Land Titles and Deeds

Atty. Palabrica
II-E
ENRIQUEZ, 201540083
Darla Claire T.

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:

On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the
land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. The
property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-
square meters. To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001. After trial, on
December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for land
registration.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. The CA ruled that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to
March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of
possession. Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs
elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari. The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of

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the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing.

The petition for review on certiorari was denied because Malabanan failed to establish by
sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of
the land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land
since June 12, 1945

Held:

No. The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

G.R. No. 175760 February 17, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. SOGOD DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

Facts:

On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and confirmation of

land title over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with an area of 23,896 square meters and situated in
Brgy. Tabunok, Municipality of Sogod, Province of Cebu. Sogod claimed that it purchased the

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land "from Catalina Rivera per deed of absolute sale dated Oct[ober] 28, 1996[.]" It also averred
that "by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest[,] [it had] been in open, continuous,
exclusive[,] and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since June 12, 1945[.]"

On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved to dismiss the
Petition11 on the ground that Sogod was disqualified from applying for original registration of
title to alienable lands pursuant to Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution.

On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources, Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City filed an Opposition on
the ground that the land was previously forest land and "was certified and released as alienable
and disposable only on January 17, 1986."

On May 10, 2001, the trial court rendered the Decision granting the application.

The Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. According to the
Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in allowing the titling of Lot No. 2533
because, Sogod failed to prove its open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; The land was only declared alienable and
disposable on January 17, 1986, pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1611, "making
it impossible for [Sogod] and its predecessor-sin-interest to have possessed the land in concept of
an owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier[;]""Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
disqualifies private corporations from applying for original registration of title to alienable
lands."

On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the Decision
of the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu. The Office of the
Solicitor General moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision.

Issue:

Whether the occupation of forest land prior to its classification as alienable and disposable land
may be considered for purposes of complying with the requirements for judicial confirmation of
title

Whether respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the property in the manner
and length of time required by law

Held:

The requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable. The ruling in Heirs of Malabanan adopted the earlier
interpretation in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit that Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree "merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed." This court also

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emphasized in Naguit the absurdity that would result in interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring
that the public land should have already been characterized as alienable by June 12, 1945. The
more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already
an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

Analyzing the testimony as well as the documentary evidence submitted, it can be clearly
surmised that the land was devoted to agriculture in 1945 and even prior to that year. Based on
human experience, the area planted with corn and maguey is a considerable tract of land that it
presupposes that the land ceased to be a forest land. Such that, even if the land was declared to
be alienable and disposable only in the year 1986, the actual use of Catalina Rivera of this tract
of land was already agriculture. Thus, respondent had established (by itself and through its
predecessor-in-interest) its possession in the concept of owner of the property since 1945. It is
further undisputed that the property was declared alienable and disposable in 1986 prior to
respondent's filing of its application in 1999. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in
affirming the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Decision granting respondent's application for
original registration of title.