Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
July 13, 2010
Summary: In an earlier essay in this
series, Ronald Asmus argued that
the consensus and strategic para-
digm that has guided the enlarge-
ment of NATO and the EU to Central
and Eastern Europe since the mid
1990s has crumbled and no longer
fits today’s strategic circumstances.
He says that absent a new narra-
tive for further enlargement and a
revised strategy for accomplishing
it, the historic window for extending
core Western institutions to new
democracies as part of building a
Europe that is unified, free, and at
peace is likely to close. Iris Kempe
takes issue with that view and
argues that it is too pessimistic. She
contends that key elements of that
narrative already exist, that impor-
tant institutional building blocks
for further enlargement led by the
European Union are being put into
place and that a new narrative can
and should be framed around the
theme of “Completing Europe.”
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Completing Europe:
A Response to Ronald Asmus
by Iris Kempe*
In his essay “Is Enlargement Dead?”
Ronald Asmus argues that there is a
real risk that the historical window
of opportunity for enlarging trans-
atlantic and European institutions is
coming to a close, and that the West
needs a new moral and strategic
narrative about why enlargement
still matters if it hopes to keep that
window open. In my view, the most
concise answer to that challenge is
that Europe is starting to tell the
story of its completion. This is a
more optimistic view. In a foresee-
able if somewhat long-term future,
the enlargement part of the Euro-
pean Union’s history will definitely
come to a close — not because of
enlargement fatigue and policy
failure, but rather because the EU
will have brought in all those states
that aspire to membership and it will
border on states that do not.
This is not to say that many of
the points Asmus raises are not
legitimate. At first and perhaps even
second glance, prospects do appear
dim for extending the benefits of
close European and transatlantic
integration to a wider selection of
states to the east of the European
Union’s present borders. Following
the big-bang enlargement of 2004
and the subsequent disappoint-
ment with Romanian and Bulgarian
membership in 2007, the EU has
indeed been suffering from a case
*
Dr. Iris Kempe is the Director of the Regional Office South Caucasus, Heinrich Boell Foundation.
of enlargement fatigue. The Russia–
Georgia War of 2008 may have
slammed the door on additional
memberships in NATO for Eastern
European countries. The domestic
weaknesses and democracy deficits
of Eastern governments — from
Viktor Yanukovych’s perceived tilt
toward Russia in Ukraine to Mikheil
Saakashvili’s alleged impulsiveness
in Georgia and other challenges in
additional eastern neighbors —
make many EU members cautious
and mitigate against opening Euro-
pean and transatlantic institutions
to these states. Analysts should not
deny the potential risk that these
countries could end up lingering in
gray zones, neither fully integrated
nor completely cast adrift.
The challenges are real and daunting.
Eventually, extending offers of
membership to these eastern neigh-
bors would significantly alter the
character of the European Union.
With Ukraine, the EU would admit
another medium-sized state whose
population is roughly similar to that
of Spain and Poland. If Turkey joins
the EU, it would be the EU’s second-
most populous state, and one with
a growing population. Admitting
countries of this size would require
recalibrating the internal voting rules
by which the EU runs. The eastern
neighbors are also poor. Budgets,
transfers, subsidies and all of the
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
financial programs of the EU will be affected by bringing
in additional net recipients. Entrenched interests will fight
hard for their prerogatives.
At the same time, there may also be reasons to be more
optimistic. In reality, the number of countries that seek
or could seek membership is shrinking, and the fear
that enlargement will never end is exaggerated. In addi-
tion to the Balkans, enlargement concerns a limited
number of states in Wider Europe, including those in the
South Caucasus. While these countries may be weaker
and poorer, they are also the final tranche likely to seek
membership.
More importantly, the European Union of 2010 and
beyond has changed; it is no longer the same EU that
admitted new members in 2004 and 2007. Negotia-
tions to modify EU institutions to accommodate a larger
number of members began in 2001, continued through
the constitutional convention and the rejection of the
Constitutional Treaty, and eventually led to the Treaty of
Lisbon. This treaty, which entered into force on December
1, 2009, offers advantages for further enlargement even
if its implementation will take some time, including the
time needed to negotiate competencies between member
states and European institutions. The Lisbon treaty gives
greater weight to the European Parliament, provides high-
profile offices to make EU policy more personalized, and
increases political coordination between member states
and EU institutions. Simplified working methods and new
voting procedures such as the “double majority” make it
possible for EU institutions to function more efficiently.
To shape Wider Europe, the Lisbon treaty provides a
three-pronged strategic toolbox. First, on the institutional
level, the new office of High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union gives
greater weight to the EU in external matters, such as
relations with eastern neighbors. The European External
Action Service, as a nascent European diplomatic corps
that builds on the EU’s existing missions, will also enable
greater efficiency in external affairs. At the very highest
level, the establishment of a permanent President of the
European Council, to drive the work of the EU’s heads
of state and government, has the potential to give EU
policy greater coherence than it had in the pre-Lisbon era.
Second, an innovation in the current Barroso Commis-
sion is Czech Commissioner Stefan Füle’s responsibility
for enlargement and neighborhood policy. In the course
of his hearing in the European Parliament on January 12,

2010, Füle spoke in favor of adding more substance than
procedures when it comes to enlargement and neighbor-
hood policy. Third, Article 8 of the Lisbon treaty includes
the option of developing a special relationship with
neighboring countries.
These internal adjustments show that the EU has recog-
nized its need to adapt to a changed Europe and to create
institutions able to accommodate a membership that may
eventually include some 40 states. That framework already
exists in the European Union on paper and is increasingly
being put into place in reality.
This new framework has the potential to change the
debate on enlargement. It will enable debates within
the EU and its member states to advance productively.
The other major challenge lies with the eastern neigh-
bors who hope to eventually join the EU. They must still
formulate and implement a European orientation as a top
national priority on all levels. Compared with those in the
previous rounds of enlargement, the countries that now
aspire to EU membership must come up with arguments
that are even more convincing and demonstrate through
their actions that their inclusion is not only in their own
interests, but would also increase security and stability in
Wider Europe. They must show that they are capable of
functioning within an ever-closer European Union, and
that their admission will be a net gain for the existing
members. Achieving the goal of completing Europe will
require both changes in the European Union’s Eastern
policy as well as paradigm changes in the countries of the
Eastern neighborhood.
The Neighbors in Wider Europe Have Work to Do
Of the six countries that fall under the rubric of Wider
Europe — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine — none has established a fully
functioning and stable democratic system. There are key
differences among them in terms of both political and
economic reform. Despite important breakthroughs
such as Georgia’s in 2003 and Ukraine’s in 2004, the
political systems in these countries range from autoc-
racy in Belarus and Azerbaijan to unsteady democracy in
Georgia and Ukraine. In their steps toward democracy
and a market economy, these countries have generally
lacked an overall master plan linking internal change and
foreign policy orientation. The current commitments
from the EU and NATO are not substitutes for prospects
of membership. Far more than the West needs an open
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
debate on enlargement, these countries in the East need
wide-ranging discussions of their future orientations.
Without stronger civil societies, deeper democracy, more
effective state institutions, and a broad national consensus
on integration, the EU’s neighbors will not be ready
to take advantage of any offers that might come from
Western institutions. The eastern neighbors also have
their work cut out for them in terms of overall develop-
ment. To make credible bids for accession, their govern-
In reality, the number of
countries that seek or could seek
membership is shrinking, and the
fear that enlargement will never
end is exaggerated. . . . [And]
the EU has recognized its need
to adapt to a changed Europe
and to create institutions able
to accommodate a membership
that may eventually include some
40 states.
ments and public institutions will likely have to function
at a level at least comparable to that of the Baltic states;
Bulgaria and Romania are widely perceived as having
gained membership without being truly prepared, and the
EU is unlikely to let that happen again. Furthermore, any
enlargement comprising more than one state will have to
be seen as a net gain for the EU; otherwise, the current
members will simply declare that more time is needed
before accession can proceed.
The European Union is nevertheless taking steps to help
the neighbors to prepare. With its Eastern Partnership,
officially launched in December 2008, the EU has opened

a new chapter in its Eastern policy. For the first time, it
aims from the very beginning to include civil societies as
driving forces of Wider Europe. With this step, the EU is
showing that previous processes of enlargement cannot
simply be replicated. The interactions between institu-
tions and governments must be different from those that
led to Central and Eastern European enlargement in 2004.
The new drive toward EU membership is more likely to be
guided by sectoral integration in areas such as free trade
and visa facilitation. Nongovernmental organizations
in the neighboring countries are a potential source of
change. At the same time, the NGOs are themselves part
of the transition process. They are still undergoing eman-
cipation from the legacies of the former Soviet Union,
and very often they are restricted by the conditions of
transition such as lack of free media or lack of a legal and
financial framework.
A Different Route
Taken together, these developments suggest that in
contrast to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the
current neighbors are likely to forge closer relations with
the EU more rapidly than with NATO. In part, this is
because the EU is continually innovating in its relations
with the region; the plethora of programs means that
the European Union is constantly present in these coun-
tries’ domestic political discussions. This preference also
stems from a view that the EU bridges their relations with
both Europe and Russia; the neighbors can improve one
without necessarily endangering the other. Finally, this
preference is partly due to the existence of more points
of contact between the neighbors’ governments and civil
societies and the EU institutions. NATO’s Partnership for
Peace, for all of its benefits, works with a narrower selec-
tion of local partners.
The United States and the EU need to be clear on what
anchoring the eastern neighbor states to the West will
mean in practice. The depth of integration implied in
eventual EU membership will hopefully provide a contin-
uous impetus for social change throughout the process.
Meeting European norms, incorporating the acquis into
national legislation, and the enormously detailed ways in
which European states work together will give the neigh-
bors continuous opportunities to strengthen their local
institutions and support from their civil societies. Very
little of this progress will make headlines, and for much
of the time it may appear very technical and as if enlarge-
ment fatigue is continuing. But as long as the neighbors
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
are working toward European standards and the present
members are helping them in these tasks, European inte-
gration will be proceeding apace.
Bringing the neighboring countries into an institutional
framework of Wider Europe requires a tailor-made
approach to both NATO and the European Union. NATO
commands immediate attention and highlights some
of the deepest internal divisions in the neighbors’ soci-
eties, along with the most difficult choices in their rela-
tions with Russia. The promise of security guarantees is
balanced by internal and external challenges, such that
decision-makers in the neighboring countries are recon-
sidering the priority they have given to NATO. In this
context, the EU has become a more attractive goal, at least
for the time being. Western partners should therefore
focus on convergence with the European Union, particu-
larly the low-key work of sectoral integration and accus-
toming the neighbors to the habits of working within
EU processes. This does not mean wavering on each
country’s right to choose its own alliances and security
arrangements, but it does mean choosing which parts of
anchoring to emphasize and provide with resources.
The Largest Neighbor: Russia
The overall goals for Brussels and major Western capi-
tals have not changed: a united and free Europe, no gray
zones, democratic governments and market economies,
and eventual integration into European and transatlantic
structures. As part of the path to these goals, Europe
— the EU and its member states — as well as the United
States will adjust the way in which they deal with the
largest neighbor in Wider Europe: Russia. On European
issues, the transatlantic partners are challenged to find
means to encourage Russia to be cooperative. One aspect
is to consider not only official Russia, but also the many
elements of Russian society that play a role in that coun-
try’s relations with the EU’s other neighbors. European
integration and change within Russia are both long-term
processes. The EU should include civic partners from
Russia in its programs for the Eastern neighborhood, and
it should work to reach beyond current ruling structures.
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not the whole of the country,
nor will it shape Russia’s relations with Europe over the
full time frame that integration is likely to take. EU insti-
tutions and actors will benefit from taking a long view in
relations with Russia.

At the same time, U.S. and EU leaders will be signaling to
Russia that there are limits to the influence it can expect
to exercise within the territory of the former Soviet
Union. The positive signals after the tragic airplane crash
near Katyn should be used to help overcome legacies
of the past. Momentum gained in the immediate after-
math should be used for sustainable efforts toward more
effective cooperation. Maintaining a discussion requires
the appropriate programs and financial resources, as
well as porous borders. This will require effort from the
neighbors, as well as from Russia. For example, societal
dialogue between Georgia and Russia is not possible
in the absence of diplomatic relations between the two
countries. One of Europe’s tasks is to initiate a dialogue
and to create the necessary diplomatic conditions for
open dialogue to take place.
Energy supply and energy security are key parts of any
EU Eastern policy. No other field of policy so tightly ties
or deeply influences the interests and interdependence of
Russia, the neighboring states, and the European Union.
Shaping Wider Europe means changing Europe’s energy
supplies. The more effectively Europe uses its energy, the
less it depends on Russia, a point that applies doubly to
the EU’s eastern neighbors. At present, the EU’s neigh-
boring states have the least efficient energy use in Europe,
offering considerable scope for improvement. The use
of renewable energy sources should also be expanded. In
addition, improving efficiency and using more renewables
should be reflected in EU technical assistance programs.
From a strategic perspective, security of delivery is every
bit as important as security of sourcing. European poli-
cymakers have chosen to improve the security of both by
diversifying potential sources and the pipelines required
to deliver oil and natural gas. The goal should be to tie
the interests of energy consumers, transit states, and
producers together so that all sides benefit.
Finishing Touches
“Is enlargement dead?” Ronald Asmus asks. Rumors of its
death are greatly exaggerated. A more constructive way
forward might be to frame the issue in terms of enlarge-
ment’s completion as a finite and politically achievable
challenge. The first step in meeting that challenge is for
Europe to begin telling the story of its completion. In a
foreseeable, if lengthy, future, the European Union still
has the chance to integrate those countries that wish to
and are able to join, after which it will border on states
that do not aspire to membership. Then the enlargement
Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program
part of the EU’s history will indeed come to a close — as
a success. The EU’s new institutions are just beginning
their work in the starting blocks; there are member states
whose leaders can see completion approaching, and the
eventual roster of members is increasingly apparent.
Completing Europe is a vision of Wider Europe that
can drive change in the neighbors, guide relations with
nearby states that do not aspire to membership, and
shape debates among the present members. Civil society
dialogue and sectoral integration are two approaches
to overcoming enlargement fatigue. Along with the
new institutions, they will help current EU members
find the means to accommodate the eastern neighbors.
A discourse about Wider Europe that also includes a
common European energy policy and linkage between
Russian and neighborhood policy will promote open
debates in both East and West, to the benefit of all partici-
pants. The eastern neighbors have hard work ahead of
them in a drive to make European integration their
national priority, based on ongoing transition processes
and developing constructive relations with Russia. Pros-
pects for a free, united Europe, with widening and deep-
ening integration led by the European Union, are not as
bleak as they appear at first glance. With a framework in
place and determined efforts from the EU’s neighbors,
the story of the next decade could still be a positive and
successful one.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-
partisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedi-
cated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between
North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF
does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the
transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the poli-
cy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis
on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities
to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship.
In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen
democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a
permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains
a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its
headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe:
Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
About the On Wider Europe Series
This series is designed to focus in on key intellectual and policy de-
bates regarding Western policy toward Wider Europe that otherwise
might receive insufficient attention. The views presented in these
papers are the personal views of the authors and not those of the
institutions they represent or The German Marshall Fund of the
United States. We want to encourage creative thinking, offer alterna-
tive ideas and foster debate. Anyone with additional ideas should
feel free to contact Ronald Asmus at rasmus@gmfus.org. We hope
you enjoy these papers and they contribute to a constructive debate
and better policies.