Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism

Institutional Environment and Organizations: Structural Complexity and Individualism. by W.

Richard Scott; John W. Meyer; Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the
Individual. by George M. Thomas; John W. Meyer; Francisco O. Ramirez; John Boli; Studies of
the Modern World System by Albert Bergesen
Review by: Martha Finnemore
International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Spring, 1996), pp. 325-347
Published by: The MIT Press
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Norms,culture,and worldpolitics:
insightsfromsociology's
institutionalismMarthaFinnemore

W. RichardScott,JohnWV. Meyer,and Associates,eds. 1994.Institutional

Environment Complexity
Structural
and Organizations: and Individualism.
ThousandOaks, Calif.:Sage Publications.
George M. Thomas,JohnW. Meyer,Francisco0. Ramirez,and JohnBoli,
Structure:
eds. 1987.Institutional State,Society,and theIndi-
Constituting
vidual.NewburyPark,Calif.:Sage Publications.
New York:
AlbertBergesen,ed. 1980.StudiesoftheModem World-System.
AcademicPress.
Internationalrelationsscholarshave become increasingly interestedin norms
of behavior,intersubjectiveunderstandings, culture,identity,and othersocial
featuresof politicallife.However,our investigations largelyhave been carried
isolation.We tend to treatour argumentsthatthese things
out in disciplinary
"matter"as discoveriesand researchinto social phenomena as foraysinto
unchartedterritory. However,scholarswithinthe fieldsof internationallaw,
history,anthropology, and sociologyhave alwaysknownthat social realities
influencebehavior,and each fieldhas incorporatedthese social constructions
in differentwaysintoresearchprograms.
Sociologistsworkingin organizationtheoryhave developed a particularly
powerfulsetofargumentsabouttherolesofnormsand culturein international
lifethatpose directchallengesto realistand liberaltheoriesin politicalscience.
Their argumentslocate causal forcein an expandingand deepeningWestern
world culture that emphasizes Weberian rationalityas the means to both

This essay benefitedgreatlyfromcommentsby Michael Barnett,JohnBoli, BarryBuzan, Eva

Buzsa, Lynn Eden, Ann Florini, Elizabeth Kier, FriedrichKratochwil,JeffLegro, Jonathan
Mercer,JohnMeyer,JohnOdell, RichardPrice,Thomas Risse-Kappen,VolkerRittberger, James
N. Rosenau, ScottSagan,Yasemin Soysal,David Strang,Nina Tannenwald,HongyingWang,Steve
Weber, AlexanderWendt,and frommaterialsupportby the Social Science Research Council/
MacArthurFoundationProgramon Peace and Securityin a ChangingWorld.

50, 2, Spring1996,pp. 325-47

IntemationalOrganization
? 1996byThe 10 Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology

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326 InternationalOrganization

justice, definedas equality,and progress,definedas wealth accumulation.

These worldculturalrules constituteactors-includingstates,organizations,
and individuals-and definelegitimateor desirablegoals forthemto pursue.
World culturalnormsalso produce organizationaland behavioralsimilarities
across the globe that are not easily explained by traditionalparadigmsin
political science. Because theycall these culturalnormsand rules "institu-
tions,"theapproachhas been named "institutionalist" bythoseworkingwithin
it.
This essayprovidesan overviewof sociology'sinstitutionalism and explores
itsimplicationsforthe studyofworldpolitics.At theoutsetit shouldbe noted
that sociologistsuse the term "institution"in very different ways than do
rational-choicescholarsor historicalinstitutionalists,emphasizingthe social
and cognitivefeaturesof institutions ratherthan structuraland constraining
features.Incommensurabledefinitions mean thatdespitesimilaritiesin label-
ing,these approaches-all called institutionalist-havelittlein common.In
fact,rational-choicescholarsworkingon positivetheoriesof institutions or the
new institutional at all in the sociological
economicsare not institutionalists
sense (and viceversa).1
Sociology's institutionalismshould interestinternationalrelations (IR)
scholarsin politicalscience forseveralreasons. First,it challengesdominant
paradigmsin political science directly.It providesa system-leveltheoretic
framework withwhichto analyzeinternationalpoliticsand generatestestable
hypothesesabout internationalbehaviorthat competewiththose of realism
and liberalism.These hypothesespredictsimilaritiesin behaviorcaused by
commonglobalculture,whererealismor liberalismwouldexpectdifferences in
behaviorby differently situatedactorswithdifferent interests.The fact that
institutionalists explore their hypotheseswith data-intensivequantitative
methodsnotusuallyassociatedwithworkon normsand culturein IR butmuch
admired by skepticsof cultural argumentsintensifiesthe institutionalists'
challenge. Explanatoryclaims made by realists and liberals must address
institutionalist iftheyare to be persuasive.
alternatives
Second, argumentsspeak directlyto a numberof theoretical
institutionalist
approachesbeing developed outsidethe confinesof the neorealist-neoliberal
debate thathas dominatedU.S. IR scholarship.Institutionalist concernsabout
the expansionof Westernworldcultureare sharedbyEnglishschool scholars
investigating the expansion of the West and the nature of what theyhave
termedinternationalsociety.2Institutionalists' argumentsalso lead them to
investigateglobalizingphenomena and the growingpower of individualsin
waysthatinvitecomparisonwiththe workof JamesRosenau, Michael Ziirn,

1. Jepperson 1991 provides an excellent discussion of the sociological understandingof

and institutionalism.
institutions For comparisonsof the variousinstitutionalisms,
see DiMaggio
and Powell 1991; and Hall and Taylor1994.
2. See Bull 1977;Bull and Watson1984; Gong 1984; and Buzan 1993.

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 Institutionalism327

Ernst Otto Czempiel, and Philip Cerny.3Both the English school and
globalizationscholarsmay quarrel withthe way institutionalists treat these
phenomena.Englishschool scholarsmaybe uncomfortable withthe sweeping
powerand determinism of the sociologists'arguments.Those interestedin the
processof globalizationand individuationmaybe put offby the institutional-
ists' claim that this process happens in conjunctionwith,ratherthan at the
expenseof,increasingstate authority. But in both cases these differencescan
and shouldbe settledempirically throughcoordinatedresearch.
Third,while it sharessome featuresof constructivist argumentsin political
science,sociology'sinstitutionalism providesa much richer and moredetailed
theoreticalframework thanhas constructivism. Sociologistsspecifythesubstan-
tive contentof social structure. They do more than simplyargue that social
structurematters; they tell us what the social structureis. Institutionalists'
specification of world culture (the social structure) as having particular
Westernand Weberiancomponentshas yieldedhypothesesthatcan be tested
empirically;indeed, theyalreadyhave been tested in the large and growing
researchprogram.
institutionalist
Further,the institutionalists'specificationof social structureis global and
all-encompassing.It permeates all aspects of political and social life in all
states. Political science research on norms and culture has tended to be
structuredaround specificissue-areas and thereforeargues that particular
norms matterin particularissue-areas. Constructivists have not made an
integratedargumentabout how the various norms in differentareas fit
together.This lack maybe a legacyof regimesscholarship,whichprovidedthe
theoreticalframework formuchearlyresearchon norms,since regimeswere
issue-specificby definition.4Withoutsuch an argumentabout the contentof a
systemicsocial structure,constructivism cannot provide an alternativeto
systemictheories.The sociologistsclaim to have done this.As I will discuss
below, constructivists in politicalscience have reason to be concernedabout
theirclaims-not because theyare beingoutflanked, butbecause thesociologi-
cal specificationand researchprogrammarginalizepolitics.
Fourth,sociology'sinstitutionalism incorporatesand endogenizeshistorical
changes ratherthan abstractingfromthem. The focus of most realist and
liberalIR scholarsis on developinggeneralizedprinciplesof interactionthat
applyregardlessof timeand place. Theiremphasisis on thewaysin which,for
example,Thucydides'politicsare like those of Metternich,whichare in turn
like thoseof HenryKissinger.The emphasisis on whatis the same overtime,
notwhatis different. Historicalchangecreatesanomaliesin theseanalyses;itis
not partof them.Institutionalists are interestedin developinggeneralizations
about historicalchange.They emphasizethe ways in whichstates' goals and
behaviorand even theirverynaturesare deeplyshaped by prevalentpolitical

3. See Rosenau 1990;Zurn 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; and Cerny1995.
4. Krasner1983,1.

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328 InternationalOrganization

ideas and social norms of a given time in history.Further,they offeran

argument, albeita sketchyone, about thedynamicsof thischange.
Finally,institutionalist argumentsabout global culture bear directlyon
recentpolicydebates. Rather than a "clash of civilizations"emergingas the
fundamentaldynamicoffutureworldpolitics,institutionalist researchprovides
powerfulevidence of global culturalhomogenization.5 Scholars may quarrel
about how to operationalizecivilizationand culture-indeed, theyare already
doing so-but institutionalists have both an argumentand evidence to
contributeto this-debate. They are less clear, however,about what cultural
homogenizationimpliesfor global order and stability.I returnto this issue
below.
The firstsectionof thisarticleprovidesa briefoverviewof institutionalist
argumentsand theirresearchprogram.To clarifythe natureand implications
of these arguments,I contrastthemwithothersbetterknownto American
politicalscientists.While sociology'sinstitutionalismhas structural
similarities
to ImmanuelWallerstein'sapproachand sharessubstantiveinterestswiththe
English school, it is fundamentallydifferentfrom both and from other
argumentspoliticalscientistshave encountered.6
The second halfof thisarticleexploresthe implicationsof the sociological
approachforpoliticalscienceresearch.Sociology'sinstitutionalism allowsus to
ask questionsabout featuresofinternational politicsthatare assumedawayby
otherparadigms.However,some of the answersit providesare not likelyto
politicalscientists.The articlecloses withsome recommendations
satisfy about
ways in which politicalscientistscan engage and challenge the sociological
approachthatmightbenefitbothdisciplines.

Overviewofsociology'sinstitutionalism
Culture and organizations
argumentsdate fromthemid-1970swhena groupat Stanford
Institutionalist
Universityinterestedin cross-nationalanalyses of political and economic
change began to explore the relationshipbetween formal organizational
structuresand culture.7Prevailingtheoriesabout bureaucraciesand organiza-
tions held that,indeed, culturehad littleimpacton those entities.In fact,
formalbureaucraticorganizationscomprisedthe antithesisof culture;they
were technical,rational, and thereforeculture-neutral.They transcended
culture.

5. See Huntington1993; Ajami 1993; Bartley1993; Binyan1993; Kirkpatrick, Weeks, and Piel
1993; and Mahbubani1993.
6. See Wallerstein1974a; 1974b;and 1980.
7. For a good discussionof the intellectualroots of institutionalanalysissee DiMaggio and
Powell 1991.

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 Institutionalism329

The Stanfordgroupchallengedthatview.Prevailingtheoriesexplainedthe
rise,form,and spreadofformalbureaucraticorganizationsin functionalterms.
FollowingMax Weber,theconventionalwisdomheldthatrationalizedbureau-
craticstructureswere the most efficient and effectiveway to coordinatethe
complexrelationsinvolvedin moderntechnicalwork.Expandingmarketsand
technologicalchangescreateincreasingly complexmanagementtasks.Bureau-
craticorganizationalformsmustalso thenexpandto coordinatetheseactivities
acrossmoreand moreaspectsofsociety.Bureaucraticorganizationwas seen as
the only way to divide labor, specifyresponsibilities,and institutionalize
coordinationand decisionmakingin rationaland efficient ways.
The problemwiththisviewwas thatbureaucraticorganizationshave spread
even morequicklythanthemarketsand technologythatwere thoughtto have
createdthe need forthem.Cross-nationalanalysesof politicaland economic
change,especiallyin the developingworld,made it abundantlyclear thatthe
worldwas beingbureaucratizedand organizedmuchfasterthan it was being
developed economicallyor technologically.8 Further,the linkbetweenformal
organizationalstructure-theblueprintforhowthebureaucracyis supposedto
function-and the organization'sday-to-dayactivitieswas oftenveryloose.
Organizationtheoristshad recognizedthisearlier,butcross-national analyses-
especiallythose dealingwithdevelopingcountries-underscoredthe point.If
bureaucraciesdo notact accordingto theirrationalizedformalstructures, then
the efficiency of rational formalstructurecannot be the reason for their
proliferation.
The alternativeexplanationdevelopedbyMeyerand his colleaguesempha-
sized the environment of these organizations.Formal bureaucraticstructures
coordinatorsof
did notspread as a resultof theirfunctionalvirtuesas efficient
complex relationships(they may or may not be so) but because the wider
environment supportsand legitimizesrationalbureaucracyas a social good.
Organizationsexist,proliferate, and havetheformtheydo notbecause theyare
efficientbutbecause theyare externally legitimated.9
This is the entrypointforculture.The contentof thisexternalenvironment
is cultural.The social values thatsupportand legitimatesome organizational
formsand notothers,some social activitiesand notothers,are culturalvalues.
Culturehad gottena bad name in sociologyformanyofthesame reasonsitgot
a bad name in political science. Part of the institutionalists'self-described
missionis to reclaimcultureformacrosociology.10 One way theydo thisis to
make dominant Western culture the object of their study and thus to
denaturalizefeaturesofsocial lifethatappear naturaland inevitableto mostof

8. The studiesin Meyerand Hannan 1979pointto thisconclusion.

9. The seminalessayoutliningthisargumentis Meyerand Rowan 1977.Earlyapplicationsofthe
argumentin cross-national contextscan be foundin Meyerand Hannan 1979.
10. Thomas et al. 1987,7.

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330 InternationalOrganization

us because thisis our own culture.We are so deeplyembeddedin it thatit is

hardto see beyondit.
Western-style is not an unproblematicattributeof bureaucratic
rationality
organizations,as mostorganizationtheoristsassume. Rationalityis a cultural
value. It is associatedwithmodernity and progressand othercultural"goods"
of contemporarysocial life. Ironically,people create rational bureaucratic
organizationsforotherthanrationalreasons.When facedwithsocial workto
be done, people forma committeeor create a bureaucracybecause it is the
appropriatesociallysanctionedwayto addressa social task;it is "the thingto
do." We continueto formcommitteesand bureaucracieseven when we are
skeptical about their effectiveness,indeed, even as we deride them as
ineffective and useless in public and politicaldiscourse.1"There is an almost
ceremonialaspect to bureaucraticorganizationin modernlife. Bureaucratic
rationality is "myth"and conformance withit is "ceremony"in theinstitution-
alistview.12
Since JohnMeyerand Brian Rowan's articulationof the basic argument-
that externalculturallegitimationratherthan task demands or functional
needs explains much if not most of organizationalbehavior-institutional
analyseshave followeddifferent paths empirically.The institutionalistargu-
ment is not necessarilyinternationalin nature,and much of the work and
subsequenttheorizinghavebeen done byscholarslookingat nationaland even
very localized phenomena.13Institutionalists have mapped normativeand
culturalenvironments thatshape the behaviorof organizationsin professions
such as mentalhealth,in the arts and culture,in municipalgovernments, in
nationalgovernments, and in the creationof whole businesssectors.14 How-
ever,Meyerand his colleagues have continuedtheirinterestin cross-national
and global phenomena. In fact, the logic of the argumentthat cultural
environments operateon organizationsat all levelssuggeststhatlocal environ-
mentsare alwaysembedded in largernationalor transnationalones. Thus, if
one were to push institutionalist scholarsinvestigating localized organizational
behaviorto specifythe originsor dynamicsof theirlocal environments, they
would have to look ultimately to global phenomenaof the kindMeyerand his
colleagues investigate.In this substantivesense, the global institutionalist
argumentsforma backdropfortheothersand logicallysubsumethem.It is this
international-level argumentthat challengesIR scholarsin politicalscience
mostdirectlyand is thefocusof thisessay.

11. For an explorationof thisparadox in the contextof effortsto reformU.S. governmental

bureaucracyoverthepast century, see Marchand Olsen 1989,especiallychap. 5.
12. Meyerand Rowan 1977emphasizethisin theirtitle.
13. Amongthosewho have been particularly influential
are authorscontributingto Powell and
DiMaggio 1991.Otherinfluential worksincludeScott1981; Meyerand Scott1983; and Scottet al.
1994.
14. See Meyer 1994; DiMaggio 1988; McNeely 1993; Tolbertand Zucker 1983; Dobbin 1994;
Suchman1994;and Dobbin 1992.

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 Institutionalism331

The contentand consequences of the

world cultural environment
The worldculturethatinstitutionalists see expandingacrossand integrating
theglobe is a Westernculture.Althoughinstitutionalist literaturecontainsno
singleextendeddiscussionof eithertheoriginsor thecontentofglobalculture,
thefollowingpictureemergesfromseveralsourcesoftencitedbyinstitutional-
ist researchers.15 It has its originsin Western Christendomand Western
capitalism and has spread as the West has expanded economicallyand
politically.In doingso it has bureaucratized,marketized,and individuatedthe
worldin waysthatare not expectedor easilyexplainedbyothersocial science
arguments. In fact,Meyerarguesthattheexpansivenatureofitsideologiesand
cultureis itselfa distinctive featureof Westernculturewithrootsin medieval
Christendom. Theoriesor ideologieslikethosefromtheWestthatmakeclaims
about all people and all places have much more expansivepotentialthan
particularizedand localized ideational frameworks like that of the Balinese
theater-state documentedbyClifford Geertz.16
As notedearlier,one centralfeatureofWesterncultureis thevalue itplaces
on rationality and purposiveaction.Byrationality, institutionalists mean simply
the structuring of action in termsof ends and means. Rational action, in
Westernculturalterms,is not onlygood, it is natural.However,one does not
haveto readveryfarin anthropology, history,or area-studiesliteratures before
discovering thatWestern-style purposiverationality is notso obviousor natural
to non-Westerners (or, indeed, to Westerners,thoughtheywould be loath to
admitit). There are manyotherwaysto structure social action,notablyin terms
of roles, rituals,duties, and obligations,that are not consequentialistin a
Westernrationalwaybut are effective guidesto social behaviornonetheless.17
Progress and justice are the two ends toward which Western societies
structuretheirrationalaction.Throughhistoricalexperiencethese two goals
have come to be definedin particularways.Progressor "success" is defined
materially,whichforindividualsusuallymeansincreasingwealthand forstates
means increasinggrossnationalproduct.Justiceis usuallydefinedin termsof
equality. Rational means to both these goals, in the Western cultural
framework, are bureaucraciesand markets.Claimsof efficiency in contributing
to increased wealth and progresslegitimizeboth. Both locate authorityin
impersonalrules that can be legitimatedin termsof equality-equal access,
equal opportunity.
The Westernculturalagenda ofpromoting expandinggrossnationalproduct
and equalitythroughexpandingand deepeningbureaucraciesand marketshas

15. The besttreatments are in Thomas et al. 1987 and Bergesen1980.

Meyer,Boli, and Thomas 1987,30; and Geertz 1980.
16. See, respectively,
view,see
17. For a discussionof alternativelogics of action that supportthe institutionalist
Marchand Olsen 1989,chap. 2.

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332 InternationalOrganization

spread to dominate global political and social life over the past several
centuries.One prominentartifactof Western cultural dominance is the
organizationof theworldintoWestern-style bureaucraticstates.Conventional
argumentsabout the rise of the modern state emphasize its functional
advantagesat providingsecurityand extracting revenueto explainitssuccessat
theexpenseofotherformsofpoliticalorganization.18 This may(or maynot) be
trueof the riseof the statein Europe, but it does not explainthe expansionof
Western-style statesto all cornersof theworld.The modernbureaucraticstate
has become the sole legitimateformof political organizationin the world;
virtuallyall othershave been eliminated.Empires,colonies,feudal arrange-
ments,and a varietyof otherformshave become extinctand, perhaps more
important, unimaginablein contemporary politics.19
This is nota functionalresultforat least tworeasons.Extremevaluationon
statehood as the only legitimateformof political organizationmakes many
kindsof politicalconflictdifficult to resolve.It means thatself-determination
requireshavinga state.Ifyou are not a state,you are nobodyin worldpolitics,
and nationalliberationgroupsunderstandthis.This createsan all-or-nothing
dynamic in many conflictsthat might be more easily resolved if other
organizationalformswere available.
Second, this valuation on statehood has created many ineffective, even
failed,states.Far fromhavingemergedas "lean, mean competitors"fromsome
organizationalselectionprocess,thestateas an organizationalformhas had to
be imposedand, indeed,proppedup in manypartsof theworld.The factthat
hopelesslyfailed states still must be reconstructedas states rather than
reorganizedin some otherway,forexampleas colonies,underscoresthestrong
culturalsupportforstatehoodand theillegitimacy ofotherpoliticalforms.20
Drawingon theirargumentabout Westernculturelegitimating bureaucratic
structures,institutionalists explainthese seeminglydysfunctional outcomesas
the resultof externalculturallegitimationratherthaninternaltaskdemands.
Statesexistin manyplaces notbecause theyare good at whattheyare supposed
to do (providesecurityand economicgrowth,promoteequality)butbecause a
largerworldculturesupportsthem.
The other central feature of Western culture with importantpolitical
consequencesis individualism and expandingnotionsof individualrightsof all
sorts-human rights,citizenrights,women's rights,children'srights.Meyer
makesa powerfulcase thatWesternculturalvalues have createdtheindividual
as an autonomousactor and describes the processes wherebyattributesof
individualpersonhood have become elaborated and expanded.21There is

18. See Tilly1975;and Skocpol1979.For another, morerecentargument thatemphasizes

coercion
military andexchange dominance,see Spruyt
1994.
19. For a moredetailedargument, empirical
see Meyer1980.For extensive on this
research
phenomenon, see Strang1991;1990.
20. Fora related, argument
albeitnoninstitutional, onthispointseeJackson
1990.
21. Meyer1987.

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 Institutionalism333

nothinginevitableor obvious about structuring societies around atomized

individuals.Many othersocieties and cultureslocate social value and moral
responsibility in the family,the tribe,or some other social unit. Western
individualismis distinctive,and its culturallogic leads to some distinctive
behaviorpatterns.Substantively, it leads to the expansionof individuallegal
rights,noted earlier. Analytically,it leads Western social science to treat
individualsas unproblematic, irreducible,autonomousactorswho knowwhat
theywantindependentofsocial or culturalcontextand,indeed,who createthe
social context.The institutionalist claimis theopposite-that theindividualas
autonomoussocial actoris a product,nota producer,of societyand culture.
Sociology's institutionalismis thus radically differentfrom realism or
liberalismin IR in that it falls on the structuralor holist side of the
agent-structure debate.22Analytically, social structure is ontologically priorto
and generativeofagents.It createsactors;itis notcreatedbythem.In contrast,
most argumentsin IR and politicalscience begin withagents.They take as
givensome set of actorshavinga similarly pre-specified set of interests-states
pursuingwealth or security,membersof Congresspursuingreelection,firms
pursuingprofits, nationalleaderspursuinga place in history. Macro-levelsocial
structureis explained as the consequence of their interaction.Even in
approachesthatIR calls "structural," like KennethWaltz's structural realism,
the internationalstructureis an epiphenomenonof the power capabilitiesof
and interactionamong individualactors; it has no independentontological
status.It constrainsonly;it is notgenerative.23
In institutionalistanalysis,the social structureis ontologicallyprimary.It is
thestarting pointforanalysis.Its rulesand values createall theactorswe might
considerrelevantin internationalpolitics,includingstates,firms,organiza-
tions, and even individuals.The structureof this argumentis thus like
Wallerstein's,but the contentis quite different. Wallerstein'sstructureis a
materialand economicone; it is capitalistproductionimperativesthatcreate
thestates,multinational firms, transnational organizations, nationalliberations
movements, and class struggles that we see driving contemporary international
politics.24The institutionalists' structure is a cultural one; it is Western
rationalityand individualism thatcreatestates,markets,bureaucraticorganiza-
tions,and,theywould argue,capitalismitself.
substantiveconcernswiththeexpansionofWesternculture
Institutionalists'
mostresembleEnglishschoolconcerns.Contributors to HedleyBull and Adam
Watson's volume, The Expansion of InternationalSociety,investigatemany
phenomena of interestto institutionalists. Like institutionalists, they see
Westerncultureexpandingto become a worldculturewithimportantglobal
politicalimplications.Howeverthetwogroupscarryout theirinvestigations in

22. See Wendt1987;and Dessler 1989.

23. Waltz 1979.
24. Wallerstein1974a. For a detailed analysisof the structuralcharacterof Wallerstein's
argument, see Wendt1987.

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334 InternationalOrganization

quitedifferentways.Englishschoolinvestigators carryout theirworkmorelike

historians;theyarrive at crafted
carefully narrativesthatinterpretevents.They
do not engage in the explicit exercises
hypothesis-testing thatAmerican social
scientistsadmire.25
by contrast,operate verymuch in the American social
Institutionalists,
scientifictradition.Their theorizingand hypothesesare explicit,and their
methodsare positivistic sophisticated,muchmore so
and oftenquantitatively
thanmostIR research.This allows themto engage and challengethose who
would dismissargumentsabout culturebased on more interpretive research
methods.

The institutionalistresearchprogram
The intellectualstructure researchprogramflowsfrom
of theinstitutionalist
the basic Meyerand Rowan insight and the structure-oriented (as opposed to
agent-oriented) nature of their argument. Realists, liberals,and otherswho
begin with assumptions about actors and interestswould expect different
actors
withdifferent intereststo behave differently. Similarbehaviorby dissimilar
actorsor actorswithdissimilarinterestswould be anomalous. But withinan
institutionalistperspective,such behavioris easilyexplained.Global cultural
normsmaymake similarbehavioralclaimson dissimilaractors.Of course,in a
structural realistperspectivethe internationalsystemmayconstraindissimilar
actorsintosimilarbehaviors,but such constraintsshouldnot applyuniformly.
Strongeractorswillbe less constrainedand, as structuralrealistsare quick to
point out, power constraintsoften still leave many options for states. A
structure ofpowerconstraints cannotexplainthewide scope and uniformity of
isomorphicoutcomestheinstitutionalists document.
Institutionalistsuse this insightto investigateand explain isomorphismof
social formsacross very differentareas of the world in a wide varietyof
substantiveareas. Isomorphismacross states,a topicof obviousinterestto IR
and comparativistscholars in political science, has been investigatedby
institutionalistsalong two research trajectories.First, institutionalistshave
posed a question that IR scholars cannot because of their ontologicalas-
sumptionthatstatesare actors:whydo we live in a worldof states?As noted
earlier,statesare not alwaysor obviouslyfunctionalor effective providersof
security,economicgrowth,and equalityrightsin manypartsof theworld.Yet,
as David Stranghas demonstrated,sovereignstates are a remarkablyrobust
organizationalformthathas edged out all competitors.Giventheweaknessof
manyless-developedstates,thisresultcan onlybe understood,institutionalists
have argued,as theresultofstrongexternalculturalsupportforthestatein the
largerworldenvironment.26

25. Bull and Watson,1984.

26. See Strang1991; Meyer1980;Boli 1987b;Ramirezand Thomas 1987; and McNeely 1989.

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 Institutionalism335

A second and more central question addressed by the institutionalist

researchagenda is isomorphismacross states:whydo statesin such radically
different circumstances look so muchalike? Some amountof similarity might
be expectedby conventionalperspectives focused on common task demands
faced by all states.They all need money,so theyall have financeministries.
Theyall need coerciveapparatusesto collectmoneyfromtheirpopulations,so
theyall have police. They all need to controland/or provide servicesfor
internalpopulations,so all have home or interiorministries. But isomorphism
is pervasiveto degreesthatare hardto explainfromthe pointofviewof local
taskdemands.
For example,nationalconstitutions definecitizenrightsand obligationsin
waysthatcorrelatenotwithlocal conditionsin thevariousstatesbut withthe
kindsofideologiesand rightsarticulatedin othernationalconstitutions written
at thattime.JohnBoli's workshowsthatconstitutional articulationsof citizen
rightshave changed in a coordinatedway across the internationalsystemof
states over the past century.The patternof rightsexpansionhe documents
suggeststhatwhetheror not a state codifiessuffrageforwomenor economic
rightsfor citizens has little to do with the status of women or economic
conditionsin a state,but it has a greatdeal to do withinternationalcultural
normsaboutwomen'ssuffrage and economicrightsat thetimetheconstitution
was written.27
Similarly,Yasemin Soysal'sworkon guestworkersin European statesshows
howtheconceptofcitizenshipitselfis embeddedin globalhumanrightsnorms
thatgiverise to a patternof policies amongthese statesthatis puzzlingfrom
realistor liberalperspectives.All European statesinvitedguestworkersin to
meetshort-term labor shortfalls. When unemployment began to rise,however,
it became politicallyimpossibleforanyof these statesto send workershome.
Moreover,European states have all providedfood, housing,medical care,
education,and otherbenefitsto these foreignnationalstheyno longerwant.
Soysaltracesthisbehaviorto global humanrightsnormsthatconstrainstates'
treatment offoreignnationalsacrossthesystem.28
Education policyhas not concernedIR scholars,but as an arena in which
statescreate citizens,it is the pointat whichthe relationshipbetweenthe two
fociof Westernmodernity-thestate and the individual-is defined.Conse-
quently,it has receiveda greatdeal of attentionfrominstitutionalists, and it is
in thisresearch that manyimportant featuresof the institutionalist
argument
havebeen developed.
State-sponsorededucationhas grownenormouslyin the past fifty years,and
curriculaaround the world show striking Institutionalists
similarities. pointout
thatthe reasonswhyeducationshould be state-directedand -formalizedare
notobvious;certainly, no one can pointto a reasonforthesuddenexplosionin

27. Boli 1987a.

28. Soysal 1995.

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336 InternationalOrganization

world education activityafter World War II. The rush to schoolingis a

recenthistoricalphenomenon.Further,thecontentofwhatis taught
relatively
(or what is supposed to be taught)aroundthe worldhas convergeddramati-
cally. Again, looking at task demands one can thinkof good reasons why
educationcurriculain a statewhose economyproducesprimarycommodities
should be quite different fromone that produces high-technology manufac-
tures,but the similarityin formaleducation structuresdoes not reflectthis.
argue,resultfromglobal changesin world
institutionalists
These similarities,
normsand cultureabout education.
Individualnationaleducationsystemsare structuredbya common"ideologi-
argue.As FranciscoRamirezand JohnBoli write,
cal order,"institutionalists
[T]hisordercontainsa powerfuldialectic:One pole is theideologyof the
stateas theprimary locus of social organizationand vehicleof societalde-
velopment;theotheris the ideologyof theindividualas thebasic unitof
social action,the ultimatesourceofvalue, and thelocus of social meaning.
These poles are integratedwithintheideologyof citizenship,in whichthe
individualis seen as botha contributor to thenationaldevelopmentproject
(as a producerand as a loyalsupporterof stateprograms,laws,and regula-
tions)and as a beneficiary of stateorganizationalaction(as a consumerand
as a "citizen"in thepure sense who enjoyscertainprotectionsand guaran-
tees underwritten bythe state).
This dialectichas clear implicationsforthemeaningand structure of edu-
cationin theworldsystem.The ideologyof theindividualrestsin parton a
functionalisttheorythatnew membersof society(children)are essentially
unformedbeingsrequiringcomprehensive initiationand socialization.Edu-
cationis themeansto achievethisend.29
"Ideologies" or shared culturaland normativeunderstandings about what a
state is and what an individualis thus structureeducation (and a myriadof
otherfeaturesofmodernsocial life)in commonwaysacrosstheglobe.
Welfarepoliticsand welfarepolicies also change in patternsthatcorrelate
notwithnationallevelsofindustrialization, unemployment, or laborunrestbut
withbroaderinternational redefinitionsofstateresponsibility vis-a-viscitizens.
David Strangand PatriciaChang have shownthe importanceof international
organizationsto the elaborationand disseminationof these global definitions
George Thomas and Pat Lauderdale extendthesefindings
of responsibility; to
land reformissues.30
Even the state defenseapparatus,the componentof the state thatrealism
would expectto be mostconstrainedby task demandsimposedby a self-help
world,exhibitsthiskindof isomorphism. all stateshave defense
First,virtually

researchon education,see
29. Ramirez and Boli 1987a, 154. For additionalinstitutionalist
Meyer,Ramirez,and Soysal 1992; Meyer 1977; Ramirez and Rubinson 1979; Ramirez and Boli
1987a; 1987b;and Ramirezand Meyer1980.
30. See Strangand Chang 1993; and Thomas and Lauderdale 1987,respectively.

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 Institutionalism337

ministrieseven when theyface no externalthreat.Further,virtuallyall states

have tripartitemilitarystructures, with an army,air force,and navy-even
landlocked states. Finally,weapons acquisitionpatterns,particularlyamong
developingstates,is oftendrivenbysymbolic(and therefore cultural)consider-
ations. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman argue thatmanyof these states treat
weaponslikeflagsand acquire amountsand assortments ofweaponsthatmake
littlesense fromthepointofviewofdeployment fordefensebutthathave a lot
of "symbolicthrow-weight." to understandfrom
These behaviorsare difficult
within an analytic frameworkthat assumes that militarystructuresare
determinedbythedemandsofdefendingterritory againstoutsidethreats.They
make a lot of sense, however,if one understandshaving a militarywith
particularcharacteristics as beinga necessarypartof the trappingsof modern
statehood.Understandingthatmilitarieshave a strongculturaland legitimat-
ingrole to playforstates,vis-a-visbothotherstatesand theirownpopulations,
explainsa greatdeal ofwhatwouldotherwisebe anomalousbehavior.31
As these examples suggest,institutionalists'empiricalinterestsare wide-
ranging.The commonthreadin all of thisworkis an interestin the waysin
whichinternational behaviorcorrelateswithand is drivenbysystemicor global
culturalfactorsratherthan local task demands.Each demonstration poses a
challenge to conventionalactor-interestapproaches includingrealism and
liberalismin politicalscience.

Implicationsforpoliticalscience

One of the chiefvirtuesof sociology'sinstitutionalism is that it providesa

framework withwhichwe can ask questions about issues that realism and
liberalismtreatas assumptionsand therebyremovefromthe researchagenda.
researchon the originand natureof statesand sovereignty
Institutionalist is
one example. The broadeningand deepening of the European Union, the
of the SovietUnion,and thegrowthof multilateralism
disintegration have put
sovereigntyand statehoodhighon the agenda of manyIR scholars.32 Neoreal-
ism and neoliberalismare of littlehelp in addressingthese questions since
these approaches begin with the assumptionthat states are actors having
certainprespecifiedand unproblematiccharacteristics.While assumptionsof
thiskindhave advantages(parsimony,generalizability) theycome at the price
of removingthe assumed features of politics from the research agenda.
by contrast,offersa set of empiricallytestable
Sociology'sinstitutionalism,
propositionsabout states and sovereignty that can guide research.Political

31. See Eyre and Suchman forthcoming;and Suchman and Eyre 1992. For a related
analysis,see Wendtand Barnett1993.
constructivist
32. For examples,see Jackson1990;Thomson1994; Weber 1995; Lyonsand Mastanduno1995;
and Thomson1995.

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338 InternationalOrganization

scientistsmaytestthese argumentsand findthemwanting,but theywould at

least have theoreticalguidanceforsuchtests.33
Human rights,especiallythe rapid expansionof successfulhuman rights
claims,is anotherarea about whichconventionalIR approacheshave littleto
offerin thewayof hypothesesor testableexplanations.Approachesthattreat
states as actorshave littleto say about individualsand provideno reason to
expectthatindividualswould be able to make claimsagainststatesthatin any
waycompromisestatesovereignty by
or controlovercitizens.Institutionalists,
contrast,makeclearclaimsabouthowand whyindividualrightswillspreadand
have extensiveempiricalevidenceto back up theirclaims.34
Rosenau's turbulencetheoryalso emphasizes individuals,and it might
providea wayto challengeinstitutionalists. His argumentthatindividualsare
able to make new and expandingclaimsagainststatesbecause of a revolution
in cognitiveskillsassociatedwithtechnology suggestsa differentpatternofthe
spread of these rightsand claimsthan the one institutionalists would expect:
Rosenau would expectrightsexpansionto correlatewithtechnologicaldiffu-
sion, while institutionalistswould expect roughlycontemporaneousglobal
change,regardlessofobjectivetechnologicalconditions.35
In addition to shedding light on issues that are assumed rather than
investigated byour dominantparadigms,institutionalism also has implications
for issues that have been centralto neorealistand neoliberal debates. For
example,institutionalistswouldhave strongargumentsto make aboutmultilat-
eralism and the role of internationalinstitutions-a cornerstoneof the
neorealist-neoliberaldebate. Institutionalistswould expectcontinuedaggre-
gate growthin thenumberand influenceofinternational organizationsbutnot
forthereasonsneoliberalsclaim.Multilateralism willincreasenotonlybecause
it facilitatesPareto-optimaloutcomesand helps statesget what theywant in
cost-effective waysbut also forculturalreasons. Participationin the growing
networkof internationalorganizationsis culturallynecessaryand "appropri-
ate," in James March and Johan Olsen's sense of the term.36Further,
participationin internationalorganizationsconstructsor constituteswhat
stateswant or, in the case of European Union participation, what theyare.37
Institutionalistargumentsabout multilateralism would focuson what Ruggie
calls the "qualitativedimension"of multilateralism-thenorms,principles,
and sharedsocial understandings thatitembodies-but theyoffera muchmore
detailednotionaboutwherethoseprinciplescome fromand theirrelation,one
to another,than political scientistshave so far articulated.38The empirical

33. For an explicitrejectionof institutionalist in favorof what I

argumentsabout sovereignty
wouldcall a "neo-Machiavellian"view,see Krasner1994.
34. See, forexample,Thomas et al. 1987,chaps. 6, 10, 11,and 12.
35. Rosenau 1990.
36. March and Olsen 1989.
37. See Soysal 1995; and Finnemoreforthcoming.
38. Ruggie1993,6.

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 Institutionalism339

expectationsstemmingfromthisargumentwould be forcontinuingand even

increasing adherence to multilateralism-evenwhen it runs contraryto
expressednationalinterests-becauseitembodiessome set ofvalues centralto
thelargerworldculture.
However,at least twofeaturesofsociology'sinstitutionalism shouldconcern
researchhas been more concerned
political scientists.First,institutionalist
withdocumentingthe effectsof worldculturalstructurethaninvestigating its
causes or themechanismsofchangein theculturalstructure itself.Institution-
alists tend to produce global correlativestudies whose structureand logic
followfromMeyerand Rowan's initialinsightsabout isomorphism in the face
of dissimilartask demands. Institutionaliststudies generallyproceed by
collectingquantitativedata on a large numberof units (usually states) and
demonstrating thatratherthancorrelating withlocal taskdemands,attributes
or behaviorof the unitscorrelatewithattributesor behaviorof otherunitsor
withworldwidephenomena(internationalconferencesand treatiesor world
historicalevents,forexample). These analysesare oftenquite sophisticated,
using event historyanalysisand other techniquesthat look exotic to most
political scientists.However,once correlationis established,world cultural
causes are assumed. Detailed process-tracingand case study analysis to
validate and elaborate the inferencesbased on correlationare missing.39
Research to uncoverthe processes and mechanismswherebyworld cultural
normsspread and evolvewould have at least twoeffects.The firstwouldbe to
enrichtheinstitutionalist argument.Such researchwouldopen up a moretruly
dialectical relationshipbetween agency and structureand enable more
persuasiveaccountsoftheoriginsand dynamicsoftheworldculturalstructure.
Detailed case studiesabout the mechanismsbywhichculturalnormsevolve
and spread are also likely to call into question the cognitivebasis of
institutionalist groundtheirargumentsabout theways
theory.Institutionalists
in whichcultureoperatesin social psychology. MeyercreditsErvingGoffman,
Guy Swanson,and C. WrightMills withprovidinga connectionbetweenthis
Detailed examinationofcases
social psychologicalliteratureand institutions.40
is to
of spreadingWesternculture likely reveal thatitstriumphis not due only
to
or evenprimarily cognition. The painted
picture by studiesisone
institutionalist
in whichworldculturemarcheseffortlessly acrosstheglobe.Little
and facelessly
attention or coercion.To anypoliticalscientist(or
is paid eitherto contestation
historian) an accountoftheriseofthemodemstatein theWestand itsexpansion
acrossAfrica,Asia,and theAmericasthatomitsconflict, violence,and leadershipis
grossly incomplete. theimplication
Similarly, thathumanrights or citizenrights or
even marketeconomiesbecome establishedand spread in a peaceful,orderly
fashionthrough cognitionaloneis untenableto anyonewhohas detailedknowledge
ofcases.

39. For some examplesof studiesthataddressthisgap, see Thomas and Boli forthcoming.
40. See Goffman1959; 1974; Swanson1971; and Mills 1940.

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340 InternationalOrganization

The lack of case study analysis or on-the-groundinvestigationof the

mechanismswherebyworldcultureproducesisomorphismobscuresthe roles
of politicsand power in world historyand normativechange. The cognitive
processes to whichinstitutionalists point are important,but theyare by no
means the only processes at work in internationallife. Destroyingcultural
competitors, bothfigurativelyand literally,is a time-honored wayof establish-
ingculturaldominance.Treatmentofthenativepopulationsin NorthAmerica
is one example. Attemptsat ethnic cleansing in Nazi Germany,Bosnia,
Rwanda,and elsewhereare another.Culturalrulesare oftenestablishednotby
persuasionor cognitiveprocessesof institutionalization but by forceand fiat.
Over time,culturalnormsestablishedbyforceindeed maybecome institution-
alized in the sense thattheycome to have a "taken-for-granted" qualitythat
shapes action in the ways institutionalists describe. But emphasizingthe
institutionalizedqualityof sovereignty, for example,and its effectsin world
politicsshould not obscurethe role playedbyforceand coercionin imposing
sovereignty rulesand in arbiteringtheirongoingevolution.
One instancewhereforceand military powermaybe particularly important
to institutionalist
concernsinvolvesthe Reformationand eventualProtestant
dominationof the West. Institutionalists trace theirWesternculturalnorms
back to medieval Christendomwithouta word about the Reformationor
Protestantism's effecton theseculturalrules.This is a startlingomissiongiven
theintellectualdebtthesescholarsowe Max Weber.Manyoftheculturalrules
institutionalistsemphasize-individualism and markets, for example-
arguablyhave strongties to Protestantism not Christianity
specifically, gener-
ally. One could argue that the Westernculturethatis expandingacross the
globe is reallya Protestantculture.Protestantism did not come to dominate
Europe throughcognitionand persuasionalone, as centuriesof religiouswars
make clear. Western culture may look the ways it does because of three
centuriesof Anglo-American(i.e., Protestant)power and dominationof the
West, dominationthat was secured throughrepeated militaryconquest of
France.
The second featureof institutionalistresearchthatshouldconcernpolitical
scientistsis theirspecification
of the contentofworldculture.Institutionalists
focus on Western rationalityas the means to both progressand equality.
Progressis definedas wealthaccumulation,justice is definedas equality,and
rational means, in institutionalist research,are usually bureaucracies and
markets.Institutionalists tendto treattheseelementsofWesternmodernity as
at least looselycompatible.Equality,in the formof individualrights,expands
togetherwithmarketsand bureaucraciesacross the globe,and institutionalist
researchdocumentsthe collectiveand interrelatedspread of these cultural
norms.
The implication,whichwill be suspectto all politicalscientists,is that all
'good" things(in the Western cultural frame) can and do go together.
Institutionalistsmaynot intendthisimplication,but both theirresearchand

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 Institutionalism341

their theorizingconsistentlyunderscorethe mutuallyreinforcing nature of

theseWesternculturalrules.
In fact,thereare good reasonsto believethattheelementsofworldculture,
even as the institutionalists have specifiedit, contain deep tensions and
contradictions thatconstrainisomorphismand limitthe stabilityof behavioral
convergence.Most obviousis the tensionbetweenthe two "ends" of Western
world culture-progress, defined as economic accumulation,and justice,
definedas equality.The trade-off betweenequityand growthin development
economicsis well-known. In makingdecisionsabout economicpolicies,thetwo
pillarsofthenormativestructure oftenpull in oppositedirections.Partisansof
policies have invokedequalitynormsin theirdefense.Those
redistributionist
pushingformore and fastergrowthwill evoke progressnorms.Policymakers
oftenhave to makeexplicitand controversial trade-offsbetweenthetwo.
Similarly,the two rational means to justice and progress-marketsand
bureaucracies-may be in tension. Market arrangementsmay be justified
normatively bytheirefficient contributions to progress(wealthaccumulation)
and by equality defined as opportunityor access, but they often create
outcomesthat offendother definitionsof equality,notablyequalityof out-
comes. Marketstend to produce unequal distributional outcomes.The com-
monsolutionis to bringin bureaucracy,in theformof the state,to remedythe
equalityoffensesof markets.However bureaucraciesmay compromisethe
efficiencyof marketsand so compromiseprogress.Again, progress(wealth)
conflictswithjustice (equality).And, again, no obviousor equilibriumset of
arrangements can resolvethis.41
Contradictions amongdominantculturalnormsmean thatsocial institutions
are continuallybeing contested,albeit to varyingdegrees at different times.
Unresolvednormativetensionsin a set of social compromisesat one timemay
be the mobilizingbasis forattackson thatset of social arrangements later as
people articulatenormativeclaims that earlierwere pushed aside. Further,
compromisesamongcompetingworldnormativeprinciplesmaybe contingent
on local circumstancesand personalitiesand are likelyto reflectlocal norms
and customswithwhichinternationalnormshave had to compromise.Thus,
afterWorld War II Japanwas forced(note the processwas not cognitive)to
accept a set of Westerneconomic and politicalarrangementsthathad been
forgedelsewhere,in theUnitedStates.Overtime,thosearrangements became
in Japanbut in unique waysthatreflectednon-Westernlocal
institutionalized
culturalnorms.The subsequentsuccess of Japan in Westernterms(a great
deal of economicaccumulationwithrelativeequality)has promptedWestern
firmsand Asian statesto adopt a numberof Japanesepractices,policies,and
norms.This kindof culturalfeedback,fromperipheryto core,is neglectedby
theunidirectional model.
institutionalist

chap. 5.
41. For an expandeddiscussionofthisset oftensions,see Finnemoreforthcoming,

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342 InternationalOrganization

These contestationprocessesfornormativedominanceare political.In fact,

normativecontestationis in large part what politicsis all about; it is about
competingvalues and understandings ofwhatis good,desirable,and appropri-
ate in our collectivecommunallife. Debates about civil rights,affirmative
action, social safetynets, regulationand deregulation,and the appropriate
degree of governmentintrusioninto the lives of citizens are all debates
preciselybecause thereis no clear stablenormativesolution.Further,theyare
all debatesinvolving conflictamongthebasic normativegoods identified bythe
institutionalists.
Civilrights,affirmative
action,and to some extentsocial safety
nets are debates about the natureof equality-who attainsequalityand how
thatequalityis measured.Since thesolutionsall involvebureaucraticinterven-
tion,these debates are also about the relationshipof bureaucraciesand the
stateto equality.Debates about social safetynetsraise specificissuesabout the
relationshipbetweenbureaucraciesand marketsand the degree to whichthe
lattermaybe compromisedby the formerin the serviceof equality.Debates
overregulationand government intrusionare bothabout the degree to which
bureaucracycan compromisemarkets,on the one hand, or equality and
individualrightsthatderivefromequality,on theother.
If one takes seriouslythe tensionsand contradictionsamong elementsof
culture,researchmustfocuson politicsand process.If culturalelementsstand
in paradoxical relationssuch that equilibriumarrangementsare limitedor
constrained,theinteresting questionsbecome,whicharrangements are adopted
where-and why?Institutionalists may be right.Commonglobal normsmay
create similar structuresand push both people and states toward similar
behaviorat giventimes,butifthebodyofinternational normsis notcompletely
congruent,then those isomorphismswill not be stable. Further,people may
adopt similarorganizationalformsbutshowlittlesimilarity in behaviorbeyond
that.Botswanaand the United States maybothbe organizedin the formof a
modernstate,but thecontentof thoseformsand thebehaviorwithinthemare
verydifferent. Isomorphismis not homogeneity;it does not create identical
behavioral outcomes.42 Without a specificationof culture that attends to
oppositionswithinthe overall structure,institutionalists will not be able to
accountforeitherdiversity or changein thatstructure.

Conclusions

Institutionalist
argumentsemphasizestructure at theexpenseofagency.Doing
so has importantintellectualbenefits.It allowsinstitutionalists
to ask questions
about featuresof social and political life that other perspectivestake for
granted-ubiquitoussovereignstatehoodand expandingclaimsbyindividuals,
forexample.Further,froman IR theoryperspective, institutionalists'
emphasis

42. I am gratefulto Michael Barnettforbringingthispointto myattention.

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 Institutionalism343

on structureallows for system-levelexplanationsthat compete with other

dominantparadigmsand so enrich the body of theoryavailable to tackle
puzzles in thefield.
Iftheneglectofagencywereonlyan omission,therewouldbe littlecause for
concern.No theoryexplainseverything. One can alwaysexplain a fewmore
data pointsbyaddinga fewmorevariablesand increasingthecomplexity ofthe
model. But the institutionalists' inattentionto agencyleads theminto more
seriouserrors.It leads themto misspecify boththemechanismsbywhichsocial
structure produceschangeand thecontentofthesocial structure itself.
Cognitiveprocessesmaydominateorganizationalchangein manyempirical
domains,but theycompetewithand oftenare eclipsedbycoercionin manyof
the empiricaldomains that concernIR scholars.Educational curriculamay
change in peacefulwaysdrivenby cognitivedecision-making processes;state
authoritystructuresoften do not. Violence is a fundamentallydifferent
mechanismofchangethancognition.Both mechanismsmayoperatein a given
situation.Often there are choices to be made even withinthe constraints
imposedby force,but outcomesimposed externallythroughviolence are not
capturedbya cognitivetheoreticalframework.
are not alone in this tendencyto overlook power and
Institutionalists
coercionin explainingorganizationaloutcomes.Much of organizationtheory
shares this characteristic.Terry Moe has noted the failure of the new
economicsof organizationto incorporateconsiderationsof power,but even
Moe, a politicalscientist,is not particularly concernedwithissues of violence
sincetheseoccurrarelyin hisownempiricaldomain-U.S. bureaucracy.43
Institutionalistmodelsimplya worldsocial structure made up of normsthat
are largelycongruent.Their emphasis is on the mutuallyreinforcingand
expansivenatureof thesenorms.Theystressthe consensusthatarisesaround
various culturalmodels-of citizenship,of statehood,of education,of indi-
vidual rights-to the point that these normsand institutionsare taken for
grantedin contemporarylife. The implicationis that the spread of world
cultureis relativelypeaceful.Institutionalists specifyno sourcesof instability,
conflict,or oppositionto the progressiveexpansionofworldculture.Yasemin
Soysal'sworkis perhapsthemostattunedto contradictions amongthecultural
elementsofcitizenshipshe studies.However,evenin herworkthesecontradic-
tionsresultonlyin paradoxicalarrangements withwhichpeople seem to live
reasonablypeacefully.44
The resultof thisspecification is thatall of politicsbecomes problematicin
an institutionalist
framework. If the worldculturetheyspecifyis so powerful
and congruent,the institutionalists have no grounds for explainingvalue
conflictsor normativecontestation-inotherwords,politics.A researchdesign
that attended to agency and the processes wherebyisomorphiceffectsare

43. Moe 1984.

44. Soysal 1995.

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344 InternationalOrganization

produced would have preventedinstitutionalists fromfallinginto this trap.

Focusingmore closely on process would draw attention to the contradictions
among normativeclaims and force institutionalists to rethinkboth the
specificationofworldcultureand itslikelyeffects.
These problematicfeaturesof institutionalist theorylie squarelyon the turf
ofpoliticalscientists.Politicsand process,coercionand violence,value conflict
and normativecontestationare our business. Institutionalism would benefit
greatlyfroma dialogue withpoliticalscientists.Likewise,politicalscientists
Thus far,IR scholarsinterested
could learn a greatdeal frominstitutionalists.
in normshave lacked a substantivesystemictheoryfromwhichto hypothesize
and carry out research. Institutionalismprovides this. Taking its claims
seriouslymayproduceradicalrevisionsto the existingsociologists'theories.It
may also produce opposing theoreticalarguments.Either outcome would
advance researchin both disciplinesand enrichour understandingof world
politics.

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