1 set, Model No. 6, 1-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
146,250.00
6) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
225,000.00
7) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
275,000.00
8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2,
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
93,750.00
9) 1 piece, Model Table No. 4,
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
105,000.00
10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal
No. 6, Italian marble pedestal,
worth - - - - - - - - - - - - -
150,000.00
11) 1 piece, Model Column
Standard No. 11, Italian marble
worth - - - - - - - - - - - -
93,750.00
12) 1 piece, Model Table No. 1,
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
105,000.00
13) 1 piece, Model High Table
No. 10, Italian marble, worth - -
-----------------
187,500.00
14) 1 piece, Model Table No. 8,
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
187,500.00
15) 1 piece, Model Table No. 7
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
187,500.00
16) 1 piece, Model Table No. 5
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
112,500.00
17) 1 piece, Model Table No. 9,
Italian marble table, worth - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
187,500.00
18) 3-seater sofa, worth- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - 255,000.00
with an aggregate value of
3,219,875.00, Philippine
currency, without the consent of
his employer, to the damage and
prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc., in the said amount of
3,219,875.00.
Contrary to law.3
On motion of the prosecution,
the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment
covering the properties of
Umezawa.
Umezawa then filed an
Omnibus Motion to quash the
information filed against him,
the discharge of the writ of
attachment issued by the trial
court, and to set the case for
preliminary investigation. MPI,
the private complainant therein,
opposed the motion.
In the meantime on July 21,
1995, MPI filed another
criminal complaint for qualified
theft against Umezawa, his wife
Kimiko Umezawa, Mitsuyo
Yaguchi, Justin Legaspi,
Yoshikazu Hayano and Henry
Chua allegedly committed in
March 1995, with the Office of
the City Prosecutor. The case
was docketed as I.S. No. 95-
442.
On July 25, 1995, the trial court
issued an Order in Criminal
Case No. 013231-L denying the
omnibus motion. On joint
motion of Umezawa and the
public prosecutor, the trial court
ordered a reinvestigation of the
case. Conformably, the public
prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation of Criminal Case
No. 013231-L jointly with I.S.
No. 95-442.
On September 25, 1995,
Umezawa filed a petition with
the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), docketed as
SEC Case No. 002919, for the
nullification of the Resolution
issued by the three alleged
members of MPI Board of
Directors, authorizing the filing
of criminal complaints against
him in behalf of the corporation.
On January 3, 1996, the public
prosecutor issued a Joint
Resolution finding probable
cause for qualified theft and one
count of estafa against
Umezawa, and dismissing the
case against the other accused.
The Prosecutor maintained his
finding of probable cause
against Umezawa in Criminal
Case No. 013231-L.
On February 20, 1996, the
public prosecutor filed an
Information for qualified theft
with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
City against Umezawa,
docketed as Criminal Case No.
013423-L. The accusatory
portion reads:
That on the 8th day of February
1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, while being the
President and General Manager
of Mobilia Products, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the
manufacture and export of
quality furniture, whose
principal place of business is at
the Mactan Export Processing
Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with
intent to gain, without the
consent of his employer, and
with grave abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away from the
corporations factory the
following expensive pieces of
furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater
German
leather sofa, all valued at... .
225,000.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater
German
leather sofa, all valued at. . . . . .
. . 275,000.00
with an aggregate value of
500,000.00 Philippine
Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of Mobilia Products,
Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Another Information for estafa
was thereafter filed against the
same accused, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013424-L.
The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in March 1995,
in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, by means of
unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence reposed upon him as
the President and General
Manager of Mobilia Products,
Inc., did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to
his own personal use and benefit
the amount of Seventeen
Million One Hundred Eight
Thousand Five Hundred
(17,108,500.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, which was
the total value of the furnitures
ordered and manufactured by
the accused or at his instance
using Mobilia supplies,
materials and machineries, as
well as time and personnel
which were supposed to be for
the exclusive use of Mobilia
Products, Inc. but were
converted for the use and benefit
of the accused and Astem
Philippines Corporation, a
company or firm engaged in the
same business as that of Mobilia
Products, Inc., which is, [in] the
manufacture and production of
quality furniture for export,
owned by the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of
Mobilia Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On April 25, 1996, Umezawa
filed a motion for the suspension
of the proceedings on the
ground of the pendency of his
petition with the SEC in Case
No. 002919. The trial court,
however, issued an Order on
May 21, 1996, denying the said
motion. It held that the filing and
the pendency of a petition before
the SEC did not warrant a
suspension of the criminal
cases.
On September 25, 1998,
Umezawa was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
On September 30, 1998,
Umezawa filed anew a Joint
Motion to Quash the
Informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 013231-L and 013423-L,
on the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute
the felony of qualified theft.
Umezawa claimed that based on
the Joint Affidavit of the
witnesses for the prosecution
submitted during the
preliminary investigation,
Yasushi Kato and George del
Rio, MPI Vice-President and the
head of the Upholstery
Department, respectively, the
appropriate charge should
be estafa and not qualified theft.
Umezawa further claimed that
for their failure to object to and
resist his alleged delictual acts,
the said witnesses were as guilty
as he was and should have been
included in the Information. He
also asserted that there was,
likewise, no allegation in the
Informations as to who was the
owner of the articles stolen;
hence, there was no offended
party. He noted that the
Informations merely alleged
that MPI was his employer. He
further posited that there was no
valid charge against him
because the resolution
authorizing the filing of the
cases against him was approved
by a mere minority of the
members of the MPI Board of
Directors.6
Umezawa, likewise, filed a
Motion to Quash7 the
Information in Criminal Case
No. 013424-L on the ground
that the facts alleged in the
Information did not constitute
the felony of estafa. He posited
that the Information did not
contain any allegation that any
demand was made for him to
return the goods. Furthermore,
the owner of the said articles
was not specified. He noted that
as gleaned from the Joint
Affidavit of the witnesses for
the prosecution, there was no
lawful private complainant. He
reiterated that the MPI board
resolution authorizing the filing
of the charge against him was
not approved by the majority of
the members of its board of
directors. Umezawa also alleged
that the charge for estafa with
abuse of confidence was already
included in the charge for
qualified theft, where it was
alleged that he committed theft
with abuse of confidence;
hence, the charge for estafa
should be quashed, otherwise,
he would be placed in double
jeopardy. The motion was duly
opposed by the prosecution.
On January 29, 1999, the trial
court issued a Joint
Order8 dismissing the cases for
lack of jurisdiction. It held that
the dispute between the private
complainant and the accused
over the ownership of the
properties subject of the charges
is intra-corporate in nature, and
was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. It ruled
that Umezawa, as a member of
the board of directors and
president of MPI, was also a
stockholder thereof. While
Umezawa claimed to be
the bona fide owner of the
properties subject of the
Informations which he
appropriated for himself, the
private complainant disputes the
same; hence, according to the
trial court, the conflicting claims
of the parties should be resolved
by the SEC. The private and
public prosecutors received
their respective copies of the
Joint Order on February 2, 1999.
The MPI, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the joint
order of the court and for the
reinstatement of the cases on
February 15, 1999. The MPI
relied on the following grounds:
a. The Honorable Court has
jurisdiction and must exercise it
over these cases;
b. The above-entitled case is not
an intra-corporate controversy;
and
c. The accused could not claim
ownership nor co-ownership of
the properties of private
complainant corporation.9
The MPI maintained that the
trial court had jurisdiction over
the cases and cited Section 5 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
902-A, which provides the rules
on cases over which the SEC has
original and exclusive
jurisdiction. A copy of the
motion was served on the public
prosecutor for his approval.
However, the public prosecutor
did not affix his conformity to
the motion, and instead opted to
appear before the trial court
during the hearing of the same.
During the hearing, both the
public and private prosecutors
appeared. In support of his
motion, the private prosecutor
argued that the trial of the case
must be done in the presence of
and under the control and
supervision of the public
prosecutor.10
The trial court denied the
motion in an Order dated April
19, 1999. It held that the SEC,
not the trial court, had
jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. It also ruled that
the motion of the private
complainant was pro forma, it
appearing that the public
prosecutor had not approved the
same.
The public prosecutor received a
copy of the Order on April 20,
1999. On April 26, 1999, the
People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus wi
th the CA against Presiding
Judge Rumuldo R. Fernandez
and Umezawa, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 52440. The CA
allowed the MPI to intervene as
petitioner, and admitted its
petition- in-intervention.
The People of the Philippines, as
the petitioner therein, raised the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS
THE LEGAL AND
MINISTERIAL DUTY OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE AND
JURISDICTION OF THESE
SUBJECT CRIMINAL
CASES;
WHETHER OR NOT THE
SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST RESPONDENT
HAJIME UMEZAWA;
WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT JUDGE
COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN DISMISSING THE
CRIMINAL CASES AND
DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION. 11
The People asserted that the
controversy involving the
criminal cases was not between
Umezawa and the other
stockholders of MPI, but one
between him as the accused
therein and the People of the
Philippines. It averred that
under Section 20(b) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, the
RTC has exclusive jurisdiction
over the cases against
Umezawa. It also alleged that in
dismissing the criminal cases
against Umezawa on the ground
that it had no jurisdiction over
the crimes charged, the RTC
committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.
On September 2, 1999, the CA
rendered judgment granting the
petition and nullifying the
assailed Orders of the RTC. It
ruled that the issue of ownership
of the properties subject of the
Informations was not an intra-
corporate dispute. It held that certiorari, raising the following
Umezawa, although president issues:
and general manager of the MPI
and a stockholder thereof, was WHETHER OR NOT THE
not a joint owner or co-owner of SECURITIES AND
the personal properties subject EXCHANGE COMMISSION
of the charges. It also held that HAS JURISDICTION OVER
the dispute between a private THE CRIMINAL CASES
corporation and any of its AGAINST UMEZAWA.
stockholders relative to the
ownership of properties does WHETHER OR NOT ALL
not ipso facto negate the THE NECESSARY
jurisdiction of the RTC over the ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES
criminal cases under B.P. Blg. OF QUALIFIED THEFT
129, as amended. It also AND ESTAFAARE
declared that the material SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED
averments of the Informations IN THE INFORMATIONS.
sufficiently charged qualified
theft and estafa. EVEN
ASSUMING ARGUENDO TH
Umezawa filed a motion for the AT THE FACTS ALLEGED
reconsideration of the decision DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
of the CA. In a complete volte OFFENSE THE CORRECT
face, the appellate court issued a RULING IS NOT TO DISMISS
Resolution on August 8, 2001, THE CASE BUT TO ORDER
granting the motion and AMENDMENT.
reversing its decision. It
affirmed the ruling of the RTC WHETHER OR NOT THE
that the dispute between STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT
Umezawa and the other TO APPEAL.
stockholders and officers over
the implementation of the MPIs WHETHER OR NOT THE
standard procedure is intra- MOTION FOR
corporate in nature; hence, RECONSIDERATION OF
within the exclusive jurisdiction UMEZAWA IS PRO
of the SEC. Citing Section FORMA.13
5(a)(b) of P.D. No. 902-A, and
the ruling of this Court in Alleje
The People of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals,12 the
filed a separate petition for
appellate court ruled that based
review on certiorari, contending
on the material allegations of the
that:
Solicitor General in the petition
before the CA, the SEC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS
conflicting claims of the parties.
It likewise affirmed the ruling of ERRORS OF LAW AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF
the RTC that the absence of any
allegation in the Information DISCRETION IN FINDING
THAT THE PETITION FOR
that the MPI was the owner of
the properties subject of the MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI
AND INJUNCTION WAS
Information is fatal.
FILED OUT OF TIME AND
THAT PETITIONER HAS
The petitioner MPI filed the
LOST ITS RIGHT TO
instant petition for review on
APPEAL;
2. THE COURT OF APEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW IN
RULING THAT NOT ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF
QUALIFIED THEFT AND
ESTAFA ARE PRESENT;
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED BLATANT
AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF
LAW IN FINDING THAT THE
SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(SEC) HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL CASES;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE PRO-
FORMA MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF
UMEZAWA.14
The two petitions were
consolidated in the Second
Division of the Court.
The threshold issues for
resolution are the following: (a)
whether or not the petition
for certiorari of the People of
the Philippines in the CA
assailing the January 29, 1999
Joint Order of the trial court was
time-barred; (b) whether the
RTC has jurisdiction over the
crimes charged in the said
Informations; (c) whether the
Informations sufficiently charge
the felonies of qualified theft
and estafa; and (d) if in the
affirmative, whether all the
elements of qualified theft and
estafa are alleged in the
Informations.
On the first issue, the CA held
that the Public Prosecutor failed
to file a motion for the
reconsideration of the trial
courts January 29, 1999 Joint
Order dismissing the cases, that
is, within fifteen days from
receipt of a copy of the said
order on February 2, 1999;
neither did the People appeal the
said Order within the period
therefor. Thus, according to the
CA, the People filed its petition
for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus assailing the
January 29, 1999 Joint Order of
the trial court only on April 26,
1999, well beyond the 60-day
period therefor. The appellate
court, likewise, held that the
filing of the motion for
reconsideration of the said Joint
Order by the private prosecutor
without the conformity of the
Public Prosecutor did not toll
the period for the People to file
its motion for reconsideration
thereof, or to appeal therefrom,
or to file a petition
for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. It ruled that, having
lost its right to appeal in due
course, the People was
proscribed from filing a petition
for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. The CA declared
that the motion for
reconsideration filed by
petitioner MPI of the Joint
Order of the RTC is pro forma,
the public prosecutor not having
signified his written conformity
thereto.
On the other hand, the petitioner
People of the Philippines insists
that while the public prosecutor
did not expressly conform to the
motion for reconsideration of
the January 29, 1999 Joint Order
of the trial court filed by the
private prosecutor, through the
public prosecutors presence
during the hearing of the said
motion, his supervision and
control over the private
prosecutor during the said
hearing, he in effect adopted and
conformed to the said motion
for reconsideration.
In his comment on the petitions,
respondent Umezawa maintains
that the motion for
reconsideration of the joint
order of the trial court filed by
the private prosecutor did not
interrupt the period within
which the People could appeal,
citing the ruling of this Court
in Cabral v. Puno.15 The
respondent posits that the
finding of the trial court, which
was affirmed by the CA, that the
public prosecutor did not
conform to the motion for
reconsideration of the private
prosecutor, is binding on this
Court. The respondent also
avers that the petitioner has no
personality to file the petition.
Moreover, he insists that
whether the public prosecutor
conformed to the private
prosecutors motion for
reconsideration is a question of
fact which is not proper in a
petition for review on certiorari.
The Courts Ruling
The contention of the petitioner
People of the Philippines is not
correct. All criminal actions
commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor.16 When
the civil action for civil liability
is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the offended party
may intervene, by counsel, in
the prosecution of the
offense.17 In Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,18 we held that
under Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party
may intervene in the criminal
action personally or by counsel,
who will then act as private
prosecutor for the protection of
his interests and in the interest of
the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice. A
separate action for the purpose
would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-
consuming for both parties and
further delay the final
disposition of the case. The
multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. With the implied
institution of the civil action in
the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one
composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating
the civil. The prime purpose of
the criminal action is to punish
the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing
the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social
order.19
The intervention of the private
offended party, through counsel,
and his prosecution of the case
shall be under the control and
supervision of the public
prosecutor until the final
termination of the case. A public
prosecutor who has been
entrusted by law with the
prosecution of criminal cases is
duty-bound to take charge
thereof until its final
termination, for under the law,
he assumes full responsibility
for his failure or success since
he is the one more adequately
prepared to pursue it to its
termination.20 The prosecution
of offenses is a public function.
Indeed, the sole purpose of the
civil action is the resolution,
reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for
the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the
accused. 21 Under Article 104 of
the Revised Penal Code, the
following are the civil liabilities
of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in
civil liability. The civil
liability established in Articles
100, 101, 102 and 103 of this
Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage
caused;
3. Indemnification for
consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party,
through counsel, has asserted
his right to intervene in the
proceedings, it is error to
consider his appearance merely
as a matter of tolerance.22
The public prosecutor may turn
over the actual prosecution of
the criminal case, in the exercise
of his discretion, but he may, at
any time, take over the actual
conduct of the trial. However, it
is necessary that the public
prosecutor be present at the trial
until the final termination of the
case; otherwise, if he is absent,
it cannot be gainsaid that the
trial is under his supervision and
control.23
In a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the
interest of the private
complainant or the offended
party is limited to the civil
liability arising therefrom.
Hence, if a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, a
reconsideration of the order of
dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally
feasible, insofar as the criminal
aspect thereof is concerned and
may be made only by the public
prosecutor; or in the case of an
appeal, by the State only,
through the OSG. The private
complainant or offended party
may not undertake such motion
for reconsideration or appeal on
the criminal aspect of the
case.24 However, the offended
party or private complainant
may file a motion for
reconsideration of such
dismissal or acquittal or appeal
therefrom but only insofar as the
civil aspect thereof is
concerned.25 In so doing, the
private complainant or offended
party need not secure the
conformity of the public
prosecutor. If the court denies
his motion for reconsideration,
the private complainant or
offended party may appeal or
file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus, if
grave abuse amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown and the aggrieved party
has no right of appeal or given
an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The public and private
prosecutors are not precluded,
whenever feasible, from filing a
joint motion for the
reconsideration of the dismissal
of the case or the acquittal of the
accused, on the criminal and
civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only
petitioner MPI, through counsel,
filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the trial
courts Joint Order dated
January 29, 1999, praying for
the reinstatement of the cases
insofar as the civil aspect thereof
is concerned. The public
prosecutor did not approve nor
conform to the said motion.
Although petitioner MPI
provided ample space for the
said conformity of the public
prosecutor, the latter did not do
so; he merely appeared during
the hearing of the said motion
with the private prosecutor
when the latter presented his
oral arguments in support of the
said motion.
The fact that the public
prosecutor did not conform to
the said motion, however, does
not mean that the same is pro
forma. It must be stressed that
the propriety and efficacy of the
motion, insofar as the civil
aspect of the cases is concerned,
is not dependent upon the
conformity of the public
prosecutor. Hence, the filing of
the joint motion for
reconsideration effectively
suspended the running of the
period for petitioner MPI to
assail the joint order in the
CA via an appeal or a special
civil action
for certiorari or mandamus und
er Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, since the public
prosecutor did not file any
motion for the reconsideration
of the joint order nor conform to
the motion of petitioner MPI,
insofar as the criminal aspect of
the cases is concerned, the
period for the State to assail the
said joint order was not
suspended. Only the motion for
reconsideration filed by the
public prosecutor of the joint
order of dismissal of the cases
could have tolled the period
within which the State could
appeal, insofar as the criminal
aspect of the cases was
concerned. The bare fact that the
public prosecutor appeared for
the State during the hearing of
the motion for reconsideration
of petitioner MPI does not
amount to or constitute his
adoption of the said motion as
that of the State. As ruled by this
Court in Cabral v. Puno:26
While it is true that the offended
party, Silvino San Diego,
through the private prosecutor,
filed a motion for
reconsideration within the
reglementary fifteen-day period,
such move did not stop the
running of the period for appeal.
He did not have the legal
personality to appeal or file the
motion for reconsideration on
his behalf. The prosecution in a
criminal case through the
private prosecutor is under the
direction and control of the
Fiscal, and only the motion for
reconsideration or appeal filed
by the Fiscal could have
interrupted the period for
appeal.27
We agree with the ruling of the
CA that the petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner
People of the Philippines with
the CA on April 26, 1999 was
filed beyond the 60-day period
as provided in Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court,28 it
appearing that the public
prosecutor received a copy of
the joint order of the trial court
on February 2, 1999, and, thus,
had only until April 3, 1999
within which to file the said
petition.
Even then, the Court still holds
that the CA erred in dismissing
the petition of the People of the
Philippines simply because the
public prosecutor erred in not
himself filing a motion for
reconsideration of the joint
order of the trial court, on his
perception that by being present
during the hearing of the motion
for reconsideration of petitioner
MPI, he thereby adopted the
said motion as that of the
States. The settled rule is that
the State is not estopped by the
mistakes of its officers and
employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr.
v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court
declared:
Estoppel does not lie against
the government because of the
supposedly mistaken acts or
omissions of its agents. As we
declared in People v. Castaeda,
"there is the long familiar rule
that erroneous application and
enforcement of the law by
public officers do not block
subsequent correct application
of the statute and that the
government is never estopped
by mistake or error on the part of
its agents."
The Court also held in Chua v.
Court of Appeals:30
While ordinarily, certiorari is
unavailing where the appeal
period has lapsed, there are
exceptions. Among them are (a)
when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy
dictates; (b) when the broader
interest of justice so requires; (c)
when the writs issued are null
and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. 31
On the second issue, the
petitioners assert that the CA
erred in holding that the dispute
between it and the respondent is
intra-corporate in nature; hence,
within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the SEC. As gleaned from the
material allegations of the
Informations, the RTC had
exclusive jurisdiction over the
crimes charged. Petitioner MPI
further avers that even if there is
no allegation in the Informations
identifying it as the owner of the
personal properties described in
the Informations, its ownership
of the properties can be inferred
from the other allegations. The
petitioners maintain that even if
the Informations are deficient,
the remedy is the amendment of
the Informations and not the
dismissal of the cases.
For his part, the respondent
avers that the assailed
Resolution of the CA is correct,
and that it is the appellate
courts decision which is
erroneous.
We agree with the petitioners.
According to Section 20 of B.P.
Blg. 129
SEC. 20. Jurisdiction in
criminal cases. Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter.
Section 32 thereof was later
amended by Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 7691, as
follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court and of
the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all violations of
city or municipal ordinances
committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature,
value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to
property through criminal
negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof.
Case law has it that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, the
complaint or Information must
be examined for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the
facts set out therein and the
prescribed period provided for
by law are within the
jurisdiction of the court, and
where the said Information or
complaint is filed. It is settled
that the jurisdiction of the court
in criminal cases is determined
by the allegations of the
complaint or Information and
not by the findings based on the
evidence of the court after
trial.32 Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by
the law in force at the time of the
filing of the Information or
complaint. Once jurisdiction is
vested in the court, it is retained
up to the end of the litigation.
Indeed, in People v.
Purisima,33 this Court held that:
In criminal prosecutions, it is
settled that the jurisdiction of
the court is not determined by
what may be meted out to the
offender after trial or even by
the result of the evidence that
would be presented at the
trial, but by the extent of the
penalty which the law
imposes for the misdemeanor,
crime or violation charged in the
complaint. If the facts recited in
the complaint and
the punishment provided for by
law are sufficient to show that
the court in which the complaint
is presented has jurisdiction,
that court must assume
jurisdiction.
In Criminal Case No. 013231-L,
the value of the properties
subject of qualified theft is
3,219,875.00, while in
Criminal Case No. 013423-L,
the value of the property was
pegged at 255,000.00. Under
Article 309 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for theft when
the value of the stolen property
exceeds 22,000.00 is as
follows:
1. The penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 20,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds
the latter amount, the penalty
shall be the maximum period of
the one prescribed in this
paragraph and one year of each
additional ten thousand pesos,
but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code further provides for the
penalty for qualified theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The
crime of theft shall be punished
by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those
respectively specified in the
next preceding article, if
committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail
matter or large cattle or consists
of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery
or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
On the other hand, in Criminal
Case No. 013424-L for estafa,
the amount of the fraud involved
is 500,000.00, and under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty for such crime
is
1st. The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000
pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
Patently, then, based on the
material allegations of the
Informations in the three cases,
the court a quo had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crimes
charged.
The bare fact that the respondent
was the president and general
manager of the petitioner
corporation when the crimes
charged were allegedly
committed and was then a
stockholder thereof does not in
itself deprive the court a quo of
its exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimes charged. The
property of the corporation is
not the property of the
stockholders or members or of
its officers who are
34
stockholders. As the Court
held in an avuncular case:35
... Properties registered in the
name of the corporation are
owned by it as an entity separate
and distinct from its members.
While shares of stock constitute
personal property, they do not
represent property of the
corporation. The corporation
has property of its own which
consists chiefly of real estate
(Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372,
21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould,
145 Iowa, 1, 123 N.W. 743). A
share of stock only typifies an
aliquot part of the corporations
property, or the right to share in
its proceeds to that extent when
distributed according to law and
equity (Hall & Faley v. Alabama
Terminal, 173 Ala., 398, 56 So.
235), but its holder is not the
owner of any part of the capital
of the corporation (Bradley v.
Bauder, 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is
he entitled to the possession of
any definite portion of its
property or assets (Gottfried v.
Miller, 104 U.S., 521; Jones v.
Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The
stockholder is not a co-owner or
tenant in common of the
corporate property (Harton v.
Johnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So.,
992) "36
As early as the case of Fisher v.
Trinidad,37 the Court already
declared that "[t]he distinction
between the title of a
corporation, and the interest of
its members or stockholders in
the property of the corporation,
is familiar and well-settled. The
ownership of that property is in
the corporation, and not in the
holders of shares of its stock.
The interest of each stockholder
consists in the right to a
proportionate part of the profits
whenever dividends are
declared by the corporation,
during its existence, under its
charter, and to a like proportion
of the property remaining, upon
the termination or dissolution of
the corporation, after payment
of its debts."38
We also agree with the ruling of
the CA in its decision that the
SEC (now the Regional Trial
Court) had no jurisdiction over
the cases filed in the court a quo.
The appellate courts reliance in
the assailed Resolution issued
by the Board of Directors of the
petitioner corporation, on
Section 5(b) of P.D. No. 902,
has no factual and legal basis.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A
provides that the SEC39 shall
have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving the following:
(a) devices or schemes
employed by, or any acts of, the
board of directors, business
associates, its officers or
partners, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be
detrimental to the interest of the
public and/or of the
stockholders, partners, members
of association or organizations
registered with the Commission,
and
(b) controversies arising out of
intra-corporate or partnership
relations, between and among
stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation,
partnership or association of
which they are stockholders,
members or associates,
respectively.
In Fabia v. Court of
Appeals,40 the Court explained
that Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-
A should be taken in
conjunction with Section 6 of
the law. It then proceeded to
explain:
In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-
A mandates that cases involving
fraudulent actions and devices
which are detrimental to the
interest of stockholders,
members or associates and
directors of the corporation are
within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the SEC. Taken
in conjunction with Sec. 6 of the
same law, it will be gathered that
the fraudulent acts/schemes
which the SEC shall exclusively
investigate and prosecute are
those "in violation of any law or
rules and regulations
administered and enforced by
the Commission" alone. This
investigative and prosecutorial
powers of the SEC are further
"without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any
provision of The Revised Penal
Code."
From the foregoing, it can thus
be concluded that the filing of
the civil/intra-corporate case
before the SEC does not
preclude the simultaneous and
concomitant filing of a criminal
action before the regular courts;
such that, a fraudulent act may
give rise to liability for violation
of the rules and regulations of
the SEC cognizable by the SEC
itself, as well as criminal
liability for violation of
the Revised Penal
Code cognizable by the regular
courts, both charges to be filed
and proceeded independently,
and may be simultaneously with
the other.41
Thus, the filing of a petition in
the SEC for the nullification of
the Resolution of May 2, 1995
issued by the Chairman and two
members of the Board of
Directors of petitioner MPI,
which authorized the filing of
criminal cases against
respondent Umezawa, was not a
bar to his prosecution for estafa
and qualified theft for his
alleged fraudulent and delictual
acts. The relationship of the
party-litigants with each other or
the position held by petitioner as
a corporate officer in respondent
MPI during the time he
committed the crime becomes
merely incidental and holds no
bearing on jurisdiction. What is
essential is that the fraudulent
acts are likewise of a criminal
nature and hence cognizable by
the regular courts.42 Thus,
notwithstanding the fact that
respondent Umezawa was the
president and general manager
of petitioner MPI and a
stockholder thereof, the latter
may still be prosecuted for the
crimes charged. The alleged
fraudulent acts of respondent
Umezawa in this case constitute
the element of abuse of
confidence, deceit or fraudulent
means, and damage under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code on estafa.43
We agree with the
encompassing disquisitions of
the CA in its decision, to wit:
A dispute involving the
corporation and its stockholders
is not necessarily an intra-
corporate dispute cognizable
only by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Nor
does it ipso facto negate the
jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over the subject
cases. The Supreme Court citing
the case of Viray v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 92481, 191
SCRA 308 [1990]) in Torio v.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
107293, March 2, 1994, 230
SCRA 626) held:
"It should be obvious that not
every conflict between a
corporation and its stockholders
involves corporate matters that
only the SEC can resolve in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers."
As the Supreme Court further
ruled in the Torio case that "a
contrary interpretation would
distort the meaning and intent of
P.D. 902-A, the law re-
organizing the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The
better policy in determining
which body has jurisdiction over
a case would be to consider not
only the relationship of the
parties but also the nature of the
questions raised in the subject of
the controversy.44
On the last issue, we find and so
hold that the Informations state
all the essential elements of
estafa and qualified theft. It was
adequately alleged that
respondent Umezawa, being the
President and General Manager
of petitioner MPI, stole and
misappropriated the properties
of his employer, more
specifically, petitioner MPI. As
expostulated by the CA in its
decision:
In any event, the allegations
in the informations, if
hypothetically admitted, are
sufficient to bind Umezawa to
the charges of qualified theft and
estafa. As aptly ruled by the
court a quo in its Order of July
25, 1995, all the elements of the
offense of qualified theft are
present. There is no basis for
claiming otherwise.
Furthermore, the private
offended party, as well as the
subject matter of the felonious
taking and the ownership
thereof, have been adequately
indicated or identified leaving
no room for any doubt on these
matters. Considering that the
motions to quash of September
30, 1998 are fundamentally
rehash of the motion to quash
filed on May 29, 1995 and the
culpable acts subject of the new
informations are virtually the
same as the first information
filed against Umezawa, there is
no conceivable reason why the
court a quo abandoned its
previous stand and controverted
itself in regard the sufficiency of
the informations.
In our considered view, and as
the court a quo had correctly
held in its Order of May 26,
1996, "even a SEC ruling
voiding the resolution
authorizing the filing of criminal
charges versus the accused
Hajime Umezawa can have no
bearing on the validity of the
informations filed in these three
criminal cases as pointed out by
private complainant, the public
offenses of qualified theft and
estafa can [be] prosecuted de
officio." The resolution of the
office of the prosecutor on the
preliminary investigation as
well as the re-investigation
conducted on the letter-
complaint filed by private
complainant company
sufficiently established prima
facie case against the accused
and the legality or illegality of
the constitution of the board
which authorized the filing of
the complaint does not
materially affect either the
informations filed against
Umezawa or the pending
criminal proceedings. As
petitioners contend, the action is
now between the People of the
Philippines and herein private
respondent.45
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the petitions
are GRANTED. The Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 52440 dated
August 8, 2001 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated
September 2, 1999 is
AFFIRMED.
o Sec, 4, Presidential Decree
No. 1606, as amended by Rep.
Act
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The
Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise, known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public
officers and employees
including those employed in
government-owned or
controlled corporations,
embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, whether
simple or complexed with other
crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses
committed by public officers or
employees, including those
employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office.
The jurisdiction herein
conferred shall be original and
exclusive if the offense charged
is punishable by a penalty
higher than prision correccional,
or its equivalent, except as
herein provided; in other
offenses, it shall be concurrent
with the regular courts.
In case private individuals are
charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees
including those employed in
government-owned or
controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees.
Where an accused is tried for
any of the above offenses and
the evidence is insufficient to
establish the offense charged, he
may nevertheless be convicted
and sentenced for the offense
proved, included in that which is
charged.
Any provision of law or the
Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall at all times
be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in
the same proceeding by, the
Sandiganbayan, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the
filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such
action shall be recognized;
Provided, however, that, in
cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, where the civil
action had therefore been filed
separately with a regular court
but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan, said civil action
shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan for
consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal
action, otherwise, the criminal
action may no longer be filed
with the Sandiganbayan, its
exclusive jurisdiction over the
same notwithstanding, but may
be filed and prosecuted only in
the regular courts of competent
jurisdiction; Provided, further,
that, in cases within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the regular
courts, where either the criminal
or civil action is first filed with
the regular courts, the
corresponding civil or criminal
action, as the case may be, shall
only be filed with the regular
courts of competent jurisdiction.
Excepted from the foregoing
provisions, during martial law,
are criminal cases against
officers and members of the
armed forces in the active
service.
o Sec. 7(b), Rep. Act No. 1-
L25, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 9282
Section 7. Section 7 of the same
Act is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA
shall exercise:
"a. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal,
as herein provided:
"1. Decisions of the
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or
other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters
arising under the National
Internal Revenue or other laws
administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
"2. Inaction by the
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or
other charges, penalties in
relations thereto, or other
matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
where the National Internal
Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in
which case the inaction shall be
deemed a denial;
"3. Decisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial
Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate
jurisdiction;
"4. Decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure,
detention or release of property
affected, fines, forfeitures or
other penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other
laws administered by the Bureau
of Customs;
"5. Decisions of the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals in
the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving
the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided
by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals;
"6. Decisions of the Secretary of
Finance on customs cases
elevated to him automatically
for review from decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs
which are adverse to the
Government under Section 2315
of the Tariff and Customs Code;
"7. Decisions of the Secretary of
Trade and Industry, in the case
of nonagricultural product,
commodity or article, and the
Secretary of Agriculture in the
case of agricultural product,
commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing
duties under Section 301 and
302, respectively, of the Tariff
and Customs Code, and
safeguard measures under
Republic Act No. 8800, where
either party may appeal the
decision to impose or not to
impose said duties.
"b. Jurisdiction over cases
involving criminal offenses as
herein provided:
"1. Exclusive original
jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses arising from violations
of the National Internal Revenue
Code or Tariff and Customs
Code and other laws
administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue or the Bureau
of Customs: Provided, however,
That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph
where the principal amount o
taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed
is less than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) or where there
is no specified amount claimed
shall be tried by the regular
Courts and the jurisdiction of
the CTA shall be appellate. Any
provision of law or the Rules of
Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of
civil liability for taxes and
penalties shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in the
same proceeding by the CTA,
the filing of the criminal action
being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the
civil action, and no right to
reserve the filling of such civil
action separately from the
criminal action will be
recognized
"2. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
. Over peals from the judgments,
resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in tax
cases originally decided by
them, in their respected
territorial jurisdiction.
"b. Over petitions for review of
the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax
cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in their respective jurisdiction.
"c. Jurisdiction over tax
collection cases as herein
provided:
"1. Exclusive original
jurisdiction in tax collection
cases involving final and
executory assessments for taxes,
fees, charges and penalties:
Provided, however, That
collection cases where the
principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and
penalties, claimed is less than
One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00) shall be tried
by the proper Municipal Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
and Regional Trial Court.
"2. Exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
. Over appeals from the
judgments, resolutions or orders
of the Regional Trial Courts in
tax collection cases originally
decided by them, in their
respective territorial
jurisdiction. petitions for review
of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax
collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction."
Sec. 90, Rep. Act No.9165
o Peoplev. Hon. Azarraga,
G.R.Nos. L87717 &187L27,L2
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.HON. JOSE D.
AZARRAGA and JOHN REY
PREVENDIDO, Respondents.
In the present Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner
questions the legality of Chapter
V, Section 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC or the "Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of
Executive Judges and Defining
Their Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties" issued by this Court on
27 January 2004, in relation to
Section 90 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The antecedent facts are as
follows:
On 7 February 2009, petitioner
filed two (2) Informations1
before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iloilo City against
private respondent John Rey
Prevendido for Violation of
Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002. The cases
were raffled to Branch 36, a
designated special court
pursuant to R.A. 9165, presided
by Judge Victor E. Gelvezon.
Soon after, however, Judge
Gelvezon disclosed that Coreen
Gemarino, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
operative who conducted the
entrapment operation against
private respondent, had close
family ties with him. Thus, in
order to preserve the integrity of
the court, Judge Gelvezon
issued an Order2 dated 17
February 2009 inhibiting
himself from trying the case.
The cases were then reassigned
to the other special court,
Branch 25, presided by Judge
Evelyn E. Salao.
On 24 February 2009, Judge
Salao also issued an Order3
whereby she inhibited herself
for the reason that Coreen
Gemarino was a cousin; thus,
the cases were endorsed to the
Office of the Executive Judge
for reassignment.
Citing Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC, Executive
Judge Antonio M. Natino
ordered the Clerk of Court to
forward the entire records of the
cases to Branch 37 presided
over by public respondent, the
pairing judge of Branch 36,
which was the special court that
originally handled the cases.4
On 16 March 2009, however, as
soon as public respondent
proceeded with the cases,
Prosecutor Kenneth John
Amamanglon filed a Motion to
Transfer Case to a Branch of
Competent Jurisdiction.5 He
questioned the jurisdiction of
public respondent to hear the
cases, citing Sec. 90 of R.A.
9165. Prosecutor Amamanglon
also claimed that, as the
prosecutor assigned to Branch
37, he was not among the
prosecutors who had been
designated to handle cases
exclusively involving violations
of R.A. 9165.
On the same day, respondent
judge denied the motion on
three grounds, to wit:
1. This motion ought not to have
been filed in this court for lack
of legal basis;
2. This court is not without
jurisdiction to hear the instant
case;
3. The matter about the
appearance of Trial Prosecutor
Kenneth John Amamanglon
should have been addressed to
the Department concerned.6
Respondent judge thus set the
hearing on the Motion for
Admission to Bail7 filed on 10
February 2008. He directed the
city prosecutor to assign an
assistant city prosecutor to
handle the case effective 20
March 2009.
Prosecutor Amamanglon,
however, moved for a himself from hearing the case
reconsideration8 of respondent
judges Order, contending that
the trial court needed a special
designation from this Court in
order to have jurisdiction over
the cases. Thus, Prosecutor
Amamanglon concluded, absent
the special designation,
respondent court should remand
the cases to the Office of the
Executive Judge for re-raffling
to another court specially
designated pursuant to R.A.
9165. To support its contention,
petitioner further cited this
Courts 11 October 2005
Resolution in A.M. No. 05-9-
03-SC, which clarified whether
drug courts should be included
in the regular raffle.
Respondent judge denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in
its Order dated 20 March 2009.9
He held that A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC should be deemed to have
modified the designation of
special courts for drug cases. He
declared that, under the
circumstances enumerated in
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, Branch
37 itself became a special court.
He further ruled that A.M. No.
05-9-03-SC was inapplicable.
On 23 March 2009, the city
prosecutor endorsed the assailed
Orders of respondent judge to
the Office of the Solicitor
General for the appropriate
review and filing of the
necessary action.10 Thus, on 24
March 2009, petitioner filed the
present petition before this
Court.
On 27 March 2009, while the
Petition for Prohibition was
pending, respondent judge
issued an Order11 inhibiting
after private respondent alleged
that the former was biased for
the prosecution. The cases were
thereafter transferred to Branch
35, also a regular court, presided
by Judge Fe Gallon-Gayanilo.
Absent a temporary restraining
order from this Court, the trial
court proceeded to hear the
cases.
The present petition raises two
(2) issues, to wit:
I. WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE
DRUG CASES IN CRIMINAL
CASE NOS. 09-68815/16
DESPITE HIS ASSIGNMENT
TO A REGULAR COURT
II. WHETHER OR NOT A.M.
NO. 03-8-02-SC IS IN
CONFORMITY WITH
SECTION 90 OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9165, MANDATING
THE DESIGNATION OF
SPECIAL COURTS TO
EXCLUSIVELY TRY AND
HEAR DRUG CASES12
At the outset, it is an established
policy that parties must observe
the hierarchy of courts before
they can seek relief directly
from this Court. The rationale
for this rule is twofold: (a) it
would be an imposition upon the
limited time of this Court; and
(b) it would inevitably result in
a delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of cases,
which in some instances, had to
be remanded or referred to the
lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or
as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not
a trier of facts.13 It is only for
special and compelling reasons
that this Court shall exercise its
primary jurisdiction over the
extraordinary remedy of writ of
prohibition. However, in the
case at bar, since it is only the
Supreme Court itself that can
clarify the assailed guidelines,
petitioner is exempted from this
rule.
The petition, however, must fail.
The crux of the matter in the
present case is whether or not
this Court violated Sec. 90 of
R.A. 9165 when it issued A.M.
03-8-02-SC, particularly Chap.
V, Sec. 9, which prescribes the
manner in which the executive
judge reassigns cases in
instances of inhibition or
disqualification of judges sitting
in special courts. Petitioner
insists that should respondent
judge (now Judge Fe Gallon-
Gayanilo of Branch 35)
continue hearing and trying the
case, it "would result in the
circumvention of the legislative
conferment of jurisdiction to a
court to exclusively try and hear
drug offenses only."14
Contrary to the assertion of
petitioner, this Court did not
commit any violation of R.A.
9165 when it issued the assailed
guidelines. Rather, it merely
obeyed Article VIII, Sec. 5(5) of
the 1987 Constitution, which
mandates that the rules
promulgated by this Court
should provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, in
conformity with the right of all
persons to a speedy disposition
of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.15 As this Court stated in
San Ildefonso Lines v. Court of
Appeals,16 there must be a
renewed adherence to the time-
honored dictum that procedural
rules are designed not to defeat,
but to safeguard, the ends of
substantial justice.
Petitioner grounds its assertion
on Sec. 90 of R.A. 9165, which
states:
Jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court shall designate special
courts from among the existing
Regional Trial Courts in each
judicial region to exclusively try
and hear cases involving
violations of this Act. The
number of courts designated in
each judicial region shall be
based on the population and the
number of cases pending in their
respective jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
Trial of the case under this
Section shall be finished by the
court not later than sixty (60)
days from the date of the filing
of the information. Decision on
said cases shall be rendered
within a period of fifteen (15)
days from the date of
submission of the case for
resolution.
Petitioner interprets the above
provision to mean that a court
must be specifically designated
by the Supreme Court as a
special court. But what is Chap.
V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-
SC if not an express designation
of a special court?
Chap. V, Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-
8-02-SC provides:
Raffle and re-assignment of
cases in special courts where
judge is disqualified or
voluntarily inhibits
himself/herself from hearing
case. (a) Where a judge in a
court designated to try and
decide
xxx xxx xxx
(3) cases involving violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, or ...
is disqualified or voluntarily
inhibits himself/herself from
hearing a case, the following
guidelines shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) Where there are more than
two special courts of the same
nature in the station, the
Executive Judge shall
immediately assign the case by
raffle to the other or another
special court of the same nature.
In case the Presiding Judge of
the other special court is also
disqualified or inhibits
himself/herself, the case shall be
forwarded to the pairing judge
of the special court which
originally handled the said case.
If the pairing judge is also
disqualified or inhibits
himself/herself, the case shall be
raffled to the other regular
courts. At the next raffle, an
additional case shall be assigned
to the disqualified or inhibiting
judge/s to replace the case so
removed from his/her/their
court... (Emphasis supplied.)
Under R.A. 9165, Congress
empowered this Court with the
full discretion to designate
special courts to hear, try and
decide drug cases. It was
precisely in the exercise of this
discretionary power that the
powers of the executive judge
were included in Chap. V, Sec.
9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC vis-
-vis Sec. 5(5) of Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, in
cases of inhibition or
disqualification, the executive
judge is mandated to assign the
drug case to a regular court in
the following order: first, to the
pairing judge of the special
court where the case was
originally assigned; and,
second, if the pairing judge is
likewise disqualified or has
inhibited himself, then to
another regular court through a
raffle. Under these exceptional
circumstances, this Court
designated the regular court,
ipso facto, as a special court
but only for that case. Being a
"designated special court," it is
likewise bound to follow the
relevant rules in trying and
deciding the drug case pursuant
to R.A. 9165.
Petitioner also contends that the
legislative intent of R.A. 9165 is
"to make use of the expertise of
trial judges in complicated and
technical rules of the special
drug law." Thus, petitioner
suggests that in instances in
which all the judges of special
courts have inhibited
themselves or are otherwise
disqualified, the venue for the
affected drug cases should be
transferred to the nearest station
that has designated special
courts.
Petitioners suggestion is ill-
advised. To subscribe to this
suggestion is to defeat the
purpose of the law.
Undoubtedly, petitioners
unwarranted suggestion would
entail the use of precious
resources, time and effort to
transfer the cases to another
station. On the other hand, the
assailed guidelines provide for a
much more practical and
expedient manner of hearing
and deciding the cases. To
reiterate, over and above
utilizing the expertise of trial
judges, the rationale behind Sec.
90 of R.A. 9165 and Chap. V,
Sec. 9 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
is to effect an efficient
administration of justice and
speedy disposition of cases, as
well as to breathe life into the
policy enunciated in Sec. 2 of
R.A. 9165, to wit:
Declaration of policy. It is the
policy of the State to safeguard
the integrity of its territory and
the well-being of its citizenry
particularly the youth, from the
harmful effects of dangerous
drugs on their physical and
mental well-being, and to
defend the same against acts or
omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation.
In view of the foregoing, the
State needs to enhance further
the efficacy of the law against
dangerous drugs, it being one of
today's more serious social ills.
Toward this end, the
government shall pursue an
intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking
and use of dangerous drugs and
other similar substances through
an integrated system of
planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse
policies, programs, and projects.
The government shall however
aim to achieve a balance in the
national drug control program
so that people with legitimate
medical needs are not prevented
from being treated with
adequate amounts of
appropriate medications, which
include the use of dangerous
drugs.
It is further declared the policy
of the State to provide effective
mechanisms or measures to re-
integrate into society
individuals who have fallen
victims to drug abuse or
dangerous drug dependence
through sustainable programs of
treatment and rehabilitation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As a matter of fact, this Court
also issued similar guidelines
with regard to environmental
cases,17 election cases
involving elective municipal
officials,18 and cases that
involve killings of political
activists and members of
media.19 Foremost in its mind is
the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Petitioner further points out that
this Court issued A.M. No. 05-
9-03-SC to define the phrase "to
exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of this Act"
to mean "...[c]ourts designated
as special courts for drug cases
shall try and hear drug-related
cases only, i.e., cases involving
violations of RA 9165, to the
exclusion of other courts."
Hence, petitioner submits, drug
cases should not be assigned to
regular courts according to the
procedure provided in A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC; in other words, the
two issuances contradict each
other.
Again, this Court disagrees.
Petitioner underestimates the
rule-making power of this
Court. Nothing in A.M. No. 05-
9-03-SC or in A.M. No. 03-8-
03-SC suggests that they
contradict each other. In fact,
both were issued with a
common rationale, that is, to
"expeditiously resolve criminal
cases involving violations of
R.A. 9165," especially in the
light of the strict time frame
provided in Sec. 90 of R.A.
9165. Both provide for the
guidelines regarding the
assignment of drug cases to
special courts. Thus, A.M. No.
05-9-03-SC provides for the
exemption of special courts
from the regular raffle under
normal circumstances, while
A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provide
for the assignment of drug cases
to special courts except under
special circumstances that
would warrant reassignment to a
regular court.
Moreover, the exemption of
special courts from the regular
raffle was not established as an
ironclad rule.1avvphi1 A.M.
No. 05-9-03-SC does in fact
allow special courts to acquire
jurisdiction over cases that are
not drug cases. In the interest of
justice, executive judges may
recommend to the Supreme
Court the inclusion of drug
courts in the regular raffle, and
this Court has the discretion to
approve the recommendation, as
the Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, Executive
Judges and presiding judges of
special courts for drug cases
shall hereby observe the
following guidelines:
xxx xxx xxx
4. If, in the opinion of Executive
Judges, the caseload of certain
drug courts allows their
inclusion in the regular raffle
without adversely affecting their
ability to expeditiously resolve
the drug cases assigned to them
and their inclusion in the regular
raffle becomes necessary to
decongest the caseload of other
branches, the concerned
Executive Judges shall
recommend to this Court the
inclusion of drug courts in their
jurisdiction in the regular raffle.
The concerned drug courts shall
remain exempt from the regular
raffle until the recommendation
is approved. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In conclusion, the two sets of
guidelines are examples of this
Courts foresight and prudence
in the exercise of its rule-
making power. These guidelines
were issued to prevent or
address possible scenarios that
might hinder the proper
administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Petition for
Prohibition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
o Secs. 5(a), (j), and (k), Rep.
Act No. 8369
Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily
Courts. - The Family Courts
shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide
the following cases:
a) Criminal cases where one or
more of the accused is below
eighteen (18) years of age but
not less than nine (9) years of
age but not less than nine (9)
years of age or where one or
more of the victims is a minor at
the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, That if
the minor is found guilty, the
court shall promulgate sentence
and ascertain any civil liability
which the accused may have
incurred.
The sentence, however, shall be
suspended without need of
application pursuant to
Ptesidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the "Child
and Youth Welfare Code";
b) Petitions for guardianship,
custody of children, habeas
corpus in relation to the latter;
c) Petitions for adoption of
children and the revocation
thereof;
d) Complaints for annulment of
marriage, declaration of nullity
of marriage and those relating to
marital status and property
relations of husband and wife or
those living together under
different status and agreements,
and petitions for dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains;
e) Petitions for support and/or
acknowledgment;
f) Summary judicial
proceedings brought under the
provisions of Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as
the "Family Code of the
Philippines";
g) Petitions for declaration of
status of children as abandoned,
dependent o neglected children,
petitions for voluntary or
involuntary commitment of
children; the suspension,
termination, or restoration of
parental authority and other
cases cognizable under
Presidential Decree No.603,
Executive Order No. 56, (Series
of 1986), and other related laws;
h) Petitions for the constitution
of the family home;
i) Cases against minors
cognizable under the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended;
j) Violations of Republic Act
No. 7610, otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination
Act," as amended by Republic
Act No. 7658; and
k) Cases of domestic violence
against:
1) Women - which are acts of
gender based violence that
results, or are likely to result in
physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering
to women; and other forms of
physical abuse such as battering
or threats and coercion which
violate a woman's personhood,
integrity and freedom
movement; and
2) Children - which include the
commission of all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, violence, and
discrimination and all other
conditions prejudicial to their
development.
If an act constitutes a criminal
offense, the accused or batterer
shall be subject to criminal
proceedings and the
corresponding penalties.
If any question involving any of
the above matters should arise
as an incident in any case
pending in the regular courts,
said incident shall be
determined in that court.
o Sec. 21-, Rep. Act No. 1OL75
JURISDICTION
Section 21. Jurisdiction. The
Regional Trial Court shall have
jurisdiction over any violation
of the provisions of this Act.
including any violation
committed by a Filipino national
regardless of the place of
commission. Jurisdiction shall
lie if any of the elements was
committed within the
Philippines or committed with
the use of any computer system
wholly or partly situated in the
country, or when by such
commission any damage is
caused to a natural or juridical
person who, at the time the
offense was committed, was in
the Philippines.
There shall be designated
special cybercrime courts
manned by specially trained
judges to handle cybercrime
cases.
B. The People of the Philippines
o Sec. 2, Rule 1-10 (unless
otherwise specified, citation of a
Rule
refers to the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure)
o Sec. 4, Rule l-10
o Presidential Decree No. l-275,
as amended
o People v. Hon. Garfin, G.R.
No. L53176,29 March 2004
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.HON. ZEIDA AURORA B.
GARFIN, In her capacity as
Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 19, of the City of Naga
and SERAFIN
SABALLEGUE, respondents.
For determination in this
petition is a question in
procedural law - - - whether an
information filed by a state
prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of
the city or provincial prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor should
be dismissed after the accused
has entered his plea under the
information.
Petitioner comes before us with
a petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, seeking
to declare as null and void the
Orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 19 dated February 26,
20021 and April 3, 20022 which
dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction the case of People
vs. Serafin Saballegue, Criminal
Case No. RTC 2001-0597, and
denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are
undisputed.
On June 22, 2001, private
respondent was charged with
violation of Section 22(a) in
relation to Sections 19(b) and
28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social
Security Act," in an information
which reads:
The undersigned State
Prosecutor of the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor,
Legazpi City, accuses
SERAFIN SABALLEGUE, as
proprietor of Saballegue
Printing Press with business
address at 16 San Mateo St.,
Peafrancia Ave., Naga City for
Violation of Section 22(a) in
relation to Sections 19(b) and
28(e) of R.A. 8282 otherwise
known as the Social Security
Act of 1997, committed as
follows:
That on or about February 1990
and up to the present, in the City
of Naga, Philippines, within the
functional jurisdiction of SSS
Naga Branch and the territorial
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named
accused, while being the
proprietor of Saballegue
Printing Press, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally refuse and fail and
continuously refuse and fail to
remit the premiums due for his
employee to the SSS in the
amount of SIX THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-
THREE PESOS (6,533.00),
Philippine Currency,
representing SSS and EC
premiums for the period from
January 1990 to December 1999
(n.i.), and the 3% penalty per
month for late remittance in the
amount of ELEVEN
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FORTY-THREE PESOS and
28/100 (11,143.28) computed
as of 15 March 2000, despite
lawful demands by letter in
violation of the above-cited
provisions of the law, to the
damage and prejudice of the
SSS and the public in general.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Legazpi City for Naga City. 22
June 2001.
(sgd.) ROMULO SJ.
TOLENTINOState Prosecutor
Special Prosecutor on SSS
Cases in Region V3
The information contains a
certification signed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino which states:
I hereby certify that the required
investigation in this case has
been conducted by the
undersigned Special Prosecutor
in accordance with law and
under oath as officer of the
court, that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the
offense has been committed,
that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and that the filing
of the information is with the
prior authority and approval of
the Regional State Prosecutor.4
The case was raffled to Branch
19 of the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City presided by
respondent judge Hon. Zeida
Aurora B. Garfin. On September
24, 2001, accused Serafin
Saballegue pleaded not guilty to
the charge and the case was set
for pre-trial.5 Three days
thereafter, the accused filed a
motion to dismiss6 on the
ground that the information was
filed without the prior written
authority or approval of the city
prosecutor as required under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court.7
The People, through State
Prosecutor Tolentino, filed an
opposition,8 against which the
accused filed a rejoinder.9The
People filed a reply to the
rejoinder10 on December 21,
2001. A rejoinder to the
reply11 was filed by the accused
on January 21, 2002.
After considering the arguments
raised, the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss in its first
questioned Order dated
February 26, 2002, to wit:
After considering the respective
arguments raised by the parties,
the Court believes and so
resolves that the Information has
not been filed in accordance
with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule
112 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, thus:
Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x
No complaint or information
may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Expresio unius est exclusio
alterius.
The Information will readily
show that it has not complied
with this rule as it has not been
approved by the City
Prosecutor.
This Court holds that the
defendants plea to the
Information is not a waiver to
file a motion to dismiss or to
quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. By express
provision of the rules and by a
long line of decisions, questions
of want of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the
proceedings (People vs.
Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750).
The Supreme Court in Villa vs.
Ibaez (88 Phil 402) dwelt on
lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information and
on jurisdiction at the same time,
pertinent portions run as
follows:
The defendant had pleaded to
the information before he filed a
motion to quash, and it is
contended that by his plea he
waived all objections to the
information. The contention is
correct as far as formal
objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express
provision of section 10 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, and
by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions of want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. Now,
the objection to the respondents
actuations goes to the very
foundations of jurisdiction. It is
a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the
person of the accused and the
subject matter of the accusation.
In consonance with this view, an
infirmity of the nature noted in
the information cannot be cured
by silence, acquiescence, or
even by express consent.
Prosecutor Tolentino also
contends that having been duly
designated to assist the City
Prosecutor in the investigation
and prosecution of all SSS cases
by the Regional State prosecutor
as alter ego of the Secretary of
Justice in Region V, then that
authority may be given to other
than the City Prosecutor. The
Court finds this contention to be
devoid of merit. The Regional
State Prosecutor is not the alter
ego of the Secretary of Justice
but a mere subordinate official
and if ever the former files
cases, it is by virtue of a
delegated authority by the
Secretary of Justice. Potestas
delegada non potesta delegare
(sic) what has been delegated
cannot be redelegated.
In his opposition, the state
prosecutor also attached a
memorandum dated June 22,
2001 by Regional State
Prosecutor Santiago M.
Turingan addressed to
Provincial Prosecutor and City
Prosecutors of Region V
directing them to inhibit and to
append the following
NOTATION after the
certification in the Information
for filing.
NOTATION: The herein
City/Provincial Prosecutor is
inhibiting from this case and the
Special Prosecution Team on
SSS Cases in Region V is
authorized to dispose of the case
without my approval in view of
the request for inhibition of the
SSS Regional Manager as
granted by the Regional State
Prosecutor.
A perusal of the Information,
however, would readily show
that nowhere in the Information
has the City Prosecutor of Naga
City appended the above-quoted
notation/inhibition. At most, the
authority of the special
prosecutor is only for the
conduct of preliminary
investigations and the
prosecution of cases after they
are filed. The Court, however,
believes that the filing of this
Information must be in
conformity with the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, particularly
Section 4 of Rule 112.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered and for lack of
jurisdiction, the Court hereby
resolves to DISMISS this case
without pronouncement as to
cost.
SO ORDERED.12
A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the People
contending that as a special
prosecutor designated by the
regional state prosecutor to
handle SSS cases within Region
V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is
authorized to file the
information involving violations
of the SSS law without need of
prior approval from the city
prosecutor. 13 Letters of
commendation from Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito
14
Zuo and Secretary Hernando
Perez15 were offered as proof to
show that State Prosecutor
Tolentinos authority to file the
information was recognized. In
response, the defense pointed
out in its opposition that the
motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing, hence
it is pro forma or a mere scrap of
paper. 16
On April 3, 2002, respondent
judge issued the second
questioned Order which reads:
Acting upon the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ.
Tolentino, Special Prosecutor
on SSS cases in Region V, and it
appearing that the same has
failed to comply with the
requirement of notice prescribed
in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, the same is
hereby DENIED for being a
mere scrap of paper.
SO ORDERED.17
Hence, this petition by the
People through Regional State
Prosecutor Santiago Turingan
and State Prosecutor Romulo
SJ. Tolentino. Petitioner
attributes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part
of respondent judge, viz:18
1. RESPONDENT JUDGE
DISMISSED THE
INFORMATION WITHOUT
THE REQUIRED
SUPPORTING FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASES;
2. RESPONDENT JUDGE
DELIBERATELY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IGNORED
THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN FAVOR OF
THE PROSECUTION
WITHOUT THE REQUIRED
SUFFICIENCY OF
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE. THE
WORD "MAY" IN SEC. 4,
RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF
COURT IS NOT
MANDATORY;
3. RESPONDENT JUDGE
COMMITTED GRAVE
ERROR IN DELIBERATELY
IGNORING THE
JUDICIALLY KNOWN
INHIBITION OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR AND THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE MATTER;
4. RESPONDENT JUDGE
GRAVELY ABUSED HER
DISCRETION IN
INTERFERING WITH THE
PURELY EXECUTIVE
FUNCTION OF FILING AN
INFORMATION BY RULING
ON THE AUTHORITY OF
THE FILING OFFICER TO
FILE THE INFORMATION.
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed its
comment19 in compliance with
this Courts Resolution dated
September 23, 2002.20 It opines
that the dismissal of the
information is mandated under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Private respondent contends
that:21 1) the instant petition was
filed out of time; 2) the special
State Prosecutor is only
authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation and
prosecution of SSS cases and
not to sign the information; and
3) the City Prosecutor did not
expressly inhibit himself from
handling SSS cases nor signing
the information.
We shall first resolve the
procedural issues. Respondent
contends that the motion for
reconsideration filed on April 1,
2002 is late because it was filed
eighteen days after March 14,
2002, the date when petitioner
received the first questioned
order. Respondent has
overlooked that the 15th day
after March 14 is a Good Friday.
Hence, petitioners last day to
file the motion for
reconsideration was on the next
working day after Good Friday,
April 1.22
Next, respondent argues that
having been considered as a
mere scrap of paper, the motion
for reconsideration of the
petitioner did not toll the
running of the reglementary
period. Respondent, however,
erroneously assumes that the
present case is an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45. As
stated at the outset, this is an
original petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65.
Sec. 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court is clear. It provides that
"(a) pro forma motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall not
toll the reglementary period of
appeal." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the same provision has
no application in the case at bar.
The reckoning date is the receipt
of the second questioned Order
and not the receipt of the first.
Section 4, Rule 65, as amended
by En Banc Resolution A.M.
No. 00-2-03-SC, September 1,
2000, provides, viz:
Sec. 4. When and where petition
filed.-- The petition may be filed
not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a
motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60)- day period shall
be counted from notice of the
denial of said motion.
xxxxxxxxx
As shown by the records,
petitioner received the first
questioned order dated February
26, 2002 on March 14,
2002.23 A motion for
reconsideration was timely filed
on April 1, 200224 which was
dismissed for lack of notice of
hearing in an Order dated April
3, 2002.25 This second
questioned order was received
by petitioner on April 11,
2002.26 A motion for extension
of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari was filed on
April 18, 2002.27 A motion for
leave to file and admit the
instant petition for certiorari and
mandamus was filed on May 29,
2002.28Having been filed within
the reglementary period,
petitioners motion for leave to
file the instant petition was
granted in this Courts
Resolution dated July 15,
2002.29
We now come to the other issue:
whether the prior written
authority and approval of the
city or provincial prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor is
necessary in filing the
information at bar.
Petitioner takes the unbending
view that the approval of the city
or provincial prosecutor is no
longer required. It is contended
that the Regional State
Prosecutor has already directed
the city or provincial prosecutor
to inhibit from handling SSS
cases.30 Petitioner cites the letter
of Regional State Prosecutor
Santiago M. Turingan to SSS
Regional Director in Naga City
dated June 6, 199731 and copies
of Regional Orders No. 97-024-
A32 and 2001-03333 dated July
14, 1997 and September 28,
2001, respectively, showing the
designation of State Prosecutor
Tolentino as special prosecutor
for SSS cases in Region V.
Petitioner relies on Galvez, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al.34 and
Sanchez v. Demetriou, et al.35 to
prop up its contention that given
the designation of State
Prosecutor Tolentino, the city
prosecutor need not participate
in the filing and prosecution of
the information in the case at
bar.
We disagree. Under Presidential
Decree No. 1275, the powers of
a Regional State Prosecutor are
as follows:
Sec. 8. The Regional State
Prosecution Office: Functions
of Regional State Prosecutor. -
The Regional State Prosecutor
shall, under the control of the
Secretary of Justice, have the
following functions:
a) Implement policies, plans,
programs, memoranda, orders,
circulars and rules and
regulations of the Department of
Justice relative to the
investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases in his region.
b) Exercise immediate
administrative supervision over
all provincial and city fiscals
and other prosecuting officers of
provinces and cities comprised
within his region.
c) Prosecute any case arising
within the region.
d) With respect to his regional
office and the offices of the
provincial and city fiscals within
his region, he shall:
1) Appoint such member of
subordinate officers and
employees as may be necessary;
and approve transfers of
subordinate personnel within
the jurisdiction of the regional
office.
2) Investigate administrative
complaints against fiscals and
other prosecuting officers
within his region and submit his
recommendation thereon to the
Secretary of Justice who shall,
after review thereof, submit the
appropriate recommendation to
the Office of the President:
Provided, that where the
Secretary of Justice finds
insufficient grounds for the
filing of charges, he may render
a decision of dismissal thereof.
3) Investigate administrative
complaints against subordinate
personnel of the region and
submit his recommendations
thereon to the Secretary of
Justice who shall have the
authority to render decision
thereon. (emphases supplied)
The power of administrative
supervision is limited to "the
authority of the department or
its equivalent to generally
oversee the operations of such
agencies and to insure that they
are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but
without interference with day-
to-day activities; or require the
submission of reports and cause
the conduct of management
audit, performance evaluation
and inspection to determine
compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the
department; to take such action
as may be necessary for the
proper performance of official
functions, including
rectification of violations,
abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to
review and pass upon budget
proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to
them."36 This is distinguished
from the power of "supervision
and control" which includes the
authority "to act directly
whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to
a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts
and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine
priorities in the execution of
plans and programs; and
prescribe standards, guidelines,
plans and programs."37
The Regional State Prosecutor is
clearly vested only with the
power of administrative
supervision. As administrative
supervisor, he has no power to
direct the city and provincial
prosecutors to inhibit from
handling certain cases. At most,
he can request for their
inhibition. Hence, the said
directive of the regional state
prosecutor to the city and
provincial prosecutors is
questionable to say the least.
Petitioner cannot lean on the
cases of Galvez and Sanchez. In
those cases, the special
prosecutors were acting under
the directive of the Secretary of
Justice. They were appointed in
accordance with law. Nowhere
in P.D. No. 1275 is the regional
state prosecutor granted the
power to appoint a special
prosecutor armed with the
authority to file an information
without the prior written
authority or approval of the city
or provincial prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor. P.D. No. 1275
provides the manner by which
special prosecutors are
appointed, to wit:
Sec. 15. Special Counsels. -
Whenever the exigencies of the
service require the creation of
positions of additional counsel
to assist provincial and city
fiscals in the discharge of their
duties, positions of Special
Counsels may be created by any
province or city, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of
Justice, and with salaries
chargeable against provincial or
city funds. The Secretary of
Justice shall appoint said
Special Counsels, upon
recommendation of the
provincial or city fiscal and
regional state prosecutors
concerned, either on permanent
or temporary basis.
Special Counsel shall be
appointed from members of the
bar and shall be allowed not
more than the salary rate
provided in this Decree for the
lowest rank or grade of assistant
fiscal in the province or city
where assigned. (emphases
supplied)
Under Department Order No.
318,38 "Defining the authority,
duties and responsibilities of
regional state prosecutors," then
Acting Secretary of Justice
Silvestre H. Bello III ordered the
appointed regional state
prosecutors (which included
Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan for Region V) to,
among others, "(i)nvestigate
and/or prosecute, upon the
directive of the Secretary of
Justice, specific criminal cases
filed within the region."
(emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, there is no
pretense that a directive was
issued by the Secretary of
Justice to Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan to
investigate and/or prosecute
SSS cases filed within his
territorial jurisdiction. A bare
reading of the alleged letter of
commendation by then
Secretary Hernando Perez
would show that it does not
amount to a directive or even a
recognition of this authority. In
fact, while the letter of Secretary
Perez commends the efforts of
Regional State Prosecutor
Turingan in successfully
prosecuting SSS cases, it also
negates his authority to
prosecute them. Secretary Perez
called the Regional State
Prosecutors attention to DOJ
Circular No. 27, series of 2001,
which states that all important
cases of the SSS should be
referred to the Office of the
Government Corporate
39
Counsel. Thus, Regional State
Prosecutor Turingan cannot be
considered a special prosecutor
within the meaning of the law.
Petitioner argues that the word
"may" is permissive. Hence,
there are cases when prior
written approval is not required,
and this is one such instance.
This is too simplistic an
interpretation. Whether the
word "may" is mandatory or
directory depends on the context
of its use. We agree with the
OSG that the use of the
permissive word "may" should
be read together with the other
provisions in the same section of
the Rule. The paragraph
immediately preceding the
quoted provision shows that the
word "may" is mandatory. It
states:
Sec. 4, Rule 112. x x x
Within five (5) days from his
resolution, he (investigating
prosecutor) shall forward the
record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, or to the
Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on
the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform
the parties of such action.
(emphasis supplied)
Having settled that the prior
authority and approval of the
city, provincial or chief state
prosecutor should have been
obtained, we shall now resolve
the more important issue:
whether the lack of prior written
approval of the city, provincial
or chief state prosecutor in the
filing of an information is a
defect in the information that is
waived if not raised as an
objection before arraignment.
We hold that it is not.
The provisions in the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure that demand
illumination are Sections 3 and
9 of Rule 117 in relation to
paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule
112, to wit:
Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.
The accused may move to quash
the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not
constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed
the information had no
authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed
form;
(f) That more than one offense is
charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments
which, if true, would constitute
a legal excuse or justification;
and
(i) That the accused has been
previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express
consent.
Section 9. Failure to move to
quash or to allege any ground
therefor.The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of
a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he
did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a),
(b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
this Rule. (emphasis supplied)
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3
provides, viz:
No complaint or information
may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without
the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or
city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy. (emphasis
supplied)
Private respondent and the OSG
take the position that the lack of
prior authority or approval by
the city or provincial prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor is an
infirmity in the information that
prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the
case. Since lack of jurisdiction is
a defect that may be raised as an
objection anytime even after
arraignment, the respondent
judge did not err in granting the
motion to dismiss based on this
ground. As basis, they cite the
case of Villa v. Ibaez, et
al.40 where we held, viz:
The defendant had pleaded to an
information before he filed a
motion to quash, and it is
contended that by his plea he
waived all objections to the
informations. The contention is
correct as far as formal
objections to the pleadings are
concerned. But by clear
implication, if not by express
provision of section 10 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court (now
Section 9 of Rule 117), and by a
long line of uniform decisions,
questions of want of jurisdiction
may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. Now, the objection
to the respondents actuations
goes to the very foundation of
the jurisdiction. It is a valid
information signed by a
competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the
person of the accused and the
subject matter of the accusation.
In consonance with this view, an
infirmity in the information
cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by
express consent.41 (emphasis
supplied)
The case of Villa is authority for
the principle that lack of
authority on the part of the filing
officer prevents the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by
law while jurisdiction over the
case is invested by the act of
plaintiff and attaches upon the
filing of the complaint or
information.42 Hence, while a
court may have jurisdiction over
the subject matter, like a
violation of the SSS Law, it does
not acquire jurisdiction over the
case itself until its jurisdiction is
invoked with the filing of the
information.
In the United States, an
information has been held as a
jurisdictional requirement upon
which a defendant stands trial.
Thus, it has been ruled that in
the absence of probable cause,
the court lacks jurisdiction to try
the criminal offense.43 In our
jurisdiction, we have similarly
held that:
While the choice of the court
where to bring an action, where
there are two or more courts
having concurrent jurisdiction
thereon, is a matter of procedure
and not jurisdiction, as
suggested by appellant, the
moment such choice has been
exercised, the matter becomes
jurisdictional. Such choice is
deemed made when the
proper complaint or
information is filed with the
court having jurisdiction over
the crime, and said court
acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, from
which time the right and
power of the court to try the
accused attaches. (citations
omitted) It is not for the
defendant to exercise that
choice, which is lodged upon
those who may validly file or
subscribe to the complaint or
information under sections 2
and 3 of Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court. 44 (emphasis
supplied)
A closer look at Villa would be
useful in resolving the issue at
hand. In that case, Atty.
Abelardo Subido, Chief of the
Division of Investigation in the
Office of the Mayor of Manila,
was appointed by the Secretary
of Justice as special counsel to
assist the City Fiscal of Manila
in the cases involving city
government officials or
employees. Pursuant to his
appointment, Atty. Subido filed
an information against Pedro
Villa for falsification of a
payroll. Atty. Subidos authority
to file the information was
challenged on the ground that he
was disqualified for
appointment under Section 1686
of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 144,
to wit:
SEC. 1686. Additional counsel
to assist fiscal. The Secretary
of Justice may appoint any
lawyer, being either a by amendment. In that case, the
subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the
public service, temporarily to
assist a fiscal or prosecuting
attorney in the discharge of his
duties, and with the same
authority therein as might be
exercised by the Attorney
General or Solicitor General.45
We held, viz:
subject to orders by, mutually
independent superiors having,
possibly, antagonistic interests.
Referring particularly to the
case at hand for illustration,
Attorney Subido could be
recalled or his time and attention
be required elsewhere by the
Secretary of Interior or the City
Mayor while he was discharging
his duties as public prosecutor,
and the Secretary of Justice
would be helpless to stop such
recall or interference. An
eventuality or state of affairs so
undesirable, not to say
detrimental to the public service
and specially the administration
of justice, the Legislature wisely
intended to avoid.
The application of the 1951
Villa ruling is not confined to
instances where the person who
filed the information is
disqualified from being a special
prosecutor under Section 1686
of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended, but has been
extended to various cases where
the information was filed by an
unauthorized officer as in the
case at bar. In Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,46 the
Court held that it is a
fundamental principle that when
on its face the information is
null and void for lack of
authority to file the same, it
cannot be cured nor resurrected
Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG)
conducted an investigation and
filed an information with the
Sandiganbayan against
petitioner Roman Cruz, Jr.
charging him with graft and
corruption. The petitioner
sought to quash the information
on the ground that the crime
charged did not constitute a
"Marcos crony related crime"
over which the PCGG had
authority to investigate and file
an information. The Court found
that the crime alleged in the
information was not among
those which PCGG was
authorized to investigate under
Executive Orders No. 1 and 14
of then President Corazon
Aquino and ruled that the
information was null and void.
Of similar import is Romualdez
v. Sandiganbayan, et al.47 where
we ruled that the information
having been filed by an
unauthorized party (the PCGG),
the information was fatally
flawed. We noted that this
defect is not a mere remediable
defect of form, but a defect that
could not be cured.1awphi1.net
In Cudia v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,48 we also reiterated the Villa
ruling. The accused in that case
was apprehended in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for illegal possession
of firearms and was brought to
Angeles City where the
headquarters of the arresting
officers was located. The City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed
an information in the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City. We
invalidated the information filed
by the City Prosecutor because
he had no territorial jurisdiction,
as the offense was committed in
Mabalacat, Pampanga and his
territorial jurisdiction was only
in Angeles City. We held that an
information, when required by
law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another.49 Otherwise,
the court does not acquire
jurisdiction.50 It is a valid
information signed by a
competent officer which, among
other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the
person of the accused and the
subject matter thereof. The
accuseds plea to an information
may be a waiver of all formal
objections to the said
information but not when there
is want of jurisdiction.
Questions relating to lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding. An
infirmity in the information,
such as lack of authority of the
officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence,
or even by express consent.51
Despite modifications of the
provisions on unauthorized
filing of information contained
in the 1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedure under which Villa
was decided, the 1951 Villa
ruling continues to be the
prevailing case law on the
matter.52
The 1940 Rules of Court
provided in Rule 113, Section
10 that, if the defendant fails to
move to quash the complaint or
information before he pleads
thereto, he shall be taken to have
waived all objections which are
grounds for a motion to quash
except (1) "when the complaint
or information does not charge
an offense" or (2) "the court is
without jurisdiction of the
same." (emphasis ours) Among
the enumerated grounds for a
motion to quash under Section 2
of the same Rule was "(t)hat the
fiscal has no authority to file the
information." With only the
above two exceptions provided
by the 1940 Rules, the Court
nevertheless made the Villa
ruling that if the filing officer
lacks authority to file the
information, jurisdiction is not
conferred on the court and this
infirmity cannot be cured by
silence or waiver, acquiescence,
or even by express consent.
The 1940 Rules of Court was
amended in 1964. With only
minimal changes introduced, the
1964 Rules of Court contained
provisions on unauthorized
filing of information similar to
the above provisions of the 1940
Rules.53
Then came the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Lack of
authority of the officer who filed
the information was also a
ground for a motion to quash
under these rules. The 1985
Rules also provided for waiver
of the grounds for a motion to
quash under Rule 117, Section
8, but enumerated the following
exceptions to the waiver: (a) the
facts charged do not constitute
an offense; (b) the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged or the
person of the accused; (c) the
criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; and (d) the
accused has been previously
convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted, or acquitted of
the offense charged.
Apparently, the want of
jurisdiction under the 1985
Rules refers to jurisdiction over
the offense and the person, and
not over the case as in Villa
where the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for
lack of authority of the officer
who filed the information. Still,
despite the enumeration, the
Court continued to apply the
Villa ruling as shown in the
afore-cited Cruz and Cudia
cases.
The 1985 Rules was amended in
2000. The 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure also
provide for lack of authority of
the filing officer as among the
grounds for a motion to quash
and the waiver of these grounds.
Similar to the 1985 Rules, the
Revised Rules enumerate the
exceptions from the waiver,
namely: (a) that the facts
charged do not constitute an
offense; (b) that the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged; (c) that the
criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; and (d) that
the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without
his express consent. Under the
regime of the 2000 Revised
Rules, we reiterated the Villa
ruling in the above-cited
Romualdez case. With the
enumeration of the four
exceptions, which was almost a
replica of the enumeration in the
1985 Rules, the 2000 Rules did
not intend to abandon Villa. The
Villa ruling subsisted alongside
the enumerated exceptions
under the 1985 Rules, and it
remains to do so under the
enumerated exceptions under
the 2000 Rules. Neither the
Rationale of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure nor
the Minutes of the Meeting of
the Committee on the Revision
of the Rules of Court evinces
any intent to abandon the
doctrine enunciated in Villa.
In sum, we hold that, in the
absence of a directive from the
Secretary of Justice designating
State Prosecutor Tolentino as
Special Prosecutor for SSS
cases or a prior written approval
of the information by the
provincial or city prosecutor, the
information in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed
by an officer without authority
to file the same. As this infirmity
in the information constitutes a
jurisdictional defect that cannot
be cured, the respondent judge
did not err in dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is
DENIED. The respondent
courts orders dated February
26, 2002 and April 3, 2002 are
AFFIRMED. Criminal Case No.
RTC 2001-0597 is DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of
a new information by an
authorized officer.
o Chapter 2, Title lll, Book lV,
Administrative Code of 1987
Department Proper
SECTION 5. The Department
Proper.The Department
Proper shall be composed of the
Office of the Secretary and the
Undersecretaries, Technical and
Administrative Service,
Financial Management Service,
Legal Staff and the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor.
SECTION
6. Undersecretaries.The
Secretary shall be assisted by
three (3) Undersecretaries. The
Secretary is hereby authorized
to delineate and assign the
respective functional areas of
responsibility of the
Undersecretaries, provided, that
such responsibility shall be with
respect to the mandate and
objectives of the Department;
and provided, further, that no
Undersecretary shall be
assigned primarily
administrative responsibilities.
Within his functional area of
responsibility, an
Undersecretary shall have the
following functions:
(1) Advise and assist the
Secretary in the formulation and
implementation of the
Departments policies, plans,
programs and projects;
(2) Oversee the operational
activities of the Department;
(3) Coordinate the programs and
projects of the Department for
efficient and effective
administration;
(4) Serve as deputy for the
Secretary;
(5) Perform, when so
designated, the powers and
functions of the Secretary,
during the latters absence or
incapacity; and
(6) Perform such other functions
as may be provided by law or
assigned by the Secretary to
promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the delivery of
frontline services.
SECTION 7. Legal Staff.
The Legal Staff shall have the
following functions:
(1) Assist the Secretary in the
performance of his duties as
Attorney General of the
Philippines and as ex-officio
legal adviser of government-
owned or controlled
corporations or enterprises and
their subsidiaries;
(2) Prepare and finally act for
and in behalf of the Secretary on
all queries and/or requests for
legal advice or guidance coming
from private parties, and minor
officials and employees of the
government;
(3) Maintain and supervise the
operation of the Department
Law Library as well as its
personnel; and
(4) Perform such other functions
as are now or may hereafter be
provided by law or assigned by
the Secretary.
SECTION 8. Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor.The
Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor shall have the
following functions:
(1) Assist the Secretary in the
performance of powers and
functions of the Department
relative to its role as the
prosecution arm of the
government;
(2) Implement the provisions of
laws, executive orders and rules,
and carry out the policies, plans,
programs and projects of the
Department relative to the
investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases;
(3) Assist the Secretary in
exercising supervision and
control over the National
Prosecution Service as
constituted under P.D. No. 1275
and/or otherwise hereinafter
provided; and
(4) Perform such other functions
as may be provided by law or
assigned by the Secretary.
SECTION 9. Provincial/City
Prosecution Offices.The
Provincial and City Fiscals
Office established in each of the
provinces and cities pursuant to
law, is retained and renamed
Provincial/City Prosecution
Office. It shall be headed by a
Provincial Prosecutor or City
Prosecutor, as the case may be,
assisted by such number of
Assistant Provincial/City
Prosecutors as fixed and/or
authorized by law. The position
titles of Provincial and City
Fiscal and of Assistant
Provincial and City Fiscal are
hereby abolished.
All provincial/city prosecution
offices shall continue to
discharge their functions under
existing law.
All provincial and city
prosecutors and their assistants
shall be appointed by the
President upon the
recommendation of the
Secretary.
r Sec.24and 35, Rep. Act
No.6975
Section 24. Powers and
Functions. The PNP shall
have the following powers and
functions:
(a) Enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the
protection of lives and
properties;
(b) Maintain peace and order
and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety;
(c) Investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of
criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution;
(d) Exercise the general powers
to make arrest, search and
seizure in accordance with the
Constitution and pertinent laws;
(e) Detain an arrested person for
a period not beyond what is
prescribed by law, informing the
person so detained of all his
rights under the Constitution;
(f) Issue licenses for the
possession of firearms and
explosives in accordance with
law;
(g) Supervise and control the
training and operations of
security agencies and issue
licenses to operate security
agencies, and to security guards
and private detectives, for the
practice of their professions; and
(h) Perform such other duties
and exercise all other functions
as may be provided by law.
In addition, the PNP shall
absorb the office of the National
Action Committee on Anti-
Hijacking (NACAH) of the
Department of National
Defense, all the functions of the
present Philippine Air Force
Security Command
(PAFSECOM), as well as the
police functions of the Coast
Guard. In order to perform its
powers and functions efficiently
and effectively, the PNP shall be
provided with adequate land,
sea, and air capabilities and all
necessary material means of
resources.
Section 35. Support Units.
The PNP shall be supported by
administrative and operational
support units. The
administrative support units
shall consist of the Crime
Laboratory, Logistic Unit,
Communications Unit,
Computer Center, Finance
Center and Civil Security Unit.
The operational support units
shall be composed of the
Maritime Police Unit, Police
Intelligence Unit, Police
Security Unit, Criminal
Investigation Unit, Special
Action Force, Narcotics units,
Aviation Security Unit, Traffic
Management Unit, the Medical
and Dental Centers and the Civil
Relations Unit. To enhance
police operational efficiency
and effectiveness, the Chief of
the PNP may constitute such
other support units as may be
necessary subject to the
approval of the Commission:
Provided, That no support unit
headed by a chief
superintendent or a higher rank
can be created unless provided
by law.
Administrative Support Units.
(1) Crime Laboratory. There
shall be established a central
Crime Laboratory to be headed
by a Director with the rank of
chief superintendent, which
shall provides scientific and
technical investigative aid and
support to the PNP and other
government investigative
agencies.
It shall also provide crime
laboratory examination,
evaluation and identification of
physical evidences involved in
crimes with primary emphasis
on their medical, chemical,
biological and physical nature.
There shall be likewise be
established regional and city
crime laboratories as may be
necessary in all regions and
cities of the country.
(2) Logistic Unit. Headed by a
Director with the rank of chief
superintendent, the Logistics
Unit shall be responsible for the
procurement, distributions and
management of all the logistical
requirements of the PNP
including firearms and
ammunition.
Communications Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Communications Unit shall be
responsible for establishing an
effective police
communications network.
Computer Center. Headed by
a Director with the rank of chief
superintendent, the Computer
Center shall be responsible for
the design, implementation and
maintenance of a database
system for the PNP.
(5) Finance Center. Headed by
a Director with the rank of chief
superintendent, the Finance
Center shall be responsible for
providing finance services to the
PNP.
(6) Civil Security Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Civil Security Unit shall provide
administrative services and
general supervision over
organization, business operation
and activities of all organized
private detectives, watchmen,
security guard agencies and
company guard houses.
The unit shall likewise supervise
the licensing and registration of
firearms and explosives.
The approval applications for
licenses to operate private
security agencies, as well as the
issuance of licenses to security
guards and the licensing of
firearms and explosives, shall be
decentralized to the PNP
regional offices.
(b) Operational Support Units.
(1) Maritime Police Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Maritime Police Unit shall
perform all police functions
over Philippine territorial waters
and rivers.
(2) Police Intelligence Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Police Intelligence Unit shall
serve as the intelligence and
counterintelligence operating
unit of the PNP.
(3) Police Security Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent,
Police Security Unit shall
provide security for government
officials, visiting dignitaries and
private individuals authorized to
be given protection.
(4) Criminal Investigation Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Criminal Investigation Unit
shall undertake the monitoring,
investigation and prosecution of
all crimes involving economic
sabotage, and other crimes of
such magnitude and extent as to
indicate their commission by
highly placed or professional
criminal syndicates and
organizations.
This unit shall likewise
investigate all major cases
involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and operate
against organized crime groups,
unless the President assigns the
case exclusively to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
(5) Special Action Force.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Special Action Force shall
function as a mobile strike force
or reaction unit to augment
regional, provincial, municipal
and city police forces for civil
disturbance control,
counterinsurgency, hostage-
taking rescue operations, and
other special operations.
(6) Narcotics Unit. Headed by
a Director with the rank of chief
superintendent, the Narcotics
Unit shall enforce all laws
relative to the protection of the
citizenry against dangerous and
other prohibited drugs and
substances.
(7) Aviation Security Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Aviation Security Unit, in
coordination with airport
authorities, shall secure all the
country's airports against
offensive and terroristic acts that
threaten civil aviation, exercise
operational control and
supervision over all agencies
involved in airport security
operation, and enforce all laws
and regulations relative to air
travel protection and safety.
(8) Traffic Management Unit.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Traffic Management Unit shall
enforce traffic laws and
regulations.
(9) Medical and Dental Centers.
Headed by a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Medical and Dental Centers
shall be responsible for
providing medical and dental
services for the PNP.
(10) Civil Relations Units.
Headed with a Director with the
rank of chief superintendent, the
Civil Relations Unit shall
implement plans and programs
that will promote community
and citizens' participation in the
maintenance of peace and order
and public safety.
r Republic Act No. 757, as
amended
o Cabarrus, Jr. v. BernaS A.C.
No. 4634, 24 September L997
JESUS CABARRUS,
JR., complainant, vs.JOSE
ANTONIO S.
BERNAS, respondent.
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus, Jr. filed an
administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose
Antonio Bernas for alleged
violations of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code
of Professional Responsibility.
In his complaint-affidavit1 dated
August 12, 1996, complainant
alleged as follows:
A. That on April 16, 1996,
respondent Ramon B. Pascual,
Jr., subscribed under oath before
Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a
notary public in Makati City,
wife of lawyer Jose Antonio
Bernas, a verification and
certification of non-forum
shopping which was appended
to a complaint for reconveyance
of property and damages,
denominated as Civil Case No.
65646, filed before the Regional
Trial Court in National Capital
Region, RTC, which case was
raffled to RTC Branch 159 in
Pasig City. A photocopy of said
complaint is hereto attached and
marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-
1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B. That as basis for the instant
complaint for falsification of
public document, I am hereto
quoting verbatim, the test (sic)
of Annex A-6, the verification
and certification of non-forum
shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under
oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case,
and certify that he cause the
preparation of the foregoing
pleading, the content of which
are true to his personal
knowledge and that he has not
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issues in any court, including
the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal
or agency. If he should learn that
a similar action of (sic)
proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme
Court or any other Tribunal
agency, he undertake to report to
(sic) that fact within Five (5)
days from notice to this notice
(sic) to this Honorable Court.
Emphasis supplied.
C. That the cause of action relied
upon by the respondent in Civil
Case No. 65646 is fraud,
facilitated by forgery as gleaned
from paragraphs 15, 16, and 22;
D. That contrary to the tenor,
import and meanoing (sic) of the
allegation under 1-B of the
instant complaint, respondent
and his counsel Jose Antonio
Bernas caused the preparation
and filing of a criminal
complaint for falsification of a
public document on April 11,
1996, (three days before the
filing of the aforecited Civil
Case) at the AOED of the
National Bureau of
Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic)
Ave., a xerox copy of said
complaint is hereto attached and
marked as Annex "B".
D-1. That as stated in Annex
"B", the gravaman of the
affidavit complaint of the
respondent is forgery, the same
legal issue in Civil Case No.
65646;
D-2. That as early as August 14,
1995, respondent counsel, Jose
Antonio Bernas filed a written
complaint at the NBI for the
same cause of action which was
reiterated in another letter
submitting to the NBI standard
specimen signatures dated
October 1995, copies of said
letter complaint are hereto
attached and marked as Annexes
(sic) "C".
E. That respondent Ramon B.
Pascual, Jr., on the basis of
Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of
submarkings knowingly
subverted and perverted the
truth when he falsify certified
(sic) and verified under oath in
the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any
other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in any
court, including the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other Tribunal or agency."
Where verification-certification
was placed under oath and was
conveniently notarized by the
wife of the counsel of
respondent in both cases at
Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig
and at the NBI, an agency within
the ambis (sic) and purview of
the circulus (sic) of the Supreme
Court prohibiting forum
shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the
counsel on record of the
respondents in Civil Case No.
65646 is the same lawyer who
instigated a criminal complaint
at the NBI for forgery and
respondents themselves
conspired and confabulated with
each other in facilitating and
insuring the open, blatant and
deliberate violation of Art. 172
of the Revised Penal Code
which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by private
individual and use of falsified
documents. The penalty
of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods
and a fine of not more than
P5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any private individual who
shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the
next preceding article in any
public or official document or
letter of exchanged (sic) or any
other kind of commercial
document; and
2. Any person who, to the
damage of a third party, or with
the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the
next preceding article.
Any person who shall
knowingly introduce in
evidence in any judicial
proceeding or to the damage of
another or who, with the intent
to cause such damage, shall use
any of the false documents
embraced in the next preceding
article, or in any of the foregoing
subdivisions of this article, shall
be punished by the penalty next
lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio
Bernas should be disbarred for
having instigated, abetted and
facilitated the perversion and
subversion of truth in the said
verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. Contrary
to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02,
Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers, the
pertinent provisions of which
are herein below quoted and a
copy of said code is hereto
attached and marked as Annex
"E";
CANON 1. A. LAWYER
SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
or decietful (sic) conduct.) at
defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal
system.
CANON 3. A. LAWYER IN
MAKING KNOWN HIS
LEGAL SERVICES SHALL
USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,
FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION
OF (sic) STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Rule 3.01 A lawyer shall not
use or permit the use of any
false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualified
(sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER
OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
In his Comment,2 respondent
Jose Antonio Bernas avers that
he has not committed forum
shopping because the criminal
action is not an action that
involves the same issue as those
in a civil action and both suits
can exist without constituting
forum shopping so long as the
civil aspect has not been
prosecuted in the criminal case.
He emphasized that forum
shopping only exists when
identical reliefs are issued by the
same parties in multiple fora.
In his Supplemental
Comment,3 respondent further
contends that neither he or his
client Pascual has commenced
any criminal action. Pascual
merely requested the NBI to
assist in the investigation or
prosecution, and left it to the
NBI to determine whether the
filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would
determine probable cause,
would be appropriate. It was
only upon request of the NBI
that he assisted Ramon Pascual
in drafting an affidavit-
complaint for falsification of
public documents against
complainant. Likewise,
respondent by counsel reiterates
that the letter transmitted to the
NBI cannot constitute an action
or proceeding because the NBI's
functions are merely
investigatory and informational
in nature. NBI has no
prosecutorial functions or quasi-
judical powers and is incapable
of granting relief or remedy. The
NBI cannot be an agency
contemplated by the circular.
The core issue to be resolved
here is whether respondent Atty.
Bernas transgressed Circular
No. 28-91, Revised Circular No.
28-91, and Administrative
Circular No. 04 - 94 on forum
shopping.
After a careful scrutiny of the
records, we find the
administrative complaint bereft
of merit and should be
dismissed.
There is forum-shopping
whenever, as a result of an
adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another.
Therefore, a party to a case
resorts to forum shopping
because "by filing another
petition involving the same
essential facts and
circumstances, . . . , respondents
approached two different fora in
order to increase their chances
of obtaining a favorable
decision or action.4 In this case,
there is no forum shopping to
speak of. Atty. Bernas, as
counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr.,
merely requested the assistance
of the NBI to investigate the
alleged fraud and forgery
committed by Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus.5 The filing of a civil
case for reconveyance and
damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City does
not preclude respondent to
institute a criminal action. The
rule allows the filing of a civil
case independently with the
criminal case without violating
the circulars on forum shopping.
It is scarcely necessary to add
that Circular No. 28-91 must be
so interpreted and applied as to
achieve the purposes projected
by the Supreme Court when it
promulgated that Circular.
Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an
instrument to promote and
facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedure
which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as
possible.6
Adjunct to this, Act No. 1577,
specifically section 1 hereof
provides, viz:
Sec. 1. There is hereby created a
Bureau of Investigation under
the Department of Justice which
shall have the following
functions:
(a) To undertake investigation
of crimes and other offenses
against the laws of the
Philippines, upon its initiative
and as public interest may
require;
(b) To render assistance,
whenever properly requested in
the investigation or detection of
crimes and other offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing
house of criminal and other
informations for the benefit and
use of all prosecuting and law-
enforcement entities of the
Philippines, identification
records of all persons without
criminal convictions, records of
identifying marks,
characteristics, and ownership
or possession of all firearms as
well as of test bullets fired
therefrom;
(d) To give technical aid to all
prosecuting and law-
enforcement officers and
entities of the Government as
well as the courts that may
request its services;
(e) To extend its services,
whenever properly requested in
the investigation of cases of
administrative or civil nature in
which the Government is
interested;
and those who not only hear and
(f) To undertake the instruction
and training of representative
number of city and municipal
peace officers at the request of
their respective superiors along
effective methods of crime
investigation and detection in
order to insure greater efficiency
in the discharge of their duties;
(g) To establish and
maintain an up-to-date
scientific crime laboratory and
to conduct researches in
furtherance of scientific
knowledge in criminal
investigation;
(h) To perform such other
related functions as the
Secretary of Justice may assign
from time to time.
Explicitly, the functions of the
National Bureau of
Investigations are merely
investigatory and informational
in nature. It has no judicial or
quasi-judicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief
to a party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. It is
an investigative agency whose
findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its
own initiative and as public
welfare may require. It renders
assistance when requested in the
investigation or detection of
crimes which precisely what
Atty. Bernas sought in order to
prosecute those persons
responsible for defrauding his
client.
The courts, tribunals and
agencies referred to under
Circular No. 28-91, Revised
Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-
94 are those vested with judicial
powers or quasi-judicial powers
determine controversies
between adverse parties, but to
make binding orders or
judgments. As succinctly put it
by R.A. 157, the NBI is not
performing judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. The NBI
cannot therefore be among those
forums contemplated by the
Circular that can entertain an
action or proceeding, or even
grant any relief, declaratory or
otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant
complaint is hereby
DISMISSED.
o Atty. Dizon v. Atty.
Lambino, A.C. No. 5968, 9
August 2006
ATTY. ORLANDO V.
DIZON, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. MARICHU C.
LAMBINO, Respondent.
ATTY. MARICHU C.
LAMBINO, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. ORLANDO V.
DIZON, Respondent.
The killing during a rumble on
December 8, 1994 of University
of the Philippines (UP)
graduating student Dennis
Venturina, the chairperson of
the UP College of Public
Administration Student
Council, drew the then
Chancellor of UP Diliman
Roger Posadas to seek the
assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Acting on the request of
Chancellor Posadas, Atty.
Orlando Dizon, then Chief of
the Special Operations Group
(SOG) of the NBI, together with
his men, repaired to the Office
of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head
of the UP Security Force on
December 12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the
killing, Francis Carlo Taparan
and Raymundo Narag, were at
the time in the office of Col.
Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested
to take them into his custody.
Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal
Counsel of UP Diliman, who
repaired to the Office of Col.
Bentain, advised against Atty.
Dizons move, however, he not
being armed with a warrant for
their arrest.
Chancellor Posadas and Vice
Chancellor for students Rosario
Torres-Yu, who also repaired to
the office of the colonel, joined
Atty. Lambino in opposing the
turn-over of the suspects to Atty.
Dizon, despite the latters claim
that under its Charter the NBI
was authorized to make
warrantless arrests.
The suspects lawyer, one Atty.
Villamor, later also showed up
at the office of Col. Bentain and
after what appeared to be a
heated discussion between Atty.
Dizon and the UP officials, the
students were allowed to go
back to their dormitories, with
Atty. Villamor undertaking to
accompany them to the NBI the
following morning.
The two student-suspects were
eventually indicted in court.
Hence, spawned the filing of a
complaint by Atty. Dizon
against Atty. Lambino before
the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for violation
of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility, docketed
as CBD Case No. 346.
Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a
criminal complaint also against
Atty. Lambino, together with
Chancellor Posadas and Vice
Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col.
Bentain, before the
Ombudsman, for violation of
P.D. 1829 which makes it
unlawful for anyone to obstruct
the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal
offenses.
Atty. Lambino in turn charged
Atty. Dizon before the IBP with
violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01,
1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules
6.01 and 6.02; and Canon 8,
Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD
Case No. 373.
The administrative cases were,
on motion of Atty. Lambino,
consolidated. Before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), the issues were defined
as follows:
1. Whether the act of Atty.
Lambino in refusing to turn over
the suspected students to the
group of Atty. Dizon constitutes
violation of Code of
Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty.
Dizon in trying to arrest the
student-suspects constitutes
violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
By Report and
Recommendation submitted to
the Board of Governors of the
IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD
Investigating Commissioner
Siegfrid B. Mison
recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against Atty.
Lambino in light of a finding
that she "acted within her
official duties as she
safeguarded the rights of the
students in accordance with the
schools substitute parental
authority" and "within the
bounds of the law as the NBI
agents had no warrants of
arrest."
With respect to the complaint
against Atty. Dizon, the
Commissioner recommended to
reprimand him for violating the
Code of Professional
Responsibility in "recklessly
tr[ying] to arrest" the suspects
without warrant.
The IBP Board of Governors, by
Resolution of October 22, 2005,
adopted and approved the
Commissioners Report. The
IBP thereupon transferred to this
Court its Notice of Resolution,
together with the records of the
cases which this Court noted by
Resolution of February 1, 2006.
As earlier stated, the issue
against Atty. Lambino is
whether she violated the Canons
of Professional Ethics in
"refusing to turn over the
suspected students to the group
of Atty. Dizon."
When the complaint of Atty.
Dizon before the Ombudsman
against Chancellor Posadas,
Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and
Atty. Lambino was elevated on
Certiorari and Prohibition, this
Court addressing in the negative
the two issues raised therein, to
wit:
(1) Whether the attempted arrest
of the student suspects by the
NBI could be validly made
without a warrant; and (2)
Whether there was probable
cause for prosecuting petitioner
for violation of P.D. No. 1829. x
x x,1
held that the objection of the
said UP officials to the arrest of
the students "cannot be
construed as a violation of P.D.
No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without
rendering it
unconstitutional,"2 they having
"a right to prevent the arrest [of
the students] at the time because
their attempted arrest was
illegal."3
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was
legally justified in advising
against the turn over of the
suspects to Atty. Dizon, there
being no basis for him to effect
a warrantless arrest. Atty.
Dizons administrative
complaint against her must then
be dismissed.
Respecting the complaint
against Atty. Dizon, this Court,
also in Posadas v. Ombudsman,
held that "[f]or the failure of the
NBI agents to comply with the
constitutional and procedural
requirements, . . . their attempt
to arrest [the two student-
suspects] without a warrant was
illegal."4
In the main, Atty. Dizon
invoked Section 1 (a) of
Republic Act 157 (The NBI
Charter) which empowers the
NBI "to undertake
investigations of crimes and
other offenses against the laws
of the Philippines, upon its own
initiative and as public interest
may require"5 and to make
arrests. The invocation does not
impress. Said section does not
grant the NBI the power to make
warrantless arrests. The NBI
Charter clearly qualifies the
power to make arrests to be "in
accordance with existing laws
and rules."
Members of the investigation
staff of the Bureau of
Investigation shall be peace
officers, and as such have the
following powers:
(a) To make arrests, searches
and seizures in accordance
with existing laws and rules.6
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
By persisting in his attempt to
arrest the suspected students
without a warrant, Atty. Dizon
violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER
SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
xxxx
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the
legal system. (Emphasis
supplied).
WHEREFORE, CBD Case No.
346 against Atty. Marichu C.
Lambino is DISMISSED.
Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in
CBD Case No. 373, found guilty
of violation of Canon 1 of Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is
REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction
shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the National Bureau
of Investigation, and the
Department of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
o Sec. 11 (3), Ll (4), & L5, Rep.
Act No. 6770
The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall be composed of
the Special Prosecutor and his
prosecution staff. The Office of
the Special Prosecutor shall be
an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and
shall be under the supervision
and control of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall, under the
supervision and control and
upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, have the
following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute
criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining
agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties
assigned to it by the
Ombudsman.
The Special Prosecutor shall
have the rank and salary of a
Deputy Ombudsman.
Section 15. Powers, Functions
and Duties. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on
its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.t has primary
jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any
investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation
of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at
its own instance, any officer or
employee of the Government, or
of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well
as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with
original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required
by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety
in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned
to take appropriate action
against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglect
to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law, and
recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21 of this
Act: provided, that the refusal
by any officer without just cause
to comply with an order of the
Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute an officer or
employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said
officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned,
in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as it
may provide in its rules of
procedure, to furnish it with
copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered
into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public
funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for
appropriate action;
(5) Request any government
agency for assistance and
information necessary in the
discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary,
pertinent records and
documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by
its investigation of the matters
mentioned in paragraphs (1),
(2), (3) and (4) hereof, when
circumstances so warrant and
with due prudence: provided,
that the Ombudsman under its
rules and regulations may
determine what cases may not
be made public: provided,
further, that any publicity issued
by the Ombudsman shall be
balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of
inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and
corruption in the Government,
and make recommendations for
their elimination and the
observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue
subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, and take testimony in
any investigation or inquiry,
including the power to examine
and have access to bank
accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of
Court and under the same
procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or
its investigators or
representatives such authority or
duty as shall ensure the effective
exercise or performance of the
powers, functions, and duties
herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the
proper action for the recovery of
ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February
25, 1986 and the prosecution of
the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give
priority to complaints filed
against high ranking
government officials and/or
those occupying supervisory
positions, complaints involving
grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large sums
of money and/or properties.
C. The Accused
o Secs. 14 & 16-D, Chapter 5,
Title lll, Book lV,
Administrative
Code of 1987, as amended by
Rep. Act No.9406
Public Attorneys Office
SECTION 14. Public
Attorneys Office (PAO).The
Citizens Legal Assistance
Office (CLAO) is renamed
Public Attorneys Office (PAO).
It shall exercise the powers and
functions as are now provided
by law for the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office or may
hereafter be provided by law.
SECTION 15. Organizational
Structure.The PAO shall
consist of the following
constituent units:
(1) Office of the Chief Public
Attorney and two (2) Deputy
Chief Public Attorneys;
(2) Five (5) line divisions in the
Central Office, namely:
Administrative, Financial and
Management, Special and
Appealed Cases, Legal
Research and Statistics, and
Field Services Divisions; and
(3) Regional and
Provincial/District Offices.
SECTION 16. The Chief
Public Attorney and Other PAO
Officials.The PAO shall be
headed by a Chief Public
Attorney and shall be assisted
by two (2) Deputy Chief Public
Attorneys. Each PAO Regional
Office established in each of the
administrative regions of the
country shall be headed by a
Regional Public Attorney who
shall be assisted by an Assistant
Regional Public Attorney.
The Chief Public Attorney,
Deputy Chief Public Attorneys,
Regional Public Attorneys and
Assistant Regional Public
Attorneys shall be appointed by
the President upon the
recommendation of the
Secretary.
D. The Offended Party
The issue here is whether the
Sec. 12, Rule L10
Section 12. Name of the
offended party. The
complaint or information must
state the name and surname of
the person against whom or
against whose property the
offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by
which such person has been or is
known. If there is no better way
of identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious
name.
(a) In offenses against property,
if the name of the offended party
is unknown, the property must
be described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the of the
person against whom or against
whose properly the offense was
committed is thereafter
disclosed or ascertained, the
court must cause the true name
to be inserted in the complaint or
information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a
juridical person, it is sufficient
to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is
known or by which it may be
identified, without need of
averring that it is a juridical
person or that it is organized in
accordance with law. (12a)
o Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 11-9063, 27 January
1997
JOSE G. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ADELA
TEODORA P. SANTOS,
Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in affirming the
trial court's order granting the
motion to quash the information
for bigamy based on
prescription.
On 28 August 1991, petitioner
Jose G. Garcia filed with the
(Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office an "Affidavit of
Complaint"1 charging his wife,
private respondent Adela
Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia
Santos," with Bigamy, Violation
of C.A. No. 142, as amended by
R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification
of Public Documents. However,
in his letter of 10 October 1991
to Assistant City Prosecutor
George F. Cabanilla, the
petitioner informed the latter
that he would limit his action to
bigamy.2
After appropriate proceedings,
Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla
filed on 8 January 1992 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
(Quezon City an
information,3 dated 15
November 1991, charging the
private respondent with Bigamy
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or before the 2nd day of
February, 1957, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, being previously
united in lawful marriage with
REYNALDO QUIROCA, and
without the said marriage
having been dissolved, (or
before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings), did
then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with
JOSE G. GARCIA, which
marriage has [sic] discovered in
1989, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended
party in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of
the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The information was docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-92-
27272 and assigned to Branch
83 of the said court. On 2 March
1992, the private respondent
filed a Motion to Quash alleging
prescription of the offense as
ground therefor. She contended
that by the petitioner's
admissions in his testimony
given on 23 January 1991 in
Civil Case No. 90-52730,
entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia
S. Garcia," and in his complaint
filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on 16
October 1991, the petitioner
discovered the commission of
the offense as early as 1974.
Pursuant then to Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code
(RPC),4 the period of
prescription of the offense
started to run therefrom. Thus,
since bigamy was punishable
by prision mayor,5 an afflictive
penalty6 which prescribed in
fifteen years pursuant to Article
92 of the RPC, then the offense
charged prescribed in 1989, or
fifteen years after its discovery
by the petitioner.
The private respondent
quoted7 the petitioner's
testimony in Civil Case No. 90-
52730 as follows:
the private respondent?
A That she has been married
previously in case I don't know
it. But she said she has been
previously married, in fact I saw
her husband Rey, a few days
ago and they said, "Baka
magkasama pa silang muli."
A'ITY. EVANGELISTA:
Q When did Eugenia R. Balingit
told [sic] that private respondent
was already married to another
man?
A That was when I told her that
we are Separating now. I told
her in tagalog, "na
maghihiwalay na kami ni Delia
ngayon." "Ang unang tanong
niya sa akin, "si Rey ba ang
dahilan," ang alam ko po, Rey
ang dating boyfriend niya, kaya
ang sabi ko, "hindi po, Mario,
ang panga!an," napabagsak po
siya sa upuan, sabi niya, "hindi
na nagbago."
Q When was that when you
came to know from Eugenia
Balingit, the judicial guardian,
that private respondent was
already married to another man
when she married you?
A That was when the affair was
happening and I found out.
Q What year?
A 1974.8
The portion of the complaint
filed on 16 October 1991 before
the CSC which the private
respondent alluded to, reads as
follows:
5. At the time the respondent
married the herein complainant
she never informed him that she
was previously married to a
certain REYNALDO
QUIROCA" on December 1,
1951 wherein she used the name
of "ADELA SANTOS" which
was part of her true name
"ADELA TEODORA P.
SANTOS" as per her genuine
Baptismal Certificate issued by
the Parish of San Guillermo,
Bacolor, Pampanga, a copy of
the said Baptismal Certificate is
hereto attached as ANNEX "D";
6. . . .
7. These facts were discovered
only by the herein complainant
in the year 1974 where they
separated from each other
because of her illicit relations
with several men continued use
of her alias name "DELIA",
without proper authority from
the Courts; and committing a
series of fraudulent acts; her
previous marriage to a certain
"Reynaldo Quiroca" is
evidenced by a certification
issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, a copy of
which is hereto attached as
ANNEX "F",9
In its 29 June 1992 order,10 the
trial court granted the motion to
quash and dismissed the
criminal case, ruling in this
wise:
This court believes that since the
penalty prescribed under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code
for the offense of bigamy
is prision mayor, which is
classified as an afflictive penalty
under Article 25 of the same
Code, then said offense should
prescribe in fifteen (15) years as
provided in Article 92 of the
Code. The complainant having
discovered the first marriage of
the accused to one Reynaldo
Quiroca in 1974 when he was
informed of it by one Eugenia
Balingit, the offense charged
has already prescribed when the
information was filed in this
case on November 15, 1991.
The argument presented by the
prosecution that i was difficult
for the complainant to obtain
evidence of the alleged first
marriage, hence, the
prescriptive period should be
counted from the time the
evidence was secured will not
hold water. Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code specifically
provides, thus:
"The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day
on which the crime is
discovered. . . ."
it did not state "on the day
sufficient evidence was
gathered," thus this Court
cannot change the requirements
of the law.
The petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the above
order on 26 August 1992,11 to
which he filed "numerous"
supplements thereto, focusing
on the private respondent's
many trips abroad which the
petitioner claimed suspended
the running of the prescriptive
period. These trips were
enumerated in the
certification12 issued by
Associate Commissioner
Ramon M. Morales of the
Bureau of Immigration (BID),
which reads as follows:
This is to certify that the name
GARCIA/DELIA/S. appears in
the Bureau's files of Arrivals
and Departures as having the
following travel records:
Departed for HKG on 06/03/77
aboard PR
Arrived from HKG on 07/02/77
aboard PA
Arrived from SYD on 07/09/77
aboard PR
Arrived from GUM on 06/14/80
aboard PA
Arrived from MEL on 07/17/81
aboard PR
Arrived from TYO on 05/20/83
aboard PA
Departed for HKG on 09/22/83
aboard PR
Arrived from SIN on 09/28/83
aboard PR
Departed for TYO on 04/30/84
aboard PA
Arrived from SFO on 07/03/84
aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/19/84
aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 08/05/85
aboard PA
Departed for TYO on 11/1 7/86
aboard UA
Arrived from LAX on 12/12/87
aboard UA
Departed for LAX on 11/30/87
aboard UA
Departed for CHI on 11/14/88
aboard UA
The trial court disallowed
reconsideration of its 29 June
1992 order, finding "no urgent
or justifiable reason to disturb or
set [it] aside." As to the sojourns
abroad of the private respondent
as shown in the certification, the
trial court held that the same "is
not that kind of absence from the
Philippines which will interrupt
the period of prescription of the
offense charged. . ."13
The petitioner then appealed to
the Court of Appeals which
docketed the appeal as CA-G.R.
CR No. 14324. He contended
therein that: (a) the trial court
erred in quashing the
information on the ground of
prescription; and (b) the counsel
for the accused was barred from
filing the motion to quash the
information against the
accused.14 As to the first, the
petitioner argued that bigamy
was a public offense, hence "the
offended party is not the first or
second (innocent) spouse but the
State whose law/policy was
transgressed." He tried to
distinguish bigamy from private
offenses such as adultery or
concubinage "where the private
complainant is necessarily the
offended party," thus, the
prescriptive period for the
former should commence from
the day the State, being the
offended party, discovered the
offense, which in this case was
on 28 August 1991 when the
petitioner filed his complaint
before the Prosecutor's Office.
The petitioner added that the
"interchanging use" in Article
91 of the RPC of the terms
"offended party," "authorities,"
and "their agents" supports his
view that the State is the
offended party in public
offenses.
Additionally, the petitioner
referred to the general rule
stated
in People v. Alagao15 "that in
resolving the motion to quash a
criminal complaint or
information[,] the facts alleged
in the complaint or information
should be taken as they are."
The information in this case
mentioned that the bigamy was
discovered in 1989. He
admitted, however, that this rule
admits of exceptions, such as
when the ground for the motion
to quash is prescription of the
offense, as provided in Section 4
of the old Rule 117 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Nonetheless, he advanced the
view that this exception is no
longer available because of the
implied repeal of Section 4, as
the amended Rule 117 no longer
contains a similar provision
under the rule on motions to
quash; and that granting there
was no repeal, the private
respondent failed to introduce
evidence to "support her factual
averment in her motion to
quash," which is required by
Rule 117. He further asserted
that the factual bases of the
motion to quash, viz., the
petitioner's testimony in Civil
Case No. 90-52730 and his
complaint filed with the CSC
are not conclusive because the
testimony is hearsay evidence,
hence inadmissible, while the
complaint is vague, particularly
the following portion quoted by
the private respondent:
7. These facts where discovered
only by the herein complainant
in the year 1974 when they
separated from each other
because of her illicit relations
with several men continued use
of her alias name "DELIA",
without proper authority from
the Courts; and committing a
series of fraudulent acts; her
previous marriage to a certain
"Reynaldo Quiroca" is
evidenced by a certification
issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, a copy of
which is hereto attached a
ANNEX "F";
The petitioner alleged that the
phrase "These facts" in said
paragraph 7 does not clearly
refer to his discovery of the
private respondent's first
marriage. Moreover, he doubted
whether the term "discovered"
in the said paragraph was used
in the sense contemplated by
law. At best, the petitioner
theorized, the discovery only
referred to the "initial,
unconfirmed and uninvestigated
raw, hearsay information"
which he received from
Balingit.
Finally, the petitioner reiterated
that the prescriptive period was
interrupted several times by the
private respondent's numerous
trips abroad.
As regards his second
contention, the petitioner argued
that the counsel for the private
respondent had already stated
that he represented only Delia S.
Garcia and not Adela Teodora P.
Santos. Consequently, the
private respondent's counsel
could not ask for the quashal of
the information in favor of
Adela Teodora P. Santos alias
Delia Santos. The petitioner
opined that the counsel for the
private respondent should have
sought a dismissal of the case in
favor of Delia Garcia alone.
The Court of Appeals gave
credence to the private
respondent's evidence and
concluded that the petitioner
discovered the private
respondent's first marriage in
1974. Since the information in
this case was filed in court only
on 8 January 1992, or eighteen
years after the discovery of the
offense, then the 15-year
prescriptive period had certainly
lapsed.16 It further held that the
quashal of an information based
on prescription of the offense
could be invoked before or after
arraignment and even on
appeal,17 for under Article 89(5)
of the RPC, the criminal liability
of a person is "totally
extinguish[ed]' by the
prescription of the crime, which
is a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability." Thus,
prescription is not deemed
waived even if not pleaded as a
defense.18
Undaunted, the petitioner is now
before us on a petition for
review on certiorari to annul
and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals and to compel
the respondent court to remand
the case to the trial court for
further proceedings. He submits
the following assignment of
errors:
I
BIGAMY IS A PUBLIC
OFFENSE,
CONSEQUENTLY,
PRESCRIPTION SHOULD
HAVE BEEN COUNTED
FROM THE TIME THE
STATE DISCOVERED ITS
COMMISSION;
II A MOTION TO QUASH
CANNOT ALSO GO
BEYOND WHAT IS STATED
IN THE INFORMATION;
III
BY THEMSELVES, THE
FACTUAL BASES OF THE
MOTION TO QUASH ARE
NOT ALSO CONCLUSIVE;
IV
ASSUMING THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
STARTED IN 1974, SAID
PERIOD HOWEVER WAS
INTERRUPTED SEVERAL
TIMES.
We notice that except for the
first two pages of the petition,
the deletion of a few paragraphs,
the substitution of the term
"petitioner" for "appellant," and
the deletion of the contention on
the' counsel for the private
respondent being barred from
filing a motion to quash, the
herein petition is a reproduction
of the Appellant's Brief filed by
the petitioner with the Court of
Appeals. Verily then, the instant
petition is a rehash of an old tale.
However, the Court of Appeals
failed to sufficiently address
several issues raised by the
petitioner, most probably
prompting him to seek redress
from this Court.
We resolved to give due course
to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective
memoranda. The Office of the
Solicitor General was the last to
submit a Memorandum for the
public respondent. Both the
private and public respondents
ask for the dismissal of this
petition and the affirmance of
the challenged decision.
Petitioner's position is
untenable. Denial then of this
petition is all it merits.
We shall take up the assigned
errors in seriatim.
It is true that bigamy is a public
offense. But, it is entirely
incorrect to state, as the
petitioner does, that only the
State is the offended party in
such case, as well as in other
public offenses, and, therefore;
only the State's discovery of the
crime could effectively
commence the running of the
period of prescription therefor.
Article 91 of the RPC provides
that "[t]he period of prescription
shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their
agents. . . ." This rule makes no
distinction between a public
crime and a private crime. In
both cases then, the discovery
may be by the "offended party,
the authorities, or their agents."
Article 91 does not define the
term "offended party." We find
its definition in Section 12, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as "the
person against whom or against
whose property, the offense was
committed.19 The said Section
reads as follows:
Sec. 12. Name of the offended
party. A complaint or
information must state the name
and surname of the person
against whom or against whose
property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person
has been or is known, and if
there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be
described under a fictitious
name.
More specifically, it is
reasonable to assume that the
offended party in the
commission of a crime, public
or private, is the party to whom
the offender is civilly liable, in
light of Article 100 of the RPC,
which expressly provides that
[e]very person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly
liable."20 Invariably then, the
private individual to whom the
offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened
by Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal
and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly
instituted with a criminal action,
unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes
recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the
same act or omission of the
accused. . . .
It is settled that in bigamy, both
the first and the second spouses
may be the offended parties
depending on the
circumstances.21
The petitioner even admits that
he is the offended party in
Criminal Case No. (Q-92-
27272. The information
therein,22 which he copied in
full in the petition in this case,
describes him as the "offended
party" who suffered "damage
and prejudice . . . in such amount
as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code."23
The distinction he made
between public crimes and
private crimes relates not to the
discovery of the crimes, but to
their prosecution. Articles 344
and 360 of the RPC, in relation
to Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, are clear on this
matter.
II
The petitioner's contention that a
motion to quash cannot go
beyond the information in
Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272
which states that the crime was
discovered in 1989, is palpably
unmeritorious. Even People
v. Alaga,24 which he cites,
mentions the exceptions to the
rule as provided in paragraphs
(f) and (h) of Section 2, and
Sections 4 and 5 of the old Rule
117, viz., (a) extinction of
criminal liability, and (b) double
jeopardy. His additional claim
that the exception of extinction
can no longer be raised due to
the implied repeal of the former
Section 4,25 Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court occasioned by its
non-reproduction after its
revision, is equally without
merit. No repeal, express or
implied, of the said Section 4
ever took place. While there is
no provision in the new Rule
117 that prescribes the contents
of a motion to quash based on
extinction of criminal liability,
Section 2 thereof encapsulizes
the former Sections 3, 4, and 5
of the old Rule 117. The said
Section 2 reads as follows:
Sec. 2. Foms and contents.
The motion to quash shall be in
writing signed by the accused or
his counsel. It shall specify
distinctly the factual and legal
grounds therefor and the court
shall consider no grounds other
than those stated therein, except
lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. (3a, 4a, 5a).
(underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
It is clear from this Section that
a motion to quash may be based
on factual and legal grounds,
and since extinction of criminal
liability and double jeopardy are
retained as among
the grounds for a motion to
quash in Section 3 of the new
Rule 117, it necessarily follows
that facts outside the
information itself may be
introduced to grove such
grounds. As a matter of fact,
inquiry into such facts may be
allowed where the ground
invoked is that the allegations in
the information do not constitute
the offense charged. Thus,
in People v. De la Rosa,26 this
Court stated:
As a general proposition, a
motion to quash on the ground
that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the
offense charged, or any offense
for that matter, should be
resolved on the basis alone of
said allegations whose truth and
veracity are hypothetically
admitted. However, as held in
the case of People vs. Navarro,
75 Phil. 516, additional facts not
alleged in the information, but
admitted or not denied by the
prosecution may be invoked in
support of the motion to quash.
Former Chief justice Moran
supports this theory.27
In Criminal Case No. 92-27272,
the trial court, without objection
on the part of the prosecution,
allowed the private respondent
to offer evidence in support of
her claim that the crime had
prescribed. Consequently, the
trial court, upon indubitable
proof of prescription, correctly
granted the motion to quash. It
would have been, to quote De la
Rosa, "pure technicality for the
court to close its eyes to [the fact
of prescription) and still give
due course to the prosecution of
the case" a technicality which
would have meant loss of
valuable time of the court and
the parties.
As noted by Dr. Fortunato
Gupit, Jr., consultant of the
Rules of Court Revision
Committee, the aforequoted
Section 2 of the new Rule 117
on "factual and legal grounds"
of a motion to quash is based on
the De la Rosa case.28
III
The petitioner likewise claims
that the factual bases of the
private respondent's motion to
quash are inconclusive. The
petitioner cannot be allowed to
disown statements he made
under oath and in open court
when it serves his purpose. This
is a contemptible practice which
can only mislead the courts and
thereby contribute to injustice.
Besides, he never denied having
given the pertinent testimony.
He did, however, term it vague
in that it was not clear whether
the prior marriage which
Eugenia Balingit disclosed to
him was that entered into by the
private respondent with
Reynaldo Quiroca. It is
immaterial to whom the private
respondent was first married;
what is relevant in this case is
that the petitioner was informed
of a prior marriage contracted by
the private respondent.
Neither may the petitioner be
heard to cast doubt on the
meaning of his statements in his
sworn complaint filed before the
CSC. We find no hint of
vagueness in them. In any event,
he has not denied that he in fact
discovered in 1974 that the
private respondent had been
previously married.
Finally, the petitioner draws our
attention to the private
respondent's several trips abroad
as enumerated in the
certification of the Bureau of
Immigration, and cites the
second paragraph of Article 91
of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term of
prescription shall not run when
the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago." We
agree with the Court of Appeals
that these trips abroad did not
constitute the "absence"
contemplated in Article 91.
These trips were brief, and in
every case the private
respondent returned to the
Philippines. Besides, these were
made long after the petitioner
discovered the offense and. even
if the aggregate number of days
of these trips are considered,
still the information was filed
well beyond the prescriptive
period.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit and the challenged
decision of 13 February 1995 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 14324 is
AFFIRMED.
o Senador vs. People, G.R. No.
20L62O,6 March 2013
RAMONCITA O.
SENADOR, Petitioner,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and
CYNTHIA JAIME,
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking
the reversal of the May 17, 2011
Decision1 and March 30, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 00952.
In an Information dated August
5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita
O. Senador (Senador) was
charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in
Dumaguete City with the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, par.
1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code,3 viz:
That on or about the 10th day of
September 2000 in the City of
Dumaguete, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the
said accused, having obtained
and received from
one Cynthia Jaime various
kinds of jewelry valued in the
total amount of
705,685.00 for the purpose of
selling the same on consignment
basis with express obligation to
account for and remit the entire
proceeds of the sale if sold or to
return the same if unsold within
an agreed period of time and
despite repeated demands
therefor, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to remit
proceeds of the sale of said
items or to return any of the
items that may have been unsold
to said Cynthia Jaime but
instead has willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied
and converted the same to
his/her own use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of said
Cynthia Jaime in the
aforementioned amount of
705,685.00.4 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner
pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecutions evidence
sought to prove the following
facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her
daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime
(Cynthia), were engaged in a
jewelry business. Sometime in
the first week of September
2000, Senador went to see Rita
at her house in Guadalupe
Heights, Cebu City, expressing
her interest to see the pieces of
jewelry that the latter was
selling. On September 10, 2000,
Ritas daughter-in-law and
business partner, Cynthia,
delivered to Senador several
pieces of jewelry worth seven
hundred five thousand six
hundred eighty five pesos (PhP
705,685).5
In the covering Trust Receipt
Agreement signed by Cynthia
and Senador, the latter
undertook to sell the jewelry
thus delivered on commission
basis and, thereafter, to remit the
proceeds of the sale, or return
the unsold items to Cynthia
within fifteen (15) days from the
delivery.6 However, as events
turned out, Senador failed to
turn over the proceeds of the
sale or return the unsold jewelry
within the given period.7
Thus, in a letter dated October 4,
2001, Rita demanded from
Senador the return of the unsold
jewelry or the remittance of the
proceeds from the sale of
jewelry entrusted to her. The
demand fell on deaf ears
prompting Rita to file the instant
criminal complaint against
Senador.8
During the preliminary
investigation, Senador tendered
to Rita Keppel Bank Check No.
0003603 dated March 31, 2001
for the amount of PhP
705,685,9 as settlement of her
obligations. Nonetheless, the
check was later dishonored as it
was drawn against a closed
account.10
Senador refused to testify and so
failed to refute any of the
foregoing evidence of the
prosecution, and instead, she
relied on the defense that the
facts alleged in the Information
and the facts proven and
established during the trial
differ. In particular, Senador
asserted that the person named
as the offended party in the
Information is not the same
person who made the demand
and filed the complaint.
According to Senador, the
private complainant in the
Information went by the name
"Cynthia Jaime," whereas,
during trial, the private
complainant turned out to be
"Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia
Jaime was never presented as
witness. Hence, citing People v.
Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United
States v. Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog
(Lahoylahoy),12 Senador would
insist on her acquittal on the
postulate that her constitutional
right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against
her has been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial
court, by Decision dated June
30, 2008, found Senador guilty
as charged and sentenced as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds
RAMONCITA SENADOR
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ESTAFA under
Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years and one
(1) day of prision correccional
as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the
private complainants, RITA
JA[I]ME and CYNTHIA
JAIME, the following: 1) Actual
Damages in the amount of
695,685.00 with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of the
Information until fully paid; 2)
Exemplary Damages in the
amount of 100,000.00; and 3)
the amount of 50,000 as
Attorneys fees.
Senador questioned the RTC
Decision before the CA.
However, on May 17, 2011, the
appellate court rendered a
Decision upholding the finding
of the RTC that the prosecution
satisfactorily established the
guilt of Senador beyond
reasonable doubt. The CA
opined that the prosecution was
able to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the following
undisputed facts, to wit: (1)
Senador received the pieces of
jewelry in trust under the
obligation or duty to return
them; (2) Senador
misappropriated or converted
the pieces of jewelry to her
benefit but to the prejudice of
business partners, Rita and
Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed
to return the pieces of jewelry
despite demand made by Rita.
Further, the CAfinding that
Uba13 is not applicable since
Senador is charged with estafa,
a crime against property and not
oral defamation, as in Uba
ruled:
WHEREFORE, the June 30,
2008 Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32,
Dumaguete City, in Criminal
Case No. 16010, finding
accused appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was
denied in a Resolution dated
March 30, 2012. Hence, the
present petition of Senador.
The sole issue involved in the
instant case is whether or not an
error in the designation in the
Information of the offended
party violates, as petitioner
argues, the accuseds
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her,
thus, entitling her to an
acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be
emphasized that variance
between the allegations of the
information and the evidence
offered by the prosecution does
not of itself entitle the accused
to an acquittal,14 more so if the
variance relates to the
designation of the offended
party, a mere formal defect,
which does not prejudice the
substantial rights of the
accused.15
As correctly held by the
appellate court, Senadors
reliance on Uba is misplaced. In
Uba, the appellant was charged
with oral defamation, a crime
against honor, wherein the
identity of the person against
whom the defamatory words
were directed is a material
element. Thus, an erroneous
designation of the person
injured is material. On the
contrary, in the instant case,
Senador was charged with
estafa, a crime against property
that does not absolutely require
as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the
offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the
correct identification of the
criminal act charged in the
information.16 Thus, in case of
an error in the designation of the
offended party in crimes against
property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of
the Rules of Court mandates the
correction of the information,
not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended
party.The complaint or
information must state the name
and surname of the person
against whom or against whose
property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or
nickname by which such person
has been or is known. If there is
no better way of identifying
him, he must be described under
a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property,
if the name of the offended party
is unknown, the property must
be described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person
against whom or against whose
property the offense was
committed is thereafter
disclosed or ascertained, the
court must cause such true name
to be inserted in the complaint or
information and the record. x x
x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above
provision that in offenses
against property, the materiality
of the erroneous designation of
the offended party would
depend on whether or not the
subject matter of the offense was
sufficiently described and
identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador
supports the doctrine that if the
subject matter of the offense is
generic or one which is not
described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged,
then an erroneous designation of
the offended party is material
and would result in the violation
of the accuseds constitutional
right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the
accusation against her. Such
error, Lahoylahoy teaches,
would result in the acquittal of
the accused, viz:
The second sentence of section
7 of General Orders No. 58
declares that when an offense
shall have been described with
sufficient certainty to identify
the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial. We are of
the opinion that this provision
can have no application to a case
where the name of the person
injured is matter of essential
description as in the case at bar;
and at any rate, supposing the
allegation of ownership to be
eliminated, the robbery charged
in this case would not be
sufficiently identified. A Kepner,18 Sayson
complaint stating, as does the
one now before us, that the
defendants "took and
appropriated to themselves with
intent of gain and against the
will of the owner thereof the
sum of 100" could scarcely be
sustained in any jurisdiction as a
sufficient description either of
the act of robbery or of the
subject of the robbery. There is
a saying to the effect that money
has no earmarks; and generally
speaking the only way money,
which has been the subject of a
robbery, can be described or
identified in a complaint is by
connecting it with the individual
who was robbed as its owner or
possessor. And clearly, when
the offense has been so
identified in the complaint, the
proof must correspond upon this
point with the allegation, or
there can be no
conviction.17 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject
matter of the offense was money
in the total sum of PhP 100.
Since money is generic and has
no earmarks that could properly
identify it, the only way that it
(money) could be described and
identified in a complaint is by
connecting it to the offended
party or the individual who was
robbed as its owner or
possessor. Thus, the identity of
the offended party is material
and necessary for the proper
identification of the offense
charged. Corollary, the
erroneous designation of the
offended party would also be
material, as the subject matter of
the offense could no longer be
described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v.
v.
People,19 and Ricarze v. Court
of Appeals20 support the
doctrine that if the subject
matter of the offense is specific
or one described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged,
then an erroneous designation of
the offended party is not
material and would not result in
the violation of the accuseds
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her.
Such error would not result in
the acquittal of the accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this
Court ruled that the erroneous
designation of the person
injured by a criminal act is not
material for the prosecution of
the offense because the subject
matter of the offense, a warrant,
was sufficiently identified with
such particularity as to properly
identify the particular offense
charged. We held, thus:
The allegation of the complaint
that the unlawful
misappropriation of the
proceeds of the warrant was to
the prejudice of Aun Tan may be
disregarded by virtue of section
7 of General Orders, No. 58,
which declares that when an
offense shall have been
described in the complaint with
sufficient certainty to identify
the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial. In any
event the defect, if defect it was,
was one of form which did not
tend to prejudice any substantial
right of the defendant on the
merits, and can not, therefore,
under the provisions of section
10 of the same order, affect the
present proceeding.21 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld the
conviction of Sayson for
attempted estafa, even if there
was an erroneous allegation as
to the person injured because the
subject matter of the offense, a
check, is specific and
sufficiently identified. We held,
thus:
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this
Court laid down the rule that
when an offense shall have been
described in the complaint with
sufficient certainty as to identify
the act, an erroneous allegation
as to the person injured shall be
deemed immaterial as the same
is a mere formal defect which
did not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the
aforementioned case, which had
a factual backdrop similar to the
instant case, where the
defendant was charged with
estafa for the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant
which he had cashed without
authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to
the effect that the unlawful act
was to the prejudice of the
owner of the cheque, when in
reality the bank which cashed it
was the one which suffered a
loss, was held to be immaterial
on the ground that the subject
matter of the estafa, the warrant,
was described in the complaint
with such particularity as to
properly identify the particular
offense charged. In the instant
suit for estafa which is a crime
against property under the
Revised Penal Code, since the
check, which was the subject-
matter of the offense, was
described with such
particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged, it
becomes immaterial, for
purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was
established during the trial
that the offended party was
actually Mever Films and not
Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank
of America as alleged in the
information." 22 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the
doctrine espousing an erroneous
designation of the person
injured is not material because
the subject matter of the offense,
a check, was sufficiently
identified with such
particularity as to properly
identify the particular offense
charged.23
Interpreting the previously
discussed cases, We conclude
that in offenses against property,
if the subject matter of the
offense is generic and not
identifiable, such as the money
unlawfully taken as
in Lahoylahoy, an error in the
designation of the offended
party is fatal and would result
in the acquittal of the accused.
However, if the subject matter
of the offense is specific and
identifiable, such as a warrant,
as in Kepner, or a check, such as
in Sayson and Ricarze, an
error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject
matter of the offense does not
refer to money or any other
generic property. Instead, the
information specified the
subject of the offense as
"various kinds of jewelry valued
in the total amount of
705,685.00." The charge was
thereafter sufficiently fleshed
out and proved by the Trust
Receipt Agreement24signed by
Senador and presented during
trial, which enumerates these
"various kinds of jewelry valued
in the total amount of PhP
705,685," viz:
Thus, it is the doctrine
elucidated in Kepner, Sayson,
and Ricarze that is applicable to
the present case, not the ruling
in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The
error in the designation of the
offended party in the
information is immaterial and
did not violate Senadors
constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against her.
Lest it be overlooked, Senador
offered to pay obligations
through Keppel Check No.
0003603, which was dishonored
because it was drawn against an
already closed account. The
offer indicates her receipt of the
pieces of jewelry thus described
and an implied admission that
she misappropriated the
jewelries themselves or the
proceeds of the sale. Rule 130,
Section 27 states:
In criminal cases. except those
involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be
compromised. an offer of
compromise by the accused may
he received in evidence as
implied admission of guilt.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Taken together, the C A did not
err in affirming petitioner's
conviction for the crime of
estafa.1wphi1
In light of current
jurisprudence,25 the Court,
however, finds the award of
exemplary damages
excessive.1wphi1 Art. 2229 of
the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good.
Nevertheless, "exemplary
damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish
another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions."26 On this
basis, the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of PhP
100,000 is reduced to PhP
30,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision
dated May 17, 2011 and
Resolution dated March 30,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in
C A-G.R. CJ.C No. 00952,
finding Ramoncita Senador
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of ESTAFA under
par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, are hereby
AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the
award of exemplary damages he
reduced to PhP 30,000.
SO ORDERED.
lll. Venue (18 July 2015)
. Rule L10, Sec.15, RCP
Section 15. Place where action
is to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory
where the offense was
committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is
committed in a train, aircraft, or
other public or private vehicle
while in the course of its trip, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during such
its trip, including the place of its
departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is
committed on board a vessel in
the course of its voyage, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory where
the vessel passed during such
voyage, subject to the generally
accepted principles of
international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside
the Philippines but punishable
under Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be cognizable
by the court where the criminal
action is first filed. (15a)
Sec.18, B.P.129r Presidential
Decree No. 1069 (Extradition
Law)
Section 18. Costs and
Expenses; By Whom
Paid. Except when the relevant
extradition treaty provides
otherwise, all costs or expenses
incurred in any extradition
proceeding and in
apprehending, securing and
transmitting an accused shall be
paid by the requesting state or
government. The Secretary of
Justice shall certify to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs the
amounts to be paid by the
requesting state or government
on account of expenses and
costs, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall cause the
amounts to be collected and
transmitted to the Secretary of
Justice for deposit in the
National Treasury of the
Philippines.
o Treas v People, G.R. No.
195002, 25 January 2012
HECTORTREAS, Petitioner
vs.PEOPLE Respondent.
Where life or liberty is affected
by its proceedings, courts must
keep strictly within the limits of
the law authorizing them to take
jurisdiction and to try the case
and render judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to annul and
set aside the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision dated 9 July
20102 and Resolution dated 4
January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the
Case
The pertinent facts, as found by
the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999,
Margarita Alocilja (Margarita)
wanted to buy a house-and-lot in
Iloilo City covered by TCT No.
109266. It was then mortgaged
with Maybank. The bank
manager Joselito Palma
recommended the appellant
Hector Treas (Hector) to
private complainant Elizabeth,
who was an employee and niece
of Margarita, for advice
regarding the transfer of the title
in the latters name. Hector
informed Elizabeth that for the
titling of the property in the
name of her aunt Margarita, the
following expenses would be
incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary
Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous
Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave
P150,000.00 to Hector who
issued a corresponding receipt
dated December 22, 1999 and
prepared [a] Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.
Subsequently, Hector gave
Elizabeth Revenue Official
Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for
P24,000.00. However, when she
consulted with the BIR, she was
informed that the receipts were
fake. When confronted, Hector
admitted to her that the receipts
were fake and that he used the
P120,000.00 for his other
transactions. Elizabeth
demanded the return of the
money.
To settle his accounts, appellant
Hector issued in favor of
Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce
check No. 0042856 dated
November 10, 2000 in the
amount of P120,000.00,
deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees.
When the check was deposited
with the PCIBank, Makati
Branch, the same was
dishonored for the reason that
the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated
formal and verbal demands,
appellant failed to pay. Thus, the
instant case of Estafa was filed
against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an
Information was filed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor
before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), both of Makati City. The
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of
December, 1999, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 which
money was given to her by her
aunt Margarita Alocilja, with
the express obligation on the
part of the accused to use the
said amount for expenses and
fees in connection with the
purchase of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-109266,
but the said accused, once in
possession of the said amount,
with the intent to gain and abuse
of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the
amount of P130,000.00 less
attorneys fees and the said
accused failed and refused and
still fails and refuses to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja
and Margarita Alocilja in the
aforementioned amount of
P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment on 26 April
2002, petitioner, acting as his
own counsel, entered a plea of
"Not Guilty." Allegedly due to
old age and poor health, and the
fact that he lives in Iloilo City,
petitioner was unable to attend
the pre-trial and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC
rendered a Decision5 finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of
Estafa under section 1,
paragraph (b), of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
with the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, judgment is rendered
finding accused Hector Trenas
guilty of the crime of Estafa
with abuse of confidence as
penalized under Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, and
which offense was committed in
the manner described in the
aforementioned information. As
a consequence of this judgment,
accused Hector Trenas is
sentenced to suffer a penalty of
Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor to Seventeen
(17) Years and Four (4) Months
of Reclusion Temporal.
Moreover, he is ordered to
indemnify private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of
P130,000.00 with interest at the
legal rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the date this case
was filed until the amount is
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
We note at this point that
petitioner has been variably
called Treas and Trenas in the
pleadings and court issuances,
but for consistency, we use the
name "Treas", under which he
was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner
filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,7 which was
denied by the RTC in a
Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8
On 25 September 2008,
petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal before the RTC.9 The
appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July
2010, the CA rendered a
Decision10 affirming that of the
RTC. On 4 August 2010,
petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 4 January
2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner
filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review
on Certiorari12 before this Court.
He asked for a period of 15 days
within which to file a petition
for review, and the Court
granted his motion in a
Resolution dated 9 February
2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner
filed his Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court,
with the following assignment
of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT
AN ACCUSED HAS TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE
OF LACK OF JURISDICTION
EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF
JURISDICTION APPEARS IN
THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT
DEMAND MADE BY A
PERSON OTHER THAN THE
AGGRIEVED PARTY
SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF
DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE
THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13
On the first issue, petitioner
asserts that nowhere in the
evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that
150,000 was given to and
received by petitioner in Makati
City. Instead, the evidence
shows that the Receipt issued by
petitioner for the money was
dated 22 December 1999,
without any indication of the
place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage
prepared by petitioner was
signed and notarized in Iloilo
City, also on 22 December
1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that
the money was actually
delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence
and office were situated there as
well. Absent any direct proof as
to the place of delivery, one
must rely on the disputable
presumption that things
happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and
the ordinary habits of life. The
only time Makati City was
mentioned was with respect to
the time when the check
provided by petitioner was
dishonored by Equitable-PCI
Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner
asserts that the prosecution
witness failed to allege that any
of the acts material to the crime
of estafa had occurred in Makati
City. Thus, the trial court failed
to acquire jurisdiction over the
case.
Petitioner thus argues that an
accused is not required to
present evidence to prove lack
of jurisdiction, when such lack
is already indicated in the
prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue,
petitioner claims that the
amount of P150,000 actually
belongs to Margarita. Assuming
there was misappropriation, it
was actually she not Elizabeth
who was the offended party.
Thus, the latters demand does
not satisfy the requirement of
prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa.
Even assuming that the demand
could have been properly made
by Elizabeth, the demand
referred to the amount of
P120,000, instead of P150,000.
Finally, there is no showing that
the demand was actually
received by petitioner. The
signature on the Registry Return
Receipt was not proven to be
that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court
issued a Resolution directing the
Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to file the latters
Comment on the Petition. On 27
July 2011, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, praying
for an additional period of 60
days within which to submit its
Comment. This motion was
granted in a Resolution dated 12
September 2011. On 23
September 2011, the OSG filed
a Motion for Special Extension,
requesting an additional period
of five days. On 29 September
2011, it filed its Comment on the
Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts
that the RTC did not err in
convicting petitioner as charged.
The OSG notes that petitioner
does not dispute the factual
findings of the trial court with
respect to the delivery of
150,000 to him, and that there
was a relationship of trust and
confidence between him and
Elizabeth. With respect to his
claim that the Complaint should
have been filed in Iloilo City, his
claim was not supported by any
piece of evidence, as he did not
present any. Further, petitioner
is, in effect, asking the Court to
weigh the credibility of the
prosecution witness, Elizabeth.
However, the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great
weight, unless tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance,
which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue,
the OSG stresses that the
defense of "no valid demand"
was not raised in the lower
court. Nevertheless, the demand
letter sent to Elizabeth suffices,
as she is also one of the
complainants alleged in the
Information, as an agent of
Margarita. Moreover, no proof
was adduced as to the
genuineness of petitioners
signature in the Registry Return
Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that
the Court may recommend
petitioner for executive
clemency, in view of his
advanced age and failing health.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with
merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises
questions of law, the resolution
of the Petition requires a review
of the factual findings of the
lower courts and the evidence
upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In many
instances, however, this Court
has laid down exceptions to this
general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by
the Court of Appeals from its
findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of
facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in
making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is premised on
misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals
failed to notice certain relevant
facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a
different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are
themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of
the specific evidence on which
they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are
contradicted by the evidence on
record.14
In this case, the findings of fact
of the trial court and the CA on
the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are
conclusions without any citation
of the specific evidence on
which they are based; they are
grounded on conclusions and
conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision,
ruled on the commission of the
offense without any finding as
to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented
by the prosecution through
private complainant Elizabeth
Luciaja, the Court is convinced
that accused Trenas had
committed the offense of Estafa
by taking advantage of her trust
so that he could misappropriate
for his own personal benefit the
amount entrusted to him for
payment of the capital gains tax
and documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private
complainant Luciaja, after
accused Trenas had obtained the
amount of P150,000.00 from
her, he gave her two receipts
purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, for
the fraudulent purpose of
fooling her and making her
believe that he had complied
with his duty to pay the
aforementioned taxes.
Eventually, private complainant
Luciaja discovered that said
receipts were fabricated
documents.15
In his Motion for
Reconsideration before the
RTC, petitioner raised the
argument that it had no
jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The trial court denied
the motion, without citing any
specific evidence upon which its
findings were based, and by
relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given
to [Treas] in Makati City was
incontrovertibly established by
the prosecution. Accused
Treas, on the other hand, never
appeared in Court to present
countervailing evidence. It is
only now that he is suggesting
another possible scenario, not
based on the evidence, but on
mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to
seriously assay his assertions,
the same would still not warrant
a reversal of the assailed
judgment. Even if the Deed of
Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed on 22
December 999 in Iloilo City, it
cannot preclude the fact that the
P150,000.00 was delivered to
him by private complainant
Luciaja in Makati City the
following day. His reasoning the
money must have been
delivered to him in Iloilo City
because it was to be used for
paying the taxes with the BIR
office in that city does not
inspire concurrence. The
records show that he did not
even pay the taxes because the
BIR receipts he gave to private
complainant were fake
documents. Thus, his
argumentation in this regard is
too specious to consider
favorably.16
For its part, the CA ruled on the
issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that
the court will not entertain
evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that
Hector did not comment on the
formal offer of prosecutions
evidence nor present any
evidence on his behalf. He failed
to substantiate his allegations
that he had received the amount
of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City.
Hence, Hectors allegations
cannot be given evidentiary
weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or
circumstance of weight and
influence which would appear to
have been overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the
outcome of the case, the factual
findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by
the trial court remain binding on
appellate tribunal. They are
entitled to great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed
on review.17
The instant case is thus an
exception allowing a review of
the factual findings of the lower
courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration
in this case is the principle that,
in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited
territory. In Isip v. People,18 this
Court explained:
The place where the crime was
committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.
It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been
committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should
have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information.
And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take
cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a criminal case, the
prosecution must not only prove
that the offense was committed,
it must also prove the identity of
the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within
the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this
Court dismissed a Complaint for
estafa, wherein the prosecution
failed to prove that the essential
elements of the offense took
place within the trial courts
jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find
nothing in the direct or cross-
examination of Yu to establish
that he gave any money to
Fukuzume or transacted
business with him with respect
to the subject aluminum scrap
wires inside or within the
premises of the Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in
criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal
information against Fukuzume
was filed with and tried by the
RTC of Makati. He was charged
with estafa as defined under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of which are as
follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the
Information as having been
committed in Makati. However,
aside from the sworn statement
executed by Yu on April 19,
1994, the prosecution presented
no other evidence, testimonial
or documentary, to corroborate
Yu's sworn statement or to
prove that any of the above-
enumerated elements of the
offense charged was committed
in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish
that any of the subsequent
payments made by Yu in the
amounts of P50,000.00 on July
12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July
22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and
P170,000.00 on October 18,
1991 was given in Makati.
Neither was there proof to show
that the certifications purporting
to prove that NAPOCOR has in
its custody the subject
aluminum scrap wires and that
Fukuzume is authorized by
Furukawa to sell the same were
given by Fukuzume to Yu in
Makati. On the contrary, the
testimony of Yu established that
all the elements of the offense
charged had been committed in
Paraaque, to wit: that on July
12, 1991, Yu went to the house
of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that
with the intention of selling the
subject aluminum scrap wires,
the latter pretended that he is a
representative of Furukawa who
is authorized to sell the said
scrap wires; that based on the
false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject
aluminum scrap wires; that Yu
paid Fukuzume the initial
amount of P50,000.00; that as a
result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of
estafa, as defined and penalized
under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
was consummated when Yu and
Fukuzume met at the latter's
house in Paraaque and, by
falsely pretending to sell
aluminum scrap wires,
Fukuzume was able to induce
Yu to part with his money.
From the foregoing, it is evident
that the prosecution failed to
prove that Fukuzume committed
the crime of estafa in Makati or
that any of the essential
ingredients of the offense took
place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court
convicting Fukuzume of the
crime of estafa should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction,
without prejudice, however, to
the filing of appropriate charges
with the court of competent
jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the prosecution
failed to show that the offense of
estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of
the RPC was committed within
the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City.
That the offense was committed
in Makati City was alleged in
the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of
December, 1999, in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the
amount of P150,000.00 x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)20
Ordinarily, this statement would
have been sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of
Makati. However, the Affidavit
of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the
offense was committed. It
provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999,
[Elizabeth] personally entrusted
to ATTY. HECTOR TREAS
the sum of P150,000.00 to be
expended as agreed and ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS issued to
me a receipt, a photo copy of
which is hereto attached as
Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several
follow-ups with ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS, the latter
failed to transfer the title of
aforesaid property to MRS.
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He
also failed to pay the capital
gains tax, documentary stamps
and BIR-related expenses. What
ATTY. HECTOR TREAS
accomplished was only the
preparation of the Deed of Sale
covering aforesaid property. A
copy of said Deed of Sale is
hereto attached as Annex "C",
6. THAT in view of my
persistent follow-ups, ATTY.
HECTOR TREAS issued to
me a check for refund of the sum
given to him less the attorneys
fee of P20,000.00 and the sum
of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to
BIR or in the net sum of
P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was
deposited at EQUITABLE PCI
BANK dela Rosa-Rada Branch
at Makati City, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason: ACCOUNT
CLOSED. x x x21
Aside from the lone allegation
in the Information, no other
evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the
offense or any of its elements
was committed in Makati City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of
the RPC, the elements of estafa
are as follows: (1) that money,
goods or other personal property
is received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any
other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to
return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by
the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) there is demand
by the offended party to the
offender.22
There is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered
by the prosecution23 that points
to where the offense, or any of
its elements, was committed. A
review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there
was no mention of the place
where the offense was allegedly
committed:
Q After the manager of
Maybank referred Atty. Treas
to you, what happened next?
A We have met and he
explained to the expenses and
what we will have to and she
will work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount
when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted
to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of
this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of
this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is
for his Attorneys fee, NINETY
THOUSAND is for the capital
gain tax TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND is intended for
documentary sum (sic) and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS is for
other expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt
issued by Atty. Treas for this
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able
to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a
document, madam witness,
already identified during the
pre-trial as exhibit "B". This
appears to be a receipt dated
December 22, 1999. Will you
please go over this document
and inform this court what
relation has this to the receipt
which you said Atty. Treas
issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by
Atty. Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND was given to Atty.
Treas by you, what happened
next?
A We made several follow-ups
but he failed to do his job.24
Although the prosecution
alleged that the check issued by
petitioner was dishonored in a
bank in Makati, such dishonor is
not an element of the offense of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1
(b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone
allegation in the information,
there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which
even mentions that any of the
elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule is
settled that an objection may be
raised based on the ground that
the court lacks jurisdiction over
the offense charged, or it may be
considered motu proprio by the
court at any stage of the
proceedings or on
appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or
otherwise. That jurisdiction is
conferred
by the sovereign authority that
organized the court and is given
only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law.26
It has been consistently held by
this Court that it is unfair to
require a defendant or accused
to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense or it is not the
court of proper venue.27 Section
15 (a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure of 2000 provides that
"[s]ubject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory
where the offense was
committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred."
This fundamental principle is to
ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and
appear in, a different court from
that of the province where the
crime was committed as it
would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in
another place.28 This principle
echoes more strongly in this
case, where, due to distance
constraints, coupled with his
advanced age and failing health,
petitioner was unable to present
his defense in the charges
against him.
There being no showing that the
offense was committed within
Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.29
As such, there is no more need
to discuss the other issue raised
by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees
it fit to note that the Code of
Professional Responsibility
strongly militates against the
petitioners conduct in handling
the funds of his client. Rules
16.01 and 16.02 of the Code
provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall
account for all money or
property collected or received
for or from the client.1wphi1
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall
keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own
and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or
receives money from his client
for a particular purpose (such as
for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly
account to the client how the
money was spent.30 If he does
not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the
client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to return
the money (if the intended
purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant
disregard of Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility.31
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty
to deliver his client's funds or
properties as they fall due or
upon demand.32 His failure to
return the client's money upon
demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in
him by the client.33 It is a gross
violation of general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it
impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves
punishment.34
In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this
Court ruled that the issuance of
checks which were later
dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed
on him, shows lack of personal
honesty and good moral
character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence,
and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against
petitioner. In any case, should
there be a finding that petitioner
has failed to account for the
funds received by him in trust,
the recommendation should
include an order to immediately
return the amount of 130,000
to his client, with the
appropriate rate of interest from
the time of demand until full
payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated
9 July 2010 and the Resolution
dated 4 January 2011 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32177 are SET
ASIDE on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch
137, Makati City. Criminal Case
No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED
without prejudice. This case is
REFERRED to the IBP Board
of Governors for investigation
and recommendation pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court.
o Lopez v. Cityludge, G.R. No.
L-25795, 29 October 1966
ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ,
AURORA MEJIA
VILLASOR, ROY P.
VILLASOR,
vs.THE CITY JUDGE,
CESAR L. PARAS,
TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN,
and TERRA
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
In the month of February 1964,
petitioners Roy P. Villasor, as
administrator of the intestate
estate of the spouses Manuel M.
Mejia and Gloria Lazatin
(Special Proceedings No. 48181
of the Court of First Instance of
Manila), together with his co-
petitioners Angelina Mejia
Lopez and Aurora Mejia
Villasor and other heirs of said
spouses, entered into a contract
with respondent Trinidad T.
Lazatin for the development and
subdivision of three parcels of
land belonging to said intestate
estate. Subsequently Lazatin
transferred his rights under the
contract to the Terra
Development Corporation.
Months later, petitioners and
other co-heirs filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-
8344) for the rescission of said
contract for alleged gross and
willful violation of its terms.
Thereafter, Lazatin and the
Terra Development
Corporation, in turn, filed with
the Fiscal's Office of the City of
Angeles a complaint against
petitioners for an alleged
violation of the provisions of
Article 172 in relation to those
of Article 171, paragraph 4, of
the Revised Penal Code. After
conducting a preliminary
examination in connection
therewith, the City Fiscal of
Angeles filed with the Court of
said City an information
charging petitioners with the
crime of falsification of a private
document upon the allegation
that they made it appear in the
contract mentioned heretofore
that Aurora M. Villasor was the
"guardian" of the minor George
L. Mejia and that Angelina M.
Lopez was similarly the
"guardian" of the minor
Alexander L. Mejia, when in
truth and in fact they knew that
they were not the guardians of
said minors on the date of the
execution of the document
(Criminal Case No. C-2268).
Upon petition of the parties thus
charged, the City Fiscal of
Angeles reinvestigated the case
on March 7, 1965 to give them
an opportunity to present
exculpatory evidence, and after
the conclusion of the
reinvestigation the parties
charged moved for the dismissal
of the case mainly on the ground
that the City Court of Angeles
had no jurisdiction over the
offense because the private
document that contained the
alleged false statement of fact
was signed by them outside the
territorial limits of said city. As
the resolution of this motion to
dismiss was delayed and in the
meantime the City Court had set
Criminal Case No. C-2268 for
arraignment, the defendants
secured from said court several
postponements of the
arraignment.
Finally, in view of the City
Fiscal's continued failure to act
on the motion to dismiss the
case, petitioners filed on
November 26, 1965 with the
City Court a motion to quash
upon the ground that said court
had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. The
complainants in the case with
the conformity of the City Fiscal
filed an opposition thereto,
and on February 3, 1966 the
respondent judge denied said
motion to quash and reset the
arraignment of all the
defendants on March 5 of the
same year. In view thereof,
petitioners filed the present
action for certiorari and
prohibition.
Upon the foregoing facts the
only question to be resolved is
whether or not the City Court of
Angeles City has jurisdiction to
try and decide Criminal Case
No. C-2268 for alleged
falsification of a private
document by the parties named
in the information.
It is clear that petitioners are not
charged with having used a
falsified document, in violation
of the last paragraph of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code.
The charge against them is that
of having falsified a private
document by knowingly and
willfully stating therein that
Aurora M. Villasor and
Angelina M. Lopez were the
"guardians" of their minor
brothers George and Alexander,
respectively, when in fact they
knew that, at the time they made
such written statement, it was
Carolina M. de Castro who was
the judicial guardian of said
minors.
It is settled law in criminal
actions that the place where the
criminal offense was committed
not only determines the venue of
the action but is an essential
element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs.
Pagdayuman 5 Phil. 265). Thus,
under the provisions of Section
86 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
municipal courts have original
jurisdiction only over criminal
offenses committed within their
respective territorial
jurisdiction.
In the present case, it is the
claim of petitioners a claim
supported by the record that
Angelina M. Lopez and Aurora
M. Villasor signed the private
document wherein they are
alleged to have made a false
statement of fact, the first within
the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati, and the second within
the territorial jurisdiction of
Quezon City, both within the
province of Rizal.
We now come to consider the
question of when and where is
the offense of falsification of a
private document deemed
consummated or committed.
Upon this point, We have ruled
clearly and definitely in U.S. vs.
Infante, 36 Phil. 146, that the
crime of falsification of a private
document defined and penalized
by Article 304 of the Penal Code
(now paragraph 2, Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) is
consummated when such
document is actually falsified
with the intent to prejudice a
third person, whether such
falsified document is or is not
thereafter put to the illegal use
for which it was intended.
Again in U.S. vs. Barretto, 36
Phil. p. 207, We said:
. . . The contention of counsel
would seem to be that the
information was defective, in
that it fails to set forth expressly
the place where improper and
illegal use was made of the
falsified document, an
allegation which counsel for
appellant insists was absolutely
essential for the proper
determination of the court
clothed with jurisdiction over
the alleged offense. But under
the definition of the crime of
falsification of a private
document as set forth in Article
304 of the Penal Code, the
offense is consummated at the
time when and at the place
where the document is falsified
to the prejudice of or with the
intent to prejudice a third
person, and this whether the
falsified document is or is not
put to the improper or illegal use
for which it was intended. It is
evident, therefore, that the place
where the crime is committed is
the place where the document is
actually falsified, and that the
improper or illegal use of the
document thereafter is in no
wise a material or essential
element of the crime of
falsification of a private
document; . . . .
Applying the above ruling to the
facts before Us, it would appear
that if the private document
subject of the information was
falsified by the persons therein
charged, the act of falsification
the signing of the document
and the coetaneous intent to
cause damage was
committed and consummated
outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of
Angeles, and that whether the
falsified private document was
thereafter put or not put to the
illegal use for which it was
intended, or was signed by the
other contracting party within
the territorial jurisdiction of the
City of Angeles is in no wise a
material or essential element of
the crime of falsification of the
private document, nor could it in
any way change the fact that the
act of falsification charged was
committed outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City.
Thus, that the City Court of
Angeles has, no jurisdiction
over the offense charged is
beyond question.
Respondents, however, contend
that the motion to quash filed by
the defendants necessarily
assumes the truth of the
allegation of the information to
the effect that the offense was
committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City and
that they may not be allowed to
disprove this at this early stage
of the proceedings. This is not
exactly the law on the matter at
present. It was the law
applicable to a demurrer
now obsolete to an
information. The motion to
quash now provided for in Rule
117 of the Rules of Court is
manifestly broader in scope than
the demurrer, as it is not limited
to defects apparent upon the face
of the complaint or information
but extends to issues arising out
of extraneous facts, as shown by
the circumstance that, among
the grounds for a motion to
quash, Section 2 of said Rule
provides for former jeopardy or
acquittal, extinction of criminal
action or liability, insanity of the
accused etc., which necessarily
involve questions of fact in the
determination of which a
preliminary trial is required.
In the present case, the portion
of the record of the
reinvestigation which was
submitted to the respondent
judge for consideration in
connection with the resolution
of the motion to quash filed by
the defendants shows beyond
question that the offense
charged was committed far
beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of Angeles City.
On the propriety of the writs
prayed for, it may be said that,
as a general rule, a court of
equity will not issue a writ of
certiorari to annul an order of a
lower court denying a motion to
quash, nor issue a writ of
prohibition to prevent said court
from proceeding with the case
after such denial, it being the
rule that upon such denial the
defendant should enter his plea
of not guilty and go to trial and,
if convicted, raise on appeal the
same legal questions covered by
his motion to quash. In this as
well as in other jurisdictions
however, this is no longer the
hard and fast rule.
The writs of certiorari and
prohibition, as extra-ordinary
legal remedies, are, in the
ultimate analysis, intended to
annul void proceedings; to
prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal
authority and to provide for a
fair and orderly administration
of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong Eng
vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, We
took cognizance of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition
although the accused in the case
could have appealed in due time
from the order complained of,
our action in the premises being
based on the public welfare and
the advancement of public
policy. In Dimayuga vs.
Fajardo, 43 Phil. 304, We also
admitted a petition to restrain
the prosecution of certain
chiropractors although, if
convicted, they could have
appealed. We gave due course to
their petition for the orderly
administration of justice and to
avoid possible oppression by the
strong arm of the law. And
in Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63
Phil. 627, the petition for
certiorari challenging the trial
court's action admitting an
amended information was
sustained despite the availability
of appeal at the proper time.
More recently, We said the
following in Yap vs. the Hon. D.
Lutero, etc., G.R. No. L-12669,
April 30, 1959:
Manifestly, the denial, by
respondent herein, of the motion
to quash the information in case
No. 16443, may not be
characterized as "arbitrary" or
"despotic", or to be regarded as
amounting to "lack of
jurisdiction". The proper
procedure, in the event of denial
of a motion to quash, is for the
accused, upon arraignment, to
plead not guilty and reiterate his
defense of former jeopardy, and,
in case of conviction, to appeal
therefrom, upon the ground that
he has been twice put in
jeopardy of punishment, either
for the same offense, or for the
same act, as the case may be.
However, were we to require
adherence to this pretense, the
case at bar would have to be
dismissed and petitioner
required to go through the
inconvenience, not to say the
mental agony and torture, of
submitting himself to trial on the
merits in case No. 16443, apart
from the expenses incidental
thereto, despite the fact that his
trial and conviction therein
would violate one of his
constitutional rights, and that,
on appeal to this Court, we
would, therefore, have to set
aside the judgment of conviction
of the lower court. This would,
obviously, be most unfair and
unjust. Under the circumstances
obtaining in the present case, the
flaw in the procedure followed
by petitioner herein may be
overlooked, in the interest of a
more enlightened and
substantial justice.
Indeed, the lack of jurisdiction
of the City Court of Angeles
over the criminal offense
charged being patent, it would
be highly unfair to compel the
parties charged to undergo trial
in said court and suffer all the
embarrassment and mental
anguish that go with it.
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring that
the offense charged in the
information filed in Criminal
Case No. C-2268 of the City
Court of Angeles City is not
within the jurisdiction of said
court and that, therefore, said
court is hereby restrained and
prohibited from further
proceedings therein. Costs
against the private respondents.
. llusorio v. Bildner, G.R. No.
173935-38, 23 December 2008
ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs. MA. ERLINDA I.
BILDNER, LILY F.
RAQUEO, SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, MA. CRISTINA
A. ILUSORIO, AND
AURORA I.
MONTEMAYOR
Respondents Ma. Erlinda
Bildner and Lily Raqueo were
charged by Erlinda K. Ilusorio
(petitioner) before the
Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Pasig City with
perjury arising from their filing,
on behalf of Lakeridge
Development Corp.(LDC), of a
petition in the Makati City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
issuance of new owners
duplicate copy of Certificate of
Condominium Title (CCT) No.
21578 covering a condominium
unit in Makati. The Information
reads:
On or about November 4, 1999,
in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, conspiring
and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one
another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and
falsely subscribe and swear to
a Petition for Issuance of a
New Owners Duplicate Copy
of Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21578 before
Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, a
notary public in and for Pasig
City, duly appointed, qualified
and acting as such, and in which
Petition said accused subscribed
and swore to, among other
things, facts known to them to
be untrue, that is: That the
Petitioners claim that the title
was lost, which fact was
material matter and required by
law to be stated in said Petition,
when in truth and in fact as the
said accused very well knew at
the time they swore to and
signed the said petition for
Issuance of a New Owners
Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578, that said
statement appearing in
paragraph 4 of said Petition:
"4. Pending registration of the
mortgage document with the
Registry of Deeds of Makati
City, the petitioners had their
respective offices, renovated
and by reason thereof,
documents were moved from
their usual places and thereafter,
sometime in the early part of the
second quarter of this year,
when petitioners were ready to
have the mortgage documents
registered, the said owners
duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 could no longer be
located at the places where
they may and should likely be
found despite earnest and
diligent efforts of all the
petitioners to locate the same;"
was false and untrue because the
said title was in the possession
of the complainant, Erlinda K.
Ilusorio, and the above false
statement was made in order
to obtain a New Owners
Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578, to the damage
and prejudice of complainant
Erlinda K. Ilusorio.
Contrary to law.1 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Three similarly worded
Informations for perjury were
also filed against
respondents Sylvia Ilusorio, Ma
. Cristina Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor also before
the Pasig City MeTC arising
from their filing of three
petitions, also on behalf of LDC,
before the Tagaytay City
RTC for issuance of new
owners duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 17010,2 170113 and
170124 covering properties
located in Tagaytay City.
As the purported corporate
officers of LDC, respondents
filed the above-mentioned
petitions for issuance of new
owners duplicate copies of
titles over properties located in
Makati City and Tagaytay City
after the owners copies thereof
could no longer be found
"despite earnest and diligent
efforts" to locate the same.
Petitioner, alleging that she,
as bona fide chairman and
president of LDC,5 has in her
possession those titles, filed her
opposition to respondents
petitions.6 Respondents
forthwith amended their
respective petitions,7 the
amendments reading, according
to petitioner, as follows:
4. On November 4, 1999, in the
belief that the aforesaid owners
duplicate copy of CCT No.
21578 had been lost and can no
longer be recovered, the
petitioners filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati
City a petition for the
cancellation and issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of
CCT No. 21578 in lieu of the
lost copy;
5. However, after the
jurisdictional facts and evidence
had been presented before the
said court, the above-named
respondents, through their
counsel, filed their opposition to
the petition on the ground that
the said owners duplicate copy
of Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 allegedly is not
lost and is actually in their
possession and, thereafter, in a
subsequent hearing held on
February 10, 2000, said
respondents, through counsel,
presented before this
Honorable Court the
duplicate copy of said CCT
No. 21578;
6. The owners duplicate copy
of CCT No. 21578, pursuant to
law, should be in the actual
possession of the registered
owner thereof and it is
indubitable that LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION is the
registered owner entitled to the
possession and control of the
evidence of ownership of all
corporate properties;
7. The respondents have no
authority nor legal basis to take
and continue to have possession
of said CCT No. 21578, not one
of them being a corporate officer
of LAKERIDGE
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, the
registered owner of said
property;
. The respondents, in the
absence of any authority or right
to take possession of CCT No.
21578, should be ordered by this
Honorable Court to surrender
the owners duplicate copy
thereof, which they continue to
hold without legal and/or
justifiable reasons, not only for
the purpose of causing the
registration of the mortgage
thereof in favor of the
mortgagee/petitioner, Ma.
Erlinda I. Bildner, but also for
the reason that it is the
corporation, as owner of the
property, who [sic] is entitled to
possession and control and
therefore, said CCT must,
pursuant to law, be kept at the
corporations principal place of
business.
(Underscoring in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Using as bases the contents of
the original petitions filed in the
Makati and Tagaytay
8
RTCs, petitioner filed charges
of falsification of public
documents and perjury against
respondents before the Pasig
City Prosecutors Office.9
By Resolution of April 6, 2000,
Investigating Prosecutor
Edgardo Bautista, with the
imprimatur of the City
Prosecutor, dismissed the
falsification charges but found
probable cause to indict
respondents for perjury.10 Four
informations for perjury were
accordingly filed before
the MeTC Pasig, one against
respondents Ma. Erlinda I.
Bildner and Lily F. Raquero;
another against respondents
Sylvia K. Ilusorio, Maria
Cristina A. Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor; still another
against respondents Sylvia K.
Ilusorio, Maria Cristina A.
Ilusorio and Aurora
Montemayor; and the last
against respondents Sylvia K.
Ilusorio, Maria Cristina Ilusorio
and Aurora Montemayor,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
121496, 121497, 121498 and
121499, respectively.
After the consolidation of the
Informations, respondents
moved for their quashal on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction
due to improper venue, lack of
bases of the charges as
the original petitions had
already been withdrawn, and
privileged character of the
pleadings.11
Branch 72 of the Pasig City
MeTC, by Order12 of June 13,
2001, ruled that venue was
properly laid, viz:
To determine the correct venue
(territorial jurisdiction)[,] the
vital point is the allegations [sic]
in the complaint or information
of the situs of the offense
charged. If the complaint or
information alleges that the
crime was committed in the
place where the court has
jurisdiction, then that court has
jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case. (Colmenares vs. Villar,
33 SCRA 186). In other words,
what is important is the
allegation in the complaint that
the crime was committed in the
place which is within the courts
jurisdiction (Mediante vs. Ortiz,
19 SCRA 832).
In the instant cases, the
information [sic] allege that the
offenses were committed in
Pasig City. Hence, pursuant to
the aforecited doctrinal rulings,
this court has the venue or
territorial jurisdiction over these
cases. (Underscoring supplied)
Nonetheless, finding that
respondents petitions are
privileged, the MeTC,
citing Flordelis v. Judge
Himalalaon13 and People v.
Aquino, et al.,14 granted the
Motions to Quash, viz:
However, the Court finds the
third ground[-privileged
character of the pleadings]
meritorious. In the case of
Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, (84
SCRA 477) which is also a
prosecution for Perjury, the
Supreme Court held:
Moreover, it is likewise clear
that any statement contained in
an appropriate pleading filed in
court that is relevant to the
issues in the case to which it
relates is absolutely priveleged
[sic] and it is the law that the
same may not be made the
subject of a criminal
prosecution. (People vs.
Aquino, 18 SCRA 555.)"
Similarly, the alleged perjurious
statements in the instant cases
are contained in a Petition filed
before the Regional Trial Courts
of Makati and Tagaytay Cities
which are relevant to the case
the same being for the issuance
of a new owners duplicate copy
of a certificate of title alleged to
be lost.
As the facts charged herein do
not constitute an offense and/or
the information contains
averments which, if true, would
nonetheless constitute a legal
excuse or jurisdiction [sic],
quashal of the Information[s] is
thus in order.
(Underscoring in the original;
emphasis supplied)
Reconsideration of the quashal
of the Informations having been
denied,15 petitioner appealed to
the Pasig City RTC Branch 263
of which, by Decision16 of
January 25, 2006, affirmed the
ruling of the MeTC. After the
denial of her motion for
reconsideration,17 petitioner
filed with this Court the present
petition for review
on certiorari,18 contending that:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED
IN RELYING ON THE CASES
OF FLORDELI[S] VS.
HIMALALOAN (84 SCRA
477) AND PEOPLE VS.
AQUINO (18 SCRA 555) [IN
HOLDING] THAT
STATEMENTS MADE IN
PLEADINGS, EVEN IF
PERJURIOUS OR FALSE,
ARE ABSOLUTELY
PRIVILEGED AND NOT
SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION.
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner is of the view
that People v. Aquino19 cited by
the RTC does not apply in the
present controversy as that case
involved a libel case and "there
is no authority which states that
the rules on absolute privileged
statements in pleadings apply to
both crimes of perjury and
libel."20
Neither, petitioner posits, does
the also cited case of Flordelis
v. Himalaloan21 apply wherein
the Court sustained the quashal
of the therein information for
perjury as the answer to the
complaint containing the
alleged false allegations did not
have to be under oath.
In their Comment, respondents
initially burrow into the
petitions alleged procedural
crack by underscoring the
apparent disregard by petitioner
of the established policy of
judicial hierarchy of courts,
pointing out that the petition
should have been first filed with
the Court of Appeals.22
On the merits, respondents
reiterate, in the main, the
congruent rulings of the MeTC
and RTC that allegations made
by the parties or their counsel in
a pleading are privileged in
nature. Moreover, they contend
that since they had amended the
original petitions, there were no
more bases for the charges of
perjury."23
A word first on the procedural
question raised by respondents.
The present petition is one for
review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, not a
special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
(APPEAL FROM THE
REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS), Section 2(c)
provides that in all cases where
only questions of law are raised,
the appeal "shall be to the
Supreme Court by petition for
review in accordance with Rule
45."24 Indubitably, the issue
tendered in this case is
a question of law, hence, there is
no violation of the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
On the merits, the Court denies
the petition on the ground that,
contrary to the lower courts
ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly
laid in Pasig.
The allegations in each of the
Informations indicate Pasig as
the situs of the offense charged
where respondents petitions
were notarized. Albeit the
Informations referred to
the "subscribed and sworn"
petitions of respondents as bases
of the charges, there is no
mention therein that those
petitions were filed in Makati
City and Tagaytay City. The
Complaint-Affidavits,25 which
initiated the criminal actions,
reflect such jurisdictional
details. Consider this allegation:
6. On November 4, 1999, MA.
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
LILY F. RAQUENO allegedly
representing
LAKERIDGE filed a verified
Petition for Issuance of a New
Owners Duplicate Copy of
Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21578 before the
Regional Trial Court
of Makati City x x x x,
(Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
as well as this:
06. On November 10, 1999,
AURORA I. MONTEMAYOR,
SYLVIA ILUSORIO, and MA.
CRISTINA A. ILUSORIO
allegedly representing
LAKERIDGE filed three (3)
verified Petitions for Issuance
of a New Owners Duplicate
Copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 17010, 17011 and
17012 before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch
18, Tagaytay City x x x x.
(Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
The allegation in each of the
four similarly-worded
Informations that perjury was
committed in Pasig is neither
controlling nor sufficient to
show that the Pasig MeTC has
jurisdiction over them. The
purported perjurious petition
quoted in each of the
Informations in fact indicates
that, with respect to the CCT of
the Registry of Deeds of Makati
the TCTs of the Registry of
Deeds of Tagaytay, venue of the
criminal action arising
therefrom is in Makati and
Tagaytay, respectively.
Perjury is committed as follows:
Article 183, Revised Penal
Code.
False Testimony in other cases
and perjury in solemn
affirmations. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person
who, knowingly making
untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions
of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make
an affidavit, upon any material
matter before a competent
person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law
so requires.
x x x x26 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
There are thus four elements to
be taken into account "in
determining whether there is
a prima facie case" of
perjury, viz:
(a) that the accused made a
statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a
material matter; (b) that the
statement or affidavit was made
before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and
administer oath; (c) that in the
statement or affidavit, the
accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a
falsehood; and (d) that the
sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is required
by law or made for a legal
purpose.27(Citation omitted)
It is the deliberate making of
untruthful statements upon any
material matter, however,
before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath
in cases in which the law so
requires,28 which is imperative
in perjury29
Venue, in criminal cases, being
jurisdictional,30 the action for
perjury must be instituted and
tried in the municipality or
territory where the deliberate
making of an untruthful
statement upon any matter was
made, in this case, in Makati and
Tagaytay.31
It was in Makati and Tagaytay
where the intent to assert an
alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement finds
relevance or materiality in
deciding the issue of whether
new owners duplicate copies of
the CCT and TCTs may issue.
Whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four
petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the
gist of the offense of perjury
being the intentional giving of
false statement. So United
States v. Caet 32teaches, viz:
It is immaterial where the
affidavit was subscribed and
sworn, so long as it appears from
the information that the
defendant, by means of such
affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The
gist of the offense charged is not
the making of the affidavit in
Manila, but the intentional
giving of false evidence in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province by means of such
affidavit.33 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
While the Court finds that,
contrary to the MeTC and RTC
ruling, venue of the
Informations was improperly
laid, and on that score the Court
denies the present petition as
priorly stated, it is confronting
the sole issue raised by
petitioner whether the
questioned petitions of
respondents are, as the MeTC
held and which the RTC
affirmed, absolutely privileged
on the basis of Flordelis and
Aquino.
The issue had already been
addressed by the Court in Choa
v. People,34 in this wise:
Sison and Aquino both involve
libel cases. In Sison, this Court
categorically stressed that the
term "absolute privilege" (or
"qualified privilege") has an
"established technical
meaning, in connection
with civil actions for libel and
slander." x x x x.
The Flordelis case is likewise
not in point.
There, Flordelis was charged
with perjury for having alleged
false statements in his
verified answer. This Court held
that no perjury could be
committed by Flordelis because
"an answer to a complaint in an
ordinary civil action need not be
under oath," thus, "it is at once
apparent that one element of the
crime of perjury is absent x x x,
namely, that the sworn
statement complained of must
be required by law." 35 (Italics in
the original; underscoring
supplied)
Verily, both the MeTC and the
RTC misappreciated this
Courts rulings
in Flordelis and Aquino as
respondents petitions-bases of
the subject Informations for
perjury are required by law to be
under oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is,
on the ground that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig has no jurisdiction over
the Informations for perjury
against respondents, DENIED.
. lJnion Bank v. People, G.R.
No. L92565,28 February 2012
UNION BANK OF THE,
PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.PEOPLE
We review in this Rule 45
petition, the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch
65, Makati City (RTC-Makati
City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038.
The petition seeks to reverse and
set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari of petitioners
Union Bank of the Philippines
(Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners).
The RTC found that the
Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 63, Makati City (MeTC-
Makati City) did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to quash the
information for perjury filed by
Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for
perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for
making a false narration in a
Certificate against Forum
Shopping. The Information
against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of
March 2000 in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a
material matter before a
competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused
stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affid
avit of merit of a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,]
Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from
petitioner Union Banks two (2)
complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin
against the spouses Eddie and
Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe. The first complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-
0717, was filed before the RTC,
Branch 109, Pasay City on April
13, 1998. The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-
000, was filed on March 15,
2000 and raffled to the MeTC,
Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the
Certification against Forum
Shopping. Accordingly, she was
charged of deliberately violating
Article 183 of the RPC by
falsely declaring under oath in
the Certificate against Forum
Shopping in the second
complaint that she did not
commence any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issue in another tribunal or
agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to
Quash,3 citing two grounds.
First, she argued that the venue
was improperly laid since it is
the Pasay City court (where the
Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC-Makati
City (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was
subscribed) that has jurisdiction
over the perjury case. Second,
she argued that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense
because: (a) the third element of
perjury the willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood
was not alleged with
particularity without specifying
what the other action or
proceeding commenced
involving the same issues in
another tribunal or agency; (b)
there was no other action or
proceeding pending in another
court when the second
complaint was filed; and (c) she
was charged with perjury by
giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information
make out perjury by making a
false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied
the Motion to Quash, ruling that
it has jurisdiction over the case
since the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized
in Makati City.4 The MeTC-
Makati City also ruled that the
allegations in the Information
sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati
City subsequently denied
Tomas motion for
reconsideration. 6
The petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC-
Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City
orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their
petition on the rulings in United
States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v.
Bildner8 which ruled that venue
and jurisdiction should be in the
place where the false document
was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for
certiorari, the RTC-Makati City
held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners
stance is concerned[,] the more
recent case of [Sy Tiong Shiou
v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 &
179438, March 30, 2009)
however, reaffirms what has
been the long standing view on
the venue with respect to perjury
cases. In this particular case[,]
the high court reiterated the rule
that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory
where the offense was
committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. It
went on to declare that since the
subject document[,] the
execution of which was the
subject of the charge[,] was
subscribed and sworn to in
Manila[,] then the court of the
said territorial jurisdiction was
the proper venue of the criminal
action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of
jurisprudence on the matter, it is
not amiss to state that the city
court of Makati City has
jurisdiction to try and decide the
case for perjury inasmuch as the
gist of the complaint itself
which constitute[s] the charge
against the petitioner dwells
solely on the act of subscribing
to a false certification. On the
other hand, the charge against
the accused in the case of
Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based
on the complaint-affidavits
therein[,] was not simply the
execution of the questioned
documents but rather the
introduction of the false
evidence through the subject
documents before the court of
Makati City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that
the MeTC-Makati City did not
commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order
denying the Motion to Quash
was based on jurisprudence later
than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati
City also observed that the facts
in Ilusorio are different from the
facts of the present case. Lastly,
the RTC-Makati City ruled that
the Rule 65 petition was
improper since the petitioners
can later appeal the decision in
the principal case. The RTC-
Makati City subsequently
denied the petitioners motion
for reconsideration.10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we
reverse the RTC-Makati City
decision and quash the
Information for perjury against
Tomas. The petitioners contend
that the Ilusorio ruling is more
applicable to the present facts
than our ruling in Sy Tiong
Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio
showed that the filing of the
petitions in court containing the
false statements was the
essential ingredient that
consummated the perjury. In Sy
Tiong, the perjurious statements
were made in a General
Information Sheet (GIS) that
was submitted to the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared
the petitioners view. In his
Manifestation and Motion in
lieu of Comment (which we
hereby treat as the Comment to
the petition), the Solicitor
General also relied on Ilusorio
and opined that the lis mota in
the crime of perjury is the
deliberate or intentional giving
of false evidence in the court
where the evidence is material.
The Solicitor General observed
that the criminal intent to assert
a falsehood under oath only
became manifest before the
MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue
of what the proper venue of
perjury under Article 183 of the
RPC should be Makati City,
where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized,
or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to
the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition and hold
that the MeTC-Makati City is
the proper venue and the proper
court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the
petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal
Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place
where the criminal action is to
be instituted, but also the court
that has the jurisdiction to try
and hear the case. The reason for
this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is
limited to well-defined
territories such that a trial court
can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed
within its territorial
jurisdiction.12 Second, laying
the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and
justice of having an accused on
trial in the municipality of
province where witnesses and
other facilities for his defense
are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding
of improper venue in criminal
cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining
the venue where the criminal
action is to be instituted and the
court which has jurisdiction
over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the
criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court
or municipality or
territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.
[emphasis ours]
The above provision should be
read in light of Section 10, Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure which
states:
Place of commission of the
offense. The complaint or
information is sufficient if it can
be understood from its
allegations that the offense was
committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at
some place within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was
committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense
charged or is necessary for its
identification.
Both provisions categorically
place the venue and jurisdiction
over criminal cases not only in
the court where the offense was
committed, but also where any
of its essential ingredients took
place. In other words, the venue
of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged
where the Information states
that the offense was committed
or some of its essential
ingredients occurred at a place
within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The
Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by
a statement under oath in the
complaint or initiatory pleading
asserting a claim or relief; it may
also be in a sworn certification
annexed to the complaint or
initiatory pleading. In both
instances, the affiant is required
to execute a statement under
oath before a duly
commissioned notary public or
any competent person
authorized to administer oath
that: (a) he or she has not
theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his or
her knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if
he or she should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is
pending, he or she shall report
that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein
his or her aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been
filed. In relation to the crime of
perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum
Shopping is the truth of the
required declarations which is
designed to guard against
litigants pursuing simultaneous
remedies in different fora.14
In this case, Tomas is charged
with the crime of perjury under
Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The
elements of perjury under
Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused
made a statement under
oath or executed an
affidavit upon a Information to have been made
material matter.
(b) That the statement
or affidavit was made
before a competent
officer, authorized to
receive and administer
oath.
(c) That in the statement
or affidavit, the accused
made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn
statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is
required by law or made
for a legal
15
purpose. (emphasis
ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the
court is being assailed in a
criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations
in the complaint and
information must be examined
together with Section 15(a),
Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the
allegations in the Information
sufficiently support a finding
that the crime of perjury was
committed by Tomas within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of
perjury, the execution of the
subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in
the Information to have been
committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the
Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath
before a notary public, were also
sufficiently alleged in the
in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of
March 2000 in the City of
Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a
material matter before a
competent person authorized to
administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused
stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affid
avit x x x.16
We also find that the third
element of willful and deliberate
falsehood was also sufficiently
alleged to have been committed
in Makati City, not Pasay City,
as indicated in the last portion of
the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affid
avit of merit of a complaint for
sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin docketed as
[Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court[,]
Pasay City, that the Union Bank
of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was
false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and
intentional assertion of
falsehood was allegedly shown
when she made the false
declarations in the Certificate
against Forum Shopping before
a notary public in Makati City,
despite her knowledge that the
material statements she
subscribed and swore to were
not true. Thus, Makati City is
the proper venue and MeTC-
Makati City is the proper court
to try the perjury case against
Tomas, pursuant to Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential
elements constituting the crime
of perjury were committed
within the territorial jurisdiction
of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to
the En Banc primarily to address
the seeming conflict between
the division rulings of the Court
in the Ilusorio case that is cited
as basis of this petition, and the
Sy Tiong case that was the basis
of the assailed RTC-Makati City
ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong
Cases
The subject matter of the perjury
charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified
petitions filed with the court for
the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copies of certificates
of title. The verified petitions
containing the false statements
were subscribed and sworn to in
Pasig City, but were filed in
Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which
court (Pasig City, Makati City
and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the
perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the
action were in Makati City and
Tagaytay City, the places where
the verified petitions were filed.
The Court reasoned out that it
was only upon filing that the
intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and
where the alleged untruthful
statement found relevance or
materiality. We cited as
jurisprudential authority the
case of United States. v.
Caet18 which ruled:
It is immaterial where the
affidavit was subscribed and
sworn, so long as it appears from
the information that the
defendant, by means of such
affidavit, "swore to" and
knowingly submitted false
evidence, material to a point at
issue in a judicial proceeding
pending in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo Province. The
gist of the offense charged is not
the making of the affidavit in
Manila, but the intentional
giving of false evidence in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Province by means of such
affidavit. [emphasis and
underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured
statements were made in a GIS
which was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila. We ruled
that the proper venue for the
perjury charges was in Manila
where the GIS was subscribed
and sworn to. We held that the
perjury was consummated in
Manila where the false
statement was made. As
supporting jurisprudence, we
cited the case of Villanueva v.
Secretary of Justice19 that, in
turn, cited an American case
entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We
ruled in Villanueva that
Perjury is an obstruction of
justice; its perpetration well may
affect the dearest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal.
Deliberate material falsification
under oath constitutes the crime
of perjury, and the crime is
complete when a witness'
statement has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A
Background
To have a better appreciation of
the issue facing the Court, a look
at the historical background of
how the crime of perjury
(specifically, Article 183 of the
RPC) evolved in our
jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms
of false testimonies. The first is
false testimony for and against
the defendant in a criminal case
(Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the
second is false testimony in a
civil case (Article 182, RPC);
and the third is false testimony
in other cases (Article 183,
RPC). Based on the Information
filed, the present case involves
the making of an untruthful
statement in an affidavit on a
material matter.
These RPC provisions,
however, are not really the bases
of the rulings cited by the parties
in their respective arguments.
The cited Ilusorio ruling,
although issued by this Court in
2008, harked back to the case of
Caet which was decided in
1915, i.e., before the present
RPC took effect.21 Sy Tiong, on
the other hand, is a 2009 ruling
that cited Villanueva, a 2005
case that in turn cited United
States v. Norris, a 1937
American case. Significantly,
unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is
entirely based on rulings
rendered after the present RPC
took effect.22
The perjurious act in Caet
consisted of an information
charging perjury through the
presentation in court of a motion
accompanied by a false sworn
affidavit. At the time the Caet
ruling was rendered, the
prevailing law on perjury and
the rules on prosecution of
criminal offenses were found in
Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the
Philippine Commission, and in
Subsection 4, Section 6 of
General Order No. 5823 for the
procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having
taken oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in
any case in which a law of the
Philippine Islands authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration,
disposition, or certificate by him
subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or
subscribes any material matter
which he does not believe to be
true, is guilty of perjury, and
shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos
and by imprisonment for not
more than five years; and shall
moreover, thereafter be
incapable of holding any public
office or of giving testimony in
any court of the Philippine
Islands until such time as the
judgment against him is
reversed.
This law was copied, with the
necessary changes, from
Sections 539224 and 539325 of
the Revised Statutes of the
United States.26 Act No. 1697
was intended to make the mere
execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.27
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6
of General Order No. 58
provided that the venue shall be
the court of the place where the
crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by
the Court in Caet, perjury was
committed by the act of
representing a false document in
a judicial proceeding.28 The
venue of action was held by the
Court to be at the place where
the false document was
presented since the presentation
was the act that consummated
the crime.
The annotation of Justices
Aquino and Grio-Aquino in
their textbook on the
RPC29 interestingly explains the
history of the perjury provisions
of the present RPC and traces as
well the linkage between Act
No. 1697 and the present Code.
To quote these authors:30
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318
of the Old Penal Code and art.
154 of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code, while art.
181 was taken from art. 319 of
the old Penal Code and Art. 157
of Del Pans Proposed
Correctional Code. Said arts.
318 and 319, together with art.
321 of the old Penal Code, were
impliedly repealed by Act 1697,
the Perjury Law, passed on
August 23, 1907, which in turn
was expressly repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916,
Act 2657. In view of the express
repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and
321 of the old Penal Code were
deemed revived. However, Act
2718 expressly revived secs. 3
and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art.
367 of the Revised Penal Code
repealed Act Nos. 1697 and
2718.
It should be noted that perjury
under Acts 1697 and 2718
includes false testimony,
whereas, under the Revised
Penal Code, false testimony
includes perjury. Our law on
false testimony is of Spanish
origin, but our law on perjury
(art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act
1697) is derived from American
statutes. The provisions of the
old Penal Code on false
testimony embrace perjury
committed in court or in some
contentious proceeding, while
perjury as defined in Act 1697
includes the making of a false
affidavit. The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on false
testimony "are more severe and
strict than those of Act 1697" on
perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be
appreciated that Article 183 of
the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon
any person, who knowingly
makes untruthful statements and
not being included in the
provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath,
or make an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a
competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires.
[emphasis supplied; emphases
ours]
in fact refers to either of two
punishable acts (1) falsely
testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal
or civil case; and (2) making a
false affidavit before a person
authorized to administer an oath
on any material matter where the
law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong
decided under Article 183 of the
RPC essentially involved
perjured statements made in a
GIS that was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila and
submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the
case involved the making of an
affidavit, not an actual
testimony in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil. From
this perspective, the situs of the
oath, i.e., the place where the
oath was taken, is the place
where the offense was
committed. By implication, the
proper venue would have been
the City of Mandaluyong the
site of the SEC had the charge
involved an actual testimony
made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the
presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by
an affidavit that contained a
falsity. With Section 3 of Act
No. 1697 as basis, the issue
related to the submission of the
affidavit in a judicial
proceeding. This came at a time
when Act No. 1697 was the
perjury law, and made no
distinction between judicial and
other proceedings, and at the
same time separately penalized
the making of false statements
under oath (unlike the present
RPC which separately deals
with false testimony in criminal,
civil and other proceedings,
while at the same time also
penalizing the making of false
affidavits). Understandably, the
venue should be the place where
the submission was made to the
court or the situs of the court; it
could not have been the place
where the affidavit was sworn to
simply because this was not the
offense charged in the
Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the
Caet case as its authority, in a
situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the
issuance of duplicate certificates
of title (that were allegedly lost)
were the cited sworn statements
to support the charge of perjury
for the falsities stated in the
sworn petitions. The Court ruled
that the proper venue should be
the Cities of Makati and
Tagaytay because it was in the
courts of these cities "where the
intent to assert an alleged
falsehood became manifest and
where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or
materiality in deciding the issue
of whether new owners
duplicate copies of the
[Certificate of Condominium
Title] and [Transfer Certificates
of Title] may issue."31 To the
Court, "whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four
petitions were subscribed and
sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the
gist of the offense of perjury
being the intentional giving of
false statement,"32citing Caet
as authority for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may
have partly led to the present
confusion on venue because of
its very categorical tenor in
pointing to the considerations to
be made in the determination of
venue; it leaves the impression
that the place where the oath
was taken is not at all a material
consideration, forgetting that
Article 183 of the RPC clearly
speaks of two situations while
Article 182 of the RPC likewise
applies to false testimony in
civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would
have made perfect sense had the
basis for the charge been Article
182 of the RPC, on the
assumption that the petition
itself constitutes a false
testimony in a civil case. The
Caet ruling would then have
been completely applicable as
the sworn statement is used in a
civil case, although no such
distinction was made under
Caet because the applicable
law at the time (Act No. 1697)
did not make any distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were
to be used, as what in fact
appears in the Ilusorio ruling,
then only that portion of the
article, referring to the making
of an affidavit, would have been
applicable as the other portion
refers to false testimony in other
proceedings which a judicial
petition for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of a
Certificate of Condominium
Title is not because it is a civil
proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of
a false affidavit, what assumes
materiality is the site where the
oath was taken as this is the
place where the oath was made,
in this case, Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue
of criminal cases has been
subject to various changes from
the time General Order No. 58
was replaced by Rules 106 to
122 of the Rules of Court on
July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule
106 of the Rules of Court
provided for the rule on venue of
criminal actions and it expressly
included, as proper venue, the
place where any one of the
essential ingredients of the
crime took place.1wphi1 This
change was followed by the
passage of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985
Rules of Criminal
34
Procedure, and the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which all adopted the
1940 Rules of Criminal
Procedures expanded venue of
criminal actions. Thus, the
venue of criminal cases is not
only in the place where the
offense was committed, but also
where any of its essential
ingredients took place.
In the present case, the
Certification against Forum
Shopping was made integral
parts of two complaints for sum
of money with prayer for a writ
of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B.
Tamondong, who, in turn, filed
a complaint-affidavit against
Tomas for violation of Article
183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed,
the criminal act charged was for
the execution by Tomas of an
affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances,
Article 183 of the RPC is indeed
the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this
article which penalizes one who
"make[s] an affidavit, upon any
material matter before a
competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in
which the law so requires." The
constitutive act of the offense is
the making of an affidavit; thus,
the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a
falsity is subscribed and sworn
before a duly authorized person.
Based on these considerations,
we hold that our ruling in Sy
Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the
guidance of the Bar and the
Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making
of a false affidavit under Article
183 of the RPC is committed at
the time the affiant subscribes
and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the
elements of the crime of perjury
are executed. When the crime is
committed through false
testimony under oath in a
proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the
place where the testimony under
oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding
that is neither criminal nor civil,
a written sworn statement is
submitted, venue may either be
at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where
the oath was taken as the taking
of the oath and the submission
are both material ingredients of
the crime committed. In all
cases, determination of venue
shall be based on the acts
alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime
committed.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, we hereby DENY
the petition for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
o People v. Grospe, G.R. No. L-
74053-54, 20 January 1988
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SAN
MIGUEL
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE,
Presiding Judge, Branch 44,
Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga and MANUEL
PARULAN, respondents.
-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for
certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision of respondent
Presiding Judge of Branch 44,
Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, dismissing Criminal
Case No. 2800 for Violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal Case
No. 2813 for Estafa, for being
"bereft of jurisdiction to pass
judgment on the accused on the
basis of the merits of these
cases."
Respondent-accused, Manuel
Parulan, is an authorized
wholesale dealer of petitioner
San Miguel Corporation (SMC,
for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of
the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, he was charged with
Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for
having issued a check on 13
June 1983 for P86,071.20) in
favor of SMC but which was
dishonored for having been
drawn against 'insufficient funds
and, in spite of repeated
demands, for having failed and
refused to make good said check
to the damage and prejudice of
SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of
the same Court, Respondent-
accused was charged with
Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code for having made out
a check on 18 June 1983 in the
sum of P11,918.80 in favor of
SMC in payment of beer he had
purchased, but which check was
refused payment for
"insufficient funds" and, in spite
of repeated demands, for having
failed and refused to redeem
said check to the damage and
prejudice of SMC.
The two cases were tried jointly,
the witnesses for both
prosecution and defense being
the same for the two suits.
Based on the facts and the
evidence, Respondent Judge
arrived at the following
"Findings and Resolution:"
From the welter of evidence
adduced in these two , this Court
is convinced that the two checks
involved herein were issued and
signed by the accused in
connection with the beer
purchases made by him on
various occasions at the
Guiguinto, sales office of SMC
at Guiguinto, Bulacan and
which checks he handed and
delivered to the sales Supervisor
of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio,
who holds office in that
municipality. The Court finds it
rather difficult to believe the
claim and testimony of the
accused that these checks which
he admittedly signed and which
he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in
blank were filled up without his
knowledge particularly the
amounts appearing therein
which in the case of the check
involved in Criminal Case No.
2800 amounted to P86,071.20,
and, in the case of the check
involved in Criminal Case No.
2813, amounted to Pl1,918.80.
The accused had been engaged
in business for some time
involving amounts that are quite
considerable, and it is hard to
believe that he will agree to this
kind of arrangement which
placed or exposed him to too
much risks and uncertainties.
But even as this Court is
convinced that the accused had
issued these checks to the
representative of SMC on the
occasions testified to in these
cases by the witnesses for the
prosecution which two checks
were subsequently dishonored
due to lack of funds resulting in
damage to SMC, the offended
party herein, this Court, after
considering the totality of the
evidence and the circumstances
that attended the issuance of
these two checks until they were
both dishonored by the drawee
bank, the Planters Development
Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
has come to the conclusion that
it is bereft of jurisdiction to pass
judgment on the accused on the
basis of the merits of these
cases.
which he reasoned out, thus:
Deceit and damage are the two
essential elements that make up
the offenses involving
dishonored checks. And in order
that this Court may have
jurisdiction to try these cases, it
must be established that both or
any one of these elements
composing the offenses charged
must occur or take place within
the area over which this Court
has territorial jurisdiction. Here,
however, it is clear that none of
these elements took place or
occurred within the
jurisdictional area of this Court.
As gleaned from the evidence,
the two checks involved herein
were issued by the accused at
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were
delivered and handed to
Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of
San Miguel Corporation in his
capacity as the representative of
the company holding office in
that municipality where the
transactions of the accused with
SMC took place. It was before
Supervisor Cornelio at
Guiguinto, Bulacan that false
assurances were made by the
accused that the checks issued
by him were good and backed
by sufficient funds in his bank,
the Planters Development Bank,
at Santa Maria, Bulacan, only to
turn out later on that this was not
so.
The other element of damage
pertaining to the offenses
charged in these cases was
inflicted on the offended party,
the SMC, right at the moment
the checks issued by the accused
were dishonored by the Planters
Development Bank, the drawee
bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan
which received them from the
BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga
branch for clearing purposes.
The argument advanced by the
prosecution in its memorandum
filed herein that the two checks
were deposited by SMC at the
BPI, San Fernando, Branch, San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it
maintained its accounts after
receiving these checks from its
Guiguinto Sales Office which
bank later on made the
corresponding deductions from
the account of SMC in the
amounts covered by the
dishonored checks upon
receiving information that the
checks so issued by the accused
had been dishonored by the
drawee bank at Santa Maria,
Bulacan, is inconsequential. As
earlier stated, the element of
damage was inflicted on the
offended party herein right at the
moment and at the place where
the checks issued in its favor
were dishonored which is in
Santa Maria, Bulacan.
Respondent Judge then decreed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of
all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing
these cases for lack of
jurisdiction.
The bail bond posted by the
accused in these cases are
ordered cancelled.
This Petition for certiorari
challenges the dismissal of the
two criminal cases on the
ground that they were issued
with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the
contrary proposition and argues
that the order of dismissal was,
in effect, an acquittal not
reviewable by certiorari, and
that to set the order aside after
plea and trial on the merits,
would subject Respondent-
accused to double jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and
circumstances we uphold the
Petition.
The principal ground relied
upon by Respondent Judge in
dismissing the criminal cases is
that deceit and damage, the two
essential elements that make up
the offenses involving
dishonored checks, did not
occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of his Court in
Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan
where false assurances were
given by Respondent-accused
and where the checks he had
issued were dishonored. The
People maintain, on the other
hand, that jurisdiction is
properly vested in the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be
pointed out, as the Solicitor
General has aptly called
attention to, that there are two
dishonored checks involved,
each the subject of different
penal laws and with different
basic elements: (1) On June 13,
1983, Respondent-accused
issued Planters Development
Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan
Branch) [PDB] Check No.
19040865 in the sum of
P86,071.20 in favor of SMC,
which was received by the SMC
Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan. The check was
forwarded to the SMC Regional
Office at San Fernando,
Pampanga, where it was
delivered to and received by the
SMC Finance Officer, who then
deposited the check with the
Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI), San Fernando Branch,
which is the SMC depository
bank. On July 8,1983, the SMC
depository bank received a
notice of dishonor of the said
check for "insufficiency of
funds" from the PDB, the
drawee bank in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. This dishonored check
is the subject of the charge of
Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in
Criminal Case No. 2800 of the
lower Court (hereafter, the
Bouncing Checks Case).
(2) On June 18, 1983,
Respondent-accused likewise
issued PDB Check No.
19040872 in the amount of
P11,918.80 in favor of SMC,
which was received also by the
SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan, as direct payment for
the spot sale of beer. That check
was similarly forwarded by the
SMC Supervisor to the SMC
Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it
was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat and who, in turn
deposited the check with the
SMC depository bank in San
Fernando, Pampanga. On July
8,1983, the SMC depository
bank received a notice of
dishonor for "insufficiency of
funds" from the drawee bank,
the PDB, in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. This dishonored check
is the subject of the prosecution
for Estafa by postdating or
issuing a bad check under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No, 2813 of the
lower Court (briefly, the Estafa
Case).
In the crime of Estafa by
postdating or issuing a bad
check, deceit and damage are
essential elements of the offense
(U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383-
390) and have to be established
with satisfactory proof to
warrant conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law, on the other hand,
the elements of deceit and
damage are not essential nor
required. An essential element
of that offense is knowledge on
the part of the maker or drawer
of the check of the insufficiency
of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon.
Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc.,
December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA
323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No.
75243, March 16, 1987,148
SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law makes the mere act
of issuing a worthless check a
special offense punishable
thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC, No.
I,66327, May 28,1984,129
SCRA 490. Malice and intent in
issuing the worthless check are
immaterial, the offense
being malum prohibitum (Que
vs. People of the Philippines, et.
al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18,
September 21, 1987). The
gravamen of the offense is the
issuance of a check, not the non-
payment of an obligation
(Lozano vs. Hon.
Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction clarified,
the threshold question is
whether or not venue was
sufficiently conferred in the
Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga in the two cases.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which
has been carried over in Section
15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Place where action is
to be instituted
(a) In all criminal prosecutions
the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the
municipality or province
wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof
took place.
In other words, a person charged
with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality
or province where the offense
was in part committed. In
transitory or continuing offenses
in which some acts material and
essential to the crime and
requisite to its consummation
occur in one province and some
in another, the Court of either
province has jurisdiction to try
the case, it being understood that
the first Court taking cognizance
of the Case will exclude the
others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-
27410, August 28, 1975, 66
SCRA 235). However, if an the
acts material and essential to the
crime and requisite of its
consummation occurred in one
municipality or territory, the
Court of that municipality or
territory has the sole jurisdiction
to try the case (People vs. Yabut,
L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76
SCRA 624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing a
bad check, may be a transitory
or continuing offense. Its basic
elements of deceit and damage
may arise independently in
separate places (People vs.
Yabut, supra). In this case,
deceit took place in San
Fernando, Pampanga, while the
damage was inflicted in Bulacan
where the cheek was dishonored
by the drawee bank in that place
(See People vs. Yabut, supra).
Jurisdiction may, therefore, be
entertained by either the
Bulacan Court or the Pampanga
Court.
For while the subject check was
issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it
was not completely drawn
thereat, but in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where it was uttered
and delivered. "What is of
decisive importance is the
delivery thereat The delivery of
the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation as
an obligation" (People vs.
Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in
People vs. Yabut, supra). For
although the check was received
by the SMC Sales Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was
not the delivery in
contemplation of law to the
payee, SMC. Said supervisor
was not the person who could
take the check as a holder, that
is, as a payee or indorsee
thereof, with the intent to
transfer title thereto. The rule is
that the issuance as well as the
delivery of the check must be to
a person who takes it as a holder,
which means "the payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is
in possession of it, or the bearer,
thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law, cited in
People vs. Yabut, supra.) Thus,
said representative had to
forward the check to the SMC
Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, which
was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat who, in turn,
deposited it at the SMC
depository bank in San
Fernando, Pampanga. The
element of deceit, therefore,
took place in San Fernando,
Pampanga, where the rubber
check was legally issued and
delivered so that jurisdiction
could properly be laid upon the
Court in that locality.
The estafa charged in the two
informations involved in the
case before Us appears to be
transitory or continuing in
nature. Deceit has taken place in
Malolos, Bulacan, while the
damage in Caloocan City, where
the checks were dishonored by
the drawee banks there.
Jurisdiction can, therefore, be
entertained by either the
Malolos court or the Caloocan
court. While the subject checks
were written, signed, or dated in
Caloocan City, they were not
completely made or drawn
there, but in Malolos, Bulacan,
where they were uttered and
delivered. That is the place of
business and residence of the
payee. The place where the bills
were written, signed or dated
does not necessarily fix or
determine the place where they
were executed. What is of
decisive importance is the
delivery thereof. The delivery of
the instrument is the final act
essential to its consummation as
an obligation (People vs. Larue,
83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered
bill or note is inoperative. Until
delivery, the contract is
revocable (Ogden, Negotiable
Instruments, 5th ed., at 107).
And the issuance as well as the
delivery of the check must be to
a person who takes it as a holder,
which means "(t)he payee or
indorsee of a bill or note, who is
in possession of it, or the bearer
thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Delivery of
the check signifies transfer of
possession, whether actual or
constructive, from one person to
another with intent to transfer
title thereto (Bailey, Brady on
Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59;
Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Thus, the
penalizing clause of the
provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d)
states: "By postdating a check,
or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation when the offender
had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of
the check," Clearly, therefore,
the element of deceit thru the
issuance and delivery of the
worthless checks to the
complainant took place in
Malolos, Bulacan, conferring
upon a court in that locality
jurisdiction to try the case.
In respect of the Bouncing
Checks Case, the offense also
appears to be continuing in
nature. It is true that the offense
is committed by the very fact of
its performance (Colmenares vs.
Villar, No. L-27126, May 29,
1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that
the Bouncing Checks Law
penalizes not only the fact of
dishonor of a check but also the
act of making or drawing and
issuance of a bouncing check
(People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II,
No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523).
The case, therefore, could have
been filed also in Bulacan. As
held in Que vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-
18, September 11, 1987 "the
determinative factor (in
determining venue) is the place
of the issuance of the check".
However, it is likewise true that
knowledge on the part of the
maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency of his funds,
which is an essential ingredient
of the offense is by itself a
continuing eventuality, whether
the accused be within one
territory or another (People vs.
Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos.
66003-04, December 11, 1987).
Accordingly, jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offense also
lies in the Regional Trial Court
of Pampanga
And, as pointed out in
the Manzanilla case,
jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in
the Information, which are
controlling (Arches vs.
Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193,
cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-
27410, August 28, 1975, 66
SCRA 235). The Information
filed herein specifically alleges
that the crime was committed in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
therefore, within the jurisdiction
of the Court below.
B. The dismissal of the subject
criminal cases by Respondent
Judge, predicated on his lack of
jurisdiction, is correctable by
Certiorari. The error committed
is one of jurisdiction and not an
error of judgment on the merits.
Well-settled is the rule that
questions covering
jurisdictional matters may be
averred in a petition for
certiorari, inclusive of matters
of grave abuse of discretion,
which are equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (City of Davao vs.
Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
111, 115). An error of
jurisdiction renders whatever
order of the Trial Court nun and
void.
C. The present petition for
certiorari seeking to set aside the
void Decision of Respondent
Judge does not place
Respondent-accused in double
jeopardy for the same offense. It
will be recalled that the
questioned judgment was not an
adjudication on the merits. It
was a dismissal upon
Respondent Judge's erroneous
conclusion that his Court had no
"territorial jurisdiction" over the
cases. Where an order
dismissing a criminal case is not
a decision on the merits, it
cannot bar as res judicata a
subsequent case based on the
same offense (People vs.
Bellosillo, No. L-18512,
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA
835, 837).
The dismissal being null and
void the proceedings before the
Trial Court may not be said to
have been lawfully terminated.
There is therefore, no second
proceeding which would subject
the accused to double jeopardy.
Since the order of dismissal was
without authority and, therefore,
null and void, the proceedings
before the Municipal Court have
not been lawfully terminated.
Accordingly, there is no second
proceeding to speak of and no
double jeopardy. A continuation
of the proceedings against the
accused for serious physical
injuries is in order. (People vs.
Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had
jurisdiction to try and decide the
subject criminal case, venue
having been properly laid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of
Respondent Judge of February
17, 1986 is hereby set aside and
he is hereby ordered to reassume
jurisdiction over Criminal Cases
Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court
and to render judgment of either
conviction or acquittal in
accordance with the evidence
already adduced during the joint
trial of said two cases.
o lsip v. People, G.R. No.
170298,26 )une2007
MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Before us is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 October 2004
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21275
entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip
and Marietta M. Isip" to the
extent that it affirmed with
modifications petitioner Manuel
S. Isips conviction for Estafa in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch XVII, Cavite City, and
its Amended Decision2 dated 26
October 2005 denying his
Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.
The antecedents are the
following:
Petitioner was charged with
Estafa in Criminal Case No.
136-84 before Branch XVII of
the RTC of Cavite City, under
the following information:
That on or about March 7, 1984,
in the City of Cavite, Republic
of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, received from
Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven
carat diamond (mens ring),
valued at 200,000.00, for the
purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver
the proceeds of the sale thereof
or return the jewelry if not sold,
on or before March 15, 1984,
but the herein accused once in
possession of the above-
described articles, with intent to
defraud and with grave abuse of
confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert the same
to his own personal use and
benefit and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the return
of the jewelry or the delivery of
the proceeds of the sale thereof,
failed to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the aforesaid
Leonardo A. Jose in the
abovestated amount of
200,000.00, Philippine
Currency.3
Petitioners wife, Marietta M.
Isip, was indicted before the
same court for seven counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. The
cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-
84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84. The accusatory portion
of the information in Criminal
Case No. 146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27,
1984, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, knowing fully
well that her account with the
bank is insufficient, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and knowingly issue
Pacific Banking Corporation
Check No. 518672 in the
amount of 562,000.00, in
payment for assorted pieces of
jewelry, received from
Leonardo A. Jose, which check
upon presentation with the
drawee bank for payment was
dishonored for insufficiency of
funds and notwithstanding
repeated demands made by
Leonardo A. Jose for the
redemption of the said check,
accused refused and still refuses
to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid
Leonardo A. Jose in the above-
stated amount of 562,000.00,
Philippine Currency.4
The six other Informations are with intent to defraud and with The versions of the prosecution
similarly worded except for the grave abuse of confidence, did, and the defense, as taken by the
date when the offense was then and there, willfully, Court of Appeals in the parties
committed, the number and unlawfully and feloniously respective briefs, are the
amount of the check. The misappropriate, misapply and following:
pertinent data in the other convert them to their own
informations are as follows: personal use and benefit and i) Prosecution Version.
paid the same with Check Nos.
Crim. Case No. 518646 and No.
Date of Commission 518669,
of Checkdated Sometime Amount in of1982,
Checkappellant
March 29, 1984 and April 1, spouses Manuel and Marietta
147-84 17 March1984,
1984 respectively,
518644 in the Isip 50,000.00 were introduced to
amount of 90,000 and complainant Atty. Leonardo
148-84 30 March25,000,
1984 respectively,
518645 which Jose. 50,000.00 The introduction was
upon presentation with the bank made by complainants father,
was dishonored 5 for Nemesio, business associate of
149-84 12 March 1984 030086 150,000.00
insufficiency of funds and the Isips. Nemesio and the Isips
notwithstanding repeated were then engaged in the buy
155-84 25 Marchdemands
1984 by Leonardo A. and 95,000.00
made 518674 sell of pledged and
Jose for the redemption of the unredeemed jewelry pawned by
156-84 29 Marchsaid
1984check, failed
518646
to do so, to his gambling90,000.00
habitus (pp. 8-16,
damage and prejudice in the tsn, June 8, 1993).
157-84 1 April 1984
abovestated 518669 amount of 25,000.00
120,000.00, Philippine Needing a bigger capital to
The spouses Isip were likewise Currency.6 finance the growing operation,
charged before the same court the Isips convinced complainant
with five (5) counts of Estafa. Except for the description and to be their capitalist, a
The cases were docketed as value of the pieces of jewelry proposition to which
Criminal Cases No. 256-84, involved, date of receipt and complainant acceded to (p. 14,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and agreed date of return, and the ibid).
378-84. The Estafa charged in number, date and amount of the
Crim. Case No. 256-84 was checks issued in payment Thus, the operation went
allegedly committed as follows: thereof, the four other smoothly that was before
informations are similarly February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn,
That on or about March 20, worded. The specifics thereof ibid).
1984, in the City of Cavite, are as follows:
Republic of the Philippines and On February 3, 1984, at
within the jurisdiction of this Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed
complainants Date of Check
residence in No./Date
Honorable Court, the above- Jewelry Receipt Return
Caridad, Cavite City, appellant
named accused, conspiring, 257-84 spouses received 030086/03-12-84
from
confederating together and 150,000 03-07-84
complainant 03-30-84
a 6 carat mens ring
mutually helping one another, 260-84 valued at 200,000.00 with the 518647/03-25-84
received from one Leonardo A. 95,000 condition that
03-20-84 they are going to
03-27-84
Jose the following pieces of sell said jewelry x x x 518672/03-27-84
on
261-84
jewelry, to wit: one (1) set dome
562,000 03-20-84
commission 03-27-84 basis for
shape ring and earrings valued at 200,000.00 and if they are not
120,000.00, with the 378-84 able to sell the
518644/03-17-84
same, they have
obligation of selling the same on 200,000 02-03-84 -
to return the ring if sold on 518645/03-30-84
or
commission basis and deliver before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn,
the proceeds of the sale thereof October 15, 1993).
or return them if not sold, on or When arraigned on the charges,
before March 21, 1984, but the petitioner and Marietta Isip
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did
herein accused, once in pleaded not guilty. There being
not return the ring or the
possession of the said jewelry only one complainant in all the
proceeds thereof. Instead,
by means of false pretenses, cases, joint trial of the cases
Marietta Isip issued two (2)
followed.
personal checks dated March 17
and 30, 1984, respectively, for
50,000.00 each as partial
payment for the jewelry. The
receipt of the jewelry was
acknowledged by Marietta Isip
with Manuel acting as a witness
(pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular mens ring is the
subject of Criminal Case No.
378-84 for Estafa while Check
Nos. 518644 and 518645
(Pacific Banking Corp.) dated
March 17 and 30, respectively,
are the subject of Criminal Case
Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
In the morning of March 7,
1984, the Isip couple went again
to complainants residence in
Caridad, Cavite City where
complainant delivered one (1)
Choker Pearl with 35 pieces of
south sea pearls with diamond
worth 150,000.00. The
condition was that the proceeds
be turned over to complainant
on or before March 30, 1984
(pp. 27-29, tsn, ibid). March 30,
1984 came, but instead of
turning over the proceeds or
return the Choker Pearl, Mrs.
Isip issued a check dated March
12, 1984 for 150,000.00
(RCBC check No. 030086) as
payment (p. 34, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal
Case No. 254-84 for Estafa
against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for
violation of BP 22 against
Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day,
Mr. Manuel Isip went to
complainants residence in
Cavite City and got from the
latter a mens ring (7 carats)
worth 200,000.00. Mr. Isip
signed a receipt with the
condition that he return the ring
or deliver the proceeds, if sold,
on or before March 15, 1984.
March 15, 1984 came, but Mr.
Isip sought an extension which
fell due on April 7, 1984. April
7, 1984 came and went by, but
Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46,
tsn, ibid). The above is the
subject matter of Criminal Case
No. 136-84 for Estafa against
Manuel Isip.
On March 20, 1984, the Isips
went again to Cavite City and
got from complainant one (1)
Dome shaped ring with
matching earring with diamonds
valued at 120,000.00. As with
their previous agreement, the
item was to be returned or the
proceeds of the sale be delivered
on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52,
tsn, ibid). The following
morning, however, Mrs. Isip
issued two (2) personal checks
(Check Nos. 518646 and
518669 dated March 29, 1984
for 90,000.00 and 25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the
Dome shaped ring (p. 53, tsn,
ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal
Case No. 256084 for Estafa
against the spouses Isip and
Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and
and (sic) 157-84 for Violation of
BP 22 against Marietta Isip.
At noontime on the same day,
the Isip couple went back to the
residence of complainant and
got from him one (1) collar heart
shaped necklace and one (1)
baguette necklace worth
95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As
agreed upon, Marietta Isip
signed a receipt with the
condition that the jewelry or the
proceeds thereof be delivered to
complainant on March 27, 1984.
The Isips defaulted and instead,
Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check
No. 518647) dated March 27,
1984 in the amount of
90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn,
October 22, 1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are
the subject of Criminal Case No.
260-84 for Estafa against the
Isip couple and Criminal Case
No. 155-84 for Violation of BP
22 against Marietta Isip.
Again, in the early evening of
March 20, 1984, the Isips went
to complainant informing him
that Balikbayan doctors are
having a convention in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur saying that, that was
the most opportune time to sell
jewelries. Assorted pieces of
jewelry were delivered to Mrs.
Isip as reflected in a receipt duly
signed by her (Exhibit O)
acknowledging the value
thereof to the tune of
562,000.00.
Exhibit O contained the
promise that the jewelry or
proceeds thereof will be
delivered on March 27, 1984.
Inspite of the promise contained
in Exhibit O, Mrs. Isip issued
a postdated check (Check No.
51867) dated March 27, 1984 in
the amount of 562,000.00 as
payment for the assorted pieces
of jewelry (pp. 8-12, tsn,
October 22, 1993).
This is the subject matter of
Criminal Case No. 261-84 for
Estafa against the couple and
Criminal Case No. 146-84
against Marietta Isip for
Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the
above transactions were
deposited on April 6, 1984 (p.
14, tsn, ibid), but all of them
bounced for being drawn against
insufficient funds. Demand
letters sent to the couple proved
futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to
these cases, complainant
Leonardo Jose, who had his
residence at Room 411, 4th
Floor, Plaza Towers
Condominium on (sic) 3375
Guerrero Street, Ermita, Manila,
but claims he had his ancestral
home at 506 P. Burgos Street,
Caridad, Cavite, was an
employee of the Bureau of
Customs, having been so since
1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the
other hand, appellants Manuel
S. Isip (Manuel hereafter) and
Marietta M. Isip (Marietta
hereafter) are spouses, residents
at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr.,
8/29/93, 4) and engaged in
various business undertakings in
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Baguio
City, Olongapo City and Bataan
(Tr., Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13)
appellant Manuel, in the
brokerage and trucking
business; while appellant
Marietta, in that of selling
jewelry and financing, as well as
in PX goods, real estate and
cars, which she started when she
was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10;
Tr., 10/2/95, 12). In 1982, at the
casino in Olongapo City,
appellant Marietta started
obtaining jewelry from losing or
financially-strapped players
which she repledged as security
for financing she obtained from
one Nemesio Jose, father of
complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr.,
Idem, 11-12; Tr., Idem, 14).
After about a year, when
Nemesio Jose ran short of
capital, he referred appellants to
his son, complainant Leonardo
Jose, with address at the Plaza
Towers Condominium aforesaid
for needed financing (Tr., Idem,
13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19).
Beginning early 1983, at
complainants residence at
Plaza Tower Condominium in
Manila, appellant Marietta,
accompanied by her husband
who participated only as a
witness, started having
transactions with complainant
who, on different dates in
February, March and April,
1984, extended various amounts
to her for which appellant
Marietta pledged jewelry which,
in turn, were agreed between her
and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the
proceeds thereof or return the
jewelry to complainant (Tr.,
Idem, 16-18). In the course of
the transactions, appellant
Marietta had issued several
checks to complainant as
guarantee for the payment of the
subject jewelry which have
either been paid or redeemed,
had returned the unsold jewelry
to complainant and had
conveyed, by way of payment
for other jewelry, some personal
properties, like brass and antics,
and real properties in Balanga,
Bataan and Mabalacat,
Pampanga, to complainant who
caused the same to be registered
in the names of his son,
Christian Jose, and his wife,
Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A,
3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the
result that all the obligations of
appellants to complainant have
already been paid for or offset
(Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-
36, 37-39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8).
Also, all the checks that
appellant Marietta issued which
were initially dishonored have
already been (sic) (Tr., 10/2/95,
25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact,
complainant caused the
dismissal of some cases he filed
against appellants. Complainant
however failed to return some of
the redeemed and/or paid checks
issued to him by appellant
Marietta on the pretext that he
did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96,
20). Inasmuch as appellant
Marietta incurred some default
in payment and complainant
suspected that she would not be
able to redeem the checks or pay
for the pledged jewelry,
complainant demanded that
appellants sign certain
documents to avoid any
misunderstanding, with threat of
prosecution before the Cavite
courts if they do not comply
(Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-
6). So, in order to maintain good
relations with complainant,
appellant Marietta signed the
document acknowledging
obligations to him in one sitting,
which appellant Manuel
witnessed (Tr., Idem, 21-22).
Later, appellants learned that,
although all the transactions
were entered into in Manila,
complainant filed the cases
herein before the Cavite
Regional Trial Court (Tr., Idem,
23-24).7
On November 25, 1996, the trial
court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion thereof
reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the Court finds the
accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip
guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a (sic) violation of B.P. 22 in
Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-
84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84,
156-84 and 157-84 and she is
hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of One (1) year of
prision correctional (sic) in each
case; and of Estafa in the
following Crim. Cases: No. 256-
84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from
Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, and to indemnify
the complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of 120,000.00
for the value of the articles
misappropriated; Crim. Case
No. 257-84 where she is
sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of 150,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 260-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to
Seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of 95,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 261-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of 562,000.00;
Crim. Case No. 378-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of 200,000.00
and to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip
is acquitted in Crim. Cases Nos.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84
and 378-84. However, in Crim.
Case No. 136-84, he is hereby
found guilty of Estafa and he is
hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve
(12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose in the amount of
200,000.00 value of the
jewelry misappropriated, and to
pay the costs.8
In ruling the way it did, the RTC
found that the transactions
involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken
place at complainant Atty.
Leonardo Joses ancestral house
in Cavite City when the latter
was on leave of absence from
the Bureau of Customs where he
was connected. It said the
defense failed to substantially
prove its allegations that the
transactions occurred in Manila,
particularly in the Towers
Condominium, and that
complainant is a resident of
Bigasan, Makati. It added that
the testimony of Marietta Isip
that the money with which the
complainant initially agreed to
finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan
Finance in Cavite City further
refuted the defenses claim that
the transactions happened in
Manila. The trial court likewise
found the defenses contention,
that the obligations were already
paid and set-off with the
turnover to complainant of
personal and real properties, to
be untenable for it is contrary to
human nature to demand
payment when the same had
already been made and the
alleged set-offs were for other
cases which were settled
amicably and subsequently
dismissed upon motion of the
City Prosecutors Office at the
instance of the complainant.
The trial court was convinced
that accused Marietta Isip
misappropriated the pieces of
jewelry involved in Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84 and
violated Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 when she issued the checks
mentioned in Criminal Cases
No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84,
149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and
157-84. As to petitioner, the trial
court acquitted him in Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84 finding
him to have acted as a mere
witness when he signed the
receipts involved in said cases,
but found him liable in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 for
misappropriating a 7-carat
diamond mens ring which he
secured from the complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and
spouse appealed to the Court of
Appeals assigning the following
as errors:
-I-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF AND DECIDING THE
CASES AGAINST
APPELLANTS AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE SAME
UPON THE GROUND THAT
NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE
OFFENSES CHARGED
THEREIN WAS
COMMITTED WITH (SIC)
ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT,
ASSUMING IT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASES BELOW, ERRD IN
NOT HOLDING THAT NO
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M.
ISIP FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SUBJECT CHECKS
INASMUCH AS SAID
CHECKS WERE ISSUED AS
MERE GUARANTY FOR
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT,
ASSUMING ANY INCIPIENT
LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME
OF ESTAFA HAD BEEN
INCURRED BY
APPELLANTS IN THE
PREMISES, ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT SUCH
INCIPIENT LIABILITY HAD
BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS
MADE AND/OR NOVATION
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID
APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FINDING APPELLANTS
MANUEL S. ISIP AND
MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY
IMPUTED UPON THEM AND
IN NOT ACQUITTING THEM
UPON THE GROUND THAT
THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR
OF ANY CRIME FOR THAT
MATTER, HAD NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
AND/OR THAT THE
LIABILITY INCURRED BY
THEM, IF ANY, IS MERELY
CIVIL.9
Before the Court of Appeals
could have decided the case,
Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and
civil liability, if any.
In a decision promulgated 26
October 2004, the Court of
Appeals disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City (Branch
XVII)
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is
AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the
sentence imposed on accused-
appellant Manuel S. Isip shall be
two (2) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to
twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and that
the sum of 200,000.00 he was
ordered to pay to Leonardo A.
Jose shall bear interest at the
legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84,
147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-
84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-
appellant Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged; and
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged, but ordering them to
pay to Leonardo A. Jose, jointly
and severally, the sums of
120,000.00, 150,000.00,
95,000.00, 562,000.00 and
200,000.00 representing the
amounts involved in said cases,
plus interest thereon at the legal
rate from filing of the
information until fully paid.10
The Court of Appeals upheld the
lower courts finding that the
venue was properly laid and that
the checks were delivered by the
two accused and/or that the
transactions transpired at
complainants ancestral home in
Cavite City, and that,
consequently, the offenses
charged took place within its
territorial jurisdiction. With
respect to the seven counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the appellate court
acquitted Marietta Isip of the
charges on the ground that since
the checks involved were issued
prior to 8 August 1984, the
dishonor thereof did not give
rise to a criminal liability
pursuant to Ministry Circular
No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84), the
Court of Appeals ruled that
since the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the
pieces of jewelry were
dishonored, there was no
payment to speak of. It also
found the defenses claim of
redemption/dacion en pago
that real and personal properties
were conveyed to complainant
who executed affidavits of
desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases
to be unmeritorious. However,
the appellate court ruled that
though novation does not
extinguish criminal liability, it
may prevent the rise of such
liability as long at it occurs prior
to the filing of the criminal
information in court. In these
five cases, it ruled that there was
novation because complainant
accepted the checks issued by
Marietta Isip as payment for the
pieces of jewelry involved in
said cases. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals acquitted
Marietta and petitioner,11 but
held them liable to complainant
for the value of the jewelry
involved.
As regards Criminal Case No.
136-84 for estafa against
petitioner, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts ruling
of conviction. It found
petitioners claims that he did
not receive the jewelry worth
200,000.00 mentioned in the
information; that the receipt he
issued for said jewelry was
among those documents which
were forced upon him to sign
under threat of criminal
prosecution; and that he signed
the same to preserve his
friendship with complainant, to
be not persuasive.
On 17 November 2004,
petitioner, for himself and in
representation of his deceased
wife, Marietta Isip, filed a
Partial Motion for
Reconsideration insofar as it
affirmed his conviction in
Criminal Case No. 136-84 and
adjudged him civilly liable,
jointly and severally, with
Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84.12
On 26 October 2005, the Court
of Appeals, taking into account
the death of Marietta M. Isip
prior to the promulgation of its
decision, rendered an Amended
Decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision
dated October 26, 2004 is
AMENDED in respect to par. 3
of the dispositive portion thereof
which shall now read as follows:
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84 is REVERSED,
accused-appellants Manuel S.
Isip and Marietta M. Isip
ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged and the civil aspect of
those cases DISMISSED."13
Petitioner is now before us
appealing his conviction in
Criminal Case No. 136-84. He
raises the following issues:
First WHETHER OR NOT
THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO
PETITIONER AND FOR
WHICH HE WAS
CONVICTED;
Second WHETHER THE
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY
SHOWS THAT PETITIONER
RECEIVED THE SUBJECT
OF SAID OFFENSE OR THAT
HE RECEIVED IT IN CAVITE
CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE
INCIPIENT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY ARISING FROM
SAID OFFENSE, IS (sic) ANY,
WAS EXTINGUISHED BY
NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner
maintains that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No.
136-84 and it is pure speculation
and conjectural, if not altogether
improbable or manifestly
absurd, to suppose that any of
the essential elements of the
Estafa charged in Criminal Case
No. 136-84 took place in Cavite
City. First, he states that the
residence of the parties is
immaterial and that it is the situs
of the transaction that counts.
He argues that it is non sequitur
that simply because
complainant had an alleged
ancestral house in Caridad,
Cavite, complainant actually
lived there and had the
transactions there with him
when he and his late wife were
actual residents of Manila. Mere
convenience suggests that their
transaction was entered into in
Manila. He adds that the source
of the fund used to finance the
transactions is likewise
inconsequential because it is
where the subject item was
delivered and received by
petitioner and/or where it was to
be accounted for that determines
venue where Estafa, if any, may
be charged and tried. Second, he
further argues that it does not
follow that because complainant
may have been on leave from
the Bureau of Customs, the
transactions were necessarily
entered into during that leave
and in Cavite City. He asserts
that there is no competent proof
showing that during his leave of
absence, he stayed in Cavite
City; and that the transactions
involved, including the subject
of Criminal Case 136-84
covering roughly the period
from February to April 1984,
coincided with his alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions
in criminal cases, unlike in civil
cases, is jurisdictional.14 The
place where the crime was
committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an
essential element of
jurisdiction.15 It is a
fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been
committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should
have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information.
And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take
cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.16
In the case at bar, we, like the
RTC and the Court of Appeals,
are convinced that the venue
was properly laid in the RTC of
Cavite City. The complainant
had sufficiently shown that the
transaction covered by Criminal
Case No. 136-84 took place in
his ancestral home in Cavite
City when he was on approved
leave of absence17 from the
Bureau of Customs. Since it has
been shown that venue was
properly laid, it is now
petitioners task to prove
otherwise, for it is his claim that
the transaction involved was
entered into in Manila. The age-
old but familiar rule that he who
alleges must prove his
allegations applies. 18
In the instant case, petitioner
failed to establish by sufficient
and competent evidence that the
transaction happened in Manila.
Petitioner argues that since he
and his late wife actually resided
in Manila, convenience alone
unerringly suggests that the
transaction was entered into in
Manila. We are not persuaded.
The fact that Cavite City is a bit
far from Manila does not
necessarily mean that the
transaction cannot or did not
happen there. Distance will not
prevent any person from going
to a distant place where he can
procure goods that he can sell so
that he can earn a living. This is
true in the case at bar. It is not
improbable or impossible for
petitioner and his wife to have
gone, not once, but twice in one
day, to Cavite City if that is the
number of times they received
pieces of jewelry from
complainant. Moreover, the fact
that the checks issued by
petitioners late wife in all the
transactions with complainant
were drawn against accounts
with banks in Manila or Makati
likewise cannot lead to the
conclusion that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite
City.
It is axiomatic that when it
comes to credibility, the trial
courts assessment deserves
great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly
the witnesses deportment and
manner of testifying, the trial
court is in a better position than
the appellate court to evaluate
properly testimonial
evidence.19 It is to be pointed
out that the findings of fact of
the trial court have been
affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. It is settled that when
the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are
generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court.20 In the
case at bar, we find no
compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and to apply the
exception. We so hold that there
is sufficient evidence to show
that the particular transaction
took place in Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner
contends that the Court of
Appeals holding that the ring
subject of Crim. Case No. 136-
84 was delivered to and received
by petitioner is seriously flawed.
He argues that assuming he
signed the receipt evidencing
delivery of the ring, not due to
the threat of prosecution but
merely to preserve his
friendship with complainant, the
fact remains that there is no
showing that the ring was
actually delivered to him.
Petitioner insists there is no
competent evidence that the ring
subject of Criminal Case No.
136-84 was ever actually
received by, or delivered to,
him.
We find his contentions
untenable. The finding of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner
received the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84 is
supported by the evidence on
record. The acknowledgment
receipt21 executed by petitioner
is very clear evidence that he
received the ring in question.
Petitioners claim that he did not
receive any ring and merely
executed said receipt in order to
preserve his friendship with the
complainant deserves scant
consideration.
Petitioner, an astute
businessman as he is, knows the
significance, import and
obligation of what he executed
and signed. The following
disputable presumptions weigh
heavily against petitioner,
namely: (a) That a person
intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary
act; (b) That a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns;
(c) That private transactions
have been fair and regular; and
(d) That the ordinary course of
business has been
followed 22Thus, it is presumed
that one does not sign a
document without first
informing himself of its contents
and consequences. We know
that petitioner understood fully
well the ramification of the
acknowledgment receipt he
executed. It devolves upon him
then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however,
find that he failed to do so.
Aside from his self-serving
allegation that he signed the
receipt to preserve his friendship
with complainant, there is no
competent evidence that would
rebut said presumptions. It is
clear from the evidence that
petitioner signed the
acknowledgment receipt when
he received the ring from
complainant in Cavite City.
Petitioners argument that he did
not receive the subject ring23 is
further belied by the testimony
of his wife when the latter
testified that said ring was
borrowed by him on 7 March
1984.24 In all, the delivery of the
ring and the transaction
regarding the same occurred in
Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner
argues that, assuming gratia
argumenti that any criminal
liability was incurred by
petitioner respecting the ring
subject of Criminal Case No.
136-84, the same was incipient,
at best, and was effectively
extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to
complainant were more than
sufficient to cover or offset
whatever balance remained of
the obligations incurred as
shown by the fact that
complainant executed
Affidavits of Desistance and
caused the dismissal of some of
the cases filed. He maintains
that the Court of Appeals did not
apply the rule of novation as
regards the ring subject of
Criminal Case No. 136-84
because it rejected his denial of
receipt of said ring and his claim
that he signed the receipt
supposedly covering the same
under threat of prosecution and
merely to preserve their good
relations. He claims the Court
should not have denied the
application of the rule of
novation on said case because
the rejected initial claim (that he
did not receive the ring and that
he signed the receipt to preserve
their good relations) was but an
alternative defense and its
rejection is not a reason to deny
the application of the novation
rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of
Appeals that novation25 cannot
be applied in Criminal Case No.
136-84. The claim of petitioner
that the personal and real
properties conveyed to
complainant and/or to his family
were more than sufficient to
cover or offset whatever balance
remained of the obligations
incurred has no basis. If it were
true that the properties delivered
to complainant were sufficient,
the latter would have caused the
dismissal of all, not some as in
this instance, the cases against
petitioner and his late wife.
This, complainant did not do for
the simple reason that the
properties conveyed to him were
not enough to cover all the
obligations incurred by
petitioner and his deceased wife.
Complainant testified that the
properties he received were in
settlement of cases other than
the cases being tried herein.26 In
particular, he said that petitioner
and his spouse settled eight
cases which were subsequently
dismissed when they delivered
properties as payment.27 It
follows then that the obligations
incurred by petitioner and his
spouse were not yet settled
when the criminal cases herein
tried were filed.
His contention, that the Court of
Appeals did not apply the rule of
novation in Criminal Case No.
136-84 because it rejected or did
not believe his (alternative)
defense of denial, is untenable.
The main reason why the Court
of Appeals did not apply
novation in said case was that
not all the elements of novation
are present. For novation to take
place, four essential requisites
have to be met, namely, (1) a
previous valid obligation; (2) an
agreement of all parties
concerned to a new contract; (3)
the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a
valid new obligation. In
Criminal Case No. 136-84, only
the first element is extant. What
distinguishes this case from
Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and
378-84, where the Court of
Appeals applied the rule of
novation, was that there were
checks issued as payment,
though subsequently
dishonored, for the pieces of
jewelry involved. In Criminal
Case No. 136-84, it is very clear
that neither petitioner nor his
wife issued any check as
payment for the subject ring that
could have extinguished his old
obligation and brought to life a
new obligation.
From the allegations of the
information in Criminal Case
No. 136-84, it is clear that
petitioner was charged with
Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b), of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of
estafa with abuse of confidence
are: (1) the offender receives the
money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on
commission, or for
administration, or under any
other obligation involving the
duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (2) the offender
misappropriates or converts
such money or property or
denies receiving such money or
property; (3) the
misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (4) the offended
party demands that the offender
return the money or
property.28 All these are present
in this case. Petitioner received
from complainant a seven-carat
diamond (mens ring), valued at
200,000.00, for the purpose of
selling the same on commission
basis and to deliver the proceeds
of the sale thereof or return the
jewelry if not sold. Petitioner
misappropriated or converted
said ring for his own benefit and
even denied receiving the same.
Despite repeated demands from
complainant, petitioner failed to
return the ring or the proceeds of
the sale thereof causing damage
and prejudice to complainant in
the amount of 200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals on petitioner,
we find the same to be in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision
and amended decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 21275 dated 26 October
2004 dated 26 October 2005,
respectively, are AFFIRMED.
c Calme v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 116688, 30 August
1996
WENEFREDO
CALME, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
former 10th Division with
HON. ANTONIO M.
MARTINEZ as chairman and
HON. CANCIO C. GARCIA
and HON. RAMON
MABUTAS as
members, respondents
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Petitioner Wenefredo Calme
appeals from the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 28883 dated 10 December
1993 and its resolution dated 14
July 1994 upholding the
jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12,
Oroquieta City over the
information for murder filed
against him (Calme).
Petitioner and four other persons
were accused of killing Edgardo
Bernal by allegedly throwing
him overboard the M/V "Cebu
City," an interisland passenger
ship owned and operated by
William Lines, Inc., while the
vessel was sailing from Ozamis
City to Cebu City on the night of
12 May 1991. Petitioner
impugned the Oroquieta RTC's
jurisdiction over the offense
charged through a motion to
quash which, however, was
denied by Judge Celso Conol of
RTC, Branch 12, Oroquieta
City. Petitioner Calme's petition
for certiorari and prohibition
was denied due course and
dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision dated 10
December 1993. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of
said decision was denied in the
Court of Appeals's resolution 14
July 1994. Hence, the present
appeal wherein the only issue
for resolution is whether or not
the Oroquieta court has
jurisdiction over the offense
charged against petitioner.
Petitioner asserts that, although
the alleged crime took place
while the vessel was in transit,
the general rule laid down in par.
(a) of Sec. 15 (now Section 14),
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court is the applicable
provision in determining the
proper venue and jurisdiction
and not Sec. 15(c) (now Section
14) thereof since the exact
location where the alleged crime
occurred was known.1
Petitioner thus claims that the
proper venue is Siquijor
because, according to the
Marine Protest filed by the
vessel's captain, Elmer
Magallanes, the ship was 8.0
miles off Minalonan Point,
Siquijor Island, when he (Capt.
Magallanes) received the report
that "a passenger jumped
overboard."2
Petitioner's contention is
unmeritorious. The exact
location where the alleged
offense was committed was not
duly established. The Marine
protest simply adverted that the
vessel was within the waters of
Siquijor Island when the captain
was informed3 of the incident,
which does not necessarily
prove that the alleged murder
took place in the same area. In
any case, where the crime was
actually committed is
immaterial since it is undisputed
that it occurred while the
vessel was in transit. "In transit"
simply means "on the way or
passage; while passing from one
person or place to another. In the
course of
transportation."4 Hence,
undoubtedly, the applicable
provision is par. (c) of Sec. 15
(now Section 14), Rule 110
which provides that "(w)here an
offense is committed on board a
vessel in the course of its
voyage, the criminal action may
be instituted and tried in the
proper court of the first port of
entry or of any municipality or
territory through which the
vessel passed during such
voyage subject to the generally
accepted principles of
international law."
Petitioner further contends that
even if Sec. 15(c), Rule 110
governs, Oroquieta City would
still be excluded as a proper
venue because the reckoning
point for determining the venue
under the aforementioned
paragraph is the first port of
entry or the
municipalities/territories
through which the ship
passed after the discovery of the
crime, relying on Act No. 400.5
We disagree. Obviously, Act
No. 400 was amended by Sec.
15(c), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court in that under the
former law, jurisdiction was
conferred to the CFI of any
province into which the ship or
water craft upon which the
crime or offense was committed
shall come after the commission
thereof, while the present rule
provides that jurisdiction is
vested "in the proper court of the
first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory through
which the vessel passed during
such voyage . . . ." This is the
applicable provision and since it
does not contain any
qualification, we do not qualify
the same. We fully concur with
the findings of the Court of
Appeals, thus:
To support his arguments,
petitioner relies on Act 400,
which according to him is the
spirit behind the present Sec.
15(c), Rule 110. The said Act
specifically provides, among
other things, that for crimes
committed within the navigable
waters of the Philippine
Archipelago, on board a ship or
water craft of Philippine
registry, jurisdiction may be
exercised by the Court of First
Instance in any province in
which the vessel shall come
after the commission of the
crime.
Petitioner's reliance on Act 400
is erroneous. The provision of
said Act vesting jurisdiction in
the province where the vessel
shall come after the commission
of the crime is not carried in the
present Rule.
It is a basic rule in statutory
construction that where the
provisions of the law or rule is
clear and unequivocal, its
meaning must be determined
from the language employed. It
must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted
interpretation (Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp. vs.
NLRC, 206 SCRA [7]01;
Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista,
207 SCRA 561).
The words of Sec. 15(c) being
clear, there is no reason to rely
on Act 400 in determining its
true meaning, regardless of
whether said Act was indeed the
moving spirit behind it. In fact,
it does not seem that
the provision of Act 400 was
carried into the present rule, as it
is now worded.6
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the petition for
review is hereby DENIED.
. People v. Panlilio, G.R. Nos.
L135!9-20,29 March 1996
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
DANILO PANLILIO y
FRANCISCO, defendant-
appellant.
Danilo Panlilio y Francisco was
charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, with kidnapping
under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code (Crim. Case No.
2351-V-93) and violation of
P.D. 532 known as the "Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974" (Crim.
Case No. 2352-V-93). In the
first, case, the Information
alleged that on or about 17
March 1993 in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, the accused
kidnapped Leah Marie Jordan y
Villato and detained her for
more than an hour. In the second
case, the Information alleged
that on the same occasion, with
intent to gain and by means of
force and intimidation, the
accused took a pair of gold
earrings worth P700.00 from the
same complaining witness while
they were walking along St.
Jude St., Malinta, Valenzuela, a
public highway.
Ranged against the denial and
alibi of the accused, the trial
court found the testimony of
Leah Marie positive and
convincing hence its joint
decision of 15 June 1993
convicting the accused in both
cases as charged. In the
kidnapping case the accused
was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay the costs,
while in the highway robbery he
was sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term from
ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to
thirteen (13) years and two (2)
months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to
pay complainant the value of the
pair of earrings and to pay the
costs.1
The evidence shows that at
about eleven-forty in the
morning of 17 March 1993 Leah
Marie Jordan y Villato, a 10-
year old student, was waiting for
her younger sister outside the
premises of St. Jude School in
Malinta, Valenzuela. There she
was approached by Danilo
Panlilio who inquired if she
knew a certain "Aling Rosa."
After she replied that she did not
know her and that she was only
there to fetch her younger sister,
Danilo suddenly poked a knife,
which was concealed inside a
hat, at the right side of her neck,
handed her an empty cigarette
pack with a note and ordered her
to give it to "Aling Ester." When
she told him that she did not
know where to find "Aling
Ester," he said that he would
lead her to the place where
"Aling Ester" could be found.
While Danilo and Leah Marie
were walking side by side the
former continued to poke his
knife at the latter's neck. He told
her to be quiet otherwise he
would kill her. Then they both
boarded a passenger jeepney
with the knife still effectively
serving as a contrivance to keep
her mute. Aside from the driver
they were the only passengers
on board the jeepney. While in
the jeepney Danilo forcibly took
Leah Marie's pair of earrings.
Upon reaching Navotas Danilo
and Leah Marie alighted from
the jeepney. He dragged her
towards a vacant lot where,
according to him, every girl he
brought there was made to
choose between rape and death.
Upon hearing this, she struggled
hard to free herself from his
hold. Luckily, at this juncture,
she saw policemen coming
towards their direction so she
shouted for help. One of the
policemen fired a warning shot
which prompted Danilo to run
away. The policemen pursued
him until they caught up with
him and brought him together
with Leah Marie to the Navotas
Police Station for investigation.
Meanwhile, policemen from
Valenzuela went to the house of
Leah and informed her parents
that their daughter was in the
Navotas Police Station. The
couple then rushed to the Station
where they saw Leah and
brought her to the Valenzuela
Police Station to file a complaint
against Panlilio. The mother of
Leah noticed that the earrings of
Leah were missing. When asked
about her earrings Leah told her
mother that Panlilio forcibly
took them from her.
The version of the appellant is
that on the day of the incident he
left his residence at Barrio
Magdaragat, Tondo, Manila, at
past ten o'clock in the morning
to go to Waywan Missionary at
San Rafael Village, Tondo,
Manila. However he defecated
first on a vacant lot in Navotas
before proceeding. Then he saw
a young girl in the area and
warned her not to pass through
the garbage because she might
sink. It was at this point when
policemen arrived and readily
accused him of being the rapist
in the area.
The accused contends in this
appeal that the trial court erred
(1) in not dismissing the case for
highway robbery on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction; and, (2)
in finding that for the crimes
charged his guilt has been
proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Appellant argues that the
robbery, according to the
complaining witness herself,
was perpetrated in Navotas2 so
that the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela has no jurisdiction
over the case. He also claims
that the prosecution failed to
present evidence that she indeed
owned any pair of earrings. It is
his thesis that it is simply
incredible that a knife was
continually poked at her neck all
the way from St. Jude School in
Malinta to Navotas for an hour
or so without anyone noticing,
otherwise, she could have
shouted and asked for help; but
she did not. Furthermore, he
claims that Leah Marie could
have only been coached into
testifying that she was alone
outside the school premises in a
feeble attempt to explain the
puzzling situation that nobody
came to her rescue when he
allegedly abducted her at
knifepoint in broad daylight
during school dismissal time
when parents, guardians and
others usually converge to fetch
their children or wards. Under
the circumstances, we are urged
to consider as more credible the
version of the defense.
Section 2, par. (e), of P.D. 532
defines the crime of highway
robbery/brigandage as the
"seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other
unlawful purposes, or the taking
away of the property of another
by means of violence against or
intimidation of person force
upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any
person on any Philippine
Highway," and under Sec. 2,
par. (c), of the same decree,
"Philippine Highway" is "any
road, street, passage, highway
and bridge or other parts thereof
or railway or railroad within the
Philippines used by persons, or
vehicles, or locomotives or
trains for the movement or
circulation of persons or
transportation of goods, articles,
or property or both." We
correlate these provisions with
Sec. 15, par. (b), of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court which
provides that "[w]here an
offense is committed on a
railroad train, in an aircraft, or in
any other public or private
vehicle while in the course of its
trip, the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the court
of any municipality or territory
where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during
such trip, including the place of
departure and
arrival (emphasis supplied).
With the foregoing as
guideposts we are now asked:
Did the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela have jurisdiction
over the highway robbery?
In her direct examination the
complaining witness testified
that when she and the accused
alighted from the jeepney in
Navotas he forcibly took her
pair of earrings.3 However,
during the cross-examination
she changed her testimony thus
Q So you want to impress to the
Court that even in front of St.
Jude he already asked you to
remove your earrings?
A Not yet. When we were
already aboard the jeep, that
was the time when he told me to
remove my earrings 4 (emphasis
supplied).
But thereafter she clung to the
same statement for the entire
course of her cross-examination
which appears to be her correct
narration of events
Q And it was there that while
you were already in the vacant
lot that the accused told you to
remove your earrings, is that it?
A We were not yet there.
Q Where were you?
A when we boarded the jeep, he
instructed me to remove my
earrings5 (Emphasis supplied).
Q And it was there in the
Navotas area when he told you
to remove your earrings?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Where?
A From the time we boarded the
jeep.
Q That was the time when you
removed your earrings and gave
it to him?
A Yes, sir6 (Emphasis supplied).
The most candid witnesses
oftentimes make mistakes and
fall into confused and
inconsistent statements, but
such honest lapses do not
necessarily affect their
credibility.7 More importantly,
ample margin of error and
understanding should be
accorded to young witnesses
who much more than adults
would be gripped with tension
due to the novelty of testifying
before a court.8
But the testimony of
complainant that upon boarding
the jeepney the accused ordered
her to remove her earrings and
give them to him is material in
determining whether the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela had jurisdiction over
the highway robbery. Was
Valenzuela their place of
departure or the municipality
where their jeepney passed
during the trip? Here lies the
problem. The complainant was
uncertain of their place of
departure
Q If you will be requested to
point to the place where you
boarded, you could point the
place where you bearded the
jeepney?
A No, sir, I cannot. I do not
know that place because I was
(just) instructed to board.9
Q You want to impress the
Court that you boarded a
passenger jeepney and you do
not know the place where you
boarded the jeep?
A No, sir.10
Q When you were already
traveling from the place, is (sic)
that in Valenzuela where you
boarded the jeep?
A I do not know, sir.11
Neither did Leah Marie mention
the place or places where their
vehicle passed. We could have
relied on the evidence that St.
Jude School is in Malinta,
Valenzuela, in order to establish
the fact that they also boarded
the jeepney in Valenzuela. Yet,
her other testimony is damaging
Q So you want to impress that
from St. Jude you were led by
the accused to a place where
there was a passenger jeepney?
A Yes, sir.
Q You walked or you took a
tricycle because that is the
means of transportation
available in the place?
A We did not board a tricycle.
We just walked.
Q And from St. Jude, how long
did it take you to walk or
negotiate the distance?
A A long time because, as a
matter of fact, I got tired.12
From the foregoing, it would
seem that the prosecution failed
to establish the precise place
where the highway robbery was
supposedly committed other
than Navotas. Hence, we agree
with the defense that the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela had no jurisdiction
over the Offense of highway
robbery, although based on a
different ground.
2. If it shall have been
committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical
injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him
shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or
detained shall be a minor,
female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where
the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even
if none of the circumstances
abovementioned were present in
the commission of the offense.
The poking by appellant of a
knife at the complainant could
have indeed passed unnoticed
because, as mentioned distinctly
in her testimony, the knife was
concealed in a hat, 13 and that
she did not shout for help
because all along he was poking
his knife at her 14 and telling her
not to resist or shout otherwise
she would be killed.15
rejected by the court a quo.
They were inherently weak and
could not prevail over the
positive testimony of
complainant that the accused
detained her and took her
earrings against her will.17
WHEREFORE, the decision
finding the accused-appellant
Danilo Panlilio y Francisco
guilty of kidnapping in Crim.
Case No. 2351-V-93 and
imposing upon him a prison
term of reclusion perpetua, and
to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED.
As regards Crim. Case No.
2352-V-93 for highway
robbery, the case is
DISMISSED on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, without prejudice to
its refiling with the court of
proper jurisdiction.

As regards the charge of The testimony of Leah Marie

kidnapping, Art. 267 of the
Revised Penal Code provides
Art. 267. Kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who
shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive
him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion
perpetuato death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention
shall have lasted more than five
days.
that she was alone in the vicinity
of St. Jude School waiting for
her sister is not hard to believe.
It is highly probable that she
arrived there too early or way
beyond dismissal time.
Anyway, it is clear that the
arguments raised by accused-
appellant pertain to the
credibility of the complainant,
and the appraisal by the trial
court of her credibility is
entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts which do not
deal with live witnesses but only
with the cold pages of a written
record. 16 Hence the appellant's
denial and alibi were properly