38 G.R. No.

137347 March 4, 2004 Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball
court. He was nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the
appellant. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the
vs.
appellant for playing on the roof.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95,
convicting appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-
old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. while the latter was flying his kite on top of a roof. The court a quo
sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw
Vincent and Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga
batang ito, hindi kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon
immediately jumped down from the roof.6 Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof
flying his kite. When he heard the appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter.
Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45
caliber pistol7 towards the direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal
area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the
basketball court.8

Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's head.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with murder reads:
Whilcon retreated and left his friend.9 The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's
hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was
That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said pronounced dead on arrival.
accused, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the hospital. They
employ personal violence upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS, a
rushed to the hospital, only to see their son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be
minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him
found.
on the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
offended party. Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted an autopsy where he made the following findings:
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-lateral aspect.

Case for the Prosecution3 Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest wall, right side.

Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The
family lived at Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed
"Hataw," was a grade three pupil whose education was sponsored by the Spouses Petinato, an
American couple, through an educational foundation.4
The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed in the Traffic Management
Group (TMG) based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle
Unit of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion
collar widest postero-inferiorly, located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and
8.0 cms. behind the left external auditory meatus, directed forward upward and from left
to right, involving the scalp, fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the
left and right cerebral hemispheres of the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone
(punched-out), lacerating the scalp, making an Exit wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with
everted and irregular edges, 12.0 cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front of the right external
auditory meatus.

Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid, extensive, bilateral.

At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if
he could play outside. She agreed.5 Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez,
Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.
Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside this carinderiawas a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old
Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of
Visceral organs, congested.
basketball.

1
 Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.10
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet
entered the left upper back portion of the head (above the level of the left ear) 11 and exited to the
right side.12 Dr. Baluyot signed Vincent's certificate of death.13
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the
scene of the shooting but failed to find the victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon
City General Hospital where they heard that the victim had died. They returned to the crime scene
and recovered an empty shell from a .45 caliber gun.14
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the
appellant was assigned on detached service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the
appellant had not reported for duty.15 At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police Senior
Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the Regional Director of the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the
appellant to the Sangandaan Police Station together with his .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No.
AOC-38701.16
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought to the Department of Justice
where he was enrolled under its Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI
Special Agent Roberto Divinagracia on September 29, 1998. 17 On the same date, P/Insp. Abelardo
Aquino wrote the Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic
examination of the .45 caliber pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of a .45 caliber
gun found at the scene of the shooting.18 Before noon on September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived
at the station and turned over two witnesses, Raymond Castro and Ricardo Salvo. He also turned
over the witnesses' sworn statements.19 On October 2, 1998, on orders of the police station
commander,20 Pajarillo took pictures of the crime scene, including the carinderia and the roof with a
bullet hole as part of the office filing.21 He did not inform the prosecution that he took such pictures,
nor did he furnish it with copies thereof. However, the appellant's counsel learned of the existence
of the said pictures.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98
stating that:
FINDINGS:
Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen marked "FAP"
revealed the same individual characteristics with cartridge cases fired from the
above-mentioned firearm.
CONCLUSION:
The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from the above-mentioned caliber .45
Thompson Auto Ordnance pistol with serial number AOC-38701.22
Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As evidenced by receipts, they
spent P49,174 for the funeral.23
Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998,
Macario Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's
brother-in-law was drunk and armed with a knife, and was creating trouble in their house. The
appellant's house was located along a narrow alley (eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was
200 meters away from Macario's house.24 Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service
revolver, cocked it, put the safety lock in place and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He brought
out his motorcycle from the garage and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley leading to the main road.
Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road, called his attention to his revolver which was
about to fall off from his waist. The appellant got distracted and brought his motorcycle to the right
side of the road, near the abandoned carinderia where he stopped. As he stepped his right foot on
the ground to keep himself from falling, the appellant lost his balance and slipped to the right. At
this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot and suddenly went off. Bystanders shouted,
"Ano yon, ano yon, mukhang may tinamaan." He picked up his gun and examined it. He put the safety
latch back on and tucked it at his right waistline. He then told Macario to wait for a while to check if
somebody was really hit. He went near the abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the
ground. He picked up the bloodied child, boarded him on a tricycle on queue and instructed its
driver, Boy Candaje, to bring the boy to the hospital. 25 On board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay
and Milbert Doring.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan City but did not
inform her of the incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103,
located at Roces Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major Suyo that he met an accident;
that his gun fell and fired; and, that the bullet accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that
he might not be able to report for work that day and the following day. He assured his superior that
he would surrender later. He then went to Valenzuela City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito
Lam, who was a motorcycle unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three days. He also visited
friends during that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol.
Major Suyo accompanied and turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test. He stated that the results of the
drug test were negative. The appellant was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for
investigation.26 The pictures27 of the crime scene were given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny
Yaket, shown in one of the pictures pointing to a bullet hole. The appellant's testimony was
corroborated in pari materia by Macario Ortiz.
Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September
26, 1998, he was playing basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road
beside the chapel. With him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the rooftop of
the carinderia with Whilcon. While Puti was shooting the ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo
ran beside the chapel near the basketball court. He looked back towards the basketball court and
saw the appellant, about 15 meters away from the canal, holding the prostrate and bloodied
Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot Vincent. He did not report what he saw to the police
authorities. He was ordered by his father to testify for the appellant. He also testified that his
mother was related to Daniel, the appellant's brother.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder, qualified
by treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor
of the appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
2
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina
y Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the
accused of his public position (par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the
amounts of P49,174.00, as actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages; P25,000.00, as
exemplary damages; and, P50,000.00, as death indemnity.
The accused is to pay the costs.
The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the accused, shall remain under the
custody of the Court and shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules and
regulations upon the finality of this decision.28
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RELEVANT
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE
CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COURT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING AND
ADVOCACY, AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF SPECULATION, PATENTLY
DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND PARTIALITY.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
RICARDO SALVO, ALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS
WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS CONTRARY TO THE COMMON EXPERIENCE OF
MANKIND.
4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING EXCULPATORY
AND INCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED. 29
The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the physical evidence, viz.,
the hole found on the rooftop of the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant
contends that the picture30taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the
principal witnesses of the prosecution, and the pictures 31 showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing
to a hole on the roof buttress the defense of the appellant that the shooting was accidental. The
appellant maintains that his service revolver fell to the ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of
the gun was pointed to an oblique direction, it fired, hitting the victim who was on the rooftop. The
bullet hit the back portion of the victim's head, before exiting and hitting the rooftop. The appellant
posits that the pictures belie Ricardo's testimony that he deliberately shot the victim, and, instead,
complements Dr. Baluyot's testimony that the gunshot wound came from somewhere behind the
victim, somewhere lower than the point of entrance. The appellant invokes P/Insp. Mario Prado's
testimony that if a gun hits the ground in an oblique position, the gun will fire and the bullet will exit
in the same position as the gun, that is, also in an oblique position.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the contention of the appellant is based
on speculations and surmises, the factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by
competent and credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the hole shown in the
pictures32 was caused by a bullet from a .45 caliber pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay
Tanod Johnny Yaket, who was shown in the pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed to
prove that any slug was found on the rooftop or under the roof which came from the appellant's .45
caliber pistol. According to the Solicitor General, the pictures relied upon by the appellant cannot
overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of the young eyewitness Ricardo Salvo.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the appellant is exempt from
criminal liability is a factual issue. The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence, his affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going
off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from
criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused. For the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or
with fault or negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with
due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention
of causing it.34 An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although
it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court held that an accident is a fortuitive
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand without which such other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.36 In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice.37 The appellant must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because by admitting having caused the death of the
victim, he can no longer be acquitted.
3
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense. Yes, Your Honor.

First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the COURT: (to the witness)
pictures showing the hole on the roof of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim
accidentally. However, when the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel of the gun and then the
appellant relating to the pictures, the latter refused to answer. This can be gleaned from the
hammer is moved backwards and therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor, thus:
trigger, the bullet will fire because the hammer will move forward and then hit the base
of the bullet?
Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent but were refused to be
answered. This certainly led the undersigned to cast doubt on respondent's allegations.
A Yes, Your Honor.
The defenses set forth by the respondent are evidentiary in character and best
appreciated in a full-blown trial; and that the same is not sufficient to overcome probable
cause.39 Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out?

Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim. 40 There is no evidence showing A Yes, Your Honor.
that the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the
position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.
Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of your house?

Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the chamber
A I safety (sic) it, sir.
of his pistol was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline. 41 He
also testified that the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the gun would fire if the hammer is
moved backward with the safety lock in place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a safety lock?
hard on the trigger, the gun would not fire:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Is this your service firearm?
Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it upwards.
A Yes, Your Honor.
(witness did as instructed)
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went out of the house?
It is now on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that time when you tucked the
gun in your waistline?
Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?

A The hammer was cocked like this.

(witness did as instructed)

COURT:
A It will not, Your Honor.

Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved backwards near the safety grip.
COURT: (to the parties)

ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY:

Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused pulled the trigger, the hammer
did not move forward?
Admitted, Your Honor.
PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:
ATTY. PEREZ:

4
 Admitted, Your Honor. Lam in Valenzuela City, and transferred from one house to another for three days to prevent his
arrest:
COURT: (to the witness)
Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26, 1998?
Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger many times, a bullet will not
come out from the muzzle of the gun because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)? A No, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?

Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun? A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?

Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of the gun is like this and A Because at that time I was already confused and did not know what to do, Your
therefore it is open but it is on a safety lock, there is space between the safety grip which Honor.
is found below the hammer, there is a space, is it not?
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of Valenzuela?
Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.
A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.
The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to demonstrate.
Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of PO3 Lam for three days?
(to the witness)
A Yes, sir.
You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if you want but do not remove the
safety lock.
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay Toro?

(witness did as instructed)

A Because I am worried, sir.

The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not touch the hammer even if the
COURT: (to the witness)
hammer is cocked.42

Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3 Lam?
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the defense
proffered by the appellant was incredible. This can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court:
A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in the evening, I go back to the
house of PO3 Lam, Your Honor.
3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as providential, when the counsel
of the accused was holding the gun in a cocked position and the safety lock put in place,
the gun accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27 or 28, 1998 and then
fire and neither was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of returned to the house of PO3 Lam in the evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to
the gun to move forward. The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position as it your 103 Base?
was when it dropped on the floor.43
A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major Suyo.
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid
from the investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame, Quezon City?

5
 A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor. the authorities and give an account of the accident. His failure to do so would invite
suspicion and whatever account or statement he would give later on becomes doubtful.
Q What is the connection of you having money to that of informing your officer that
you will surrender? For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was accidentally shot is odious, if not, an
insult to human intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of a fantasy than a
reality. It was a deliberate and intentional act, contrary to accused's claim, that it happened
A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already be detained and that I will
outside the sway of his will.45
have no money to spend.

It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
of the witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of
their testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, as the
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit trial judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they
your family in Barangay Bahay Toro? testified.46 We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no reason to deviate from
the findings of the trial court.
A No, sir.
The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves credence. He testified in a positive and
straightforward manner, which testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was
COURT: (to the witness)
subjected to a grueling cross-examination by the appellant's counsel, he never wavered in his
testimony. He positively identified the appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the
Q Did you send somebody to visit your family? latter deliberately aimed his gun and shot the victim. The relevant portions of his testimony are
quoted:
A No, Your Honor.
Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do you remember of any unusual
incident which took place?
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

A: Yes, sir.
Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent?

Q: What was that unusual incident?

A I was not able to do that, sir.

A: When Vincent was shot, sir.

Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay Toro?

Q: Who shot Vincent?

A No sir, because I already brought the child to the hospital.44

A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir.

The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was
accidental and that he was not negligent.

We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its decision on this matter:
Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Fallorina?
The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a policeman, that the victim was
accidentally shot was his failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after the A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir.
incident. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that he would choose to flee and keep
himself out of sight for about three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond
Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?
human comprehension that a policeman, who professes innocence would come out into
the open only three (3) days from the incident and claim that the victim was accidentally
shot. Human behavior dictates, especially when the accused is a policeman, that when A: Yes, sir.
one is innocent of some acts or when one is in the performance of a lawful act but causes
injury to another without fault or negligence, he would, at the first moment, surrender to
Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that you saw him and Fallorina shot
him?
6
A: "Nakatalikod po siya." A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir.

(Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already marked as Exhibit O-14).

Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the figure of a certain Jeffrey and you Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now seated. Can you tell the Court how far
and his tricycle? Why did you include this drawing? where (sic) you from Fallorina at that time of the shooting?

A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was boarded to and brought to the COURT:
hospital.
Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the distance pointed to by the witness
(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11) is more or less 7 meters.

Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle?

A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir. ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked as Exhibit O-7. Why did you Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, can you tell that?
include the motorcycle?
COURT: (to the witness)
A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at that time.
Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy at that time the body (sic) was
COURT: (to the witness) shot?

Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the motorcycle was moving? COURT:

A: It was stationary, your Honor. 10 meters more or less?

Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Fallorina before you saw him
shot the boy?
Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina before the incident?

A: More or less two years, sir.

A: He came from their house, Your Honor.
Q: Why do you know him?
Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand Fallorina?
A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, especially on Sundays, sir.
A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your Honor.

Q: How many shots did you hear?

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
A: Only one, sir.
Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was Buddha still there?
Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina?

7
A: Yes, sir. Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what
did he do?
Q: What was that gun?
A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.
A: .45 cal., sir.
Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?
Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.?
A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.
A: No, sir.
Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?
Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?
A: I do not know anymore.47
A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the movies, sir.
The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine,
his act was deliberate and intentional.
Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for two (2) years and you saw him
shot Vincent on September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Please look around
the courtroom now and point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina? It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as witnesses for the prosecution,
only Ricardo Salvo remained steadfast after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program
of the Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified for the prosecution,
CT. INTERPRETER:
despite the fact that the appellant was a policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who
was always crying,48 unable to obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would
Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the back of the lady and wearing a falsely testify against the appellant. It was only his purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this
yellow shirt and maong pants and when asked of his name, he stated his name as incident and that justice be done to the victim. 49 Hence, the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to full
Ferdinand Fallorina. faith and credence.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) The Crime Committed by the Appellant

Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard utterances at that time that he shot the We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised
victim? Penal Code qualified by treachery. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot
intentionally while his back was turned against the appellant. The little boy was merely flying his
kite and was ready to get down from the roof when the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The

essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the
slightest provocation on his part.50 Nonetheless, Vincent was an eleven-year-old boy. He could not
A: Yes, sir. possibly put up a defense against the appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is not
so much as to put emphasis on the age of the victim, rather it is more of a description of the young
victim's state of helplessness.51 Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be
Q: What was that?
expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. 52 The
abuse of superior strength as alleged in the Information is already absorbed by treachery and need
A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsisibaba diyan!" not be considered as a separate aggravating circumstance.53

We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public
position in this case. We reverse the trial court on this score.
Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof,
what about Fallorina, what did he do? There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used his service firearm, the .45
caliber pistol, in shooting the victim. However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant
took advantage of his position as a policeman when he shot the victim.54 The shooting occurred only
A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he went at the back of the karinderia
when the appellant saw the victim on the rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in
where Vincent fell, Your Honor.
appreciating abuse of public position against the appellant.

8
The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the
accused spontaneously and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes
to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 55
In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City,
and even moved from one house to another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who
swore to obey the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him and terminate their
investigation. It was only after the lapse of three days that the appellant gave himself up and
surrendered his service firearm.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
95, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and, there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr. the amount of P49,174 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil
indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
39 G.R. No. L-37908 October 23, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
BENJAMIN ONG y KHO, and BIENVENIDO QUINTOS y SUMALJAG previously convicted as
affirmed in G.R. No. L-34497, accused, BLDOMERO AMBORSIO, alias "VAL", Defendant-
appellant.
On the night of April 23, 1971, victim Henry Chua was last seen alive in the company of his friend
Benjamin Ong. As Chua failed to return to his home,his family, alarmed by his mysterious
desappearance, sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation, the Manila Police
Department, and the Philippine Constabulary to locate him. Knowing that Bajamin Ong was the last
person with Chua before the disappearance of the latter, the NBI tried to contact Ong. Ong also
disappeared, so the various police agnecies began a manhunt for the apprehension of Ong.
Banjamin Ong was apprehended on August 29, 1971, in Stio patanda, Barrio Balugo, Oas, albay,
Brouth to Ligao, Albay, Ong denied any knowledge of the desappearance of Chua. When Ong was
transferred to CampVicente Lim in Laguna, he attempted to commit suicide. On September 1, 1971,
when Ong was turned over to the NBI for investigation, he unhesitatingly confessed his
responsiblity for the killing of Henry Chua. Ong implicated Bienvienido Quintos as one of his
companions in the cirme. When quintos was arrested he also admitted his participation in the crime,
and pointed to Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosio as their companions in the perpetration of
the crime, stating the details of its execution.
Based on the confessions of Ong and Quintos, the NBI and the Manila Police Department were able
to recover the body of Henry Chua in a state of advanced decomposition. The Identity of the body of
Chua was confirmed by Siy Giap Chua, brother of Henry. 1 both Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido
Quintos were tried (CCC-VII-922-Rizal, for "kidnapping with Murder") and convicted by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, Seventh, Judicial District, (Judge Onofre A.Villaluz) in the "Sentence",
dated October 11, 1971. 2 As both Ong and Quintos were sentenced to death, the criminal case was
elevated on automatic review to this Court (G.R. No. L-34497). This Court in its decision dated
January 30, 1975, 3 found the two accused Benjamin Ong y Kho and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle
offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analoguous to passion or
obfuscation, thereby imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on both of them. 4 Said decision
became final and executory on February 19, 1975. 5
At the time Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos were tried and convicted by the trial court,
accused Baldomero Ambrosio and Fernando Tan, Alias Oscar Tan, were still at large. 6
After the arrest of accused Baldomero Ambrosio sometime in August of 1972, 7 an information was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against him, to wit:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Benjamin Ong y Kho, Bienvenido
Quintos y Sumaljag, Fernando Tan alias "Oscar Tan", and Baldomero Ambrosio
alias "Val" of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about April 23 to April 24, 1971, inclusive, in the municipality of
Paraaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
9
 Honorable court, the above named accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring and confederating totether and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with treachery and known
premeditation and for the purpose of killing one Henry Chua and thereafter
extorting money from his family through the use of a ransom note, kidnapped
and carried away said Henry Chua, initially by means of friendly gestures and
later through the use of force, in an automobile, and later after having taken
him to an uninhabited place in Caloocan City, with the use of force detained
him (Henry Chua) and killed him in the following manner, to wit: The accused
after gagging and tying up Henry Chua and repeatedly threatening him with
death, assured him that if he would write and sign a ransom note for the
payment by his family of the sum of $50,000.00 (US), he would not be killed
and would be released upon receipt of the ransom note, he was again gagged
and tied up by the accused, and thereafter stabbed in the abdominal region,
several times with an ice-pick, inflicting upon him (Henry Chua) mortal
wounds on his vital organs, which directly caused his death.
All contrary to law with the following generic aggravating circumstances:
(a) Evident premeditations;
(b) Grave abuse of confidence;
(c) Nighttime;
(d) Use of an motor vehicle ;
(e) Use of uperior strenght;
(f) Cruelty. 8
The accused Baldomero Ambrosio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on August 26, 1972, was
tried, and the trial court rendered its decision dated October 17, 1973, with dispositive portion, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Baldomero Ambrosio, Guilty, beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidanapping with Murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 267 thereto, as
charged in the Information, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of Death; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of
P12,000.00; to pay moral damges in the amount of P10,000.00 and another
P10,000.00 as exemplary damges jointly and severally with Benjamin Ong and
Bienvienido Quintos; and to pay his proportionable share of the costs.
So Ordered. 9
The evidence for the prosecution, essentially the same as presented and reviewed by automatic
appeal, by this Court in G.R. No. L,34497, established its version as follows:
Dr. Ricardo Ibarrola, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that he
conducted the autopsy of the deceased Henry Chua, and prepared the necropsy report Exh. "M". The
body of the deceased at the time of the autopsy was already in a far advanced state of
decomposition. The brains, lungs. and other soft tissues of the body were already tot:ally
decomposed while some of the internal organs, like the heart and the liver were already autolized.
Dr. Ibarrola located two stab wounds on the liver, caused by a sharp pointed piercing implement,
most probably an ice-pick. He attributed death to these stab wounds, although he gave the
considered opinion that death could have been hastened by asphyxiation as the probability existed
that Henry Chua was by alive. 10
The body of Henry Chua was Identified by his brother, Siy Giap who was present when the body was
exhumed from a shallow grave in Barrio Makatipo Caloocan City. His Identification of the body was
based on the clothes and shoes worn by the deceased, as well as the personal effects found on it,
including an expensive Piaget white gold watch, a lighter, a wallet with driver's license, Diner's card
and other personal papers. 11
Agents Enrique Lacanilao and Diego Gutierrez of the National Bureau of Investigation investigated
the accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido Quintos. The original and supplementary extrajudicial
confessions of Ong and Quintos 12 which led to the successful discovery of the place where Henry
Chua was buried and the subsequent exhumation of the body 13 were Identified by these agents.
These witnesses also revealed the recovery of the rope with which Chua's hands were tied and the
flannel cloth with which he was gagged when he was killed. 14 Both agents testified on the re-
enactment of the crime." 15 In the course of investigation of accused Benjamin Ong and Bienvenido
Quintos, the accused Baldomero Ambrosio was implicated. When accused Ambrosio was arrested in
August of 1972, he was brought to the NBI office by the Chief of Police of Batan, Aklan. Ambrosio
voluntarily gave the extrajudicial statement Exhibit "S". 16
Ceferino Castro of the Baliwag Police Department narrated the discovery of Henry Chua's Mustang
car with Plate No. 1602 which was abandoned near a gasoline station at barrio They, Baliwag,
Bulacan. The pictures of the car were identified. 17
Patrolman Marciano Roque of the Caloocan City Police Department, narrated the alleged plan to kin
Chua as initiated by Benjamin Ong. Roque knew Ong for more than five years as the Assistant
Manager of the Acme Shoes Rubber and Plastic Corporation, a company situated in Caloocan City,
owned by Ong's brother-in-law Chua Pak. During the first week of April, 1971, Roque went to the
Acme office to get a pair of rubber sandals. Benjamin Ong invited Roque for a ride in Ong's car,
where Ong revealed his plan to kidnap a person who allegedly cheated Ong in gambling games.
Roque tried to discourage Ong from carrying out his plan. The latter insisted and asked Roque to
assist him during the several meetings that followed between Ong and Roque. Roque claimed he
was taken by Ong to Barrio Matipo, Caloocan City, and shown the place where Ong planned to bury
the person he planned to kidnap and kill. In one of the meetings between Roque and Ong, the former
saw a man seated at the rear of Ong's car and the latter referred to that man as his godson who will
help him in the execution of the crime. That man turned out to be the accused Baldomero Ambrosia
Ong tried to persuade Roque to join the plan as the father of the intended victim happens to be a
very rich man and the ransom money they expected to get would enable Roque to leave the police
force and retire. Roque tried to avoid Ong and urged the latter to forget the matter. 18
Bienvenido Quintos who was previously accused and convicted of the crimes," of
murder, 19 implicated Balintawak. Ambrosio when the former testified in his defense during that
trial of CCC-VII-922-Rizal against Ong and Quintos. 20Quintos stated that he could recognize his co-
accused, then at large, Fernando Tan and Baldomero Ambrosia On April 23, 1971, Quintos and Tan
met Ong and Ambrosio at the Barrio Fiesta restaurant in Caloocan City. At about 9:00 p.m. they went
10
to the Brown Derby restaurant at Quezon Boulevard Extension, riding in the Chevrolet car of Ong.
They , proceeded afterwards to Roxas Boulevard where Ong ordered his driver Ambrosio to stop at
the Amihan Night Club. While Ambrosio and Quintos stayed in the car, Ong and Tan went inside the
night club. Tan returned to the car and invited Quintos to go to the nearby Wigwam Night Club.
After a while, Tan and Quintos returned. Tan sat beside the driver Ambrosio while Quintos sat at the
rear seat. They followed another car a Mustang from Dewey Boulevard to Cruelty Hall, then to
Quiapo, Espana and Quezon Boulevard Extension, Quezon City. They passed Sto. Domingo Church,
made a U-turn, and turned right to Talayan Village. Quintos saw the car they were following stop in
a dark place, and Ambrosio alighted from their Chevrolet car. Tan pulled a gun as he went to the
other parked car the Mustang. Quintos followed the two and he saw Tan approach and point a
gun at a man while Ambrosio pulled that man out of the Mustang. That man was the victim, Henry
Chua. Tan and Ambrosio forced Chua to the rear seat of the Chevrolet car, then compelled him to lie
down on the floor. Ambrosio took a rope and tied the feet and hands of the victim, while Tan took a
flannel cloth and gagged that man. They took the route going to San Francisco del Monte Avenue. In
the meantime, Ong rode in the Mustang car and followed them. They, all went to Novaliches road. At
a narrow street along the way both cars stopped. Tan and Ambrosio took the victim from the car as
Ong arrived. That man was made to walk and then made to lie down face up. Ong gave Tan an ice-
pick and ordered "patayin na iyan " (kill him already), who in turn gave the ice-pick to Ambrosia For
his part, Ambrosio gave the ice-pick to Quintos. However, Quintos returned it to Tan, who said
"Hindi ka pa pala puwede " (You are not capable yet). Whereupon, Tan told Ambrosio to focus a
flashlight on the center of the front side of the body of Henry Chua. Tan stabbed Chua twice on the
chest. While Tan lighted their way, Ambrosio carried the upper portion of the body, while Quintos
carrying the lower portion. When Quintos got tired, Tan gave him the flashlight while Tan and
Ambrosio carried the body to a hole. The hole was covered by Ambrosio Ong then stepped
repeatedly over the covered hole to compress the earth. They, returned to the car. Ong drove the
Mustang car together with Tan. Quintos and Ambrosio rode in the Chevrolet car, driven by the
latter. They, followed the Mustang to the highway. Later, it was parked and abandoned near a
gasoline station. Then Ong and Tan joined Quintos and Ambrosio in the Chevrolet and they
proceeded to Manila. 21
The version of the defense is as follows:
Accused Baldomero Ambrosio stated that in 1971, he was a family driver of Roger Chen, and before
that employment, he worked for seven years at the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation. Accused
Benjamin Ong was the manager of the Acme Shoes Rubber Corporation while the accused Tan was a
supervisor in the same company. Ambrosio alleged that Tan was a man of bad reputation, involved
in a killing incident and kidnapping of a woman. 22
In the evening of April 23, 1971, Ong, with Tan and Quintos, picked up Ambrosio from his place so
that the latter could drive for Ong. They, went to a restaurant at Balintawak known as Barrio Fiesta.
They then went to the Amihan Night Club at the Dewey Boulevard. Ong, Quintos and Tan alighted
from the car while Ambrosia remained in the car and he slept. (Barrio trio woke up Ambrosio at
about 1:00 a.m. Tan and Quintos rode with Ambrosio where Ong was riding. They went towards
Espana. At the Araneta Avenue, the car where Ong was riding stopped. Tan ordered Ambrosio to
stop in front of the car. Tan and Quintos went to the other car. Tan introduced himself as a
policeman, then he opened the door of the car and pulled the driver out. 23
'The narration of Ambrosio as to how the crimes," happened substantially coincided in details to the
manner it was described by Quintos. 24 Ambrosia however, claimed that he did not participate
voluntarily in the crime, but rather he was ordered by Tan as to all the acts he did during the
execution of the offense.
Accused Ambrosio admitted that at about 4:00 p.m. of April 24, 1971, he and his wife went to
Arayat, Pampanga. They, stayed two days in Arayat, then he proceeded to his brother's place in
Balintawak. He then went to Aklan up to the time he. 25 He denied that Ong pointed was arrested in
August of 1972. to him as a godson in the presence of Patrolman Roque. 26 Ambrosio likewise denied
that even before April 23, 1971, he was already with Ong, Quintos and Tan and that Ambrosio
already dug that hole in Novaliches where the body of Chua was placed. 27
He also claimed that the extrajudicial statement Exhibit S " was signed by him because he was
maltreated. 28
The principal thrust of the defense's argument that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this case (complex crimes," of kidnapping with murder) because its
jurisdiction as a Circuit Criminal Court is limited to ... (a) crimes committed by public officers, crimes
against persons and crimes against property as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
whether simple or complex with other crimes," and kidnapping is not one of the crimes that may be
tried and decided by that court, becomes of no moment when this Court in G.R. No. 34497 ruled that
Ong and Quintos were guilty of murder and not kidnapping with murder. 29 The co-accused of
Ambrosio were, therefore, tried and convicted of the crimes," of murder, a crimes," against persons,
certainly within the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal court that rendered judgment in this case.
The only issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the accused Ambrosio voluntarily
participated in the commission of the crime. That the crimes," of murder was committed has already
been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt when this Court convicted Ong and
Quintos in G.R. No. L-34497. This Court already ruled that "Conspiracy, connivance and unity of
purpose and intention among the accused were present throughout in the execution of this crime.
The four participated in the planning and execution of the crimes," and were at the scene in all its
stages. They cannot escape the consequences of any of their acts even if they deviated in some detail
from what they originally thought of. Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation in
every detail of the execution. Thus, treachery should be considered against all persons participating
or cooperating in the perpetration of the crime." 30
The defense of the accused Ambrosio that he was an unwilling participant in the killing of Henry
Chua because of threats made by Fernando Tan, to Our mind, cannot be given credence. Quintos, as
shown in his testimony, (Exh. "1") by narrated how Ambrosio participated in the crime, manifesting
voluntariness in his acts throughout the execution of the same. Ambrosio was the one who pulled
Chua from the Mustang car. Ambrosio provided the rope and tied the hands and feet of Chua. He was
the one who drove the car with the victim inside to that place in Novaliches where they by Chua
after killing him. He focused the flashlight on the chest of the victim when Tan stabbed him. He
helped carry the victim to the hole where he was buried, and Ambrosio covered the hole with earth
using a spade. Exhibit "I" for the defense is certainly binding on it.
Ambrosio admitted that he went to different places and to Aklan after the crimes," was committed,
and he was arrested only in August of 1972, nearly two years after the crimes," was committed. He
never revealed to the authorities the crimes," that he alleged to be an unwilling participant of in that
long span of time. He also admitted that there were at least two times when he could have escaped
from the group of Ong when the crimes," was being executed and yet Ambrosio never did so. During
the execution of the felon', Ambrosio never by act or deed protested to the group regarding its cruel
commission. We also cannot fully understand why Ambrosio had to join the group of Tan, if
according to Ambrosia himself, Tan was a man of bad reputation. 31 Tan has never been
apprehended. The defense of Ambrosio that he was threatened by Tan to participate in the crimes,"
stands uncorroborated, as contradicted by the testimony of Quintos.The inevitable conclusion is
that Ambrosio voluntarily participated in the commission of the crime.
11
The trial court did not err in discrediting Ambrosio's claim that he was maltreated by the agents of
the law to extract his extra-judicial statement. (Exhs. "S"). He never did protest the alleged
maltreatment before the Regional Director Nestor Gonzales before whom he signed the statement.
Although he had all the chances to do so, he never filed charges against the persons who allegedly
maltreated him. 32 The confession of the accused Exhibits "S" is, therefore, admissible against him.
As to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in the commission of the crime, this
Court already ruled in G.R. No. L-34497, that treachery (alevosia) qualified the killing of Chua to
murder. Chua's hands were tied and his mouth was gagged when he was stabbed twice with an ice-
pick. Chua was defenseless and helpless enabling the accused to commit the crimes," without risk to
them. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. The
aggravating circumstance of nighttime (nocturnidad) cannot be absorbed in treachery because in
this crimes," treachery arose from the defenseless position of Chua when he was killed, while
nighttime was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate immunity in the commission of the
crime. The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado) is also present, due to the
deliberate selection of an isolated place (Barrio Makatipo Novaliches, Caloocan City) for killing and
burying the victim. Abuse of confidence cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance
present in the crime, because it does not appear that the victim Chua ever reposed confidence on
Ong. Chua knew that he was far stronger in money and influence than Ong. The fact that Henry Chua
invited Ong night clubbing on that fatal evening and accommodated the latter in his car did not
show that Chua had confidence in Ong.
The aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crimes," can be
considered present because the Biscayne car of Ong was used to trail the victim's car and to
facilitate the commission of the crimes," and the escape of the accused.
Cruelty (ensaamiento) cannot be considered because there is no evidence that the victim Chua was
by while still alive to make him suffer.
Evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes, because the accused meditated,
planned, and tenaciously persisted in the accomplishment of the crime.
Accused Ong was given the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one analogous to passion
and obfuscation" 33 because Chua previously threatened Ong for non-payment of debt arising from
gambling, causing Ong humiliation and shame. 34
Taking into consideration the above aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Ong was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. 35 Accused Quintos, although no mitigating circumstance could be appreciated
in his favor, was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Ong and Quintos were also sentenced "jointly
and severally to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Henry Chua in the amount of P12,000.00; to
pay moral damages in the asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and another P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay their proportionate share of the costs. 36
The present case (G.R. No. L-37908) already pending review iii this Court when G.R. No. L-34497
was decided on January 30, 1975, should have been decided together with the latter case, as they
arose from the same crime, involving the same accused.
It is Our considered view that the accused Baidomero Ambrosio stands in this case on a similarly
situated position as convicted accused Bienvenido Quintos in G.R. No. L-34497, and should,
therefore be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and not death.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated October 17, 1973, is hereby, MODIFIED, finding
the accused Baidomero Ambrosio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetual to indemnify jointly and severally with his co-accused, the
heirs of the deceased Henry Chua in the asphyxiation of P12,000.00; to pay moral damages in the
asphyxiation of P50,000.00; and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay his
proportionate share of the costs.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The role played by Baldomero Ambrosio, the godson of Benjamin Ong, in the murder of Henry Chua,
is described in this Court's decision in People vs. Ong, L-34497, 62 SCRA 174, 2 10, as follows:
When they reached a dark and secluded place, Benjamin Ong urged Chua to
stop the car for the former to urinate to which the latter obliged. The Biscayne
car where Fernando Tan, Bienvenido Quintos and Baldomero Ambrosio were
riding, stopped. Fernando Tan poked his gun at Chua and pulled him down
from his Mustang car with Ambrosio giving help.
His hands were tied, his mouth gagged with a flannel cloth, and he was placed
in the Biscayne car. Tan and Bienvenido Quintos then rested their feet on him.
Then Ambrosio drove the Biscayne while Ong drove the Mustang. They
proceeded towards Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City, where Henry
Chua was stabbed to death and buried.
There can be no doubt as to Ambrosio's complicity in the murder of Chua.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The role played by Baldomero Ambrosio, the godson of Benjamin Ong, in the murder of Henry Chua,
is described in this Court's decision in People vs. Ong, L-34497, 62 SCRA 174, 2 10, as follows:
When they reached a dark and secluded place, Benjamin Ong urged Chua to
stop the car for the former to urinate to which the latter obliged. The Biscayne
car where Fernando Tan, Bienvenido Quintos and Baldomero Ambrosio were
riding, stopped. Fernando Tan poked his gun at Chua and pulled him down
from his Mustang car with Ambrosio giving help.
His hands were tied, his mouth gagged with a flannel cloth, and he was placed
in the Biscayne car. Tan and Bienvenido Quintos then rested their feet on him.
Then Ambrosio drove the Biscayne while Ong drove the Mustang. They
proceeded towards Barrio Makatipo, Novaliches, Caloocan City, where Henry
Chua was stabbed to death and buried.
There can be no doubt as to Ambrosio's complicity in the murder of Chua.
12
40 G.R. No. 213216 April 20, 2015 According to the prosecution, at around 8 o'clock6 in the evening of December 5, 1996, AAA was
instructed by her father to fetch her sister in school. However, AAA failed to find her sister and
decided to go back home. On her way home, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened her
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
with a bladed weapon, dragged her to a cottage at a nearby beach resort, and bound her hands and
vs.
feet. Thereafter, they removed her clothes and placed her on the floor. Arguta then mounted AAA
RICKY ARGUTA alias "JOEL" and WILSON CAHIPE alias "SIWIT," Accused-Appellants.
and inserted his penis into her vagina. After Arguta satisfied his lust, Cahipe took over and raped
her. Thereafter, accused-appellants left AAA at the cottage. An hour later, Cahipe returned and
DECISION dragged AAA to a store owned by a certain Lino Ostero 7 (Ostero). There Cahipe undressed her again,
mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, AAA was returned to the cottage.
The next day, AAA's father found her crying at the cottage. 8
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Further, the prosecution offered the findings of the physical examination by a certain Dr. Eilleen
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellants Ricky Arguta alias "Joel"
Colaba on AAA, stating, inter alia, that: (a) AAA's genitalia was grossly normal, which means no
(Arguta) and Wilson Cahipe alias "Siwit" (Cahipe; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the
abnormality; (b) AAA has complete healed hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock
Decision2 dated April 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01462, which
positions and a partially healed hymenal laceration at the 12 o'clock position; and (c) AAA's
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
genitalia is negative for the presence of spermatozoa.9
City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 97-02-76 and 97-02-77 finding accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Rape, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended. In their defense, accused-appellants both denied the accusations leveled against them, and offered
their respective alibis. Cahipe claimed that on the date and time of the alleged incident he was
minding Ostero's store. On the other hand, Arguta averred that he was at Ostero' s house watching
The Facts
television during the time that the incident supposedly occurred. They both asserted that they did
not know why AAA would accuse them of raping her.10
On January 30, 1997 two (2) criminal informations were filed before the RTC charging Cahipe with
two (2) counts of Rape, and Arguta of one (1) count of the same crime, viz.:
The RTC Ruling

Crim. Case No. 97..:02-76

That on or about the 5th day of December 1996 in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused-
appellants], conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, motivated by lewd design.
with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], 4 without her consent and against her
will.
Contrary to Law.
Tacloban City, January 30, 1997.
In a Decision11 dated July 25, 2008, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Simple Rape in Crim. Case No. 97-02-76 and, accordingly, sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the
amounts of 50,000.00 as civil indemnity and 50,000.00 as moral damages. Further, the RTC found
Cahipe not guilty of the crime of Rape in Crim. Case No. 97-02-77 and, accordingly, acquitted him
due to insufficiency of evidence.12
In finding the guilt of accused-appellants, the RTC held that AAA's testimony, as well as the medico-
legal report, established that on December 5, 1996, accused-appellants intercepted AAA, threatened
her with a bladed weapon, dragged her to a nearby cottage, undressed her, bound her, and took
turns raping her. The R TC did not lend credence to accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi,
in light of the positive assertions made by AAA, and considering that it was not physically
impossible for them to have been at the place of the crime on the date of the incident. 13

Crim. Case No. 97-02-77

That on or about the 5th day of December 1996, in the Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Cahipc],
motivated by lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], without her consent and against her
will.
However, as regards the second count of Rape against Cahipe, the RTC opined that it would be
unusual for AAA, who had just been raped and left alone in the cottage, to not attempt to escape or
shout for help when she was being transported to Ostero' s store and back to the cottage, observing
that AAA had to pass Ostero's house before reaching the latter's store. According to the R TC, these
pose serious doubts as to the existence of the second rape charge, thus, necessitating its dismissal. 14
Dissatisfied, accused-appellants appealed their conviction to the CA.

Contrary to Law.
The CA Ruling

Tacloban City, January 30, 1997.5

13
In a Decision15 dated April 24, 2014, the CA affirmed accused-appellants' conviction with
modification ordering the accused-appellants to jointly and severally pay AAA the amount of
30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the other amounts already awarded, and imposed
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of
finality of its Decision until fully paid.16
Agreeing with the R TC' s findings, the CA ruled that AAA' s categorical and straightforward
testimony prevailed over accused-appellants' denial and alibi. It observed that accused-appellants
were in the vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of the incident, and that the two could easily
reach the cottage where the rape occurred.17 Thus, it concluded that accused-appellants' actions fell
squarely within the definition of Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC, noting that accused-
appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA, and such was attained through force, threat, or
intimidation.18
Aggrieved, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether accused-appellants' conviction for Rape should be
upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors.19 The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 20 Proceeding from the foregoing, the
Court deems it appropriate to modify accused-appellants' conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified
Rape, as will be explained hereunder.
In this case, the Court notes that the rape occurred during the effectivity of the old rape provision of
the RPC, i.e., Article 335,21 and, thus, the latter provision is controlling in this case, to wit:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim;
and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the
victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12)
years of age or demented.22 The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating
the imposition of a higher penalty.23 In People v. Lamberte,24 the Court clarified the legal effect of the
presence of both circumstances, as follows:
The presence of either circumstance - "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" -
qualifies the crime.1wphi1 If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a
generic aggravating circumstance. That was our ruling in People vs. Garcia, [192 Phil. 311, 342]
(1981) reading:
In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are present, namely. 1. use of a deadly
weapon and 2. that two persons committed the rapes. The first was alleged in the information while
the second was proved during trial. In both cases, the Court appreciated the first as a qualifying
circumstance and the second as a generic aggravating circumstance, in accordance with settled
jurisprudence according to the trial court.
We do not agree. Under the law above quoted, either circumstance is qualifying. When the two
circumstances are present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a
generic aggravating circumstance for either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code enumerating what are aggravating circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is
the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.25(Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed instrument and
tied her up before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence holds that
force or intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the assailant's
objective is accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was irresistible or not
becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the victim's perception and
judgment and it is enough that the victim fears that something will happen to her should she resist
her assailant's advances.26 In this regard, case law provides that the act of holding a bladed
instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the
victim with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission. 27
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by the
courts a quo that accused-appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of a
deadly weapon, as the same are supported by the records. It must be noted that the assessment and
findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive and binding to the
Court if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence,28 as in this case. Nevertheless, considering that the crime was committed by two (2)
persons, the accused-appellants herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to
increase their conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. Anent the proper penalty to be
imposed, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 934629 provides that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses
14
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by 41 G.R. No. 137050 July 11, 2001
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, accused-appellants should be
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole. 30
vs.
GEORGE CORTES Y ORTEGA, accused-appellant.
Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the award of damages in favor
of AAA to the amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 75,000.00 as moral damages, and
PARDO, J.:
30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. 31
The case is before the Court on automatic review of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court,
Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, finding accused George Cortes y Ortega guilty beyond reasonable
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated April 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
doubt of murder and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death.
CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 01462 is hereby AFFIRMED, finding accused-appellants Ricky Arguta alias
"Joel" and Wilson Cahipe alias "Siwit" (accused-appellants) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with On August 12, 1998, provincial prosecutor Alfredo J. Pondoc of Surigao del Sur filed with the
MODIFICATION sentencing accused-appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, an Information for murder against accused
eligibility for parole, and ordering them to jointly and severally pay AAA the amounts of 75,000.00 George Cortes y Ortega, which reads as follows:
as civil indemnity, 75,000.00 as moral damages, and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of
"That on or about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, of June 24, 1998, at P. Lindo
finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Street, Saint Paul District, Nangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with treachery and
SO ORDERED. evident premeditation, armed with a knife and with intent to kill did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assault and stabbed one Edlyn S. Gamboa, a
16 year old girl, thereby inflicting the latter multiple stab wounds on her body which
caused her instantaneous death as certified by the doctor, to the damage and prejudice of
the victim's heirs.

Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code." 2

On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench
outside her house located at P. Lindo St., Saint Paul District, Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. While
thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibua. Junilla noticed
that Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the
house. When Edlyn complied, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times.
Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away
despite being wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed.
Junilla shouted for help. At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but
again collapsed after walking about five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic,
where she expired.

Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom
he had an altercation earlier. He committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused
was very drunk and the place was very dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person
the following morning through the radio vigilantes program.

On August 28, 1998 the trial court arraigned the accused.3 He entered a plea of guilty.4 In virtue of
his plea of guilty, the trial court proceeded to satisfy itself of the voluntariness of the plea by
propounding questions to the accused to find out if he understood his plea and the legal
consequence thereof. Accused, assisted by counsel, reiterated his plea of guilty and the extra judicial
confession he executed before the police.

15
Nonetheless, the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove the presence of aggravating
circumstances. The accused on the other hand presented evidence proving the mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty,
nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the
commission of the crime. The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative
mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court after considering the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances attendant found the existence of the aggravating circumstances and appreciated only
the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty that was offset by one of the aggravating circumstances.
The trial court then proceeded to rule on the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the accused. The
trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by the Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the family of the victim in the
amount of P60,000.00, and to pay damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and cost ." 5
Hence, this review.6
Accused raises the following errors imputed to the trial court:
1. In finding that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty,
nighttime, abuse of superior strength, sex and intoxication attended the commission of
the crime charged; and
2. In imposing the death penalty upon accused instead of reclusion perpetua.
According to the accused, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and other circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
We agree with the accused that the prosecution did not prove the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. "The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this
aggravating circumstance: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an
act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time
between the determination and the execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of the act."7
As to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, although the accused stabbed the victim several
times, the same could not be considered as cruelty because there was no showing that it was
intended to prolong the suffering of the victim. "For cruelty to be appreciated against the accused, it
must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly
and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated
because by deliberately increasing the suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and
consequently a marked degree of malice and perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various
successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening
between the infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong
the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into
consideration."8
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple
reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an
aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes
advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity
from identification or capture."9 In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely
sought the cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.
"The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can not be appreciated
separately as another aggravating circumstance."10 Here, treachery qualified the offense to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was
not shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed
manifest disrespect for her womanhood.11 In fact, the accused mistook the victim for a man.
"Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the
penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the
other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person
pleading in toxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic
beverage prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason.
At the same time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the
alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime."12
Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information and considering that there was one mitigating circumstance attendant, that of plea of
guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion perpetua.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that "the only aggravating circumstance present was
treachery which qualified the killing to murder and that there were two mitigating circumstances of
plea of guilty and intoxication, not habitual. The penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in
accordance with Article 63 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6759.
We also award P50,000.00 as moral damages in keeping with current jurisprudence. Moral damages
is proper considering the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim on account of her
untimely and gruesome death.13
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, in Criminal
Case No. 2026 convicting accused George Cortes y Ortega of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. In lieu of the death penalty, the accused George Cortes y
Ortega is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death
indemnity, and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs of suit.
16
42 G.R. No. 130508 April 5, 2000 Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his companions. Thereafter,
Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando Regala in bed while her grandmother was on
the floor. After the rape, appellant and his two companions counted the money they took
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
from the "aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
vs.
ARMANDO REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2 pieces of ring valued
at P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of
Robbery with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows:
That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Bangon,
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
gain, violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied
said Consuelo Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry
away cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to the damage
and prejudice of owner Consuelo Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine
Currency; and in pursuance of the commission of the crime of robbery against the will
and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused and/or intercoursed
with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the incident. He was identified at a
police line-up by Nerissa and her grandmother.
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural Health Clinic of Aroroy,
Masbate for medical examination. In the Medical Report presented by Municipal Health
Officer Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, it was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the
hymen at 4:00 o'clock and 7:00 o'clock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a possible
sexual assault upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) 2
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September 11, 1995, he was staying
in the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in
the gold panning business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified and
corroborated his defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5
kilometers away from Barangay Bangon.
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the
accused. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Armando Regala y
Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as penalized
under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the victim Consuelo Arevalo the sum of
P9,000.00, the cash and value of the looted articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa
Tagala the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
cost. 3
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that:

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Aroroy, Masbate, who personally examined the rape victim; Nerissa Tagala the rape-victim, 17 years
EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
old, a third year high school student; and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
companion when the robbery with rape transpired at Consuelo's house.

(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

The prosecution's version is stated in Appellee's Brief as follows:
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4

On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy,
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo
Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions
entered the former's house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26, 1996). In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in identifying
him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged. He claims that the complaining witness could
not have positively identified him as there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen by removing the
incident which took place at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify
pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her
accused-appellant only after he was pinpointed by Nerissa, and made contradictory statements in
grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26,
court when she stated that accused-appellant removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later
1996)
17
stated that accused-appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer,
Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness either voluntarily submitted to a sexual
act or was forced into one.
The appellee insists that appellant's lame defense of alibi cannot stand against the positive
identification made by the victim, and avers that the victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the
rape was committed, was motivated by a sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor
General also recommends an additional award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of
Nerissa Tagala.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime.
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was sleeping with her
grandmother in the latter's house when the accused-appellant Regala, together with the
unidentified companions entered the house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her
grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took of her panty and her shorts,
and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual intercourse ("itot") with her while she
was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother
being opened. She could not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two
companions of the accused-appellant entered the room as she was being raped. Two rings valued at
about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko" and the other "Citizen") and money was taken by
the accused-appellant and his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant
counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to the kitchen, still
hogtied, and rape again, 5 On cross-examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no
electricity, and the light in the house was already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because
at the time Regala was counting the money, one of his companions was holding the flashlight
"beamed to the money" and there was "some reflection" on the face of Regala. 6 She remembered the
face of Regala because of an earring on his left ear 7 which he was wearing when presented at the
police line-up. 8
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her granddaughter. Nerissa Regala
entered the house with two companions, hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After
having sexual intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from her
aparador, and got a stainless Seiko wristwatch and two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able
to recognize Regala because of his earring on his left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa
at the police station. She was not able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged with a
piece of cloth by Regala. 9 On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was able to see
Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized
Regala because of his earring and his flat top hair cut.10
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to
clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala as the person who, with two companions,
committed the crime of robbery accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa
Tagala positively identified Armando Regala because at the time he was counting the money on her
bed, the other companion of the accused beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was a
reflection on the face of Regala. Although the three intruders were wearing masks when they
entered the house, they removed their masks later. 11
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper
situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this
ground unmeritorious. 12
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the contradictory replies of
Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala removed his mask "before" 13 or "after" 14 she and
Nerissa were hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The
contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that both Nerissa and
Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a flashlight used to focus at the money while it
was being counted and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo
remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up
inside the police station.
Dr. Conchita Ulanday's testimony does not support the contention of accused-appellant that Nerissa
voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her
findings point to the fact that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not
prove that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was
suggested evidence of penetration as shown by the two lacerations at 4 o'clock and at 7 o'clock
which were fresh wounds. That the act was involuntary was clearly established by the facts that
Nerissa was hogtied when she was sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa
was a 16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to have any
ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced
by this Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself to a public trial
or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished. 15
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was already in force. Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. There are
cases 16 holding that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not
increase the penalty. In People vs. Martinez,17accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified
persons, who remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape
where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death after considering two (2)
aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court
did not consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of
robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts,
with all acts or rape on that occasion being integrated in one composite crime."
There are likewise cases 18 which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Candelario 19 where three (3) of the four (4) armed
men who robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People
vs. Obtinalia, 20 ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is
not changed simply because there were several rapes committed. The multiplicity of rapes should
instead be taken into account raising the penalty to death."
18
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be
considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the
same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10)
providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the
robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple
rapes. 21 However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of
the offender 22 and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute. 23
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-appellant should not be
considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.
As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
compensatory damages should be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled
to an award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended party
in rape. 24 Also a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim since it
is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the ordinary
crime of rape to warrant per se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. 25
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala
is entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
43 G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias
"BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA,
JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO
CAAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO
GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the
crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly
abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and there
take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in
Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and
intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage and prejudice in
such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y
ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either
by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its
execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by
cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in
sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky
Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon
y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid
in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating
circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to
make its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
19
 4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted
amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until
such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants
went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its
decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal, Eduardo
Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to
be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the
ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against
the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion
y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby
granted, and the case dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose
identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of
which were submitted and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime
Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino,
and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Caal. However, for practical purposes
all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and
single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial
course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00
per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she
was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows,
and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward
bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by
her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door convertible car
with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to
bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved
her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the
driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided
for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?"
Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously.
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The girl
held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream. Her
strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car.
Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's
right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la
Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three men
inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her
arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was completely
in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of Broadway
Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio
Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated
the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language
that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw
acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss
De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced
his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to
resist them. She continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only
breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because
her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino
remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge
against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the
sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and
then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange
knowing glances with Caal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria
Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his
pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or else
she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky
Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second
floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw
Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Caal sitting beside her, all of them smiling
meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three
expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the
command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be
ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable
for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order, according to
them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she
proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the
20
Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come
zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before flagging a
from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to
the floor. her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When
Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke
down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her
answered her in the negative.
and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which
the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked
up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss De la Riva reached home.
blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and reporters,
were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said, "Mommy,
Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter upstairs.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting
Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The older
on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release
woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong
her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la
solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned,
Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff
treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the
resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body. The
sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk
complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose succeeded
officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report
in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.
of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual
attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.
Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded
in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any,
room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the
should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be
accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda
informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss
hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went
De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the family,
into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured
went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a
water on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say
statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who
that they had to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then
abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-
left the room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la
internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
Riva. Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the
body and succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was
also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was
that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual
struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door,
proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a
threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all,
group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he
escape what with their presence.
abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal
identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her
clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before Pat.
give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was
Marcos G. Vias. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about, and was
mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie
involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions. Jose stated,
actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she
among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la
did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her
Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car; that it was
face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the
Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.
hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant
Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent her from
being seen by others. After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant
Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement
(Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They
shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as
finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos
appellant Aquino.
Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come

21
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and
Caal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the
evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as among the four persons who
abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the Chief of
Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh.
B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons
in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on
his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Caal downstairs and
undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest. In
his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that
the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had
planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all four of them participated in the
commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the
complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a
statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that,
on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He
admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He
would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual
intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on
different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the
doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his
supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the
court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-
arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was
examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal
wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he
elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion,
could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could
have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they
could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination,
the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced
by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He
explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three
days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched
herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) took the witness stand. We
quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog
Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time
from 9:30 in the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in
the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to
the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had consumed a
whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk,
according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a
certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their
new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men
piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth
(Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao
After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to Espaa Extension
to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in Espaa
Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them.
They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast
of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay."
The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a
lesson," sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda
stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car,
opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino
confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the
girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about
ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red
convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they
also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just
to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be
and return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her
he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead
with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea
'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street
where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then
suddenly changing his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll
pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little
while she consented to do the performance as long as it would not last too long
and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie
alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of
them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when
they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused
testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys
to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves
also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their
briefs, while Boy Pineda and Caal stripped to the skin "because it was hot."
The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie
and they heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00
later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the
naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This
accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime
Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in the car for
Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the
mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and
Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie
came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they
should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just
come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia
Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem.
He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her
22
 "show" and he was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons
after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives
and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make
the company complete they invited Caal to join them. They used another car
of Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa,
Aquino detached himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the
barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the meantime his two companions had
remained in the City and had, according to Canal, gone to live in a house very
close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another house where
the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the
last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was
wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor
of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity
and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the
complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the
able dissertion of the trial judge on this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the
proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease
exhibition which the complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00,
P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection
lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman
exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie
de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and
promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not even for all money in the
worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these wolves in men's
clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a woman
stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money,
and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the
rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an
interval of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their
immoral curiosity about her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the
men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again
something beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman
whom the accused had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the
price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to
perform first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that
Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly
down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since
when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment basis? By the very
precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are
usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when
she did not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they
could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find
them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about the complaint,
it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a
most stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense want
this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this
circumstances during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police
interrogator, the person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of
Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion
that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for the accused.
It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more
clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there
need for this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation
for Maggie's positive identification of Caal as the man with the tattoo mark on
his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the
four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply
"because it was hot." What kind of men were these who were so devoid of any
sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not
only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform
before a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing"
happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be
credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick passions and
hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the
defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if
unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and
internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the
pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time
that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the
following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda
were left behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have
taken place then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons
rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in
such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her
all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva
could have inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case
against the accused. The examining physician rules out this preposterous
proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the imagination to see how
utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose? Was P900.00 which
she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all the
shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose
herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of
these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose
in the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in
the redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151;
Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25,
1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have
been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter
pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries,
however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises
23
 and traumas were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs)
could not have been cause by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to
resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and
uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against
the concerted declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct
to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated she has for
corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose
and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the
cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the
Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the
ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight of evidence.
What is more important is which of the declarations is the more credible, the
more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted.
(Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it
should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a
man is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only
one available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other
eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability
of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often placed in a position
of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards
conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De
la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they
generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the
complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is
claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg
no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the
forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn
statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did
not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was
seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs
and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged
among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This
testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more
than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof,
appellants' protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as
absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been
clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's
vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as
an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last
intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the
examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched
herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not
disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen,
but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the
cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen
her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane
woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital
organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four
strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides,
Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in
the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive
rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26,
1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them
raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value,
considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the
most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make
capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she
was not abused. Her statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who
had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her
family, and her career, was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This
is one reason why the complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that
befell her. Another reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course,
the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have
been self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda
alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the
hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would
picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped
on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have come from a studio? Equally
important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her
private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and
earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on
the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating
details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements
were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The
statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of
inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the
police; and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their
various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While
in their statements Jose and Canal admitted having waited together with the two other appellants
for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate
himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while
appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual
intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have
contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too,
that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged
use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department,
who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any
part of the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that
one of his arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further,
that the police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand
that the two appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or
by anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-
24
considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the
in-custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on
record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other
ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs.
Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1,
par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of
the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in
U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of
Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have
provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the
proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second
stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section
18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not
only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered.
And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of
unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-
cited cases.
would get, and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I
consulted him for three times and his decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse
to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of
the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's
wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life
imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The
situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case
from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the
court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7)
original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial
Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the
rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes
imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no
doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City,
was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the
successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of
rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that
each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still
connected with the abduction in other words, they should be detached from, and considered
independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed
with the latter.

5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a
of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111
capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would
which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of
the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having
aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the
crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29,
1. By using force or intimidation;
1961, and People vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of
Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less
to require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the
part of the trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.)
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
The case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be
ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not
present.
intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in
the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the
proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
plea of guilty with the statement that .
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he

25
 When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane,
the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently,
the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any
necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the
nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the
proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to
make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was
attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely
sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior
strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another
(Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering
the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping
her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating;
and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none of these
aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should,
however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which
does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that
there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should
likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape.
(Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court
applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum
duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which
should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to
pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated
just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into
account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty
(People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed
because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it
cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial
court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death
sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the
court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former
case the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is
charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged
and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic
philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not
hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People vs.
Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six accused
three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that "since it is the
settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then
each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the
conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In
the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been handed down)
We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death
penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless
formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a
death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this
physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition
of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of
one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will
naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple
imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to
consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to
distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it
ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously;
and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct,
though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is
determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved,
whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the
penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or
penalties, the court does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of
the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to
varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive
clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the
proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of
the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed
by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to
be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that
there are only two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties:
simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall
be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the
case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not
only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality,
has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital
penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may
not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one death sentence
irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing
thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the
26
 possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small
measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively
serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced
with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or
leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional
power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost
absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple
life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the
maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty
is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to
serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our
finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of
aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking
for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car
used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac
sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No.
11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon
City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from the
Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure
payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly
installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered
with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The
mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value
received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against
Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered
with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5,
1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a
preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order
for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car
was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose,
together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of
which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego,
who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial
of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor
filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon.
On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's
confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor
filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same
was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for
relief from judgement, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver
the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the
alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from
July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final
and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were
unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the
present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a
brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found
that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the
only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the
latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were
not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his
mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of
establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the
commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the
intervenor were made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which
circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car;
that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of
the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of
the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and
that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the
part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants, died in
prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to
him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs
declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose,
Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes
of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all
of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of
the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for
its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver
27
its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the 44 G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS, VICENTE ABERAS Y CORDERO
and JESUS FELICIA Y BALIDBID, defendants and appellants.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of Court. 1

On 10 May 1960, an information for frustrated murder2 of Antonio Maravilla and another
information for murder3 of Federico Caalete, were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Said informations were directed against the same eight accused: Eduardo Berdida y Inguito, Jesus
Felicia y Balidbid, Vicente Aberas y Cordero, Cristoto Mitilla y Paral, Demetrio Garin y Payos,
Protacio Libres y Corona, Loreto Saberon y Casas and Mario Mustrado y Sumaya.

After the defendants pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on 16 May 1960, the two cases were
tried jointly. Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Cristoto Mitilla and Mario Mustrado,
after the prosecution rested its case, the court dismissed the charges against Mario Mustrado, with
costs de oficio. After the trial, the Court of First Instance rendered on 27 July 1962 the decision now
under review. Its dispositive portion states:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the defendants Eduardo Berdida,
Loreto Saberon, Vicente Aberas and Jesus Felicia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder. This Court has in previous cases endeavored to avoid the imposition of
the capital punishment. In the case at bar, however, where the offenders, pretending to be
police officers, kidnapped the victims and mercilessly beat one of them to death, the
Court finds no other alternative, in pursuance to the mandate of the law, but to impose, as
it hereby imposes upon the said defendants, the death penalty, to indemnify jointly and
severally the heirs of Federico Caalete in the sum of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs. May
God have mercy on their souls.

In Criminal Case No. 52338, above-said defendants are also hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder and considering the aggravating
circumstances present, they are sentenced each to suffer a maximum penalty of TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor and a minimum of SIX (6) YEARS ofprision correccional, and to
pay the costs, without prejudice on the part of the complainant to institute a separate civil
action for the recovery of damages.

The defendants Garin, Mitilla and Libres are hereby acquitted, in both cases, with costs de
oficio, and their immediate release is hereby ordered.

So ordered.

The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows:

28
At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla, Federico Caalete, Virgilio Furthermore, the body of Federico Caalete was examined at the scene where it was found by
Haban and Pedrito Rapadas left the store of one Mang Terio at Mabuhay Street, North Harbor, officers of the Mobile Patrol. Detective Bureau agents likewise went to said place. Finding
Tondo, Manila, and proceeded walking towards their homes. They were met on their way by bloodstains near an a alley to Tagumpay Street, they went to a house thereat and found Protacio
Eduardo Berdida, Antonio Louie, one Tiquio and one aliasIfugao, who identified themselves as Libres sleeping on a bamboo bed. Said detectives took Libres to the headquarters.
detectives, told them not to move, and pointed sharp and long bolos to them. 4Antonio Maravilla and
Federico Caalete raised their hands, but Pedrito Rapadas and Virgilio Haban were able to run
At the police station, all the apprehended suspects were made to mingle with other persons.
away. Antonio Louie then dealt a fist blow on Antonio Maravilla. After that, the group took Antonio
Antonio Maravilla, who was fetched to point out therefrom the persons who attacked him and
Maravilla and Federico Caalete along the rail tracks, telling them that they had done something
Federico Caalete identified Eduardo Berdida, Vicente Aberas, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia.
wrong.

An autopsy was made on 8 May 1960 on the body of Federico Caalete by Dr. Luis Larion, Medical
At the end of the rail tracks, said group tied the hands of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete.
Examiner of the Manila Police Department. The post mortem findings in his report are as follows:
After doing this, they dragged the two and took them to a place in Pier 8 at the North Harbor near
(Exh. M):
Vicente Aberas' house. In said place, there were others who joined the group, among them, Jesus
Felicia, Loreto Saberon and Vicente Aberas. At this point Eduardo Berdida told Antonio Maravilla
and Federico Caalete to dig their graves, but they refused. Arturo Macabebe, who also joined the CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
group, took two sticks of cigarettes and told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete to smoke.
Antonio Maravilla again refused. Following said refusal, the victims were hit with a piece of wood.
Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain.
Eduardo Berdida and Jesus Felicia then held Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete, respectively,
by the hands and from behind. As they were thus held, Vicente Aberas delivered fist blows on them,
first on Antonio Maravilla, then on Federico Caalete.5 Furthermore, Loreto Saberon also held CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
Federico Caalete while others gave fist blows to the latter. 6 At about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8
May 1960, Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, shortly after hearing Loreto Saberon say that the
Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen.
group would cut off the ears of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete for appetizer or "pulutan". 7

RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
Antonio Maravilla's sister, Elizabeth, had meanwhile been informed by Virgilio Haban, one of those
who were able to run away, that her brother and Federico Caalete were taken by armed men. She
therefore went out with some companions in search of her brother. She asked the help of Patrolman Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral.
Carlos Pili, who was then at the corner of Kaguitingan and Lakandula Streets in front of Pier 6.
Patrolmen Amado Santos and Fabricante also joined them. As the other policemen took to separate
Congestion, lungs, bilateral.
directions, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went along Mabuhay Street. They came upon a
group of men, between Piers 6 and 8, who were hesitant to answer their inquiries. So they
proceeded further, entering a small alley. As they went on, Elizabeth found the shoes of her brother. GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM:
So they continued until they met Vicente Aberas, stripped to the waist, with bloodstains on his
hands.8 Patrolman Pili detained him. Since somebody threatened them should they proceed any About 150 cc. partially digested rice meal with slight alcoholic odor.
further, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went to Precinct 3, taking along Vicente Aberas.
Assistance from the Mobile Patrol was then requested. Accompanied by her neighbors and more
policemen, Elizabeth, together with Patrolman Pili, returned and went further to the interior of Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood, abdominal cavity.
Mabuhay Street. Finally, they came upon Federico Caalete and Antonio Maravilla, sprawled on the
ground, the former face down, the latter flat on his back. Federico Caalete was found dead. Antonio SPLEEN: Maceration spleen.
Maravilla was alive, though his face was swollen, rendering him barely recognizable. Antonio
Maravilla was taken to the North General Hospital.
PANCREAS: Contusion, hemorrhagic, pancreas.
Patrolman Pili, meanwhile, went still further to the interior and saw, about 12 meters away from
where they found the victims, a group drinking liquor. At the approach of Patrolman Pili, about four BONES AND JOINTS:
men ran away, leaving behind four men, namely, Loreto Saberon, Mario Mustrado, Cristoto Mitilla
and Protacio Libres, the last mentioned being then drunk and asleep on a bamboo bed. 9 A Mobile Fracture-separation, left parieto-occipital and right fronto-temporal skull.
Patrol car thereafter arrived and apprehended them, except Libres. Patrolman Pili next went
towards a house near Tagumpay Street in which direction the others had fled. In said house, which
was that of Crisanta Melgar, the patrolman found some persons who pretended to be sleeping, MISCELLANEOUS:
namely, Demetrio Garin, Jesus Felicia and Eduardo Berdida. Patrolman Pili brought them outside
and they were taken by the Mobile Patrol to the Detective Bureau. Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 1.3 x 0.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. deep, right lumbar region.

29
 Wound, lacerated, 3 x 0.5 cm. occipital region.
Wound, lacerated, 2.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 1 cm. deep, non-penetrating, left
abdomen.
Hematoma, frontal, right; left, parieto-occipital, and occipital, scalp, head.
Contusion, multiple, left forehead; left lower eyelids; left face; nose; lower lip;
left lateral neck; posterior neck; left shoulder; left and right posterior chest.
Contused abrasion, anterior left lower chest and right abdomen.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock and hemorrhage due to traumatic fracture of the skull with maceration
of spleen, contusion of the lungs and extensive subarachnoid hemorrhages in
the brain.
Antonio Maravilla, as shown in the medico-legal certificate of Dr. Cumalinga Espinosa of the North
General Hospital (Exh. R), sustained these injuries:
Contusion with abrasion, and periorbital hematoma, eye right.
Contusion upper and lower lip.
Contusion 2" mental region.
Contusion with slight hematoma, malar right, and mandible bilateral.
Abrasion, 3", lateral neck left.
Abrasion, 2" #2 level of the 10th rib right, along the MCL.
For the defense of herein appellants, the following evidence was presented to establish alibi:
Sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960 Crisanta Melgar was filling drums
with water in her house at 1205 Tagumpay Street, Tondo, Manila. Shortly thereafter, Eduardo
Berdida, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia arrived. Since her husband was on night duty and her
brother- in-law was ill, Crisanta Melgar asked the three to remain and help her fill up the drums
with water, intending to sell the same the next morning. Said defendants consented and for some
time helped Crisanta fill the drums with water. At about 9 o'clock in the evening, however, said
defendants went to sleep in the ground floor of Crisanta's new house, still under construction,
adjacent to the house aforementioned. At about midnight a policeman and someone in civilian
clothes knocked at the door and inquired from Crisanta if there were three persons sleeping in her
house. She said yes, and opened the door. The policeman then told Crisanta that a dead man was
found near their place. The one in civilian attire went to the back of the house. Crisanta told the
policeman she knew nothing of any incident and that the three men had been in her house for some
time. She then awoke the defendants Berdida, Saberon and Felicia. The policeman told them to
stand up and the man in civilian was asked if they were the ones involved. Said man looked at the
defendants and replied in the negative. The policeman and the civilian then left and the defendants
went back to sleep. After a while, Crisanta, who was restless and could not sleep, went down, awoke
the defendants, and told them that it was better for them to leave. So, the said defendants left, but a
policeman stopped them at Tagumpay Street and took them to the police headquarters.
As to the defendant Vicente Aberas, his defense of alibi is as follows:
In the evening of 7 May 1960, he was on board the fishing boat "Don Paulino." At about 10:30
o'clock in the evening, after unloading their catch of fish, he left for home, bringing with him
a tulingan fish. Juan, a co-worker of his, invited him to drink beer in a store near Pier 8. For some
time they stayed there, then he left for home. On the way he met five men beating up somebody.
Approaching them, he asked them to have pity on the man and not to beat him. Someone in the
group, armed with a club, warned him not to interfere, so, becoming afraid, he left. In reaching
home, he took off his shirt, cut the fish he brought with him in half, lengthwise, and took one of the
halves to the house of Emiliano Retone, another co-worker of his, who did not report for work that
day. Retone invited him to drink gin. After drinking, he headed for home, but on his way he met two
policemen and a woman. After being asked where he came from, which he answered, and whether
he had seen a fight, to which he said yes, he was taken to Precinct 3.
Appellants would, first of all, assail Antonio Maravilla's testimony identifying them as the assailants,
for the reason that he lost consciousness, and, therefore, could not be relied upon to make said
identification. Appellants would further insist on their defense of alibi. Antonio Maravilla, it is true,
lost consciousness' at about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8 May 1960. It is however equally true that
before his sense faded out he saw herein appellants perform their atrocities on himself as well as on
Federico Caalete. It cannot therefore be doubted that he made no mistake in pointing out to herein
appellants as definitely among their assailants. This he did, not only at the police station but also in
open court during the trial. It is furthermore not disputed by defendants-appellants that Antonio
Maravilla has no reason or motive to falsely accuse them of murder and attempted murder. The
positive identification he made must therefore be given credence.
It follows that the defense of alibi cannot be sustained. The rule is settled, to the point of being trite,
that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses,
pointing to the accused as participants in the crime. 10
The trial court, moreover, found the above-related defenses of alibi not credible. For, according to
said court, if defendants Berdida, Felicia and Saberon really went to help Crisanta Melgar, their
provincemate, fill drums with water at her house, it is rather unusual that they went to sleep at
about 9 o'clock in the evening. Furthermore, the policeman who inquired about persons sleeping in
Crisanta Melgar's house strangely knew their number, that is, three persons. And, finally, it is
unbelievable that said policeman did not take them to the headquarters for identification by
Antonio Maravilla himself.1wph1.t
And, with respect to the defendant-appellant Vicente Aberas, the trial court found it too surprising
to believe that he went to such lengths of amiability, as to go, shirtless at that, to his friend Retone, at
an unholy hour, to share with him one-half of his tulingan fish. No previous agreement, or urgent
need for such an act obtained. It could have waited for the next morning, especially since, having
allegedly come from work, defendant Aberas must have been tired.
30
As this Court stated in People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964, the defense of alibi is an circumstances obtaining sufficient to support the trial court's finding of the attendance of evident
issue of fact that hinges on credibility; that the credibility of an alibi depends so much on the premeditation.
credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it; and that, in this inspect, the relative weight
which the trial judge assigns to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly
Following previous instances, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in this case should be
inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate
increased to P6,000. 12
contact with those who take to the witness chair places him, compared to appellate Justices, in the
more competent position to discriminate be between the true and the false.
Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken. The record shows that
defendants perfected no appeal from the judgment below. The present automatic review is limited
And in the present appeal, we find no warrant to depart from the lower court's finding on
only to the murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. It was only because of the joint
defendants-appellants' defense of alibi.
trial that the record of the attempted murder case was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was
taken in the attempted murder case, the judgment with respect thereto has become final. It
It is also contended by appellants that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior therefore cannot now be reviewed herein, as some of the appellants would ask. And defendants-
strength, and evident premeditation should not be appreciated in fixing the penalty. Appellants appellants, who are detained, should accordingly be deemed to have started serving their respective
would argue that nighttime was not purposely sought to facilitate the offense or to afford impunity. sentence in said attempted murder case from the time the decision of the trial court became final as
At any rate, they would further argue, nighttime as well as abuse of superior strength are deemed to said case.
absorbed in treachery. As to evident premeditation, they aver that the premeditation, if any, is not
evident, for lack of sufficient lapse of time between the execution of the offense and a previous
Wherefore, the death penalty imposed on defendants-appellants is hereby affirmed, and the
showing of intent to commit it, so as to show that the offenders clung to their determination to
indemnity to the heirs of Federico Caalete is hereby increased from P4,000 to P6,000, with costs.
commit the crime.
So ordered.

The presence of one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, suffices to fix the penalty for murder at the extreme punishment of death. For there is no
mitigating circumstance in the present case. From the facts and evidence of record in this case, it is
clear that appellants took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it appears
that to carry out a sentence they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete for
the death of one Pabling, they had evidently chosen to execute their victims under cover of
darkness, at the dead of night, when the neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch as the treachery
consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the
circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom,
since the treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present to
which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does no apply. 11

In addition, the presence of evident premeditation is likewise borne out by the record. For the
victims were told at the start, when they were taken captives, that they had done something wrong,
that they were the ones who stabbed and killed one Pabling, and that for this reason they were to go
with the group (T.s.n., 10 October 1960, pp. 20, 22; Exh. D). Not only that; the victims were then
taken to a spot where they were ordered to dig their graves. The assailants were previously armed
with deadly weapons, and their assault was a concerted and group action. From the time of
apprehension of the victims, About 10 o'clock in the evening, to the time Antonio Maravilla lost
consciousness, about 1 o'clock early the following morning, is sufficient time for the offenders to
meditate and reflect on the consequences of their act.

In People vs. Lopez, 69 Phil. 298, this Court found the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation present, in view of the repeated statements of the defendants that the hour of
reckoning of the victim would arrive, the existing enmity between them, the fact that they were
previously armed with deadly weapons, and the fact that the aggression was simultaneous and
continuous until the deceased was left unconscious on the ground. And in People vs. Lazada, 70 Phil.
525, four hours was held sufficient lapse of time for purposes of the presence of evident
premeditation. Furthermore, sufficient lapse of time in this regard is not simply a matter of the
precise number of hours, but of the reasonable opportunity, under the situation and circumstances,
to ponder and reflect upon the consequences. In the present case, we find the facts and

31
45 G.R. No. 132895 March 10, 2004
the appellees brief, as follows:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 260,
National Capital Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo
("Castillo") and Evangeline Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty of Qualified Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention2 and sentencing them to death.
The Information3 charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda Wenceslao with the crime of kidnapping,
reads:
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO and
EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, conspiring together, confederating, and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, and
seriously detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @ "Rocky", a five years old child (sic), which
kidnapping or serious detention lasted for more than three (3) days thereby depriving
him of his liberty, and which was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
parents of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of the victim himself and his parents.
The said accused IMELDA CASTILLO WENCESLAO, without having participated in the
said crime as a principal, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
participated (sic) in the execution of the crime by previous and simultaneous acts by
allowing and furnishing the use of her residence where victim Horacio Cebrero IV was
kept knowing him to have been taken by principal accused Elizabeth Castillo and
Evangeline Padayhag without the consent of his parents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on 10 May 1995, both Castillo and Padayhag initially pleaded guilty. However, on
18 May 1995, Castillo and Padayhag withdrew their plea of guilt. They entered a plea of not guilty
on 3 August 1995. Imelda Wenceslao remains at large.
The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and presented eight witnesses, namely: (1)
Horacio Cebrero IV ("Rocky"), the victim; (2) Rosanna Baria, the victims "yaya"; (3) Luis Cebrero,
the victims father; (4) Sandra Cebrero, the victims mother; (5) Staff Sgt. Alejandro Delena of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP"); (6) Wivino Demol, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines ("AFP") Intelligence Security Group, army surveillance and search team; (7) Capt. Raniel
Ramiro, also of the AFP Intelligence Security Group; (8) and Staff Sgt. Manual Iglesias of the PNP.
The defense presented only two witnesses: Castillo and Padayhag themselves.
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") summarized the prosecutions version of the incident in
On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of Mr.
and Mrs. Luis De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F. Paraaque,
Metro Manila (p. 26, tsn, August 3, 1995). In the morning of said date, Femie, another
housemaid of the Cebreros and Barias relative, bathed and dressed up Rocky, the
couples six year old son and afterwards advised Baria that someone, who was also a
Cebrero househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about 8:00 a.m., a tricycle arrived.
On board was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who gave her name as
Evangeline Padayhag (p. 26, supra). Baria assisted Rocky to board the tricycle. The
tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom Rocky pointed to in court and who gave
her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn, August 3, 1995), to a nearby "Mcdonalds".
Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p. 13, supra) whom Rocky pointed to in
court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra). The three proceeded to a
house far from the "Mcdonalds" (p. 13, supra) where Rocky slept "four times" (p.
14, supra).
At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero arrived home from work. When his son
DJ arrived, he informed his father that Rocky did not attend school. Luis Cebrero asked
Baria (pp. 4-5, tsn, August 22, 1995) who told him that Rocky was fetched at home by a
woman to attend a birthday party (p. 5, supra). Informed thereof, Mr. Cebrero then called
up his friends and went to the police station to report that his son was missing (p.
9, supra).
At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero received a telephone call from a woman
saying, "Ibigay mo sa akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata" (p. 10, supra). Luis replied,
"Kailangan ko ang bata". The woman asked how much money was in his ATM and Luis
replied P40,000.00. Luis then requested to talk to his son but the woman said, "Hindi
puwede, malayo dito ang anak mo at tatawag na lang uli ako" (p. 10, supra).
Luis Cebrero decided to connect a tape recorder to his phone. On March 2, 1995, at about
7:20 p.m., his phone rang. The caller was a woman telling him, "Bigyan mo ako nang isang
million", to which he replied, "Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang million". The caller told
Luis that she will call back later on (pp. 11-12, supra).
The Cebreros informed the authorities that two of their maids were hired from an agency,
the General Services, Inc. at Paraaque. Major Ordoyo of the Intelligence Security Group,
Philippine Army (PA) sent Sergeants Rempillo and Iglesias to the agency to verify this.
The two were furnished by General Services, Inc. with the personal data of the maids
named Elizabeth Castillo and Jasmine Nuez (pp. 13-14, tsn, March 12, 1996).
When the caller did not contact Luis Cebrero the following day, March 3, 1995, he
instructed his wife to raise some money. From the bank, Mrs. Cebrero withdrew
P800,000.00 in P1,000.00 denomination. The bank provided Mrs. Cebrero a list
containing the serial numbers of the money withdrawn (pp. 15-16, supra).
On March 4, 1995, at about 9:30 p.m., Luis Cebrero received a telephone call. The caller
was a woman who asked, "Ano nasa iyo na ba ang pera"? Luis answered, "Hindi ko
kayang ibigay sa iyo ang halagang iyon, kalahati lang ang kaya kong ibigay". The caller
said, "Sige, puede na yan (p. 17, supra) and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in Paco, Obando,
32
Bulacan, alone, at about 2:00 a.m.; that at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, is a "Farmacia Dilag"
and beside it is a street which Luis must follow until he reaches the church called
"Sabadista" where he should drop the money (p. 18, supra). Luis Cebrero received
another call on that same night instructing him to stop in front of the Farmacia Dilag and
walk on the street beside it going to a chapel and to drop the money on the chapels
terrace (p. 19, supra).
Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4, 1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar,
Commanding Officer of the Intelligence Security Group (ISG), Philippine Army, briefed his
men on Rockys kidnapping and assigned them their respective tasks in the stakeout they
will undertake around the pay-off area (pp. 6-7 tsn, January 30, 1996). At about 11:00
p.m. of March 4, 1995, Sgt. Alejandro Delena and his ISG team, proceeded to Obando,
Bulacan for the stakeout. After positioning themselves near the stakeout site, a car
arrived and stopped in front of the chapel. The man alighted and placed a bag in front of
the chapel and immediately left (p. 10, supra). After about forty (40) minutes, two women
appeared, proceeded to where the bag was dropped. On seeing the bag, the women
laughed and left. After about two (2) minutes, the two women returned, picked up the bag
and immediately left (pp. 11-12, supra). The ISG team searched the area around the drop-
off place but the two women were nowhere to be found (p. 17, supra). In court, Sgt.
Delena pointed to and identified Castillo and Padayhag as the two women he saw in front
of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan and who, later on, picked up the bag dropped by Luis
Cebrero (p. 12, supra).
of Mitimos who, when shown the picture of Castillo, said that the woman in the picture is
in Barangay Mitimos (p. 46, supra).
Upon the request of the police, the two barangay officials conducted a daily surveillance
on Castillo. On March 18, 1995, Sgt. Demol reported to the ISG headquarters that Castillo
was in Barangay Mitimos. In turn, Sgt. Demol was advised that ISG will be sending him,
through JRS Express, copies of the list of serial numbers of the bills used as pay-off and a
DOJ subpoena (p. 54, supra). Upon receipt of said documents, Sgt. Demol applied for a
search warrant (p. 58, supra) which was granted by the Dipolog City Regional Trial Court
on March 21, 1995 (p. 57, supra). The search warrant was shown to Elizabeth Castillo and
her father who signed the same (pp. 60-61, supra). The search yielded a black bag placed
in a carton inside the house (pp. 61-62) containing money in P1,000.00 bills in the total
amount of P277,000.00 (p. 68, supra). The serial numbers of the recovered money bills
appeared in the list furnished to Sgt. Demol by ISG (pp. 88-89, supra). Thereafter, the
money was deposited with the Regional Trial Court at Dipolog City (p. 89, supra).
Prosecuted for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, Evangeline Padayhag and
Elizabeth Castillo initially pleaded guilty upon arraignment and were each meted the
penalty of life imprisonment (p. 4, tsn, August 3, 1995). The trial court, however, on
motion based on improvident plea, ordered the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and
directed the re-arraignment of Castillo and Padayhag.

After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the two women, Sgt. Delena and his team
charged.4
remained at the stake-out area. The team befriended the residents of the place, one of
whom was a certain Joselito Torres who claimed to be the former boyfriend of Elizabeth
Castillo whom he recognized from the picture shown to him by Sgt. Delena. Torres Appellants maintain their innocence and present their own version of the events in their brief, as
informed the ISG team that Castillo had already left for Mindanao. Sgt. Delena follows:
immediately communicated the information, including the address of Gigi Padayhag in
Navotas, to his commanding officer (p. 19, supra).
1. Accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO was a househelper at the Cebrero household from
December 1993 to January 1995. She did the cleaning of the house, laundry of dirty
At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle stopped in clothes, and also took care of Rocky, son of Luis and Sandra Cebrero;
front of his house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero opened it, he
saw his son, Rocky (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 22, 1995).
2. Accused Evangeline Padayhag, also a househelper, is a friend of Elizabeth Castillo. The
two met sometime in 1994 at Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, when Padayhag worked in the
On March 12, 1995, an ISG team headed by Sgt. Manuel Iglesias was dispatched to household of Julito Lawagon, the latter being the neighbor of Helen Lim, Elizabeth
Navotas to locate "Gigi" Padayhag at the address furnished by Sgt. Delena. The team Castillos sister;
found Padayhag who upon being apprised of the kidnapping of Rocky Cebrero,
voluntarily went with the ISG team to Camp Crame to clear her name (p. 14, tsn, May 22,
3. Upon assumption from work, Castillo was promised by Mrs. Sandra Cebrero a monthly
1996).
salary of one thousand two hundred pesos (P1,200.00);

Upon the instruction of the ISG, Sgts. Delena and Demo were ordered to proceed to
4. Castillo, however, was never given compensation during her entire employment in the
Dipolog City to look for Castillo (pp. 20-21, tsn, January 30, 1996). Sgt. Delena arrived in
Cebrero household;
Dipolog City on March 13, 1996. He was briefed and shown the area where Castillo could
be found (p. 23, supra).
5. Castillo was also not treated nicely by the Cebrero spouses. When something gets lost
in the house, she was always the one being blamed, although the children were the ones
When Sgt. Demol arrived in Dipolog City, he and Sgt. Delena coordinated with the PNP
getting the things. Besides, they say bad words against her. Thus, she has no other choice
stationed at Barangay Tulong, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte (p. 41, tsn, March 12, 1996).
but to leave her work;
Thereat, Sgt. Demol requested for the assistance of persons from Barangay Mitimos,
where Castillo was believed to be hiding. The PNP assigned them two barangay officials

33
6. Castillo had been consistently demanding from the Cebrero spouses her unpaid wages
for one year; but her demands remained unheeded;
7. Having reached only elementary education, Castillo believed that the only effective way
for her to claim back her unpaid wages is to use Rocky, son of the Cebrero Spouses;
8. On 1 March 1995 Castillo called Padayhag, telling the latter that her boyfriend is sick.
At that time, Padayhag was already working at Jelaya St., B.F. Homes, Paraaque under
the employ of Lulu Sablan. Castillo fetched Padayhag. The two, however, did not go to see
Padayhags boyfriend but instead they went to a playground;
9. Castillo then instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky from his house at Cesar Virata St., B.F.
Homes, Paraaque, Manila. When Padayhag asked why she wanted to see Rocky, Castillo
answered that she missed the boy. Padayhag obliged to the request, knowing that the
latter would not do any harm to the boy;
10. It was only the first time that Padayhag saw Rocky;
11. She brought the child to a market at B.F. Paraaque, where Castillo was waiting. The
three went on a stroll. Thereafter, they went to the house of Imelda Wenceslao, Castillos
sister, at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Castillo noticed that Rocky had a fever, so she
requested Vangie to buy a medicine;
12. Padayhag was not told by Castillo as to when the latter would return the boy.
Padayhag did not sense anything wrong with what had happened as she believed that
Castillo only took Rocky for a stroll;
13. Imelda Wenceslao asked why they brought a child along with them. Castillo answered
that she just wanted to see the boy. Wenceslao then asked if they asked permission from
the parents, and Castillo answered "no";
14. At night, Castillo talked to Mr. Luis Cebrero over the phone to inform him that Rocky
was with her. Mr. Cebrero told her not to harm the boy. No threat or demand for ransom
was ever made by the accused to the Cebrero spouses. She never asked Mr. Cebrero how
much money he had in the bank;
15. The following day, 2 March 1995, Castillo called Mr. Cebrero again to tell him that she
could not yet return Rocky because he still had a slight fever. She also told Mr. Cebrero:
"Hindi nyo ako sinusuwelduhan". He asked her: "Magkano ba ang kailangan mo?" She did
not answer. Then Mr. Cebrero said: "May pera ako rito, kalahating milyon." At that
moment, Castillo hanged-up the phone;
16. Castillo denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 25 August 1999, attached as Annex
"A" and made an integral part hereof, that she demanded one million (P1,000,000.00)
from the Cebrero spouses;
17. On the evening of 4 March 1995, when Castillo called Mr. Cebrero, he asked them
where they were. The accused told him that they were in Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, near a
Protestant Church. Mr. Cebrero then said: "Pupunta ako riyan bandang 2:00 ng madaling
araw (March 5, 1999) na may bitbit na pera at ilalapag ko ito sa may simbahan";
18. On 5 March 1995, at around 4:30 a.m. Castillo and Padayhag went out to buy
"pandesal". They noticed that at a post near a Church, a dog was trying to pull a black
plastic bag. They picked it up and brought it home. When they opened it, they found five
bundles of money, in P1,000.00 denomination;
19. At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mr. Cebrero heard a tricycle stop in front of their
house. Someone knocked at the door, and when he opened the door, he saw Rocky;
20. On 11 March 1995, Capt. Raniel Ramiro, Intelligence Security Group of the Philippine
Army, together with his men, after coordinating with Caloocan Police, arrested
Evangeline Padayhag at her residence at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City. The military men
did not have a warrant of arrest at this particular operation;
21. The military were civilian-dressed. They pretended to be Padayhags cousins who
came from abroad, and they "invited her to a birthday party". However, they brought her
to Fort Bonifacio for interrogation. It was only then that Padayhag learned that her
companions were military men;
22. At Fort Bonifacio, the police coerced Padayhag to confess to the crime, threatening
her: "Pag hindi ka pa umamin, kami na mismo and bibitay sa iyo". Padayhag, however, did
not confess to the commission of the crime. She was then brought to Camp Crame at
Quezon City on that same date;
23. The following day, 12 March 1995, during the custodial investigation, a certain Major
Meneses was exerting pressure on Padayhag to reveal where the P500,000.00 is. She told
Major Meneses: "Wala akong pera na ganoon kalaki." He said to her: "Pag hindi ka
umamin, papatayin na kita talaga!" Her answer was: "Patayin nyo man ako, hindi ako
aamin dahil wala akong ganoong kalaking pera." Major Meneses then slapped Padayhag
and hit her with a stool on her leg;
24. Major Meneses also threatened Padayhag that if she would not confess to the crime,
he would submerge her on a drum. They forcibly brought her to a toilet room. She saw
there two big drums. Major Meneses then told her: "Iyong mga hindi umamin, nilulublob
namin dito sa drum". Padayhag shouted. Thereafter, someone knocked at the door and
said: "Pakawalan nyo na iyan dahil marami nang tao". They brought her out of the room
and handcuffed her;
25. SPO1 Larry Pablo was likewise threatening Padayhag: "Pag hindi ka pa umamin,
ihuhulog na kita sa bintanang ito!" (They were on the third floor of a building) "Alam mo
ba kung ilan na ang naihulog namin diyan? Panlabindalawa ka na sa ihuhulog namin
diyan!";
26. During the custodial investigation, Padayhag was not assisted by a counsel, nor has
she waived her right to counsel. She was coerced by the police into signing an
extrajudicial confession without even explaining to her the contents thereof;
34
 27. Atty. Eranio Sedillo only arrived one hour (1 hr.) after Padayhag had already signed The Court is convinced that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused
the questioned extrajudicial confession; beyond reasonable doubt.

28. Elizabeth Castillo was arrested at Mitimos, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte on or about 21
March 1995. Police officers came to her house, and when they informed her that they
were looking for the money, she voluntarily gave it to them;
29. The approximate amount of money taken by Castillo was only twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) She returned the rest of the money to the police who arrested, her;
30. Castillo vehemently denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay (par. No. 14) that she
returned only P227,000.00;
WHEREFORE, ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG are sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of death. Further, they are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as moral damages and
Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages plus costs of
litigation.
SO ORDERED.6
Appellants seek the reversal of their conviction by raising the following assignments of error:

31. Castillo and her escorts were fetched in Manila by a van. Inside the van, they I
blindfolded her. They removed her blindfold when they reached Camp Crame;
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING (SIC) THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
32. Major Meneses and SPO1 Larry Pablo investigated her. She was slapped by Pablo,
forcing her to admit where the money is;
II

33. During the investigation, Pablo poked a gun on her, then forced her to write what he
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY TO EXTORT
would say to her. He instructed her to write: "Na kapag hindi ko isasauli ang lahat ng pera
RANSOM IN THIS CASE.
ay pwede nyo na akong patayin". Castillo followed the instructions because of fear. 5

III
In an 11-page Decision, of which nine pages were devoted to the recital of facts, the trial court found
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible and gave no weight to Castillo and
Padayhags defenses. The trial court convicted appellants on 17 December 1997 and imposed on THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION OF
them the death penalty, thus: EVANGELINE PADAYHAG.

Originally, both accused pleaded guilty to the offense and were meted the penalty of life IV
imprisonment. However, shortly thereafter, they moved to withdraw their plea claiming
it was precipitate, which the court allowed and proceeded with a full-blown trial.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE CASE
AT BAR.7
Accused Elizabeth Castillo demanded money from Rockys parents for the release of the
latter. She told his father to bring the money to Obando Bulacan. The Court can only
We affirm the trial courts judgment convicting Castillo. However, we acquit her co-accused
imagine the pain, worry, fear and anxiety of the boys parents while their youngest son
Padayhag.
was under detention.

To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the
Ransom is money, price or consideration demanded for the redemption of a captured
Revised Penal Code,8the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender is a private
person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity" (Corpus Juris Secundum 458).
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the victim of his
The testimony of Elizabeth Castillo that she did not know about the money cannot be
liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense any
given weight. Two hundred Seventy Seven Thousand (P277,000.00) Pesos was found
of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
among her things, the bills bearing the same serial number as the money paid to her.
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on
the victim or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or
The court has taken a hard look in determining the liability of Evangeline Padayhag as it a public officer.9
seems that her only participation in the crime was picking up the boy from his house.
Although she did not get part of the ransom the fact is that she fully and directly
Appellant Castillos Liability
cooperated and did her part to carry out the resolution of her co-accused. Under these
facts there was conspiracy to extort ransom. People versus Kamad Akiran, 18 SCRA 239.

35
Castillo asserts that the victims parents did not pay her wages when she worked as a maid of the Your Honor, please, may we request that the rule on evidence be not strict on this boy.
victims family.10She claims that it was this injustice, her educational level and her ignorance of the The witness is of tender age.
law, which impelled her to take Rocky. She faults the trial court for refusing to consider this. Castillo
is mistaken. Whether or not her employer failed to pay her salary is irrelevant. No amount of
ATTY. SOLUREN
perceived injustice can serve as justification for any person to retaliate through the commission of
another crime. The trial court was therefore correct in disregarding Castillos claim that Rockys
parents committed injustice on her. There is no strict implementation as to what the Honorable Prosecutor stated. There is no
strict implementation of the rules of court. In fact, we are very lenient but the fact is, the
child said he does not know. But the question is he was giving the answer to this
Castillos claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand for ransom. Ransom is "money,
witness.
price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a
payment that releases from captivity."11 Thus, even if she had a right to demand payment of her
unpaid wages, the money she actually demanded and eventually received, is still ransom. COURT

Castillos reliance on her low educational level is similarly unavailing. The penalty for kidnapping Ask another question.
for ransom is the singular and indivisible penalty of death. This bars the application of any
alternative, mitigating or aggravating circumstance.12
Q Rocky, nang sumakay kayo ni Vangie sa tricycle, nakita mo ba si Beth Castillo?

Mr. Cebrero admitted that he was unable to identify his son Rockys abductors. De Lena and Iglesias,
A Nakita namin si Beth sa McDonalds. Malapit sa amin.
the police officers who did the stake-out during the "pay-off," testified that the two women suddenly
disappeared after retrieving the plastic bag containing the ransom. The police officers inability to
explain how two simple maids managed to give 5 carloads of police officers the slip severely Q Rocky, nakita ninyo si Beth. Ngayon, tatlo na kayo, ikaw, si Beth at si Vangie?
discredits their account of what happened that day.
A Yes.
Rockys testimony, however, leaves no room for doubt. Only six years of age when he testified,
Rocky was candid and direct in his recollection, narrating events as a young boy saw them happen,
Q Rocky, noong magkasama na kayong tatlo, saan kayo nagpunta?
thus:

A Nasundo namin si Beth.

COURT

Q Noong nasundo na ninyo si Beth, saan kayo nagpunta?

Alright. Rocky, when Vangie went to fetch you from your house.

A Sa bahay nila.
A Yes.

Q Kaninong bahay?
COURT

A Hindi ko alam.
You took a tricycle.

Q Malayo ba sa McDonald o malapit. Sinabi mo kanina, nagpunta kayo sa bahay nila?

A Yes.

A Yes.
COURT

Q Iyong bahay na pinuntahan ninyo, malayo sa McDonald?

Where did you go?

A Malayo.
A I do not know.

Q Anong sinakyan ninyo?

PROS. FONACIER

36
 A Hindi ko alam. Q And as a result of sitting at the palaruan, Miss witness, what happened next?

Q Noong dumating kayo doon sa bahay na hindi ninyo, bahay, natulog ka ba doon? A Pinasundo ko si Rocky kay Vangie, mam.

A Yes. Q And why did you ask Vangie to fetch Rocky, Miss witness?

Q Ilang beses ka natulog doon? A Kasi po naalala ko pagnamamalengke ako at kasama ko si Rocky, lagi po kaming
pumupunta sa palaruan, mam
A 4 sleeps.
Q And then what happened next, Miss witness?
Q Pinakakain ka ba sa bahay na pinuntahan ninyo?
A Sinundo po ni Vangie si Rocky, mam.
A Yes.
Q Whom did Vangie fetch, Miss witness?
Q Ano ang pinakakain sa iyo?
A Si Rocky po, mam.
A Champorado and fish.
Q And after Rocky fetched by Vangie, what happened next?
Q Sino ang nagpapakain sa iyo?
A Ipinasyal po namin si Rocky, mam.15 (Emphasis supplied)
A Vangie.
She also testified that she had no permission from Rockys parents to take the child with her:
Q Sino si Vangie. Puede mo bang ituro sa amin?
T Saan kayo nananghalian?
PROS. FONACIER
S Doon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
The witness is pointing to accused Evangeline Padayhag as the Vangie he was referring
to. T Noong dumating kayo doon, ano naman ang sinabi ng kapatid mo sayo?

Q Doon sa 4 sleeps mo sa bahay na iyon, saan ka pa nila dinala? S Ang sabi niya, bakit daw may kasama kaming bata.

A Pinauwi na ako. T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo kay Imelda?

Q Sinong kasama mo noong pinauwi ka? S Sabi ko pinasyal lang po namin.

A Wala, pero mula sa McDonald, naiwan na ako sa tricycle hanggang sa bahay.13 T Hindi tinanong ni Imelda kung bakit pinasyal nyo ang bata, kung may paalam yong
bata doon sa kanyang magulang?
Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rockys testimony would have been more than enough to
convict Castillo. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to S Tinanong po.
convict.14 But there is more. The evidence on record amply supports the factual findings of the trial
court. Both the evidence of the prosecution and the defense establish the commission of the crime.
T Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?

Castillo admitted she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky on 1 March 1995:

S Sinabi ko gusto ko lang makita si Rocky.

37
 T Pero, ano ang sinabi mo noong tinanong kung may paalam ang bata sa kanyang A Sinabi ko po na nandidito sa amin, mam.
magulang, anong naging sagot mo sa katanungan niya?
Q After that what happened next?
S Ang sabi niya baka daw pagalitan kami.
A Nagalit po si Luis Cebrero sa akin, mam.
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo?
Q And what did you do when Luis Cebrero got angry?
Your Honor, may we asked (sic) the witness to be more responsive with her answer.
A Tinanong po niya ako kung magkano ang kailangan ko, mam.
COURT
Q And what else did he say, Miss witness?
What was the question, please?
A Sinabi po niya sa akin na huwag ko raw pong sasaktan si Rocky, mam.
Stenographer:
Q And then what else?
(Reading back the question)
A Pinipilit po niya ako na kung magkano daw ang kailangan namin na pera,
T Noong tinanong ni Imelda kung may paalam ang bata sa mga magulang, ano pagkatapos hindi ko na po sinagot ang tanong niya, mam.
ang sagot mo?
Q And then what happened next?
S Ang sabi ko po hindi, walang paalam.
A Binaba ko na po iyong telepono, mam.17 (Emphasis supplied)
T Ano ang naging reaction ng iyong kapatid na si Imelda?
The number and time of these calls coincided with the calls Mr. Cebrero received from Castillo
S Bakit daw hindi nagpaalam.16 (Emphasis supplied) telling him that she had Rocky and instructing him to pay the ransom for Rockys release.

Castillo testified that, during the period of Rockys detention she called Rockys father, Mr. Cebrero, Additionally, Castillo by her own admission placed herself at the time and place where the "pay-off"
to wit: occurred:

Q What happened next Miss witness? T Sa pangatlong araw naman, nandoon ka pa rin ba at saka si Rocky?

A Tinawagan ko po ang mga Cebrero. S Opo.

Q Who of the Cebreros did you call up? T Sa bahay ni Imelda?

A Si Luis Cebrero po, mam. S Nagpaalam po ako sa kapatid ko na maghahanap muna ako ng trabaho.

Q What happened next after that? T Si Vangie, saan naman siya noon?

A Pagtawag ko po kay Mr. Luis Cebrero tinanong po niya sa akin kung nasaan si Rocky, S Nandoon pa rin sa Dagat-dagatan po.
mam.
T Si Rocky naman?
Q And what is your reply?
S Andoon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.

38
T Mga anong oras yon na nagpaalam ka na maghanap ng trabaho? S Sa may Julo po.

S Umaga po ako nagpaalam. T Ano yong Julo?

T Kung ganoon umalis ka ng umagang yan? S Malapit po iyan sa Obando

S Opo. COURT

T Saan ka naman pumunta? Saang bayan ng Bulacan yon?

S Naghanap po ako ng trabaho. S Yon lang po ang alam ko.18 (Emphasis supplied)

T Saan ka naghanap ng trabaho? Beyond a feeble excuse that she was in Obando in order to look for employment, Castillo provides
no other plausible reason why her presence at that place, at such an opportune time should not be
taken against her as additional evidence of her guilt. To attribute this to coincidence, as Castillo
S Sa may bandang Bulacan po.
would probably have us do, taxes ones credulity.

T Sa may Paco Obando, doon ka ba pumunta?

The same can be said of her inability to explain how the ransom money was found in her possession
when she was caught by policemen in Dipolog. Castillo plainly contradicts herself on this point. In
S Hindi po. Castillos brief, she admitted going to the "pay-off" site on the day Mr. Cebrero was told to leave the
ransom for Rockys release. Castillo admitted she found at the site a black plastic bag filled with
money and brought it home.19 However in her testimony before the trial court, she maintained that
T Saang parte ka ng Bulacan pumunta?
the first time she saw the same plastic bag was when it mysteriously appeared in her luggage when
she went to Dipolog:
S Malapit po sa may Hindi ko na po matandaan yong pinuntahan namin.
Q And thereafter, Miss witness, what happened next?
T Malapit sa may?
A Hinanap ko iyong mga kagamitan ko po, mam.
S Papunta na po ng Obando, pero hindi nakarating doon.
Q And for what purpose you looked at your things, Miss witness?
T Saan ka pumunta doon para maghanap ka ng trabaho?
A Para ayusin po iyong mga kagamitan ko para makapagpahinga na po ako, mam.
ATTY. SOLUREN
Q What happened next, Miss witness?
Already answered, Your Honor, that the place papunta ng Obando pero hindi pa
nakakarating sa Obando.
A May nakuha ako na isang plastic bag sa loob ng aking bag, mam.

STATE PROSECUTOR FONACIER

Q And what is this plastic bag about, Miss witness?

That is why I am asking.

A May laman po na pera, mam.

COURT
Q And how much money was there in that plastic bag, Miss witness?

What place is that? Witness may answer.

A Hindi ko po alam.

T Anong detalyadong lugar?

39
 Q And what did you observe about the money in the plastic bag?
A Nagulat po ako, mam.
Q And why were you surprised?
A Hindi ko po kasi lubos na maisip na ang bag na aking dala dala ay may laman
na isang malaking halaga na pera, mam.
Q And what did you do after learning that there was money inside your bag, Miss
witness?
A Pinabayaan ko na lang po at inaantay na may kumuha na lang po niyon sa akin
mam.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to spend time with
him. At the same time, in her brief Castillo claims that what spurred her to take Rocky was her
desire to get her unpaid wages from the Cebreros. 21
appellants as his abductors.24 These admissions, damaging as they may sound, are of little use to
appellants. The reason is simple. The facts to which Rockys testimony pertains to are the very same
facts Castillo herself admitted on the witness stand. Even if we were to discredit Rockys testimony
entirely, the facts of his kidnapping stand proven by no less than Castillos own admission on the
witness stand and in her brief.
With the evidence Castillos own testimony established, the prosecutions witnesses did little more
than corroborate what Castillo herself had admitted. Since Castillo admitted in open court that she
instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky even without the parents permission, we find her explanations
futile. Her allegations of torture and of signing a sworn statement without counsel are useless. After
claiming to have been tortured into making her sworn statement, logic would have it that Castillo
should have debunked the contents of that statement through her testimony. Instead, she freely and
voluntarily recounted events as she narrated them in her sworn statement. Moreover, there is no
allegation that the trial court decided her guilt based on her sworn statement. The trial court based
its decision on the testimonies of all the witnesses, including Castillos.
In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt Castillos guilt.
Appellant Padayhags Liability

The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence on record shows that the
Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even
prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
cared for during his detention. This argument is pointless. The essence of kidnapping is deprivation
of liberty. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an
enclosure or treated him harshly.22 Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place question including those not raised by the parties. 25 This becomes even more imperative in cases
from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of where the penalty imposed is death.
detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs
freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.
Padayhags sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to
where Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling with the two, went to the house
Next, Castillo explains that she called Mr. Cebrero not to ask for ransom but to tell him that Rocky of Castillos sister together with Castillo and Rocky, and then later left the house. From this fact
was with her and unharmed. Castillo admitted that Mr. Cebrero pleaded with her not to harm Rocky. alone, the prosecution would have us rule that Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The
Castillo failed to explain, however, why she did not inform Mr. Cebrero of their exact whereabouts prosecution contends that without Padayhags help, Castillo could not have abducted Rocky.
so that Mr. Cebrero could fetch Rocky. Her failure to inform Mr. Cebrero clearly shows she kept
Rocky in detention considering she called Mr. Cebrero several times while she had physical control
We are not persuaded.
over Rocky.

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to
Castillos explanation that she decided to return Rocky only when he was no longer sick is also
commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must
implausible. In the first place, she failed to explain why she did not return the child the moment she
be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the
found out he was sick. That would have been the more prudent course of action at that time.
commission of the crime without any space for baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter
However, one day after the "pay-off" on 4 March 1995, Rocky suddenly appeared by himself at the
through.26 Indeed, conspiracy must be proven as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.27
Cebreros home on 5 March 1995. Any reasonable person would conclude that the pay-off and the
return of the child were related events. Castillo would have us attribute this to coincidence.
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in
execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to
Castillo would also have us believe that what prompted her sudden departure for Dipolog, where
the goal of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither
she was eventually captured, was her inability to find employment in Manila. And yet Castillo does
joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been
not explain why she tried to bring Padayhag along with her to Dipolog.
motivated by a common design.28

Finally, Castillo points out that the prosecution coached Rockys testimony. True, Rocky admitted he
Padayhags act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with Castillos plan, a plan
did not know the contents of the document he signed in front of the fiscal. 23 Rocky also stated that he
Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that Padayhag met Castillo only because
was told to testify that Padayhag forced him to go with her, and finally, that he must accuse both
40
Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhags boyfriend was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they
were to visit Padayhags boyfriend that the two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo
had deceived her:
Q Why? (sic) Elizabeth Castillo fetched you on February 28, 1995 and why did you
decide to leave your employment?
A Opo, sir.29
After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to fetch Rocky citing as reason
her love for the child and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag is a young lass from the
province who only finished Grade Two. Padayhag was thus easily misled by the more worldly
Castillo. Padayhags testimony reveals her naivet:

A Kasi sabi po niya sa akin ang boyfriend ko raw ay maysakit, sir. COURT

Q And could you tell us who is that boyfriend of yours? Q Ano ang sinabi sa iyo bakit mo susunduin ang bata?

A Si Jessie Mercader po, sir. A Namimiss na raw po niya iyong bata at nais niyang makita, Your Honor.

Q And what is the address of Jessie Mercader, at that time, February 28, 1995? COURT

A Sa Caloocan City po, sir. Tapos ikaw ang pinasundo niya doon sa bata?

Q And you said he was sick. What was his sickness? A Opo, Your Honor.

ATTY. SOLUREN COURT

Your Honor, that is misleading. Tapos noon dalhin sa Caloocan, ano pa, sinabi pa rin niya namimiss niya ang bata ganoon
uli ang sinabi niya sa iyo?
COURT
A Wala na po siyang sinabi sa akin, Your Honor.
Reform your question.
COURT
Q Madam witness, you said that you were informed that your boyfriend was sick. Did
you go and see your boyfriend? Hindi ka ba nakahalata na may mali doon sa pangyayaring iyon?

A Sumama po ako kay Elizabeth Castillo pero hindi na po kami natuloy pumunta doon, A Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay ipapasyal lamang niya ang bata, Your Honor.
sir.
Q Sa Caloocan?
Q For what reason you did not go?
A Opo, Your Honor.
A Hindi po sinabi sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo, sir.
COURT
Q So, you did not come to find out what was the sickness of your boyfriend?
Tapos umalis ka na pagkatapos ninyong kumain doon ng kapatid niya?
A Hindi na po sir.
A Opo, Your Honor.
Q Are we made to understand, madam witness, when you left your employer on 28
February 1995 for the reason that your boyfriend was sick, you did not actually go and
COURT
see your boyfriend?

41
 Ipinasyal ba niya ang bata? Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo at Hulyo tama ba iyon?

A Hindi ko na po alam kasi umalis nga po pagkatapos namin kumain, Your Honor. A Opo, Your Honor.

COURT COURT

Kailan niya sinabi sa iyo na ibabalik ang bata? Papaano nangyari noong Enero 1995 ikaw ay nagtratrabaho na kay Lulu Sablan?

A Wala po siyang sinabi kung kailan, Your Honor. A Itinuro po sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo na mag-apply ng trabaho sa may BF Homes,
Your Honor.
COURT
COURT
Ganoon ba ang alam mo sa pamamasyal?
Kailan kayo nagkita nitong si Elizabeth Castillo?
A Siya naman po ang nagyaya, Your Honor.30
A Noong January lang po, Your Honor.
Her ignorance and susceptibility to confusion becomes more evident in the following exchange:
COURT
COURT
Saan kayo nagkita?
Kailan ka ba umalis kay Mr. Julito Luwagon?
A Pinaalis niya po ako doon sa pinagtratrabahuan ko sa may Dagat Dagatan, Your
Honor.
A Hindi ko pa matandaan, Your Honor.

COURT
COURT

Alam mo ba kung ilang buwan mayroon ang isang taon?

Pero sabi mo kanina ay pitong buwan ka doon?

A Hindi ko po alam, Your Honor.

A Opo pitong buwan ako roon pero hindi ko po matandaan kung anong buwan, Your
Honor.
COURT
ATTY. SOLUREN
Pero alam mo ang mga buwan, Enero, Pebrero.. alam mo iyon?
She only finished Grade II, Your Honor.
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
COURT
Yes I know it but she would know that she works for seven (7) months. Alam mo ba na
December 1994 ka nagsimula mangamuhan kay Julito Luwagon? Sige nga sabihin mo nga sa akin kung anu-ano ang mga buwan?

A Opo, Your Honor. A Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo, Agosto, Setyembre, Oktubre,
Nobyembre at Disyembre po, Your Honor.31
COURT

42
Padayhags confusion in the way she answered the questions propounded to her only highlights the It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite
fact that she was not aware of Castillos plans and was vulnerable to the latters manipulation. Her with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
straightforward and wide-eyed admission of facts that incriminate her demonstrate a level of
honesty that can only be found in those who do not know the art of deceit. Far from a cold and
There was therefore a need for clear and convincing proof that this single act was committed to
calculating mind, Padayhag strikes us as one whose innocence often leaves her at the mercy of her
kidnap the child. The prosecution failed to prove this. Padayhag explained that Castillo coaxed her
more worldly peers. It is clear that she acted with the full belief that Castillo was doing nothing
into fetching Rocky through another deception and by playing on her feelings of sympathy and
wrong. Whatever moved her to do what Castillo asked of her is up for speculation. What matters is
friendship. Castillo corroborated this on the witness stand. The prosecution failed to prove
that her motivation in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap the boy. To impose criminal liability, the
otherwise.
law requires that there be intentional participation in the criminal act,32 not the unwitting
cooperation of a deceived individual.
The facts as established show that the only thing Castillo told Padayhag was to fetch Rocky because
Castillo missed her former ward. Upon reaching the house of the Cebreros, the boys nanny handed
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of an individual as a
over to Padayhag the child. There is no allegation or evidence that Padayhag knew the criminal plan
conspirator should focus on all acts before, during and after the commission of the crime.33 We have
of Castillo. Neither is there any hint that Castillo told Padayhag to abduct the boy, or to misrepresent
done precisely that, and it is precisely why we rule for her innocence. After her stroll with Castillo
herself or use means that would have led Padayhag to suspect that Castillo had some criminal
and Rocky, she left when Castillo brought the boy to her sisters house in Caloocan. 34 She never
design. Nor was there any proof that Padayhag knew that Castillo had no permission from the boys
visited nor contacted Castillo afterwards. She remained at her house and refused to go with Castillo
parents. The appearance of the boy itself, newly bathed and dressed for a stroll, would have led
when the latter suddenly tried to coax her to go to Dipolog. None of the money used as ransom was
Padayhag to believe whatever story Castillo contrived to ask her in fetching the boy.
found in her possession. Her involvement in the "pay-off" was never established. The testimony of
two prosecution witnesses, Sgt. De Lena and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with Castillo
when the latter picked up the ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillos admission in open A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution, and
court that she brought along a certain "Mila" and not Padayhag.35 In addition, the testimonies of not on the weakness of the defense of the accused. The prosecution should have done more to
these two police officers suffer from their failure to explain how they suddenly lost track of the two establish Padayhags guilt. Instead, the prosecution left a lot of room for other possible scenarios
women who took the ransom in front of their very eyes. besides her guilt. This is a fatal error. The presumption of innocence imposes a rule of evidence, a
degree of proof that demands no less than total compliance. As we explained in United States v.
Reyes:42
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy. We also find that the
prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People v. Gonzales36 we
held: The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which means proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two
which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability,
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It
the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty- a certainty that
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
(Emphasis supplied)
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both
On the other hand, we find Padayhags explanation sufficiently supported by circumstances aside
constitutional and criminal law.37 Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every single fact
from Castillos testimony. Padayhags acts before, during and after the crime all point to the
establishing guilt.38 Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. 39 The defense of
conclusion that she was no more than an unwitting tool of Castillo. Castillo misled her into a
the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. 40 Within this framework, the prosecution must
meeting. Castillo again misled her into fetching Rocky. Castillo never met or contacted her after the
prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The
day of Rockys abduction. Castillo also testified that she did not bring Padayhag along with her when
presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.
she went to Obando on the day that coincided with the "pay-off." The only circumstance linking
Padayhag to that event is the shaky account of two police officers who admitted that their quarry
The failure to prove Padayhags involvement as a conspirator reveals how tenuous the evidence is inexplicably disappeared before their very eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in the
linking her to the crime. Padayhags culpability hinges on how her act of fetching Rocky and performance of official duty, by itself, cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of
bringing him to Castillo formed part of a concerted effort to kidnap the child. The act of fetching the innocence.43 Nothing links Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She never received any part of the
boy, by itself, does not constitute a criminal offense. By itself, it is not even sufficient to make her an ransom, precisely because she did not even know it existed.
accomplice. For a person to be considered an accomplice there must be a community of design, that
is, knowing the criminal design of the principal, the co-accused concurs with the latter. Mere
Penalty and Damages
commission of an act which aids the perpetrator is not enough. As we explained in People v. Cual:41

Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,44 the penalty of death is imposed upon proof that the
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which
kidnapping was committed to extort ransom from the victim or any other person. We find that the
cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed.
prosecution has established Castillos guilt for this crime beyond reasonable doubt. However,
43
Castillos pecuniary liability must be modified to conform with jurisprudence. The award of
exemplary damages must be deleted in the absence of any aggravating circumstance. Mr. Cebrero
testified that their family suffered serious anxiety at the possibility of not seeing Rocky again. 45 The
pain and anguish they experienced justifies the award of moral damages. However, we reduce the
trial courts award of moral damages to P100,000 in line with current jurisprudence. 46
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 260, National Capital
Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86 convicting appellant Elizabeth Castillo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Elizabeth Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay
the victim P100,000 as moral damages. The award for exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal
basis. The trial courts Decision convicting appellant Evangeline Padayhag is REVERSED. We
ACQUIT Evangeline Padayhag and order her immediate RELEASE from confinement unless held for
another lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to report to the Court,
within five days from notice, compliance with this Decision.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies of the records of this case be
forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
46 G.R. No. 132324 September 28, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORLITO TAN @ "NORLY" and JOSE TAN, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof to show that the killing was justified
shifts to him. Even if the prosecution evidence may be weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission owning authorship of the killing. However, to implicate a co-accused as a co-
principal, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of conspiracy, the
responsibility of the two accused is individual, not collective.
The Case
Before us is an appeal of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, in Criminal
Case No P-2297, which convicted Norlito Tan of murder, and Jose Tan of being an accomplice in
such crime.
On January 3, 1994, an Information 2 was filed against the appellants, the accusatory portion of
which reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1993, in Barangay Gatbo,
Municipality of Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone and stab with a deadly weapon
one Magdaleno Rudy Olos alias Modesto Olos, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended party in such amount as may
be proven in court. 3
On December 14, 1995, Jose Tan was arrested in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. Upon his arraignment on
January 3, 1996, he entered a plea of not guilty. 4 Subsequently, Norlito Tan was arrested on April 1,
1996. When arraigned on May 23, 1996, he likewise pleaded not guilty. 5 Trial on the merits ensued.
On July 2, 1997, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the accused NORLY aliasNORLITO TAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of MURDER and is hereby imposed the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA ranging from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years while the other accused JOSE TAN is also adjudged guilty as an
accomplice to the offense of MURDER and is hereby imposed an indeterminate
penalty of PRISON MAYOR in its medium period ranging from eight (8) years
and one (1) day as minimum to ten years (10) as maximum, together with its
accessory penalties. As civil liability, both accused are hereby ordered to pay
the heirs of MODESTO OLOS, represented by his widow, Ofelia Nueca Olos, the
44
 sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine currency with costs
against them.1wphi1.nt
The accused Norly Tan and Jose Tan are credited with the full period of their
preventive imprisonment if they agreed in writing to abide with all the terms
and conditions of their provisional detention, otherwise, to only 4/5 thereof. 6
11-12, TSN, August 14, 1996); the second finding consists of a 1.6 centimeter
wound located "on the level of the 4th introspect asterior left side of the body
of the victim below the level of the nipple or left front side of his body below
the nipple" (p. 13, ibid.); the third finding consists of a fatal injury located "at
the umbilical area left side of the liver of the victim with the intestine coming
out." (pp. 13-15 ibid).

xxx xxx xxx9

The appellants lodged their appeal with the Court of Appeals which, in view of the penalty imposed,
forwarded it to this Court. 7
Version of the Defense
The Facts
In their Brief, 10 Appellants Norlito Tan and Jose Tan claim self-defense and denial, respectively,
alleging as follows:
Version of the Prosecution

B. Evidence for the Defense:

In the People's Brief, 8 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts as viewed by the
prosecution in this wise:
On September 6, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m., Ramon Nueca was weeding his
ricefield located at Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. At that time, there was still
sunlight. (pp. 7-8, TSN, July 3, 1996).
At a distance of about twenty (20) meters, Ramon Nueca saw Magalino Olos,
(who was also his brother-in-law), walking along the road going to Gatbo. At
that time, appellant Jose Tan who was then sixteen (16) years old, was also
walking infront of Olos. Appellant Norlito Tan, (brother of appellant Jose Tan),
who was holding an eight-inch knife known as "gatab", suddenly emerged from
the grassy portion at the right side of the road where the grasses [were]
"higher than a person." Appellant Norlito Tan stabbed Olos three (3) times.
Olos was hit twice at the upper portion of his back and once at his abdomen.
Thereafter; appellant Jose Tan threw a stone at Olos, hitting him at his neck
(pp. 9-16, 35-37, TSN, July 3, 1996).
Ramon Nueca decided to go to the place of the incident to pacify appellants.
However, when appellants saw Ramon Nueca coming, they fled. Ramon Nueca
and his brother, Simplicio, brought Olos to the Municipal Hall of Ocampo. From
there, Olos was brought by an ambulance to the Bicol Regional Hospital in
Naga City where he later died. (pp. 18-20, TSN, July 3, 1996).
On September 6, 1993 in Bgy. Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, Jose Tan was then watching a basketball game while
his brother Norlito Tan was playing basketball. At about 5:30 o'clock PM, they
left together to go home but on their way home, they passed the road and
dropped by at the house of Wilfredo Bale to chew betel and betelnut. While
they were in the yard of Wilfredo Bale, the latter told accused Norlito Tan to go
home as Modesto Olos might chase him again. Heeding the advice of Wifredo,
Norlito left to go home, while Jose remained on the yard of Wilfredo. While
Norlito was on his way home, Modesto Olos who was then in the ricefield
walked fast towards the road and met the former who evaded the latter by
proceeding to the other side of the road as Modesto had been blocking his way
and telling him that Norlito would be buried alive. Then Modesto drew a knife
and stabbed Norlito who was able to parry the thrust and hold the former's
hand holding the knife. Norly Tan immediately drew his knife from his boot
and retaliated by stabbing Modesto who was hit and fell to the ground. Then
Ramon Nueca arrived and embraced Norlito, and at this moment, Angel Paular
who was holding a stone ran towards him but Norlito was able to extricate
himself from the hold of Ramon and ran away.
When Modesto and Norlito were then fighting, Jose Tan was in front of the
house of Wilfredo Bele. Then, when Norlito was fleeing and passing by the
house of Wilfredo, Jose Tan also ran away.

Olos was examined and treated at the Bicol Regional Hospital by a certain Dr. At the time of said incident, Jose Tan was then below sixteen (16) years old as
Jullie Sy. However, at the time of the trial of this case, he was no longer he was born on September 18, 1977 as per birth certificate submitted to the
connected with [the] Bicol Regional Hospital, hence, was not available to testify trial court.
in this case. His findings as reflected in the medical certificate (Exhibit B)
which he issued were interpreted by Dr. Thomas Gonzales, the incumbent
The Trial Court's Ruling
Municipal Health Officer of Pili, Camarines Sur (p. 3, Annex A, Appellants'
Brief).
In convicting Appellant Norlito Tan of murder, the trial court ruled that his claim of self-defense was
"negated by the evidence on record." It added that when an accused pleads self-defense, the burden
Dr. Gonzales testified that the first finding in the medical certificate (Exhibit B)
of proof shifts on him, a burden Norlito Tan failed to discharge. Jose Tan's denial was equally
consists of a 1.4 centimeter-wound found at the left portion of the back side of
unavailing in view of the credible prosecution witnesses' identification of him.
the victim which would have been inflicted by a sharp-bladed instrument (pp.

45
The lower court held that treachery and evident premeditation accompanied the killing and, thus,
the crime committed was murder. However, the court a quo dismissed the prosecution's claim of
conspiracy and adjudged Jose Tan guilty merely as an accomplice.
The Assigned Errors
Appellants fault the trial court with the following errors:
1. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that accused Norlito
Tan treacherously killed Modesto Olos and that accused Jose Tan
helped his brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in relying solely [on] and giving full
credence [to] the testimonies of Ramon Nueca and Ofelia Olos and in
disregarding the testimonies of both accused and their witnesses.
3. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that both accused
eluded the apprehending authorities indicating that they are guilty
of the crime charged.
4. The court a quo imposed an excessive penalty upon both accused
granting but not admitting that accused Norlito Tan is guilty of the
crime charged and accused Jose Tan being a minor below 16 years
old is guilty as an accomplice;
5. The court a quo seriously erred in convicting accused Norlito Tan
of the crime of murder and accused Jose Tan as an accomplice. 11
To resolve the case, the Court believes that the following points should be discussed: (1) credibility
of witnesses; (2) self-defense and burden of proof; and (3) characterization of the crime and the
applicable penalty.
The Court's Ruling
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants, but erred in imposing the proper penalty.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
Well-rooted is the rule that factual findings of the trial judge who tried the case and heard the
witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless there are circumstances of weight and substance
which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the
case. 12 Because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses while testifying on the stand, its conclusions and findings on their credibility are entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be changed except for strong and valid reasons. 13
Alleged Irregularities
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Prosecution
Witnesses Ramon Nueca and Ofelia Olos, considering that the defense was not able to cross-examine
Nueca thoroughly. With regard to Olos, appellants claim that her presentation as a rebuttal witness
was irregular and, as such, should not have been allowed by the court a quo.
There is no merit to appellants' assertion of procedural prejudice. True, Ramon Nueca did not
return to court to finish his cross-examination; however, this does not mean that his testimony
should be expunged, as appellants insist. It must be noted that his failure to appear before the court
was not the fault of prosecution. More important, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine
him, as in fact he was actually subjected to cross-examination by the appellants' counsel, Atty.
Crispo Q. Borja Jr. 14 The cross-examination touched on the material points elicited from Nueca
during his direct examination his eyewitness description of Norly and Jose Tan's participation in
the killing.
Neither can the presentation of Ofelia Olos as a rebuttal witness be deemed irregular. Considering
that the appellants claimed self-defense only after the prosecution had rested its case, the latter,
after being allowed by the trial court, exercised its prerogative to present Olos, so that she could
testify that the attack on her husband was sudden and unexpected. Furthermore, it is within the
sound discretion of a trial judge to allow a party that has rested its case to introduce rebuttal
evidence. 15
Alleged Inconsistencies
Appellants insist that the testimonies of Nueca and Olos were tainted with contradictions and
inconsistencies, viz.:
The vital and material points of the testimony of Ramon Nueca which require
careful considerations are as follows, to wit:
1. He saw [his] brother-in-law Modesto Olos stabbed thrice by Norlito Tan,
hitting him twice at the back and once in front of the body, (pp. 12 & 14, tsn, 7-
3-96), contrary to the testimony of Dr. Gonzales who testified that the victim
suffered injuries at the left portion of the backside body (intercostal post line),
at the left front side below the nipple, and on his abdomen. (pp. 11, 12 & 14,
tsn, 8-14-96).
2. The reason why both accused killed his brother-in-law was that they were
apprehended by the victim in the house of Flores per information given to him
by said victim (p. 21, tsn, 7-3-96), while in his sworn statement marked Exh. 1,
he stated that he [did] not know of any motive why accused Norlito stabbed
and Jose stoned him.
3. Norlito hid and emerged from the "talahib" grass and immediately stabbed
his brother-in-law (pp. 13, 15 & 40, tsn, 7-3-96), while in exhibit 1, he stated
that while he was walking on the road going to Gatbo, he was approached by
Norlito and Jose, and then Modesto was stabbed by Norlito.
46
 xxx xxx xxx testimonies of Nueca and Olos, but they do not detract from the clarity, the cohesiveness or the
consistency of their testimonies on how Norly Tan killed the victim. Nueca testified thus:
With respect to the vital and material; points/parts of the testimony of Ofelia
Olos which likewise require careful consideration are as follows: Q Now, were you able to see the persons responsible for
the stabbing of Rudy Olos?
1. That before the stabbing incident, she saw Norlito suddenly emerged from
the "talahib" grass and immediately stabbed her husband this is contrary to xxx xxx xxx
her statement given during the preliminary inquiry conducted by the presiding
judge of MTC, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, which statement is part of the record of
A Yes, sir, there were two (2) persons.
this case. In said statement, she said that when she was out of her house after
cooking, she saw her husband being stabbed by Norlito and before her
husband was stabbed, he was standing on the road and about to pick up a Q Were you able to recognize them?
stone when attacked by both accused. She did not mention any "talahib" grass
in said statement.
A Yes, sir.

2. That while Norlito was stabbing her husband, Jose shouted at his brother to
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court their names?
stop; These allegations of Ofelia are contrary to human experience for the
simple reason that if accused Jose really shouted at his brother to stop stabbing
Modesto Olos, he would not throw stones at the latter. A Yes, sir, Norly Tan and Jose Tan.

3. That her house is six (6) meters away from the road and in between her Q How is this Norly Tan related to the Norlito Tan
house and the road, there are irrigation canal, ricefield, and a vacant lot (Pp. impleaded in this case who stabbed Magdalino Rudy
16-17, tsn 3-10-97); This is contrary to the testimony of her brother-in-law Olos?
as according to him, the house of Ofelia is thirty (30) meters away from the
road, and between the road and the house of Olos, there are two (2) irrigation
A The same person, sir.
canals and a ricefield in between said canals (P. 30, tsn 7-3-96). Thus, it is
improbable that the house of Ofelia is only 6 meters away from the road, and
she could not see the person on the other side of the "talahib" grass from her Q And please tell the Honorable Court . . . what did Norly
house as the grass is higher than the height of a person and the distance from Tan do?
the house is 30 meters to the road as testified by Ramon Nueca (Pp. 34-36, tsn
7-3-96).
A Norlito Tan stabbed Magdalino Rudy Olos.

4. That her husband was twice stabbed at the back on the left side back
Q Were you able to see the instrument which was used by
shoulder (P. 24. tsn 3-10-97). This is [contrary] to the testimony of Dr.
Norly Tan in stabbing Magdalino Rudy Olos?
Tomas Gonzales as already mention in the foregoing.

A Yes, sir, a kind of knife which is known in our dialect as

Considering the foregoing testimony of Ofelia Olos, it is indubitable that she
"tabak," or "gatab."
was telling lies when she testified in court and was not an eye-witness to the
incident. Taking into consideration both testimonies of Ramon Nueca whose
testimony on cross-examination was not finished for his failure to return to Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the
court and of Ofelia Olos on rebuttal stage whose testimony is improper for weapon otherwise called as "gatab" in your locality?
consideration for reason already aforestated, we contend that the trial court
gravely erred in relying solely and giving full credence to the testimonies of
A Somewhat small knife which is about eight (8) inches
said prosecution witnesses and in finding that accused Norlito Tan long.
treacherously killed Modesto Olos and finding also that Jose [T]an helped his
brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.
Q Was that eight inches long including the handle?
These arguments do not persuade. The prosecution witnesses clearly placed the appellants at the
scene of the crime and established that Norly Tan stabbed Olos. These facts were admitted by Norly A Yes, sir.
Tan, who claimed self-defense. True, there are some apparent minor inconsistencies in the

47
 Q Now, was Magdalino Rudy Olos hit by the thrusts of Q And what injury sustained by victim Magdalino Rudy
Norly Tan? Olos at his back [] was that the injury resulting from his
death or which of the stabbing blows made by Norly Tan .
. . [h]it him?
A Yes, sir.

A They all hit him, sir.

Q In what part of the body of Magdalino rudy Olos was hit
by Norly Tan?
Q How about the stabbing blow for the second time?
A At the back, sir.
A Still at the back, sir.
COURT
Q How about the third time?
Q Which part of the back?
A He was hit on the abdomen.
A Upper portion of his back, Your Honor. At this juncture,
witness is pointing the upper right portion of his back. Q Now, you mentioned earlier that Norly Tan emerged
from the grassy portion, will you please tell the
Honorable Court how tall [was the] grassy portion where
xxx xxx xxx
Norly Tan emerged?

FISCAL RAMOS
A It is higher than a person, sir.

Q By the way, what was Magdalino Rudy Olos doing in the

Q How far is that grassy portion where Magdalino Olos
road when he was actually assaulted by Norly Tan?
came from?

A He was on his way home, sir.

A Just beside the road, sir.

Q Now, in relation to the victim Magdalino Rudy Olos,

where was Norly Tan when he stabbed Olos?
A He was on the left side of Magdalino Olos, sir.
Q And where did Norly Tan emerge or where did he come
from before he stabbed Magdalino Olos?
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court of your own
knowledge or observation, was Olos able to see Norly Tan
before the latter emerged from the grassy portion?
A He could not have seen Norly Tan because Magdalino
Olos already passed when Norlito Tan emerged from the
grassy portion of the field.

A He came from the "talahib". Q Now, for how long had time elapsed when Norly Tan
emerged from the grassy portion of the field and stabbed
Olos?
COURT

A Around one (1) second, sir.

Q How many times did he stab the victim?

Q When the victim Olos was stabbed by Norly Tan for the
A Three (3) times your honor.
first time at his back, what did Olos do, if any?

xxx xxx xxx

A When he faced Norly Tan, Norly Tan stabbed him in his
abdomen?
FISCAL RAMOS
48
 COURT Q At what moment did Jose Tan throw [stones at]
Magdalino Rudy Olos[?]
Q So the second stab was also in the abdomen of the
victim? A After his brother Norly Tan stabbed Olos, sir.

A No, your honor, the two (2) stabs hit his back and the Q And was Olos hit by the stone of Jose Tan?
third stab hit his abdomen.
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In what part of his body was he hit was Jose Tan?
FISCAL RAMOS
A In his neck.
Q Now, how about Jose Tan, do you know where he was at
the time his brother Norly Tan emerged from the
Q How many times did he stone Magdalino Rudy Olos?
"talahib"?

A Only one (1) sir.

A Yes, sir.

Q How about you, what did you do while Norly Tan was
Q Where was he?
stabbing the victim, Magdalino Olos?

A He was at the middle of the road.

A I was about to run away to them in order to pacify
them, but when the two (2) brothers saw me, they fled.
Q Now, in relation to where Magdalino Rudy Olos was
walking at the middle of the road where was Jose Tan at
Q Towards what direction [did] they [flee?].
that time?

A Towards the direction of their uncle's house. 16

A In front of Olos.

The above-quoted testimony jibes with that of Ofelia Olos as to how the incident happened, 17 and
Q How far was Jose Tan at that time?
with that of Dr. Gonzales as to the number of wounds sustained by the victim.

A About five (5) meters.

The inconsistencies pointed our by the appellants refer to their alleged motive for killing the victim,
the distance of the witnesses from the locus criminis and the location of the wounds inflicted.
COURT However, motive is not important when there is no doubt about the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime, 18 as in the present case. True, there was variance in the witnesses' testimonies as to their
distance from the stabbing incident. However, the sketch presented in court showed that they had a
Q So they saw each other?
clear view of the scene. 19 And although they could not pinpoint precise locations, they were able to
give the correct number of wounds sustained by the victim. Their perception as to where the victim
A Yes, your Honor. was struck was likewise correct.1wphi1.nt

xxx xxx xxx In any case, the inconsistencies cited by the appellants are not substantial enough to impair the
credibility of these witnesses. Rather, such minor lapses manifest truthfulness and candor and erase
suspicion of a rehearsed
FISCAL RAMOS
testimony. 20

Q What, if any, did Jose Tan do?

In all, we cannot fault the trial court for upholding the relevant portions of the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies.
A He stoned Olos.
49
 Second Issue:
Self-Defense
When the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to them to prove that the
killing was justified and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor. They must rely on the
strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
latter is weak, it could not be disbelieved after their open admission of responsibility for the
killing. 21
In the present case, it is incumbent upon Appellant Norly Tan to prove self-defense. Thus, he must
prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to
prevent it were reasonable, and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. However,
he failed to discharge this burden. True, he alleges that it was the victim, Magdalino Olos, who was
the aggressor who had started the fracas:
Q When Modesto Olos met you on the left side of the road,
what else did he do?
A When we were on the left side of the road, Modesto
Olos asked me why I was there and then I told him that I
was a resident and then he told me that he will bury me
alive and at the same time he thrust his bladed weapon
and stabbed me.
COURT
Q Did he hit you?
A I was able to parry the thrust and [hold] his arm with
the weapon. When I was able to hold his hand with the
bolo, I was also able to draw my own bladed weapon and
I was able to stab him.
Q From where did you draw that weapon which you used
in stabbing Modesto Olos?
A I drew it from inside my boot.
xxx xxx xxx
The above-quoted testimony, however, shows some inherent contradictions. If it was the victim who
had attacked Norly Tan, then why did the former suffer three stab wounds and the latter none?
Likewise, the Court finds it hard to believe that Norly Tan was able to subdue the victim with one
hand and at the same time get his weapon from his boot. Clearly then, his self-serving allegation
would not suffice. It pales in comparison with the positive and categorical declaration of the
prosecution witnesses that the attack on the victim was sudden and unprovoked.
Third Issue:
Crime and Its Punishment
The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was attended by treachery; hence, the crime was
murder.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person attacked. 23 Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. 24 In the case at bar, the attack on Magdalino Olos was treacherous,
because he was caught off guard and was therefore unable to defend himself, as testified to by the
prosecution witnesses and as indicated by the wounds inflicted on him.
Culpability of Jose Tan
We agree with the court a quo that the prosecution was not able to establish conspiracy in the
killing of the victim; thus, Appellant Jose Tan is guilty only as an accomplice. Worth quoting is the
trial court's disquisition on the matter:
However, the evidence of the prosecution regarding the participation of the
other accused, Jose Tan is not so satisfactory specially regarding its theory of
conspiracy. In fact, according to the widow Ofelio Olos, she even heard Jose Tan
telling and pleading with his brother to stop his attack and stabbing of the
victim. The most therefore that said accused could be liable for is merely that
of an accomplice, who, not being a principal cooperated in the execution of the
offense by previous and simultaneous acts, that in this case, by his stoning the
victim Modesto Olos and hitting him on the neck. However, the accused Jose
Tan's act of stoning was not a direct participation nor indispensable to the
killing of the victim. Also, as held by the Supreme Court, when doubt exists
whether an accused acted as principal or accomplice, the court should favor
the lesser or milder identity (People vs. Irenea, G.R. No. 44410, August 5,
1988). 25
The above-quoted ruling follows legal and jurisprudential precepts. The Revised Penal Code defines
accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, 26 cooperate in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." 27
In the present case, the prosecution was not able to prove that Jose Tan conspired with his brother
to commit the murder. Neither was it shown that he had prior knowledge of the latter's criminal
intent. Absent a conspiracy, the responsibility of the accused is individual, not collective, and each is
to be punished only for his separate acts.
The penalty of Appellant Jose Tan as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of the principal,
which in murder cases is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. Considering that he is
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, 28 because he was only sixteen years
old when the crime was committed, 29 the trial court should have lowered his penalty by two
degrees, i.e. prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Likewise, he is entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
50
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven, the imposable penalty on Norlito Tan 47 G.R. No. 90185 March 1, 1995
is reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Norlito vs.
Tan, as principal, is sentenced to reclusion perpetua; while Appellant Jose Tan, as an accomplice and ERNESTO ABARRI y BATING, CLEMENTE CAWALING y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA y
a minor, is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision CAWALING, JOSELITO PAJALAGO y GONZALES and RONNIE ANDALES y ROMIROSA, accused-
correccional as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor as maximum.1wphi1.nt appellants.

SO ORDERED. QUIASON, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Kalookan City in
Criminal Case No. C-31521, finding accused Ernesto Abarri y Batting, Clemente Cawaling y Cirinio,
Conrado Estrada y Cawaling, Joselito Pajalago y Gonzales and Ronnie Andales y Romirosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The information filed against the accused reads as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of October 1988, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another with intent to gain and
by means of force, threats and intimidation upon the person of GREGORIA GAN
y LIM, that is by poking a knife at the latter, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles, to
wit:

one (1) Chinese gold ring P5,000.00

one (1) lady's wristwatch 2,000.00
Cash money amount (sic) to 250.00

TOTAL P7,250.00

belonging to said Gregoria Gan y Lim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforementioned total amount of P7,250.00; and on the occasion thereof,
said accused with the use of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd
designs, have sexual intercourse with one GREGORIA GAN y LIM, against the
latter's will and without her consent (Rollo, p. 7).

Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

On May 22, 1989, the trial court. rendered its decision convicting all appellants of the crime of
robbery with rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ERNESTO
ABARRI Y BATTING, CLEMENTE CAWALING Y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA Y
CAWALING, JOSELITO PAJALAGO Y GONZALES and RONNIE ANDALES Y
ROMIROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the special
complex offense of robbery with rape as described and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This Court

51
 appreciates the presence of the aggravating circumstance of the nocturnity and admitted to forcibly bringing Gan to a vacant lot and binding her arms and legs. Alejo turned over
there being no appreciable mitigating circumstance, this Court sentences each the two to the custody of the police detachment in Binondo.
of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. This Court
likewise hereby orders the five accused to indemnify the victim, jointly and
The police brought Abarri and Andales to the crime scene. However, Gan was no longer there when
severally, the amount of P20,000.00 as consequential damages; to return the
they arrived. The police proceeded to Gan's house where the latter positively identified the two as
amount of P250.00, the Seiko watch and the Chinese gold necklace, subject
among those persons who robbed her.
matter of the robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the value thereof, jointly
and severally, in the amount of P7,250.00; and to pay the costs.
The findings of NBI Medico Legal Officer Roberto Garcia were as follows: (1) there were physical
injuries outside the victim's genitals, the age of which was consistent with the alleged time of
The accused shall be credited in the services of their sentences with full time
commission of the crime at about 7:30 P.M. of October 14, 1988; (2) the victim's hymen had old
the accused have undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the
healed lacerations; (3) the opening of the hymen was big enough to accommodate or to allow the
provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Rollo, p. 32).
penetration of an average-sized adult male organ in erection without producing any new injury to
the hymen.
Hence, this appeal.
III
II
The defense rests on denial and alibi. All of the accused claim that they were not at the scene of the
On October 14, 1988, at around 7:30 P.M., while Gregoria Gan was walking along 4th Avenue, crime as each of them was somewhere else.
Kalookan City on her way home, Ernesto Abarri and Ronnie Andales stopped her and each poked a
knife at her neck. Abarri then grabbed Gan's bag and warned: "Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag
Abarri testified that at around 8:00 P.M. of October 14, 1988, he and Estrada were on their way
kang sisigaw." Gan was dragged by the two and brought inside a fenced, vacant lot strewn with
home from work. While walking in Pulgueras Street in Binondo, Manila, they were accosted by some
garbage and covered with tall grass. Clemente Cawaling, Conrado Estrada and Joselito Pajalago were
barangay tanod who accused them of breaking into a store. At first they denied their involvement.
former employees of Gan.
But after they were mauled at the Binondo Police Station, they were forced to admit their
involvement in the robbery.
Once inside the vacant lot, Abarri, with the use of a "balisong, " tore the upper portion of Gan's
blouse. The other accused then started tearing the rest of the blouse and pulling down her pants.
Estrada corroborated the version of Abarri as to their whereabouts on the night of the robbery. He
The torn blouse was used to tie her mouth, hands and feet. When she was completely naked, the
further testified that he and Cawaling were former employees of Gan.
accused started touching her private parts.

Cawaling, Pajalego and Andales all claimed that they were at their respected homes that night when
Abarri opened Gan's handbag and took a bunch of keys, which included the key for her store at
the crime was committed. Cawaling claimed that he was coerced by the police to admit his
Carmen Planas Street in Binondo, Manila. He also got her watch valued P2,000.00, necklace valued
complicity. Andales claimed that he came to know his co-accused only at the city jail.
at P5,000.00 and wallet containing P250.00.

We have consistently ruled that for alibi to prosper as a defense, two requirements must be satisfied
After robbing Gan, appellants left except Andales. Before leaving, Cawaling told Andales: "Nognog,
that the accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed and that it was
(referring to Andales) bahala ka na, sampung taon na rin na hindi nakakatikim 'yan, makatas pa
physically impossible for him to be at that place and time (People v. Gaguban, G.R. No. 96287, April
'yan."
25, 1994). The requisites of time and place must be strictly met (People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454
[1993]).
Andales then dragged Gan to a dark spot and after loosening the tie on her legs, raped her twice.
After satisfying his lust, Andales left.
In the case at bench, appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
scene of the crime when it was committed.
Gan waited for about 20 minutes before she started to roll over to the middle of the lot. In the
process, the tie on her mouth loosened and she was able to shout for help. Responding to her cries,
The defense posits that no direct evidence on the conspiracy was established by the prosecution.
neighbors came and untied her hands.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
Meanwhile, at around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Barangay Captain Anita Alejo was informed by a
a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the
resident that somebody was opening the store of Gan. Repairing at the place, Alejo saw Abarri and
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common
Estrada. She noticed that the door of the store had been partly opened. When she asked the two
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense (People v. Uy, 206 SCRA
what they were doing there, Abarri answered that Gan instructed them to get the latter's pants.
270 [1992]); People v. Dela Cruz, 190 SCRA 328 [1990]).
Alejo brought them to the barangay hall for investigation. Upon further questioning, Abarri

52
The common intent of robbing the victim and committing the acts of lasciviousness can be inferred
from their behaviors.
Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan's neck and forcibly brought her to the vacant lot. The
other appellants followed them and watched while Abarri divested the victim of her valuables. After
robbing the victim, Abarri with the use of a "balisong" tore the upper portion of the victim's blouse
and all the other appellants participated in removing her clothes, pawing her and biting her nipples.
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances (People v. Balbas, 129 Phil. 358[1967]). We find that the acts of
appellants in striping naked and hogtying the victim and touching her private parts constitute lewd
designs.
However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness committed by him culminated in the
raping of the victim when he was left alone with her. Nothing in the records show that the other
accused had knowledge or were aware of the rape committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone is
guilty of robbery with rape (People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 [1951]).
Likewise, we do not regard the remarks made by Cawaling to Andales as sufficient to make him a
principal by inducement or a co-conspirator. Before a remark can produce such an effect, the same
must be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining cause of the crime
(People v. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 [1972]). The inducer must have such an overpowering moral
ascendency over the actor (People v. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537 [1993]), as to make the utterance a
command from a superior to a subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that the decision of
Andales to rape the victim had been made before Cawaling uttered the remarks. Cawaling was then
leaving the place with Abarri, Estrada and Pajalago while Andales purposely stayed behind with the
victim. There is not even a showing that Cawaling had any moral influence over Andales.
The trial court, therefore, erred in convicting all the appellants of the crime of robbery with rape. In
view of the fact that the charge of rape includes abusos deshonestos, the appellants, other than
Andales, can be found guilty of committing the crime of robbery with abusos deshonestos.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Ernesto Abarri, Clemente Cawaling,
Conrado Estrada and Joselito Pajalago are GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crimes
of robbery and acts of lasciviousness. This Court sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
maximum for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, and to indemnify Gregoria Gan jointly and
severally in the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, they are
sentenced to suffer the in de-terminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and 2 MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify jointly
and severally Gregoria Gan in the amount of P7,250.00 as actual damages.
Ronnie Andales is FOUND GUILTY of the crime of robbery with rape. He is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Gregoria Gan in the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and jointly and severally with the other appellants, the amount of P7,250.00 as actual
damages.
SO ORDERED.
48 G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent
of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND
EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once
more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the
validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a
number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none,
it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide
public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has
seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that
he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute
books;
53
 (b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint
was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the
judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of
probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on
March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately
filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised
similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within
the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandezcharged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise,
the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from
an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the
compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was
not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution
stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the
provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues
raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and
two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main
dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion
may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in
his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as
a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed
in the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or
less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under
the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new
provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the
occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes
rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are
committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon
the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as
binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition,
absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion
with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from
the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that
this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2)
for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory
of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished
separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
54
 La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de
delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo
de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro
reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana,
p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of
the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in
1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables
en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas
delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para
cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente
al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite
que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse,
penando separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez
Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p.
2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in
its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect
substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or
more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the
penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period,
Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the
offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru
separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for
the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total
of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling
merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's
complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for
the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that
the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12)
years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the
policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength
of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the
warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous
records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might
consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to
assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which
55
is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or
deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that
jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should
the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to
the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in
dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said
Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for
the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a
bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties
in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the
efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has
only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this
Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay
that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only
if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short
shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal
Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of
March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law,
that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become
no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to
stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as
often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to,
or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
56
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition
could have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and
Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was
obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period
imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was
recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another
remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process
issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ
ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process,
judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of
which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the
prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist,
would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to
regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42
Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers
(Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was
"restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a
settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas
Corpus has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law
rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-
crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for
Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases.
All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-
examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandezdoctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
57
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
The principle bears repeating:

And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
means for' the commission of rebellion.
rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
This argument is puerile. highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes,
take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of
and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try
First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.
to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the
(Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of
rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted
First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services,
legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion
Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
and is part of the rebellion.

I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the
In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion
trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme
Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well- I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
known Supreme Court ruling. listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for
any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not
would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
belong to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and
blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly
non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible, The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
make it conform to the law. records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been

58
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with
of probable cause must be shown. murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.

In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime informations for a non-existent crime.
earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the
Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.

I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.

The Court in Salonga stressed:

I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law,
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against
could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. This is a
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual
public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear that
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The
this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together, would
right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it
constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed
would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25
by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from
that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure
the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the
be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
forces of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that
contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been
no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which
accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the
those "who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or
determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of
particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope of
the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large
the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,
acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand,
such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter
differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or
to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129
insurrection.
SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under
by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462) offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
Article 8, Civil Code).
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made to interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated. content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA

59
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law
as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing
doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is
criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one
(People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director
of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of
legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United
States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of
the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the
Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt
whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming
the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms
which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g.,
People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears
to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second
clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine
here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence
(or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in
view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority
in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when
an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the
latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must
be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal
Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what
is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in
the rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous
events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex
crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes
committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly
considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual
ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in
the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not
indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said
crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes
between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those
resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in
carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill
fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not
be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable.
In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under
60
the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's.
A coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders
the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to
be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently,habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In
view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed,
devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant,
accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III,
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas
corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged
(construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2,
Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount
thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the
proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court
(Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned,
it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of
taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life,
and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3whether committed in
furtherance, of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that
rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a
contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court.
I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional
liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him
"provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will
serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been
satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question,
while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be
read as charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had
been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery,
and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now
celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
61
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder
an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information
on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must
file an entirely new and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration
of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition
could have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and
Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was
obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period
imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was
recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have
continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another
remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process
issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence, the writ
ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process,
judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of
which may be assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the
prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist,
would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to
regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42
Phil. 805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. The
scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers
(Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
62
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was
"restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a
settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas
Corpus has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law
rebellion may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-
crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for
Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases.
All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-
examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandezdoctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes,
and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try
to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the
rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted
legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion
and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the
trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without
bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme
Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-
known Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not
belong to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and
blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly
non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been
the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be
freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
63
 Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not
have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having
spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There is relevance to this
excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98) 'The
delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal
ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial
than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the
rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to
speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and
authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice
Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph
of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was
reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these
words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme
Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last
word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of
First Instance of Manila (Br. VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961.
(Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See also Albert v. Court of
First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable.
In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion
complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for
any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence
would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the
former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing
of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in
the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime
earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the
Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. Here, it is a
case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The
right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it
would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25
SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough
that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure
that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our
country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may
be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that
no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of
the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large
degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination,
such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter
to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129
SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are
created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission
by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made to
see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of
more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with
murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.
64

FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law,
could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct
or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. This is a
matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines the actual
terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear that
this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together, would
constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed
by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from
the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the
forces of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting
contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been
appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which
those "who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or
particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees?Clearly, the scope of
the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable
acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand,
differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or
insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under
the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to
Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract
but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law
as of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing
doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is
criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one
(People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director
of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of
legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United
States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of
the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the
Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt
whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming
the Hernandez could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms
which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g.,
People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears
to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have
necessarily read or understood the Hernandezdoctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second
clause. Put in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine
here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence
(or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To
formulate the question ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in
view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority
in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
65
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders
are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to
are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The be posted by the petitioner.
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when
an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal
which is bailable. Consequently,habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In
the rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the
view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed,
occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.

The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant,
events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III,
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex
(construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our
crime provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes
jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2,
committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly
Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount
considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual
thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the
ingredients or elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in
proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court
the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not
(Section 14, Rule 102).
indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said
crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes
between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
In the latter case, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.

The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned,
the Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's.
government," 2 which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of
A coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life,
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3whether committed in
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
furtherance, of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
66
rebellion may be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a
contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder
an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information
on which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective,even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
amendment will not alter its substance.
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must
file an entirely new and properinformation, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. of the courts.
I take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional
liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
"provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.

Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."

I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question,
while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be
read as charging simple rebellion."

The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had
been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery,
and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now
celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with
an original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.

And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has

67
49 G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993 On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.
No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of
vs.
particulars).
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
QUIASON, J.:

However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March 11,
Resolution of said court promulgated on 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp.
2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and was set for
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass
25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case
her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10,
until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13,
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
1992.
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).

On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).

On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored
aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is
letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of
the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on
the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July
22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a
hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse
morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice
Francis Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going
abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of
the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to
these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared

68
 to the peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of
of is kindergarten stuff. The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense
stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of perverse morality we can do was allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9,
without (Rollo, p. 156). 1991 and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).

The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable,
reads as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of
her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged
with soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at
Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having
favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program
nor even the Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena
that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
approve the application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue
injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said
accused (Rollo, p. 36).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there
indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of
the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because
of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to
the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of
the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but
on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft
resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the
preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-
meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled
that:
for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception,
have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge (1) She was a public officer;
against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had
Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the
Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The
collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and
bias on the part of Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ). (4) She was cognizant of such fact; and

Re: Claim of denial of due process

69
 (5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of
her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that
the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay,
are matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue
injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element
of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by
petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted
that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations,
the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we
therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue
with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define
and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same
instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following
cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the
accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67
Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same
coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
(People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's
fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of
collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under
the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from
January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956
(People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on
two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and
falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936.
The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose
or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354
[1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of
the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June
1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People
v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections
from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of
Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
70
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to
crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up
claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless
the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as
shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine
that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW
1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against
putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court
observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the
accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal
act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to
enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was
done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information,
except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states
the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded
categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of
one violation of the law represented by the approval of the applications of 32
foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this
respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through
counsel, the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but
only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that
the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November
13, 1992 stated as follows:
. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice
to the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very
fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the
stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to those not
qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is
MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into
one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar as to the
disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the
majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the
decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the
issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply
directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by
Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a
single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that
opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate
71
the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one
Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations, for that court seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those
Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698
charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, being the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow
the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury
to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official
and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of
the provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for
legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that the
Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for
Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President
is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants,
under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passport
beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order
provides, among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the
Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport
requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear
from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated
that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter
being alien spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before January
1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements
under Executive Order No. 324 to apply for waiver of passport requirements
and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved
such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for
certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself,
give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect
links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft Act reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by
Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions.
Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement
that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and
administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or
mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion,
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most
notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may waive
exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases
of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to assure
family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived
by the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation,
namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating
to aliens likely to become public charges; (c) those
relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those
provisions as relates to a single offense of simple
possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to
72
 national security and members of subversive
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds
for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for
humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public
interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines
include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this Act.2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in
whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be
criminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course of
applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no
question that the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by
petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not
disputed that the said alien spouses and minor children did not fall under any
of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive
Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that
petitioner had anypersonal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has
suggested, for instance that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order
No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use. It
may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the
Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and
minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information,
as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary
investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an allegation which actually a
conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal
information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the preliminary investigation
showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the
applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by
petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by
petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements
by alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified
aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive
Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of
allowing or restoring family unity there would be no "injury," let alone an
"undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver of
passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of
qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if
petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that
contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by
the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the
implementation of such a stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and
respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances deferred to
such interpretations rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje,
81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,
29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA
54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an
administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of
law by this Court, the official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that
reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the
public officer who has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error
of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions,
personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185
SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by
petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in
effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to
prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no
real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already
admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have
legal questions like that before this Court resolved at the earliest possible
opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the
aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the
legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of
law, constitute a crime.Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done
constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the
administration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For the
thrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at
the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to
profit personally by any such interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the
penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was
73
at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which
petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be
terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer
should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two
(32) Amended Informations.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the
majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the
decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the
issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply
directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation
of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that
opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate
the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one
Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations, for that court seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those
Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698
charges the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior
or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, being the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow
the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury
to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official
and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of
the provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for
legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that the
Executive Order "does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for
Immigrants under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President
is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants,
under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passport
beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The Order
provides, among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the
Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport
requirements of certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear
from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated
that she had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
1984, but who were the spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter
being alien spouses or parents who had entered the Philippines before January
1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of passport requirements
under Executive Order No. 324 to apply for waiver of passport requirements
and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved
such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for
certain acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself,
give rise to criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect
74
links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft Act reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by
Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and enforce its provisions.
Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement
that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and
administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or
mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion,
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most
notably, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may waive
exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases
of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes to assure
family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived
by the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation,
namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating
to aliens likely to become public charges; (c) those
relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those
provisions as relates to a single offense of simple
possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to
national security and members of subversive
organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds
for exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for
humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public
interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines
include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as
may be required under the provisions of this Act.2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in
whose cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be
criminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course of
applying, interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no
question that the applications for waiver of passport requirements by the
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by
petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not
disputed that the said alien spouses and minor children did not fall under any
of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in paragraph 12 of Executive
Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that
petitioner had anypersonal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien
spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has
suggested, for instance that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order
No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use. It
may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the
Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and
minor children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information,
as noted above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary
investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an allegation which actually a
conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally" which are recited redundantly in the criminal
information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the preliminary investigation
showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the
applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by
petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given by
petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements
by alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified
aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984
and who were otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive
Order No. 324 may be granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of
allowing or restoring family unity there would be no "injury," let alone an
"undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver of
passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of
qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if
petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that
contemporaneous interpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by
the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with the
implementation of such a stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and
respect from the courts. This Court itself has in many instances deferred to
such interpretations rendered by such administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje,
81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs,
29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA
54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an
administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of
law by this Court, the official responsible for such interpretation is not, for that
reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the
public officer who has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error
75
 of judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, 50 G.R. No. 137953-58 April 11, 2002
personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185
SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant,
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
vs.
WILFREDO DELA TORRE, appellee.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by
petitioner were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in
PANGANIBAN, J.:
effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to
prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no
real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an acquittal or to
admitted by petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have increase the penalty imposed in a conviction.
legal questions like that before this Court resolved at the earliest possible
opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go through the
The Case
aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the
legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision1 and June 3, 1998 Order2 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69) 3 in Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I, 2180-I,
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of
2181-I, 2182-I, 2183-I and 2184-I. The assailed Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two
law, constitute a crime.Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done
counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the
constitute a criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiff (now appellant).
administration of law and government rules and regulations in general. For the
thrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced hereunder:
the risk of criminal liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to
profit personally by any such interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY
penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
beyond reasonable doubt as follows:

The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case

"1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness,
No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is
before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two
at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which
(2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the
petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be
amount of 10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer
should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake. "2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness,
defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to two
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two
(2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the
(32) Amended Informations.
amount of 10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

"3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

"4) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2182-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.

"5) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2183-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty

76
 of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of "Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela Torre.
50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.1wphi1.nt The latter gave birth to three children, Mary Rose, Mark Anthony, and Mark Domil. When
Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal abode with Mark
Domil, leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of appellee, who resided with his
"6) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2184-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized
progeny in a one-room hut in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of
50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages."4 "Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary School.
She was the brightest in her class, even though because of their poverty, she had to walk
from their hut to the school everyday.
The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were similarly worded
as follows:
"In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and
performance of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at th[at] time. The latter appeared
"That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta.
sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty. When confronted by
Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Generosa Mayo, the head teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she was abused
Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, actuated by lust
repeatedly by appellee. Mayo informed Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary Rose, about the
and by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and
abuses. They then decided to refer the matter to the Department of Social Welfare and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness on the person of
Development (DSWD), who took Mary Rose under its custody.
Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Mary Rose de la Torre."5
"It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when appellee
told her, anak puwede ba nating subukan? She did not understand what that meant and
The other Information6 charged appellee with the same crime against the same victim on a different
continued to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary Rose. After removing her
date, October 10, 1996.
shorts as well as his shorts, he poked his penis into her organ. He also kissed and
embraced Mary Rose, who just wept. The same incident was repeated in the evening of
On the other hand, the four Informations charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997, similarly read October 10, 1996.
as follows:
"In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the vagina
"That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta. of Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached. She started to fear appellee. He also
Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable had sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more occasions, that is, on
Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre, with lewd design November 1 and 12 and December 23, 1996.
by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with one Mary Rose de la
"A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta.
Torre, a minor of 11 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the damage
Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her vagina admitted one finger with ease. She
and prejudice of the latter."7
was no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00
and 9:00 nine oclock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract
The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different dates: November infection."15 (Citations omitted)
1,8 November 129and December 23,10 1996. When arraigned on August 13, 1997, appellee
pleaded11 not guilty12 to all six (6) Informations. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the
Appellees Version
challenged Decision.

On the other hand, appellees statement of facts, 16 as contained in his Brief,17 is reproduced as
Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed a Notice of Appeal 13 dated June 9, 1998.
follows:

The Facts
"Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre, namely:
Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda left her family when Mary Rose was
Appellants Version about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim lived with her father
and brother Mark Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
In its Brief,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts
as follows: "Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and
when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her
head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred
the case to the DSWD who took her under its custody.
77
 "Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following
dates: September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996,
November 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.
"Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by her
daughter and said that the only reason he can think of why the daughter filed the charges
is because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs. Sobrevilla." 18 (Citations
omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that "it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of lasciviousness
against Mary Rose on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal knowledge [of]
Mary Rose on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23 December
1996."19 Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the victim was
equivalent to intimidation. It did not give any probative value to his uncorroborated and
unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi.
However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained
that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses, as follows:
"1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or
intimidation in the commission of the acts complained of.
xxx xxx xxx
"2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and mother of
Mary Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old leaving behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose
and her brother, Mark Anthony.
"3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony.
"4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five (5) years,
Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living together as a family and Mary Rose
was never molested by her father.
"5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose but there is
no reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of his father considering that both Mary
Rose and Mark Anthony have no one to call as a mother."20
Hence, this appeal.21
The Issue
In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this single error for our consideration:
"The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four
indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by
R.A. No. 7659."22
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Lone Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of
death on the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and
that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial
court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.23
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is
substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.1wphi1.nt
The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the
right of the accused against double jeopardy.1wphi1.nt
In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v.
Leones,24 it unmistakably declared that "[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort,
there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold
the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the
penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double
jeopardy."25 It added:
"This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial
court did not appeal his conviction, an appeal by the government seeking to increase the
penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and should
therefore be dismissed."26
This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United States27 (hereinafter "Kepner"), as
follows:
"The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or
innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him again upon the merits, even
in an appellate court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same offense."28
The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.29 Speaking through Justice Isagani A. Cruz, the
Court explained that an "appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose
of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy."30
78
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and
(3) against multiple punishments for the same offense.31
Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded the practice as
equivalent to two separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of
multiple prosecution.32
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.33 It also serves
the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction.34 And finally, it prevents the State, following
conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.35
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the prosecution
cannot prosper. The rule is clear -- the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty.36
Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous, these cannot be
corrected by this Court on an appeal by the prosecution. Said the Court:
"Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This
is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter
how obvious the error may be."37
The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for
certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. This was explained in People v. CA and Maquiling38 as
follows:
"While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused
its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On
the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary
review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy
would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari
into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy."39
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
51 [G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO TABACO, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintii-appellee.
Orlando B. Consigna for Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON
THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. Time and again,
we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accuseds
denials, the trial courts findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. . . . After a careful examination of
the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the trial courts assessment of
credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in
the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES OF THE ACCUSED,
ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT. As between the positive identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a
settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of
the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare denial and explanation.
3. ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; WHERE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WERE
ACTUATED BY IMPROPER MOTIVE, THE PRESUMPTION WAS THAT THEY WERE NOT SO
ACTUATED AND THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT. There is no
evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any ill-motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses as to why they would testify adversely against accused-appellant in the
way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate,
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the
presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; ACCUSEDS UNDISPUTED ACT OF FIRING THE GUN, EQUIVALENT TO CRIMINAL
INTENT. Even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the near-
fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing
the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is
equivalent to criminal intent.
5. ID.; DOCTRINES ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE v. PAMA PEOPLE v. LAWAS AND PEOPLE v. PINEDA,
NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BENCH. We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing
only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial courts holding that a
complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by
one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous" does not
hold water. . . . The trial court misappreciated the facts in People v. Pama. In said case, there was
only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two
crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act
produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. . . . The trial court also misread People v. Pineda.
True, the case of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the
79
point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court
found that there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court "That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the
read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
distinct crimes.." . . Furthermore, the trial courts reliance on the case of People v. Lawas is feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused
misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the his death.
individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the Accused-Appellant. Contrary to Law." 1

6. ID.; THE FIRING OF SEVERAL BULLETS BY THE ACCUSED ALTHOUGH RESULTING FROM ONE In Criminal Case No. 10-316, Accused was charged in the following information with the complex
CONTINUOUS BURST OF GUNFIRE CONSTITUTES SEVERAL ACTS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the
COMPLEX CRIME; CASES, OF PEOPLE v. DESIERTO AND PEOPLE v. PARDO APPLIED IN THE CASE wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
AT BENCH. What is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People v.
Desierto. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an "That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein: "In the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent
case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban,
five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds
other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as sustained by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the
accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito
each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and Raquepo) which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will." 2
those resulting from every single act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a
series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide.
Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
connect one of them with its companion offenses." In Desierto, although the burst of shots was
caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its "In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James
special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing, the trigger which should produce the located at Aparri, Cagayan.
several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. . . . The firing of several
bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain
Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan,
that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco
thus separate and distinct from the other. In People v. Pardo we held that: "Where the death of two who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th
persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing
not a complex crime, are committed.." . . Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a with him his M-14 issued firearm.
burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-
appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey,
accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua. Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda
II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who
was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio
DECISION Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to
death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton
(Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4)
cases identically read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
At about nine (9) oclock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of
Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2)
Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They
occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were:
(1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the
mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench
situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a
little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row
of seats upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be

80
more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
At about ten(10) oclock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he
suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle,
followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter
managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon
cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Cos canteen, saw the accused going out
rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of
the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him what is that that
happened again Mario. Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to
maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard
five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the
accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco Mario relax ka
lang Mario keep calm. They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri,
gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and
in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to
be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to
adequate medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right
foot; (2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario
Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints." 3
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22,
1987, AccusedMario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of
ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a
superior officer arriving thereat at about 12:00 oclock noon, more or less. He directly went inside
the cockpit arena to make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside
the said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in
different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said
persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions that if they did not have the
authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surely have confiscated the same from
them. It was his belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government,
assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself
at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22,
1987.
At about 9:00 oclock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost
seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his head.
Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that
his presence must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a
warning shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After
firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from different
directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding
his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of
the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to
relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax
lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said
persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun
which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by
Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr.
That because of such incident, Accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the
family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, Accused surrendered
to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of the death of
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not
know at the time he surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury
sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo." 4
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty
as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-
appellant, it found that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree
Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains
that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the
assailant, but somebody else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the
roof of the cockpit arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions.Where there are directly
conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look
for some facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability
or improbability of a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in
weighing testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., Et Al., L-
46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., L-46485, November 21, 1979,
94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People v. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61
SCRA 180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin,
Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims,
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the
prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and
three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo.
So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria
and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well
stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra
actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in port arm
position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at the 4th
row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor
Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was
corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) meters
away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well-lighted at
that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out
rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former
being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling what is that happened again
Mario, while the latter told him Mario relax ka lang keep calm. After which Mariano Retreta
grappled for the possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to
stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by
81
Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun
went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo." 5 Q: Showing to you Exh.R, do you know whose picture is this?

The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was A: Picture of spent shells.
heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer,
the guns magazine was already empty. Q: How about Exh.R-1, do you know what is this?

The court a quo said further:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session,
Stenographer L. Tamayo).
"ATTY. VILLENA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine that time? that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo
Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh.S, p. 188, record).
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder
Q: Do you have the magazine now? before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh.T, p. 187, record).

A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir. The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle? incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death
by accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270),
A: Yes, sir, I examined it. Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat. Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the
late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer
A: Yes, sir. and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14
rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets? Although they have not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and
Regunton), yet their corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all
A: No live bullets, sir." (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 session, circumstances, so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Pimentel,
stenographer L. Tamayo). 147 SCRA 251; People v. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable
leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph the crime. (People v. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People v. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face
of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused, as the
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo v. Sandiganbayan, 150
SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity, and as
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this gun, M-14, crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable,
and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine? and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the
proper protection of society. (People v. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there is
Q: How many bullets in all? no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus be
held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no less
A: Twenty, sir. from accuseds brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the
settled rule that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports? Rules of Court).

A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not
1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo). inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the cockpit arena The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not
(Exh.R & R-1, pp. 157-158, record). shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of
the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused
ATTY. ARRIOLA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library was, the front row, in much lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have

82
shot aforesaid victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay
2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola. the heirs of the deceased victims Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the
amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,00.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from his However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs
seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability,
4th row of cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful
meters, as it could have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the accused.
This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds 2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco is
inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead front to sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1) day Prision
back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION
right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward. TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of
P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees in
above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back as exit for
wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with 3. The M-14 rifle (Exh.K and K-2) the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC Company,
Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the Commanding
possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted. Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch
Clerk of Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed with law and the rules.
were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must
have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and seats hitting 4. The accused to pay the costs.
wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The
bullets RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented 5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent
railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by
possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to
stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. v. Ortencio,
his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard 38 Phil. 341; People v. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
which was hit by the bullets.
SO ORDERED." 7 (Emphasis ours)
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is
overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds inflicted Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, Accused still interposed the present
upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh.K).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary appeal on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there (1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the
being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo." 6 (3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.

The dispositive part of the decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that
when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accuseds denials, the trial courts
"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial conscience, findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears in the
the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
against him:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library significance of which has been misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the
case of People v. de Guzman, 10 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284
(Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but "In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
declared to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to obscene them on the stand, the trial judge
248, Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the

83
guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?
impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will
affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in Q: Was that all you gathered?
confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will
not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an
informed and reasoned verdict." 11 x x x

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the
trial courts assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused- Q: How many shots did you hear?
appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
A: Three (3) shots, sir.
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant,
x x x
whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-
mayor and his companions.
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?
Villasins testimony on this point is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A: Successive, sir.
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right side?
Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
A: None, sir.
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?
ATTY. ARRIOLA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was that he you are referring to?

A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990) x x x

Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come from?
Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard gun shot, will
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir. you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?

Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports? A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth [port] arm
position).
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
x x x
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: He was hit, sir. Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library A: He fired the gun, sir.

Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if you know? Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

A: M-14, sir. A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

x x x ATTY. VILLENA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you returned, what

84
did you see?

A: I saw two dead persons, sir. COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw? Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir. A: Many, sir.

Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola? ATTY. VILLENA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A: Less than a meter, sir. Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in succession or
automatic?
x x x
A: Automatic, sir.

Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as you x x x
mentioned?

A: They have similarity, sir. Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

x x x A: An army man, sir.

Q: How long have you been employed with the army?

Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your companions?
A: Five (5) years, sir.
A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
Q: Where were you facing?
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir." 12
A: We were facing south the arena.
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat downward, is
Q: From what direction? it not?

A: Infront of us, sir. A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.

Q: Where was he, was he in your front? Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

A: He was in the first row of seats. A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened? x x x

A: Somebody was killed, sir.

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself at the gate
Q: Who was that? of the cockpit, is that correct?

A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir. A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.

x x x Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?

A: Yes, sir.
85
x x x A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.

Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place where you
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report, did you stayed?
notice if he had a gun with him?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.
A: He passed by our back, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was shot?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
x x x
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir." 13 Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if there was
untoward incident that happened?
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A: Yes, sir.
"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor Arreola?
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
Q: What part of the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir.
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm?
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?
A: M-14, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
Q: How were they arranged?
A: Yes, sir.
A: In rows, step by step, sir.
Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: How many rows?
Q: What did you do also?
A: Four rows, sir.
A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q: What happened to him?
Q: And how about you?
A: When I was wounded he also said, uncle I was also wounded.

86
Q: What did you tell when he told you that? A: A little bit west of us, sir.

A: I told him, you seek cover also my son. Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late Arreola on the
northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola
x x x who was on 4th row, is that what you mean?

A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor Arreola?
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were together with
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir." 14 the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.

"ATTY. CONSIGNA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco
considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct
Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the accused Mario examination you immediately sought cover?
Tabaco?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
A: Before the shooting, sir.
x x x
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the first time
prior to the shooting incident?
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola was dead
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir. already?

Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario Tabaco? A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.

A: He sat on the first row of the seats. Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?

Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, A: Yes, sir, in our place.
the accused sit?
x x x
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: How far? Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. A: In our place, sir.

Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o the cockpit? Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A: A little to the west, sir. A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he was also hit.

Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the cockpit?
x x x
A: We were on the northwest.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?

87
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: You dont know the person who shot him?
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went off and
Q: You do not know the person who shot him? thats the time I took cover, sir.

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir." 15 x x x

The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside." 17
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the abovenamed
eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellants bare denial of the charges against him.
x x x As between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare
denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun? greater weight than his bare denial and explanation. 18

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir. Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any
ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place? accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no evidence
and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
A: Inside the cockpit, sir. motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to
full faith and credit. 19
Q: Where were you also?
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth
A: I was at the stairs, sir. when they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor
Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-Mayor
Q: When you saw him what happened if any? Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the assailant was
on the same level as the Ex-Mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was
A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got down, sir. at a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was
seated at the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated at
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun? the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.

A: It was directed to the Mayors place, sir. Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of
the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed his
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco? rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them. 20

A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir. The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of
Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor? the same level.

A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to hide myself, Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a
sir." 16 point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his
wound was inflicted. 21
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellants liability for the death of
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.

Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire? Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and
policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of

88
March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena.
While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco, grabbed the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal
the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and Code).
the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters
away from his left side, was hit at his testicles. Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing the other (delito
part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 oclock in the evening of March complejo) and/or complex proper (People v. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out
from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which
cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been
Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.
cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard
Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm." He also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again, The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to horizontal successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four
position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more
appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People v. Dama, CA 44 O.G.
Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun from Accused-Appellant. 3339; People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People v. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.

Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say as the deaths of Oscar
as lucky. Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284
and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People v.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more
Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no serious offense is murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were
apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit. completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabacos
sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People v. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515),
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single penalty of
from port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People v. Herson Magbanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72,
might harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22 December 15, 1989).

Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing
near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single
firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious
equivalent to criminal intent. offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion
temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual
which he intended.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.

We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs.K, SN No. 1492932, K-2 magazine of M-14
of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial and Exh.L Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an
court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the
explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph bullets can penetrate even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven
when, according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard
"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and
Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh.R and R-1)." 23
prosecuted under only one Information.
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for
The law provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the
evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or

89
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (Emphasis ours)" 24 does not hold water. "Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed."cralaw virtua1aw library
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People
v. Pama 25 (not People v. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People v. Lawas, 26 and People v. Furthermore, the trial courts reliance on the case of People v. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The doctrine
Pineda. 27 enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused
by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People v. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet doubt, to the Accused-Appellant.
which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting
in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for
the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon, perpetua.
which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered
from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People v. Pama cannot be applied. On the appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated
contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People v. Desierto 29 . homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the
The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby
firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated imposed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Costs against Accused-Appellant.
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each
of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the SO ORDERED.
two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as
provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the
accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to
each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as
those resulting from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a
series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured
by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide.
Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would
connect one of them with its companion offenses." (Emphasis ours)

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing
the trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually
produced them. 30

The trial court also misread People v. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us with a
definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was
not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several
homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that
the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the
applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that
"to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law." 33 (Emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by
Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each
person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that
only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus
separate and distinct from the other. In People v. Pardo 34 we held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

90
52 G.R. No. L-47941 December 7, 1940 Petitioner Cristobal has filed the present petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of
the court below on the several grounds stated in the petition.
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, petitioner,
vs. It is the contention of the petitioner that the pardon granted by His Excellency, the President of the
ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL., respondents Philippines, to the respondent, Teofilo C. Santos, did not restore the said respondents to the full
enjoyment of his political rights, because (a) the pardoning power of the Chief Executive does not
apply to legislative prohibitions; (b) the pardoning power here would amount to an unlawful
LAUREL, J.:
exercise by the Chief Executive of a legislative function, and (c) the respondent having served his
sentence and all the accesory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon. All these
This is the petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of propositions involve an inquiry into the primary question of the nature and extent of the pardoning
Rizal in its election case No. 7890, rendered on November 28, 1940, sustaining the right of Teofilo C. power vested in the Chief Executive of the Nation by the Constitution.
Santos to remain in the list of registered voters in precinct No. 11 of the municipality of Malabon,
Province of Rizal.
Paragraph 6 of section 11 of Article VII of our Constitution, provides:

The antecedents which form the factual background of this election controversy are briefly narrated
(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
as follows:
and to remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of
impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as may be
On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein, deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor and the accesories of the National Assembly.
provided by law, to return to the offended parties, Toribio Alarcon and Emilio Raymundo the
amounts P375 and P125, respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, and
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
to pay the costs. On appeal, this court, on December 20, 1930, confirmed the judgment of conviction.
prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after convictions; and
Accordingly, he was confined in the provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal, from March 14, 1932 to August 18,
(b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by
1932 and paid the corresponding costs of trial. As to his civil liability consisting in the return of the
the Constitution, the pardoning power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to the
two amounts aforestated, the same was condoned by the complaints. Not withstanding his
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
conviction, Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a registered elector in the municipality of Malabon,
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised
Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipality of
by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
Malabon, Rizal, and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and 1937, seated as the municipal
committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the convictions. In the present case, the
president of that municipality. On August 22, 1938, Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise known
disability is the result of conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from
as the Election Code, was approved by the national Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its
disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any
command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends
crime against the property." In view of this provision, the respondent forth with applied to his
to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
Excellency, the President for an absolute pardon, his petition bearing date of August 15, 1939. Upon
removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case, while the pardon
the favorable recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Executive, on December 24,
extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment
1939, granted the said petition, restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political rights, except
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property
that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment
responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political rights."
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property
(Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24, 1939.) While there are cases in the United States which
responsibility."
hold that the pardoning power does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by
the learned judge below, in the United States the right of suffrage is a matter exclusively in the
On November 16, 1940, the herein petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the exclusion of hands of the State and not in the hands of the Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then,
the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of voters in precinct No. 11 of Malabon, Rizal, on the there are cases to the contrary (Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766; Hildreth vs. Health, 1 Ill.
ground that the latter is disqualified under paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. App. 82). Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of
357. After hearing, the court below rendered it decision on November 28, 1940, the dispositive section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power
portion of which reads as follows: of the Chief Executive, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive,
not contemplated in the Constitution, and would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a
case of this nature except through legislative action.
Without going further into a discussion of all the other minor points and questions raised
by the petitioner, the court declares that the pardon extended in favor of the respondent
on December 24, 1939, has had the effect of excluding the respondent from the The petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
disqualification created by section 94, subsection (b) of the New Election Code. The
petition for exclusion of the respondent Teofilo C. Santos should be, as it hereby is,
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
denied. Let there be no costs.

91

Separate Opinions
HORRILLENO, M., dissenting:
Miguel Cristobal, el recurrente en este asunto, presento en el Jusgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal
un escrito el 16 de Noviembre de 1940, en el que pedia que Teofilo C. Santos fuese excluido del
censo electoral del municipio de Malabon, por el fundamento de que bajo las disposiciones del
Codigo Electoral, en su articulo 94, inciso (b), estaba incapacitado para votar como elector. Previos
los procedimiento legales, viose el asunto, y luego de haber ambas partes presentado todas las
pruebas, tanto orales como documentales, el recurrido Juez, Honorable Alejo Labrador, fallo el
asunto el 28 de dicho mes, denegando la solicitud. El recurrente, con fecha 28 de noviembre de
1940, presento este recurso contra el mencionado Juez, Honorable Alejo Labrador. Dada cuenta por
el Sr. Escribano de la presentacion del recurso al Tribunal, este lo sobreseyo por falta de meritos.
Con fecha 3 de diciembre de 1940, el recurrente registro un escrito en el que solicitaba la
reconsideracion de la resolucion del Tribunal, denegando el recurso. Estimada la peticion, sealose
a vista la causa para el dia 6 de diciembre de 1940, a las nueve de la maana. Las partes
comparecieron e informaron sobre sus respectivas alegaciones.
No existe controversia alguna sobre los hechos. Se admite por el recurrido Teofilo C. Santos que el
21 de junio de 1929, se presento contra el una querella por estafa por el Fiscal Provincial de Rizal;
que, despues de un debido proceso de ley, fue convicto de dicho delito por el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de la referida Provincial de Rizal, y condenado a la pena de seis meses de arresto mayor y a
restituir a los ofendidos en la causa: a Toribio Alarcon la cantidad de P375 y a Emilio Raymundo la
suma de P125, con la prision subsidiaria en caso de insolvencia. Contra aquella sentencia el
recurrido Teofilo C. Santos interpuso apelacion para ante este Tribunal Supremo, el cual, en su
sentencia, promulgada el 20 de diciembre de 1930, confirmo en todas sus partes la apelada; que el
repetido Teofilo C. Santos extinguio toda la pena que se le impuso, pena que llevaba consigo la
accesoria de la suspencion del ejercicio del sufragio por todo el tiempo de la condena; y que salio de
la carcel el dia 18 de agosto de 1932.
Que en la misma fecha, 15 de agosto de 1939, presento un a solicitud de indulto a su Excelencia, el
Presidente del Commonwealth, en la cual solicitud, ademas de los hechos arriba relatados, exponia
que, bajo las disposiciones de la Ley No. 357, en sus articulos 93 y 94, el Teofilo C. Santos, estaba
descalificado para votar y ser elegido. Su Excelencia, el Presidente, con fecha 24 de diciembre de
1939, le indulto. El decreto de indulto se lee asi:
MALACAAN PALACE
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
By virtue of the authority conferred upon by me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Teofilo C. Santos, convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the crime of estafa and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a term of six months with the accesories of the law and to return to the
offended parties Toribio Alarcon, the amount of P125 or to P375, and to Emilio
Raymundo, the amount of P125 or to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings, is hereby restored to full
civil and political rights, except that with respect to the rights to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which
are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, Philippines, this 24th day of December, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, and of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, the fifth.
(Sgd.) MANUEL L. QUEZON
By the President:
(Sgd.) JORGE B. VARGAS
Secretary to the President.
La mayoria de este Tribunal, fundada en el decreto de indulto, opina:
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction
without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is
not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command.
There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends
to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. In the present case,
while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that "he will
be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
insolving no money or property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the
respondent of full civil and political rights." (Pardon, Exhibit 1, extended December 24,
1939.) While there are cases in the United States which hold that the pardoning power
does not restore the privilege of voting, this is because, as stated by the learned judge
below in the United States the right suffrage is a matter exclusively in the hands of the
State and not in the hands of Federal Government (Decision, page 9). Even then, there are
cases to the contrary (Jones vs. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss., 766; Hildreth vs. Health, 1 Ill.
App., 82). Upon the other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in
paragraph (b) of section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not contemplated in the
Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of
restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.
Tales son las conclusiones de la mayoria.
Las nuestras son: 1.a Que el derecto de indulto a favor del recurrido Santos no tenia objeto; 2.a Que,
si bien el indulto remite el castigo impuesto la reo, no tiene la virtud, sin embargo, de borrar la
comision del delito por el acusado y su conviccion; y 3.a Que el inciso (b) del articulo 94 del Codigo
Electoral no es, propiamente hablando, una pena ni una incapacidad resultante de la conviccion del
recurrido.
92
PRIMERA CONCLUSION but what the party convicted has already endured, or paid, the pardon does not
restore. When it takes effect, it puts an end to any further infliction of
punishment, but has no operation upon the portion of the sentence already
Que el decreto de indulto a favor del recurrido Santos no tenia objeto.
executed. A pardon proceeds not upon the theory of innocence, but implies guilt."

Segun hechos admitidos por el mismo recurrido Santos, cuando el fue indultado ya habia extinguido
"In People ex rel Deneen vs. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 69 L.R.A. 701, 73 N.E. 737, it was held
toda su condena y salido de la carcel. Como la suspencion del derecho de sufragio, que es una pena
that a pardon issued to an attorney after conviction and sentence did not efface the moral
accesoria que lleva consigo la prision, impuesta, dura solamente lo que esta dura, el, al cumplirla
turptitude established by conviction; the court saying: "The crime of which the respondent
totalmente, recobro tal derecho. No habia por tanto, razon para restaurar el privilegio porque ya se
was convicted and imprisoned in the penitentiary of the state of Missouri was an
habia recobrado.
infamous offense, which involved not only moral turpitude, but also the lack of
professional integrity. The conviction of that crime had the effect to degrade him, and to
SEGUNDO CONCLUSION establish that he was of bad moral character as a man and as a lawyer. The pardon granted
him by the then acting Governor of the state of Missouri did not efface the moral
turpitude and want of professional honesty involved in the crime, nor obliterate the stain
Que, si bien el indulto remite el castigo impuesto al reo, no tiene la virtud, sin embargo, del borrar la
upon his moral character."
comision del delito y la conviccion del accusado.

In Re Spencer, 5 Sawy. 195, Fed. Cas. No. 13234, the court was called upon to decide
En Corpus Juris hallamos to siguente:
whether a pardon obliterated and wiped out the fact of conviction of crime, so that it
could be urged against an applicant for citizenship. It was there said:
Section 32. B. Operation 11. In General. When a full and absolute pardon is granted,
it exempts the individual upon whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the law
"The offender is purged of his guilt, and thenceforth he is an innocent man;
inflicts for the crime which he has committed. The crime is forgiven and remitted, and the
but the past is not obliterated nor the fact that he had committed the crime
individual is relieved from all of its legal consequences. The effect of a full pardon is to
wiped out.
make the offender a new man. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting
out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law of the offender is as innocent as if
he had never committed the offense, it does not so operate for all purposes, and as the "Apply these principles to this case. By the commission of the crime the
very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of penalty, a pardon implies guilt; it applicant was guilty of misbehavior, within the meaning of the statute, during
does not obliterate the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof; it his residence in the United States. The pardon has absolved him from the guilt
does not wash out the moral stain; as has been tersely said, it involves forgiveness and not of act, and relieved him from the legal disabilities consequent thereupon. But it
forgetfulness. has not done away with the fact of his conviction. It does not operate
retrospectively. The answer to the question: Has he behaved as a man of good
moral character? must still be in the negative; for the fact remains,
En State of Washington vs. Linda Burfield Hazzard, 47 A.L.R., pp. 540-541, el tribunal Supremo de
notwithstanding the pardon, that the applicant was guilty of the crime of
Washington dijo:
perjury did behave otherwise than as man of good moral character." (Las
cursivas son nuestras.)
Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a
conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of blood which has been definitely fixed.
En State vs. Grant, 133 Atl. Rep., pag. 791, se declaro:
(State vs. Serfling, 131 Wash. 605, 230 Pac. 847.)

A pardon is not presumed to be granted on the ground of innocence or total reformation.

In Baldi vs. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div. 425, 198 N.Y. Supp. 493, a pardoned felon was denied a
... It removes the disability, but does not change the common-law principle that the
license to operate a taxicab upon the ground that his previous conviction of crime
conviction of an infamous offense is evidence of bad character for truth. (Las cursivas son
established a bad character. The Supreme Court said:
nuestras.)

"Respondent contends that, because he was pardoned by the Governor, no

En la decision promulgada el 19 de febrero de 1917, en el caso de People vs. McIntyre, 163 N.Y.S.
further consequences should follow his conviction of crime. But the executive
528-529, se dijo:
act did not did not obliterate the fact of the conviction. As was said in Roberts vs.
State, 160 N.Y. 217, 54 N.E. 678, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 561:
that the Governor may grant a pardon which shall relieve from a judgment of habitual
criminality, but upon subsequent conviction for felony of a person so pardoned, a
"It is manifest that the appellant's pardon and restoration to the rights of
judgment of habitual criminality may again be pronounced, a pardon, while relieving
citizenship had no retroactive effect upon the judgment of conviction which
from the penalty of an offense, does not change the fact that the one pardoned had been
remains unreversed and has not been set aside. We think the effect of a pardon
is to relieve the offender of all unenforced penalties annexed to the conviction,
93
 convicted, and in a prosecution for offense the offense of which he was pardoned may be
shown to established his habitual criminality. (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
En United States v. Swift, 186 Fed. Rep., p. 1003, hallamos lo que sigue:
8. Pardon (Sec. 1) Nature of "Pardon" "Amnesty". A "pardon" or "amnesty" secures
against the consequences of one's acts, and not against the acts of themselves. It involves
forgiveness; not forgetfulness.
Tenemos, pues, que la infamia que el delito imprime en el reo, no puede ser borrada por el induito.
No hay en las fuentes de la piedad cristiana mas acendrada, aguas suficientes que puedan lavarla.
TERCERA CONCLUSION
Que el inciso (b) del articulo del Codigo Electoral no es, propiamente hablando, un pena ni una
incapacidad (disability) resultante de la conviccion del recurrido.
El Poder Legislativo, al incorporar en el Codigo Electoral el inciso (b) del articulo 94 del mismo
cuerpo legal, no tuvo en cuenta, o mas claramente, no se referia de un modo singular al recurrido
Santos. Dicho inciso es una disposicion general que el Estado, haciendo uso de sus poderes de
policia, mediante el poder correspodiente del mismo, el legislativo, ha dictado, como medida de
prevision y proteccion contra los que, por su torpeza moral probada, puedan adulterar la pureza del
sufragio, unica fuente del poder en las Democracias.
En Hawker v. New York 170 U.S., 189, el acusado era un medico que habia sido convicto del delito de
aborto y sentenciado a diez aos de prision en el ao 1878. Habiendo ejercido la medicina despues
de extinguir su condena, a pesar de la prohibicion de una ley de la Legislatura de Nueva York,
promulgada el 9 de mayo de 1893, relativa a la salud publica, y que se lee asi:
any person who, ... after conviction of a felony, shall attempt to practice medicine, or shall
so practice, ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars, or imprisonment for
six months for the first offense, and on conviction of any subsequent offense, by a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not less than one year, or by
both fine and imprisonment.
dicho acusado fue procesado en abril de 1896 por infraccion de la citada ley. Habiendo sido
convicto, apelo de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones del Estado de Nueva York, el
cual confirmo el fallo del tribunal de origen. Entonces presento un writ of errors en el Tribunal
Supremo de los Estados Unidos, que confirmo, a su vez, el fallo apelado, y en su sentencia, entre
otras cosas, dijo:
Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter reform and become on
fact possessed of a good moral character. But the legislature has power in cases of this
kind to make a rule of universal application, and no inquiry is permissible back of the rule
to ascertain whether the fact of which the rule is made the absolute test does or does not
exist. Illustrations of this are abundant. At common law one convicted of crime was
incompetent as a witness, and this rule was in no manner affected by the lapse of time
since the commission of the offense and could not be set aside by proof of a complete
reformation. So in many States a convict is debarred the privileges of an elector, and an
act so debarring was held applicable to one convicted before its passage. (Washington v.
State, 75 Alabama, 582.) (Supra, 197.)
Parece, dicho sea con el mas profundo respeto que merece la mayoria, que esta ha dado una
interpretacion equivocada a la palabra "disability" resultante de la
conviccion (conviction). Conviccion, a nuestro juicio, es la declaracion de la culpabilidad de un reo,
hecha por el Tribunal.
Ahora bien, cuales son las incapacidades resultantes de tal declaracion de culpabilidad? Estas las
seala la ley. En el caso presente, la incapacidad (disability) consistia en la pena que se le impuso al
recurrido Santos; pena que la de arresto mayor con la accesoria de suspension del derecho de
sufragio, habiendo el reo extinguido toda su condena, se ha levantado completamente. No habia ya,
entonces, ninguna incapacidad (disability) para el, ni civil ni politica, porque sus incapacidades
(disabilities) resultantes de su conviccion habian desaparecido despues de la extincion de su
condena. No existia, al tiempo de cumplir esta, ninguna otra ley que le privara del derecho de
sufragio, porque el Codigo Electoral, ya mencionado, no se habia aun promulgado. El inciso (b) del
articulo 94 del referido Codigo Electoral, que dice: "Todo el que haya sido declarado mediante
sentencia firme culpable de un delito contra la propiedad" es como llevamos dicho una medida
de prevision y proteccion que el Estado, por medio de sus correspondientes organismos, tiene
derecho a distar en el ejercicio de sus poderes de policia. Tal inciso tiene su base no precisamente en
el delito cometido, sino en lo que este delito ha revelado, cual es el fondo moral del recurrido que,
como se habra visto en el curso de esta disidencia, no se ha borrado con el indulto. La
transformacion de ese fondo moral es obra propia del individuo mismo, mediante una firme
voluntad y resulta determinacion de regenerarse.lawphil.net
La mayoria declara, aunque no lo hace de una manera categorica, que el inciso (b) del articulo 94 del
Codigo Electoral restringe el poder constitucional del Ejecutivo de indultar. Lo que viene a decir que
el mencionado inciso (b) del articulo 94 del Codigo Electoral rie con la Constitucion. A nosotros no
nos parece asi; y, tal ha sido la intencion de la mayoria, debio haberlo declarado de un modo directo
y categorico. Pero, esta, verdaderamente, en pugna el repetido inciso (b) con la Constitucion?
Opinamos que no. Por el contrario, sostenemos que tal inciso no rie con nuestra ley fundamental.
Decimos mas: esta dentro de las facultades del Poder Legislativo el dictarlo. El Titulo V, Articulo 1,
de dicho documento dice asi:
TITULO V. SUFRAGIO
ARTICULO 1. Podra ejercitar el sufragio todo ciudadano filipino que tenga veintiun aos de edad o
mas, sepa leer y escribir, haya residido en Filipinas un ao y seis meses, por lo menos, en el
municipio en que se proponga votar antes de la fecha de la eleccion, y que de otro modo no este
incapacitado por la ley. La Asemblea Nacional otorgara, sin embargo, a la mujer el derecho de
sufragio, siempre que, en un plebiscito que se convocara al efecto, dentro de dos aos despues de
adoptada esta Constitucion, trescientas mil mujeres cuando menos, que poseyeren las necesarias
calificaciones, voten afirmativamente sobre la cuestion.
Es indiscutible, por tanto, bajo este precepto constitucional, que la facultad de dterminar y fijar las
descalificaciones de un elector radica exclusivamente en el Poder Legislativo. Podria ocurrir que
este Poder, en el ejercicio de sus facultades constitucionales, incurriera en alguna injusticia o en
algun error, pero tal injusticia o error solamente podrian curarse, como ya hemos dicho, por el
mismo Poder Legislativo o por el Poder Judicial, esto es, enmendadose o derogandose la ley por
aquel, o declarandola nula este.
94
Por consecuencia, el, inciso (b) del articulo 94, del Codigo Electoral no rie con la Constitution;
concuerdo con ella.
Tambien nos parece erronea la interpretacion dada por la mayoria al decreto de indulto es absoluto.
La parte del indulto pertinente al caso dice: "... is hereby restored to full civil and political
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property
responsibility." La excepcion de "That with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature, involving
no money or property responsibility" hace del indulto, no absoluto sino condicional.
Y por ultimo, es preciso hacer notar que las decisiones en las causas de Jones v. Board of Registrars
(56 Miss., 766) y Hildreth v. Heath (1 Ill. App. 82), en que se funda la mayoria, fueron dictadas en
abril de 1879 y en abril de 1878, respectivamente, y estan en pugna asi nos parece con la
citada por nosotros recaida en el asunto de State of Washington v. Linda Burfield Hazzard (47 9. L.R.
pp. 540-541) supra, decision que fue promulgada el 12 de julio de 1926.
53 G.R. No. 105673 July 26, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO MAGANA, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
Circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case was more than sufficient
to convict the accused-appellant of rape with homicide. But beyond affirming the
correctness of the trial court's decision and reiterating familiar legal doctrines, we
declare that in this instance, the ruthlessness and viciousness exhibited by appellant in
carrying out his dastardly design upon a hapless minor most certainly warrants the
imposition of the severest punishment possible. We also note with considerable
frustration and anxiety that this case is only one among a host of others, constituting a
veritable floodtide of crime and immorality which seemingly signals an unstoppable
regression to the law of the jungle, where anyone is free to grab and take whatever he
pleases.
This is an appeal taken from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 38,1 in Criminal Case No. 6919 entitled "People vs.
Antonio Magana". The trial court found the accused (appellant herein) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced him
to "imprisonment for life (Reclusion Perpetua)".2
The Facts
At about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, 14-year old Odette Sta. Maria left for school, as
usual taking the feeder road which is about 2 1/2 km. from Sierra Bros. From there, she
would have gotten a ride to school.
At about 7:00 a.m. that morning, Danilo De Austria saw accused-appellant "strangling the
victim" with his left arm by the side of the feeder road. De Austria was about to untie his
carabao before reporting the incident to the authorities, but he was immediately accosted
by the appellant who poked a knife at him, threatening to kill him if the family of the
victim would come to know of the matter.
The victim's mother, Lucia Sta. Maria, got worried when at 5:00 p.m., her daughter was
not with the other kids returning from school. She and her husband started to ask around
for Odette, and learned that she did not even make it to school that day. Together with De
Austria and some neighbors, they searched for Odette. At about 9:00 p.m., they found the
body of the girl sprawled on the ground some twenty meters from the site of that
morning's incident. The body was muddy, the face swollen, with hack wounds on the
neck. Half of the victim's body was covered with cut grass. Her skirt was raised upward;
her panty had been removed and was found near the body.
Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Marcelito B. Abas, Municipal Health Officer of
Labo, Camarines Norte, showed that the victim sustained hacking wounds on the neck,
hematomas on the head, body and left arm, and multiple laceration of the hymen. The
95
cause of death was "shock hemorrhagic due to the hacking wound on the neck". The time
of death was estimated at approximately 12 to 24 hours prior to the time of autopsy.
After the burial of the victim, De Austria revealed to the Sta. Marias what he witnessed
that fateful morning. Accordingly, on March 7, 1991, an Information was filed charging
appellant with rape with homicide. It reads:
That on or about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1991, at
Mahawanhawan, Municipality of Labo, Province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a bolo and with the use of a piece of wood, and by
means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one ODETTE STA. MARIA, a girl of
14 years old (sic), against the latter's will; that on or after the commission of
said offense, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
taking advantage of his superior strength, assault, attack, hack and hit said
Odette Sta. Maria, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds
which were the proximate cause of the death of said Odette Sta. Maria, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
All contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances that the said
offense was committed in uninhabited place being a grassy area and the victim
not having given provocation for the offense.3
On February 7, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Antonio Magana
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide and hereby sentences him to the penalty of DEATH. However, in
view of the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced (sic)
imprisonment for life (Reclusion Perpetua). And, he is hereby ordered to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) for her death, THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (39,000.00) as
liquidated damages, TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as moral
damages and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages.4
Hence, this appeal.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's theory is that on that fatal morning appellant was lying in wait for the
victim, and when she passed by on her way to school, appellant forced her to go with him
by strangling or choking her and threatening her with a bladed weapon, the same one
used on De Austria. Then, he forced himself on her. Afterwards, he hacked her neck,
thereby killing her. He attempted to hide the body of the victim by covering it with cut
grass. He also threatened to kill De Austria to prevent the latter from telling on him.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: Dr. Marcelito Abas,
Municipal Health Officer of Labo, Camarines Norte, Danilo de Austria, Lucia Sta. Maria, Fe
Caramoan Juanson, and Antonio Vasquez.
Dr. Abas testified that the victim sustained a hacking wound on the right side of the neck;
an incised wound above the first wound parallel to each other; multiple hematomas of
both eyes, both cheeks, left forehead, and left chin; "multiple hematomas right chest, both
scapular region (sic) of the back, left upper extremity posterior aspect with fracture of
both radius and ulna, middle portion;" and multiple laceration of the hymen at 4, 6 and 8
o'clock.5 Also, when he conducted the autopsy, the victim was not wearing
underwear. 6 Dr. Abas was of the opinion that the victim died approximately 12 to 24
hours before the post-mortem examination which was conducted at 8:30 a.m. of January
15, 1991, and that death could have occurred at about 7:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991. 7 The
hacking wound, he said, was caused by a sharp instrument, but the hematomas were
inflicted with a blunt instrument. He also testified that the multiple lacerations in the
victim's hymen, which were probably inflicted just before the hacking, indicated the
possibility of rape.8
Danilo De Austria, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, Labo, Camarines Norte, was
familiar with both the appellant and the victim. He testified that on that fateful morning,
at about 7:00 a.m., while he was walking along the feeder road towards the ricefields in
Barangay Mahawanhawan, he espied the appellant and the victim some forty meters
ahead of him. 9 He was shocked to see appellant strangling the victim with his left
arm.10 Before he could make a move, appellant blocked his way, poked a double-bladed
weapon at him and threatened to kill him if he told the Sta. Marias of the incident. He said,
"Yes, yes" because he was "over-frightened" of the appellant. He knew appellant to be
abusive whenever he was drunk.11
De Austria further testified that the vicinity where he saw appellant assaulting the victim
was uninhabited, and that cries for help would go unheard; that the person working the
ricefields in that area was none other than accused-appellant himself; and that the body
of the victim was found in a grassy area five meters from the feeder road, and about
twenty meters from where the victim was seen being strangled.12 De Austria also
revealed that some ten days after the killing, both he and the appellant were abducted
and interrogated by the NPA, and that he heard appellant admit to the NPAs that he had
raped the girl.13
Lucia Sta. Maria, mother of the victim, testified that about a week before her daughter's
death, they met appellant, and Odette complained that appellant was staring at her in a
"bad way". The victim informed her that appellant would look at her that way everytime
they met.14
Fe Caramoan Juanson, a neighbor, testified that while she was grazing her carabao, she
saw appellant standing on the feeder road at about 6:30 a.m. that day. Appellant, who was
wearing a faded jacket, appeared uneasy, looking left and right and towards the
hinterland of the barangay, seemingly waiting for somebody. 15The place where she saw
appellant waiting was very near the place where the body of the victim was recovered. 16
Antonio Vasquez, martial arts instructor of the victim's brother-in-law, spent the night of
January 13, 1991 at the house of the Sta. Marias, and left at about 6:10 a.m. the following
morning to go back to Labo. He took the feeder road and saw the appellant, whom he met
96
many times and knew by face and whom he positively identified in court, standing quite the rest of the day at his house, which is only 500 meters from the grassy place where the
near the place where the victim's body was subsequently recovered. Appellant appeared body of the victim was found.30
to be uneasy and was pacing back and forth; he seemed to be looking for something. The
witness noticed that appellant wore a faded brown jacket at that time. 17
The Issues

Version of the Defense

The appellant charges that the trial court erred:

The defense's theory consists of establishing an alibi for appellant and implicating Danilo
1. In failing to give due credence to the accused's defenses;
De Austria as the perpetrator of the crime. The following witnesses were presented, viz.,
Merly Mahipos, Wilfredo Chavez, Jaime Chavez, Jovita Paquita, and the appellant himself.
2. In giving undue credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses;
Mahipos, 35, married and a resident of Sierra Bros, testified that on January 14, 1991, at
about 6:30 a.m., while she and her husband were walking from Sierra Bros to 3. . . . (In convicting) the accused despite the failure of the prosecution to prove
Mahawanhawan, a distance of two kilometers (about thirty minutes on foot) they met the the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt;
victim and Danilo De Austria.18 The latter were not yet halfway on the road to Sierra Bros
and about 50 meters from the house of Mahipos' parents. The victim was walking ahead
4. In convicting the accused of . . . Rape with Homicide although the
of De Austria by about seven (7) arms length.19 She asked the victim why she was alone
prosecution have (sic) only proven a case for Homicide;
and the victim only smiled. De Austria walked fast and carried a bolo ("sinampalok")
about eighteen inches long. 20 He was wearing a white T-shirt and black short pants. She
did not see appellant, however. 5. In not considering that based on the evidences (sic) presented (by) both the
prosecution and the defense, it is Danilo De Austria and not the accused, who is
probably guilty of the offense charged.31
Wilfredo Chavez, 31, married, a farmer and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that at
about 6:00 a.m. of January 14, 1991, while he was at home, he saw De Austria and the
victim pass by, with the victim ahead of De Austria by about seven (7) arms length. 21 He all of which may be summed up as questioning the trial court's assessment of the
did not see appellant that morning. credibility of witnesses and its appreciation of the weight and sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence, vis-a-vis that of the defense.
Jaime Chavez, 42, married, a farmer and likewise a resident of Mahawanhawan, testified
that on that day, at about 6:30 a.m., he was in his house situated beside the feeder road, The Solicitor General adds that the trial court erred when it equated life imprisonment
waiting for his co-laborers to arrive, as they were supposed to go gold panning at Jose with reclusion perpetuain the dispositive portion of the decision.
Panganiban, Camarines Norte. He saw the victim (in her school uniform) pass by,
followed closely by De Austria at about 6:30 a.m. 22 After five (5) minutes, Mahipos and
The Court's Ruling
her husband passed by, going the other way. He further testified that appellant came to
his house at about 7:00 a.m. and asked that he be included in the gold panning activity.
Appellant stayed in his house for an hour and left at around 8:00 a.m. together with First Issue: Credibility of Appellant's Defense
Kagawad Jovita Paquita to buy cigarettes at Sierra Bros. 23He later saw appellant in Sierra
Bros at about 9:00 a.m. He also testified that the place where appellant worked was about
We cannot agree with appellant's contention to the effect that the defense built a more
half a kilometer from the place where the body of Odette was recovered. 24
credible case than the prosecution, and that its story is consistent with ordinary human
experience. In essence, the defense's theory is that, although appellant was in
Jovita Paquita, 47, married and resident of Mahawanhawan, testified that she saw Mahawanhawan, he could not have been at the scene of the crime that fatal morning, and
appellant at Chavez' house at past 8:00 a.m. that morning. She and appellant walked that someone else (De Austria) was present thereat.
together to Sierra Bros. There, they parted ways.25
As pointed out by the Solicitor General,32 appellant's alibi itself showed that he was at or
Appellant testified that on that day, after taking breakfast at about 6:30 a.m., he went to very near the place where witness De Austria said he saw him at the time of the
his mother's house, (which is near the feeder road and about 50 meters from his own commission of the felony. By appellant's own admission, he was in the same barangay on
house26), where he stayed for about 15 minutes, then left by about 7:00 a.m. to see the date and time when the crime occurred. the places where appellant claimed to have
Kagawad Jaime Chavez. 27 Chavez' house is approximately 330 meters from appellant's gone that morning are, as found by the trial court, "within walking distance" of each
house.28 After about five minutes, he went to the Mahawanhawan Elementary School to other. Thus, the court a quo held ". . . that despite (the) variance in testimony as to time
buy cigarettes. Unable to buy any there, he returned to Chavez' place and thereafter went and others, it is not physically impossible for accused to be at the scene of the crime. . . ."
to Sierra Bros at 8:00 a.m. He bought cigarettes at Sierra Bros, then returned to his house, Therefore, his alibi is inherently wake and hardly credible.
arriving there at around 9:30 a.m.29Later, he made copra at his parent's land, then spent

97
In jurisprudence, alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of the facility with On the other hand, it is not also logical to conclude (as accused-appellant would have us
which it can be fabricated.33 Thus, courts have always looked upon it with suspicion and do) that Juanson was lying because she, and not her husband, happened to be grazing
have received it with caution. It is a well-settled rule that in order for an alibi to prevail, their carabao that morning when she saw appellant on the feeder road. Likewise, the
the defense must establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically defense was too obviously clutching at straws when they tried to fault Vasquez, who
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its happens to be a martial arts instructor, for not having accompanied the victim that day on
commission, and not merely that the accused was somewhere else. 34 her way to school. He was only a guest of the victim's brother-in-law, not even of the Sta.
Marias, and we cannot see how he could have been held responsible in any manner for
assuring the safety of the victim.
To cite only one example, this Court, in People vs. Cruz,35 computed distances to show
that, contrary to the allegation of the accused, it was not physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime: Further, the defense contends that the testimony of De Austria is inconsistent with logic
and human experience. He testified that he saw appellant strangling the victim, but there
was no sign of strangulation according to Dr. Abas. Also, he was threatened by appellant
. . . In the case at bar, the distance between his father's farm and the resthouse
with a double-bladed weapon, but no such weapon was presented in court. And instead of
on the other hand, and the distance between the said boundary and the
reporting the strangling incident to the authorities at once, he opted to untie his carabao
resthouse, on the other, which are 2 and 1/2 kilometers, respectively, are not
first.
such distances as were physically impossible for accused to negotiate or
traverse; in fact, per his own testimony, he was able to travel from his father's
farm to the said boundary to play basketball that same day. Besides, the house The Court finds that these circumstances do not destroy the credibility of De Austria. On
of accused's parents where he was living was only 200 to 250 meters away direct examination, he testified as follows:
from the resthouse, which distance accused could have easily negotiated . . . .
PROS. VILLAFUERTE
Aside from its inherent weakness, accused-appellant's alibi cannot overcome the positive
identification by witness De Austria of appellant as the one straggling the victim that fatal
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, do you still recall where were you
morning.
sometime on January 14, 1991, at about 7:00 o'clock in
the morning?
Second Issue: Credibility of Persecution Witnesses
xxx xxx xxx
Hewing to the general rule in criminal law that the guilt of an accused is not determined
by the weakness of defense's case but by the strength of that of the prosecution, appellant
A: I was walking towards the ricefield.
also tries to attack the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Q: Where?
Appellant points to the fact that the witnesses for the prosecution are related to the
victim and one another. But then, such purported "defect" cannot be ascribed solely to
the witnesses of the prosecution. Among the witnesses of the defense, we find that A: On the feeder road.
Mahipos is appellant's "kinakapatid",36 while the Chavezes are related to appellant by
affinity,3 7 and Paquita admitted that appellant is the "godson of (her) in-law".38
xxx xxx xxx

Relationship can put the testimony of a witness in doubt, but it cannot adversely affect
Q: While walking on the feeder road of Mahawan-hawan
credibility by itself.39 It is a familiar rule of law that the assessment of witnesses'
on that particular date and time, do you remember if you
credibility by the trial court is accorded great respect because it is in the best position to
have seen anybody on that time while walking?
observe and evaluate their demeanor at the time they gave their testimony. 40 As will be
shown later, this Court sees no reason to rule otherwise.
xxx xxx xxx
Perhaps from sheer desperation, appellant advances an incredible theory: the spouses
Sta. Maria, parents of the victim, were trying to cover up their involvement with the New A: Antonio Magana, sir.
People's Army by blaming appellant for the crime. Aside from failing to prove such
alleged involvement, accused could not point to any believable reason why the victim's
Q: Who else?
parents would supposedly forego seeking justice for the rape and killing of their daughter
merely in order to allay some vague suspicion about their ideological learnings.
A: And Odette.

98
 xxx xxx xxx to fear of reprisal or reticence to get involved. In this case, the reason was clearly fear, as
appellant threatened De Austria with harm unless the latter kept quiet. De Austria knew
the accused to be abusive (even violent) when drunk. Furthermore, their relative ages
PROS. VILLAFUERTE
also provide basis for De Austria's fear. While the accused is 42 years of age, 43 De Austria
is a young man of 19 years.44 On direct examination, De Austria stated:
Q: In what manner did you see this Odette Sta. Maria and
this Antonio Magana?
Q: And what did you do when you saw this thing that you
have just said?
A: I was behind them.
A: I was shocked and I did not do anything.
Q: Behind whom?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Behind Odette and Antonio Magana.
Q: You said that you were shocked because of what you
Q: And what did you see? saw, what did you do?

A: I saw Magana strangling Odette Sta. Maria. A: My plan was to untie the carabao and to report the
matter afterwards, but he blocked my way.
Q: In what manner did you see Antonio Magana strangling
Odette Sta. Maria? Q: What did you do when you were blocked by him?

A: He was ahead of me and I was behind her. A: He poked a double bladed weapon on me.

Q: Do you mean to say that Odette was also walking in Q: Did he say anything to you?
that feeder road?
A: That once the Sta. Marias knew about this thing, he was
A: When I saw the two (2) they were no longer walking. going to kill me. "Don't expect to live!"

Q: And you said that Antonio Magana was some sort of Q: How did you receive that message?
strangling Odette Sta. Maria. How was Antonio Magana
strangling Odette Sta. Maria?
A: When he poked a bladed weapon.

A: Using his left arm, sir.

Q: When those words were uttered to you, what did you
feel?
Q: Add that left arm was wrapped around the neck of
Odette Sta. Maria?
A: Because I was overfrightened, I said, "Yes, Yes".

A: Yes, sir.41
Q: Are you afraid of Antonio Magana?

The absence of signs of strangulation does not change in the slightest the fact that the
A: Yes, sir.
victim was attacked and killed. Even though the weapon used in the killing was not
presented in court, still it does not disprove the use of force and violence, as the fatal hack
wounds on the cadaver which, according to Dr. Abas, 42 were caused by such a weapon, Q: Why?
sufficiently establish this point.
A: Because when he gets drank (sic), he becomes abusive.
In People vs. Cortes, supra, this Court held that delay in reporting a crime does not detract
from the veracity of the testimony as long as it is explained. Such delay could be ascribed
99
 Q: You have personal knowledge on that? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir.45 Q: What time on January 14, 1991 have you seen Antonio
Magana?
While the reactions of eyewitnesses to a crime may vary, and even if De Austria's reaction
may not be typical or expected of a very credible witness, still, the same cannot be A: I could not tell exactly what time but it was in the
considered damaging to his credibility. The trial court accepted his testimony and this morning of January 14, 1991.
Court sees no reason not to.
Q: Can you, more or less, approximate the time?
Third Issue: Case Against De Austria
A: To my estimate, more or less 6:30 in the morning.
In a facetious attempt to throw the blame on De Austria and to discredit him, the defense
presented witnesses who claimed that they saw De Austria trailing the victim by a few
Q: Where did you see Antonio Magana on that date and
arms' length on the feeder road that morning; one witness added that De Austria had
time?
with him a "sinampalok" (bolo) about eighteen inches long.

A: He was standing at the feeder road.50

The Court cannot bring itself to believe such story. While cross-examining De Austria, the
defense tried but failed to elicit an admission that he was courting the victim. 46 Nothing
else was presented to show improper motive on his part. Viewed against De Austria's Q: You said you saw Antonio Magana standing on the
clear and categorical testimony that he saw appellant strangling the victim, the feeder road while you were grazing your carabao. What
testimonies of the defense witnesses merely ascribe to De Austria a vague and equivocal did you notice from Antonio Magana, if any?
act which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be made the basis for imputing to him
the authorship of the crime.
A: He was uneasy, looking both sides and looking towards
the interland (sic) of the barangay.51
Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
Q: Do you know the place where the body of Odette Sta.
The evidence of the prosecution is undeniably circumstantial in nature. This is true of Maria was recovered?
most rape and rape-cum-homicide cases. The Court, in previous decisions, always took
this into consideration.4 7 In many cases, the victim, usually the sole witness, is killed.
A: Yes, sir.
In People vs. Masongsong,48 we held that rape is usually done with the least possibility of
being seen by the public, as in fact, the presence of eyewitnesses might even raise serious
doubts. Q: Do you know when she was allegedly raped and killed?

The present case is no different, built as it is upon circumstantial evidence presented A: Yes, sir.
through the prosecution witnesses. Dr. Abas testified that the victim died from hack
wounds on the neck and that her hymen sustained lacerations, showing the victim was
Q: What date was that?
violated and violently killed. He opined that the victim was raped before she was hacked
to death. Dr. Abas' approximation of the time of death was corroborated by the
testimonies of De Austria, Juanson and Vasquez.49 Lucia Sta. Maria testified that she found A: January 14.
her daughter's body with skirt raised and without underwear. De Austria positively
identified appellant as the person strangling the victim that morning. Juanson and
Q: 1991?
Vasquez confirmed that they also saw appellant look uneasy, walking back and forth as if
waiting for somebody by the feeder road that morning.
A: Yes, sir.
Juanson on direct examination said:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: On January 14, 1991, do you recall having seen Antonio
Magana?

100
 Q: On the same day that you saw Antonio Magana Q: Mr. Witness, what time did you return to Labo on
seemingly waiting for somebody at about 6:30 o'clock in January 14, 1991?
the morning?
A: About 6:10 in the morning.
ATTY. MAGANA:
Q: Did you check your watch?
Misleading, Your Honor. The witness had not testified
that she has seen Antonio Magana waiting for somebody.
A: Yes, sir.53

FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
Q: In that early morning of January 14, do you recall if you
have seen Antonio Magana?
I did not mention any name.
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Where?
Witness may answer.
A: The place where I saw him on January 14, 1991,
WITNESS: Antonio Magana was quite near the place where we
recovered the body of Odette Sta. Maria.
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL VILLAFUERTE:
Q: And what did you notice at him when you glanced at
him?
Q: That place where you saw Antonio Magana in the early
morning of January 14, 1991, do you know how far is it
from the very place also where the body of Odette Sta. A: I don't understand why he is acting uneasy.54
Maria was found on the night of same day, at more or less
6:30?
Motive was established by Lucia Sta. Maria who testified that her daughter told her one
week prior to the incident that appellant would always look at her in a "bad way"
WITNESS: whenever they met. On direct examination she said:

A: I could not give a good estimate but it is only very near Q: During the death, as a result of the death of Odette Sta.
were the cadaver was found. Maria, did you have any suspect as to who could have
done this to your daughter?
xxx xxx xxx
A: I am suspecting the accused Antonio Magana because
one week before she died, we met him.
Q: And in the place where you said Antonio Magana was
looking, was he looking in that direction where a resident
at the house where Odette Sta. Maria is residing will be Q: When you said you met Antonio Magana, what
coming from? happened then?

A: Yes, sir.52 A: My daughter held my hand, and she was trembling all
over.
Vasquez on direct examination corroborates. He said:
Q: What was your reaction when you noticed this to
Odette?

101
 A: I asked her why she was behaving like that, she told me
that Antonio Magana was staring at her in a bad way.
Q: Did you ask your daughter how she had seen the
accused staring at her?
A: That everytime she went to school and back home, and
whenever she met Antonio Magana, she informed me that
Antonio Magana stared bad at her.
Q: In other words, Odette had that fear over the looks of
Antonio Magana?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when she told you that, what did you tell her, if
any?
A: I did not mind it, sir, I said it might be natural on his
part.
Q: This incident happened a week before she died?
A: Yes, sir.55
Taken together, these pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged, (a) there being more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inference is derived having been duly proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances being such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.56 Considered as a whole, they constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that appellant was the author of the crime.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law
does not mean such a degree of proof, as excluding the possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.57 This was sufficiently established in the
case at bar.
Fifth Issue: Rape Despite Absence of Spermatozoa
The defense harps on the absence of spermatozoa during autopsy as proving that no rape
was committed.
The Court disagrees. It has been long settled that absence of spermatozoa does not
necessarily mean that rape was not committed; the slightest penetration of the female
organ is enough.58 The lacerations of the victim's hymen sufficiently established that
sexual intercourse took place. This is further corroborated by Lucia who saw the cadaver
without underwear and with skirt raised.
Again, we find the chain of circumstances unerringly leading to one solitary conclusion:
appellant was the perpetrator of this despicable crime.
Life Imprisonment Is Not Reclusion Perpetua
The Solicitor General points out the error of the trial court in equating reclusion
perpetua with life imprisonment when it sentenced the accused "to the penalty of DEATH.
However, in view of the suspension of the death penalty, accused is hereby sentenced to
imprisonment for life (Reclusion
perpetua). . . . ."59
This Court distinguished between the two penalties in its previous decisions. Recently,
in People vs.Lascuna,60 the Court noted that such distinction had been made as early as
1948 in People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil 167. In People vs. Baguio,61 the Court made the following
differentiations:
The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life
imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being
invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the . . . Code but by
special law. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30)
years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with
it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not
the same as life imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any
accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent
or duration.
At the risk of being repetitive, this Court enjoins trial judges to keep the foregoing in mind
and apply the correct penalty. We further caution them against lapsing into the same
error.
In the instant case, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the
death penalty under the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A.
2632 and R.A. 4111, when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed),
was prohibited by the Constitution at the time the offense was committed. So too, we
delete the award of liquidated damages inasmuch as there was pre-agreement on any
such damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with modifications the assailed Decision. We
uphold the conviction of appellant for the crime of rape with homicide and the order to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
for her death, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages and ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages. We herewith modify the sentence imposed
to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
102
54 G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968 Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense
was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts material
and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the rule is
settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
place has jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos

RESOLUTION
independientes en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum
delicti commisi, y ha de aceptarse que el delito se comete en cualquiera de los lugares
ANGELES, J.: donde se produzca uno de pesos plurales resultados.2

On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the
body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on
certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary
at Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director
of Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for
the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was
charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary
at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to
twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under
the custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964,
while still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement.
Petitioner was recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of
sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance
of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced
accordingly with the imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we
shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision
sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or
malversation3 and abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the
crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and
continuing from one place to another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated
from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed
upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another;
for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be
validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is
fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be
found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for,
under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is
where he has escaped from confinement. 7Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is
founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime evading the service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.

Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief
by habeas corpus.

The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the
offense with which he was charged evasion of service of sentence?

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

103
55 G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed the conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Pias City of Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) of kidnapping
with rape of AAA,2 a minor of six years.
The Information filed against appellant, together with one "Eljoy Salonga," reads:
That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004, in the City of Las Pinas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true identity and present
whereabout is still unknown, without legal authority or justifiable motive, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, detain and deprive AAA, a SIX (6) year old,
minor, of her liberty, against her will and consent, and the said detention lasted for eight (8) days,
and while accused RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @ Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in custody
of AAA and armed with a gun, by means of force, threat, or intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA for several instances against
her will and consent thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse, which is prejudicial to her physical and
psychological development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Salongas "true identity and . . . whereabout[s]" were, as stated in the Information, unknown.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:
In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to school, appellant, who was
sitting by a tree in Las Pias, pulled her aside and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that
they would go to Jollibee. AAA obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow attendee of Sunday Bible
classes. Appellant brought AAA, however, to a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy Salonga
and two unidentified individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.
AAA was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight days during which he abused
her by inserting his finger inside her vagina on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.
AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her stepfather BBB went to her
school to inquire. As nobody knew her whereabouts, BBB decided to report the matter to the Las
Pias City Police Station. A neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant sitting by a tree at the
same time that AAA was on her way to school.
BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about appellant. A former co-
worker of appellant gave BBB an address in Imus, Cavite, prompting BBB to report on January 22,
2004 to the Imus Police Station the disappearance of AAA.
At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was with AAA, was apprehended.
For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted an initial medico-legal examination which revealed the
following
Findings:
- Hymen: Deep fresh 3 & 9oclock position
- Vestibule congested
Conclusion:
- Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity
- There are no ext. signs of application of any form of trauma 4 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty.
The lower court thereupon conducted a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea,
and despite repeated questions and just as repeated answers showing that appellant understood his
plea and its consequences, the trial court still ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAAs "detailed account of her ordeal is a
manifestation of her honesty and forthrightness,"5 convicted appellant, disposing in its Decision of
June 7, 2004 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt by his voluntary and spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding
Judge does not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in
obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, this Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN y
PANGANIBAN, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING
with RAPE and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty because the
penalty imposable is single and indivisible and this is regardless of its presence. x x x
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity and an additional amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is
automatically awarded to rape victims without need of proof. x x x
104
SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the death penalty imposed.
Per People v. Mateo,7however, the Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of
November 22, 2005 for intermediate disposition.
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with modification appellants
conviction, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas
City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan y Panganiban @ Natol @
Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without
eligibility for parole and is ordered to indemnify the AAA the following: (a) 50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; and (b) 50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.8
By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
respective Supplemental Briefs if they so desired within thirty (30) days from notice. 9 In
compliance, the parties submitted their respective Manifestations that the Appeal Briefs they had
earlier filed would suffice.
In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of an
improvident plea of guilt as it failed, so he claims, to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth
in People v. Pastor.10
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In Pastor, the Court, holding that "there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must
conduct a searching inquiry," nevertheless came up with the following guidelines:
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of
promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of
authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it,
that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by
the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.11
There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry." As long as
the voluntary intent of the accused and his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are
ascertained, as was done in the present case, the accuseds plea of guilt is sustained. Consider the
following transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings taken during appellants arraignment:
ATTY. CABARDO
Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor.
COURT
Arraign the accused in Tagalog.

1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the Criminal Information)
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the COURT
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of
physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's
What is his plea? Hes pleading guilty?
intimidating robes.

COURT INTERPRETER
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Yes, Your Honor.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of COURT
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his plea.
105
Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational attainment? Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod intimidate you
or exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
ACCUSED
A No, Your Honor.
A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor.
COURT
Q Do you know how to read and write?
Please speak louder.
A Yes, Your Honor.
ACCUSED
Q What is your occupation?
A No, Your Honor.
A Im a driver, Your Honor.
COURT
Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal
Information. Did you plead Guilty voluntarily, freely without anyone forcing or Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten you, exert pressure on you so
intimidating you? that you will plead Guilty as charged to the Criminal Information?

A Yes, Your Honor. A None, Your Honor.

Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you the effects and consequences if Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to January 23, 2004, you kidnapped,
you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information as charged? detained one AAA, a six (6) year old minor against her will and consent?

A Yes, Your Honor. A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo explained to you fully your rights Q And that while in your custody, by means of force intimidation, you inserted your finger
under the Constitution before you plead Guilty to the Criminal Information? inside the vagina of the said minor for several instances against her will?

A Yes, Your Honor. A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to the Criminal Information, this Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the admonition given to you by this Court,
Court will immediately sentence you and confine you at the National Penitentiary? do you still insist and reiterate your pleading Guilty to the Criminal Information as
charged for Kidnapping with Multiple Rape?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence you so that you will plead Guilty
to the Criminal Information? COURT

A No, Your Honor. The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for taking the responsibilities and I
hope that you will be completely reformed.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this voluntarily, freely and of your own
volition? ACCUSED

A Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor.

106
 COURT A: I did not want to, Your Honor.

Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has pleaded Guilty as charged in the Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to go with the accused?
Criminal Information, I am directing the Prosecution to present evidence to determine
the culpability of the accused.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A: Nothing, Your Honor.

But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident plea of guilt when arraigned,
Q: Did you cry?
there is no compulsion to remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While
the Court has set aside convictions based on improvident pleas of guilt in capital offenses,
which pleas had been the sole basis of the judgment, where the trial court receives evidence to A: Yes, Your Honor.
determine precisely whether the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea
is made loses legal significance for the simple reason that the conviction is, independently of the
Q: How did you cry?
plea, based on evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged.

A: I was just crying, Your Honor.17

In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the evidence presented by the
prosecution supports his guilt beyond reasonable doubt 13 of the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. xxxx
7659.14 Thus in People v. Larraaga15 the Court held:
Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you have not seen your mother and
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is father?
called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code
are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries,
A: Yes, sir.
(4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the
prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 Q: How many nights?
amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is
killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
A: Eight (8) nights, sir.
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex
crime. (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a dead person and at the club,
where else were you taken by Kuya Renato?
A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual confinement, restraint and rape
of AAA were proven.
A: At coastal mall, sir.
Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, youth and immaturity being
generally badges of truth and sincerity,16 declared: Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused you and Kuya Renato inserted his
penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He forced me, Your Honor.
Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger?
Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go with him, what did the accused do
to you? A: His finger, sir.

A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned out that it was not true. xxxx

Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a tricycle, you really wanted to go to Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?
Jollibee, is that the understanding of the Court?
A: Yes, sir.

107
 Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato? 56 G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012

A: I told him that it was painful. 18 MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY
AAAs stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days and the measures he took in
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
order to recover her. And the initial medico-legal report conducted for inquest purposes shows that
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S. PANGILINAN, AFP
AAA suffered deep fresh lacerations in her hymen which are "compatible with recent loss of
(RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, Respondents.
virginity."

DECISION
The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established with the presentation of AAAs
certificate of live birth, hence, the death penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. In view,
however, of the enactment in the interim of Republic Act 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of PERALTA, J.:
Death Penalty in the Philippines," the appellate court correctly modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 under Rule 65,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the
A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In accordance with prevailing Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011, promulgated by the Office of the President.
jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity, which is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape,
and the award of moral damages even without need of proof as it is presumed that the victim
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
suffered moral injuries,19 are both increased from 50,000 to 75,000.

On October 13, 2004, the Provost Martial General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Col.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
Henry A. Galarpe, by command of Vice-Admiral De Los Reyes, issued a Restriction to
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil indemnity and moral
Quarters1 containing the following:
damages are increased from 50,000 to 75,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.

1. Pursuant to Article of War 70 and the directive of the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP to the
SO ORDERED.
undersigned dtd 12 October 2004, you are hereby placed under Restriction to Quarters
under guard pending investigation of your case.

2. You are further advised that you are not allowed to leave your quarters without the
expressed permission from the Acting Chief of Staff, AFP.

3. In case you need immediate medical attention or required by the circumstance to be

confined in a hospital, you shall likewise be under guard.

Thereafter, a Charge Sheet dated October 27, 2004 was filed with the Special General Court Martial
NR 2 presided by Maj. Gen. Emmanuel R. Teodosio, AFP, (Ret.), enumerating the following violations
allegedly committed by petitioner:

CHARGE 1: VIOLATION OF THE 96TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER

AND GENTLEMAN).

SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly,
wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: cash holdings with the Armed
Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five
hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received from AFPSLAI from June 2003
to December 2003 in the amount of one million three hundred sixty-five thousand pesos

108
(P1,365,000.00); dollar peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking Petitioner, upon arraignment on November 16, 2004, pleaded not guilty on all the charges.
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wifes names
The Office of the Chief of Staff, through a Memorandum 2 dated November 18, 2004, directed the
such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-
transfer of confinement of petitioner from his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo to the
665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC 134, 1997
ISAFP Detention Center. On the same day, petitioner, having reached the age of fifty-six (56),
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ 582 and 2001 Toyota RAV 4 Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr.
compulsorily retired from military service after availing of the provisions of Presidential Decree
FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
(P.D.) No. 1650,3 amending Sections 3 and 5 of P.D. 1638, which establishes a system of retirement
for military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly,
Pursuant to a Resolution4 dated June 1, 2005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
wrongfully and unlawfully fail to disclose/declare all his existing assets in his Sworn Statement of
was transferred from the ISAFP Detention Center to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, such as the following: his cash holdings with the Armed
Forces Police Savings and Loans Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) in the amount of six million five After trial, at the Special General Court Martial No. 2, on December 2, 2005, the findings or the After-
hundred [thousand] pesos (P6,500,000.00); cash dividend received form AFPSLAI in June 2002 and Trial Report5 of the same court was read to the petitioner. The report contains the following verdict
December 2002 in the total amount of one million four hundred thirty-five thousand pesos and sentence:
(1,435,000.00), dollar and peso deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, Allied Banking
Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's
MGEN CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 AFP the court in closed session upon secret written ballot
Bank and Planter's Development Bank; motor vehicles registered under his and his wifes names
2/3 of all the members present at the time the voting was taken concurring the following findings.
such as 1998 Toyota Hilux Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. WRY-843, Toyota Car with Plate Nr. PEV-
Finds you:
665, Toyota Previa with Plate Nr. UDS-195, 1997 Honda Civic Car with Plate Nr. FEC-134, 1997
Mitsubishi L-300 Van with Plate Nr. FDZ-582, and 2001 Toyota RAV 4
On Specification 1 of Charge 1 Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils,
dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island,
Utility Vehicle with Plate Nr. FEV-498, conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.
United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.

SPECIFICATION 3: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF
On Specification 2 of Charge 1 Guilty except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Phils,
THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, while in the active military service of the
dollar peso deposits with Allied Bank, Banco de Oro, Universal Bank, Bank of the Philippine Island,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully violate his solemn oath as a
United Coconut Planters Bank and Planters Development Bank.
military officer to uphold the Constitution and serve the people with utmost loyalty by acquiring
and holding the status of an immigrant/permanent residence of the United
On Specification 3 of Charge 1 Guilty
States of America in violation of the State policy governing public officers, thereby causing dishonor
and disrespect to the military professional and seriously compromises his position as an officer and On Specification 1 of Charge 2 Guilty
exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain in the honorable profession of arms.
On Specification 2 of Charge 2 Guilty
CHARGE II: VIOLATION OF THE 97TH ARTICLE OF WAR (CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER
AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE).
And again in closed session upon secret written ballot 2/3 all the members are present at the time
the votes was taken concurrently sentences you to be dishonorably [discharged] from the service, to
SPECIFICATION 1: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES OF forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due and to be confined at hard labor at such place
THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 16 March 2004, knowingly, the reviewing authority may direct for a period of two (2) years. So ordered. (Emphases supplied)
wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assets in his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by Republic Act No.
Afterwards, in a document6 dated March 27, 2006, the Staff Judge Advocate stated the following
3019, as amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military
recommended action:
discipline.

IV. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

SPECIFICATION NO. 2: In that MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS FLORES GARCIA 0-5820 ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, person subject to military law, did, on or about 11 March 2003, knowingly,
wrongfully and unlawfully make untruthful statements under oath of his true assts in his Statement
of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2002 as required by Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended in relation to Republic Act 6713, conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
The court, after evaluating the evidence, found accused: GUILTY on Charge 1, GUILTY on
Specification 1 on Charge 1 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines,
dollar and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planter's Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
109
Charge 1, Specification 2 except the words dollar deposits with Land Bank of the Philippines, dollar b) To forfeit all pay and allowances due and to become due; and
and peso deposits with Allied Banking Corporation, Banco de Oro Universal Bank, Bank of the
Philippine Islands, United Coconut Planters Bank and Planter's Development Bank; GUILTY on
c) To be confined for a period of two (2) years in a penitentiary.
Specification 3 of Charge 1; GUILTY on Charge 2 and all its specifications. The sentence imposed by
the Special GCM is to be dishonorably discharged from the service, to forfeit all pay and allowances
due and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place the reviewing authority may FURTHER, pursuant to the 48th and 49th Articles of War, the sentence on Major General Carlos
direct for a period of two (2) years. As it is, the sentence is proper and legal. Recommend that the Flores Garcia AFP shall not be remitted/mitigated by any previous confinement. Major General
sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon City, is the appropriate Carlos Flores Garcia AFP shall serve the foregoing sentence effective on this date.
place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall be credited in his favor
and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced. Thus, confinement will
DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th day of September, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less than one (1) year,
Eleven.
confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate.

4. To carry this recommendation into effect, a draft "ACTION OF THE REVIEWING AUTHORITY" is
hereto attached.
In an undated document,7 the AFP Board of Military Review recommended the following action:
8. RECOMMENDED ACTION:
Consequently, on September 15, 2011, respondent Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin,
issued a Memorandum10 to the Chief of Staff, AFP for strict implementation, the Confirmation of
Sentence in the Court Martial Case of People of the Philippines Versus Major General Carlos Flores
Garcia AFP.
On September 16, 2011, petitioner was arrested and detained, and continues to be detained at the
National Penitentiary, Maximum Security, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.11

A. Only so much of the sentence as provides for the mandatory penalty of dismissal from
the military service and forfeiture of pay and allowances due and to become due for the
offenses of violation of AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and for
violation of AW 97 (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) be
imposed upon the Accused.
B. The records of the instant case should be forwarded to the President thru the Chief of
Staff and the Secretary of National Defense, for final review pursuant to AW 47, the
Accused herein being a General Officer whose case needs confirmation by the President.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari and petition for habeas
corpus, alternatively. However, this Court, in its Resolution12 dated October 10, 2011, denied the
petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration13 dated November 15, 2011,
but was denied14 by this Court on December 12, 2011.
Petitioner enumerates the following grounds to support his petition:
GROUNDS

A.
C. To effectuate the foregoing, attached for CSAFP's signature/approval is a proposed 1st

Indorsement to the President, thru the Secretary of National Defense, recommending approval of
the attached prepared "ACTION OF THE PRESIDENT."
After six (6) years and two (2) months of preventive confinement, on December 16, 2010, petitioner
was released from the Camp Crame Detention Center.8
The Office of the President, or the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP and acting as the
Confirming Authority under the Articles of War, confirmed the sentence imposed by the Court
Martial against petitioner. The Confirmation of Sentence, 9 reads in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, do hereby confirm the sentence imposed by the Court Martial in the case
of People of the Philippines versus Major General Carlos Flores Garcia AFP:
a) To be dishonorable discharged from the service;
THE JURISDICTION OF THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL CEASED IPSO FACTO UPON THE
RETIREMENT OF PETITIONER, FOR WHICH REASON THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE, AND PETITIONER'S
ARREST AND CONFINEMENT PURSUANT THERETO IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS.
B.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONER REMAINED AMENABLE TO
COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION AFTER HIS RETIREMENT, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE SENTENCE OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, FOR WHICH REASON PETITIONER'S ARREST AND
CONFINEMENT IS ILLEGAL, THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
C.

110
EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS
CONFINEMENT MAY BE IMPOSED IN ADDITION TO THE PENALTIES OF DISMISSAL AND
FORFEITURE, THE SENTENCE HAD BEEN FULLY SERVED IN VIEW OF PETITIONER'S PREVENTIVE
CONFINEMENT WHICH EXCEEDED THE 2-YEAR SENTENCE, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
HAS NO AUTHORITY TO REPUDIATE SAID SERVICE OF SENTENCE, FOR WHICH REASON
PETITIONER'S ARREST AND CONFINEMENT DESPITE FULL SERVICE OF SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL,
THUS WARRANTING THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.15
In view of the earlier resolution of this Court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, the
above grounds are rendered moot and academic. Thus, the only issue in this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which was properly filed with this
Court, is whether the Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence dated September 9, 2011.
In its Comment16 dated October 27, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) lists the following
counter-arguments:
I.
PETITIONER'S DIRECT RECOURSE TO THE HONORABLE COURT VIOLATES THE DOCTRINE OF
HIERARCHY OF COURTS; HENCE, THE PETITION SHOULD BE OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
II.
THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL RETAINED JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER DESPITE HIS
RETIREMENT DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM SINCE THE SAID
TRIBUNAL'S JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY FULLY ATTACHED PRIOR TO PETITIONER'S
RETIREMENT.
III.
THE CONFIRMATION ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT DIRECTING PETITIONER TO BE
CONFINED FOR TWO (2) YEARS IN A PENITENTIARY IS SANCTIONED BY C. A. NO. 408 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 178, PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AS
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP.
IV.
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE WAS NOT VIOLATED IN THIS CASE.
V.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE PENALTY OF TWO (2) YEARS CONFINEMENT ON PETITIONER BY THE
GCM, AND AS CONFIRMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, IS VALID.
VI.
ACCORDINGLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING THE CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE.17
Petitioner, in his Reply18 dated January 20, 2012, disagreed with the arguments raised by the OSG
due to the following:
(A)
THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE IS AN ACT BY THE PRESIDENT, AS THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, AND NOT MERELY AS THE HEAD OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
THEREFORE, THE HONORABLE COURT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE COURT WHERE HIS ACT MAY
BE IMPUGNED, AND NOT IN THE LOWER COURTS, I.E., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ("RTC") OR THE
COURT OF APPEALS ("CA"), AS THE OSG ERRONEOUSLY POSTULATES.
(B)
ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL ("GCM") RETAINED JURISDICTION "OVER THE
PERSON" OF PETITIONER EVEN AFTER HE RETIRED FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES ('AFP"), HOWEVER, HIS RETIREMENT, CONTRARY TO THE STAND OF THE OSG,
SEVERED HIS "JURAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE MILITARY, THEREBY PLACING HIM BEYOND
THE SUBSTANTIVE REACH OF THE AFP'S COURT MARTIAL JURISDICTION.
(C)
UNDER ART. 29, REVISED PENAL CODE ("RPC"), PETITIONER'S COURT MARTIAL SENTENCE OF
TWO (2) YEARS IN CARCERATION HAD ALREADY BEEN SERVED IN FULL SINCE HE HAD ALREADY
SUFFERED PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT OF AT LEAST SIX (6) YEARS BEFORE THE SENTENCE
COULD BE CONFIRMED, WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO MORE JURISDICTION
WHEN HE CONFIRMED IT, THEREBY RENDERING THE "CONFIRMATION OF SENTENCE" A PATENT
NULLITY, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, INVALIDATING THE OSG'S POSITION THAT THE PRESIDENT
STILL HAD JURISDICTION WHEN HE CONFIRMED THE SENTENCE.19
Petitioner raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try his case. According
to him, the said jurisdiction ceased ipso facto upon his compulsory retirement. Thus, he insists that
the Office of the President had acted without jurisdiction in issuing the confirmation of his sentence.
This Court finds the above argument bereft of merit.
Article 2 of the Articles of War20 circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law over persons subject
thereto, to wit:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. - The following persons are subject to these articles and shall
be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to
military law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
of the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their
call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
111
 instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or
for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call,
draft, or order to obey the same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared
though not otherwise subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
It is indisputable that petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March 2003 and
2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and
he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until
the time petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-
settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated.21 Therefore, petitioner's retirement on November 18, 2004
did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction. In B/Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani, et al.
v. Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga, et al.,22 this Court ruled that:
This point was settled against Gen. Gudani's position in Abadilla v. Ramos, where the Court declared
that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside
the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him
before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it
continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held:
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the
alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to
the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once
acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Citing Colonel Winthrop's treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated:
We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which
goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz.
3. Offenders in general Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law,
in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to
them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to
trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has
mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In
such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held
therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him as by arrest or the service
of charges, the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial
by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x
Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of
and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4
October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that
under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, "an officer or enlisted man carried in
the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be subject to the Articles of War x x x" To
this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen.
Gudani's retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum.23
It is also apt to mention that under Executive Order No. 178, or the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP,
the jurisdiction of courts-martial over officers, cadets, soldiers, and other military personnel in the
event of discharge or other separation from the service, and the exceptions thereto, is defined thus:
10. COURT-MARTIAL Jurisdiction in general Termination General Rules The general rule is
that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers and others in the military service of the
Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to
any offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into
the military service.
Exceptions To this general rule there are, however, some exceptions, among them the following:
xxxx
In certain case, where the person's discharge or other separation does not interrupt his status as a
person belonging to the general category of persons subject to military law, court-martial
jurisdiction does not terminate. Thus, where an officer holding a reserve commission is discharged
from said commission by reason of acceptance of a commission in the Regular Force, there being no
interval between services under the respective commissions, there is no terminating of the officer's
military status, but merely the accomplishment of a change in his status from that of a reserve to
that of a regular officer, and that court-martial jurisdiction to try him for an offense (striking
enlisted men for example) committed prior to the discharge is not terminated by the discharge. So
also, where a dishonorable discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a
soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his amenability
to trial for the offense. (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioner also asserts that the General Court Martial's continuing jurisdiction over him despite his
retirement holds true only if the charge against him involves fraud, embezzlement or
misappropriation of public funds citing this Court's ruling in De la Paz v. Alcaraz,et al. 24 and Martin v.
Ve r.25 However, this is not true. The OSG is correct in stating that in De la Paz,26 military jurisdiction
over the officer who reverted to inactive status was sustained by this Court because the violation
involved misappropriation of public funds committed while he was still in the active military
service, while in Martin,27 military jurisdiction was affirmed because the violation pertained to
illegal disposal of military property. Both cited cases centered on the nature of the offenses
committed by the military personnel involved, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts-
martial. On the other hand, in the present case, the continuing military jurisdiction is based on prior
attachment of jurisdiction on the military court before petitioner's compulsory retirement. This
continuing jurisdiction is provided under Section 1 of P.D. 1850,28 as amended, thus:
Section 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed
Forces. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding (a) uniformed members of the
Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall
henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with
112
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons
subject to military law under article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who commit any crime or
offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles
of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or
tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has
prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial
jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having
duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law: Provided further, that the President
may, in the interest of justice, order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case
be tried by the appropriate civil court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial over the case and the person of the
petitioner, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, therefore acquired the jurisdiction to confirm
petitioner's sentence as mandated under Article 47 of the Articles of War, which states:
Article 47. Confirmation When Required. - In addition to the approval required by article forty-
five, confirmation by the President is required in the following cases before the sentence of a court-
martial is carried into execution, namely:
(a) Any sentence respecting a general officer;
(b) Any sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer except that in time of war a
sentence extending to the dismissal of an officer below the grade of brigadier general may
be carried into execution upon confirmation by the commanding general of the Army in
the field;
(c) Any sentence extending to the suspension or dismissal of a cadet, probationary
second lieutenant; and
(d) Any sentence of death, except in the case of persons convicted in time of war, of
murder, mutiny, desertion, or as spies, and in such excepted cases of sentence of death
may be carried into execution, subject to the provisions of Article 50, upon confirmation
by the commanding general of the Army in the said field.
When the authority competent to confirm the sentence has already acted as the approving authority
no additional confirmation by him is necessary. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242). (Emphasis
supplied.)
In connection therewith, petitioner argues that the confirmation issued by the Office of the
President directing him to be confined for two (2) years in the penitentiary had already been fully
served in view of his preventive confinement which had exceeded two (2) years. Therefore,
according to him, the Office of the President no longer has the authority to order his confinement in
a penitentiary. On the other hand, the OSG opines that petitioner cannot legally demand the
deduction of his preventive confinement in the service of his imposed two-year confinement in a
penitentiary, because unlike our Revised Penal Code29 which specifically mandates that the period of
preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment, the
Articles of War and/or the Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for the same deduction in the
execution of the sentence imposed by the General Court Martial as confirmed by the President in
appropriate cases.
On the above matter, this Court finds the argument raised by the OSG unmeritorious and finds logic
in the assertion of petitioner that Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code can be made applicable in the
present case.
The OSG maintains that military commissions or tribunals are not courts within the Philippine
judicial system, citing Olaguer, et al. v. Military Commission No. 4, 30 hence, they are not expected to
apply criminal law concepts in their implementation and execution of decisions involving the
discipline of military personnel. This is misleading. In Olaguer, the courts referred to were military
commissions created under martial law during the term of former President Ferdinand Marcos and
was declared unconstitutional by this Court, while in the present case, the General Court Martial
which tried it, was created under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, and remains a valid
entity.
In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,31 this Court ruled that a court-martial
case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the
same case, this Court clarified as to what constitutes the words "any court" used in Section 17 32 of
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting members of Congress to appear as counsel in any criminal case in
which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office. This Court held:
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any court"
includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case within the meaning of
the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to appear as
counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an
offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only to a civil, but also to a military court or a
Court-Martial. Because, in construing a Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where
words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over
the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited
sense is intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not
hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial;
what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not
refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in the case of
Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say in this connection the
following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive power having no
relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of the country, it is yet, so far as it is a
court at all, and within its field of action, as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As
a court of law, it is bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of
special provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of evidence as
adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required by the terms of its statutory
oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. and the accused "without partiality, favor, or
113
affection," and according, not only to the laws and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e.
its sense of substantial right and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney
General, court-martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal existing by the same
authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it
differs from the general law of the land in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and
soldiers of the army but not to other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches
of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United
States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military as the latter courts have in
controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as
untrammelled an exercise of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. It is the general rule that one accused of the crime has the
right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is expressly so declared by the statues
controlling the procedure in court-martial. It has been held that a constitutional provision extending
that right to one accused in any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the
accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to refuse
an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice in the courts of the
state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs. Crosby, 24 Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American
Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be
approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change
or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance
imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI, of the
Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or punished by the
Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According to section 1,
Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a wrong or injury
done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in the name of the
People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or
special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the court-martial is
strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a
debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . . Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil
verdict; its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's
Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be allowed some meaning,
and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W.
540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654, quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock,
12 S. Ct. 195; 142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a criminal and
not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain conditions, a bar to another
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because the latter would place the accused in
jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Grafton
vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51 Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment will be
accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which attend the judgments of a
civil court in a case of which it may legally take cognizance; x x x and restricting our decision to the
above question of double jeopardy, we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for
the reasons stated, the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of
homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military court of
competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States, could not be
subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that
territory.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, as extensively discussed above, the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense
of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-
Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code.34In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th Article of War, or Conduct
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are not defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed by the General Court Martial, which is
two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in nature. Therefore, absent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court
Martial's decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be
applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner's period of confinement to his sentence has been
recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review, thus:
x x x Recommend that the sentence be approved. The PNP custodial facility in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, is the appropriate place of confinement. The period of confinement from 18 October 2004 shall
be credited in his favor and deducted from the two (2) years to which the accused was sentenced.
Thus, confinement will expire on 18 October 2006. Considering that the period left not served is less
than one (1) year, confinement at the National Penitentiary is no longer appropriate. 35 (Emphasis
supplied.)
114
The above was reiterated in the Action of the Reviewing Authority, thus: The OSG is correct when it argued that the power to confirm a sentence of the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the
sentence given by the court martial. As provided in Article 48 of the Articles of War:
In the foregoing General Court-Martial case of People of the Philippines versus MGEN. CARLOS F.
GARCIA 0-5820 AFP (now Retired), the verdict of GUILTY is hereby approved.
Article 48. Power Incident to Power to Confirm. - The power to confirm the sentence of a court-
martial shall be held to include:
The sentence to be dishonorably discharged from the service; to forfeit all pay and allowances due
and to become due; and to be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may
direct for a period of two (2) years is also approved. (a) The power to confirm or disapprove a finding, and to confirm so much only of a
finding of guilty of a particular offense as involves a finding of guilty of a lesser included
offense when, in the opinion of the authority having power to confirm, the evidence of
Considering that the Accused has been in confinement since 18 October 2004, the entire period of
record requires a finding of only the lesser degree of guilt;
his confinement since 18 October 2004 will be credited in his favor. Consequently, his two (2) year
sentence of confinement will expire on 18 October 2006.
(b) The power to confirm or disapprove the whole or any part of the sentence; and
The proper place of confinement during the remaining unserved portion of his sentence is an official
military detention facility.1wphi1 However, the Accused is presently undergoing trial before the (c) The power to remand a case for rehearing, under the provisions of Article 50.
Sandiganbayan which has directed that custody over him be turned over to the civilian authority (Emphasis supplied.)
and that he be confined in a civilian jail or detention facility pending the disposition of the case(s)
before said Court. For this reason, the Accused shall remain confined at the PNP's detention facility
In addition, the President also has the power to mitigate or remit a sentence. Under Article 49 of the
in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The Armed Forces of the Philippines defers to the civilian authority on
Articles of War:
this matter.

Article 49. Mitigation or Remission of Sentence. - The power to order the execution of the sentence
Should the Accused be released from confinement upon lawful orders by the Sandiganbayan before
adjudged by a court-martial shall be held to include, inter alia, the power to mitigate or remit the
the expiration of his sentence adjudged by the military court, the Provost Marshal General shall
whole or any part of the sentence.
immediately take custody over the Accused, who shall be transferred to and serve the remaining
unserved portion thereof at the ISAFP detention facility in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon
City.36 (Emphasis supplied.) Any unexpected portion of a sentence adjudged by a court-martial may be mitigated or remitted by
the military authority competent to appoint, for the command, exclusive of penitentiaries and
Disciplinary Barracks of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine Constabulary, in which
Nevertheless, the application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of War is in
the person under sentence is held, a court of the kind that imposed the sentence, and the same
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. According to a long line of
power may be exercised by superior military authority; but no sentence approved or confirmed by
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
the President shall be remitted or mitigated by any other authority, and no approved sentence of
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 37 It requires public bodies
loss of files by an officer shall be remitted or mitigated by any authority inferior to the President,
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. 38 The purpose of the
except as provided in Article 52.
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.39 In other words, the concept of equal When empowered by the President to do so, the commanding general of the Army in the field or the
justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions area commander may approve or confirm and commute (but not approve or confirm without
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental commuting), mitigate, or remit and then order executed as commuted, mitigated, or remitted any
objective.40 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or sentence which under those Articles requires the confirmation of the President before the same may
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined be executed. (As amended by Republic Act No. 242).
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites:
Thus, the power of the President to confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence of erring military
(1) the classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
personnel is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military. However,
it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same
although the law (Articles of War) which conferred those powers to the President is silent as to the
class.41 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."42 In the present case,
deduction of the period of preventive confinement to the penalty imposed, as discussed earlier, such
petitioner belongs to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to
is also the right of an accused provided for by Article 29 of the RPC.
the rights accorded to them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are
convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts.
Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled to the basic and time-honored As to petitioner's contention that his right to a speedy disposition of his case was violated, this Court
principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the finds the same to be without merit.
accused.43 It must be remembered that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner
violated are penal in nature.

115
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to the speedy merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair
disposition of cases.44However, it needs to be underscored that speedy disposition is a relative and opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.48
flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 45 In determining whether
Time runs against the slothful and those who neglect their rights. 49 In fact, the delay in the
or not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the
confirmation of his sentence was to his own advantage, because without the confirmation from the
following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or
President, his sentence cannot be served.
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 46

In this case, there was no allegation, whatsoever of any delay during the trial. What is being
questioned by petitioner is the delay in the confirmation of sentence by the President. Basically, the
case has already been decided by the General Court Martial and has also been reviewed by the
proper reviewing authorities without any delay. The only thing missing then was the confirmation
of sentence by the President. The records do not show that, in those six (6) years from the time the
decision of the General Court Martial was promulgated until the sentence was finally confirmed by
the President, petitioner took any positive action to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. This is akin to what happened in Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 47 where, in spite of the lapse of
more than ten years of delay, the Court still held that the petitioner could not rightfully complain of
delay violative of his right to speedy trial or disposition of his case, since he was part of the reason
for the failure of his case to move on towards its ultimate resolution. The Court held, inter alia:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited after the case was submitted for
resolution in 1979. It was only in 1989 when the case below was reraffled from the RTC of Caloocan
City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered
on March 14, 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of stenographic notes that
matters started to get moving towards a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after
the new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's
absence during the original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly became zealous
of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and disposition.
Anent petitioner's other arguments, the same are already rendered moot and academic due to the
above discussions.1wphi1
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.50 Thus, applying, the earlier disquisitions, this Court finds that the Office of the President did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Confirmation of Sentence in question.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari dated September 29, 2011 of Major General Carlos F.
Garcia, AFP (Ret.) is hereby DISMISSED. However, applying the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, the time within which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should
be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set
forth by the same law.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to
assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right a situation amounting to laches
had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a
different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum
and 1989 when the case was reraffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which was
granted him in 1987 when the new constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a
motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic
notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of
such right.

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a
speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and
vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the
accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just
the accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the

116
57 G.R. No. 176504 September 3, 2008
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the
Decision1 dated 27 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661 which affirmed the
Decision2 and the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, finding
petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz (Ferdinand) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Theft.
On 10 July 1997, an Information was filed before the RTC of Makati City charging Ferdinand with
Qualified Theft. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 25th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then employed as Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. with
office address located at 3/F ENZO Bldg., Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City, herein
represented by Juanito M. Tan, Jr. and had access to the funds of the said corporation,
with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of said corporation, with
grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and carry away the amount of P15,000.00 belonging to said Porta-Phone Rentals,
Inc., to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount of P15,000.00.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 97-945. During the arraignment on 22 August 1997,
Ferdinand, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty. 5 Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Juanito M. Tan, Jr., the General
Manager of Porta-Phone Rentals, Inc. (Porta Phone) when the incident in question took place. He
testified that Ferdinand appropriated for himself the amount of P15,000.00, an amount which
should have been remitted to the company; (2) Catherine Villamar (Catherine), the Credit and
Collection Officer of Porta-Phone, who discovered that Ferdinand issued a receipt for P15,000.00
from Hemisphere-Leo Burnett (Hemisphere), and who also testified that Ferdinand
misappropriated the amount for his own benefit and, when she confronted him, said he had unpaid
reimbursements from the company; (3) Luningning Morando, the accounting supervisor of Porta-
Phone, corroborated the alleged fact that Ferdinand received the amount and did not turn over the
same to the company; and (4) Wilson J. So, Chief Executive Officer of Porta-Phone, who testified that
meetings were held to demand from Ferdinand the subject sum of money.
As documentary evidence, the prosecution offered the following: Exhibit "A" - Official Receipt No.
2242, the receipt in which Ferdinand acknowledged that he received the amount of P15,000.00
from Hemisphere; Exhibit "B" - the Minutes of the Meeting held on 30 October 1996 attended by
Wilson So, Juanito Tan, Luningning Morando and Ferdinand, wherein Wilson So asked Ferdinand
the reason for the formers refusal to remit the P15,000.00 to the company, and Ferdinand
answered that there was no need to turn over the said amount because he had outstanding
reimbursements from the company in the amount of P8,518.08; Exhibit "C" - the Resignation Letter
of Ferdinand; Exhibit "D" - the Inter-Office Demand Letter dated 7 November 1996, addressed to
Ferdinand from Juanito M. Tan, Jr. requiring the former to return the amount of P15,000.00; Exhibit
"E" - the Handwritten Explanation of Ferdinand dated 8 December 1996, that he remitted the
amount to Luningning Morando; Exhibit "F"- Inter-Office Memorandum dated 8 November 1996,
issued by Juanito Tan and addressed to Luningning Morando to explain her side regarding the
allegation of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00; Exhibit "G"- Inter-Office Memorandum
prepared by Luningning Morando dated 9 November 1996, denying the allegation that she received
the amount of P15,000.00 from Ferdinand; Exhibit "H"- Inter-Office Memorandum dated 11
November 1996, issued by Juanito Tan for Ferdinand to further explain his side in light of
Luningning Morandos denial that she received the amount. It also advised Ferdinand to wait for the
verification and computation of his claim for reimbursements; Exhibit "I"- Formal Demand Letter
dated 25 November 1996, addressed to Ferdinand and issued by the legal counsel of Porta-Phone
Rentals, Inc., asking the former to return to the company the subject amount; Exhibit "J"- the
Affidavit of Complaint executed by Juanito Tan against Ferdinand; Exhibit "K"- the Collection List
dated 30 October 1996, showing that Ferdinand received from Hemisphere the amount
of P15,000.00, and the same was not turned over to Catherine; Exhibit "L"- Reply-Affidavit dated 5
February 1997, executed by Juanito M. Tan, Jr.; Exhibit "M"- the Sur-Rejoinder Affidavit of Juanito M.
Tan, Jr. dated 21 February 1997.
The collective evidence adduced by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 p.m. of 25 October
1996, in the City of Makati, Ferdinand, who is a Marketing Manager of Porta-Phone, a domestic
corporation engaged in the lease of cellular phones and other communication equipment, went to
the office of Porta-Phone located on the third floor of Enzo Building, Senator Gil Puyat Avenue, and
took hold of a pad of official receipts from the desk of Catherine, Porta-Phones collection officer.
With the pad of official receipts in his hands, Ferdinand proceeded to his client, Hemisphere, and
delivered articles of communication equipment. Although he was not an authorized person to
receive cash and issue receipts for Porta-Phone, Ferdinand received from Hemisphere the amount
of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit for the aforesaid equipment. On 26 October 1996, Ferdinand
went to Porta-Phone and returned the pad of receipts, but failed to deliver the cash he received from
Hemisphere. On 28 October 1996, the next working day, Catherine checked the booklet of official
receipts and found that one of the official receipts was missing. The green duplicate of the missing
official receipt, however, showed that Ferdinand received the amount of P15,000.00 from
Hemisphere. Upon learning of Ferdinands receipt of the said amount, Catherine confronted
Ferdinand, who answered that he deposited the amount to his personal bank account. Catherine
then instructed Ferdinand to remit the amount the next day. 6 Catherine reported the incident to the
accounting supervisor, Luningning Morando, who, in turn, reported the same to the General
Manager, Junito Tan. The following day, Ferdinand went to the office but did not deliver the amount
to Catherine, reasoning that Porta-Phone still owed him unpaid reimbursements.7 This incident
came to the knowledge of Chief Executive Officer Wilson So. Thus, on 30 October 1996, Wilson So
invited Ferdinand, Juanito and Luningning to a meeting. In the meeting, Wilson So demanded that
Ferdinand return the collection. Ferdinand refused to turn over the amount to the company. He
would return the amount only upon his receipt of his reimbursements from the company. Since
Ferdinand adamantly withheld the collected amount, Juanito issued a demand letter dated 7
November 1996, ordering the former to deliver the amount to the company. Ferdinand answered,
this time claiming that he had already remitted the amount to Luningning. With this, Juanito issued
a memorandum dated 8 November 1996, addressed to Luningning asking her to explain her side
regarding the allegation of Ferdinand that she received the P15,000.00. Luningning completely
denied having received the amount from Ferdinand. Juanito then issued another letter to Ferdinand
to further explain his side in view of Luningnings denial that she received the amount. In the letter,
Juanito also advised Ferdinand to wait for the verification and computation of his claim for
reimbursements. With the conflicting claims of Luningning and Ferdinand, another meeting was set
on 14 November 1996. In that meeting Luningning again denied having received the amount.
117
Ferdinand did not appear in the meeting. Later, a formal demand letter was issued to Ferdinand by
Porta-Phones legal counsel, which letter went unheeded. Several attempts to reach Ferdinand
proved to be futile. This prompted the company to file a criminal complaint against Ferdinand.
The defense alleged that the amount involved was already turned over to the company through
Luningning. To substantiate this, the defense presented Ferdinand as its only witness.
Ferdinand testified that on 25 October 1996, he delivered to Hemisphere several communication
gadgets and received from the same the amount of P15,000.00 as refundable deposit (the amount
required by Porta-Phone from its lessor-client to answer for the damage that may befall the items
leased) for the delivered items. Since he did not bring with him the official receipt of Porta-Phone,
he merely acknowledged having received the amount in an Acknowledgement Receipt issued by
Hemisphere. Considering that it was already late in the afternoon when he delivered the
communication items, Ferdinand brought the said amount home. The following day, he went to the
companys accounting supervisor, Luningning, to turn over to her the amount. Luningning received
the money and instructed Ferdinand to fill up the details of the transaction in Official Receipt No.
2242. When Ferdinand asked Luningning to affix her signature to the official receipt to acknowledge
that she received the amount, the latter declined and instead asked the former to affix his signature,
since it was he who closed the deal.
Later, on 28 October 1996, Catherine approached him and asked him to affix his signature to the
triplicate copy of Official Receipt No. 2242.
Ferdinand admitted that he attended the meeting of 30 October 1996 with Juanito, Luningning and
Wilson So. He, however, claimed that the discussion centered on his entitlement to reimbursements
from the company. Thereupon, Wilson So got angry with him and asked him to resign, owing to his
persistent claim for reimbursement. After this, the company withheld his salary, prompting him to
file a labor case against the same on 4 November 1996.
On 30 June 2001, the RTC rendered a decision finding Ferdinand guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused FERDINAND A. CRUZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS
and to pay the costs.8
On 2 August 2001, Ferdinand filed a Motion for New Trial on two grounds: (1) absence of a
preliminary investigation for the crime of qualified theft; and (2) newly discovered evidence. Anent
the first ground, it must be noted that in the beginning, Ferdinand was being indicted for
Estafa/Falsification of Private Document. The prosecutor later found that the proper charge should
be for Qualified Theft. Ferdinand argued that since his counter-affidavits were for the charge
Estafa/Falsification of Private Document, he claimed that preliminary investigation for Qualified
Theft was absent. With regard to the second ground, Ferdinand argued that newly discovered
evidence, i.e., the testimony of a certain Marilen Viduya, could change the judgment on the case. The
RTC granted the motion based on the second ground, and set aside its 30 June 2001 decision.
Marilen Viduya, a former employee of Hemisphere, testified that she asked Ferdinand to affix his
signature to an acknowledgement receipt for the amount of P15,000.00, which was the refundable
deposit of Hemisphere for the equipment delivered, because Ferdinand did not bring with him the
official receipt of Porta-Phone. She also averred that Luningning went to Hemisphere and conducted
an inventory of the delivered communication items. Luningning admitted to her that the P15,000.00
was already remitted to Porta-Phone.
In an Order9 dated 15 July 2003, the RTC declared that it did not find the testimony of Marilen
Viduya persuasive. It revived and reinstated its 30 June 2001 decision convicting Ferdinand of the
crime charged.
Dissatisfied, Ferdinand appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 27 April 2006, promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The 30 June 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 140, in Makati City, is hereby AFFIRMED. 10
Ferdinand filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 4 October 2006.
Hence, the instant petition.
Ferdinand contends that he was denied due process as his trial was pursued without prior clearance
from the Department of Labor pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 16 which
allegedly states that "clearance must be sought from the Ministry of Labor and /or the Office of the
President before taking cognizance of complaints for preliminary investigation and the filing in court
of the corresponding information of cases arising out of, or related to, a labor dispute." He avers that
this circular is designed to avoid undue harassment that the employer may use to cow employees
from pursuing money claims against the former.
He also argues that due process was not accorded since he was indicted for qualified theft, even as
he was initially investigated for estafa/falsification of private documents. It must be noted that the
original indictment was for estafa/falsification of private documents but later the prosecutor found
it proper to charge him with qualified theft. According to him although he was given the chance to
file counter-affidavits on the charge of estafa/falsification of private documents, he was not given
the opportunity to answer during the preliminary investigation of the crime of qualified theft.
Finally, Ferdinand maintains that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt, absent
evidence of the presence of the elements of the crime charged and given the weakness of the
evidence proffered by the prosecution.
Ferdinands arguments are not meritorious.
The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right
to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.11 In the
instant case, Ferdinand did not present evidence that arraignment was forced upon him. On the
contrary, he voluntarily pleaded to the charge and actively participated in the trial of the case.
118
Besides, the prior clearance requirement before taking cognizance of complaints under the cited
DOJ circular is not applicable to the case of Ferdinand. The RTC found that the money claim which
the Labor Arbiter awarded to Ferdinand covered only his salary during the month of November
1996. It must be noted that the crime attributed to Ferdinand was committed on 25 October 1996
before Ferdinand was entitled to the money claim. In other words, the crime was first committed
before the accrual of the money claim. This being the case, it is not remote that it was Ferdinand
who used the labor case, which he filed before the Labor Arbiter, to have leverage against the
company in the criminal case.
It is not correct for Ferdinand to claim that preliminary investigation on the charge of qualified theft
was not accorded him. The truth is, Ferdinand was able to answer the initial charge of
estafa/falsification of private documents through his counter-affidavits. Based on the same
complaint affidavit and the same sets of evidence presented by the complainant, the prosecutor
deemed it proper to charge Ferdinand with qualified theft. Since the same allegations and evidence
were proffered by the complainant in the qualified theft, there is no need for Ferdinand to be given
the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits anew, as he had already answered said allegations
when he submitted counter-affidavits for the original indictment of estafa/falsification of private
documents.
The RTC correctly convicted Ferdinand of the crime of qualified theft.
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information, in which it is charged
that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
subject of asportation.13 In this case, it was apparent that the reason why Ferdinand took the money
was that he intended to gain by it. In the meeting held on 30 October 1996, Ferdinand admitted
having received the amount and kept it until his reimbursements from the company would be
released to him. Thus, in the initial hearing of 23 September 1997, Ferdinands counsel made this
declaration:
Court: By the way paero, what is the defense of the accused?
xxxx
Atty. Dizon: Denial your honor. Denial. While it is true that he did not return
that P15,000.00 pesos, it is because the company owes the accused more
than P20,000.00.14
In the course of his testimony, Ferdinand claimed that he had remitted the amount to Luningning.
This insistent claim for reimbursements by Ferdinand would in fact show that he had the intention
to take the subject money; hence, intent to gain is made more manifest.

The elements of the crime of theft are the following: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) Ferdinands lack of authority to receive the amount is apparent, because he is not one of the
the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking collection officers authorized to collect and receive payment, thus:
was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation
against the person or force upon things.12 Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, theft is
Atty. Salvador: You made mention of collectibles, who is authorized by the company to
qualified when it is, among others, committed with grave abuse of confidence, to wit:
collect the collectibles?

ART. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
Witness: My accounting group is the only group authorized to make collections for and on
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if
behalf of the company.
committed x x x with grave abuse of confidence x x x.

Atty. Salvador: Can you give the names of this accounting group that you have
The prosecution established, beyond the shadow of doubt that Ferdinand took and kept the fifteen
mentioned?
thousand peso-collection from the companys client. Although Ferdinand insists he remitted the
amount personally to Luningning, this claim is self-serving. If indeed he personally delivered
the P15,000.00, he would have at least required Luningning to acknowledge the receipt thereof Witness: Yes sir, the group is composed of : Cathy Villamar; Dull Abular; and Evic Besa.
before he parted with the same. The Court of Appeals incisively pointed out that it was implausible
for Ferdinand to have acceded to executing an acknowledgment receipt in favor of Hemisphere so as
Atty. Salvador: Is the accused part of the group?
to give the latter protection from his company, and yet he did not ask for some kind of receipt when
he allegedly turned over the money to Luningning. Quite specious is Ferdinands argument that he
would not have had in his possession a copy of Official Receipt No. 2242, had he not delivered the Witness: No sir.15
amount to Luningning. Ferdinand acquired the receipt, not because he remitted the amount, but
because he took a sheet from a booklet of receipts containing Official Receipt number 2242 and
The lack of consent by the owner of the asported money is manifested by the fact that Porta-Phone
issued the same to Hemisphere despite his lack of authority to do so, to maliciously induce the client
consistently sought the return of the same from Ferdinand in the meetings held for this purpose and
into believing that he would remit the amount to Porta-Phone.
in the various letters issued by the company.

The collected amount belonged to Porta-Phone and not to Ferdinand. When he received the same,
As a marketing manager of Porta-Phone, Ferdinand made use of his position to obtain the
he was obliged to turn it over to the company since he had no right to retain it or to use it for his
refundable deposit due to Porta-Phone and appropriate it for himself. He could not have taken the
own benefit, because the amount was a refundable deposit for the communication items leased out
amount had he not been an officer of the said company. Clearly, the taking was done with grave
by Porta-Phone to Hemisphere. As he had kept it for himself while knowing that the amount was not
abuse of confidence.
his, the presence of the element of unlawful taking is settled.

119
Ferdinand likewise assails the testimony of prosecution witness Juanito, who retracted his affidavit 58 G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
of desistance in favor of the former and explained on the witness stand that he had agreed to
execute the same due to personal favors bestowed on him by Ferdinand. Ferdinand asserts that
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Juanitos retraction should not be given credence. This contention is unconvincing. As aptly
vs.
discussed by the Court of Appeals:
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN
SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
[W]hile his desistance may cast doubt on his subsequent testimony, We are not
unmindful that he was in fact grilled by the defense regarding his motives in revoking his
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,
earlier desistance and he remained steadfast in his testimony that [Ferdinand] was never
vs.
authorized by Porta-Phone to collect payments and that during the meeting of 30 October
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *
1996, [Ferdinand] refused to return the money. Rather than destroy his credibility, the
defenses grilling regarding the reasons for his filing his earlier desistance even
strengthened the value of his testimony for he only executed the same because of some AQUINO, J.:
personal favors from [Ferdinand]. And while [Ferdinand] suggests that subsequent
revocation of his desistance in open court may be due this time to favors extended by
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969
Porta-Phone cannot be sustained when taken together with the fact that [Juanito] was
Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y
long been separted from Porta-Phone when he testified. In fact Porta-Phones CEO did not
Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit,
even have kind words for [Juanito] when the former testified. x x x. 16
the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to
embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
In sum, this Court, yields to the factual findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, there being no compelling reason to veer away from the same. This is in line with the
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE
precept stating that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 17
by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.

The RTC imposed on petitioner the indeterminate penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
of prision mayor as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of reclusion
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the
temporal, as maximum. Under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Qualified Theft
expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed
is two degrees higher than that specified in Article 309. Paragraph 1 of Article 309 provides that if
presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects.
the value of the thing stolen is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, the penalty
shall be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In this case, the amount stolen
was P15,000.00. Two degrees higher than prision mayor minimum and medium is reclusion Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the signed by the provincial engineer.
minimum shall be prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
or within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. There being neither aggravating
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds
nor mitigating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the maximum period of the
being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2
months and 20 days. The minimum penalty imposed by the RTC is correct. However, the maximum
period imposed by RTC should be increased to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,
1969, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 April 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27661
finding Ferdinand A. Cruz GUILTY of the crime of Qualified Theft is hereby AFFIRMED with I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the
MODIFICATION. Ferdinand A. Cruz is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 amount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the
temporal, as maximum. payment.

SO ORDERED. This is signed by the auditor.

Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the
provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is
chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs
two part of the voucher.

120
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As
accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan
Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of
Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100
(16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify
to be correct. Paid by Check No. .................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the
stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the
payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and
hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-
Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to
invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The
alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to
the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher
(RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the
signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P.
Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B.
Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their signatures
in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For
and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the
imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969,
containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake
because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice
No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged
signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those
documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the
goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber
allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a
district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on
the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of
certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the
following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of
P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of
Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of
P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of
the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of
P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of
the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of
P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of
the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of
P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of
the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their
signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the
said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers
supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting
papers could not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that
the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his
company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were
cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges
were fictitious.
121
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and 1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated
hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the
serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870,
provincial government.
11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts
of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the and S), now L-33253.
pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial
government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April
that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and
29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of
their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson
guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-carried
following penalties:
by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial
engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52
laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded
and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the
Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper
same amount;
lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the
P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of
provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson
Pangasinan in the same amount; and
brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing
and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked
twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81
Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the
same amount.
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher
After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as
representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March
31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers. Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death
extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is
that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or
concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor. before the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court
became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his
obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he
pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada,
received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and
Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's
office (Exh. 6-12 Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

122
 The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate
action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil
liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel
vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It
may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October
24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused
to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of
the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of
the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired
whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in
representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there
was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had
authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
Criminal Case No. 23350).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the

After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
November 4, 1969.
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal
of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of attachment and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that
against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the
said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to
inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to
decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a
examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the
duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
motion (155 tsn).
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to
Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were
Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased). present together with the private prosecutor.

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding
thereto the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary
to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of
malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule
that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.
1683, Revised Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality.
The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the
documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court
anchored the judgment of conviction.

123
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the
propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers,
evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant
provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to
paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual
procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached
Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to
initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already
signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court
erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them.
After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn
July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts
covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1"
placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in.
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding
with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when
the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the
cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted
by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office when
that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers
for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received, was
blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the
exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have
been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had
been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to
the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court
said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to
Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments
were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27,
1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to
Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh.
13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers
inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen
meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because
the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the
treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a
crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the prosecution
show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned
vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the
auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that
contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its
evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice,
whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable
fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were
passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which
the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad
faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts
malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred
in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in
finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on
circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in
fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had
conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the
fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and
convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had
already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable
cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule
124
assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case
on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they
would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then
tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary
investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the
preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First
Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon,
86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is
that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of
Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the
exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions
of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court)
there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in
implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his
residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction
Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial
government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures
terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his
signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the
Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were
received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of
signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and
when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th
Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were
Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed
creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the
provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the
forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity
in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document
and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government
and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the
falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first
voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial
court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is
not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego
signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of
the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p.
23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego
allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the
vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under
the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine
125
(although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the
amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers
were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant
manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six
vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried
Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six
vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six
vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction
materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer
Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on
a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.
Recapitulations. In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation
on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial
engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers.
The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the
vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received
the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in
the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and
denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-
6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having
committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have
some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically
fake.
Penalties. The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and
malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes
two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit
malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671;
People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal
treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons
worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts
covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal
funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons
mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex
crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each
falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished
separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct
penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and
bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification
was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single
criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six
separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of
malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve
offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession
of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial
treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person
conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre,
37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of
parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but
126
only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article
62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the
Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos.
11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal
Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos.
1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in
paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no
modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an
indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes
of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4)
years of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the
amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal
Case NO. 23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the
sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case
No. 23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is
sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and
to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70
of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-
one (51) years (see People vs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art.
70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in
the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal
Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson guilty of six separate
crimes each of falsification and malversation as elucidated in the very well studied and ably
prepared main opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Aquino, and while I further agree
that said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego are lointtv and solidarity
liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts stated ir. the dispositive portion of the decision
herein, I have my own legal basis for holding that the estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the,
said amount&
127
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of Sendaydiego's appeal by
the deceased Sendaydiego (he died during the pendency of this appeal) insofar as his liability is reason of his death. Our possible disagreement relates only to the procedural aspect of the matter.
concerned, ... Sendaydiego's appeal will (nevertheless) be resolved only for the purpose of showing
his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate is liable." It seems to me that
The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate within this appeal
there is some degree of irreconcilable incontency in dismissing a case, thereby acquitting the
proceedings, thereby sing with the filing of a separate civil action for the In my view, the dismissal of
accused therein of criminal liability because of death or any other cause not amounting to a finding
Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as I have said to his acquittal This acquittal to my mind is different
that he had not committed the act complaint of and at the same nine holding that he or his estate
juridically from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only intimated earlier, it is a total
has in civil liability based on his criminal liability. It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an
absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from or extinction of the civil liability as if
appml due to death of the appellant, from a judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in
the Court had hold that the act from which the civil (action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e),
the affirmance of sruch conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in a case is dismissed
Rule 111.) But this is not to say that the state is already exonerated altogether from another kind of
but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally
civil liability for indemnity, restitution or reparation, for under the unbroken line of precedents I
mandated presumption of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt,
have already referred to, the pertinent provisions on Human Relations of the Civil Code, particularly
something that his death prevents the court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-
Article 30, come into play, for under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based
appellant has the effect of his total absolution by God from any earthly responsibility for the offense
on his death becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates prosecution of the civil
as such, a divine act of clemency no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. It is an
liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the
inherent inalienable human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of criminal
commission of the crime as such, that is, without having to prove the criminal liability of the
liability in any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has been duly proven beyond
defendant so long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by a
reasonable doubt in a duly held criminal proceeding. The intervention of death of the accused in any
preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil action is brought to
case is an injunction by fate itself that no criminal liability whatsoever should be imposed on him,
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings, are instituted
not only because from the very nature of the situation, it is impossible to do so but also because it
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to
would be a juridical absurdity to contemplate such a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the
prove the act complained of."
crime, and, corollarily, all its consequences.

My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on the act as crime has to
Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal liability under Artide
be prosecuted in a te civil action and not within the same criminal proceedings wherein the accused
100 of the Revised Penal Code would have no basis unless criminal responsibih"ly is fixed or exists.
has been acquitted or the case against him is terminated with exonerative consequence. If there is
It has been said that civil liabilitv under this provision "is rooted in the criminal liability". 1 In this
any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding precedent. Worse, in my
connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that "when a criminal action is
opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous premise that Article 29 of the Civil Code
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
does not mean literally what it says. Textually, this article states:
instituted with the criminal action, etc." But it must be emphasized that these legal precepts refer
exclusively to the civil liability consequent of the offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it being
elementary on our legal system that the same act my give rise to civil responsibility independent of When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
that resulting from the commission of the act as a crime. guilt has not been beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in the act viewed as a
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
violation of the penal law and still be liable civilly for it considered otherwise as an infringement of a
should be found to be malicious.
right based on a created by contract or by laws other than the criminal law. A consistent host of
jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem exists upholding the right of
a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity, restitution or reparation, notwithstanding the If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
absence or failure of the usual prosecution, in view of the provisions of the pertinent articles of the the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
Civil Code on Human Relations and Section 2 of Rule III. Stated the same act or got Of facts can be may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
the subject of obligations arise at the same time thru the different modes contemplated in Article due to that ground.
1157 of the Civil Code providing that "obligations arise from (1) lave, (2) contracts; (3) quasi-
contracts; (4) acts or omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or
Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for damages for the same act
omission is punished by law, thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor, does not exclude
or omission may be instituted." It does not say that the civil action joined with the criminal action, as
simultaneous liability of the for the same act viewed also as one giving rise to an obligation under
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 111, shall survive and be the one continued. I reiterate that what is
the another law, and/or under a contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, with the sole qualification
left to the offended party after the death of an accused before conviction is the right to institute a
that the aggrieved party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or omission. (See
civil action for damages for the same act or omission pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code
Art. 2177, Civil Code.)
and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And as I see it my learned
All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to take the position that
colleagues in the majority and I are agreed that in the light of the legal Principles I have stated, there
since the point I am pressing on is more or less procedural or remedial in nature, and perhaps, the
can be no doubt that the estate of Sendaydiego could be held liable for the acts of the d that can be
failure of the parties concerned to seriously object to the procedure pursued in the main opinion

128
could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper way of dealing with the civil
liability incurred by the estate of the deceased Sendaydiego, hence my concurrence, in the qualified
sense implicit in this separate opinion, in the dispositive portion of the decision herein.
May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted that when appeals in
criminal cases before us have to be dismissed by reason of the death of the appellant, it is not proper
to qualify such dismissal as limited to that of the criminal liability of the appellant. It is my humble
view that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the offended parties concerned should be left
to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the appropriate separate civil action contemplated
both in the Civil Code and in Rule 111, as explained above. I admit this view might entail the
institution of what is virtually a repetitive proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding what the
unequivocal language of the pertinent legal provisions mandate, unless I make myself a party to
judicial legislation, which I believe it is not constitutionally permissible for me to do, no matter how
practical the procedure might be.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson guilty of six separate
crimes each of falsification and malversation as elucidated in the very well studied and ably
prepared main opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Aquino, and while I further agree
that said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego are lointtv and solidarity
liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts stated ir. the dispositive portion of the decision
herein, I have my own legal basis for holding that the estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the,
said amount&
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of
the deceased Sendaydiego (he died during the pendency of this appeal) insofar as his liability is
concerned, ... Sendaydiego's appeal will (nevertheless) be resolved only for the purpose of showing
his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate is liable." It seems to me that
there is some degree of irreconcilable incontency in dismissing a case, thereby acquitting the
accused therein of criminal liability because of death or any other cause not amounting to a finding
that he had not committed the act complaint of and at the same nine holding that he or his estate
has in civil liability based on his criminal liability. It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an
appml due to death of the appellant, from a judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in
the affirmance of sruch conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in a case is dismissed
but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally
mandated presumption of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt,
something that his death prevents the court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-
appellant has the effect of his total absolution by God from any earthly responsibility for the offense
as such, a divine act of clemency no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. It is an
inherent inalienable human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of criminal
liability in any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has been duly proven beyond
reasonable doubt in a duly held criminal proceeding. The intervention of death of the accused in any
case is an injunction by fate itself that no criminal liability whatsoever should be imposed on him,
not only because from the very nature of the situation, it is impossible to do so but also because it
would be a juridical absurdity to contemplate such a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the
crime, and, corollarily, all its consequences.
Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal liability under Artide
100 of the Revised Penal Code would have no basis unless criminal responsibih"ly is fixed or exists.
It has been said that civil liabilitv under this provision "is rooted in the criminal liability". 1 In this
connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that "when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, etc." But it must be emphasized that these legal precepts refer
exclusively to the civil liability consequent of the offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it being
elementary on our legal system that the same act my give rise to civil responsibility independent of
that resulting from the commission of the act as a crime.
Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in the act viewed as a
violation of the penal law and still be liable civilly for it considered otherwise as an infringement of a
right based on a created by contract or by laws other than the criminal law. A consistent host of
jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem exists upholding the right of
a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity, restitution or reparation, notwithstanding the
absence or failure of the usual prosecution, in view of the provisions of the pertinent articles of the
Civil Code on Human Relations and Section 2 of Rule III. Stated the same act or got Of facts can be
the subject of obligations arise at the same time thru the different modes contemplated in Article
1157 of the Civil Code providing that "obligations arise from (1) lave, (2) contracts; (3) quasi-
contracts; (4) acts or omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or
omission is punished by law, thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor, does not exclude
simultaneous liability of the for the same act viewed also as one giving rise to an obligation under
the another law, and/or under a contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, with the sole qualification
that the aggrieved party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or omission. (See
Art. 2177, Civil Code.)
I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And as I see it my learned
colleagues in the majority and I are agreed that in the light of the legal Principles I have stated, there
can be no doubt that the estate of Sendaydiego could be held liable for the acts of the d that can be
proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of Sendaydiego's appeal by
reason of his death. Our possible disagreement relates only to the procedural aspect of the matter.
The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate within this appeal
proceedings, thereby sing with the filing of a separate civil action for the In my view, the dismissal of
Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as I have said to his acquittal This acquittal to my mind is different
juridically from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only intimated earlier, it is a total
absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from or extinction of the civil liability as if
the Court had hold that the act from which the civil (action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e),
Rule 111.) But this is not to say that the state is already exonerated altogether from another kind of
civil liability for indemnity, restitution or reparation, for under the unbroken line of precedents I
have already referred to, the pertinent provisions on Human Relations of the Civil Code, particularly
Article 30, come into play, for under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based
on his death becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates prosecution of the civil
liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the
commission of the crime as such, that is, without having to prove the criminal liability of the
defendant so long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by a
preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil action is brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings, are instituted
129
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to 59 G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998
prove the act complained of."
ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner,
My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on the act as crime has to
be prosecuted in a te civil action and not within the same criminal proceedings wherein the accused
vs.
has been acquitted or the case against him is terminated with exonerative consequence. If there is
any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding precedent. Worse, in my
opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous premise that Article 29 of the Civil Code COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
does not mean literally what it says. Textually, this article states:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa
should be found to be malicious. Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained
physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of
due to that ground. Complaint 1 against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.

Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for damages for the same act On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
or omission may be instituted." It does not say that the civil action joined with the criminal action, as Makati (docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless
provided for in Section 1 of Rule 111, shall survive and be the one continued. I reiterate that what is Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." The information
left to the offended party after the death of an accused before conviction is the right to institute a read:
civil action for damages for the same act or omission pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code
and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight
All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to take the position that Physical Injury as follows:
since the point I am pressing on is more or less procedural or remedial in nature, and perhaps, the
failure of the parties concerned to seriously object to the procedure pursued in the main opinion
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the
could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper way of dealing with the civil
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
liability incurred by the estate of the deceased Sendaydiego, hence my concurrence, in the qualified
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
sense implicit in this separate opinion, in the dispositive portion of the decision herein.
the abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco
Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in
May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted that when appeals in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-306, did
criminal cases before us have to be dismissed by reason of the death of the appellant, it is not proper then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
to qualify such dismissal as limited to that of the criminal liability of the appellant. It is my humble drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless,
view that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the offended parties concerned should be left careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without
to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the appropriate separate civil action contemplated regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and
both in the Civil Code and in Rule 111, as explained above. I admit this view might entail the without taking the necessary care and precaution to
institution of what is virtually a repetitive proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding what the avoid damage to property and injuries to person,
unequivocal language of the pertinent legal provisions mandate, unless I make myself a party to causing by such negligence, carelessness and
judicial legislation, which I believe it is not constitutionally permissible for me to do, no matter how imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a
practical the procedure might be. Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and
owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage
amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice
of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of
P8,542.00.

130
 That as further consequence due to the strong impact, xxx xxx xxx
said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which
required medical attendance for a period of less that
REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF
nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performing
PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
his customary labor for the same period of time.

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting premised on the following grounds:
petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
slight physical injuries," and sentencing her:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996
AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY
the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF
Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON
without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.
costs. 4
A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V.
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise: AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE
WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED
ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment
WHAT WAS STATED IN THE
(Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p.
ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS
711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished
THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT
with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles,
PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
IS ARRESTO MENOR AND
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS
(P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00). GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH
PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-
SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED
G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she
BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY
Cautela, Period for Filing Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied
SOURCE.
this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of
APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
Appeals rendered a decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.
DISCRETION WHEN IT
COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus: RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE
PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A
PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS
SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO
ITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF
PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT
MAY 24, 1996.
OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT
IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9

131
 C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING
THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION
AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title,
but likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v.
Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense
was arresto menor not arresto mayor.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have
pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless
imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to
property, instead of considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do
not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months," citing Lontok v.
Gorgonio, 12 thus:
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-
37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).
The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is
different from the instant case because in that case the negligent act
resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage to property
which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted a
complex crime.
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information.
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable
in their maximum period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days
imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower courts."
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as
such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January
1988, or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had
already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense
of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged
in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribes in
two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished
(Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f],
Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the
information charging him with that light offense.
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since
Regional Trial Courts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that
damage to property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered
by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only the filing with the proper
Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this time
invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13
In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum
period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court of
Appeals, 14which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial
court to "complex" reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property
because what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the
results thereof; hence, there was no need for two separate informations.
To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court
had jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court
properly took cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher
penalty for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00.
On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos v. Garcia. 15
The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the
prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three
days after the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17
In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to
the OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the
OSG's reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the
"complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to
property; besides, in that case, two separate informations were filed one for slight and
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property
through reckless imprudence. She then insists that in this case, following Arcaya v.
Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been filed. She likewise
submits that Cuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to
"complex" damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with
attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect;
otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling
in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.
132
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is
correct.
II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries are light felonies.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code applies to
the quasi offenses in question.
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be
questioned for the first time on appeal.
V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction
over the offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have
already prescribed.
I. The Proper Penalty
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto
mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect.
However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its
maximum period is the proper penalty.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would
have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only
resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be
punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
25 pesos.
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its
maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is,
however, committed deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under
Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty
then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribed under the
first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of
Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto
menor. 25
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the
third paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since
the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies
is the first paragraph of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless
imprudence which, had it been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note
that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would have
been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would
then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months
which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty
under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first paragraph, then
the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degree, which
is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or
imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1
month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth
paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of the penalties therein provided
"the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in
article 64."
133
 II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of
skill. 26
As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by
public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as
infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or
both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is
considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty
lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier
discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto
mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense
in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of
the Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave
felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared
that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony,
there is no complex crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no
complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the
light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light felonies
of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a
single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot
be charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to
distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs.
Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious
physical injuries, damage to property amounting to P10,000 and slight
physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in filing a separate
complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for
the lesiones menor graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-
37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less
grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to
quash before she pleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses
as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them. 29
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
Quasi Offenses in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. 30
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section
32(2) 31 thereof provided that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs),
Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive
original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding four
years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof."
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the
imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The
question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure,
such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.
In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which
court had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from
6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional. We then
interpreted the law in this wise:
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto
mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts,
and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has placed destierro below arresto
134
 mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of any express
provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from
said provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized
with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and
municipal courts and not under that of courts of first instance.
Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months
were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those
penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated
scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also
fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00,
the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable
penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods the duration of
which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC of Makati.
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave
felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in
five years.
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary
to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the
incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases
covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in
the instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the
prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly
with said courts.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.
Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in
case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the
Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved
therein was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish
Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances
and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of
prescription is suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty
party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted by the
filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute
a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing
of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of
this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was
affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and No pronouncement as to costs.
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by
SO ORDERED.
any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish
whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or
for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 34 and People v.
Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's
office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

135
60 G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what
distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals
may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with frustrated
homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-
2213.1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000,
he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a
leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck
Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious
as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking
outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated
wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were
serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who
were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather
than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on
the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself,
struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to
stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel
then fled and hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the
Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of
the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three
engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify
for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking
conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in
the absence of evidence to support it.3 Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to
submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could
still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in
case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language
and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand,
argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the
accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a
stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the
case to the trial court.
The Courts Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-
defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified
in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-
136
defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the
person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on
employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
that very day?
that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation. 5

A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to
the patient preferred to go home at that time.
prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an
imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound
victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon. 6 not the depth of the wound?

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab
him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnels only other
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the
middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered
injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.7 A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal
lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the
depth.13
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from
their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull
to Arnels testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were
deserving credence.8 not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr.
Belleza further testified:
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated
homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
resulted in death as in fact it did not?
A: Yes, Madam.
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his victims
life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt
Q: The injuries are slight?
regarding homicidal intent.9And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the
means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 10
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus
the problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked
Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the
wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him. xxxx

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his
use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are
not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the
victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious," 12 he could A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home
not categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus: and then come back.

137
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecutions
claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel
liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from
the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum.
With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state
only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right
to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The
Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him
to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of
his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law
on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to
probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over
to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also
be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets
the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 16 that the probation law
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral
defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight
months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he
chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When
the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served
him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and
probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the
appellate courts affirmance of his conviction."17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
"By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the
option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him.
He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated,
homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
probation.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This
would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the
provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for
138
the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment
convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess
of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds,
he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years
and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead
undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation.
No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done
right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was
not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of 20,000.00 as moral damages,
without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of
the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.
61 G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially
rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and
save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the
service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be
availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who
manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as amended by
P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Company he
failed to control his outburst and blurted
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), bullshit. Puro
kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn
you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5)
separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging him with
gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found
petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, i.e., Crim.
Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year
and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed
on each date of each case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the
offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. 1 He was
however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar
Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner elevated his
case to the Regional Trial Court.
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but appreciated
in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus
139
 . . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words
complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some missing
documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising
ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words
must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC
became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence,
issued a warrant of arrest. Butbefore he could be arrested petitioner filed an application for
probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his petition
on the following grounds
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991.
Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he had
asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he had failed
to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any
error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for reconsideration of
the questioned order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4
SCRA 436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his
petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA
18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the petitioner's
application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal
has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's compassion in
dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition as he now argues
before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the
MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of
the benefits of the Probation Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court
was such that he would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the
judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by
the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even after
appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of
the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly
included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who
thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands
convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court
which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or
its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law
who is not clearly within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted provision,
offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law should not be subjected to
any to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused
from applying for probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable
limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing law and
jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en
banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We,
however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be given.a
"liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal
interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute
themselves, andas illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for
doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit ofthe law" may
legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite
meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent"
must obviously be given effect by judges and all others who are charged with
the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to
bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be
given effect are derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and
not from some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and
transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation" rather
than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by
P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede
a disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the law-making
140
 authority projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply.
That meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and
unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Courtis simplyreading Section 4
as it is in fact written. There is no need for the involved process of construction
that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made necessary only because
petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words
of the statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he
finds it, not as he would likeit to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court
of First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will surely follow, making,
we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to
achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which
tinge words as to give them the color of a particular
judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the
law, which has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with respect to a
given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted
interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the
words here and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done
or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them
meanings which they do not ordinarily have cutting,
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the
meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been
submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's
grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should notbar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is
taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of
the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory
while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use of the term
"shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does not
make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there
was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple
prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not,
and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an
applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation.
The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set
out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the
penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D.
968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree
shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each
penalty separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to
have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and in each of the four
(4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4)
different, separate days, he was stilleligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on
petitioner was probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on
the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just
because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and
serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended,
disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to
Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple
offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the
disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of
penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally
considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say,
thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one
outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been
found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum
as minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin.
Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he could not
have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did not, his appeal now
precludes him from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that the
penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified under the
Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment"
imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10)
years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years
provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128
months; 128 months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his
argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties exceeds six (6)
years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since there are
only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation, instead of sixteen
141
(16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any
clearer "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional,
in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner
should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the
judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in
each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating
circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral defamationThere is no valid reason
therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not
sixteen (16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of
petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed
therein. Thus
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is
AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating
in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a
straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted or
absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any part of
thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed.
Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can
we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole
modification on the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as
the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application
for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he
felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability.
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to
probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed by the
MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his
conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for
probation since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision but rather to insist on his
innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the
RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at
his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive
identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare
statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in
not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court
committed an error in relying on his positive identification considering that private complainants
could not have missed identifying him who was their President and General Manager with whom
they worked for a good number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged
defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-
employees and clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner,
the trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of private
complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete
innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, the
accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty
to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after
asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By
perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the
Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of
an accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing so only
after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the Court of
Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties.
Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be
worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and executory because of the
negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the
period allowed by law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed
against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4)
separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same
Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the
Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This is vital
way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the application
for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and)
almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22of the RTC. This is a significant fact which
militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit
assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the
specific issue
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The law in
point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on probation
....
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation from one
who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's
plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that
the petitioner was up for execution of judgment before he filed his application
for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the application for probation must be filed
"within the period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
142
 appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law. Even
granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by
P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution before the
application for probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did
not file his application for probation before the finality of the said judgment;
therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may yet be
granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction already set for
execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily
must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the application for probation
with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow
probation after an appeal has been perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC although the imposed
penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not
even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an
application for probation outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise
eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying probation is
the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application for probation.
Reliance is placed on the literal application of 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended, which
provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Thus, under 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for probation.
If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit
in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation under any of the cases
mentioned in 9, to wit:
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the
public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a
fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for probation, as when
the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but on
appeal the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused should not
be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed even encouraged speculation on the
outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and
143
failed to obtain an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990 by
expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the
fact that he is eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal
if he knows he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the accused to the
choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose
is to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for
probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of the amendment, it bears
repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who; although
eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was principally
motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him,
what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given to him he was
disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as
alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to
suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found
guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The totality of the penalties
imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of
imprisonment allowed by 9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty
was reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total
term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he
did not appeal further although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered by the
present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was disqualified from
applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under the
terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of 4: "No application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow probation in
this case would be to go against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended." (p. 9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law it is not but to achieve
its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Pao, 120 SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of the
law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting
individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a
chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save government
funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and to
decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per
Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395 (1985)
instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never intended
to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can
avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty.
Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to
enable him to avail of the benefits of probation. A contrary view would
certainly negate the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is that after the
penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became
qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was because he was
afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however, was also there when
he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took
as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence and not
simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused who, upon being
arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is otherwise
eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the beginning,
later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who
appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is
reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies for probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989), in which it
was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for
probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have applied for
probation as his original sentence of one year of prision correccional did not disqualify him for
probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the prohibition in 4 that one who applies for
probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
II.
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted out
to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms
imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of 9(a) which
disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six years."
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on petitioner
was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in
each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral
defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which he would have to
serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum allowed by
law.
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence
imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer
imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said
144
accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This means eight probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several offenses, "the
(8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months. number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within
the probationable period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9,
paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that such has been the legislative
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences imposed in cases
intent.
which are jointly tried and decided. For example, 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.
in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in five
criminal cases, was qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on
Separate Opinions
different dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each
criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days. MENDOZA, J., dissenting:

That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case.
penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
I.

It is said that the basis of disqualification under 9 is the gravity of the offense committed and the
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals denying probation is
penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral
the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before filing his application for probation.
defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense
Reliance is placed on the literal application of 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended, which
than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and sentenced to a single penalty
provides as follows:
of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of
grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more times. The
relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an accused found guilty of grave oral Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
defamation four or more times and another one found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
temporal. suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation
for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or
III.
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and that
is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
execution of its decision as modified. But that is because 4 provides that "an application for
imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed with the trial court
probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case, petitioner had to
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC
had become final.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's application for Thus, under 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or applying for probation.
probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit
in the choice, however, is that the accused is not disqualified for probation under any of the cases
mentioned in 9, to wit:
VITUG, J., concurring:

Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be

While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his dissenting
extended to those:
opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty imposed
on him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation if on
appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am unable, however, to (a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
second the other proposition that multiple prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their years;
totality for purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue
Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for

145
 (b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the
public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a
fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of
this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified for probation, as when
the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in their totality exceeds six (6) years but on
appeal the sentence is modified so that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused should not
be denied the benefit of probation.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed even encouraged speculation on the
outcome of appeals by permitting the accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and
failed to obtain an acquittal. 1 It was to change this that 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990 by
expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." For an accused, despite the
fact that he is eligible for probation, may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal
if he knows he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in limiting the accused to the
choice of either appealing from the decision of the trial court or applying for probation, the purpose
is to deny him the right to probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for
probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of the amendment, it bears
repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who; although
eligible for probation, does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC petitioner was principally
motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him,
what is clear is that he had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given to him he was
disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as
alleged in the information[s]." This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to
suffer the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, since he was found
guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of four cases. The totality of the penalties
imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of
imprisonment allowed by 9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty
was reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in each case or to a total
term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he
did not appeal further although he could have done so.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space not covered by the
present law on probation . . . where in its original state, the petitioner was disqualified from
applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under the
terms of the judgment on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of 4: "No application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the ruling, states that to allow probation in
this case would be to go against the "clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended." (p. 9)
To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter is to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law it is not but to achieve
its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Pao, 120 SCRA 8, 14 (1983)). The niggardly application of the
law would defeat its purpose to "help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting
individual" (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford [him] a
chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save government
funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while incarcerated, and to
decongest the jails of the country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per
Makasiar, J.)
The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 391, 395 (1985)
instead commends itself to me:
Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never intended
to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can
avail of in order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty.
Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of the accused to
enable him to avail of the benefits of probation. A contrary view would
certainly negate the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved.
As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof of this is that after the
penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became
qualified for probation, he did not appeal further. The majority says that this was because he was
afraid that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however, was also there when
he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took
as much risk that the penalty would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.
It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his innocence and not
simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no more so does an accused who, upon being
arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty." And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is otherwise
eligible for probation.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not guilty'' in the beginning,
later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition after he is found guilty. So does an accused who
appeals a sentence because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is
reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies for probation.
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989), in which it
was held that because the petitioner had appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for
probation. For, unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have applied for
probation as his original sentence of one year of prision correccional did not disqualify him for
probation. That case fell squarely within the ambit of the prohibition in 4 that one who applies for
probation must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
146
II. execution of its decision as modified. But that is because 4 provides that "an application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case, petitioner had to
await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the original sentence meted out
had become final.
to him he was not disqualified for probation. The issue here is whether the multiple prison terms
imposed on petitioner are to be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of 9(a) which
disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent judge of the Metropolitan
than six years." Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's application for
probation.
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally imposed on petitioner
was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional in VITUG, J., concurring:
each crime committed on each date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral
defamation against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which he would have to
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in his dissenting
serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the probationable maximum allowed by
opinion that an accused, who originally is not qualified for probation because the penalty imposed
law.
on him by a court a quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation if on
appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am unable, however, to
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the modified sentence second the other proposition that multiple prison terms imposed by a court should be taken in their
imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation because he has to suffer totality for purposes of Section 9 (a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue
imprisonment of eight months sixteen times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said Bellosillo in his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an applicant for
accused in each case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This means eight probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison terms for, several offenses, "the
(8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 months or 2 years and 8 months. number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within
the probationable period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9,
paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that such has been the legislative
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple sentences imposed in cases
intent.
which are jointly tried and decided. For example, 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos. It was held Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition.
in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in five
criminal cases, was qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on
different dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this Court noted, "Rura was
sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each
criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.

That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the totality of several
penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on the accumulation of penalties. (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)

It is said that the basis of disqualification under 9 is the gravity of the offense committed and the
penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral
defamation for which the total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense
than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and sentenced to a single penalty
of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of
grave oral defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more times. The
relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an accused found guilty of grave oral
defamation four or more times and another one found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal.

III.

Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying probation in this case and that
is that petitioner applied for probation only after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the

147
62 G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping. If the evidence does not
adequately prove this element, the accused cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case,
the prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim toward a place only he
knew. There being no actual detention or confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave
coercion.
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of Arnulfo Astorga challenging
the March 31, 1993 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of
kidnapping.
In an Information2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo
Astorga was charged with violation of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby
depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended
party.
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by his counsel, 3 pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision 4 reads as
follows:5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO ASTORGA having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, [he] is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National
Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa].
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty imposed. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the trial court, as follows: 7
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically assert that around 6:30
P.M. children of neighbors were near the store of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was used. The daughter
and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling [sic] about the possession of a flashlight
until the glass got lost. Accused or "Boy" Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane
what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer and accused
immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused placed his hand on her shoulder
and covered his [sic] mouth.
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she was brought by the
accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were closed; others were opened. Accused
never went inside the store to buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until
they went inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking inside the
perimeter fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the child. Later, there being no
person around the gate, accused brought her out to the highway and walked towards the
direction of Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio Binuangan, Maco.
She asked him where they were going and accused answered that they were going home.
She told him that they were already on the opposite direction because her grandparent's
house is at Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it was an
opposite direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne that they were on the wrong
direction, accused placed his hands on her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and
protested that she must go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced
to walk she continued crying.
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described, somewhere near
the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men. Having met on their opposite
direction, the two, were noticed by the group of youngsters. The group were bound to
Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group
accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were suspicious about the man
who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked
fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran.
They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with others in chasing, asked
the accused where they were bound. He answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed
something suspicious because their destination was already towards Tagum which is an
opposite direction to Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one of those who chased
knew the family. He got from the accused Yvonne who showed some resistance.
Nevertheless, the group brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also
brought by them to Yvonne's home. The house of accused and Yvonne were five (5)
meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the victim, but he was driven by
her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He
left and never talked with the family.
148
Evidence for the Defense All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she categorically
declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's Brief, 8 dated December 10,
1993: His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].

The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the accused-appellant Consider these facts.
himself.
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was intoxicated
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the afternoon of December that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree from 1:00 P.M. until
29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of Maco, Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2) 5:00 P.M.
companions. They were drinking Red Horse and were already drunk. When they finished
drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's house. (TSN, pp. 7-8 and 18, March 23,
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his actions
1993). The house of Astorga is about 5 meters away from the house of the complainant[.]
suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging Yvonne. When he
Yvonne came and asked money from the accused to buy candy. The two went together
noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing him, he carried Yvonne and
and she was left behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return, she looked
ran until they covered a distance of half a kilometer in chasing them, until they
for them, but because it was already dark. She did not find them. She went back to the
had overtaken him.
house of the accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).

If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor, he

Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified that "at around
could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco from Tagum. Upon arrival his two
friends, Vicvic and Anding were already at his home. They decided to drink, hence they
proceeded to Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M., they Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted that
were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on the same day, the three she did not smell liquor on the accused.
proceeded near the municipal hall and with some persons, they again continued their
drinking spree taking up Red Horse wine". (Decision, p. 3).
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and was not
able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow afterthought.
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne approached him and
asked him money to buy candy. He told her that they will buy. They were not able to buy
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at opposite
because the two stores where they went were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March
direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards Tagum. Accused did
24, 1993). He took her for a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They walked inside
not change course.
the school premises which was about 20 meters away from the second store. They went
out of the school compound going towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness
[sic], he thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They reached xxx xxx xxx
Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the bridge near the municipal
hall. After reaching Purok, they met several persons, he was asked were (sic) they were
Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by dragging,
heading, and he answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that they [sic] way was already
slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused also used
going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to Tagumpay. They asked him
psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.
who was the child he was carrying. He answered that it was Traya's child, (Ibid, pp. 16-
17). He was carrying the child because he was already crying she already wanted to go
home. The group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne was being held by Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty and was
the women. They arrived at Yvonne's house. He talked to the auntie of the child and told by force prevented to go home to her parents.
her that he would converse with her but he was advised to go away because the father of
Yvonne might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to buy candy.
She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth Nalcot that she went to
The Trial Court's Ruling the house of the accused on 29 December 1991 or on any other dates to ask
money from Astorga for candy.
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion: 9
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off tangent and
incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost in the direction of
Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took Yvonne to
Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that of the person they met that
buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be subsided.

149
 he was on the wrong way considering that there are no criss crossing roads
except the highway is preposterous.
The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court: 10
I
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that Yvonne
Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that appellant
had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the
legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion,
not kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not worthy of
credence because they were inconsistent and improbable. He cites the following:
Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told Yvonne
that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-
11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were contradicted by Yvonne Traya
when she declared that Glenda Chavez had already went [sic] inside their
house when [the] accused told her that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10, March
16, 1993). She testified that she did not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision,
pp. 3-4)
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the accused at a
distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20 meters (TSN, p. 35,
March 10, 1993) Arnel Fabila, on the other hand, testified that they overtook
the accused after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March
11, 1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her because
she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However, Arnel Fabila declared
that they were able to overtake the accused only after chasing him at a distance
of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993) meaning accused was running
fast.11
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses concerning minor
details and collateral matters, like the examples cited by appellant, do not affect the
substance, veracity or weight of their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce,
rather than weaken, their credibility, for different witnesses of startling events usually
perceive things differently.12 Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot
be expected to be uniform to the last detail.
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that time allegedly
contradicted Yvonne's statement that the accused did not smell of liquor. This does not
detract from the credibility of either witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child,13 and
her Aunt Glenda, then twenty-seven years old,14 do not have the same experiences or
level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More important, whether the
accused was drunk or not is an insignificant detail that does not substantially affect the
testimonies of these witnesses.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance covered by the men
who chased appellant does not render their testimonies incredible. 15 Quite the contrary,
such discrepancy shows their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies
were unrehearsed.16 Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the group of men
following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonne's testimony is in accord with that of Arnel
Fabila a member of the group who chased appellant that they were able to overtake
appellant after chasing him half a kilometer.17
Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is also premised on the
alleged failure of the trial court to consider the following
points:18
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused casually moved
around the school premises, as if they were strolling; That when they were
already in the highway, they were also walking openly and casually until they
were met by a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the fact that the
two were walking casually along the highway when he first saw them;
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged victim will not be
seen or noticed by the people travelling or those persons residing along the
highway if it was true that the accused was dragging her and she was
continuously crying from her residence up to a distance of more than one
kilometer;
150
 c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at a very slow pace;
a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more than two hours;
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking different kinds of
intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., causing him to be confused on
which way they should take in going home.
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime. Furthermore,
motive becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and
there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has
committed it. Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the
culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 24 In this case, the identity of
appellant is not in question. He himself admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central
Elementary School.

e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters who allegedly
Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?
rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the municipal hall which
was just near the house of the victim for the filing of the necessary charge; this
[sic] actuations only confirm the fact that the accused merely sought their help Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential element of
in guiding them home, and kidnapping the fact of detention or the deprivation of liberty. The solicitor general
counters that deprivation of liberty is not limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in
an enclosure. Citing People vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and her parents to file
the case at the Fiscal's Office.
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no argument
against this conclusion that the accused deprived the offended party of her
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the one-week delay in
liberty without placing her in an inclosure; because illegal detention, as defined
the filing of the complaint. It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal
and punished in our Code, may consist not only in imprisoning a person but
accusation does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is
also in detaining her or depriving her in any manner of her liberty. 26
satisfactorily explained.19 In the present case, one week was reasonable, considering that
the victim was a resident of Binuangan and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
We agree with appellant's contention this time.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him to the municipal
hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time to rescue Yvonne and to bring her Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the elements of kidnapping are as follows:
home, which they actually did.20 There is no settled rule on how a group of young men
should react upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is not the
1. That the offender is a private individual.
only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being forcibly taken.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the

Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and walking casually does not
latter of his liberty.
negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant
used physical force and psychological means in restraining her.21 Despite her young age,
Yvonne was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that fateful night. 3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling or living along the 4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne. The fact is that a group of men present:
actually noticed and ultimately chased them.
5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five (5) days; or
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long settled rule that the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses should be accorded great respect
6. That it committed simulating public authority; or
on appeal.22

7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"
detained or threats to kill him are made; or

Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove why the accused
8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.
should kidnap Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the prosecution had failed to prove [any]
motive to support the alleged kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense
more credible and believable."23 The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms "lockup"
(encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or raptar). Lockup is included in the broader
term of "detention," which refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure

151
which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does not A Yes, sir.
necessarily involve locking up.28 Likewise, the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently, the Spanish text is controlling in cases of
Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy
conflict with the English version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative
Astorga bring you?
Code.29

A Inside the gate, sir.

A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses ineluctably shows the
absence of "locking up." Victim Yvonne Traya testified:30
Q And once inside the gate what did he do to you?
Q And after that what happened next?
A We were going around the school?
A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was
already bringing her child and bringing with her candle. xxx xxx xxx
And Arnulfo Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir.
Q Do you know why you were going around the school?
Q And after that?
A Yes, sir.
A And while I was not answering the question he
immediately grabbed me.
Q Why, what did he do?

xxx xxx xxx

A We were going around and when he saw that there is
no person in the gate we passed at that gate.
Q And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do
next?
Q And where did he go after passing that gate?

A He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering

A Towards Lupon-lupon, sir.
[sic] my mouth.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q What about you, did you talk to him?

Q And after that what did he do next?

A I asked him where we were going and he told me that

A He brought me to the school.
we are going home and I told him that this is not the way
to our house, and we did not pass this way. (Witness
Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the gesturing a certain direction).
name of the school?
Q And so when you said that that is not the way, when
A Maco Central Elementary School. you said that is not the way because our house is towards
Binuangan. . .
Q How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your
house? By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do
you know to what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to
what place is Lupon-lupon going to?
A A little bit near.

A Yes, sir.
Q When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark?

152
Q Where? A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and
Boy Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man
continued to say that this way is going to Tagum and not
A Going to my place.
to Binuangan any more.

Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that

Q What else did the man ask, if any?
place?

A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be

A On the road going to Tagum.
Q Now, what, about your house, where is it going?
A To Binuangan.
Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said
that is not the place going to your house?
A We continued walking and he also placed his hands on
my shoulder and dragged me, sir.
the ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga
put me down because he urinated. So, at that instance, I
ran, but, after he urinated, he already took hold of me not
to run any more because there is a ghost.
Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you
when he urinated, where did you run?
A Towards Binuangan, sir.
Q Towards the direction of your house?

Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging A Yes, sir.
you?
Q And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
A I was crying, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying?
Q What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy
A Yes, I told him that we are going home. Astorga?

Q And what did Boy Astorga say? A He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened
me that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is
[sic] not a red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming
A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not
from the vehicle.
to make any noise because if I will make any noise we will
be lost on our way.
Q Now, what happened next?
Q And so, what did you do?
A He placed a necklace on me, sir.
A I continued crying, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And after that, what happened?
A He was dragging me and I was crying when he was
dragging me.
A We continued walking and we met a person and he
asked Boy Astorga where we are going, sir.
Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to
him?
Q What did that man ask Boy Astorga?

153
 A Yes, I told him that I will go home.
Q And what did he say?
A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place
we are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but
it is [sic] the opposite.
Q So, what happened next?
A He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty
of persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he
slapped my mouth and after a few steps he already
carried me.
xxx xxx xxx
A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I
told him that I want to go home and he told me that we
are heading towards home, but I told him that the way we
are going to is not the way to our house.
Q By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, what happened next?
A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles
but they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
Q After that, what happened next?
A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back
and he saw that persons were already chasing him and
after that he carried me and ran.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were constantly on the
move. They went to Maco Elementary School and strolled on the school grounds. When
nobody was at the Luponlupon bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading
to Tagum, Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really wanted to
go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and continued walking her toward
the wrong direction. Later on, the group of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant
Astorga carried the victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.
This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or restraint of the
victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping. 31 Appellant's apparent intention was
to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not
materialize, however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence does not
show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less, that he actually detained her.
Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an
actual confinement or restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup."
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under Article 286 of the same
code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do
something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as
would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended
party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to
do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.32 When appellant forcibly dragged and slapped Yvonne, he
took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant presented no justification for
preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie de la Cruz. 33 Here,
Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to
buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought
home, but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction
against her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock
up" Yvonne, there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will.
In Rosemarie de la Cruz, Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the
accused in that case failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping because of the timely
intervention of the victim's neighbor. Thus, the Court held in that case: 34
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim
of the latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable
proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court,
and maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in
this case are those when accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused
to let go when the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then already
saw what was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and
the evidentiary record shows that there were a good number of people present
at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at least a
teacher nearby. The child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it
does not take much to scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under
the attendant circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed
deprived of her liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief moment
when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let go, the victim had gone
with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further act reinforcing the
inference that the victim may have been denied her liberty, even taking
cognizance of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that kidnapping in the
case at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule that factual
findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of
testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at
bar, the Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215
SCRA 266 [1992]).
154
The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains sufficient 63 G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of which were sufficiently proved by
the prosecution. Hence, a conviction for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
120 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof When there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and
DECISION
that proved or established by the evidence, and the offenses as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the PEREZ, J.:
offense charged included in that which is proved.
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the penalty imposed by law victims positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.1 For it to prosper, the
for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. 35 The court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty does not been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2
exceed one year. 36 However, appellant has been imprisoned for more than six (6)
months. He has more than served the penalty imposable for such an offense. 37
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and
executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED only ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the
of grave coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344,
detained for any other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System,
considering that he has more than served the maximum penalty imposable upon him. Creating the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating
That director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five days from receipt Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
of this Decision, of the actual date the appellant is released. No costs.
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the
SO ORDERED. reversal of the judgment of his conviction.4

The Facts

In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening more or less, at
barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being
only five years old.7

On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the
existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3
December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon
presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.

Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective
versions of the story.

155
Evidence for the Prosecution found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the
daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51Appellants aunt, Gloria, told appellant
that the policemen were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be
wash the dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant
summarized in the following manner:
with dirt.53

FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house is along the road. That of
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident
appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to
blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center. 55 Dr.
pass by FFFs house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every
Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate 56 dated 29 January
hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against
2003. It reads:
appellant prior to the incident.13

Injuries seen are as follows:

AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time playing at
the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the
road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident.14 1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.

At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC 2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA,
FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
[Rita].15

4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line

Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the
store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short
pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time.19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch 5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area
or place."20
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material

AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
her hand while on the road near the store.22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of
spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed
ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. 24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he 8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position
mounted her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a
push and pull movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the
Impression
Perochos.28 She, in turn, went straight home crying.29

MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES

FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. 30 She was without slippers.31 He found
her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head. 33 He
checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black.34 She had HYMENAL LACERATIONS
no underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. 35 AAA told him that appellant
brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos; 37 that he
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the
threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast; 38 and that he
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the
proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January
2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. 40 He asked the appellant what he did
to AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no
him.42 FFF went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked
bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
again,44 and boxed him.45

Evidence for the Defense

Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the
house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced
her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her. 49 Julito left and
156
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision, 86 the dispositive portion of which
testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he reads:
was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime. 60 Luzvilla even went further to state
that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. 61 In addition, Antonia Perocho
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed
[Antonia], sister-in-law of appellants aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape
upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as
incident was revealed.63
rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87

Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant
FFFs house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the
was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the
road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF, 66 and whenever
crime was committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced
he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him. 67
the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:

At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro
order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon
Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellants uncle sent him to the
the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to
return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .68
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of
the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate
Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of
life imprisonment.90
Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also
observed that appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean.69
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a
drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors. 71 She went out to relieve herself at the
side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos. 72 From where she was, she saw xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1)
Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAAs face was covered day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months
and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game. 75 Meanwhile, of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim
appellant was still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
Julito, now in a white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following exemplary damages and to pay the costs.91
behind.79 Luzvilla followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the
appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants Notice of
Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant, respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement. 94
boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo
pointed at appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
Voluntary Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.83
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"95 by
invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was watching the television reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to
black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 support a conviction."96
minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did
not answer. Upon Antonias advice, Julito released her and went out of the house. 84
Our Ruling

Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him,
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 oclock in
the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter.85
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three
well-entrenched principles:

157
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the A They were apart.
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in
which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
Q Who pushed them apart?
with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 97
A Hermie.
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to
convict the accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
examining physician.99
A Yes.
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime,100except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the
Q What was that?
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101

A His penis.
I

Q Where did he push his penis?

A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in
the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b)
when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of A To my vagina.
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.102
Q Was it painful?
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in
the insertion of appellants organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of
A Yes.
the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.

Q What was painful?

AAA testified:

A My vagina.
PROS. OMANDAM:

Q Did you cry?

xxxx

A Yes.103
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else
did he do to you?
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased
in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all she had been
A He mounted me.
raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that
rape was committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you? honesty.105

A Yes. Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo 106 revealed that the hymenal
lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an
object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
object;" and that such object could have been an erect male organ.107

A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.

The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration conclusively
established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
II

158
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission
of the crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at
him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover,
appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it
would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the
way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she
called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was
wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The
defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal,
was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito,
who is older, who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of
the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the
opportunity to observe the witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and
the scant or full realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances
have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone
else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainants positive identification of accused and
other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the
supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latters
testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child." 115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial
and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring
inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the
appellants very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay;
that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought
Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape
incident because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house
for the second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who
asked appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellants
errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to
Glorias statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho.
Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvillas claim that Julito wore a
white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by
AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant
wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvillas recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and
later changed to white), and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas house three (3) minutes
after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the
house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial courts appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that
Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers
who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen
at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been
brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her just as Julito Apiki
said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having
been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses
cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other." 121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts,
still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far
away and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity
when the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the
crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by
foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this
Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep
when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely
presumed that the accused slept all throughout.126
159
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant
that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded
by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellants sister-in-
law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellants physical presence in the fishpond at the
time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellants house where the
rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant
never left their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was
impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified
that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being
harvested. Likewise, Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not
have focused his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the
appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her
inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never
left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight,
save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover,
considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the
Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next
to the Perochos down the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, appellant could have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and
immediately returned to his uncles house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating
witnesses even bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the
crime.130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at
the time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic
Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3)
years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review.133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in
which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. 134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and
that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minors
cunning and shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark
place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her
defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she
was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the
death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the
imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; 142 and (2) the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the
penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties
provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. 145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree
from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned
with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
160
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether
the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no
bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family. 150 The respective
awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of 75,000.00 each are, therefore,
proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of
Appeals in the amount of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity and 75,000.00 as moral damages. And,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be increased
from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of
Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction
is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18)
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals
held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,154 the aforestated
provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the
ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in
conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court
(SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with
the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the
basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations 158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court
to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence
of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council
for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos] proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests,
and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous
crimes, the intention should still be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with
the Law,which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no
longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the
law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section
48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of
a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-
one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender
shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the
Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member
of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance
with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
161
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect 64 G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
appellants confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. vs.
00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant
is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil
DECISION
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344. NACHURA, J.:

SO ORDERED. Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which
affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated
May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate
informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, 6 then about eight (8) years of age.
The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:

Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of
YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with
the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.9Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

162
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB,
DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family
members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good
neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home.
BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA. 11 There, AAA confessed that
petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old
and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega 12 (Luzviminda), mother of
petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who
was sick.13 During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA
slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala.
There petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the
petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort
room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she
felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would
spank her.14AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the
house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time,
Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called
AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was
lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief,
removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of
AAA.15 AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2)
ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in
their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both
naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and
making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly
left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted
his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that
petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not
report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB
reported the matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for
AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed
that the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were
not able to sleep that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda
and petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to
her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination.18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas 19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was
molested.20Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann
Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an
unofficial written report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia
minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she
saw on AAA's genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could
disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her
findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. 23 As such, petitioner stayed with a
certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and
in order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was
infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the
prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. 24 He is
the second child of three siblings an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the
accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends;
when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room
together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he
never touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in
any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and
helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may
have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents,
went to AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the
time; while they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of
which BBB ran and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that
petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were
only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were
together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister; 27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents
and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his
parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four
o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's
house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as
the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for
examination.28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the
time of the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and
the rest of her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when
MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and
her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's
house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking
spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including
petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or
noise at the time; while they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA
were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately
stood up and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children
were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement;
the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they
get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day,
MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to
BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling
163
FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested. She also Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson,
they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM
and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should seek advice from the
Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner I.
would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost
two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF
bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner,
SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE
calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly
CASE.
slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases. 29

II.
The RTC's Ruling

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with
honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's
family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both III.
families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused
shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision
IV.
Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The
accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as
indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic). THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY
THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE
COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for
his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release
pending appeal.31
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's
defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim
AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive.
The CA also held that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were
irrelevant, as it is established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ
consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined
that petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great
weight and respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court,
we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain
facts of substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner
stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved;
thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner
inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions,
wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and
the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical
report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA
and found that there were no signs or indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner
submits that the CA committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it
disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove
its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner
opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent, unsophisticated and
lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old
boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six,
could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was MMM's motive in filing the
instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out
that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia

164
of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period of 3 to 4 days. SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the child is detained pending trial, the
Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if
lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and
instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child
against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to a youth detention home.
to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally,
petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law.
The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict
(OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his with the law under their custody.
disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both
doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and
penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of
Court Proceedings. If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion
AAA that petitioner raped her in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape
and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local
was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in
social welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social
accusing petitioner; and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the
Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall
presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made
determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the
by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe directly the
judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed of
demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly,
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply
the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he committed the said crime, as
for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.
manifested in his covert acts.36

SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006. 38 The law establishes a
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law 39 (CICL) and children at
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit
risk40 with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as
from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.
towards their development. In order to ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section
They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain
applicable laws.
duties and functions42 such as the formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile
delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and
rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with
the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises,
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of
namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering
R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43
that at the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to
the appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough
assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of
his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act.
Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of
the child.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution
for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's
VIII testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. 44 The RTC,
as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge
petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts
also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his
younger sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of
the crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low
as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that
such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is
not true.45 We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the
genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from petitioners parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must
be noted that in most cases of rape committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old
then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it
has been held that actual penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not
required.46Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full
165
penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the
pudendum constitutes rape.47
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness
of the act, no criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal
liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below,
at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the
CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence,
in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the
the accused are given retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised
accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
Penal Code, which provides:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
exempts (him) from criminal liability."
of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
performing a criminal act.
instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.

In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC
the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and
with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by
R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68
thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38 51of
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I
R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG
humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given
retroactive application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its
application. ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING
THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR)
AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A
We are not persuaded.
YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD
SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides: CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the
of this Act.
capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
are ready.
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of
children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
who currently have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
166
Senator Santiago. That is correct. xxxx

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or
through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before
that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will
conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical
facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have
to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and
the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue
should also be incorporated in the amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective,
all those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal
Code, for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will
be immediately released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I
would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a
transitory provision that would make this law apply also to those who might
already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their
penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory
Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically,
Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15)
years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately
be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to
cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional
provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, amendment, subject to style.
et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in
detention.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have
to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate
the counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and
provision.
absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.
prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he
should be given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago
amendment is accepted.55
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56

167
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a
statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the
law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,
and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose
of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.57
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 58 In this case, the plain
meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most
favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the
new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the
alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and
by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never assailed in any of the
proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the
crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over.
Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly,
complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years
old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act
No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that
they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly
flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their
age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. 60
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of
rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when
she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the laws greater protection. However, this
consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not
subject to review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or
unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we
have done so in this case.62
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC).

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape
SO ORDERED
committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant
exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by
the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This
award is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for
rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity
of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition
of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape. 59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect
our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of
CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped
us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the
Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has

168
65 G.R. No. 117407 April 15, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IRVIN TADULAN y EPAN, accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
Accused-appellant Irvin Tadulan was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 157, Metro Manila, in a complaint docketed as Criminal Case No. 92-186, alleging as
follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of April, 1992 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, armed
with a knife, with lewd design and by means of force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one Maristel Cruz, a minor, nine (9) years old, without her consent and
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
When arraigned under the foregoing indictment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
attributed to him. Thereafter, trial commenced with both prosecution and defendant presenting
evidence consisting of testimonies of witnesses and documentary exhibits.
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to establish the following facts:
. . . Complainant Estela Santos owns a house at No. 6 Dr. Garcia St., in Barangay
Sumilang Pasig, Metro Manila where she resides with her common-law
husband and their minor daughter, Maristel Cruz. Behind the said house,
complainant also owns a three-door apartment building, one unit of which was
rented and occupied by accused Irvin Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan and
their three children name [sic] Dianne, Angie and Bochoy who were aged 10, 9
and 5, respectively. In 1992 complainant's daughter, Maristel Cruz was about
nine (9) year [sic] old (Exh. "A") and was in grade school. She often played with
the accused's children in the vicinity of their house and the apartment building.
In the morning of April 2, 1992, at about 11:00 o'clock, Maristel Cruz was
playing with the other children when she was called by Irvin Tadulan into the
latter's apartment unit. He brought the girl upstairs and told her to lie down on
the floor. Irvin Tadulan then removed the shorts and panties of Maristel Cruz
and his own pants and briefs. He kissed the girl and fondled her breasts and
private parts. Then he put himself on top of her and inserted his organ into her
genitals. Maristel Cruz felt the pain in her vagina. She pushed Irvin Tadulan
away from her and got up, but the latter poked a kitchen knife at her and told
her to remain lying down; and because of fear, Maristel Cruz lay [sic] down on
the floor again. Irvin Tadulan placed himself on top of her once more, kissed
and fondled her breasts as before, and finally succeeded in inserting his penis
into her sex organ. As he had intercourse with Maristel Cruz, blood oozed out
of her vagina and she felt the pain. Shortly thereafter, however, she heard her
mother calling her. So, Irvin Tadulan told her to dress up quickly and ordered
her to go home.
Upon reaching home, Maristel Cruz did not inform her mother that Irvin
Tadulan had carnal knowledge of her; but two days later, their laundry woman
saw the blood stains on her panties and told her mother about it. At first,
Maristel Cruz refused to talk when her mother asked her about the said blood
stains, but when the mother persisted in asking her, the girl cried and revealed
that Irvin Tadulan had sexual intercourse with her. The mother (Estela Santos)
was shocked. She reported the matter to her godson who immediately
confronted Irvin Tadulan relative to what he had done to Maristel Cruz. At first,
Irvin Tadulan denied having done the act imputed to him by the said girl, but
he later on admitted that he had sexual intercourse with her.
Shortly thereafter, Irvin Tadulan's wife (Adefa Tadulan) arrived from a trip
from Cagayan de Oro City, and Estela Santos immediately informed her that
her husband, Irvin Tadulan has raped her (Estela) daughter Maristel Cruz.
Estela Santos further informed Adefa Tadulan that she would not take action
against the latter's husband if they would vacate the apartment unit right
away. Adefa Tadulan later on met with Estela Santos and told her that she had
driven away Irvin Tadulan, but requested that she and her children be allowed
to stay until Saturday, April 11, 1992. Estela Santos thereafter noted, however,
that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to the apartment unit every night
despite the promise of his wife that she herself would call the police should he
ever come back to the place. So, Estela Santos conferred with her cousin, a
lawyer, and later on made up her mind to file a criminal charge against Irvin
Tadulan before leaving for abroad, for she was then scheduled to go to the
United States to fetch her mother who was ill due to a stroke.
On the night of April 11, 1992, Estela Santos heard a loud noise coming from
the apartment building, and when she inquired about it she came to know that
it was Irvin Tadulan creating the noise because he was kicking the door of the
apartment unit occupied by him and his family. So, Estela Santos called up the
police because of her apprehension that Irvin Tadulan would create trouble
due to the quarrel that was then taking place between him and his wife.
Responding policemen soon arrived at the place in a mobile car, and because
Irvin Tadulan was denounced by his wife for having rape [sic] the daughter of
Estela Santos, the said police officers brought Irvin Tadulan to the Pasig Police
Station for questioning and also asked Estela Santos and her daughter to follow
them. So, that same evening, Estela Santos and her daughter went to the Pasig
Police Station where they gave their respective sworn statements (Exhs. "B" &
"E") and lodged their complaint against Irvin Tadulan. It was during the taking
of her statement before the police when Maristel Cruz also revealed that Irvin
Tadulan had laid with her not only on April 2, 1992. She stated that Irvin
Tadulan had previously laid on top of her and first attempted to have
intercourse with her sometime in September 1, 1991, but it was not
consummated because she was hurt whenever he tried to insert his penis into
her vagina.
169
 In order to determine physical signs of sexual abuse, the Pasig Police Station WHEREFORE, AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this
made a Request For The Medico Legal Examination of Maristel Cruz to the PC Court hereby finds accused IRVIN TADULAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City (Exh. "F") on the the crime of RAPE defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal
following day, April 12, 1992, upon the written Consent For Examination (Exh. Code, and he is hereby sentenced to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the
"G") which was signed by the mother, Estela Santos. A medico-legal officer of accessory penalties the law provides therefor.
the PCCLS examined Maristel Cruz and then issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-
0708-92 dated April 13, 1992 (Exh. "C") finding her "hymen with deep, healed
Accused Irvin Tadulan is also hereby ordered to indemnify the offended minor
laceration at 4 o'clock", and with the conclusion that the "Subject is in non-
girl, Maristel Cruz in the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), with
virgin state physically". Thereafter, the Pasig Police Station forwarded the
interest thereon at the legal rate of six per cent (6%) per annum from the filing
sworn statements of Maristel Cruz and her mother, together with all the
of the complaint in this case until the same is fully paid.
pertinent papers to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal where the
said minor child and her mother signed the Complaint for Rape (Exh. "D")
against Irvin Tadulan, which initiated the prosecution of the said accused in SO ORDERED. 4
this case.2
In this appeal, accused Irvin Tadulan assigns the following errors to the trial court:
On the other hand, accused Irvin Tadulan set up the defense of alibi and pardon. In support of his
defense, Tadulan testified that he could not have raped Maristel Cruz in his apartment unit in
I
Sumilang, Pasig, Metro Manila, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 2 April 1992 as he was then at his
place of work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Manila, where
he was employed as a mobile equipment operator. His testimony was corroborated by his THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE
supervisor at the plant who testified that on 2 April 1992, Irvin Tadulan worked with him at the EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
company plant during the first shift, from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and that as shown in Tadulan's
daily time record (Exhibit "1"), said accused punched in at 5:25 a.m. and punched out at 2:31 p.m.
II

Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation, Adefa Tadulan, wife of accused-appellant, testified
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
that when she arrived at their apartment on 7 April 1992 from Cagayan de Oro, she learned from
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES MARKED AS THEY ARE WITH
Estela Santos and her daughter Maristel Cruz that the latter had been raped by her husband, that
INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES WHICH CAST SERIOUS DOUBTS AS
she again went to see Estela Santos and asked for forgiveness and that the latter told her: "Hayaan
TO THEIR TRUTHFULNESS.
mo na lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung and Dios nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya." Said witness also
testified that she asked Estela Santos if the accused Irvin Tadulan could just leave first while she and
their children would vacate the apartment unit on the coming Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; III
and that pursuant to said agreement, Irvin Tadulan immediately left the apartment and she started
packing their belongings and sent their children to Cagayan de Oro in the company of her mother.
ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT IS
CORRECT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT
Adefa Tadulan further testified that on the night of 11 April 1992, her husband came home and ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY PARDONED BY COMPLAINANTS.
upon learning that she had sent their children to the province, he got angry and they had a violent
quarrel. The noise created by the quarrel was heard by Estela Santos who immediately called the
IV
police; and on that same night, Estela Santos and Maristel Cruz lodged a complaint for rape against
accused Irvin Tadulan despite the previous understanding between Estela Santos and Adefa
Tadulan that Estela would not take action anymore against Irvin Tadulan. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.5
Prior to the reception of evidence for the accused, his counsel filed a Motion to Plead Guilty to
Lesser Offense 3praying that accused be allowed to plead guilty to the crime under Article 336, The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to credibility of witnesses.
Revised Penal Code, denominated as Acts of Lasciviousness. No communication having been
received from the complainant with regard to said offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, the trial
In rejecting the version of the accused-appellant, the trial court made the following findings and
proceeded for the reception of evidence for the defense.
conclusions to which we agree.

After trial, the now appealed judgment was rendered by the lower court finding accused-appellant
This Court finds, however, that the abovementioned testimonies of accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The dispositive part of the decision reads as
Irvin Tadulan and his witness cannot prevail over the more convincing
follows:
testimony of the rape victim, Maristel Cruz, who positively identified the said
accused as the one who raped her and described in a clear and straightforward

170
manner how she was sexually abused by him. In the absence of any clear has raped Maristel Cruz, she (Estela Santos) and her said child proceeded with
showing of ill motive that might have impelled her to impute the heinous crime the filing of their complaint for rape against Irvin Tadulan.
of rape against the said accused, there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the
declarations of the said victim in court; for as held in a case (People vs.
From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of
Camasis, 189 SCRA 649), "it is hard to believe that a young unmarried woman
Estela Santos from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
would reveal that she was deflowered and allow the examination of her private
representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her
parts and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of public trial if her motive
husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their apartment
was not to bring to justice the person who wronged her." Also applicable here
unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation turn
is the well-settled principle that "alibi is unavailing as a defense where there is
[sic] out to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because Irvin
positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime, most specially, when the
Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her [sic] wife
said identification is made by the victim of the rape herself in the absence of
had a violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of April 11, 1992.
any motive to implicate the assailant". (People vs. Felipe, 191 SCRA 176, and
Otherwise stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions which were
cases therein cited). Besides, it has been held time and time again, that for alibi
not complied with, and for which reason Estela Santos proceeded with the
to prosper as a defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he
filing of a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances,
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or its
it is clear to the mind of this Court that the complainant has not expressly
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA
pardoned the said accused.
266). In this case, however, it is clear that accused Irvin Tadulan was not so
situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at the plant of the
Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, Metro Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by
Manila which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang of the same the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be
municipality where the crime was committed. effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following
words: "Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the
Relative to the defense of pardon or condonation also set up by accused Irvin
parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the
Tadulan, his wife Adefa Tadulan testified that on April 7, 1992 when she
belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was
arrived at their apartment unit from a trip from Cagayan de Oro City, she came
also held in another case, that "The express pardon of a person guilty of
to know from both Estela Santos and her daughter, Maristel Cruz, that the
attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not
latter has been raped by her husband; that she again met with Estela Santos
sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the
and asked for forgiveness, and that the said mother told her: "Hayaan mo na
express pardon of the girl herself." (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)
lang, umalis na lang kayo dito, kung ang Diyos ay nagpapatawad, tao pa kaya."
The said wife also testified that she asked Estela Santos if her husband could
just leave first while she and their children could vacate the apartment unit on In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted
the coming Saturday, and Estela Santos agreed; and that pursuant to the said only by the mother (Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended
agreement Irvin Tadulan immediately left their house, after which she also minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument
sent their children to Cagayan de Oro City in the company of her mother and that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the
then started packing-up their belongings. She further testified that on the night accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above,
of April 11, 1992, however, her husband came home and quarreled with her such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended
upon knowing that she had sent their children to the province; that because of minor herself.
the noise their quarrel created, Estela Santos called for the police; and that on
that same night, Estela Santos and her daughter lodged a complaint for rape
In fine, this Court concludes that the prosecution has proved the guilt of the
against Irvin Tadulan, despite the previous understanding between her and
accused Irvin Tadulan of the crime of rape charged against him, and that the
Estela Santos that the latter would not anymore take any action against her
defenses of alibi and pardon or condonation set up by him are lacking in
husband.
merit.6

It should be pointed out, however, as earlier narrated above, that according to

We have consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial
Estela Santos, she agreed not to file any complaint against Irvin Tadulan upon
court on the credibility of witnesses. We have sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their
the representation of his wife, Adefa Tadulan, that she had driven away her
vantage point in the evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent, of course, any showing of serious
husband, and her promise that if he would ever return to their apartment unit,
error or irregularity that otherwise would alter the result of the case. 7 We find no such serious
she herself would call for the police; that she (Estela Santos) noted, however,
error or irregularity in the case at bar.
that Irvin Tadulan was still coming home to their apartment unit every night;
that she was prompted to call for police assistance because she saw Irvin
Tadulan kicking the door of the apartment during a violent quarrel with his Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court gravely erred when it disregarded the defense of alibi
wife on the night of April 11, 1992; and that because soon after policemen despite the overwhelming evidence that the accused did not leave his place of work on 2 April 1992.
arrived at the place, Adefa Tadulan herself informed them that her husband According to the appellant, his immediate supervisor, Leandro Daguro, testified that he (appellant)

171
reported for work on 2 April 1992 and was assigned in a critical area, and being the only driver at
that time a problem would have ensued had he left his post at any given time on 2 April 1992.
Appellant likewise faults the trial court when it observed that there was no physical impossibility
for him to be at Barangay Sumilang, Pasig where the crime was committed because the court mainly
focused its attention on the fact that Barangay Pinagbuhatan is but a few kilometers away from
Barangay Sumilang, both in Pasig, hence, appellant could have returned to his place of work after
committing the crime at the time and place it occurred. Accused argues that the distance between
the two barangays was never an issue; that the question really is whether or not appellant left or
could have left his work at the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in barangay Pinagbuhatan and gone
home to barangay Sumilang in the morning of 2 April 1992.
We are not persuaded. The testimony of Leonardo Daguro that accused could not have left his work
as this would have resulted in a big problem at the area where appellant was working is too simple
for comfort. The same witness testified that he could not remember if a problem arose on that date
when the crime was committed and that he was supervising an average of seventeen (17) men in
different sections of the raw material department so that he had to go around each section.
We quote with approval the following observation of the court a quo:
. . . Besides, it has been held time and time again that for alibi to prosper as a
defense the accused must show that he was so far away that he could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime, or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission (People vs. Tasurra, 192 SCRA. 266) In this case,
however, it is not so situated on April 2, 1992, for according to him he was at
the plant of the Republic Asahi Glass Corporation in Barangay Pinagbuhatan,
Pasig, Metro Manila which is but a few kilometers from Barangay Sumilang
of the same municipality where the crime was committed. 8
Accused-appellant tries to discredit the victim's testimony by questioning her behavior after she
was allegedly raped by the accused in September 1991 in that she did not show any fear of the
accused on 2 April 1992 when she was called by him. It should be borne in mind, in this connection,
that the victim was only a naive nine (9) year old child when the crime was committed on her. She
considered the accused as a friend, almost like a relative, as in fact she called him "Tito Loloy." She
therefore unsuspectingly went near the accused when called by the latter.
As we have stressed in a recent case
. . . it is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone
traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people. The range of emotion shown by rape
victims is yet to be captured even by the calculus. It is thus unrealistic to expect
uniform reactions from rape victims. 9
The victim Maristel was too young to totally comprehend the consequences of the dastardly act
inflicted on her by the accused-appellant.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "(A)s regards the acts imputed to Estela, the delay of
seven (7) days from the date of her knowledge of the rape incident on 4 April 1992 in reporting to
the authorities the rape of her daughter is excusable. At that time, she was not yet certain of the
steps she would take considering the delicate nature of the problem they were facing" (citing People
v. Danguilan, 218 SCRA 98; People v. Joaquin, Jr., 225 SCRA 179)." Besides, we have ruled that a delay
in prosecuting the rape is not indicative of fabricated charges. 10
Finally, the accused's denial and alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by the victim
Maristel as her rapist. Maristel testified in a clear and straightforward manner that appellant
through force and intimidation and with use of a deadly weapon (kitchen knife), succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her. 11
As for the defense that Estela Santos, as the mother of the victim Maristel, expressly pardoned him,
we sustain the trial court's finding which reads as follows.
From the evidence just discussed, it would appear that the initial desistance of
Estela Santos from taking any action against Irvin Tadulan, was upon the
representation of the latter's wife Adefa Tadulan that she had driven away her
husband, and her promise that should he ever come back to their apartment
unit she herself would call for the police; but that the said representation
turned out to be untrue, and the promise was not complied with because Irvin
Tadulan was still coming home every night and, in fact, he and her wife had a
violent quarrel in the apartment unit on the night of April 11, 1992. Otherwise
stated, the desistance was subject to certain conditions which were not
complied with, and for which reason Estela Santos proceeded with the filing of
a criminal complaint against Irvin Tadulan. Upon such circumstances, it is clear
to the mind of this Court that the complainant has not expressly pardoned the
said accused.
Besides, there are authorities holding that pardon must be granted not only by
the parents of an offended minor but also by the minor herself in order to be
effective as an express pardon under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
in the case of People vs. Lacson, Jr., (C.A.) 55 O.G. 9460, we find the following
words: "Neither must we be understood as supporting the view that the
parents alone can extend a valid pardon. Far from it, for we, too are of the
belief that the pardon by the parents, standing alone, is inefficacious." It was
also held in another case, that "The express pardon of a person guilty of
attempted abduction of a minor, granted by the latter's parents, is not
sufficient to remove criminal responsibility, but must be accompanied by the
express pardon of the girl herself." (U.S. vs. Luna, 1 Phil. 360)
In the present case, the supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted
only by the mother (Estela Santos) without the concurrence of the offended
minor, Maristel Cruz. Hence, even if it be assumed for the sake of argument
that the initial desistance of the said mother from taking any action against the
accused, constitutes pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above,
such pardon is ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended
minor herself. 12
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated 4 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 92186 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 157 of Pasig, Metro Manila, is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification as
to the indemnity for the victim which is raised to P50,000.00 from P30,000.00 to conform with
prevailing jurisprudence including the recent case of People v. Romualdo Miranda y Geronimo, et al.,
G.R. No. 97425, 24 September 1996, where the victim was also a minor, as in the case at bar.
172
66 G.R. No. 135457 September 29, 2000 Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to
his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and
JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN (10) were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
JOHN DOES, accused-appellant.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as
DECISION he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however, replied that they
were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm and
he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality.
BUENA, J.:

After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie,"
New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for
appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case
him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son
No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka Django,' 'Carlos
hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated
Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion
by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative
perpetua.
of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.

On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka
Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows:
Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.

"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to
Municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
another, armed with guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought
him to Sitio Abre, Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is
ALFREDO AREVALO thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the
the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs. three criminal cases filed against him.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de
Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and
2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the
substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the following
penalty:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias
Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo
and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim
Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim. Case
No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby acquitted.

Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention.
companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a
person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished
and Malto complied. "With cost de-oficio.

Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When "SO ORDERED."1
he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down.
After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly committed by
to carry away the dead man.
the trial court:

173
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER,
AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No.
347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons
Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in
Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to
appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated
November 17, 1999 which states:
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998. 2
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed
with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit
Pampropaganda and participated in the following armed activities:
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on
14 February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol,
Sorsogon on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol,
Sorsogon in 1987;
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan,
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672
was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665
was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San Antonio,
Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No.
2664 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio
Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay
Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No.
2663 was filed against him.
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty
Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus
recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the
recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under Proclamation No.
724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were
committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be
issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed
with the Commission by any party within said period.'"3
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission, wrote the
following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of
RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was accused of
the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"2. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"3. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"4. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"5. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2663 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the
opportunity to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant
of amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice,
unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.
174
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."4 restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before
any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC. 5
the law precisely as though he had committed no offense."

In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr.
been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party. 6
Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal. 10

Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon,
17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, 12 are ordered DISMISSED. The release of
and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED
beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this decision.
insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal
association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or
agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of SO ORDERED.
publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without
leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War;
Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal
ends."1wphi1

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. 7 Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.8

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

In the case of People vs. Casido,9 the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:

"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before
or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks
forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the
175
67 G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and
21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's)
petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00
from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all
three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on
18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the
account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May
1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed
that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money
to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to
Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on
the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7 He also showed
a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause
only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for
Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the
pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo
directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson
and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of
merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the
complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's
resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe
after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were
dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period,
as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from
1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been
filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the
matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner. 15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the
DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and
declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3)
separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City
Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered
"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special
acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326
applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses
penalized thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme
Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings,
and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August
2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to
the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent
compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its
resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.28
176
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently
without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for
its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has
already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to
petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in
the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always
fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correctthe court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching
the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the
verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that
there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of
the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a
certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed
a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a
municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the
information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that
the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. 37 He argues that
sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to
him since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. 38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for
Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is
the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive
periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x
xx
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P.
Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes
in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only
the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in
the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was
approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at
the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the
offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or
examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
177
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
offender,48 and hence, the prescriptive period should be interrupted. REFILE the information against the petitioner.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the No costs.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No.
8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the
SO ORDERED

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation

against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities
Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent
change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has
become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should
now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves
the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With
this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges
against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the
time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995)
up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had
elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the
active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the
DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially
those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of
the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite
finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any
impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice

178
68 G.R. No. 140231 July 9, 2007
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), represented by ORLANDO L.
SALVADOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, Office of the Ombudsman-Manila, CONCERNED MEMBERS OF THE
PNB BOARD OF DIRECTORS, REYNALDO TUASON, CARLOS CAJELO, JOSE BARQUILLO, JR.,
LORETO SOLSONA, PRIMICIAS BANAGA, JOHN DOES, and NORTHERN COTABATO SUGAR
INDUSTRIES, INC. (NOCOSII), respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Presidential Commission on Good Government 1 (petitioner) filed the herein Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution2 dated May 21, 1999 of
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto in OMB No. 0-95-0890 which dismissed petitioner's criminal
complaint for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 3 against concerned
members of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Board of Directors and Northern Cotabato Sugar
Industries, Inc. (NOCOSII) officers, namely: Reynaldo Tuason, Carlos Cajelo, Jose Barquillo, Jr.,
Loreto Solsona, Primicias Banaga and John Does (respondents); and the Order 4 dated July 23, 1999
which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to
inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate
actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions
of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest
or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is
undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect
endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders,
officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan
proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the
project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan
release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan
transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the
Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's
insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed
that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that
NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the
required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land
contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in
the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with
the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the
guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents
violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx
g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the the Ombudsman, prompting
Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available
evidence.
In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the
dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the
respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation on May 21, 1999.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order
dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.7
Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to this Court and in support of its petition alleges that:
A) The Respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint filed by the Petitioner on the ground of
Prescription considering that:
179
 1. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER BEHEST LOANS AS ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15, OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;
2. PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT RUN IN FAVOR OF A TRUSTEE TO THE
PREJUDICE OF THE BENEFICIARY;
3. THE OFFENSES CHARGED ARE IN THE NATURE OF CONTINUING CRIMES
AS THE STATE CONTINUES TO SUFFER INJURY ON EACH DAY OF DEFAULT IN
PAYMENT. HENCE, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT APPLY;
4. PRESCRIPTION AS A MATTER OF DEFENSE MUST BE PLEADED,
OTHERWISE, IT IS DEEMED WAIVED;
5. PRESCRIPTION HAS NOT BEEN INVOKED IN THIS CASE. SINCE IT MAY BE
WAIVED OR MAY NOT BE SET IN DEFENSE, THE OMBUDSMAN
CANNOT MOTU PROPRIO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION;
6. ARTICLE 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH ADOPTS THE
"DISCOVERY RULE" SHALL APPLY IN THIS CASE;
7. THE LOAN CONTRACT AS OTHER LOAN TRANSACTIONS IN THE NATURE
OF BEHEST LOANS ARE KEPT SECRET.8
B) The respondent Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in not finding that a probable cause exists for violation by the
private respondents of section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 despite the presence of clear,
overwhelming and unrebutted evidence.9
In its Comment, the Ombudsman, without delving on the issue of prescription, in view
of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (1999),10 contends that its
finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against respondents deserves great
weight and respect, and must be accorded full weight and credit.
No comment was filed by the rest of the respondents.
The issue before the Court is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
ruling that: (a) the offense leveled against respondents has prescribed; and (b) no probable cause
exists against respondents.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject complaint
on the ground of prescription.
Respondents members of the PNB Board of Directors and Officers of NOCOSII are charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Amending said law, Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg.
195,11 increased the prescriptive period from ten to fifteen years.
The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 12 as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
The issue of prescription has long been laid to rest in the aforementioned Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,13 where the Court held:
x x x it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the
loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses
with which respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
The assertion by the Ombudsman that the phrase 'if the same not be known' in Section 2
of Act No. 3326 does not mean 'lack of knowledge' but that the crime 'is not reasonably
knowable' is unacceptable, as it provides an interpretation that defeats or negates the
intent of the law, which is written in a clear and unambiguous language and thus provides
no room for interpretation but only application.14
The Court reiterated the above ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto(2001),15 thus:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 Edsa
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made (PCGG vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 140232, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA
767; Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, supra, Note 14; Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, supra, Note 16). Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive
investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2, Act No.
3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted 'when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person.16
180
Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,17 or within three (3) years from the time of discovery.
Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no
probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered
to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information
with the appropriate courts.18 Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere
with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.19 Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional
mandate20 and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect
for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of
the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an
information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 21
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such
as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2)
when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges
are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly
no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied,22 none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 23 The exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 24
The disquisition of GIO Diaz-Salcedo, in dismissing the criminal complaint, as approved by
Ombudsman Desierto, is worth-quoting, thus:
Taking into consideration the provisions of Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum Order No. 61, the subject transactions can not be classified as behest.
Evaluation of the records of this case reveals that the loans acquired by NOCOSII are
actually foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of London. There were no direct loans
released by PNB but merely credit accommodations to guaranty the loans from Midland
Bank.
Anent complainant's claim that the collaterals offered by NOCOSII are insufficient, it
should be noted that under PNB Board Resolution No. 689 dated July 30, 1975, one of the
conditions imposed to NOCOSII was the execution of contract assigning all NOCOSII's
share of sugar and molasses to PNB. NOCOSII was also required to increase its paid up
capital at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April 30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980 or a total
of P25,000,000.00. In addition thereto, the stockholders of NOCOSII were required to
pledge or assign all their present and future shares to PNB while the accommodation
remains standing. The proposed plant site which was offered as collateral was estimated
to cost P307,903,000.00. The foregoing collaterals offered by NOCOSII are more than
sufficient to cover the loans of P333,465,260.00.
Furthermore, since the loan was approved by PNB, it presupposes that all the required
clearances were submitted by NOCOSII including the clearance from the Office of the
President; and having complied with all the documentary requirements, NOCOSII became
entitled to the release of the loan.
Complainant further alleged that NOCOSII was undercapitalized because its paid up
capital was only P50,000,000.00. Complainant, however, failed to consider the other
assets of NOCOSII which also form part of its capital. x x x25
The finding of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause by the Ombudsman is borne out by
the evidence presented by petitioner: firstly, there were no direct loans released by PNB but merely
credit accommodations to guaranty NOCOSII's foreign loans from Midland Bank Ltd. of
London; secondly, NOCOSII effectively came under government control since 1975 when PNB
acquired a majority of the voting rights in NOCOSII and was given the power to appoint a
comptroller therein; thirdly, PNB's credit accommodations to NOCOSII between 1975 and 1981 in
the aggregate sum of P333,465,260.00 were sufficiently secured by: (1) the Assignment of
Subscription Rights and/or Pledge of Shares dated September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII officers
pledged their shares of stock, representing 90% of NOCOSII's subscribed capital stock, and assigned
their subscription rights to future stocks in favor of PNB; 26 (2) the Deed of Assignment dated
September 5, 1975 whereby NOCOSII assigned its share of sugar and molasses from the operation of
its sugar central located at Barrio Mateo, Matalam, North Cotabato in favor of PNB; 27 (3) the Joint
and Solidary Agreement dated September 5, 1975 whereby the NOCOSII officers bound themselves
jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the payment of NOCOSII's obligations to
PNB;28 (4) the Real Estate Mortgage dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various
buildings, machineries and equipments, otherwise known as the NOCOSII Sugar Mill Plant, with an
estimated value of P307,593,000.00 in favor of PNB;29 and (5) the Chattel Mortgage with Power of
Attorney dated October 2, 1981 whereby NOCOSII mortgaged various transportation, agricultural
and heavy equipment in favor of the PNB;30fourthly, PNB imposed other conditions, such as, (1) the
submission by NOCOSII of the Central Bank's approval of its foreign loans; (2) the submission by
NOCOSII of the required clearances from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA)
and/or Presidential Committee on Sugar Industry (PHILSUGIN); (3) submission by NOCOSII of its
milling contracts covering a total area of not less than 14,000 hectares; (4) submission by NOCOSII
of the government permit that the planters can cultivate the required hectarage; (5) further
increase in NOCOSII's total paid-in capital to P25,000,000.00 at P5,000,000.00 a year starting April
30, 1976 up to April 30, 1980; (6) deposit in NOCOSII's account with the PNB of all cash proceeds of
NOCOSII's foreign loans the disposition of which shall be subject to the bank's control; and, (7)
designation by the PNB of its own representatives in NOCOSII's Board of Directors and its own
comptroller who shall have the authority to control all disbursements and receipts of funds of
NOCOSII.31
181
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court 69 G.R. No. 158131 August 8, 2007
to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial
evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned. 32
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JOSE V. MARTEL, OLGA S. MARTEL, and SYSTEMS AND ENCODING
May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 CORPORATION, respondents.
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 filed by the Social Security System (petitioner) of the Decision2 dated
17 October 2002 and Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The Decision of 17
October 2002 affirmed the ruling of the Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing petitioners
complaint against respondents Jose V. Martel, Olga S. Martel and five other individuals 3 for violation
of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of Republic Act No. 1161 (RA 1161), 4 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8282 (RA 8282),5 for non-remittance of contributions to petitioner.
The 5 May 2003 Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S. Martel (respondent Martels) are directors of respondent
Systems and Encoding Corporation (SENCOR), an information technology firm, with respondent
Jose V. Martel serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors. Petitioner is a government-owned and
controlled corporation mandated by its charter, RA 1161, to provide financial benefits to private
sector employees. SENCOR is covered by RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282, Section 22 of which
requires employers like SENCOR to remit monthly contributions to petitioner representing the
share of the employer and its employees.

In 1998, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office a complaint against respondent
Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534) for SENCORs non-payment of
contributions amounting to P6,936,435.80 covering the period January 1991 to May 1997. To pay
this amount, respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a parcel of land in Tagaytay City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26340 issued under respondent Martels name.
Petitioner accepted the offer "subject to the condition that x x x [respondent Martels] will x x x settle
their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time
x x x."6 Thus, petitioner withdrew its complaint from the Pasay City Prosecutors Office but reserved
its right to revive the same "in the event that no settlement is arrived at." Accordingly, the Pasay City
Prosecutors Office dismissed I.S. No. 98-L-1534.

In December 2001, respondent Jose V. Martel wrote petitioner offering, in lieu of the Tagaytay City
property, computer-related services. The record does not disclose petitioners response to this new
offer but on 7 December 2001, petitioner filed with the Pasay City Prosecutors Office another
complaint against respondent Martels and their five co-accused (docketed as I.S. No. 00-L-7142) for
SENCORs non-remittance of contributions, this time from February 1991 to October 2000
amounting to P21,148,258.30.

182
In their counter-affidavit, respondent Martels and their co-accused alleged that petitioner is
estopped from holding them criminally liable since petitioner had accepted their offer to assign the
Tagaytay City property as payment of SENCORs liability. Thus, according to the accused, the
relationship between SENCOR and petitioner was "converted" into an ordinary debtor-creditor
relationship through novation.
The Ruling of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office
In the Resolution of 28 February 2001, Pasay City Assistant Prosecutor Artemio Puti (Prosecutor
Puti) found probable cause to indict respondent Martels for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in
relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended by RA 8282.7 Prosecutor Puti rejected respondent
Martels claim of "negation" of criminal liability by novation, holding that (1) SENCORs criminal
liability was already "consummated" before respondent Martels offered to pay SENCORs liability
and (2) the dacion en pago involving the Tagaytay City property did not materialize. Prosecutor Puti
noted that respondent Martels did not dispute petitioners claim on SENCORs non-remittance of
contributions.8 Accordingly, the Pasay City Prosecutors Office filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City the corresponding Information against respondent Martels, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 01-0517.
Respondent Martels appealed to the DOJ.
The Ruling of the Department of Justice
In the Resolution dated 18 May 2001 signed by DOJ Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, the DOJ
granted respondent Martels appeal, set aside Prosecutor Putis Resolution of 28 February 2001, and
ordered the withdrawal of the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 01-0517. The DOJ found that
respondent Martels and petitioner entered into a compromise agreement before the filing of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 01-0517 and that such "negated" any criminal liability on
respondent Martels part. The DOJ Resolution pertinently reads:
From the facts obtaining, it cannot be denied that the dismissal of the first complaint
docketed as I.S. No. 98-L-1534 constituted the compromise agreement between the
parties whereby complainant SSS agreed to respondents mode of settling their liability
through a "dacion en pago". Consequently, the original relation between the parties was
converted to that of an ordinary creditor-debtor relationship thereby extinguishing the
original obligation by a new one. Complainant, therefore, cannot insist on the original
trust it had with respondents existing prior to the dismissal of the former complaint (I.S.
No. 98-L-1534) by filling [sic] the present complaint (I.S. No. 00-L-7142 now subject of
this appeal). Incidentally, this Office considers the latter complaint as a mere refilling [sic]
of the former already compromised and dismissed [complaint], because of the similarity
of the parties and causes of action.
After the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No. 98-L-1534 and prior to the filing of the
complaint at bar docketed as 00-L-7142, respondents have exerted great effort towards
complying with the terms and conditions of the compromise by way of "dacion en pago".
For example, respondents cite their arrangement for ocular inspection of the Tagaytay
land by the Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-Taal and with the Municipal Engineer
of Laurel, Batangas. The approval of the said commission to build a 12-storey building
had been complied with. This is not disputed by complainant. Access roads were acquired
by respondents from adjacent owners, ready to be titled in complainants name. Papers
and permits like ecological impact certification, site resurvey, soil test and site appraisal
were secured from various offices like the Municipality of Laurel, the Municipal Engineer,
the Presidential Commission on Tagaytay-Taal, the Philippine Volcanology Commission,
the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture, among others.
On the part of complainant, it equally shows [sic] adherence to the agreement to
compromise. Records show that on October 1999, one of its officers, Atty. Mariano Pablo
S. Tolentino, assistant vice-president, had expressed in writing his finding to the effect
that "(they) are satisfied to see the lot that (respondents) have negotiated with
Congressman Dumpit that (respondents) offered as access road to (respondents[])
property" (Annex "8" of Petition for Review). And, as borne by the records, a Dacion En
Pago Committee had been created by complainant SSS precisely to set the mechanism of
the settlement in motion. Further, respondents proposed an alternative mode of
settlement through computer-related services, which proposal was submitted to
complainant as late as December 1, 2000.
Verily, the foregoing facts indelibly show that the parties had acted with an obvious
intention to compromise. Hence, respondents reliance on the doctrine of incipient
criminal liability had [sic] factual and legal bases. While the rule provides that novation
does not extinguish criminal liability, this rule, however holds true only if a criminal
information is already filed in court. Before that bench mark point, the criminal liability is
only at its incipient stage and the new relation between the parties forged at such stage
had the effect of negating the criminal liability of the offender (People vs. Galsim, People
vs. Trinidad, 53 OG 731). x x x x
In fine, the compromise agreement between the parties whereby respondents obligation
will be settled through a "dacion en pago" and the dismissal of the complaint in I.S. No.
98-L-1534 has [sic] all the earmarks of novation negating respondents criminal liability.
Ergo, complainant is precluded from filing the present criminal complaint against
respondents.9
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the DOJ denied its motion in the Resolution of 20 September
2001.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 17 October 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the DOJs rulings and dismissed
petitioners petition. The appellate court deferred to the DOJs power to review rulings of
prosecutors and held that in reversing Prosecutor Putis findings, the DOJ did not act with grave
abuse of discretion.10
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the appellate court denied its motion in the Resolution of 5
May 2003.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJs
rulings because (1) respondent Martels were charged not with Estafa but with violation of Section
22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a special law impressed with
public interest; (2) petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels criminal liability; and (3)
novation serves only to negate civil, but not criminal, liability.
183
In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ correctly applied the concept of
novation as they had settled SENCORs liability. Respondent Martels added that as of the filing of
their Comment, they had already paid P17,887,442.54 of SENCORs liability.
In its Reply, petitioner contended that although respondent Martels attempted to pay SENCORs
overdue contributions through dacion en pago, no payment took place, as evidenced by respondent
Martels alternative offer to provide computer related services to petitioner instead of assigning the
Tagaytay City realty. On respondent Martels partial payment of SENCORs liability, petitioner
contended that such does not preclude the resolution of this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether the concept of novation serves to abate the prosecution of respondent Martels
for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.
The Concept of Novation Finds No Application Here
Novation, a civil law concept relating to the modification of obligations, 11 takes place when the
parties to an existing contract execute a new contract which either changes the object or principal
condition of the original contract, substitutes the person of the debtor, or subrogates a third person
in the rights of the creditor.12 The effect is either to modify or extinguish the original contract. In its
extinctive form, the new obligation replaces the original, extinguishing the obligors obligations
under the old contract.13
This Court first recognized the possibility of applying the concept of novation to criminal cases
in People v. Nery,14involving a case for Estafa. In that case, the Court observed that although novation
is not one of the means recognized by the Revised Penal Code to extinguish criminal liability, 15 it
may "prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic
transaction," provided the novation takes place before the filing of the Information with the trial
court. We held:
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in
court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation may be
converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the
complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities
have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may
no longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as
distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state, only the latter
can renounce it x x x.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized
by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of
novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt
on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that
its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is
made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to x x
x.16(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, novation has been invoked to reverse convictions in cases where an underlying contract
initially defined the relation of the parties such as the contract in sale on commission in Estafa
cases17 or the contract in sale of goods in cases of violation of the Trust Receipts Law.18 Further, the
party invoking novation must prove that the new contract did indeed take effect. 19
The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the first place, there is, between SENCOR
and petitioner, no original contract that can be replaced by a new contract changing the object or
principal condition of the original contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a
third person in the rights of the creditor. The original relationship between SENCOR and petitioner
is defined by law RA 1161, as amended which requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic
contributions to petitioner under pain of criminal prosecution. Unless Congress enacts a law further
amending RA 1161 to give employers a chance to settle their overdue contributions to prevent
prosecution, no amount of agreements between petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent
Martels) can change the nature of their relationship and the consequence of SENCORs non-payment
of contributions.
The indispensability of a prior contractual relation between the complainant and the accused as
requisite for the application of novation in criminal cases was underscored in People v. Tanjutco.20 In
that case, the accused, who was charged with Qualified Theft, invoked People v. Nery to support his
claim that the complainants acceptance of partial payment of the stolen funds before the filing of
the Information with the trial court converted his liability into a civil obligation thus rendering
baseless his prosecution. The Court rejected this claim and held that unlike in Nery, there was, in
that case, no prior "contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can be modified or
altered by the parties," thus:
Reliance on the aforecited Nery case, in support of the contention that the acceptance by
complainant of payment converted the liability of the accused-appellant into a civil
obligation or else that it estopped said complainant from proceeding with the
prosecution of the case, is misplaced and unwarranted.
[I]n the Nery case, which is an action for estafa, there was contractual relationship
between the parties that can be validly novated by the settlement of the obligation
of the offender. Whatever was said in that case, therefore, cannot be invoked in the
present case where no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement, which can
be modified or altered by the parties, is involved. There is here merely a taking of
the complainants property by one who never acquired juridical possession
thereof, qualified by grave abuse of confidence.21 (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, there is here merely an employers failure to pay its contributions to a government
corporation as mandated by that corporations charter.
Secondly, as Prosecutor Puti correctly noted, the agreement between petitioner and respondent
Martels for the latter to pay SENCORs overdue contributions through the assignment to petitioner
of a piece of realty never materialized. Petitioners acceptance of respondent Martels offer was
subject to a suspensive condition that "x x x [private] respondents will x x x settle their obligation
either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time x x x." This
condition was not met because three years after respondent Martels offer, petitioner did not
184
receive any payment. In fact, respondent Jose Martel, at that point, changed the terms of the
supposed settlement by offering computer-related services instead of assigning the Tagaytay City
realty. In their Comment to the petition, respondent Martels explained that they made such
alternative offer because "the processing of the papers for the Tagaytay property met with some
delay."22 In short, respondent Martels failed to make good on their promise in 1998 to settle
SENCORs liability through dacion en pago. The circumstances the DOJ cited as proof of the
compromise agreements alleged implementation were nothing but steps preparatory to the actual
payment of SENCORs overdue contributions.
In sum, we hold that any payment respondent Martels would have made to petitioner (and it
appears that pending this petition, respondent Martels partially paid SENCORs liability) only affects
their civil, if any, but not their criminal liability for violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to
Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended. As noted in the Resolution dated 28 February 2001 of the
Pasay City Prosecutors Office, respondent Martels do not dispute SENCORs non-remittance of
contributions from February 1991 to October 2000. Thus, the existence of probable cause against
respondent Martels, SENCORs directors,23 is beyond doubt.
Prosecutors Findings Not Conclusive
In dismissing petitioners petition, the Court of Appeals held:
[T]his Court has no power to determine whether probable cause to warrant prosecution
exist or not. x x x [T]he determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant
the prosecution in court of [respondent Martels] should be consigned and entrusted to
the Department of Justice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.
In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of Public Prosecutor by
determining whether probable cause exists or not. Such is a function that this Court
should not be called upon to perform x x x.24
This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to review
findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations. 25 Although policy considerations call for the
widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings,26 courts should never shirk from exercising
their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors findings are
supported by the facts, or as in this case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but
as organs of the judiciary, exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and
remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Courts review power
ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted 27 and, on the other hand, the
innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.28
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 17 October 2002 and
Resolution dated 5 May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. We REINSTATE the Resolution dated 28
February 2001 of the Pasay City Prosecutors Office.
SO ORDERED.
70 G.R. Nos. 165510-33 July 28, 2006
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration1 assailing the Decision dated September
23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and
September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending
the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned
cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10,
2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there
is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may
accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on
the ground of prescription.
In its Comment,3 the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution;
that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct
of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from
1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA
No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a
new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods
of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same
in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for
which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.
185
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid
proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute
Resolution5 dated February 10, 2004 which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41,
entitled "Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division,
et al.)" promulgated on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this
Court on June 8, 2000 which, among others, denied the accuseds motion to quash the
informations in these cases; that in particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that
the herein informations may be quashed because the officer who filed the same had no
authority to do so; and that the said Decision has become final and executory on
November 29, 2002, these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be sent to the
archives.
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would
not be a bar in petitioners subsequent prosecution. x x x. 12
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant cases
was not a violation of petitioners right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no moment
that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those cases which
have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429. As we
have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record
keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to
the date and time of filing a case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely
for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were
assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.13

The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan6 where
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred
petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 8, 2000 in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan14 when we
13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary investigation conducted by
categorically declared therein that:
Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on
June 26, 2000.7 In annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of the Sandiganbayan, we held
that: The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly
terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be
recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as
investigation was based on our ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a
in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the information was
substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioners right was violated when the
found inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent.
preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured
without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive should be
even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no
strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to
information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings. 8
due process.15

In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan9 petitioners Motion to Quash and directed the
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the question of
dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were filed by an
whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering
unauthorized party, hence void.
that as we have said in the assailed Decision, "this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the
informations against the petitioner"16and that "it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable. Thus: trial on the merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed."17 We
reconsider our stance and shall rule in the affirmative.
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution; exception.
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters his plea,
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i) 10 of move to quash the complaint and information18 on the ground that the criminal action or liability
this Rule. has been extinguished,19 which ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally
extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or
case, the accused can very well invoke the defense of prescription.
double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the
same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals11 that:
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have
prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan20 that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it
was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
186
 In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period
of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. 21
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his
Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical
Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years.
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that:
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P.
Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period
of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg.
195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to
the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the
crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same
shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner
during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
In the case of People v. Duque,24 we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on the
running of the prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by
the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof;"
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment." (Emphasis supplied)25
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the
discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto26 this Court
already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as
the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality
of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the
date of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.27
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000
prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from the
Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be
interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the
prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
the interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not
provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment,
whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom
may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if
its attention has been called to the omission.28
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as
well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the Ombudsman
directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have already
prescribed.
Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person." However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the
petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
187
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,29 petitioner averred that PCGG acted without jurisdiction and/or RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on
grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not falling within its the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration
competence.30 This Court, in its resolve to "deal with the merits of the case to remove the possibility made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioners cases in the Sandiganbayan to
take"31declared invalid
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority Opinion and
argues that
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to
Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the
jurisdiction of said offenses.32
simple expedient of escaping from the States jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot
acquire legal immunity by being a fugitive from the States jurisdiction. x x x.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,33 petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same were subscribed and
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction
filed by the PCGG. In granting petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:
unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of
the States ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by global travel, this Court should not encourage individuals facing investigation or
conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and prosecution for violation of special laws to leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad
cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.34 the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for
such anomalous practice.
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987 with the
PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In contemplation of the With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or
initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case of People v.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
Maravilla,35 this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for purposes
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription. Similarly, in the
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
case of Llenes v. Dicdican,36 this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a public officer with
provide the contrary.
the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same
supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his
could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
Dissenting Opinion that

However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged against
the petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the Philippines from
1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on
May 8, 1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[t]he term of
prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago."
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 "x x x supplementary to [special laws],
unless the latter should x x x provide the contrary." Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the
supplementary application of Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the
prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019, before and after its amendment, should run
only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27 April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting
with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting
with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the
RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on
the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration
made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special
laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are
silent on a particular matteras evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting
Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,37 this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can
be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

188
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,38 this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code All violations of
provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was found guilty of any provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.
multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of
similar rules under the special law.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
In the case of People v. Chowdury,39 the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Revised Penal of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Code to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under RA No. 8042 or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein although
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
persons and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the absence of the
accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
apparent than real.
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as early as
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-called "gap" in Act
December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines "special acts" as "acts defining and
No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive period for violations of
penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code".
R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in cases where the
accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act No. 3326.
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto,40 this
Court was categorical in ruling that
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.

The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to special laws,
Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No.
however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of "special law" as contemplated and used in
3326 applies.
Article 10 of the RPC.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
In the case of United States v. Serapio,42 the Court had the occasion to interpret the term "special
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
laws" mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now Article 10 of the
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
Revised Penal Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized by the
running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in
the only inference that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. article 7 of the Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the (article 7) have the meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally
running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, - used? x x x It is confidently contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the
Penal Code (article 7) is not used with this general signification: In fact, said phrase may
refer not to a special law as above defined, but to a general law. A careful reading of said
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales" was not used to signify
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the
"special laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be noted,
familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is
simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
the Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the provisions of said code. 43
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not
have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 41 Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the same
result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the two laws. The
Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the Philippines shall be a
Had the legislature intended to include the accuseds absence from the Philippines as a ground for
ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does not. In such a situation, Act
the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been expressly
No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly applies to special
provided in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the
laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily and only when the
legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that
latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that
special legal provisions must prevail over general ones.

189
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpios reservations about the effects of ruling that the absence of
the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Our duty,
however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom or effects of the
law is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided
nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may
recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if
its attention has been called to the omission.44
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in favor of
the accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of laws
providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis--vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive
period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority
Opinions conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused
is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally provides
the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of Philippine
jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes supports this conclusion. In the
old but still relevant case of People v. Moran,45 this Court extensively discussed the rationale behind
and the nature of prescription of penal offenses
"We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of
limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in
civil suits. The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the
statute is interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending
parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in
favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is therefore no grantor
against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction are to be made. But it is,
otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the State is the
grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to
be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of process, to be
scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time
oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return
to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he
may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of
the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of
innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of
guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in
the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is
the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but
checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and
to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained." (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the liberal
construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality of
the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply
be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly
and expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved
in favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The
exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods may and
should not be easily implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may
only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,46 we ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The
said legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes
which is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender.
In the case of People v. Moran, this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of
limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but
an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the
offense; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and
resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to
preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.
Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a
recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.47
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant case,
were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a
consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed
10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by
the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has
lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
190
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. Criminal 71 G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992
Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-
231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SO ORDERED. NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Monsod Law Office for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating Section 38 in relation to
Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge of
illegal recruitment was set out in the information in the following terms:

That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at Calamba, Laguna and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused well
knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government
agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of workers for placement abroad, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Glicerio Teodoro,
Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan, Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz and
Marcelino Desepida as workers abroad exacted and actually received money
from the above-named victims, to their damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law. 1

The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimony of the following
witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies
were summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:

. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was invited by the accused to

his house in Calamba, Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was
recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was interested in getting (sic)
him. Accused likewise presented to him that he (accused) was a licensed
recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told him to secure his birth
certificate, an NBI clearance and medical certificate. He was able to secure an
NBI clearance which he showed to the accused. The latter thereafter told him
that he would secure the rest of his papers like passport, visa and medical
certificate for him and for this, accused asked him to prepare the amount of
P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so he mortgaged his lot for
P20,000.00 to the cousin of the accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately gave
this amount to the accused who assured him that he would be able to leave
within two months. The accused did not issue a receipt for that amount despite
his request. He did not persist in asking the accused because he trusted him,
accused coming from an affluent family and a member of a well-known
Catholic organization, the "Cursillo" (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However,

191
 accused failed to employ him at Saudi Arabia within two months despite The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary recruiting permit or
repeated promise (sic) to do so. Thus, he demanded the return of his money authority form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by
but accused failed. Finally, he decided, together with the other complainants, to a special law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article 290 of the Labor
file a complaint against accused before the Philippine Overseas Employment Code provides, in relevant part, that:
Agency (POEA). . . .
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually testified issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
to the following: sometime also in January 1986, they went to the house of
accused for work abroad as the latter had earlier told them that he was
xxx xxx xxx
recruiting workers for the Saudi Arabia. The accused asked money to process
their papers. Alcaraz was able to give the accused on 22 February 1986 the
amount of P5,000.00, but the accused failed to issue him a receipt and he did The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the mode of computation of the three-
not persist in asking for it because he trusted the accused on (TSN, 5 Nov. year prescriptive period it established.
1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give the accused on 18 Feb. 1986, the
amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused did not issue a
The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act
receipt although he promised to issue one the next day. However, the following
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
day, when he reminded the accused of the receipt, he refused saying that he
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run" (emphasis supplied), supplied the
(Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco was able to give the accused
applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986 in the presence of the other applicants (TSN,
26 Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused again failed to issue a receipt despite
demand. She was told by the accused to trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the Section 2: . . .
accused failed to return their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them
decided to file a complaint with the POEA against the accused. There, they
xxx xxx xxx
executed a joint affidavit (Exh. "A"). 2

Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the allegation that he had recruited
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
complainants for overseas employment. He also denied that he had received any monies in
and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
consideration of promised employment. However, he acknowledged that his house had served as a
meeting place for a certain Delfin and one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the persons who had
promised complainants, work abroad. Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2) rules for determining the
beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on the day of the commission of the violation, if such
commission be known; and (b) if the commission of the violation was not known at the time,
On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of appellant Duque as the person
then from discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.
they had talked to for placement abroad, the person who had collected fees from them and who had
Appellant Duque contends that the prescriptive period in the case at bar commenced from the time
received information from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad, the trial court
money in consideration of promises for overseas employment was parted with by complainants.
concluded that accused Duque was primarily responsible for promising placement and inducing
Duque thus contends that the prescriptive period began to run sometime in January 1986. The
private complainants to part with their money. The prosecution also submitted a certification from
information was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna on 22 May
the licensing branch of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") stating that
1990, i.e., more than four (4) years later. Duque concludes that the offense of illegal recruitment had
no records existed whatsoever of a grant to the accused of a license or authority to recruit for
accordingly prescribed by May 1990.
overseas employment. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as follows:
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, [of]
violation of [Art.] 38 in relation to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer the Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended parties: be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
Agustin Ulat the amount of P20,000.00; Marcelino Desepida the amount of illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and
P7,000.00; Norma Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo Alcaraz the Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this
amount of P3,000.00 and the cost of suit. 3 Article.

Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of prescription of the criminal (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
offense for which he was convicted. considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
192
 Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such
non-license or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined
that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or
will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the
search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia,
properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the
closure of companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to wit: (a) recruitment activities
as listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the Labor Code; and (b) the lack of the necessary license or
authority from the POEA to engage in such activities. Recruitment for overseas employment is not in
itself necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the lack of necessary license or permit that renders such
recruitment activities unlawful and criminal. Such lack of necessary permit or authority, while
certainly known to appellant Duque back in January 1986, was not known to private complainants
at that time. Indeed, private complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such authority
or permit only when they went to the offices of the POEA for the purpose of filing a claim for return
of the money they had delivered to appellant Duque. Since good faith is always presumed, the
complainants were entitled to assume the appellant Duque was acting in good faith when he
presented himself as a recruiter for overseas placement. Even if it be assumed arguendo that
ordinary prudence required that a person seeking overseas employment ought to check the
authority or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to speak for a recruitment or
placement agency, the offended parties' failure to do so did not start the running of the prescriptive
period. In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or
obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation
of the special law is not known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A literal reading of Section 2
appears to suggest that two (2) elements must coincide for the beginning of the running of the
prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission of the violation of the special
law; and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." It is
then argued by appellant that because the co-existence of these two (2) requirements is necessary
under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run.
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal reading that appellant
suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case
been exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few months after the POEA and
the complainants had discovered that appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for
overseas work and was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to
receive money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate employment abroad for
complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for such a literal reading of Section 2.
As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for preliminary investigation of the offense normally
marks the interruption of the period of prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal reading, the
prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the same occurrence; the net effect
would be that the prescription period would not have effectively begun, having been rendered
academic by the simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute providing for prescription
of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of repose and constitutes an act of grace by which
the State, after the lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the
criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the State in favor
of the offender. 5 The applicable well-known principles of statutory interpretation are that statutes
must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so
as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd
results, 7 departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal language of the statute. Appellant's
literal reading would make nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment"
may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus,
Section 2 may be read as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law; and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof;
or as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and until institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. (Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run from
the time the recruitment activities of appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by
the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The
discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter, simultaneous in
character and occurred sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA with
the complaint for recovery of the placement fees and expenses they had paid to appellant Duque,
and the POEA, acting upon that complaint, discovered and informed the private complainants that
Duque had operated as a recruiter without the essential government license or authority.
Accordingly, the offense of illegal recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint was filed with
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed in court in May
1990.
It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by giving supplemental effect to
provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence
to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
193
 The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect of the offense of illegal
recruitment began to run on the date of discovery thereof by the private complainants and the
authorities concerned (POEA) sometime in December 1989 and was interrupted on 16 April 1990
when the affidavit-sworn complaint was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, 9 and
certainly by May 1990 when the criminal information was filed in court by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more, the appellant's defense of prescription must fail.
Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life imprisonment is properly
imposable where the illegal recruitment is committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar, private
complainants are more than three (3) in number. Moreover, appellant Duque had represented to the
public at large, including private complainants, that he was a licensed
recruiter.11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked the private complainants to
see him in his house. 12 There, complainants were "briefed" as to the requirements for overseas
employment before their supposed departure and were each required to secure a clearance from
the National Bureau of Investigation. 13Considerable sums were collected from each of the
complainants supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of passports, medical certificates and other
working papers. 14 Complainants were, in addition, shown documents which purported to be job
placement orders. This organized modus operandi was repeated in respect of each of the
complainants and presumably in respect of other persons who were similarly victimized by
appellant. There is no question that the recruitment activities of Duque were organized and "large
scale" in nature. 15
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the solemodification that the penalty properly imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment
and not reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
72 G.R. No. 177763 July 3, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO1 y PAULINO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 023873 affirming with modification the December 29, 2001 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph, " finding accused-
appellants Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder as principal and accomplice, respectively.
On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed
against accused-appellants.
On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused-appellants were
causing a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At
around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street.
Vergara approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted:
"Anong pakialam mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfantes shoulder, received a
knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter,
Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante,
meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died. 6
The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight
stab wounds: five located on the chest area and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two
fatal wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the
lower lobe of the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-1517 signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medico-
legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:
CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.
The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,8 testified that she incurred the following expenses
in connection with the death and burial of Alfante:
a) 17,000.00 for the coffin
b) 3,000.00 for the nicho
c) 250.00 for the mass
194
 d) 15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with
e) 16,000.00 for the burial lot.
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs
of the victim, to the exclusion of his common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:
Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning 500.00 a
day.9
a. 50,000.00 as civil indemnification;
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10,
2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for b. 50,000.00 as moral damages; and
"baon" the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go
to the 7-11 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the
c. 51,250.00 as actual damages.18
testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and
proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of
the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his Hence, this appeal.19 Accused-appellants confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections
side for the duration of the incident.10 Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police on April 11, 2007.20
station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his
right palm sustained during the tussle.11
The appellee21 manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.

Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination
On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal
and treatment of Vergaras injury caused by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11,
stating that he is no longer interested to pursue an appeal.22 This Court, in a Resolution dated June
2001.12
25, 2008, granted the motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he is
concerned.23
After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC
found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergaras counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:
Resolution dated November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense with its filing.24

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders
We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the
judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y
award of damages.
PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of
Murder, as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the
same, the Court hereby sentences said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the penalty
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
of reclusion perpetua and the other accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to suffer an
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and severally the Heirs of the deceased
Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as actual damages, Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for 1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages, plus costs (sic).13 means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis
added.)
Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court. 14 The
appeal was accepted by this Court in its Resolution15 dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the
transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo. 16 credibility of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 25 People v.
Clores26 reminds us that:
As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quos finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven. 17 On When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which
March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the are that (1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there
Decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner: is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent
herein; (2) the findings of the Trial Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great

195
respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand,
and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies
in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial
courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility. 27 On the other hand, this Court is
far detached from the details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its
review. On the matter of credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its
limitations and acknowledges the advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference.
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that
accused-appellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that
it had overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated
that:
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by
[appellant Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him
repeatedly in his chest and left forearm with a knife handed to him by [appellant Inocencio]. This is
an overwhelming evidence, and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and
self-defense. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily
fail.28 (Citation omitted.)
It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused-
appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.
We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara
constituted treachery qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon,
treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.33
Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the
victims shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would
befall him. The number and severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was
rendered immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his
arm to ward off the attack. We, thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding that
the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of
voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. 34
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for
death and exemplary damages awarded by the courts a quo.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1)
Anent accused-appellant Vergaras claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
proved: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
proper cases.35
the person resorting to self-defense.29 A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof.
He must prove all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial
self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. 30 court, actual damages in the amount of 51,250.00 based on the receipts 36 they submitted to the
trial court.1wphi1
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury,
upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTCs award respecting the indemnity
intent to cause injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely for the loss of earning capacity. As we have already previously ruled that:
threatening and intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to ones life."31
Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be duly
proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.
In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the
witnesses, the victims actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
employed by accused-appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage
albeit drunk when he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any
under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of
untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergaras
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.37 (Citations and emphasis omitted.)

The victim was just walking, he was neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the appellants
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary
into a fight. Appellant Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the
evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed
victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."32

196
by his common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions
mentioned in the above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:
Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime, must
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty and on the best evidence to prove obtainable by the
injured party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support the
contention of the common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning
500.00 a day. Hence, this Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-
wife of the victim which lacks specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings. 38 (Citation
omitted.)
Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as
follows:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little
sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the
aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary
or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of
consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the
civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230
of the Civil Code.39(Emphasis omitted.)
We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000.00 to conform to existing
jurisprudence.40
We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to 75,000.00 to conform to recent
jurisprudence.41
Lastly, we sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of 50,000.00 even in the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs. 42 As borne out by human
nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family.43 While no amount of damages may totally compensate
the sudden and tragic loss of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at
least assuage them.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for
damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully
paid.44
WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of 51 ,250.00 as
actual damages, 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 50,000.00 as moral damages, and 30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6o/o
per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
73 G.R. No. 175781 March 20, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCA TALARO,* GREGORIO TALARO,** NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS,
RODOLFO DUZON,*** RAYMUNDO ZAMORA** and LOLITO AQUINO, Accused.
NORBERTO (JUN) ADVIENTO, RENATO RAMOS and LOLITO AQUINO, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December,
15, 2005, in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 125, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 56, of the Rules of
Court. The CA affirmed with modification the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 38 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, thereby finding accused-appellants Norberto (Jun) Adviento,
Renato Ramos and Lolito Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentencing them to death, but acquitting accused Rodolfo Duzon.
Accused-appellants were charged before the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with the crime of murder
under an Information reading as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of April 1994, in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Laoac, Province
of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery, and evident premeditation, in
consideration of a price, and by means of motor vehicle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shoot one MELVIN ALIPIO, with a handgun hitting the latter in the different
parts of his body and the wounds being mortal caused directly the death of said MELVIN ALIPIO, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code.2
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses showed the sequence of events shortly before and after
the killing of victim Melvin Alipio to be as follows.
Raymundo Zamora is the nephew of Gregorio Talaro, the husband of Francisca Talaro. In the
morning of April 24, 1994, when Zamora went home for breakfast after driving his tricycle, he found
Francisca Talaro, Lolito Aquino, Renato "Atong" Ramos, and Norberto "Jun" Adviento conversing
among themselves under a santol tree in front of his (Zamora's) house. He went near the group to
find out what they were talking about and he learned that his aunt, Francisca Talaro, was
transacting with the other three accused-appellants for the killing of Atty. Melvin Alipio. He was
merely a meter away from the group so he heard the group's conversation. He learned that
Francisca Talaro would give the three accused-appellants an advance payment of 30,000.00 and
then another 30,000.00 after Atty. Melvin Alipio is killed, with said last payment to be delivered
in Barangay (Brgy.) Bactad. The three accused-appellants then nodded their heads in agreement.
After learning of the group's plan, Zamora got scared and stayed away from the group, but three
days after that meeting in front of his house, he was asked by Francisca Talaro to drive her and her
husband Gregorio to Brgy. Bactad. The Talaro spouses alighted at a place in Brgy. Bactad, while
Zamora stayed in his tricycle and merely waited for them. He assumed that the couple delivered the
payment of 30,000.00 to someone in Brgy. Bactad.3
197
Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino, when questioned during preliminary investigation, admitted that
he and co-accused Renato Ramos conducted a surveillance on Atty. Alipio in the afternoon of April
25, 1994.4
Around 6 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, tricycle driver Rodolfo Duzon was at the parking
area in the poblacion of Urdaneta waiting for passengers, when accused-appellant Renato Ramos
approached him. Accused-appellant Ramos offered to pay Rodolfo Duzon 200.00 for the latter to
drive Ramos' motorcycle to Laoac, Pangasinan to take some onions and turnips there. Duzon agreed,
so after bringing his own tricycle home to his house in Bactad, Urdaneta, he then drove Ramos'
motorcycle to the poblacion of Urdaneta. At the poblacion, Ramos bought a basket where he placed
the onions and turnips. Ramos then told Duzon to drive the motorcycle to Laoac, but they first
passed by Garcia Street in Urdaneta. At a house along Garcia Street, Ramos alighted and talked to
someone whom Rodolfo Duzon later came to know as accused-appellant Lolito Aquino. Ramos then
told Duzon that after coming from Laoac, Duzon should leave the motorcycle at that house on Garcia
Street with Lolito Aquino. Ramos and Duzon then proceeded to Laoac, stopping at a gas station
where they fueled up. Ramos alighted from the motorcycle at the gas station and, taking along the
basket of onions and turnips, walked towards Guardian Angel Hospital (the clinic owned by the
Alipios). Five minutes after Ramos alighted, Duzon heard three gunshots coming from the west, and
moments later, he saw Ramos, who was coming toward him, being chased by another man. When
Ramos got to the motorcycle, he ordered Duzon to immediately drive away, and poked a gun at
Duzon's back. Ramos then instructed Duzon as to the route they should take until they reached
Urdaneta where Ramos alighted, leaving Duzon with instructions to bring the motorcycle to Garcia
Street, leave it with Lolito Aquino, then meet him (Ramos) again at the poblacion where he (Duzon)
will be paid 200.00 for his services. Duzon did as he was told, but when he met with Ramos at
the poblacion and asked for the 200.00, Ramos got mad and shouted invectives at him. A few days
later, he again ran into Ramos who warned him to keep his silence, threatening to kill him (Duzon)
too if he tells anyone about the killing. Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento also threatened
him not to reveal to anyone whatever he knows about the crime. That was why Duzon decided to
keep quiet. Later, however, he revealed the matter to his brother, Victoriano Duzon, who
accompanied him to the Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) Office in Urdaneta so he could give his
statement. He executed affidavits, assisted by a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
attesting to what he knew about the crime, in his desire to be a state witness. 5
Witness Rene Balanga, who was the helper of the spouses Atty. Melvin and Dr. Lina Alipio, was
cleaning the windows at the clinic of Dr. Alipio around 8 o'clock in the morning of April 26, 1994. He
heard three gunshots coming from the garage of the clinic, which was around ten meters away from
where he was. Immediately after the gunshots, he saw a man quickly walking out from the garage,
going towards the main gate, but he was not able to clearly see the face of the man. He merely
observed that the man was around 5'4" to 5'5" in height, medium-built, wearing a blue jacket and
faded maong (denim) pants. He ran towards the garage and there, he saw Atty. Melvin Alipio lying
dead. He then chased after the man so he could identify him better but he did not succeed in doing
so because the driver of the motorcycle that the gunman was boarding was already drawing
something out from the rear portion of the motorcycle. After the assailant sped off, Balanga went to
the police station in Laoac to report the crime and give his statement before the CIS. Sometime later,
at the CIS Office, he identified Rodolfo Duzon as the driver of the motorcycle used by the gunman to
get away.6
Another eyewitness, Eusebio Hidalgo, whose son was confined at the clinic, was sitting at a bench in
the garage of the clinic on the morning of April 26, 1994. Two other women who were looking for
Atty. Alipio also sat at the bench with him after he told them that Atty. Alipio was still having his
breakfast. After a few minutes, a man arrived looking for Dr. Alipio, and also sat at the bench.
Thereafter, Atty. Alipio came out to the garage and talked to the two women. When Atty. Alipio
finished talking to them, the man sitting with them on the bench suddenly stood up and shot Atty.
Alipio three times. Atty. Alipio was merely one meter away from the assailant when the latter shot
him. After the shooting, the assailant walked away. Hidalgo then saw the helper at the clinic, Reny
Balanga, run after the assailant, but the latter had whistled to his companion who was waiting on his
motorcycle and the two were able to speed away aboard said vehicle. Hidalgo identified the
assailant from a picture7 shown to him.8 The picture was that of Renato Ramos.9
A few weeks after Atty. Melvin Alipio had been killed, Zamora was in the parking lot in Sta. Maria
Norte in Binalonan, when accused-appellant Aquino approached him and told him to remind
Francisca Talaro that she still has to pay him (Aquino) 10,000.00. Zamora then immediately told
his uncle Gregorio Talaro about Aquino's message and the very next day, Gregorio went to Zamora's
house with the 10,000.00. Gregorio could no longer wait for Aquino so he just left the money with
Zamora, instructing him to hand it over to Aquino when the latter arrives. Later that day, Zamora
saw Aquino so he told him (Aquino) to just get the money from his house. About three weeks later,
Aquino again went to Zamora's house, this time saying he needs another 5,000.00 just in case he
needs to escape. Zamora then contacted Francisca Talaro and conveyed Aquino's message to her.
The following day, Gregorio again went to Zamora's house and left the 3,000.00 for Aquino. That
afternoon, Zamora again told Aquino to just pick up the money from his house. Zamora observed
that Aquino seemed happy enough with the 3,000.00 he received. 10
Zamora said that he thinks the Talaros had Atty. Alipio killed because the latter was not able to
comply with his contractual obligations to the Talaros to complete the construction of a building. Dr.
Lina Alipio, the wife of the victim Atty. Melvin Alipio, confirmed that indeed, the victim entered into
an agreement with Rodolfo Talaro, the Talaro spouses' son, for the construction of a building, but
the construction was not finished within the agreed one-year period because of the sudden rise of
prices for materials. Atty. Alipio asked Rodolfo for additional payment so he could finish
construction, but the latter refused to pay more. Dr. Alipio stated that eventually, Atty. Alipio and
Rodolfo agreed that Atty. Alipio would return all the money he received from Rodolfo and the whole
property would, in turn, be turned over to Atty. Alipio. Atty. Alipio was unable to return the money
despite several demands made by Rodolfo, and Dr. Alipio believes this is the reason why the Talaros
had her husband killed. Dr. Alipio further testified on matters regarding expenses for the wake and
burial, and the earnings of her husband.11
Dr. Arnulfo Bacarro conducted the autopsy on the victim and stated that three slugs were taken
from the body of the victim, and the cause of death was internal hemorrhage. 12 Police officers
testified on how they conducted the investigation, stating that accused-appellant Aquino and
Zamora's statements were taken in the presence of their respective lawyers. They maintain that no
bodily harm was inflicted on the accused-appellants while they were being investigated.13
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lolito Aquino stated that he was taken by CIS men without a
warrant of arrest; that he was mauled by police authorities while under detention, but could not
undergo a medical check-up due to fear from threats that he would be killed by police authorities if
he did so; that he was assisted by a PAO lawyer when he made his confession, but he did not read
the contents of the document, Sgt. Tomelden just ordered him to sign the same; that the PAO lawyer
is not his own choice; that he does not know Rodolfo Duzon and Raymundo Zamora; and that he was
not present at the meeting held in Raymundo Zamora's yard. He admitted, however, that the
motorcycle used by the gunman belongs to him; and that he first agreed to be a state witness
because he was promised to be paid P20,000.00 and that he would be placed in the witness
protection program.14
Accused-appellant Norberto (Jun) Adviento's defense is denial and alibi. He claimed that he was not
present during the April 24, 1994 meeting held to plan the killing of Atty. Alipio, because on said
date and time, he was in the house of Congressman Amadito Perez, for whom he works as driver-
198
messenger, and that morning, he also drove the Congressman's family to church to hear mass. On
April 26, 1994, he also reported for work at the house of the Congressman from 8 o'clock in the
morning until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. He likewise denied personally knowing any of his co-
accused except for Duzon whose face is familiar to him.15
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
Wherefore, in the light of all the considerations discussed above, this court hereby finds and holds
the accused Francisca Talaro, Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, Rodolfo Duzon and Lolito
Aquino, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and
conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby imposes on each of the accused the death penalty and
to pay proportionately the costs of the proceedings.
The court further orders the accused to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased
the sum of 83,000.00 as actual damages; 100,000.00 as moral damages; 50,000.00 as death
indemnity; 10,000.00 as [attorney's fees] paid to their private prosecutor and 2,400,000.00 as
loss in the earning capacity of the deceased without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Taking into consideration that accused Francisca Talaro is already 75 years old, the death penalty
meted upon her shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
And considering that the evidence adduced by the prosecution against the accused Gregorio Talaro
is not sufficient to sustain his conviction of the offense filed against him, the court hereby declares
accused Gregorio Talaro not guilty. The court likewise declares Raymundo Zamora acquitted of the
offense filed against him.
Let an order of arrest be issued against accused Renato Ramos who escaped from jail during the
pendency of this case, to be served by the NBI, CIC and PNP of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED.16
The case was then brought to this Court for automatic review in view of the penalty of death
imposed on accused-appellants. However, in accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo,17 and the
amendments made to Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, and Section 3 of Rule
125 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court transferred this case to the CA for
intermediate review.
On December 15, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38 of
Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. U-8239, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that accused-appellant Rodolfo Duzon is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and his release is hereby
ordered unless he is being held for some other legal cause.
Further, in lieu of the awards made by the trial court in favor of the heirs of deceased Atty. Melvin
Alipio, accused-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim the
following amounts: (1) 25,000.00 as temperate damages; (2) 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (3)
50,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) 25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
SO ORDERED.18
The case is now before this Court on automatic review. The prosecution opted not to file a
supplemental brief with this Court. Accused-appellants Lolito Aquino and Renato Ramos jointly filed
their supplemental brief where it is argued that the two should be acquitted because (1) the
prosecution evidence is insufficient to prove that Lolito Aquino was part of the conspiracy to kill
Atty. Melvin Alipio; and (2) the identity of Renato Ramos was never established. Accused-appellant
Noberto (Jun) Adviento argued in his Appellant's Brief filed with the CA, that the prosecution's
evidence is insufficient to establish conspiracy, and there are no aggravating circumstances to
justify the imposition of the death penalty.
The Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that the evidence on record proves beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellants Lolito Aquino, Renato Ramos, and Norberto (Jun) Adviento, together
with Francisca Talaro, conspired to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio.
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the unlawful killing of a person,
which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation. The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code
is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.19
In People v. Sanchez,20 the Court held that "[t]he essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an
aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor." There can be no cavil that the evidence on record shows treachery in the killing of Atty.
Alipio, thus qualifying the crime as murder. The assailant, identified as accused-appellant Renato
Ramos, just suddenly fired upon Atty. Alipio at a very close distance, without any provocation from
said unarmed victim, who was then just conversing with some other people.
There is also evident premeditation because the evidence shows that a couple of days before the
actual shooting of Atty. Alipio, Raymundo Zamora already saw and heard accused-appellants
Norberto (Jun) Adviento, Renato Ramos, and Lolito Aquino, talking to Francisca Talaro and coming
to an agreement to kill Atty. Alipio.
Pitted against the prosecution evidence, accused-appellants' only defense is that the evidence is
insufficient to prove they are part of the conspiracy to commit the murder. Said defense is sorely
wanting when pitted against the prosecution evidence.
In People v. Bautista,21 the Court reiterated the hornbook principle of conspiracy, to wit:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose
or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be
shown that all participants performed specific acts which such closeness and coordination as to
indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.
199
xxxx Accused-appellant Renato Ramos insisted that he was not properly identified in open court, and
considering that there are so many persons named "Renato Ramos," then there can be some
confusion regarding his identity. There is no truth to this claim. Ramos was properly identified in
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
open court by Raymundo Zamora, as one of the men he saw and heard transacting with Francisca
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences
Talaro for the killing of Atty. Alipio.30 Hence, there can be no doubt as to which Renato Ramos is
even though it was not intended as part of the original design. x x x22 (Emphasis supplied)
being convicted for the murder of Atty. Alipio.

In this case, the existence of a conspiracy has been established by the testimony of Raymundo
Another strong indication of Lolito Aquino's and Renato Ramos' guilt is the fact that they escaped
Zamora, positively identifying all three accused-appellants as the ones he saw and heard transacting
from detention while the case was pending with the trial court. Renato Ramos escaped from prison
with Francisca Talaro on April 24, 1994 to kill Atty. Melvin Alipio for the price of P60,000.00, and
on December 20, 1994,31 while Lolito Aquino escaped on May 5, 1996.32 It has been repeatedly held
pointing to Lolito Aquino as the one who demanded and received part of the payment after Atty.
that flight betrays a desire to evade responsibility and is, therefore, a strong indication of
Alipio had been killed. The credibility of Raymundo Zamora's testimony is further bolstered by
guilt.33 Thus, this Court finds no reason to overturn their conviction.
Lolito Aquino's admission23 that he and Renato Ramos even conducted surveillance on the victim a
day before Renato Ramos carried out the shooting, and that the motorcycle used as a getaway
vehicle belonged to him. Rodolfo Duzon also pointed to Renato Ramos as the gunman; he also Nevertheless, this Court must modify the penalty imposed on accused-appellants Norberto (Jun)
pointed to Renato Ramos and Norberto (Jun) Adviento as the ones who threatened to kill him if he Adviento, Lolito Aquino, and Renato Ramos. In People v. Tinsay,34 the Court explained that:
talks to anyone about the shooting. All the proven circumstances point to the conclusion that
accused-appellants acted in concert to assure the success of the execution of the crime; hence, the
On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
existence of a conspiracy is firmly established.
Death Penalty in the Philippines, took effect. Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:

Lolito Aquino's admission, and accused-appellants' positive identification of Raymundo Zamora and
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
Rodolfo Duzon cannot be belied by accused-appellants' mere denial. It is established jurisprudence
Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witness' positive identification of the accused-
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
appellants.24 Moreover, accused-appellants could not give any plausible reason why Raymundo
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
Zamora would testify falsely against them. In People v. Molina,25 the Court expounded, thus:
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no
ill motive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
them institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he
did not commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction
that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied) penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

Accused-appellant Lolito Aquino claimed he merely admitted his participation in the crime out of xxxx
fear of the police authorities who allegedly manhandled him, however, the trial court did not find his
story convincing. The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
conclusive on this Court as it is the trial court which had the opportunity to closely observe the
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
demeanor of witnesses.27 The Court again explained the rationale for this principle in Molina,28 to
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
wit:

As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is viewed as
correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so conclude, having had
the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner
in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can better determine if such
witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Further,
factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility are entitled
to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the said
findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts
and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case.29
The Court cannot find anything on record to justify deviation from said rule.
It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has retroactive effect, to wit:
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in
criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article
62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.1wphi1

200
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that
"persons convicted of offenses pushed with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.35
The awards for damages also need to be modified. In People v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et
al.,36 the Court held that in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the
imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the award
of moral damages should be increased from 50,000.00 to 75,000.00, while the award for
exemplary damages, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, should be 30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 15, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00071 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed on
accused-appellants is REDUCEDto reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole in accordance
with R.A. No. 9346; and INCREASING the award of moral damages from 50,000.00 to 75,000.00,
and the award of exemplary damages from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00. The rest of the award of the
Court of Appeals is hereby maintained.
SO ORDERED.
74 G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,
vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-
Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and
Jeffrey Reso Dayap.
The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:
That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a
10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut
shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby
hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong
who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the
instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of
Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is
registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of
the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a
motion for leave of court to file an amended information. 6 They sought to add the allegation of
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck
abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he
was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."7
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the
motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn. 8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted
the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9
Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was
201
granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the
prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless
imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.
In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the
crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to
establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two thingsthe fact of the crime, i.e.,
the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove
these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the
accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
xxxx

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP
presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is
allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.
It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.
SO ORDERED.13
xxxx
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTCs
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed
committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of
committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the
allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in
remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled
evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were
that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed
not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor
to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC
presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not
conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court,
established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence
except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the
was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it
accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC
was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to
however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the
Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified
judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the
arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime
resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled
this case from its inception.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is
AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on
xxxx
the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence] conclusively
SO ORDERED.16
show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the
proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack
can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.
of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2
shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the rear left portion
Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as
of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out
CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and
together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting
resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the
towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent
MTC are
act of the accused.

xxxx
202
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos
v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found
support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary
Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage
to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed 10,000.00. As
there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the
amount of 1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the
merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, 20 arguing that jurisdiction
over the case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on
Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the
RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007. 21 It reiterated that it is the
RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful,
felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the
basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment.
Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting petitioner through a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense
charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29
December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but
aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records
however that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense
was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to withdraw their
motion to amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained
unamended.23 Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the
original Information without any aggravating circumstance.
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article
imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less
serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were
he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4
years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2)
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended
the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall
within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try
the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case
and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the
offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such
as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it
calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount
to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. 29 But
while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is
still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the
factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to
reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that
the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 30
Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the
prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
203
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in 75 G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008
dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in
the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the
vs.
Rules of Court.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK, Accused-appellants.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the
DECISION
matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.

CORONA, J.:
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for others.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost her two-year old son,
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December 13, 1999. And again upon being reunited
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability with him some 16 months later when he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was.
of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation of mother and child
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
be punished to the full extent of the law.
liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed
to him.33
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister
Zenaida to a McDonalds outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission
Teresa took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 34 This is because when the accused files a
from his mothers sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the
looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued
case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do
search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused,
and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of
shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35 Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite the publicity, however, Teresa received
no word about Christophers whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day
aggravating her misery.
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the
findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that
petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller
been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for 30,000 in exchange for the boy.
cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was
the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent
who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who
photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough,
was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the
when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the
proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the
mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the
swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving
woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not
of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence.
raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7,
Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the
2001 at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and
formed and Police Officer (PO)31 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresas niece.
Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No.
3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they
offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.1awphi1

204
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitangs Carinderia, two women
came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached
Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting
for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant
in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told
Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned
to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed
them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they
refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that
Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on
their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back
after several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no
longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the muslim dialect. When asked
who he was, the boy gave a muslim name with "Taurak" as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her
niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney
which was parked outside, under Tauraks watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed
the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the
PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the
other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant
with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom under the following
Information:
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
deprive Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for his release amounting
to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario in
said amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial ensued and the
parties presented their respective evidence.
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak testified that at the time
and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she
saw Christopher wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand
her. She took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it was
already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost but no one was there
so they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to keep the boy until his parents could claim
him.
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan Kumander, Lanao del Sur.
Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked for Christophers picture for confirmation. It was at
this point that Taurak arranged a meeting at Pitangs Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on
April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming
that Teresa was the boys mother did she relinquish custody to her. However, she was shocked
when members of the PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent.
There were no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest.
Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks testimony. She claimed that she was at Nunungan,
Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she did not know the exact whereabouts of
Taurak who was in Manila and whom she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7,
2001 at Pitangs Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came. When
Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a few hours with Christopher
whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and was
returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride
home at 4:00 p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her sister as
she had not committed any crime and there was no warrant for her arrest.
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on
November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and
accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the
Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00
as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by them during the
pendency of this case.
SO ORDERED.3
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision 4 dated March 31, 2006, the
appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for 30,000 as a
demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by
Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and
accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.6
We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
205
Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim 7 or a public
officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person; 8
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a)
the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public official.
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is
kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention
becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of
the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is
present.9
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with
the intent of the accused to effect it.10 It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. 11 And liberty is not
limited to mere physical restraint but embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject
only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.12
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and was recovered only
after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both of them private individuals) in
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was
certainly deprived or restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave
appellants custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice but to stay with total
strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture and dialect alien to him. At such a
very tender age, he was deprived of the liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially
his mother.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even brought him to Lanao del
Norte. She demanded 30,000 in exchange for his return to his mother. On the other hand,
Mamantaks actions (e.g., her presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed
without doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the
identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There is no reason to disturb them as
they are sufficiently supported by evidence.
Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal
tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he saw a piece of rope and brought
it home not knowing that there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the
boy to the proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and
Developments social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time during the 16 months
he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak when
they were total strangers to each other?
Similarly, Mamantaks account that she was at Pitangs Carinderia only by coincidence and that it
was only there that she first saw Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and
the release of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and receiving
the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak was a
principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself.13The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the statements of Taurak and
Mamantak did not deserve credence. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded great,
if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.14
The Court of Appeals considered the demand for 30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which
necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the trial court deemed the
amount as too measly, compared to what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence
of Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as a
reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today
call it reimbursement for "board-and-lodging.")
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured
person that will release him from captivity.15 No specific form of ransom is required to consummate
206
the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in 76 G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
exchange for the victims freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,
In this case, the payment of 30,000 was demanded as a condition for the release of Christopher to vs.
his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly considered it as a demand for ransom. LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has DECISION
banned the death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole. Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard)
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of 50,000 civil indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant
and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated
to People v.Garalde,20 the award of 50,00021 moral damages is increased to 200,000 considering
October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
the minority of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for ransom, and
by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to 100,000 exemplary damages. 22
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in
would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak
to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed
and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping.
kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly
perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
causing her death.
50,000 civil indemnity, 200,000 moral damages and 100,000 exemplary damages to their young
victim Christopher Basario.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo,
Costs against appellants.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their
right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently
SO ORDERED. convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. 3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC
decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of
Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a
complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by
its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.

In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-
defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of

Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
following:

207
 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary
damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely
acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head
office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline
for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been
convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof
negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with
Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the
selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that
Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars
which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only
subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. 9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are
not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on
civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found
guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in
Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the
civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a
pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in
civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the
employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on
crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an
employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to
respondents for the payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo
for the payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, hence, should be excused from any liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and
(2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo.
However, since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action
against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which
case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is
subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not
available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
208
 Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January
14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for
which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by
the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and
(2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct
from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. 13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of
action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 14 The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology
Bank Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between
co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her
firearm out of her bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic
manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco,
killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for
the death of Evangeline M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover
damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act
of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v.
Court of Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed
with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the
definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the
criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil
case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by
plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the
reservation made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944),
also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant
Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court
cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court,
plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the
offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal
case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to
209
 be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719,
Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the
instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses
the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee,
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-
delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an
independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and
executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. 21 It would have been entirely
different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA
is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-
delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact,
which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. 23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court,
affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established
exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact
of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from
the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of
negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her
time deposit.25On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and
aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or
one arm's length26he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however
unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was
already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot
him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension
that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony.
Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was
about 10 meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man
under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare
testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no
evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's branch manager
regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just
about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already
apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that
there were two guards inside the bank30manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that
if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from
the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known,
after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as
there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act
of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the
contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline
approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who
was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased
out of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not
the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the
mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was
suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-
defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate
210
competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension
that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that
the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such
unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed
firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would
react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned
Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the
vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who
mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's
death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that
Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had
exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it
had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications
and credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously
found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard
further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are
assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others,
whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular
evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary
to Safeguard's operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of
proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that
the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-
delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and
supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision
of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should
regularly report on their supervisory functions. 36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of
Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted,
submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police
and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of
its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its
Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the
Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks, 37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training
Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been
established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and
regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct examination that these
company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during
classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,42 the records do not
show that Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the
security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997
conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in
collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on
security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees. 43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted
further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature
of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different
from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area. 44
211
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for 77 G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014
safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given
on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC,
bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there WARLITO MONTEBON,* and CIO LIMAMA, Accused,
was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection
made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias CARDING SUMILHIG, and PASOT SALOLI, Accused-
Appellants.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the
amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the
DECISION
burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse,
legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to H.C. No. 00187-MIN, which affirmed with modifications the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the conviction2 of appellants Jojo Sumilhig (Jojo), Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig (Carding),
moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is and Pasot Saloli (Pasot) in Criminal Case No. 3(99).
aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of
Factual Antecedents
the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender.46
Appellants, together with the accused Eric Enoc, Warlito Montibon and Cio Limama, were charged
with double murder and double frustrated murder in an Amended Information, 3 the accusatory
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so
portion of which reads:
sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at
the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages
to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. That on or about October 31, 1998, inthe Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur,
Court of Appeals,48 we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
parents of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest child who died in a conspiring, confederating and helping one another, armed with assortedfirearms, with intent to kill
vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of simultaneously strafe the house of Eugenio Santander resulting to death of [Cresjoy] Santander and
her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise. RollySantander and seriously wounding Marissa Santander and Micel Santander, which would have
caused their death had there been no timely and able medical assistance rendered to them, to the
damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article
2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is awarded CONTRARY TO LAW.4
as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.50
Only Jojo, Carding and Pasot, who entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their
arraignment,5 faced trial. The other accused could not be located and remain at-large to this day.
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant
case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount
Factual Antecedents
of P30,000.00.

The prosecution established that onOctober 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry Masaglang (Jerry),
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of
together with Eugenio Santander (Eugenio) and his son Mario, were in the living room of Eugenios
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security
house in SitioOverland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they heard gun bursts and
Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the Santander family werehaving dinner.
Jerry and Mario recognized the assailants to be the appellants and their co-accused.
SO ORDERED.

212
The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted,
"At last, I have retaliated!" In the aftermath, the children of Eugenios other son Remegio6 Santander
(Remegio), 3-year old Cresjoy,7 8-year old Rolly, and teeners Marissa and Micel, sustained gunshot
wounds. Unfortunately, Cresjoy expired while on the way to the hospital while Rolly was
pronounced dead-on-arrival. Marissa sustained gunshot wounds atthe right breast area and left
wrist, while Micel was wounded inthe left sternal area and elbow.
Jojo denied involvement in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the
incident, he claimed to be in the house of his parents-in-law in SitioOlogo-o, BarangayTacub,
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. He further asserted that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime on October 31, 1998 since he could not walk briskly due to a gunshot wound he earlier
sustained in his left knee and anus. He maintained that it was only in January 1999 that he was able
to walk without the aid of crutches. However, Jojo admitted harboring ill-will against the Santander
clan since he believed that they were the ones responsible for the massacre of his family in February
1998.
Carding, for his part, claimed to be illiterate and unaware of the incident. He contended that at the
time of the shooting, he was in Dalmandang, Tacub, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, which is four-hours
walk away from the crime scene. Pasot, on the other hand, maintained that he was withhis wife at
the house of Pablo Mot in Lampara, Balasiao, Kiblawan, Davao atthe time the crime was committed.
Bothclaimed total ignoranceof the incident.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC convicted the appellants ofthe complex crime of double murder and double frustrated
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. It further ordered them to indemnify,
jointlyand severally, the heirs of Cresjoy and Rolly the sum of 100,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
the surviving victims, Marissa and Micel, the sums of 50,000.00 and 30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit
in appellants argument that the crime committed could not have been a complex crime since the
death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from several and distinctacts of
shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended Information and sufficiently proven during
trial, appellants should be convicted instead of two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated
murder. Thus, in rendering its Decision9 dated July 28, 2006, the CA disposed ofthe case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of appellants Jojo Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and
Pasot Saloli is affirmed butmodified as follows
Appellants Juan "Jojo" Sumilhig, Alias Carding Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli, are found guilty
beyondreasonable doubt of:
a. Murder for killing Crisjoy Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua;
b. Murder for the killing of Rolly Santander, and x x x are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
c. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Marissa Santander and x x x are sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and [ten] (10) days of prision
mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporalas maximum; d. Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Micel Santander
and x x x are sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ofsix (6) years, four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalas maximum. All accused are ordered to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of Crisjoy Santander and Rolly Santander the sum of
100,000.00 and the surviving victims Marissa Santander and Micel Santander
50,000.00 as moral damages and 30,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
Since there is no more dispute that appellants should not have been convicted of the complex crime
of double murder and frustrated murder as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) already
concedes to the same,11 the only error left from those raised by appellants in their brief is as follows:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A QUO
GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE
CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER.12
It must be noted at the outset that Carding diedon June 24, 2011 during the pendency of this
appeal.13 "[I]n view of [this] supervening event, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on [Cardings]
appeal. Whether x x x he was guilty of the [crimes] charged has becomeirrelevant since, following
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x, even assuming [that Carding] had incurred any
criminal liability, it was totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because [the] appeal was still
pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him [before] he died, his
civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto,was likewise extinguished by his
death."14
Appellants Arguments
Appellants claim that the RTC erred in relying heavily on the ill-feelings and vendetta Jojo harbored
against the Santander family. They contend that this motive for committing the crime is not a
substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, Jojosalibi that it was impossible for him to
be at the crime scene due to the gunshot wounds in his knee and anus is amply corroborated by a
medical prognosis.
Anent Pasot, appellants argue that although the trial court found his claim of total ignorance on
almost about everything to beincredulous, still, his conviction must not rest on the weakness of his
defense but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence.
213
Appellants likewise question the finding of conspiracyand treachery.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellants conviction was based on
their positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses.
True, the RTC noted in its Decision the existence of motive on the part of Jojo for committing the
crime as well as Pasots incredulous claim of ignorance on almost about everything. It is well to note,
however, that the said court neither based the appellants conviction on the existence of such motive
nor on Pasots weak defense of ignorance alone, but upon the prosecution witnesses identification
of appellants as the assailants, viz:
Assessing the evidence presented by both [P]rosecution and defense, we see a less than glaring hint
of vendetta. As part of his defense, the accused Jojo Sumilhig narrated that his family was massacred
by Jerry Santander, brother of Remigio Santander [in] February 1998. Short of admitting the crime,
Sumilhig stated that because of this, he harbored ill feelings not only against Jerry and Carlos
Santander but also against their family. Thus a clear motive for killing the Santander family has been
established giving credence to prosecution witnesses allegation that after the strafing Jojo Sumilhig
shouted"Nakabalos na ko!" The likelihood of his intention to wipe out the said family became even
more apparent.
Despite his positive assertion that it was the Santanders that killed his family, he did not file any
case against them. It was only after he was arrested that he filed a complaint against Jerry and
Carlos Santander.
His alibi likewise failed to meet the stringent requisites of the Rules. Even as Dr. Quirapas appeared
determined to rule out the possibility that he could walk without crutches five months after his
discharge, the same was based on general medical prognosis. Such prognostication admits certain
exception[s], as could be gleaned from the testimony of the doctor himself that the healing period
may vary depending on the age and physical condition of the patient. Notably Jojo Sumilhig was
then 23 years old.
What was certain was the positive identification made by Jerry Masaglang and Remegio Santander
of all of the accused.
The "overkill" by which the accused Pasot Saloli and Carding Sumilhig claimed total ignorance of
almost anything only served to arouse incredulity. Both accused claimed they could not read, write,
tell time, day, month or year. Neither could [they] allegedly speak [or] understand Visayan, which is
of common knowledge to be widely spoken in almost every part of Mindanao. Saloli claimed he did
not know what day [it] was when he was testifying, or the day before and after that. Both claimed
they did not know the complainants or of the massacre that took place.
xxxx
More importantly, these claims [of] utter ignorance are belied by the evasiveness by which all three
accused answered in obvious effort to avoid criminal responsibility. Behind the faade of ignorance
and lack of education lurks a calculating mind. We find [it] difficult to ascribe innocence to the
accused when traces of ingenuity and craftiness characterize their testimonies.
All these observations however become insignificant in the face of the positive and spontaneous
identification of the assailants/accused by credible witnesses Jerry Masaglang and Remigio
Santander.15
There is no reason to doubt Jerry and Marios identification of the appellants considering that (1)
Jerry was just six meters away from them;16 (2) the moon was bright and Jerry was familiar with all
the accused as most of them are his relatives;17 and, (3) Mario knows Jojoever since he was
small.18 Besides, "[t]ime-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly [deserve] more
credence and [are] entitled to greater evidentiary weight."19
Anent the respective alibis interposed by appellants, suffice it to say that "[a]libi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of a credible witness."20
There was conspiracy among the accused.
"[C]onspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it."21 It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime.22"Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves when such leadto a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest."23
Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a series of events
that clearly established conspiracy among them. First, they were all armed with firearms. Second,
they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third, when they were within close range of the
intended victims, they simultaneously discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the
same time and fled together. Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and immediately after strafing
the house of Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and execution. 24 Treachery attended
the commission of the crime.
"There is treachery whenthe offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods orforms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure the
execution, without risk to himself arising from [any] defense which the offended party might
make."25
Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the assault deprived the
victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their persons. This is considering that
the victims were unaware that they would be attacked by appellants with a hailof bullets from their
firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he suddenness of the attack, without the slightest
forewarning thereof, placed the [victims] x x x in such a position that they could not have defended
themselvesfrom the aggression x x x."26
The crime committed is two counts of
murder and two counts of frustrated
murder.
214
As earlier discussed, treachery attendedthe commission of the crime. This qualifies the killing of finding appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
Cresjoy and Rolly to murder. murder and two counts offrustrated murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONSas follows:

With regard to Marissa and Micel, the Court notes that while the RTC was silent as to the nature of For the murders of Cresjoy Santander and Rolly Santander:
injuries sustained by them, the CA correctly ruled on the seriousness thereof. The Medico Legal
report of Marissa shows that she suffered multiple gunshot wounds in her right breast and left
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall suffer the prison tenn of reclusion
wrist27 while the Certificate of Treatment/Confinement of Micel states that she sustained gunshot
perpetua for each count of murder without eligibility for parole;
wounds in the area of the sternum and elbow.28As aptly found by the CA, the girls would have died if
not for the timely medical attention provided to them. The crimes committed by the appellants
against them were thus frustrated murders. (2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims the amount
of 5,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of each victim;
The Penalty
(3) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli shall pay the heirs of the victims 25,000.00
as temperate damages for each death.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetuato death.1wphi1With both penalties being indivisible and there being no aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lower of the two penalties For the frustrated murders of Marissa Santander and Micel Santander:
which is reclusion perpetua was properly imposed by the CA on appellants for each count of
murder.29 However, appellants are not eligible for parole.30
(1) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
As regards the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each
imposed on appellants.31 Accordingly, the penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporalfor count of frustrated murder; and,
each count of frustrated murder. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of
modifying circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum penalty
(2) appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli are ordered to pay moral damages and
shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of fourteen (14)
exemplary damages to each of the victims in the reduced amounts of 40,000.00 and
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the
25,000.00, respectively.
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayorin any of its
periods, the range of which is from six (6) years,one (1) day to twelve (12)years. The prison term
imposed by the CA on appellants must therefore be modified to six (6) years and one (1) day of All amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum commencing
prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
temporalas maximum, which is within these ranges,32 for each count of frustrated murder.
Due to the death of Ricardo Swnilhig alias Carding Sumilhig prior to final judgment, his criminal
Awards of Damages liability and civil liability ex delicto as found by the Regional Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are extinguished. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 3(99) is ordered dismissed insofar as
Ricardo Sumilhig alias Carding Sumilhig is concerned.
For the murders of Cresjoy and Rolly, the CA correctly held that their heirs are entitled to an award
of civil indemnity, however, the amount of the award must be 75,000.00 for each death pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence.33 The awards of moral damages in the amount of 50,000.00 each and Costs against appellants Jojo Sumilhig and Pasot Saloli.
exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000.00 each are proper. 34 In addition, the heirs of the
victims are entitled to temperate damages in the sum of 25,000.00 for each death in lieu of actual
SO ORDERED.
damages.35

For the frustrated murders of Marissa and Micel, the awards of moral and exemplary damages by
the CA must be decreased to 40,000.00 and 20,000.00, respectively for each victim.36 They are
likewise entitled to temperate damages in the amount of 25,000.00 each in lieu of actual
damages.37

All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annumfrom the date of finality of
thisjudgment until fully paid.38

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 00187-MIN which affirmed
withmodification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of DigosCity, Davao del Sur, Branch 19,
215
78 G.R. No. 205412, September 09, 2015 hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Subsequently, Flora and Emerlito executed their
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and filed a case for Parricide against accused-appellant.6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ADRIAN GUTING Y TOMAS, Accused-Appellant.
On cross-examination, PO1 Macusi divulged that when the knife was given to him by PO1 Torre for
safekeeping, he did not ask accused-appellant if it was the knife he used to kill his father. Neither did
DECISION accused-appellant mention to PO1 Macusi that it was the knife he used in stabbing Jose. All that
accused-appellant said was, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" PO1 Macusi also
admitted that he did not request for the examination of the knife because it was clean; any trace or
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
stain of blood on it would have been washed away by the rains at that time. PO1 Macusi was further
questioned as to why he did not put into writing accused-appellant's admission that he killed his
For Our consideration is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 23, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in father, and PO1 Macusi explained that it escaped his mind as he was still new at the job then and he
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, which affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2010 of the Regional Trial was carried away by the fast flow of events.7
Court (RTC), Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Criminal Case No. 06-93, finding accused-appellant
Adrian Guting y Tomas guilty of the crime of Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. Flora conceded that she was not present when Jose, her husband, was killed by accused-appellant,
their son. Flora only learned of the stabbing incident and accused-appellant's surrender from the
In an Information3 dated August 1, 2006, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-93, accused-appellant police officers of the Camiling Police Station. Flora declared that she spent for the wake and burial of
was charged before the RTC with Parricide, allegedly committed as follows: Jose and that Jose, who was a tricycle driver, had been earning around P200.00 a day at the time of
his death.8
That on or about 4:50 in the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2006 at Plaridel St., Poblacion B. Camiling,
Doctor Valentin Theodore Lomibao (Dr. Lomibao) conducted the autopsy of Jose's body. Dr.
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
Lomibao reported that Jose suffered around 39 stab wounds on the head, neck, thorax, abdomen,
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation, that is, having
and extremities. Jose's internal organs were heavily damaged by the stab wounds, resulting in his
conceived and deliberated to kill his own father Jose Guting y Ibarra, 67 years old, married, while
instantaneous death. Dr. Lomibao also showed several pictures of Jose's body which were taken
inside their residential house, and armed with a bladed weapon, suddenly and unexpectedly
before he conducted the autopsy.9
stabbed several times the victim, employing means, manner and form in the execution thereof
which tender directly and specially to insure its commission without danger to the person of said
Accused-appellant opted not to present any evidence in his defense.
accused, the result of which attack was that said victim received multiple stab wounds on his body
which directly caused his instantaneous death.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on June 24, 2010 finding accused-appellant guilty of Parricide
When arraigned on September 19, 2006, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime based on his verbal admission that he killed his father, Jose. Even assuming that accused-appellant's
charged.4Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued. admission was inadmissible in evidence, the RTC adjudged that the prosecution was still able to
establish sufficient circumstantial evidence which, taken collectively, pointed to accused-appellant
Below is a summary of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. as the perpetrator of the brutal killing of his father. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment
reads:
Police Officer (PO1) Fidel Torre (Torre) testified that on the rainy afternoon of July 30, 2005, at WHEREFORE, accused Adrian Guting y Tomas is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
around 5:00 o'clock, he and PO1 Alexis Macusi (Macusi) were standing in front of the Camiling the offense of Parricide punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and
Police Station when accused-appellant, all wet from the rain and with a bladed weapon in his hand, hereby sentences him to a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
suddenly approached them and told them that he had stabbed his father. Hearing accused-
appellant's statement, PO1 Torre immediately got the bladed weapon from accused-appellant and Accused is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
turned it over to PO1 Macusi for proper disposition. 5 indemnity, another amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and still another amount of
P30,000.00 as temperate damages.10
PO1 Macusi corroborated PO1 Torre's testimony. PO1 Macusi narrated that accused-appellant Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
suddenly appeared before them at the Police Station, all wet and holding a knife. Accused-appellant No. 04596. The appellate court promulgated its Decision on May 23, 2012, decreeing thus:
proclaimed that his father was already dead. Unsuspecting, PO1 Macusi asked who killed accused- WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
appellant's father. Accused-appellant answered, "Sinaksak ko po yong tatay ko! Napatay ko na po!" Branch 68 convicting herein accused-appellant Adrian Guting y Tomas for the crime of Parricide
PO1 Torre then got the knife from accused-appellant and gave it to PO1 Macusi. PO1 Macusi placed under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is AFFIRMED.11
the knife in the custodian cabinet in the Police Station. Thereafter, PO1 Macusi, Senior Police Officer Hence, accused-appellant comes before us via the instant appeal with the same assignment of errors
(SPO) 2 Eliseo Hermosado (Hermosado), and SPO2 Noli Felipe (Felipe) went to the residence of Jose he raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
Guting (Jose), accused-appellant's father, to verify the reported crime, while other police officers I
informed Flora Guting (Flora), Jose's wife (also accused-appellant's mother), who was still in the
market with Emerlito Guting (Emerlito), Jose and Flora's other son (accused-appellant's brother), THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
who was then driving a tricycle for hire. While waiting for Flora and Emerlito, PO1 Macusi, SPO2 HIS EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION.
Hermosado, and SPO2 Felipe inquired from the neighbors if anybody had witnessed the crime, but
no one did. When Flora and Emerlito arrived, they entered the house and saw Jose's lifeless body II
with blood still oozing from his wounds. Immediately, Flora and Emerlito brought Jose to the

216

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF
INSUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR. 12
We find no merit in accused-appellant's appeal.
Accused-appellant argues that his oral confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, without the
assistance of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence for having been made in blatant violation of his
constitutional right under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12, paragraphs 1 and 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution mandate that:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.13
The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertains to
"custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody
and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police
officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an
admission.14 As we expounded in People v. Marra15:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is
only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus
on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
(Citation omitted.)
Applying the foregoing definitions, accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when
he admitted, without assistance of counsel, to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi that he stabbed his father
to death. Accused-appellant's verbal confession was so spontaneously and voluntarily given and
was not elicited through questioning by the police authorities. It may be true that PO1 Macusi asked
accused-appellant who killed his father, but PO1 Macusi only did so in response to accused-
appellant's initial declaration that his father was already dead. At that point, PO1 Macusi still had no
idea who actually committed the crime and did not consider accused-appellant as the suspect in his
father's killing. Accused-appellant was also merely standing before PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi in
front of the Camiling Police Station and was not yet in police custody.
Accused-appellant cites in support of his argument People v. Cabintoy,16 where we held that an
uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in
writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. The situation of accused-
appellants in Cabintoy is not similar to that of accused-appellant herein. The accused-appellants
in Cabintoy, when they executed their extrajudicial confessions without assistance of counsel, were
already suspects under custodial investigation by the San Mateo Police for robbery with homicide
committed against a taxi driver. Accused-appellant in the instant case, on his own volition,
approached unsuspecting police officers standing in front of the police station with a knife in his
hand and readily confessed to stabbing his father to death. Accused-appellant was arrested and
subjected to custodial investigation by the police officers only after his confession.
Hence, herein accused-appellant's confession, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not
in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The present case is more akin to People v. Andan17 wherein we allowed into evidence
the uncounselled confession of therein accused-appellant given under the following circumstances:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the
mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control"
over the local police and may arguably be- deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to
the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not
question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The
mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with
the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him
did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by
the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts
or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion
by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Moreover, accused-appellant's verbal confession that he stabbed his father to death made to PO1
Torre and PO1 Macusi, established through the testimonies of said police officers, falls under Rule
130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion
that no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.18 Accused-appellant's
declaration is admissible for being part of the res gestae. A declaration is deemed part of the res
gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when these three requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances.19 All the requisites are present in this case.
Accused-appellant had just been through a startling and gruesome occurrence, that is, his father's
death. Accused-appellant made the confession to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi only a few minutes
after and while he was still under the influence of said startling occurrence, before he had the
opportunity to concoct or contrive a story. In fact, accused-appellant seemed to still be in shock
when he walked to the Police Station completely unmindful of the rain and the knife in his hand, and
headed directly to PO1 Torre and PO1 Macusi, who were standing in front of the Police Station, to
confess to stabbing his father to death. The police officers who immediately went to the house of
Jose, accused-appellant's father, found Jose's lifeless body with blood still oozing from his stab
wounds. As res gestae, accused-appellant's spontaneous statement is admissible in evidence against
him.
Accused-appellant's confession was further corroborated by the circumstantial evidence.
To justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. 20 Rule
133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court enumerates the conditions when circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction, thus:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial Evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction
if:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
217
(a) There is more than one circumstance;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Damages for the loss of earning capacity of Jose should be awarded as well given the testimony of
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and his wife, Flora, on this particular fact. We refer to our pronouncements in People v. Verde27 that:
The heirs are also entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased Francisco
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Gealon. The fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for
The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found that the aforequoted requisites have been satisfied damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said damages.
in this case given the following circumstantial evidence: The testimony of the victim's wife, Delia Gealon, as to the earning capacity of her husband Francisco
1. On or about 4:50 o'clock in the afternoon of July 30, 2006, the victim was stabbed to death. Gealon sufficiently establishes the basis for making such an award. It was established that Francisco
Gealon was 48 years old at the time of his death in 1991. His average income was P200.00 a day.
2. Thirty minutes later, [accused-appellant] personally went to Camiling Police Station and Hence, in accordance with the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted in several cases
surrendered himself and the bladed weapon he used in killing his father to the police authorities of decided by this Court, the loss of his earning capacity is to be calculated as follows:
the said police station. To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the non-availability of documentary
evidence, there must be oral testimony that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the
3. When his mother learned about the incident, [accused-appellant] did nothing to appease his minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact that in the victim's
responding mother. "It has always been said that criminal case are primarily about human nature." line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (b) the victim was employed as a daily wage
Here is a case of a son doing nothing to explain the death of his father to his grieving mother. Such worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 28
inaction is contrary to human nature.
In the case at bar, Jose was 67 years old at the time of his death and was earning a daily wage of
4. When he was detained after police investigation, [accused-appellant] did not object to his P200.00 as a tricycle driver, which was below the P252.00 to P263.50 minimum wage rate for non-
continued detention. agriculture under Wage Order No. 11 dated June 16, 2005 for Region III. We take judicial notice that
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable there is no documentary evidence available to establish the daily earning capacity of a tricycle
conclusion that points to accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.21 The driver. We thus compute the award of damages for the loss of Jose's earning capacity as follows:
incriminating collage of facts against accused-appellant was created by circumstantial evidence Gross
Net earning life
anchored on the credible and unbiased testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. We will not = x annual - less living expenses (50% of gross annual income)
capacity (x) expectancy
disturb but shall accord the highest respect to the findings of the RTC on the issue of credibility of income
the witnesses and their testimonies, it having had the opportunity to observe their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.22 x = 2(80-67) x [73,000.00-36,500.00]
3
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines Parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or = 8.67 x 36,500.00
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and
shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. = P316,455.00
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) Finally, in conformity with current policy, we impose interest on all monetary awards for damages
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
Parricide - other than the fact of killing - is the relationship of the offender to the victim. 23 All the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04596, finding accused-
elements are present in this case. Jose, the victim, was killed by accused-appellant, his own son. appellant, Adrian Guting y Tomas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is
Accused-appellant's birth certificate, which was presented before the RTC, establishes that accused- hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
appellant was the legitimate son of Jose and Flora. of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
The crime of Parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With damages, and P316,455.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity. All monetary awards for
one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstance, the damages shall be subject to interest of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant was proper. Decision until they are fully paid.

We modify though the monetary awards imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.24

Prevailing jurisprudence pegs the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the
heirs of the victim of Parricide at P75,000.00 each.25 The temperate damages awarded by the RTC in
the amount of P30,000.00 should be decreased to P25,000.00 to also conform with the latest
jurisprudence.26 It is fitting to additionally award exemplary damages in the sum of P30,000.00
considering the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

218