Analysis
June 25, 2010
Summary: Based on the tradition-
al framework of Turkish foreign
policy, one would have expected it
to encourage Iran to comply with
the requirements of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
cooperate with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
while trying to persuade the Unit-
ed States and other members of
the UN Security Council that dip-
lomatic means should be given
continued priority. But in the final
analysis, as a natural outcome
of its traditionally pro-Western
foreign policy orientation, Turkey
would not have led the effort to
oppose the measures that were
adopted by the Security Council.
The fact that Turkey has chosen
to cooperate with another emerg-
ing power — Brazil — to challenge
the way the international nuclear
order operates, appears to signal
a fundamental shift in the way
policy is formulated.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
Turkey’s Iran Policy:
Moving Away from Tradition?
by İlter Turan
Addressing a large audience of busi-
nessmen, members of the press and
academics at the Istanbul Forum in
May, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu outlined several goals for
his country’s foreign policy. Global
problems, he said, had to be addressed
within frameworks that all stake-
holders had taken part in forming. If
countries were asked to comply with
rules and institutional arrangements
that had been developed without their
consent, it would prove difficult for
them to accept them as legitimate.
Davutoğlu also made references to
the growth of the Turkish economy
and Turkey’s natural inclination to
develop mutually beneficial relation-
ships with countries in its region. He
emphasized that Turkey’s contribution
to addressing regional problems were
viewed as both natural and desirable
by those with whom Turkey shared a
common history and culture. Finally,
he reminded the audience that Turkey
was pursuing a policy of zero problems
with neighbors.
The guidelines of Turkish foreign
policy as elaborated by Davutoğlu had
in fact evolved from two major devel-
opments during the last two decades
of the 20th century. First in 1980 came
the decision to liberalize the foreign
currency regime, quickly leading to a
reorientation of the Turkish economy
from import substitution to export-
led growth. Next came the end of the
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet
Union, developments that redefined
the global security environment and
consequently Turkey’s security needs.
Economic considerations began to
constitute a much greater factor in
Turkey’s foreign policy. In terms of
security, various regional and global
relationships were forged while main-
taining Turkey’s continued involve-
ment in the Atlantic Alliance as a pillar
of its defense.
This adjustment in Turkish foreign
policy was initiated by the late Ismail
Cem during his tenure as foreign
minister from 1997 to 2002. Turkey
assumed a new interest in the regions
surrounding it and, in particular, tried
to reach out to the countries of the
Middle East with whom relations had
been neglected during the years of
the Cold War. At the same time, these
new developments in Turkey’s foreign
policy did not aim to alter its basic
pro-western orientation. Turkey still
pursued its goal of joining the Euro-
pean Union and its security continued
to rest upon NATO. As its economy
continued to grow in leaps and bounds
to become the 16th largest economy
in the world, and as its share in world
Analysis
trade increased, it was invited to become a member of G-20
group of countries. These developments, taken together, did
not point to a policy aimed at bringing about a change in
the world order. Rather, it was an attempt to become a more
active and influential player in the existing system.
The policy Turkey has been following with regards to Iran’s
nuclear ambitions, combined with the philosophy that is
manifest in Davutoğlu’s remarks, suggest that the basis
of Turkish foreign policy is being transformed. Based on
the traditional framework of Turkish foreign policy, one
would have expected it to encourage Iran to comply with
the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and cooperate with the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA), while trying to persuade the United
States and other members of the UN Security Council that
diplomatic means should be given continued priority. But
in the final analysis, as a natural outcome of its traditionally
pro-Western foreign policy orientation, Turkey would not
have led the effort to oppose the measures that were adopt-
ed by the Security Council. The fact that Turkey has chosen
to cooperate with another emerging power — Brazil — to
challenge the way the international nuclear order operates,
appears to signal a fundamental shift in the way policy is
formulated.
Turkey’s arguments regarding its position on Iran’s nuclear
ambitions have focused not so much on the potential risks
involved in Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and its
implications for Turkey’s security, but on the fact that there
are other countries in the region — notably Israel — that al-
ready possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, efforts should be
directed toward the establishment of a nuclear-free region,
within which Iran would also abandon its pursuit of nuclear
weapons.
Though not spelled out in such specific terms, the logic of
the Turkish position on Iranian weapons flows somewhat as
follows: The current non-proliferation regime gives inherent
advantages to the several countries that possessed atomic
weapons when the regime was initially established in 1968
with the advent of the NPT. Those that were in possession
of nuclear weapons from the beginning have not abided by
their commitment to disarm completely. New countries,
on the other hand, were added to the list of states pos-
sessing nuclear weapons after the treaty went into effect.

Some newcomers to the nuclear club have also been able to
develop nuclear weapons by staying out of the NPT system.
All newcomers have enjoyed, at one time or another, the
discreet cooperation and support of some of those already
possessing weapons. On many occasions, major powers
have turned a blind eye to those who have violated the sys-
tem. Consequently, the non-proliferation system has failed
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It has instead
allowed the major world powers to sometimes permit and
at other times fail to deter countries from developing their
own arsenals. The regime gives a monopoly of nuclear
weapons to those that already have them, placing them at
a permanent advantage without a meaningful program of
total nuclear disarmament. It is therefore not justified to
expect countries to observe a set of rules that were devel-
oped without their participation or give their consent to
an arrangement that accords undue privileges to a select
group of countries. This is all the more important since the
possession of nuclear weapons provides a country with a
shield that protects it against conventional attacks by other
powers.
This approach naturally means that deep differences remain
between the United States and Turkey regarding UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1929, which imposes sanctions on
Iran in order to compel it to cooperate with the IAEA, and
the American government’s refusal to accept as sufficient
the agreement that Brazil and Turkey were able to broker
with the Iranian government. Turkey notes that Iran prom-
ised to exchange 1,200 kilograms of its low grade uranium
for 120 kilograms of enriched uranium that is to be used for
medical purposes, and that Turkey would serve as the de-
pository of the fuel until the exchange is completed, adding
that this is precisely what the United States had asked for.
The United States meanwhile argues that other conditions
that it had asked for were not fully met and that the amount
of uranium Iran possesses has actually increased, leaving in
its hands enough fuel to make a bomb. Furthermore, Iran
has not abandoned its efforts to enrich the uranium in its
possession.
Turkey’s gentler approach may be explained by several fac-
tors. Turkish leaders enjoy recounting that Turkey and Iran
(and their predecessor states) have been at peace since 1639
and that they are unwilling to commit significantly hostile
acts toward Iran that might compromise that relationship.
Analysis
Turkey’s trade with Iran is robust and growing. Turkey
aspires to serve as an energy corridor to Western markets
for Iranian gas and oil. And finally, political leaders call
attention to the fact that the negative effects of an embargo
are not felt equally. During the oil embargo against Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq, a disproportionate burden was placed upon
Turkey without adequate compensation from the inter-
national community. Clearly, these are sufficient reasons
to account for Turkey’s reluctance to support an embargo
against Iran. But the desire for a new international order
that is in greater harmony with the emerging distribution of
global power also appears to constitute a more comprehen-
sive framework that better explains Turkish foreign policy
actions in general, not just with regard to Iran.
Where do things stand now? Turkey has announced that
it will abide by the UNSC decision, despite voting against
it. The United States, for its part, has encouraged Turkey to
continue its efforts to extract an agreement from Iran that
fully satisfies American concerns. As much as Turkey might
want to change the world, and the United States maintain
the status quo, both countries, it appears, have too many
interests in common to risk a rupture in their relations.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His
previous employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-
1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the
chair of the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the
director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East
(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political
Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Commit-
tee and a vice president of the International Political Science Associa-
tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World
Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is
board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the
board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published
in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and
foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and
international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members,
and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish
politics on TV and newspapers.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-par-
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to
promoting better understanding and cooperation between North Amer-
ica and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by sup-
porting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere,
by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communi-
ties, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by
providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the
transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initia-
tives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to
its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe:
Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
About the On Turkey Series
GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis
briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-
tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/tur-
key or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.gmfus.org/reaction.