ART 962
interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention;
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000]
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. PASTORA
PIEDAD, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu
moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the
Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad,"
pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay
City. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H.
Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court
awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that
the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an
incomplete publication of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice
to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of
allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial
court denied the motion, prompting petitioner to raise her case to the
Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the appeal on the
thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions
of law. Finding merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but
questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and consistently
with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the
distinctions between questions of law and questions of fact, thus:
"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevance of specific
surrounding circumstances, and their relation to each other and to the
whole and the probabilities of the situation."[1]
Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court,
ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had aprima
facie interest over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the
proper parties was not acquired in view of the deficient publication or
notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and
terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to
place the appeal within the jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:
"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution
are based on facts not in dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-
appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H.
Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad;
that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of
Augusto H. Piedad; that the notice of hearing was published for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was
no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate
court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the
transfer of the remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-
appellee.
"These facts are undisputed.
"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or
falsehood on alleged facts. The question as to whether intervenor-
appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil degree, has legal
the question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in
this case is defective which would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of the parties and the question as to whether the proceedings
has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of
transfer of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite
the absence of an order of closure of the intestate court, all call for the
application and interpretation of the proper law. There is doubt as to
what law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts.
"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the
evidence, nor the credibility of witnesses presented, nor the existence
and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances. Resolution on the
issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on
record."[2]
Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the
appellate court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate
court. But let us set aside the alleged procedural decrepitude and take on
the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral
relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral
relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does the rule of
proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral
relatives?
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an
almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of
law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person upon
his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in
isolation of, the system set out by the Code.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest
in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except
when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus,
Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half
blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the
paternal and maternal lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a
decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree"
of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person
he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to
whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have
if he were living or if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would
have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood."
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division
of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the
representative or representatives shall not inherit more than what the
person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral
relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and
respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference
following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the
legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, thesurviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives,
except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in
Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining
the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent,
Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
"Article 966. x x x
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three
from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin
and so forth."
Accordingly Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of
the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth
degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the
fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line." -
invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only
that among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of
succession), no preference or distinction shall beobserved "by reason
of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit
alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit
equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being
a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the
fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in
succession to a fifth-degree relative.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art 970 and 971
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C.
ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu the question raised is whether the widow whose husband
predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs.
Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived
by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the
dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R.
Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order
dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs
of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes
(daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and
Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated
February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share
of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio
Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of
her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned
Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition.
First is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-
law? Second are the Orders of the trial court which excluded the
widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the
said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those
who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil
Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the
same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him
in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by
right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children or their descendants and illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit
from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order
of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the
State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a
provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the
deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature
intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the
parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with
the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards
the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this
observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in
Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it
affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-
law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis
supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code
aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of
the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the
estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of
the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra
V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of
Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of
the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by
Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed
his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased
his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would
have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband
Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties
of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her
husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of
representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it
unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving
spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded
to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Art 975
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO
CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a
legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859
(Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely:
Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio
Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband
Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit
"E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic
(Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died
sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August
19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino,
Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her
heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong,
Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on
April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa
Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her
daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present
suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving
behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit
1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns
the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following
described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her
deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with
38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded
on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S.
by Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by
Tax No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now
Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and
German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by
Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of
11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso
and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by
Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W.
by Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in
the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at
P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San
Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro
Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio
Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653
for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.
21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria,
Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990
sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E.
by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by
Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959,
namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the
Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic,
daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and
Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties
passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the
administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached
her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties.
However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to
divide the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and
burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to defer
the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again
sometime in 1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the
request as the debts, accordingly, had already been paid.
Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having
been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of
the same to the defendants.
 After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24)
share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio
Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are
represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino
Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959
the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24)
share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with
legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.TA7
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the
substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and
execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession,
that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence,
the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half
undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under
letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to
be only in his possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of
Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court
in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura
Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course
of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants
to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic,
died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa
succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the
New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be
brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares,"
and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of
Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the
subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of
the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly
established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination
is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case
to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil
Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These
Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation,
if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall
be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid
down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of
full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of
half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil
Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-
Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that
"nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that
is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to
whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does
not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in
their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article
1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the
sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces
of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood
relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura,
et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28
SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded
by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews
and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and
erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that
Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as
she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No
costs.
Art 980
THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 109963 October 13, 1999
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES, ARCADIA TEVES, TOMAS
ZAMORA, FELICIA TEVES, HELEN TEVES, ALFREDO OSMEA, ROBERTO
TEVES, JOAQUIN TEVES, III, PETER TEVES, MILDRED TEVES, WILSON
MABILOG, LEONILO PATIGAYON, EDUARDO PATIGAYON, ALEXANDER
PATIGAYON, ALDRIN PATIGAYON, NOEL PATIGAYON, VICTOR
PATIGAYON, MA. TEVES PATERNO OCHOTORENA, EXEQUILA TEVES,
EMILIO JO, EMILIANA TEVES, MILAGROS TEVES, EDSEL PINILI, VICENTE
TEVES, EMILIANA ISO, ALBERTO TEVES, ERLINDA TEVES, DIOSDADO
TEVES, VICTORIA TEVES AND VIVENCIO NARCISO,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT NAMELY: ELISA IT-IT,
SUSANA IT-IT, NORBERTO IT-IT, ISA-AC IT-IT, JR., JAIME IT-IT, FELICITAS
IT-IT, TERESITA IT-IT, ANTONIO NODADO, CORAZON IT-IT, JIMMY LERO,
DANILO IT-IT, EDITA GAMORA, PACITA VAILOCES, CRIS VAILOCES,
CECILIA CIMAFRANCA and CECILIA FLOR CIMAFRANCA, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals which was promulgated on August 18, 1992
affirming the July 11, 1991 decision 2 of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental in favor of defendants-appellees.
The facts, as culled from the pleadings of the parties herein and the
decision of the lower courts, are as follows:
Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children, namely
Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Andres, Asuncion, Gorgonio, Cresenciano,
Arcadia and Maria. Andres, however, predeceased both his parents and
died without issue. After Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died,
intestate and without debts, in 1943 and 1953, respectively, their children
executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto
themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their
deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their
sister Asuncion Teves. The validity of these settlements executed
pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the primary issue
in the present case.1wphi1.nt
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo and Arcadia Teves filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental for the
partition and reconveyance of two parcels of land located in Dumaguete,
designated as Lots 769-A and 6409, against the heirs of Asuncion Teves.
The complaint was subsequently amended to include Maria Teves and
the heirs of Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, and Gorgonio Teves as plaintiffs and
the spouses Lucresio Baylosis and Pacita Nocete, and Cecilia Cimafranca-
Gamos and Cecilia Flor Cimafranca as defendants. 3Plaintiffs-appellants
alleged that defendants-appellees, without any justifiable reason,
refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey to plaintiffs
their rightful shares. 4
Lot 769, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4682-A, 5 is
registered in the names of Urbana Cimafranca, one-fourth (1/4) share,
Marcelina Cimafranca, the wife of Joaquin Teves, one-fourth (1/4) share,
Domingo Villahermosa, one-eighth (1/8) share, Antero Villahermosa, one-
eighth (1/8) share, Cecilia Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share and Julio
Cimafranca, one-eighth (1/8) share. The present controversy involves only
Marcelina Cimafranca's one-fourth (1/4) share in the land, designated as
Lot 769-A.
On June 13, 1956, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro, Asuncion, Gorgonio and Arcadia
Teves executed a document entitled "Settlement of Estate and
Sale," 6 adjudicating unto themselves, in equal shares, Lot 769-A and
conveying their shares, interests and participations over the same in
favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P425.00. A similar deed
denominated "Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" 7 was signed by Maria
Teves on April 21, 1959. Under such deed, Maria conveys her own share
over Lot 769-A in favor of Asuncion Teves for the consideration of P80.00.
The two settlements were denounced by the plaintiffs as spurious. The
trial court summarized the claims of the plaintiffs, viz
. . . Maria Teves Ochotorena herself, denied having executed this
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale over her share or interest in Lot
769 claiming that her signature in said document is a forgery. She
disowns her signature declaring that as a married woman she
always signs a document in her husband's family name. Further,
she declared that on the date she purportedly signed said
document in Dumaguete City before the notary public, she was in
her home in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
On Exhibit "G" which is likewise offered as Exhibit "3" for the
defendants, plaintiffs hold that said document is spurious claiming
that the signatures of Pedro Teves, Felicia Teves and Gorgonio
Teves are all forgeries. To support this allegation, Helen T.
Osmena, daughter of Felicia Teves and Erlinda Teves, daughter of
Gorgonio Teves were presented as witnesses. Being allegedly
familiar with the style and character of the handwriting of their
parents these witnesses declared unequivocally that the
signatures of their parents appearing on the document are
forgeries.
In sum, plaintiffs argue that these fraudulent documents which
defendants rely in claiming ownership to the disputed properties
are all nullities and have no force in law and could not be used as
basis for any legal title. Consequently, in their view, they are
entitled to the reliefs demanded particularly, to their respective
shares of the disputed properties. 8
The other property in dispute is Lot 6409 which was originally covered by
OCT No. 9091 9 and was registered in the name of Joaquin Teves and his
two sisters, Matea and Candida Teves. However, Matea and Candida died
without issue, causing the entire property to pass to Joaquin Teves. On
December 14, 1971, Lot 6409 was adjudicated and divided in equal shares
in a "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale" 10 executed by Joaquin
Teves' children Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and
Maria Teves. In the same deed, the shares of these same heirs in Lot 6409
were sold to Asuncion Teves for P100.00. Asuncion Teves took
possession of the land and acquired title 11 over the same on March 22,
1972. After her death in 1981, her children, defendants-appellees It-it
herein, extrajudicially settled Asuncion Teves' property, adjudicating
unto themselves Lot 6409. 12 On July 20, 1983 a new transfer certificate
of title 13 was issued in the names of Asuncion Teves' children, namely
Elisa, Susana, Norberto, Isaac, Jaime, Felicitas, Teresita, Corazon, and
Danilo, all surnamed It-it. On July 2, 1984, the It-its sold Lot 6409 to
defendants-appellees Lucrecio Baylosis, Sr. and Pacita Nocete-Baylosis
for P20,000.00 14 and a transfer certificate of title 15 was issued in the
name of the Baylosis couple.
Plaintiffs-appellants claim that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement &
Sale covering Lot 6409 is also spurious. Their arguments were discussed
in the trial court's decision as follows
Presented as Exhibit "D" and "1" for both the plaintiffs and
defendants respectively, is a document denominated as
"Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale" executed on December 4, 1971
by and among the heirs of Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca.
This document which gave birth to TCT No. 5761 over Lot 6409
registered in the name of Asuncion Teves It-it is questioned by the
plaintiffs as spurious for the following reasons:
1. Erasure of the word "quitclaim" is superimposed with the word
"sale" in handwriting.
2. The consideration of "One peso" stated in document is
intercalated with the word "hundred" in handwriting.
3. The signature of Maria Teves Ochotorena, Pedro Teves and Felicia
Teves are forgeries.
 4. The thumbmark imposed on the name of Gorgonio Teves does not
actually belong to Gorgonio Teves who was an educated man and
skilled in writing according to his daughter.
Aside from these defects which would make said document null and
void, Arcadia Teves who is one of the living sisters of the mother of
the principal defendants although confirming the authenticity of her
signature averred that in reality no consideration was ever given to
her and that her impression of the said document was that she was
only giving her consent to sell her share of the land.
Plaintiffs likewise contend that as regards the share of Ricardo
Teves, son of Crescenciano Teves who predeceased Joaquin and
Marcelina, it was not at all affected in that extrajudicial settlement
and sale since neither Crescenciano Teves nor his son Ricardo Teves
participated in its execution.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, plaintiffs offered TCT No. 5761 for Lot 6409 registered in
the name of Asuncion Teves It-it as Exhibit "B" as proof that said
property was later titled in trust for all the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
which was used later as basis in effecting a deed of sale in favor of
co-defendant Lucresio Baylosis. In this light, the plaintiffs argue that
the sale of said property is a nullity for it was not only attended with
bad faith on the part of both the vendor and the vendee but
primarily the vendor had no right at all to part with said property
which is legally owned by others. 16
In answer to plaintiffs-appellants' charges of fraud, defendants-appellees
maintained that the assailed documents were executed with all the
formalities required by law and are therefore binding and legally effective
as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over the lots in question.
Furthermore, it is contended that plaintiffs-appellants have slept on their
rights and should now be deemed to have abandoned such rights. 17
The trial court ruled in favor of defendants-appellees and rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint with costs against plaintiffs-
appellants. As regards Lot 6409, the court declared that the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale executed by the heirs of Joaquin Teves and
Marcelina Cimafranca was duly executed with all the formalities required
by law, thus, validly conveying Lot 6409 in favor of Asuncion Teves.
Moreover, it stated that, even granting the truth of the imputed
infirmities in the deed, the right of plaintiffs-appellants to bring an action
for partition and reconveyance was already barred by prescription. An
action for the annulment of a partition must be brought within four years
from the discovery of the fraud, while an action for the reconveyance of
land based upon an implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten
years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title.
The complaint in this case was filed on May 9, 1984, exactly 12 years, 1
month and 17 days after the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in
the name of Asuncion Teves on March 22, 1972. Thus, ownership over Lot
6409 rightfully belonged to defendants-appellees It-it.
Moreover, the trial court held that the extrajudicial settlements over both
Lots 6409 and 769, having been prepared and acknowledged before a
notary public, are public documents, vested with public interest, the
sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and
convincing evidence. The evidence presented by the plaintiffs to support
their charges of forgery was considered by the court insufficient to rebut
the legal presumption of validity accorded to such documents. 18
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision affirming the
validity of the extrajudicial statements, with a slight modification. It
disposed of the case, thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification in
that herein defendant-appellees are hereby ORDERED
to partition Lot 769-A and deliver to plaintiff-appellant
Ricardo Teves one-eight (sic) (1/8) portion thereof
corresponding to the share of his deceased father
Cresenciano Teves. No costs.
The appellate court said that plaintiffs-appellants' biased and interested
testimonial evidence consisting of mere denials of their signatures in the
disputed instruments is insufficient to prove the alleged forgery and to
overcome the evidentiary force of the notarial documents. It also ruled
that the plaintiffs-appellants' claim over Lot 6409 was barred by
prescription after the lapse of ten years from the issuance of title in favor
of Asuncion Teves, while their claim over Lot 769-A is barred by laches
since more than 25 years has intervened between the sale to Asuncion
Teves and the filing of the present case in 1984.
The appellate court noted that the conveyance of Lot 769-A in favor of
Asuncion Teves did not affect the share of Cresenciano Teves as he was
not a signatory to the settlements. It also found that Ricardo Teves,
Cresenciano's heir, is in possession of a portion of Lot 769-A and that
defendants-appellees do no not claim ownership over such portion. Thus,
the defendants-appellees It-it were ordered to partition and convey to
Ricardo Teves his one-eighth share over Lot 769-A.1wphi1.nt
As regards the extrajudicial settlement involving Lot 6409, although it
was found by the appellate court that Cresenciano Teves was also not a
signatory thereto, it held that it could not order the reconveyance of the
latter's share in such land in favor of his heir Ricardo Teves because
Cresenciano had predeceased Joaqin Teves. Moreover, Ricardo Teves, by
a deed simply denominated as "Agreement" executed on September 13,
1955 wherein he was represented by his mother, authorized the heirs of
Joaquin Teves to sell his share in Lot 6409. 19
Plaintiffs-appellants assailed the appellate court's decision upon the
following grounds
I. IN CONSIDERING RICARDO TEVES AS BOUND BY THE SIGNATURE
OF HIS MOTHER, INSPITE OF DEATH OF CRESENCIANO TEVES IN 1944;
AND UNDER THE OLD CIVIL CODE THE SPOUSE CANNOT INHERIT
EXCEPT THE USUFRUCT;
II. IN UPHOLDING SWEEPINGLY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
OF NOTARIZED DEED, DESPITE CLEAR, CONVINCING, SUBSTANTIAL
AND SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MARIA OCHOTORENA WAS IN
MINDANAO; THE NOTARY PULIC DID NOT KNOW MARIA
OCHOTORENA AND THE SIGNATURES OF THE OTHER HEIRS IN THE
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ARE BELIED BY COMPARISON WITH THE
GENUINE SIGNATURE IN EXH. "E";
III. IN VALIDATING THE ONE PESO CONSIDERATION, INSPITE OF NO
OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, THE SUPERIMPOSED P100 WAS
UNILATERALLY INSERTED, SHOWING FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED
CONSIDERATION; AND
IV. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT START FROM A VOID
CONTRACT. 20
We affirm that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of
Joaquin Teves and Marcelina Cimafranca are legally valid and binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate is authorized by
section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part
that
 If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
...
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid,
the following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no
will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left,
all had been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are
minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or
legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a
public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of
Deeds. 21
We uphold, finding no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate
courts' factual finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-
appellants is insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of the
extrajudicial settlements. The deeds are public documents and it has
been held by this Court that a public document executed with all the legal
formalities is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals
contained therein. 22 In order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public
to the effect that the grantor executed a certain document and
acknowledged the fact of its execution before him, mere preponderance
of evidence will not suffice. Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the
certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be
upheld. 23 The appellate court's ruling that the evidence presented by
plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the clear, strong, and convincing
evidence necessary to overcome the positive value of the extrajudicial
settlements executed by the parties, all of which are public documents,
being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great respect by the
appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal. 24
It is noted that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement & Sale covering Lot
6409 purports to divide Joaquin Teves' estate among only six of his heirs,
namely Asuncion, Teotimo, Felisia, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Maria
Teves. 25 It does not mention nor bear the signatures of either Pedro or
Cresenciano Teves although they are both intestate heirs of Joaquin
Teves and as such, are entitled to a proportionate share of the decedent's
estate. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, the fact that
Cresenciano predeceased Joaquin Teves does not mean that he or, more
accurately, his heirs, lose the right to share in the partition of the property
for this is a proper case for representation, wherein the representative is
raised to the place and degree of the person represented and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living. 26
However, notwithstanding their non-inclusion in the settlement, the
action which Pedro and Cresenciano might have brought for the
reconveyance of their shares in the property has already prescribed. An
action for reconveyance based upon an implied trust pursuant to article
1456 of the Civil Code prescribes in ten years from the registration of the
deed or from the issuance of the title. 27 Asuncion Teves acquired title
over Lot 6409 in 1972, but the present case was only filed by plaintiffs-
appellants in 1984, which is more than 10 years from the issuance of
title.28
The division of Lot 769-A, on the other hand, was embodied in two deeds.
The first extrajudicial settlement was entered into by Teotimo, Felicia,
Pedro, Gorgonio, Arcadia and Asuncion Teves in 1956 29, while the second
deed was executed in 1959 by Maria Teves. 30 Cresenciano was not a
signatory to either settlement. However, in contrast to the extrajudicial
settlement covering Lot 6409, the two extrajudicial settlements
involving Lot 769-A do not purport to exclude Cresenciano from his
participation in Lot 769-A or to cede his share therein in favor of
Asuncion. The settlement clearly adjudicated the property in equal shares
in favor of the eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Moreover, the deeds
were intended to convey to Asuncion Teves only the shares of those heirs
who affixed their signatures in the two documents. The pertinent
portions of the extrajudicial settlement executed in 1956, of which
substantively identical provisions are included in the 1959 deed, provide
xxx xxx xxx
5. That by virtue of the right of succession the eight heirs above
mentioned inherit and adjudicate unto themselves in equal shares Lot
No. 769-A and our title thereto is evidenced by the O.C. of Title No.
4682-A of the Land Records of Negros Oriental.
THAT FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY-FIVE (P425.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency which we have
received from ASUNCION TEVES; WE, Teotimo, Felicia, Pedro,
Gorgonio and Arcadia, all surnamed Teves, do hereby sell, transfer and
convey unto Asuncion Teves, married to Isaac Itit, Filipino, of legal age
and resident of and with postal address in the City of
Dumaguete, all our shares, interests and participations over Lot 769-A
of the subdivision plan, Psd, being a portion of Lot No. 769 of the
Cadastral Survey of Dumaguete, her heirs, successors and assigns,
together with all the improvements thereon.
xxx xxx xxx
It has even been admitted by both parties that Ricardo Teves is in
possession of an undetermined portion of Lot 769-A and defendants-
appellees It-it do not claim ownership over his share in the land. 31 Thus,
contrary to the appellate court's ruling, there is no basis for an action
for reconveyance of Ricardo Teves' share since, in the first place, there
has been no conveyance. Ricardo Teves is entitled to the ownership
and possession of one-eighth of Lot 769-A.
Neither does Ricardo Teves have a right to demand partition of Lot 769-
A because the two extajudicial settlements have already effectively
partitioned such property. Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. 32 The extrajudicial settlements
executed in 1956 and 1959 adjudicated Lot 769-A in equal shares unto the
eight heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca. Such a partition, which was legally
made, confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him. 33 Although Cresenciano, Ricardo's predecessor-in-
interest, was not a signatory to the extrajudicial settlements, the
partition of Lot 769-A among the heirs was made in accordance with their
intestate shares under the law. 34
With regards to the requisite of registration of extrajudicial settlements,
it is noted that the extrajudicial settlements covering Lot 769-A were
never registered. However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, 35 the
Court, interpreting section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, upheld the
validity of an oral partition of the decedent's estate and declared that the
non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic
validity. It was held in this case that
[t]he requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The
object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the
prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights
are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by law.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements
involving Lot 769-A are legally effective and binding among the
heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their mother had no
creditors at the time of her death.
Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both
parcels of land have been and continue to be in the possession of
Asuncion Teves and her successors-in-interest. 36 Despite this, no
explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to why they instituted
the present action questioning the extrajudicial settlements only in 1984,
which is more than 25 years after the assailed conveyance of Lot 769-A
and more than 10 years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title
over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such tardiness
indubitably constitutes laches, which is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it. 37 Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause
of action, they are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long
and inexcusable inaction.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched
doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out
to be a foolish or unwise investment. 38 Therefore, although plaintiffs-
appellants may regret having alienated their hereditary shares in favor of
their sister Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their own
contractual acts.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the August 18, 1992 decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Art 992
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-66574 June 17, 1987
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and
MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA
guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI
JARDIN, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court
of First Instance of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying
among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be
issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special Administratrix of
the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother
of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his
parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero
in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his
mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four
minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the
properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate
Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4
and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo
Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.
Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her
"Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13,
1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.
Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her
Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.
On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding
Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the
intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her
to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its
order dated November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was
rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983
(reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of which
reads
WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the
facts and law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one
entered sustaining the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the
petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and
ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for
 the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.
Costs against the oppositors-appellees.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) was denied by the same respondent court in its
order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review
with the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of
petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978)
and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece,
who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);
II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the
natural grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero
in the succession to the intestate estate of their
grandmotherSimona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);
III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the
grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of
"legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of
the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;
IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin
who is a niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who
are her direct descendants and/or grand children;
V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990
are the applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and
VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of
December 1 and December 9, 1976 which are
provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows who are the
legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti
Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees
(petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit
from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their
father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de
Santero.
Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend
in their pleadings that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law
on the case. They contend that said provision of the New Civil Code
modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right
of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate
children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from
their deceased grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed
and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly grants the
illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo
Santero) in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5
Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict
refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the
provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit
ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child. (943a)
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the
other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that
it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of
said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by
the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in
turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable
evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in
the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided
for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of
the Spanish Civil Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We
are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice
Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate
child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of
the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or
contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998.
The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of
Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase
"legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the
kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the
commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the
legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa
Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article
992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any
error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was
survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of
Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December the deceased, to wit:
1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is
without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1,
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to
Manuel C. Pascual
intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the
Jose C. Pascual
declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated
Erlinda C. Pascual
December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the
subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal.
Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already (c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide deceased, to wit:
anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has
become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent Avelino Pascual
Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a Isoceles Pascual
quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir Loida Pascual-Martinez
of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal Virginia Pascual-Ner
of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void. " Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
is hereby AFFIRMED.
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the
SO ORDERED. full blood of the deceased, to wit:

SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs. (e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. deceased and represented by the following:
PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. Dominga M. Pascual
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL- Mamerta P. Fugoso
MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents. Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
PARAS, J.:

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set
Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,
aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-
Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the
G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v.
intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C.
Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al."
which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental
trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly
motion for reconsideration. stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an
affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being
belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not
the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p.
petition, p. 17).
102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein
petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph
V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without
prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled
proceedings until the final determination thereof by
the court, or by another compromise agreement, as
regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes
Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don
Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate
Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of
Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge
Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court
resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes
Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
(Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision
the decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on
July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article
992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of
Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA
645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their
illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such
children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in
Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children
(Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners
are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine
laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC,
supra, where this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not
err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio
Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the
decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of
Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to
represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court
further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which
squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact
that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The
three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It
may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions
 of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion
is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child
to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which
would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestatobetween the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not
be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902
that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion
by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be
more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction
that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.
(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not
susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may
be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et
al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be
conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather
than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute,
the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication
(Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue
as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated
differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX
SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29,
1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco,
RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L.
CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and
CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-
seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of
First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of
probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73
Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives
were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco,
the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and
Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and
(4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus.
Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael
Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of
whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees
named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of
Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be
declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It was
also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus,
Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead
when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in
conformity with the will because the testator intended that the estate.
should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed
"que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y
negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestadocon respecio a los raismos y
que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la
declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del
difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project
of partition. It held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended
to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his
death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen
malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the testator
intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion
would be regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that
"no hay motives legales o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro
R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888,
which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual
entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus
(deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476).
Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10
and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into
compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the
legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V.
Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein
appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole
heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar
compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal became, final
and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt
dated October 24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from
the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as
settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per
understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D
or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the
settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court
approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition
was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the
Yangco's estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed
share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the
dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon
alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that
the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should
be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the
grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of
Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in
Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the
testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution
dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this
Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand
pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in
holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will
had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res
judicata and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether
Yangco's will had been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas
Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved
by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a
legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his
mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The
trial court found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y
Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre
natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that
Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and not a
legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael
Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children
were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales
reconocidos, Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los
cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in
Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus
and Florencio Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco,
Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20,
as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He
contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy
found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the
statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco,
that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin
implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the
mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis
Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from
Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt
in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus
are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken
place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
It is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was
illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose
Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus
has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share
of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita
Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court
did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el
legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes
legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo
natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity
mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez
Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child,
he (Tomas Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the
distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which
provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn,
hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further
grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged
natural or legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall
succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive,
they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural
ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established
for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half
brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to
succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
(Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs.
Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose
Table the two acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table
her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88
Phil. 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural
father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent
(Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322;
Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle,
a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz,
38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 183053 June 16, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, - versus - ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain
and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or more
appropriately, the riches of the New World by issuing the Inter
Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale
of another family imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74949,[4] reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.[5]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
(Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In
1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by
her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco,
and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel;
Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is
marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter,
Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay
Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and
Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever
since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and
Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an
acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by
the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and
Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon
City, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a
petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent Isabel,
Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour
of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether
stopped because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel,
articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or
on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio
III and Nenita.[7]
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor, containing the following
allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of
the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the
[decedent] left an estate of real and personal properties, with a
probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages
and residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident
of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate
granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-
Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident
of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old,
legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as
[respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at
the time of her death.[8]
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent
Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging,
among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as
its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal
preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her
family had been alienated from their grandparents for more
than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the
petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children
of his son[,] namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is
better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina
as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one
who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable
value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly
overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the
properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the
proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March 13,
1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the
decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the
one with a better right to the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for
Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed
the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or
in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina. Additionally,
Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he] is presently engaged in
aquaculture and banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his
early age by involving him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo
Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her
grandmothers father; the significant work experiences outside the family
group are included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the
oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with management
degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000,
Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and
evidence on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial court
rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner,
Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his
trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3)
months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and
discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or
dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within
one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court,
and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of
Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of
Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision
dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court
to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked.
Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he
appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS
REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY,
WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO
BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC
ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both
testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the best
interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants thereto, that
the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed administrator of
the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court,
[respondents immediate] family and that of the decedent are
apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this court to
ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum to dwell upon.
What matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the
decedent in the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go
against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy
in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it would go
against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio
III] for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is
accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78,
Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed
the appointment of the petitioner and instead nominated [Emilio III],
his grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination, absent any valid
and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed
away, in order to give effect to the order of preference mandated by
law. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of
[Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the
estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator
should be one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for
the demands and responsibilities of the position. While [respondent],
a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court that
when it comes to management of real estate and the processing and
payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an established track
record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a position
to better handle the preservation of the estate.[14]
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an
illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his
deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the
decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was
merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the
latters appointment as administrator of the decedents estate, cannot be
appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for the following
reasons:[15]
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive
condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he
being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of
Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate
rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and
illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is
preferred, being the next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate
as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992[16] of the
Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III,
who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred
over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother,
the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much
competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for
she possesses none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1, [17] Rule
78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III
and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedents estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding
Emilio III in the administration of the decedents undivided estate.
Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and
circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession
is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the decedent,
absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the
iron curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal
relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate
of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of
gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in the
conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains
undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one degree
from Federico, not simply representing his deceased illegitimate father,
Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in
excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As
Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as
much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent,
considering that the CA even declared that under the law, [Federico],
being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share
in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to
a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a
suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos
death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If
no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person
as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or
next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the
attendant facts and circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has
long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court.[20] In the main, the attendant facts and
circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration
by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the appointment by the
trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the
decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate.
In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation
which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession
other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina
and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico,
and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In
all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the
unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms
part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
 One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that
Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate
and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance
where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an
illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the
decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy,
educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted
by decedents husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for
letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and
a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992
of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the
illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in
the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of
an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation,
in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise
maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first
solution would be more in accord with an enlightened
attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.[23]
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the
deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and,
finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the
descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals,
always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter
degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have
done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of
anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of
blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will
that his property be given to charitable or educational
institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.[24]
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect
the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in
fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild
to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case,
painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a
deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint
impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will
administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be
settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue
remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,
although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially
opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the
inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from
the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of
Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding
Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of
decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu
as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
ART 994
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001]
Heirs of Spouses REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS and ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS
SR. -- ROBERTO R. SANDEJAS, ANTONIO R. SANDEJAS,
CRISTINA SANDEJAS MORELAND, BENJAMIN R. SANDEJAS,
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS; and heirs of SIXTO S. SANDEJAS II,
RAMON R. SANDEJAS, TERESITA R. SANDEJAS, and ELIODORO
R. SANDEJAS JR., all represented by ROBERTO R.
SANDEJAS, petitioners, vs. ALEX A. LINA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to
probate court approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-
heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In
settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property contracted by
the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the
same Rule, the said provision does not limit to the executor or
administrator the right to file the application for authority to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under administration. The
standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court inures
to any person who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated April 16, 1999
and the Resolution[2] dated January 12, 2000, both promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 49491. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:[3]
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, [w]e hereby MODIFY the [O]rder of
the lower court dated January 13, 1995, approving the Receipt of Earnest
Money With Promise to Buy and Sell dated June 7, 1982, only to the three-
fifth (3/5) portion of the disputed lots covering the share of
[A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. [in] the property. The intervenor is
hereby directed to pay appellant the balance of the purchase price of the
three-fifth (3/5) portion of the property within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this [O]rder and x x x the administrator [is directed] to execute
the necessary and proper deeds of conveyance in favor of appellee within
thirty (30) days thereafter.
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration of the foregoing
disposition.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA), are
as follows:[4]
On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP.
Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that letters of
administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of
his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1,
1981, Letters of Administration [were issued by the lower court
appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the
late Remedios Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 16). Likewise
on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took his oath as administrator
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 17). x x x.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and
among the records burned were the records of Branch XI of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. As a result, [A]dministrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
filed a [M]otion for [R]econstitution of the records of the case on
February 9, 1983 (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 1-5). On February
16, 1983, the lower court in its [O]rder granted the said motion (Record,
SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 28-29).
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and
petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant Alex A. Lina alleging
among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and [A]dministrator Eliodoro
P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his
heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in
their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the
estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas, to wit:
1. A parcel of land (Lot No. 22 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-
21121, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13465;
2. A parcel of land (Lot No. 21 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-
21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY (270) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13464;
3. A parcel of land (Lot No. 5 Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-
21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13468;
4. A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Block No. 45 of the subdivision plan Psd-
21141, being a portion of Block 45 described on plan Psd-19508 G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2029), situated in the Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal,
containing an area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS,
more or less, with TCT No. 13468;
The [R]eceipt of the [E]arnest [M]oney with [P]romise to [S]ell and to
[B]uy is hereunder quoted, to wit:
Received today from MR. ALEX A. LINA the sum of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company Chec[k] No. 319913 dated today for P100,000.00,
x x x as additional earnest money for the following:
xxxxxxxxx
all registered with the Registry of Deeds of the [P]rovince of Rizal (Makati
Branch Office) in the name of SELLER ELIODORO SANDEJAS, Filipino
Citizen, of legal age, married to Remedios Reyes de Sandejas; and which
undersigned, as SELLER, binds and obligates himself, his heirs,
administrators and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely in their entirety
(all of the four (4) parcels of land above described, which are contiguous
to each other as to form one big lot) to said Mr. Alex A. Lina, who has
agreed to buy all of them, also binding on his heirs, administrators and
assigns, for the consideration of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, upon such reasonable terms of payment as may be
agreed upon by them. The parties have, however, agreed on the
following terms and conditions:
1. The P100,000.00 herein received is in addition to the P70,000.00
earnest money already received by SELLER from BUYER, all of which shall
form part of, and shall be deducted from, the purchase price of
P1,000,000.00, once the deed of absolute [sale] shall be executed;
2. As a consideration separate and distinct from the price, undersigned
SELLER also acknowledges receipt from Mr. Alex A. Lina of the sum of
ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, per
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company Check No. 319912 dated today and
payable to SELLER for P1,000.00;
3. Considering that Mrs. Remedios Reyes de Sandejas is already deceased
and as there is a pending intestate proceedings for the settlement of her
estate (Spec. Proc. No. 138393, Manila CFI, Branch XI), wherein SELLER
was appointed as administrator of said Estate, and as SELLER, in his
capacity as administrator of said Estate, has informed BUYER that he
(SELLER) already filed a [M]otion with the Court for authority to sell the
above parcels of land to herein BUYER, but which has been delayed due
to the burning of the records of said Spec. Pro. No. 138398, which records
are presently under reconstitution, the parties shall have at least ninety
(90) days from receipt of the Order authorizing SELLER, in his capacity as
administrator, to sell all THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PARCELS OF LAND TO
HEREIN BUYER (but extendible for another period of ninety (90) days
upon the request of either of the parties upon the other), within which
to execute the deed of absolute sale covering all above parcels of land;
4. In the event the deed of absolute sale shall not proceed or not be
executed for causes either due to SELLERS fault, or for causes of which
the BUYER is innocent, SELLER binds himself to personally return to Mr.
Alex A. Lina the entire ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND
([P]170,000.00) PESOS in earnest money received from said Mr. Lina by
SELLER, plus fourteen (14%) percentum interest per annum, all of which
shall be considered as liens of said parcels of land, or at least on the share
therein of herein SELLER;
5. Whether indicated or not, all of above terms and conditions shall be
binding on the heirs, administrators, and assigns of both the SELLER
(undersigned MR. ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR.) and BUYER (MR. ALEX
A. LINA). (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 52-54)
On July 17, 1984, the lower court issued an [O]rder granting the
intervention of Alex A. Lina (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 167).
On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas
filed a [M]anifestation alleging among others that the administrator, Mr.
Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November 1984 in Canada and
said counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the
administrator. He also alleged, among others that the matter of the claim
of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate
of the late Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p.
220). On February 15, 1985, the lower court issued an [O]rder directing,
among others, that the counsel for the four (4) heirs and other heirs of
Teresita R. Sandejas to move for the appointment of [a] new
administrator within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this [O]rder
(Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 227). In the same manner, on
November 4, 1985, the lower court again issued an order, the content of
which reads:
On October 2, 1985, all the heirs, Sixto, Roberto, Antonio, Benjamin all
surnamed Sandejas were ordered to move for the appointment of [a]
new administrator. On October 16, 1985, the same heirs were given a
period of fifteen (15) days from said date within which to move for the
appointment of the new administrator. Compliance was set for October
30, 1985, no appearance for the aforenamed heirs. The aforenamed heirs
are hereby ordered to show cause within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Order why this Petition for Settlement of Estate should not be
dismissed for lack of interest and failure to comply with a lawful order of
this Court.
SO ORDERED. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p. 273)
On November 22, 1985, Alex A. Lina as petitioner filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila an Omnibus Pleading for (1) petition for letters of
administration [and] (2) to consolidate instant case with SP. Proc. No. R-
83-15601 RTC-Branch XI-Manila, docketed therein as SP. Proc. No. 85-
33707 entitled IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS,
SR., ALEX A. LINA PETITIONER, [for letters of administration] (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 1-7). On November 29, 1985, Branch XXXVI of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila issued an [O]rder consolidating SP. Proc.
No. 85-33707, with SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601 (Record, SP. Proc. No.85-
33707, p. 13). Likewise, on December 13, 1985, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XI, issued an [O]rder stating that this Court has no
objection to the consolidation of Special Proceedings No. 85-331707, now
pending before Branch XXXVI of this Court, with the present proceedings
now pending before this Branch (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, p.
279).
On January 15, 1986, Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his
appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios
R. Sandejas on the following reasons:
5.01. FIRST, as of this date, [i]ntervenor has not received any motion on
the part of the heirs Sixto, Antonio, Roberto and Benjamin, all surnamed
Sandejas, for the appointment of a new [a]dministrator in place of their
father, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr.;
5.02. SECOND, since Sp. Proc. 85-33707, wherein the [p]etitioner is herein
Intervenor Alex A. Lina and the instant Sp. PROC. R-83-15601, in effect are
already consolidated, then the appointment of Mr. Alex Lina as
[a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in instant
Sp. Proc. R-83-15601, would be beneficial to the heirs and also to the
Intervenor;
5.03. THIRD, of course, Mr. Alex A. Lina would be willing to give way at
anytime to any [a]dministrator who may be proposed by the heirs of the
deceased Remedios R. Sandejas, so long as such [a]dministrator is
qualified. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 281-283)
On May 15, 1986, the lower court issued an order granting the [M]otion
of Alex A. Lina as the new [a]dministrator of the Intestate Estate of
Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings. (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-
15601, pp. 288-290)
On August 28, 1986, heirs Sixto, Roberto, Antonio and Benjamin, all
surnamed Sandejas, and heirs [sic] filed a [M]otion for [R]econsideration
and the appointment of another administrator Mr. Sixto Sandejas, in lieu
of [I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina stating among others that it [was] only lately
that Mr. Sixto Sandejas, a son and heir, expressed his willingness to act
as a new administrator of the intestate estate of his mother, Remedios R.
Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 29-31). On October 2, 1986,
Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed his [M]anifestation and [C]ounter [M]otion
alleging that he ha[d] no objection to the appointment of Sixto Sandejas
as [a]dministrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his mother Remedios R.
Sandejas (Sp. Proc. No. 85-15601), provided that Sixto Sandejas be also
appointed as administrator of the [i]ntestate [e]state of his father,
Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr. (Spec. Proc. No. 85-33707), which two (2) cases
have been consolidated (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, pp. 34-36). On
March 30, 1987, the lower court granted the said [M]otion and
substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the said
[P]etitions (Record, SP. Proc. No. 85-33707, p.52). After the payment of
the administrators bond (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 348-349)
and approval thereof by the court (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 361),
Administrator Sixto Sandejas on January 16, 1989 took his oath as
administrator of the estate of the deceased Remedios R. Sandejas and
Eliodoro P. Sandejas (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 367) and was
likewise issued Letters of Administration on the same day (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 83-15601, p. 366).
On November 29, 1993, Intervenor filed [an] Omnibus Motion (a) to
approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-
Intervention Alex A. Lina and Elidioro [sic] Sandejas, Sr. on June 7, 1982;
(b) to compel the heirs of Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
thru their administrator, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of
[I]ntervenor Alex A. Lina pursuant to said conditional deed of sale
(Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 554-561) to which the administrator
filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss and/or [O]pposition to said omnibus motion
on December 13, 1993 (Record, SP. Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 591-603).
On January 13, 1995, the lower court rendered the questioned order
granting intervenors [M]otion for the [A]pproval of the Receipt of
Earnest Money with promise to buy between Plaintiff-in-Intervention
Alex A. Lina and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. dated June 7, 1982 (Record, SP.
Proc. No. 83-15601, pp. 652-654). x x x.
The Order of the intestate court[5] disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, [i]ntervenors motion for the approval of the Receipt Of
Earnest Money With Promise To Sell And To Buy dated June 7, 1982, is
granted. The [i]ntervenor is directed to pay the balance of the purchase
price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt of
this Order and the Administrator is directed to execute within thirty (30)
days thereafter the necessary and proper deeds of conveyancing.[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between
Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was
to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios Sandejas until the approval
of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. That approval was a
positive suspensive condition, the nonfulfillment of which was not
tantamount to a breach. It was simply an event that prevented the
obligation from maturing or becoming effective. If the condition did not
happen, the obligation would not arise or come into existence.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 89[7] of the Rules of Court was
inapplicable, because the lack of written notice to the other heirs showed
the lack of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this
reason, bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoy a
claim arising from ones own wrongdoing. Thus, Eliodoro Sr. was bound,
as a matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual
commitments as an owner and heir. When he entered into the agreement
with respondent, he bound his conjugal and successional shares in the
property.
Hence, this Petition.[8]
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following issues for
our resolution:
a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey
title to the property referred to in the subject document which was found
to be in the nature of a contract to sell where the suspensive condition
set forth therein [i.e.] court approval, was not complied with;
b) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. was guilty of bad faith despite
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondent [bore] the
burden of proving that a motion for authority to sell ha[d] been filed in
court;
c) Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the
subject property is three-fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the latter
should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty days from
receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent; and
d) Whether or not the respondents petition-in-intervention was
converted to a money claim and whether the [trial court] acting as a
probate court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to
execute [a] deed of conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P.
Sandejas Sr.[9]
In brief, the Petition poses the main issue of whether the CA erred
in modifying the trial courts Decision and in obligating petitioners to sell
3/5 of the disputed properties to respondent, even if the suspensive
condition had not been fulfilled. It also raises the following collateral
issues: (1) the settlement courts jurisdiction; (2) respondent-intervenors
standing to file an application for the approval of the sale of realty in the
settlement case, (3) the decedents bad faith, and (4) the computation of
the decedents share in the realty under administration.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is partially meritorious.
Main Issue:
Obligation With a Suspensive Condition
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of
the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the
suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the
Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy (also referred
to as the Receipt). Instead, they assert that because this condition had
not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land
was converted into a money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the
deceased Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to
sell. Not exactly. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price
is a positive suspensive condition. The vendors obligation to convey the
title does not become effective in case of failure to pay.[10]
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and
respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of a
court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership
in the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt,
petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to
respondent. This they could do upon the courts approval, even before full
payment.Hence, their contract was a conditional sale, rather than a
contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or
effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens or is
fulfilled.[11] Thus, the intestate courts grant of the Motion for Approval of
the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners obligation to execute
the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The condition having
been satisfied, the contract was perfected.Henceforth, the parties were
bound to fulfill what they had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedents
estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval,
however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to
dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-
ownership.[12] In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or
participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring
court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale
as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be
taken out of custodia legis, but only with the courts permission.[13] It
would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale
was imposed only for this reason.
 Thus, we are not persuaded by petitioners argument that the
obligation was converted into a mere monetary claim. Paragraph 4 of the
Receipt, which petitioners rely on, refers to a situation wherein the sale
has not materialized. In such a case, the seller is bound to return to the
buyer the earnest money paid plus interest at fourteen percent per
annum. But the sale was approved by the intestate court; hence,
the proviso does not apply.
Because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares
in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the Receipt to
the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the
intestate courts ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the
transaction.
First Collateral Issue:
Jurisdiction of Settlement Court
Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a)
jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale
but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon
an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor
or administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a
sale of the property under administration.
Citing Gil v. Cancio[14] and Acebedo v. Abesamis,[15] petitioners
contend that the CA erred in clothing the settlement court with the
jurisdiction to approve the sale and to compel petitioners to execute the
Deed of Sale. They allege factual differences between these cases and
the instant case, as follows: in Gil, the sale of the realty in administration
was a clear and an unequivocal agreement for the support of the widow
and the adopted child of the decedent; and in Acebedo, a clear sale had
been made, and all the heirs consented to the disposition of their shares
in the realty in administration.
We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this
action to proceed. The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no
bearing on the intestate courts jurisdiction over the approval of the
subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to
the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills
(Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the
removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate courts
recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise
encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this
point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the
benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately
enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.[16]
In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle
the decedents obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly
falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent
to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title
to Eliodoro Sr.s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong
the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.
The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale
between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was not a definite, clear
and absolute document of sale, as contended by petitioners. Upon the
occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally
demandable obligation that is binding upon the
parties.[17] That Acebedo also involved a conditional sale of real
property[18] proves that the existence of the suspensive condition did not
remove that property from the jurisdiction of the intestate court.
Second Collateral Issue: Intervenors Standing
Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or
administrator is authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of realty
under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in
entertaining and granting respondents Motion for Approval.
We read no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court,
provides:
SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased
contracted to convey. Notice. Effect of deed.Where the deceased was in
his lifetime under contract, binding in law, to deed real property, or an
interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on
application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to
convey such property according to such contract, or with such
modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and approved by the
court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or
administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed.x x x.
This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the
same Rule, specifically requiring only the executor or administrator to file
the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber
real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
(Section 2);[19] or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to
the heirs, devisees or legatees and other interested persons, although
such authority is not necessary to pay debts, legacies or expenses of
administration (Section 4).[20] Section 8 mentions only an application to
authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract that the deceased
entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should
file the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one
who is to be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be
entitled to the avails of the suit.[21]
Third Collateral Issue: Bad Faith
Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a)
he informed respondent of the need to secure court approval prior to the
sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the
approval.
We agree. Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to
respondent as his own properties to which he alone had a title in fee
simple. The fact that he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional
sale did not automatically imply bad faith on his part. The CA held him in
bad faith only for the purpose of binding him to the conditional sale. This
was unnecessary because his being bound to it is, as already shown,
beyond cavil.
Fourth Collateral Issue: Computation of Eliodoros Share
Petitioners aver that the CAs computation of Eliodoro Sr.s share in
the disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the conjugal
partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one
tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal
heirs. Hence, Eliodoros share should be 11/20 of the entire
property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.[22]
On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the
conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share
of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten
legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in
administration.[23]
 Petitioners computation is correct. The CA computed Eliodoros
share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It
should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal
share.[24]
The proper determination of the seller-heirs shares requires further
explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
decedents entire estate under the concept of conjugal properties of gains
-- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and
the other half to the heirs of the deceased.[25] After the settlement of the
debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed
to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this
preliminary determination of the decedents estate has already been
taken into account by the parties, since the only issue raised in this case
is whether Eliodoros share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
appealed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share
equivalent to 11/20 of the disputed lots.
SO ORDERED.
ART 995
THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several
parcels of land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was
survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been
married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City.
James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947.
Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May
1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that
James was presumptively dead. Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a
surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC")
of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta
Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.
She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate
would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first
marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's
absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years
before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending
to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the
administration of the estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and
administratrix, respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner
and against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas
y Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the
Court of Appeals, formulating that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code
in the instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when
the New Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is
bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the
presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at
No. 32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the
conjugal property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a
legal heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration
should be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado
M. Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as
follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco
del Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property
with the concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value
of the land to Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled
to one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein
petitioner Antonia Armas and her children, to the other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of
Marietta E. Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate,
and if so found competent and willing, that she be appointed as such;
otherwise, to determine who among the deceased's next of kin is
competent and willing to become the administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present
appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in
accord with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable
Court."[4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage
between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn,
would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta
was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the
Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988.
Article 256 of the Family Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance
only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is
Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other
than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the
prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives
exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to
in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the
spouse present(not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong
- it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through
some motive of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not find these
circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not
necessary[8] as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by
the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null
and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof
would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second
marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of
the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there
is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in
relation to Article 40,[10] of the Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first
husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for
more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958
with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be
deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having
been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses,
pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions --
one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the
estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right
of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters
or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and
nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the
presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and
nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or
sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the
latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed.
The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's
children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking
successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c)
of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are
likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in
lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the
decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her
own children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ART 1000
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21,
1973, dismissing petitioner's petition for settlement and partition of
estate.
On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-
said petition, subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del
Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo,
Rizal (Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).
On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition.
On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged
between the parties, issued an order requiring them to come up with a
joint stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).
On May 19, 1973, the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late
FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is
the. legitimate surviving wife of the deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.
PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally
adopted child of the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA DEL
ROSARIO CONANAN
THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO died last
September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.
That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL
ROSARIO are the petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O. CONANAN
and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.
Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to be
determined by the court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that on
the basis of the facts stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the
deceased (pp. 9-10, rec.).
On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the challenged order,
pertinent portions of which read:
A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed under
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which reads as follows:
Whenever the gross value of the estate; of a deceased person,
whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance
having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested
person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last
publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the
court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the
appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to
grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there is, to determine
who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and
to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such
debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity,
or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgment
made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office
of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real
estate, shall be recorded in the proper registrar's office.
While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is allowed
under the aforequoted provision of the rules, the same rule
specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which does
not exceed P10,000.00, The instant petition, however, clearly alleges
that the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix
del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over and
above-the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action
taken by the petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an
intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the
same has not been complied with. Based on the foregoing
observation alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed.
But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition as an
exercise (of) the powers of a probate Court in determining and
declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the, aforequoted
partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on intestate succession is
clear that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of
the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession, ...
The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the
instant case finds no basis for 'the said article is applicable in cases
where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of the adopted
child. ...
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being included
as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner
of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and
under the provisions of Section 1, Rule e 69 in re action to Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be commenced
or instituted by the party in interest.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Court hereby
DISMISSES THE PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS
(pp, 10-12, rec.).
On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and
appeal bond (see respondents comments, p. 18, rec.).
I
WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case
of Utulo vs. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia (66 Phil. 802) and reaffirmed in
Asuncion and Castro vs, De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955, 97
Phil. 910) andGutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA
69), WE uniformly held that for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a
petition for summary settlement of estate under the rules, the
requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed
P10,000,00 (P6,000.00 under the old rules) is jurisdictional.
In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the
realty left by the deceased Felix del Rosario is in the aggregate amount
of P33,000.00 which, as the court a quo correctly found, is obviously
"over and above the value allowed under the rules."
II
However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of
the court a quo in the sense that once wholly sustained, said holding
would preclude petitioner from re-filing the proper action a
consequence which, on the ground of equity and fair play, We cannot
allow to befall on petitioner We deemed it essential, for the guidance
of the parties especially herein, petitioner, to point out the demerits of
the appealed verdict.
1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article
343 on the one hand, or Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and
2. Whether the material data rule enuciated by Rule 41, Section 6 the New
Rules of Court should be followed, ex cathedra, in the present case:
A It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply,
The lower court found the following the new provisions of the New Civil
Code gername to the instant case:
Art. 341. The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by
nature;
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopted;
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's
surname."
Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the decending
direct line.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendants suceed the
parents and the other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or
age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted
article 343 of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000
of said law, which directs that:
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or
ascendants and by an adopted person. the latter shall not have more
successional rights than an acknowledged natural child.
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341 which
gives an adopted child the same rights and duties as though he were
a legitimate child. The reason for this is that:
(I)t is unjuest to exclude the adopter's parents from the inheritance
in facor of an adopted person (Report of the Code Commission, p.
92).
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who
is only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who
are naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of
the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the
intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession,
where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse
of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from
the inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil Code which
states:
If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate
ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to onefourth
(only) of the hereditary estate.
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion.
Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the
aodpted child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The
language of the law is clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed.
consonant with the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the
provisions of the New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents
of the deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an
acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term
"illegitimate children". Consequently , the respective shares of the
surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined
by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and
illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to
onehalf of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided
between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that
such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the
illegitimate children the other fourth.
B
Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29,
1973, emphasize that the petitioner's record on appeal violates the
material data rule in that
It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were
filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirment of Section 6,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal must contain
such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.
Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule,
whenever circumstances and substantial justice warrant.
The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeal, No. L-336629,
September 28, 1973 (53 SCRA 228) andVillanueva vs. Court of
Appeal (No. L-29719, Novemner 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are
particularly in point.
In Villanueva, WE held:
The deviation from the rigid rule aopted in the case of Government of
the Philippines vs. Antonio, etal., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19, 1965, is
due to our realization that after all what is of vital importance in the
requirement fo Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of court is that the
Record on Appeal shall show that the appeal was really perfected
within the reglementary period. If it could ascertained from the
record of the case that the appeal was perfected within the
reglementary period, although such fact did not evidently appear on
the face of the record on appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal.
If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected on
time, it should not throw out but assume jurisdiction over it. After all,
that procedural requirement is only intended to enable the appellate
court to determine if the appeal is still within its jurisdiction and nothing
more (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 220, emphasis
supplied).
From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that the date of
notice of the Court of First Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the
expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court is
December 14, 1973. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and
record on appeal on July 10, 1973 or still very much within the
reglementary period to perfect an appeal. And although this is not
mentioned in the record on appeal. And although this is not mentioned
in the record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact of record, the veracity
of which this COURT does not doubt.
Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the
Rules of Court, WE resolve this issue in favor of petitioner.
The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the
ends of substantial justice has found amplification in the recent cases
of Pimental, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-39423 and L-39684, June
27, 1975, 64 SCRA 475; Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
Tomas Carag, et al., L-40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332;
and Manuel R. Luna vs. Court of Appeals, Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30
1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.
WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IS A
COMPETENT COURT. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
ART 1003 AND 1005
FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 73275 May 20, 1987
FLOCERFINA BARANDA, Assisted by Husband, ELIAS FABON, HERMINIA
BARANDA RECATO represented by LILIA R. TORRENTE, as Attorney-in-
Fact, TEODORO BARANDA represented by JUANITA VICTORIA as
Attorney-in-Fact, ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION
BARANDA, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINA G. BARANDA, ELISA G. BARANDA, and THE HONORABLE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are faced once again with an all-too-familiar if distasteful controversy:
an old woman dying without issue and without a will and her collaterals
wrangling over her properties like the soldiers in Mount Calvary casting
lots for the seamless robe of Jesus. The difference in this case is that even
before the owner's death, two of the claimants had already taken over
her properties by virtue of certain supposed transfers which are in fact
that reason for this petition.
The questioned sales were effected through three deeds denominated
"Bilihan ng Lupa" and dated January 29 and February 3, 1977, 1 under
which Paulina L. Baranda, a widow, sold five parcels of land to her niece,
Evangelina Baranda, and a sixth parcel to her other niece, Elisa, also a
daughter of Pedro Baranda, Paulina's brother. The sales were made,
according to the documents, for the total consideration of P105,000.00
duly acknowledged as received by the transferor from the vendees. 2
What made these transactions suspect was a subsequent complaint filed
by Paulina Baranda against her nieces on August 1, 1977, in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, in which she alleged that she had signed the said
deeds of sale without knowing their contents and prayed that Evangelina
and Elisa be ordered to reconvey the lands subject thereof to her. 3 This
complaint was later withdrawn pursuant to an agreement dated August
2, 1977, 4 under which the defendants, in exchange for such withdrawal,
obligated themselves to "execute absolute deeds of sale covering the
above-mentioned properties in favor of the First Party," meaning the
plaintiff.
It was also stipulated in the said agreement that-
c. The FIRST PARTY shall keep possession of the
aforementioned deeds of sale, as wen as the Transfer
Certificate of Title of the above-listed properties,
which are in the hands of the SECOND PARTIES;
d. That any time that the FIRST PARTY desires to sell,
mortgage or otherwise dispose of or encumber the
abovementioned properties, the SECOND PARTIES
shall execute the proper documents in accordance
with the desire and wishes of the FIRST PARTY.
As it turned out, only Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her; Evangelina
never complied with the agreement; and when Paulina died in 1982, the
certificate of title over the lots in question were still in the names of
Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. 5
This was the factual situation when on April 26, 1982, the herein
petitioners, claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the late Paulina
Baranda, filed a complaint against Evangelina and Elisa Baranda in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the sale and the
reconveyance of the lots, with damages. Judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs: * a) declaring the deeds of sale null and void; b) ordering
the defendants to execute the necessary instrument to transfer the lots
in question to the estate of the late Paulina Baranda; c) ordering
defendants to turn over to the estate of Paulina Baranda the sum of
P24,000.00 a year from February 1982 until the administrator of said
estate takes over the management of said properties, with interest at 12%
per annum; and d) sentencing defendants to pay, jointly and severally,
the plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for
and as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. 6
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, ** the decision of the trial
court was reversed and the deeds of sale were held valid and binding, for
reasons to be discussed presently. The respondent court, in dismissing
the complaint, also required the complainants to pay P50,000.00 for
attorney's fees, P30,000.00 for litigation expenses, P20,000.00 as moral
damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The petitioners are
now before us to challenge that decision. 7
We address ourselves first to the basic issue, to wit, the validity of the
three deeds of sale allegedly signed by Paulina Baranda without knowing
their contents. The respondent court, rejecting the findings of the trial
court, upheld the questioned deeds, stressing that they were public
documents and that their authenticity could further be sustained by the
testimony of the private respondents. We disagree.
While it is true that a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the
truthfulness of its contents, 8 this rule is nonetheless not absolute but
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 9 Such
evidence, as the Court sees it, has been sufficiently established in this
case.
The curious part about the supposed deeds of sale is the consideration
allegedly agreed upon, in the amounts of P25,000.00 for lots 4 and 5,
P50,000.00 for lots 9, 11 and 6, and P30,000.00 for lot 8 which Evangelina
testified as having been actually paid to their aunt on February 3, 1977.
Especially intriguing is the source of the said purchase price, in the total
amount of P105,000.00, which by the testimony of the private
respondents was paid by them in cash to their aunt in the office of Atty.
Galos, who notarized the deeds of sale. 10
According to Evangeline, the sum of P100,000.00 was given to her by a
"balikbayan" boy friend, and it was from this amount that she paid her
share of the purchase price of P75,000.00. 11 According to Elisa, her sister
Evangelina lent her P15,000.00 and she raised another P15,000.00 from
her grandmother in the province to complete the P30,000.00 due from
her for the lot she was buying.12 At the time of these transactions, neither
Evangelina nor Elisa was gainfully employed or had independent sources
of income, both being then fresh college graduates aged 25 and 26 years
old, respectively. 13
The tale of the mysterious and generous "balikbayan" is something "out
of this world," in the language of the trial court, and we are inclined to
agree, although not in those words. This Court is itself rather perplexed
that the respondent court should have accepted this tissue of lies so
readily, considering its obvious falsity. The "balikbayan" is a hazy figure,
if we go by his own girl friend's testimony, without even a name at least,
let alone other personal circumstances to give him bone and body. All we
can glean from the record is that he is an exceedingly trusting and
generous person who, presumably out of love for Evangeline, willingly
delivered P100,000.00 in cold cash to her and thereafter disappeared
completely. (Five years later, Evangelina was still
unmarried.) 14 Strangely, this amorphous sweetheart was not even
presented at the trial to corroborate his beloved, assuming their love was
as strong as ever, or at least to protect his investment.
Elsa's explanation of how she got her own P30,000.00 is equally
imaginative and was obviously part of the fabric or fabrication
woven by her sister to conjure what now appears to be a non-existent
fund. As Elisa puts it, half of the P30,000.00 she paid came as a loan from
Evangelina's boy friend's P100,000.00 and the other P15,000.00 was
given to her by her grandmother. 15
This grandmother was another generous if also improbable figure, if we
go by Elisa's testimony this time. According to her, she persuaded her
grandmother to sell her lands in La Union, to give her the purchase price
of P15,000.00, and to come with her husband to live with her in
Manila, 16 not in her own house, significantly, but in the house of Paulina
Baranda, with whom she and her sister were themselves living. Elisa did
not present any document to prove that her grandmother did sell her
properties to raise the P15,000.00, or, indeed, that she had any property
at all to sell. There is no evidence of this whatsoever. At any rate, it is hard
to believe that this old woman would agree to sell her own properties in
La Union, where she was presumably making a living, and with her second
husband (who was not even related to Elisa and Evangeline) to live off
her granddaughters, who were themselves in a way also living off Paulina
Baranda in the latter's house. Paulina Baranda and the grandmother
were strangers.
The sisters made another incredible claim, viz., that from the house
where they and Paulina Baranda were living together they carried the
amount of P105,000.00 in cold cash to the office of Atty. Galos where
they delivered it to Paulina Baranda. 17 Apparently, Paulina then brought
it back to the same house where it came from in the first place, in a
preposterous pantomime that invites laughter, not belief, and would
make them out as three silly persons from some inane nursery rhyme.
Why the nieces did not pay the money in the house instead of bringing it
all the way from the house and back is something that has not been
sufficiently explained by the private respondents. They could have
shown, for example, that Paulina Baranda intended to bring it
somewhere else, say, for deposit in a bank, or for the purchase of some
property, such as the ticket to the United States where she was allegedly
planning to migrate. 18 There is no evidence of such deposit or purchase,
however, no evidence at all of where that money went after it was
supposedly received by Paulina Baranda on the date of the alleged
transaction. It also simply disappeared like the "balikbayan" who never
returned.
Paulina Baranda herself denied under oath that she ever sold her lands to
Evangelina and Elisa, alleging in her verified complaint that she "never
executed any deed" conveying the title to her properties and "was
surprised and shocked to learn" later that her transfer certificate of title
to her lots had been cancelled and new certificates of title had been
issued in favor of the private respondents.19 She withdrew this complaint
only after her nieces agreed in writing to reconvey the properties to her
"in order to preserve family solidarity and in order to avoid litigation
among the parties." 20
The nieces explain away this complaint by saying it was merely simulated,
to prevent the U.S. government from discontinuing her pension as a war
widow on the ground that she had squandered her property. 21 If that was
her only purpose, one might well wonder why it was necessary at all to
commence litigation as a mere resale of the properties would have been
sufficient and easily effected without the asperity of a civil complaint.
Considering that, as the private respondents kept insisting, there was
never any misunderstanding between them and their aunt, there would
have been no difficulty in their acceding to her request for a resale of the
properties to protect her pension. The fact that the complaint had to be
filed shows they were unwilling to reconvey the properties after the aunt
demanded their return following her discovery of the fake deeds of sale,
an unwillingness further manifested when Evangelina refused to comply
with this aforesaid agreement and never reconveyed the lots supposedly
bought by her.
By offering this explanation, the private respondents are in effect asking
this Court to condone and approve their attempt to deceive and defraud
the government of a sister state.
There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who, it is
claimed by the private respondents, are not the proper parties to
question the validity of the deed of sale. The reason given is that they are
not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they
parties to the challenged transactions.
It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any
direct descendants or ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived,
however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro and Teodoro, and several
nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well as
petitioners Flocerfina Baranda, Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio Baranda
Villarte, children of two deceased brothers and a sister. 22 The above-
named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who was not joined as a
petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents, and the
children of another deceased sister, are the legitimate intestate heirs of
Paulina Baranda.
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and
sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the
latter per stirpes
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the
children or brothers or sisters, whether they be of the
full or half blood.
As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale
purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to
belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their
claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private
respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina
Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless
legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by
the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of successional
rights.
This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the
parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights
belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to
their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending
special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate." 23
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina
Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to
sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to
the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance with
law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the
subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who
would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception, In fact,
even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were
not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have
sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.
Neither can it be argued that the petitioners cannot assail the said
contracts on the ground that they were not parties thereto because as
heirs of Paulina Baranda they are affected, and adversely at that, by the
supposed sales of her properties. As this Court has held
A person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a
contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is
prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties
and can show the detriment which could positively result to him
from the contract in which he had no intervention. 24
The real party-in-interest in an action for annulment or contract
includes a person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily
in the contract if he is PREJUDICED in his rights with respect to one
of the contracting parties. 25
Moreover, it is expressly and specifically provided in the Civil Code
that:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. ...
As Justice J.B.L. Reyes said in his concurring opinion in Armentia v.
Patriarca, 26 speaking of a similar situation, "what petitioners, however,
question is the validity of such transfer or disposition for if it could be
established that such disposition was invalid, the property allegedly
conveyed never left the patrimony of the transferor, and upon the latter's
death without a testament, such property would pass to the transferor's
heirs intestate and be recoverable by them or by the administrator of the
transferor's estate should there be any."
Assuming then that the petitioners are proper parties to challenge the
validity of the private respondents title to the land in question, may it not
be argued that the right to do so had nevertheless already prescribed
when they filed the complaint in 1982?
The Civil Code provides in Article 1391 that an action to annul a contract
on the ground of vitiated consent must be filed within four years from
the discovery of the vice of consent. In the instant case, however, we are
dealing not with a voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake, undue
influence, violence or intimidation that can justify its nullification, but
with a contract that is null and void ab initio.
Paulina Baranda declared under oath in her complaint that she signed the
deeds of sale without knowing what they were, which means that her
consent was not merely marred by the above-stated vices, so as to make
the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all. We
are also satisfied that there was no valid consideration either for the
alleged transfers, for reasons already discussed. Lack of consent and
consideration made the deeds of sale void altogether 27 and rendered
them subject to attack at any time, conformably to the rule in Article 1410
that an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts "does not
prescribe."
Act No. 496, which was in force at the time the complaint was filed,
provided that the action to annul a registration of land under the Torrens
system should be filed within one year; otherwise, the same shall be
barred forever. 28This is not an absolute rule, however, as the Torrens
system is not supposed to be used as an instrument for wrongdoing or to
validate an illegal acquisition of title to the prejudice of the real owner of
the property registered. We have consistently ruled that when there is a
showing of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply
held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is
registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance
of the property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible.
Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or
at least, of breach of trust, should not be allowed to
use a Torrens title as a shield against the
consequences of his wrong doing. (Cabanos vs.
Register of Deeds, 40 Phil. 620).
An action to compel reconveyance of property with a
Torrens title does not prescribe if the registered
owner had obtained registration in bad faith, and the
property is still in the latter's name. The reason is that
the registration is in the nature of a continuing and
subsisting trust. (Caladiao v. Vda. de Blas, L-19063,
April 29, 1964).
A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not
entitled to the protection of the law, for the law
cannot be used as a shield for frauds. (Ignacio vs. Chua
Hong, 52 Phil. 940; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442).
As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still
in the name of the person who caused such registration, an action in
personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real
owner. Provided only that the property has, as in this case, not passed to
an innocent third person for value, such an action is permitted. We have
held that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers' name is not to set aside
the decree after one year from the date thereof. Respecting it as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, he may nevertheless bring
an ordinary action for reconvevance or for darmages if the property has
passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 29
It was in conformity with this doctrine, in fact, that the petitioners filed
on April 26, 1982, their complaint against the private respondents for
annulment of the deeds of sale and for reconveyance of the lands subject
thereof which were illegally registered in the names of Evangelina and
Elisa Baranda.
We deal with one final matter that should be cause for serious concern as
it has a direct relevance to the faith of our people in the administration of
justice in this country. It is noted with disapproval that the respondent
court awarded the total indemnity of P120,000.00, including attorney's
fees and litigation expenses that were double the amounts claimed and
exemplary damages which were not even prayed for by the private
respondents. Such improvident generosity is likely to raise eyebrows, if
not outright challenge to the motives of some of our courts, and should
therefore be scrupulously avoided at all times, in the interest of
maintaining popular confidence in the judiciary. We therefore caution
against a similar recklessness in the future and call on all members of the
bench to take proper heed of this admonition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and that of the trial court is REINSTATED, with costs against the private
respondents.
SOORDERED.
ART 1006 AND 1008
FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO
CARTENA, defendant-appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct
application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a
legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and
San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of
Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859
(Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely:
Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio
Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband
Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit
"E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic
(Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime
in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August
19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria
Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her
heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome
Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on
April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa
Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her
daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present
suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind
her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-
Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza.lo, pp. 3)
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns
the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following
described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her
deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with
38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded
on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by
Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax
No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax
No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo
Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and
German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by
Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area of
11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso
and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the S. by
Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by
Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the
name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at P2,720.00
in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San
Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro
Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio Yerro;
and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the
year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 21452,
assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria,
Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990
sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by
Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by
Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959,
namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the
Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic,
daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and
Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the
properties left by Maura Bagsic.
 After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties
passed on to Cristela Almanza who took charge of the administration
of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested
for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were
prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as
the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not
yet been paid. Having agreed to defer the partition of the same, the
plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in 1959 only. This
time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts,
accordingly, had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without
the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving
the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24)
share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio
Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are
represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino
Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959
the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24)
share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with
legal interest from the time this decision shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
47
From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the
substitute defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and
execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession,
that is, those described under Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence,
the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-half
undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under
letters A, B and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to
be only in his possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of
Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court
in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties left by Maura
Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course
of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants
to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic,
died on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa
succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the
New Civil Code which provides that "should the only survivors be
brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares,"
and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of
Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the
subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript of
the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly
established in the trial court and that the only issue left for determination
is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law and
jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case
to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil
Code are applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These
Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former
shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid
down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of
full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of
half blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil
Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right. InAbellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-
Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that
"nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that
is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to
whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does
not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The only difference in
their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article
1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the
sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces
of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood
relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura,
et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28
SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded
by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews
and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and
erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that
Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as
she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No
costs.
ART 1025
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA,
TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and
JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO,respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of
ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around
forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father
Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was
inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan,
Title Lot
No. No.
T- 3663
6530
T- 3445-
6548 C
T- 3670
6525
T- 3666
6521
Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29,
1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its
order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-
Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The
testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
(paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary
provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros
situados en el municipiooo de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA
ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO
SON; Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie
Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual
6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521,
mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier pariente mio
varon mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de
Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados
objectos de este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de
empezar a gozar y administrar de este legado al principiar a curzar la
Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su muerte; pero
que pierde el legatario este derecho de administrar y gozar de este
legado al dejar de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de
Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada
ao VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres
difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase excomulgado, IPSO FACTO
se le despoja este legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo
del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria,
Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun
lo arriba queda expresado, pasara la administracion de este legado a
cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente
todos los productos que puede tener estate legado, ganando o
sacando de los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento para su
administracion, y los derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE (20)
Misas rezadas que debiera el Parroco celebrar cada ao, depositando
todo lo restante de los productos de estate legado, en un banco, a
nombre de estate legado.
Area in Tax Ass.
Has. Dec. Value
1.6249 18740 P 340.00
24.2998 18730 7,290.00
6.2665 18736 1,880.00
11.9251 18733 3,580.00
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted
a project containing the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported
to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take
the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered
by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic
Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his
successors, the real properties hereinbelow indicated,
to wit:
Total amount and value 44.1163 P13,090.00
Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order of August 15, 1940, approving the
project of partition, directed that after payment of the obligations of the
estate (including the sum of P3,132.26 due to the church of the Victoria
parish) the administratrix should deliver to the devisees their respective
shares.
It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to
analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as
no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix
and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right
to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that
ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on
February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new
administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor),
who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying
that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the
fruits. The probate court granted the petition. A new administrator was
appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for
the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March
25, 1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be
adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted
by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator
"has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge
Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated
the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The
parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his
order of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a
grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first
cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit
Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the
ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order.
It held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest
male relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could
exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period
would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee
claimed the ricelands within twenty years after the testator's death, the
same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the
old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred
in not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not
liberally construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust
operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the
bequest inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male
relatives had studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a
private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding
is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant priest's change of
theory cannot be countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory
construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or of the
lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the
determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case
(dicat testor et erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez
vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his
words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was
different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil.
333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills."
It is "the life and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign
guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will". (See Dissent of Justice
Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that
"the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the wilt
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made",
but excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the
following re-statement of the provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male
relatives who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as
a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he
could continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his
death but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands
if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate
every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of
Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the
legacy and the administration of the riceland would pass to the
incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as
contemplated above, the administration of the ricelands would be under
the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his
successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate
annually the products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual
produce five percent thereof for his administration and the fees
corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest
would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of
the devise in the bank in the name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the
testator intended to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who
would become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the ricelands, who
would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or
having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would
be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose
of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of
time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and
he was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado", or how long after the testator's death would it
be determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical
vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the
controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal
heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest
male relative who would study for the priesthood should be
determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male
relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest
male relatives at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or
legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably
construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male
relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to
apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could
not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three
sisters or second-degree relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs.
Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator specified his nearest male
relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister, who
would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since
he could not prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with
certitude what category of nearest male relative would be living at the
time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative
would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece)
and so he had to use the term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality
intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who
was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the
legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda,
the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after
Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim
the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos
Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended
that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp.
105-114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G.
Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that
Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest
of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration
which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew,
Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased
to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the
Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands
to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84,
Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to
evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has
no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the
testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his
succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became
vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas
cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely
anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have
so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision
would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his
bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya
legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to
a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would
like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was
not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But
the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would
be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits
thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at
the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for
the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the
ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4
of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957.
He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late
(Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands
by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise
inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted
by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute
devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary
provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the
parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event
that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death,
who desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or,
having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because
no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the
seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article
888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the
bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the
estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se
refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y
derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article
960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will
"does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no
substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator
had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra,
51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
ART 1039FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII,
which admitted to and allowed the probate of the last will and testament
of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence by
herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent
Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the
surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules
of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a
petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos,
which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen
at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila
on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her
last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as
executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was
presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins
at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the
administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and
waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a
resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent
need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and
eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed
by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every
reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic
provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of
Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity
thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated
will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of
evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion
C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of
America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C.
Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat
(Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit
C) leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United States
of America; that the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court
Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J.
McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign
country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and
that the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification which
would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the
Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the
Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of
Administration with the Will annexed issue in favor of said
Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00
conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of
Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the
same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief,
praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground
that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss
Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in
connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed
with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the
withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the
special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to
appear. He made several motions for postponement until the
hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to
Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of hearing
provided:
 Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29,
1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and
resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may
I also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the
Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for
petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing
evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge
issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present
evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left
a will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his
children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a
fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and
testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as
petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on
September 13, 1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the
petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights
of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children and forced
heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent
judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right
to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition
with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of deceased
Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-
parte of the petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not
made in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a
petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented
prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially
providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented,
within 30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the
estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be
divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of
Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no
evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of
his petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias,
Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the
allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's opposition to the
reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
No proof was adduced to support petitioner's contention that the
motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that
Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that
after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date,
filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss
Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the
motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa
had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty.
Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner
cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was
Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was
in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of
the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent
judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos
was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner
and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore,
under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that
all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger,
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run
counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the
case ofBellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs.
Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ART 1043
THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and underthe law of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to No. L-55000 July 23, 1987
be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR
N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO,
relief, the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled JR., heirs-appellants,
for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's vs.
petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to
believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for
hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested No. L-62895 July 23, 1987
"for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at
the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing. vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII,
Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in
jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L.
of Court, it is provided that: ANTIGUA, respondents.

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the No. L-63818 July 23, 1987
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the
in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R,
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P.
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an and NUMERIANO ESTENZO, petitioners,
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of vs.
jurisdiction appears on the record. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO
BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents.
Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her
death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United No. L-65995 July 23, 1987
States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO,
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule
and JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO,petitioners,
that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the
Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L.
ANTIGUA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the
following facts were established:
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the
latter having predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8)
children, namely,

These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Jose Ma. Borromeo
Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Cosme Borromeo
G.R. No. 41171
Pantaleon Borromeo
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on
March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced Vito Borromeo
heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
Paulo Borromeo
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will
Anecita Borromeo
and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and
undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The Quirino Borromeo and
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The document,
drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked by the Julian Borromeo
deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and
Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses. 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue,
and all his brothers and sisters predeceased him.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after
due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
of the deceased was a forgery.

a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the
probate of the will was affirmed inTestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose
H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656). b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after
the death of Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios
Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an only
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners herein.
Several parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo.
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
The following petitions or claims were filed:
4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left
an only daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and the following children:
Cosme Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of heirs and
determination of heirship. There was no opposition filed
against said petition. a. Anecita Ocampo Castro

2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a b. Ramon Ocampo

petition for declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo
and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition. c. Lourdes Ocampo

3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
de Castro, Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo,
Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by
Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr.
declaration of heirs and determination of shares. The petition
was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo.
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the
war and left the following children:
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and
a. Marcial Borromeo
Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo,
Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos
Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his
claim. wife, Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda
Borromeo Talam
 c. Asuncion Borromeo 4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948. 5. Salud Borromeo

e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944. 6. Asuncion Borromeo

f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925. 7. Marcial Borromeo

The last three died leaving no issue. 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and

6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the 9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo
war and left the following children:
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949 Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal
and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs.
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the
following children: On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties
aa. Federico Borromeo of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in
its order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the
administrator, Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the
bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the
said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr. value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's
fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated portion.
dd. Jose Borromeo
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier
ee. Consuelo Borromeo claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court
praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito
ff. Pilar Borromeo Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that
in the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in
disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a
gg. Salud Borromeo legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child,
he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.

c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by
his children:
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
bb. Luz Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp
dd. Rosario Borromeo
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued
an order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the
intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by
the order of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named
therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court
dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the
memorandum he submitted to support his motion for reconsideration,
Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He
asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31,
1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose
Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V.
Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B.
Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their
shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground
that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is
estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver
agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that
the same is void having been executed before the distribution of the
estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab
initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter.

1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that
the five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights,
declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
3. Vitaliana Borromeo
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
trial court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent
Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and
the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is
not a money claim against the decedent but a claim for properties, real
and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the
decedent's estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The
claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement, according
to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which
is improper. He alleges that the claim of the private respondent under the
waiver agreement was filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims
as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after there had been a declaration
of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, 1969), the
approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere
memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver
of Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been
cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo,
Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect
because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before
there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to
transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance
or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the
death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their
right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were,
therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also
supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees,
and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days
after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that
under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be
first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance.
What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person
from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the
inheritance. He points out that at the time of the signing of the waiver
document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to
the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the
validity of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts
that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after
the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it
partakes of the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate
needing approval of the court because it was executed in the course of
the proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court loses
jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the
estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the
same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to
succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code,
according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of
the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary
property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the
death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested,
although conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41
Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967
even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights"
cannot be considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three
elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of
the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right.
(People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to
waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and
when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should
be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily
relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable
explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. Sebido,
et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver
document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish
their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted
a proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance,
they proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito
Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of
money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967,
not contested or claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to
them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent
recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to
the waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled
to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights"
was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had
the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle
the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of
the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared
heirs executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be
distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court
on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others,
signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer
and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo
all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated
consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same
date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo
(assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in turn executed
a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the
same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5)
A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was
signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968,
while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be
noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed
the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-
18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the lower court filing
claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of
Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising
jurisdiction and trying the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated
December 24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24,
1974, declaring the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171
valid. The appellate court certified this case to this Court as the questions
raised are all of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but
they also question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide
the action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was
executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet
possess or own any hereditary right in the intestate estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary right was only acquired
and owned by them on April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered
distributed.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract
of waiver of hereditary right in the present case because there was no
object, which is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said
waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null
and void ab initio but was inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that
without any formal pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo
for the approval of the waiver agreement and without notice to the
parties concerned, two things which are necessary so that the lower
court would be vested with authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide
the validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set
the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite
pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December
24, 1974, which approved the validity of the waiver agreement. The
appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their
hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the
waiver document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by
virtue of the same act, they lost their rights because the rights from that
moment on became vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
there is no need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can
accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain
of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to
the inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July
31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito
Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of their right to
the inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading
invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on
August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all
oppositors to the waiver document to submit their comments within ten
days from notice and setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973.
The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance
involves no question of title to property and, therefore, the probate court
can decide the question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The
appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito
Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated
December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the
estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can
not be validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear
and convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in
this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to
all the eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the
heirs giving to the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the
fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31,
1967, some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their
hereditary rights to the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968
deed of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent
cancellation of the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all
argue against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No.
41171 that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the waiver agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers
in handling the settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno,
representative of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the
immediate closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion
dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were
grounded on the fact that there was nothing more to be done after the
payment of all the obligations of the estate since the order of partition
and distribution had long become final.
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to
resolve the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a
petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the
respondent judge to terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending
motions to compel the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an
inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the
cash in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus
will not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the
appellate court denied the petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the
motion filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration
proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory
and accounting because the latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979.
He claimed that under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the
respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or matter within three
months from the date of its submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had
already been resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings
of all incidents previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979,
pursuant to the resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs,
with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of
partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was
approved by the trial court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same
order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr.,
to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they
are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further
ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall
be segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5,
1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to
the nine (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following
circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in
order to segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato
Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the
waiver agreement signed by the heirs representing the 5/9
group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R. No.
4117 1);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render
his accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing
annotations of notices of lis pendens on the different titles of
the properties of the estate.
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet
distributed to some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of
heirs due to the pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court
in its resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the co-administrator Jose Cuenco
Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and to
render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of
several properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the
trial court dated December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar
as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and
ordering the remand of the case to the Executive,Judge of the
Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the
respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in
Special proceedings No. 916-11 because of the affirmation of the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818.
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-
R, subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the
estate and an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner,
as co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required
by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected
with all deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0.
Borromeo filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch 11, presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the
judge from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants
alleged, among others, the following:
xxx xxx xxx
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a
motion for the production of the certificates of title and to
deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably
for the ready inspection of interested buyers. Said motion was
granted by the Hon. Court in its order of October 2, 1978 which,
however, became the subject of various motions for
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that as
owners they cannot be deprived of their titles for the flimsy
reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions for
reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions
for production of titles.
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered
another incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then
the counsel of herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda
B. Talam In connection with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a
pleading which the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct
contempt because among others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated
that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat
commission" from the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty.
Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in contempt
of court with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice
of his profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the
prospect of contempt and suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose
rapproachment and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua,
et al., who, together, continued to harass administrator
xxx xxx xxx
9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a
brother of the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of
Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al.
who are agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out
the individual heirs, on the one hand, and the herein movants,
on the other, who are not willing to sell their distributive shares
under the terms and conditions presently proposed. In this tug
of war, a pattern of harassment has become apparent against
the herein movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among
the harassments employed by Atty Antigua et al. are the
pending motions for the removal of administrator Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, the subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which
 seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose
Cuenco Borromeo, and the other matters mentioned in
paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are expected
until the herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed sale.
In such a situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely
independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said
incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take
cognizance of this proceeding, including the incidents above-
mentioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in
favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against the herein
movants. Incidents which may create this impression need not
be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents
filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary
injunction before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others,
the following:
xxx xxx xxx
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of
having to state herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos
has shown undue interest in pursing the sale initiated by Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of respondent
Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo
L. Antigua.
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the
estate cannot be legally done without the conformity of the
heirs-distributees because the certificates of title are already
registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to
sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs-
distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale
that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest
more than the present income of the so called estate. Most of
the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to
say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco
Borromeo have had the courage to stand up and refuse the
proposal to sell clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos.
xxx xxx xxx
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of
the shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as
other incidents now pending in the court below which smack of
harassment against the herein petitioners. For, regardless of
the merits of said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend
that it is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by
reason of the following circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the
properties as initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua
whose sister is married to a brother of respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without
the conformity of the heirs-distributees, and
petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the great
disappointment of respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar
incidents are clearly intended to harass and embarrass
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order to
pressure him into acceding to the proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against
petitioners by failing to resolve the claim for
attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and
the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims by the other
lawyers were resolved by respondent after
petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43,
Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the
petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the transmission of the
records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Region VII for re-raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate
court on April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing
the case of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of
the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-
raffling.
The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because
Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary.
However, we decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of the
judge to whom this case will be reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been
harassed. They contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual
interest in the proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in
favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is
shown by the judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of
the estate at P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the
administrator to sell so much of the properties of the estate to pay the
attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge
Burgos would have been unreasonable because his orders against the
failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an accounting
and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They
claim that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of
the resolution of this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the
settlement and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally,
they state that the disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further
the closing of the administration proceeding as he is the only judge who
is conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed.
countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-
administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled
out to make an accounting of what t he was supposed to have received
as rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected,
from January, 1977 to February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the
withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster
the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos
invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26
to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to
buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the
projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed
by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be
required to file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for
cash, a report on which the administrators had already rendered: and to
appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge
Burgos lt was also prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the
appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.,
bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly
with his wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda
Borromeo Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana Borromeo.
Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty.
Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum to the Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register
of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Cebu and
another subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of
Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco
Borromeo.
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in
behalf of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with
Atty Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion
for relief of the administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to
bring and produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court
presided order by Judge Burgos.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces
tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce
the titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June
14, 1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order
denying the private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the
motion to quash the subpoena.1avvphi1
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco
P. Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R,
there would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years,
he had not done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings
except to sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate
Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition,
more specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate
at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be
ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be
avoided at all costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno(81 SCRA 535), this
Court stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of
the parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and
suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his
actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other
alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not
be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when
circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest
actuations and probity in favor or of either partly or incite such
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in
the Courts of Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the
Judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself "That
way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity
and objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important, the Ideal
of impartial administration of justice is lived up to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on
sound reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking
to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing
the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of
the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling
should be DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself has
become moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995
The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on
any and all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the
pendency of this petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the
respondents related to the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983
when the respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be
declared null and void and without force and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all
incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from
the heirs-distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already
titled in their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending
inhibition case elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No.
63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special
Proceeding No. 916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of
the lawyers-claimants who were individually hired by their respective
heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should be legally charged against
their respective clients and not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a
dilatory one and barred by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981,
in G.R. No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to expedite the
settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate. They claim that this
resolution, which was already final and executory, was in effect reversed
and nullified by the Intermediate Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No.
SP - 11145 when it granted the petition for certiorari and or prohibition
and disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further
cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the
transmission of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983, which
was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No.
63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the
obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired
their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August
15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and
paid should be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
in G.R. No. 63818, we grant the petition.
WHEREFORE,
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated
December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of
 the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7,
1975, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL
and VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the
waiver document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in
the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying
and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from
further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot
and academic. The judge who has taken over the sala of retired
Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall immediately conduct hearings
with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event that
the successor-judge is likewise disqualified, the order of the
Intermediate Appellate Court directing the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall be
implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The
issue seeking to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further
acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to
speedily terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R,
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties
of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank deposits
by the petitioner-administrator of the estate as required by this
Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40%
of the market value of the estate from which attorney's fees
shall be taken and paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The
lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who
individually hired them, attorney's fees according to the nature
of the services rendered but in amounts which should not
exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the
latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
ART 1051
THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999]
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA
VILLALON, ANTONIO VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON,
ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER
VILLALON, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 31976[1], affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City[2], which rendered inofficious the donation made by
Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner, to the extent that it impairs
the legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to convey to
herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of
the donated land proportionate to Victor Imperials legitime.
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square
meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also
known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio
sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son, petitioner
herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to subdivide
it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that despite
the contracts designation as one of Absolute Sale, the transaction was in
fact a donation.
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio
filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of
Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into
signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through
a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of
Albay on November 3, 1961[3], under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized
the legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated;
and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion
of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for
the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncios death, it was
agreed that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to
defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment,
Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs --- the herein petitioner, who is his
acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On
March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On
March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and
without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who
was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on
September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a
complaint for annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata, by virtue of the compromise judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial court granted
the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint
in the same case, Civil Case No. 7646, for Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession with the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and
inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner
caused Leoncio to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of
the latters physical weakness and mental unfitness, and that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired the legitime
of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest.[4]
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed
sufficient property to Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563
hectares of agricultural land in Manito, Albay; (2) reiterated the defense
of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses of prescription and
laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case
was pending in the Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action
by his sons, namely, Antonio, Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all
surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther H. Villalon.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the
legitime of Victor, on the basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncios
death, he left no property other than the 32,837-square meter parcel of
land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC went on further to
state that petitioners allegation that other properties existed and were
inherited by Victor was not substantiated by the evidence.[5]
 The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this
manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half
of that or 16,418 square meters becomes the free portion of Leoncio
which could be absorbed in the donation to defendant. The other half,
which is also 16,418 square meters is where the legitime of the adopted
son Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the
adopted child) in relation to the acknowledged natural child (defendant)
is 10 is to 5[,] with the acknowledged natural child getting of the legitime
of the legitimate (adopted) child, in accordance with Art. 895 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of
the natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants.
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been taken)
plaintiffs are therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters while defendant
gets 5,420 square meters.[6]
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period
is 30 years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code[7], reckoned from March 15,
1962, when the writ of execution of the compromise judgment in Civil
Case 1177 was issued, and that the original complaint having been filed in
1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In addition, the trial court
regarded the defense of prescription as having been waived, this not
being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTCs Decision of December 13,
1990 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale otherwise
known as Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series of 1951 of the Notarial
file of Pompeyo B. Calleja which is considered a donation, is hereby
reduced proportionately insofar as it affected the legitime of the late
Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs herein, to the
extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of
10,940 square meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to plaintiffs
should include the portion which they are presently occupying, by virtue
of the extended lease to their father Ricardo Villalon, where the
bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other
portion that may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise, this court will
appoint a commissioner to undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of his
legitime and by virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently proved.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of
respondent court: (1) that there was no res judicata, there being no
identity of parties and cause of action between the instant case and Civil
Case No. 1177; (2) that private respondents had a right to question the
donation; (3) that private respondents action is barred by prescription,
laches and estoppel; and (4) that the donation was inofficious and should
be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be,
between the first and second action, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of cause of action.[9] A perusal of the records leads us to conclude
that there is no identity of parties and of cause of action as between Civil
Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was instituted by
Leoncio in his capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is
true that upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action,
such does not alter the fact that Victors participation in the case was in
representation of the interests of the original plaintiff, Leoncio. The
purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of the estate[10], or his
heir, as in this case, for which no court appointment is
required.[11] Petitioners argument, therefore, that there is substantial
identity between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs and
successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncios cause of action as donor of the property was
fraud, purportedly employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of
the donation. While the same circumstances of fraud and deceit are
alleged in private respondents complaint, it also raises the additional
ground of inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioners contentions, inofficiousness of donation
does not, and could not, form part of Leoncios cause of action in Civil Case
No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause of action may arise only upon the
death of the donor, as the value of the donation will then be contrasted
with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased.[12]
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the
revocation in full of the donation on ground of fraud, the instant case
actually has two alternative causes of action. First, for fraud and deceit,
under the same circumstances as alleged in Leoncios complaint, which
seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court
correctly dismissed because the compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
1177 served as a ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever
defects in voluntariness and consent may have been attendant in the
making of the donation. The second cause of action is the alleged
inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of Victors
legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire donation, but only
of that portion diminishing the legitime.[13]It is on the basis of this second
cause of action that private respondents prevailed in the lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to
contest the donation. Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of
the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donors death have a right to the
legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the
reduction of inofficious donations. xxx
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it
was only Victor who was entitled to question the donation. However,
instead of filing an action to contest the donation, Victor asked to be
substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even moved for
execution of the compromise judgment therein.
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing
acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution, the
judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance
tacit repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the
part of the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic
instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over
the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon
the latters death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise
judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He
was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking
the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victors heirs,
upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is
expressly recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioners other assignment of
errors. Having ascertained this action as one for reduction of an
inofficious donation, we cannot sustain the holding of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the applicable prescriptive period is thirty
years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of both courts that
this case is a real action over an immovable allots undue credence to
private respondents description of their complaint, as one for Annulment
of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property,
which suggests the action to be, in part, a real action enforced by those
with claim of title over the disputed land.
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not
amount to a claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of
Appeals[14], we declared that what is brought to collation is not the
donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was
donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation
which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in
value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or
donee.[15]
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of
an inofficious donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances
of reduction or revocation of donations: (1) four years, in cases of
subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or adoption of a child; [16] (2)
four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the donation;[17] and (3)
at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled to
support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their
support.[18] Interestingly, donations as in the instant case,[19] the
reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime,
are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason we
must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation
created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the
obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of
the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory
heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case
of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for
inofficiousness of a donation propter nuptias, recognized that the cause
of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-
decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to
initiate this case. The action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial courts holding that the defense of prescription had
been waived, it not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial,
suffice it to say that while the terms of the pre-trial order bind the parties
as to the matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the height of injustice
for us to adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is
manifest in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact of
the lower courts.[20]
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has
prescription set in, private respondents are also guilty of estoppel by
laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died on January 8, 1962. Fifteen
years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo Villalon, who also
died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any
interest to contest the donation of his deceased father. As we have
discussed earlier, the fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No.
1177 did not amount to a renunciation of his inheritance and does not
preclude him from bringing an action to claim his legitime. These are
matters that Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that he
is a lawyer[21]. Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee of a portion of the
donated property, and could have instituted the action as sole heir of his
natural son, or at the very least, raised the matter of legitime by way of
counterclaim in an ejectment case[22] filed against him by petitioner in
1979. Neither does it help private respondents cause that five years have
elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their
complaint with the RTC.
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that
the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[23] We find the
necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by laches in this
case, in order to avoid an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after
finding the donation to be inofficious because Leoncio had no other
property at the time of his death, the RTC computed the legitime of Victor
based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its dispositive
portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as
Victors legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the
legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps
must be taken: (1) the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all the payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the value of
all donations subject to collation would be added to it.[24]
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not
the property itself, which is brought to collation. Consequently, even
when the donation is found inofficious and reduced to the extent that it
impaired Victors legitime, private respondents will not receive a
corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where
the collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an
equivalent, as much as possible, in property of the same nature, class and
quality;[25] (2) if such is impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired
legitime in cash or marketable securities;[26] or (3) in the absence of cash
or securities in the estate, so much of such other property as may be
necessary, to be sold in public auction.[27]
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on
grounds of prescription and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 31976, affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 7646, is reversed and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.