Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco
Carreon for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They
deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and
property without due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty
to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary
of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power.
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of
private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its
provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated
all private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general
acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as respondents
assert, petitioners suffered no wrongnor allege anyfrom the enforcement of the criticized
statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is
one which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink
from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to
duty and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th
Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have
become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its
validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government.
Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides that
before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the
Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the
petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and
are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent
Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong
under the terms of lawand, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who
fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405;
Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-
325.)
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests
of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public
Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)
Bona fide suit.Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only
in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital
controversy between litigants. (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
p. 1138.)
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit
of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex
rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive
relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate
mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the
problem may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for
then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional
issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep.,
May 23, 1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)
The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme
Court quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind objected to by them,
we have decided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the
face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the
Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was
introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?
In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of
Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education in the Philippines and of all
educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul
Munroe, Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members
performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the local
educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671
pages. The following paragraphs are taken from such report:
PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS
(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in
the subjects taught.
(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The
Commission recommends 40 as a maximum.
(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public
schools of the same grade.
In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government
in the exercise of its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous
permit" system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other
statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now
be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational institutions shall be under the
supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate
establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53
C. J. S. 4.)
What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on
account of violation of rules or regulations of the Department.
II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring
on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power."
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:
"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or
specific, of what constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there
any indication of any basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the
public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the
Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the 'efficiency of instruction.'"
Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the
Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary of Education is given the power to
fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the
exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard. . . .."
It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to
prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to be observed
by all such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners
contend that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague,
indefinite and uncertain"and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The best
answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed
standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or
revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and
accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been
satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and could,
validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the
Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate
instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school.
At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or
interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to assail the validity of
the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.
True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical
and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who
"bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge
those regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper
administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to
show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per
se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.
Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way
as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" "public interest" and "justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative
standards justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Taada and Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of
legislative power.
In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education
have transcended the governmental power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners
appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they
failed to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being
"capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional practices that unless a
constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will
not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)
We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the
Secretary of Education complete control of the various activities of private schools, and why
the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the
statute does not in express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to
inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official permits to operate
under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount
to complete control. If any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the
Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it
would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having
before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with
the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National Board of Education,
opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is
amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically
competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or relevancy of the
measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)
If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools,
the question arises whether the power of supervision and regulation granted to the State by
section 5 Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is
enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control
of Education by the State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II,
p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)
The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it
enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral
character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in
the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)
The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means
power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove
that State control of private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to
note that the Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean
greater power than mere regulation.
SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met
by the regular amount appropriated in the annual Appropriation Act: Provided,
however, That for additional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private
schools, colleges and universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to
student of said schools, colleges and universities and President of the Philippines
may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy an equitable assessment from each
private educational institution equivalent to one percent of the total amount accruing
from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the assessment herein provided
by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the
cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for recognition granted to it.
Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to
open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional, in the same way
that taxes on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaperboth
constitutional privilegeshave been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the
exercise of a constitutional right.
The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to
restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the
collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the
suit, it is one against the State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving
"the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance.
There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly
a mere feeand not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty and power to
regulate and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves
investigation and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower
courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still be within the original
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.
The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its
section 1 provides:
This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U.
S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous restraints upon
publication of newspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical
of government institutions or policies.
Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether
the law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5)
to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools,
as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that
section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the
police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power.
For instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power to
control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the former
conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education ismerely implied from
the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the
situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states
where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced.
However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us.
We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the
petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to
perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use of textbooks that
are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally
improper? What's the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the
investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to civil liberties, of
possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with
obvious alarm. Much depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the
statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the Board
on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a
middle course between the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no
cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop. Anyway, and
again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the
National Board of Education created by Republic Act 1124.
Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they
apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, after all administrative
remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional
boundaries and protect individual liberties.
IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the
proper court, and at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision of the issue herein
presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie
Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba,
and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others
are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation
to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and
concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the
same grounds as aforestated.
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati,
thus:
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be
made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is
the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a
local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about
by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated
that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to
its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area
previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section
2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area
of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between
the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of
a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by
making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if
they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using
the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with
unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable
difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the
existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain
the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of
newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by
which the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words,
the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so
long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e.,
by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this
case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has
been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens
titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose
which the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of
the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful
due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of
their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no
cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but
defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving
the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment
of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada
v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is
an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation,
means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed
as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case
at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A.
No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of
the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati
and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new
election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of
the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving
for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city
shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the
present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by
them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,
respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They
further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the
coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would
not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently
crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements
before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-
election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen
to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic
issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for:
(1) reapportionment6cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is
not expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census,
stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we
ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership
by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what
was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a
general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional
legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the
same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure,
with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index,
or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to
such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to
prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK for brevity)
elections originally scheduled last May 6, 2002. The petition also seeks to
prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK.
Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayers and
class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly situated.
Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be
voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on May 6, 2002 be
postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21
years old.
Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated and
conspired to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the
membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of
age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but not
more than 21 years old will be summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly
discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly disassociated and
obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.[1]
Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction -
The Issues
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition,
it would be necessary to consider an office a property. It is, however,
well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the
sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is
a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is
that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of
men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every
officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the
office as a trust for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from
the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office. While the law
makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative
council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a
proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional
principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to
public office. Even the State policy directing equal access to opportunities for
public service[35] cannot bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK
membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in
public affairs,[36] this policy refers to those who belong to the class of people
defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth
qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not
qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on
being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches
mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his
office. In the same manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for
membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK
membership.
The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the
postponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes
the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law also
fixes the date of the SK elections.Petitioners are not even assailing the
constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and will apply to the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave
abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK
elections. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners contradict their allegation
of illegality. The evidence consist of the following: (1) Comelec en
banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 that recommended the
postponement of the SK elections to 2003; (2) the letter of then Comelec
Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the President of the Senate; and (3) the Conference Committee Report
consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.
The Comelec exercised its power and duty to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall[37] and to recommend to Congress effective measures to
minimize election spending.[38] The Comelecs acts enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute
proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there exists a connivance and conspiracy
(among) respondents in contravention of the present law. As the Court held
in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,[40] the Comelec, as the government agency
tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to
the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.
The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and
administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the May 6, 2002
SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec
has demonstrated an earnest effort to address the practical problems in holding
the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains that the decision of
the Comelec to recommend to Congress the postponement of the elections was
made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. [41] Public respondents having
acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave
abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.
Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections would allow
the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in power, depriving other
youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK positions. This argument
deserves scant consideration. While RA No. 9164 contains a hold-over provision,
incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until their successors have been
elected or qualified. On July 15, 2002, when the SK elections are held, the hold-
over period expires and all incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold
their SK offices and their ex-officio public offices.
In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining
this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable controversy. Petitioners do
not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the
creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim
any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose
amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no
direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or
privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek
judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue
when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers action is properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines (TELEBAP) and
GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881
(otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election Code) requiring radio and television
stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign
period.[15] The Court held that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as a
taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of
Congress.[16]
Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to
taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds
by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,[17] the petitioners
therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to question several presidential
decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling
for a national referendum, with the Court explaining that
...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential
Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain a
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers,
laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined,
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No.
991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031
appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in
the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently
clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds.
In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution
Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as taxpayers to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leaves to Senators and
Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress. [18]And
in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works,[19] the Court allowed petitioner to
maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act
No. 920 appropriating P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of
feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of
public funds by means of a law.
Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v.
Laron,[20] the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent
Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to
question the legality of the contract of lease covering the public market entered
into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that
Ravanzo did not possess the requisite standing to bring such taxpayers suit since
[o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered
into between petitioner and the City shows that no public funds have been or will
be used in the construction of the market building.
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its
operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.
The relevant provision states -
The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by
Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature
setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the
payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21] The funds used for the
PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25
(5) of article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to
decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit. [22]In the case at bar, there
being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot
be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer,
but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in
the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.[23] In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in
interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he
will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24]Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner
presume to make such a representation.
II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants
The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants.
Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President created seventy (70)
positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty
(20) presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential advisers, and twenty-
eight (28) presidential assistants.[25] Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the
PCCR, the President does not have the power to create these positions. [26]
Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does
not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court. First of all, he has
not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a
result of the appointment of such presidential advisers. Secondly, petitioner has
not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he
possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which
was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what
official act, whether it be by means of an executive order, administrative order,
memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the positions
of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of
the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his allegation, petitioner merely
annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the
names and positions of such presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to
his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It
would be improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient
nature of the allegations in the Petition.
III. Right to Information
Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive
Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D) dated October 4,
1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in
government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury
vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang. [27]
The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which
provides that
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the
legislature to exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang Kabataan elections
those kabataang barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections
within the period of January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 under BP
337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been
correspondingly extended to coincide with the term of office of those who may
be elected under RA 7160.
All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the
different sanggunians shall be deemed vacant until such time that the
sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and the respective
pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That, elections for the
kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time
between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall be considered as the first
elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the kabataang
barangay officials elected within the said period shall be extended
correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this
Code. (emphasis added)
They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine
whether the City of Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d)
so as to be exempt from holding the elections on December 4, 1992.
The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second
elections on May 13, 1996 rendered this case moot and
[3]
can validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections
is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the
question may not be decided before the date of such elections.
In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first
articulated, appellants were ordered by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to cease and desist from granting a shipper what the ICC
perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage
charges. The cease and desist order was for a period of about two
years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to November
15), but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been able to hand down its
decision by the time the cease and desist order expired.The case was
decided only on February 20, 1911, more than two years after the order
had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had thereby
become moot and the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this
contention, the Court held:
We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The
first question is whether then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had
authority to determine whether under 532(d) of the Local Government
Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for
SK. As already stated, petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the
proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that this is a power
which Art.IX,C, 2(1) of the Constitution vests in the
COMELEC. Respondents further argue that, by mandating that
elections for the SK be held on December 4, 1992 in every barangay,
the COMELEC in effect determined that there had been no elections for
the KB previously held in the City of Manila.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC
placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the
DILG. Contrary to respondents contention, this did not contravene Art.
IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall
have the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall. Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of
the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have recently held, contests
involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors, it was [8]
contended that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it
prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman
different from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus
Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article 1 of the said
Code which explicitly provides that it shall govern all elections of
public officers; and, (b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete
abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily
mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided
for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52,
Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1,
Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code. [9]
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2),
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELECs exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to
the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the
Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the
Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the
punong barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. They were to be
elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the
same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial
courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial
Courts.
....
The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and
was in line with the legislative policy evident in several statutes.Thus,
P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang Barangays in every
barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the Secretary of
Local Government and Community Development shall promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of this Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation
No. 2421 of the President of the Philippines, in calling for the general
elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14, 1985, tasked the
then Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports, and the Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang
Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in a
Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C.
Aquino directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue the
necessary rules and regulations for effecting the representation of the
Kabataang Barangay, among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of
the local government units.
The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was
by no means inconsequential. DILG supervision was to be exercised
within the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in
Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to
perform was the enforcement of the rules.
Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the
COMELEC did not name the barangays which, because they had
conducted kabataang barangay elections between January 1, 1988 and
January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on
December 4, 1992. That these barangays were precisely to be
determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority
given to the DILG to supervise the conduct of the elections. Since
532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials whose term of office
was extended beyond 1992, the authority to supervise the conduct of
elections in that year must necessarily be deemed to include the
authority to determine which kabataang barangay would not be included
in the 1992 elections.
The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a
fact, namely, whether between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992
elections had been held in a given kabataang barangay. If elections had
been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on December 4,
1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term of office of the kabataang
barangay officials so elected was extended correspondingly to coincide
with the term of office of those elected under [the Local Government
Code of 1991]. In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government was to act merely as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will was to take effect. There was no undue delegation of
[11]
WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in
November 1985 yet, which is over their three years term of office;
WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit
provided for under the law;
....
The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897
barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30, 1990, KB City Federation
elections were conducted.
It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of
KB elections held in the aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon the
effectivity of the new Local Government Code that the exception clause
of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee which drafted the Code show the following: [13]
EN BANC
DECISION
Chairman Abon replied, however, by letter of July 12, 2005 that the
Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the documents being requested,
albeit he was certain that Usec. Aquino would provide the Congressman
with a copy once the negotiation is completed. And by letter of July 18,
2005, NEDA Assistant Director-General Margarita R. Songco informed the
Congressman that his request addressed to Director-General Neri had been
forwarded to Usec. Aquino who would be in the best position to respond to
the request.
In its third hearing conducted on August 31, 2005, the House Committee
resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA, but the
same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman
Congressman Teves information, then House Speaker Jose de Venecia had
requested him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the
President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.[3]
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be
entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate
grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which respondents
enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,
paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation,
competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.[5]
While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the
public since September 11, 2006,[6] respondents do not dispute that, at the
time the petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners Reply when the
JPEPA was still being negotiated the initial drafts thereof were kept from
public view.
Standing
For a petition for mandamus such as the one at bar to be given due course, it
must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party
from the enjoyment of a legal right.[7]Respondents deny that petitioners have
such standing to sue. [I]n the interest of a speedy and definitive resolution of
the substantive issues raised, however, respondents consider it sufficient to
cite a portion of the ruling in Pimentel v. Office of Executive
Secretary[8] which emphasizes the need for a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy on questions of standing.
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need
not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right.[9] As the present petition is anchored on the
right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens
and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the
standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
Mootness
Considering, however, that [t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is
the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between
the two States parties,[10] public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its
signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has
been largely rendered moot and academic.
With the Senate deliberations on the JPEPA still pending, the agreement as it
now stands cannot yet be considered as final and binding between the two
States. Article 164 of the JPEPA itself provides that the agreement does not
take effect immediately upon the signing thereof. For it must still go through
the procedures required by the laws of each country for its entry into
force, viz:
Article 164
Entry into Force
This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the
date on which the Governments of the Parties exchange
diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective legal
procedures necessary for entry into force of this Agreement
have been completed. It shall remain in force unless terminated
as provided for in Article 165.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
President Arroyos endorsement of the JPEPA to the Senate for concurrence
is part of the legal procedures which must be met prior to the agreements
entry into force.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the
petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the
disclosure of the full text thereof.
Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the
documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to
information on matters of public concern[13] and contravenes other
constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full
public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.[14] Second,
they contend that non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their
right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political,
and economic decision-making.[15] Lastly, they proffer that divulging the
contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been concluded will
effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in
violation of the principle of separation of powers.
xxxx
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method
of publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are
started, pressure groups attempt to muscle in. An ill-timed
speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the
concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would
quickly lead to widespread propaganda to block the
negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are
fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion
before it is approved. (The New American Government and Its
Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Since the factual milieu in CIEL seemed to call for the straight application
of the doctrine in Fulbright, a discussion of why the district court did not
apply the same would help illumine this Courts own reasons for deciding
the present case along the lines ofFulbright.
In both Fulbright and CIEL, the U.S. government cited a statutory basis for
withholding information, namely, Exemption 5 of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).[39] In order to qualify for protection under
Exemption 5, a document must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be
either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature, and (2) it must be both pre-
decisional and part of the agency's deliberative or decision-making
process.[40]
Judge Friedman, in CIEL, himself cognizant of a superficial similarity of
context between the two cases, based his decision on what he perceived to
be a significant distinction: he found the negotiators notes that were sought
in Fulbright to be clearly internal, whereas the documents being sought
in CIEL were those produced by or exchanged with an outside party, i.e.
Chile. The documents subject of Fulbright being clearly internal in
character, the question of disclosure therein turned not on the threshold
requirement of Exemption 5 that the document be inter-agency, but on
whether the documents were part of the agency's pre-decisional deliberative
process. On this basis, Judge Friedman found that Judge Green's discussion
[in Fulbright] of the harm that could result from disclosure therefore is
irrelevant, since the documents at issue [in CIEL] are not inter-agency,
and the Court does not reach the question of deliberative
process. (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, Fulbright was not overturned. The court in CIEL merely found the
same to be irrelevant in light of its distinct factual setting. Whether this
conclusion was valid a question on which this Court would not pass the
ruling in Fulbright that [n]egotiations between two countries to draft a
treaty represent a true example of a deliberative process was left standing,
since the CIEL court explicitly stated that it did not reach the question of
deliberative process.
Going back to the present case, the Court recognizes that the
information sought by petitioners includes documents produced and
communicated by a party external to the Philippine government, namely,
the Japanese representatives in the JPEPA negotiations, and to that extent
this case is closer to the factual circumstances of CIEL than those
of Fulbright.
Nonetheless, for reasons which shall be discussed shortly, this Court echoes
the principle articulated in Fulbright that the public policy underlying the
deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic negotiations should
also be accorded privileged status, even if the documents subject of the
present case cannot be described as purely internal in character.
It need not be stressed that in CIEL, the court ordered the disclosure of
information based on its finding that the first requirement of FOIA
Exemption 5 that the documents be inter-agency was not met. In
determining whether the government may validly refuse disclosure of the
exchanges between the U.S. and Chile, it necessarily had to deal with this
requirement, it being laid down by a statute binding on them.
It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government
may not be disclosed if they fall under recognized exceptions. The privilege
for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions, for
the footnote to the immediately quoted ruling cites PMPF
v. Manglapus itself as an authority.
To clarify, there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be
taken into account. One is the presumed public interest in favor of keeping
the subject information confidential, which is the reason for the privilege
in the first place, and the other is the public interest in favor of disclosure,
the existence of which must be shown by the party asking for
information. [47]
xxxx
Whether it can accurately be said that the Filipino people were not involved
in the JPEPA negotiations is a question of fact which this Court need not
resolve. Suffice it to state that respondents had presented documents
purporting to show that public consultations were conducted on the
JPEPA. Parenthetically, petitioners consider these alleged consultations as
woefully selective and inadequate.[53]
AT ALL EVENTS, since it is not disputed that the offers exchanged by the
Philippine and Japanese representatives have not been disclosed to the
public, the Court shall pass upon the issue of whether access to the
documents bearing on them is, as petitioners claim, essential to their right to
participate in decision-making.
The case for petitioners has, of course, been immensely weakened by the
disclosure of the full text of the JPEPA to the public since September 11,
2006, even as it is still being deliberated upon by the Senate and, therefore,
not yet binding on the Philippines. Were the Senate to concur with the
validity of the JPEPA at this moment, there has already been, in the words
of PMPF v. Manglapus, ample opportunity for discussion before [the treaty]
is approved.
The text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to
convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their
right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also
published.
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to
Congress, and is exercised by the President only by delegation of that body,
it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested
directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade
agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464[58] may be
interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its
office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is
unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President
must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the
relevant provisions of the Constitution.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing
subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for their office until resort to
it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a
compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an
assertion of executive privilege.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress power of inquiry. [59] So
long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no
strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents failure to
invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not
amount to a waiver thereof.
We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a
genuine zeal to protect our peoples right to information against any abuse of
executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share.
There is, at least, a core meaning of the phrase sole organ of the nation in its
external relations which is not being disputed, namely, that the power
to directly negotiate treaties and international agreements is vested by our
Constitution only in the Executive. Thus, the dissent states that Congress has
the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations but does not have the
power to negotiate international agreements directly.[62]
2. The dissent also asserts that respondents can no longer claim the
diplomatic secrets privilege over the subject JPEPA documents now that
negotiations have been concluded, since their reasons for nondisclosure cited
in the June 23, 2005 letter of Sec. Ermita, and later in their Comment,
necessarily apply only for as long as the negotiations were still pending;
The House Committee that initiated the investigations on the JPEPA did not
pursue its earlier intention to subpoena the documents. This strongly
undermines the assertion that access to the same documents by the House
Committee is critical to the performance of its legislative functions. If the
documents were indeed critical, the House Committee should have, at the
very least, issued a subpoena duces tecum or, like what the Senate did
in Senate v. Ermita, filed the present petition as a legislative body, rather
than leaving it to the discretion of individual Congressmen whether to
pursue an action or not. Such acts would have served as strong indicia that
Congress itself finds the subject information to be critical to its legislative
functions.
Furthermore, from the time the final text of the JPEPA including its annexes
and attachments was published, petitioner-members of the House of
Representatives have been free to use it for any legislative purpose they may
see fit. Since such publication, petitioners need, if any, specifically for the
Philippine and Japanese offers leading to the final version of the JPEPA, has
become even less apparent.
In asserting that the balance in this instance tilts in favor of disclosing the
JPEPA documents, the dissent contends that the Executive has failed to
show how disclosing them after the conclusion of negotiations would impair
the performance of its functions. The contention, with due respect, misplaces
the onus probandi. While, in keeping with the general presumption of
transparency, the burden is initially on the Executive to provide precise and
certain reasons for upholding its claim of privilege, once the Executive is
able to show that the documents being sought are covered by a recognized
privilege, the burden shifts to the party seeking information to overcome the
privilege by a strong showing of need.
When it was thus established that the JPEPA documents are covered by the
privilege for diplomatic negotiations pursuant to PMPF v. Manglapus, the
presumption arose that their disclosure would impair the performance of
executive functions. It was then incumbent on petitioner- requesting parties
to show that they have a strong need for the information sufficient to
overcome the privilege. They have not, however.
When the Court in Senate v. Ermita limited the power of invoking the
privilege to the President alone, it was laying down a new rule for which
there is no counterpart even in the United States from which the concept of
executive privilege was adopted. As held in the 2004 case of Judicial Watch,
Inc. v. Department of Justice,[69] citing In re Sealed Case,[70] the issue of
whether a President must personally invoke the [presidential
communications] privilege remains an open question. U.S. v. Reynolds,[71] on
the other hand, held that [t]here must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer.
The rule was thus laid down by this Court, not in adherence to any
established precedent, but with the aim of preventing the abuse of the
privilege in light of its highly exceptional nature. The Courts recognition
that the Executive Secretary also bears the power to invoke the privilege,
provided he does so by order of the President, is meant to avoid laying down
too rigid a rule, the Court being aware that it was laying down a new
restriction on executive privilege. It is with the same spirit that the Court
should not be overly strict with applying the same rule in this peculiar
instance, where the claim of executive privilege occurred before the
judgment in Senate v. Ermita became final.
5. To show that PMPF v. Manglapus may not be applied in the present case,
the dissent implies that the Court therein erred in citing US
v. Curtiss Wright[72] and the book entitled The New American Government
and Its Work[73] since these authorities, so the dissent claims, may not be
used to calibrate the importance of the right to information in the Philippine
setting.
That the Court could freely cite Curtiss-Wright a case that upholds the
secrecy of diplomatic negotiations against congressional demands for
information in the course of laying down a ruling on the public right to
information only serves to underscore the principle mentioned earlier that
the privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso
factolose all force and effect simply because the same privilege is now being
claimed under different circumstances.
These cases show that the Court has always regarded claims of privilege,
whether in the context of an executive-legislative conflict or a citizens
demand for information, as closely intertwined, such that the principles
applicable to one are also applicable to the other.
Absurdity would be the ultimate result if, for instance, the Court adopts the
clear and present danger test for the assessment of claims of privilege
against citizens demands for information. If executive information, when
demanded by a citizen, is privileged only when there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent, it would be
very difficult for the Executive to establish the validity of its claim in each
instance. In contrast, if the demand comes from Congress, the Executive
merely has to show that the information is covered by a recognized privilege
in order to shift the burden on Congress to present a strong showing of
need. This would lead to a situation where it would be more difficult for
Congress to access executive information than it would be for private
citizens.
We maintain then that when the Executive has already shown that an
information is covered by executive privilege, the party demanding the
information must present a strong showing of need, whether that party is
Congress or a private citizen.
The rule that the same showing of need test applies in both these contexts,
however, should not be construed as a denial of the importance of analyzing
the context in which an executive privilege controversy may happen to be
placed. Rather, it affirms it, for it means that the specific need being shown
by the party seeking information in every particular instance is highly
significant in determining whether to uphold a claim of privilege. This need
is, precisely, part of the context in light of which every claim of privilege
should be assessed.
The claim that the book cited in PMPF v. Manglapus entitled The New
American Government and Its Work could not have taken into account the
expanded statutory right to information in the FOIA assumes that the
observations in that book in support of the confidentiality of treaty
negotiations would be different had it been written after the FOIA. Such
assumption is, with due respect, at best, speculative.
As to the claim in the dissent that [i]t is more doubtful if the same book be
used to calibrate the importance of the right of access to information in the
Philippine setting considering its elevation as a constitutional right, we
submit that the elevation of such right as a constitutional right did not set it
free from the legitimate restrictions of executive privilege which is
itself constitutionally-based.[76] Hence, the comments in that book which
were cited in PMPF v. Manglapus remain valid doctrine.
6. The dissent further asserts that the Court has never used need as a test to
uphold or allow inroads into rights guaranteed under the Constitution. With
due respect, we assert otherwise. The Court has done so before, albeit
without using the term need.
Given that the dissent has clarified that it does not seek to apply the clear
and present danger test to the present controversy, but the balancing test,
there seems to be no substantial dispute between the position laid down in
this ponencia and that reflected in the dissent as to what test to apply. It
would appear that the only disagreement is on the results of applying that
test in this instance.
However, when the Executive has as in this case invoked the privilege, and
it has been established that the subject information is indeed covered by the
privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting
that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without
any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the
doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a
limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such
controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern.
Thus, we hold that the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive
privilege.
8. Against our ruling that the principles applied in U.S. v. Nixon, the Senate
Select Committee case, and In re Sealed Case, are similarly applicable to the
present controversy, the dissent cites the caveat in the Nixon case that the
U.S. Court was there addressing only the Presidents assertion of privilege in
the context of a criminal trial, not a civil litigation nor a congressional
demand for information. What this caveat means, however, is only that
courts must be careful not to hastily apply the ruling therein to other
contexts. It does not, however, absolutely mean that the principles applied in
that case may never be applied in such contexts.
Hence, U.S. courts have cited U.S. v. Nixon in support of their rulings on
claims of executive privilege in contexts other than a criminal trial, as in the
case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services[80] which involved former
President Nixons invocation of executive privilege to challenge the
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act[81] and the above-mentioned In re Sealed Case which involved a claim
of privilege against a subpoena duces tecum issued in a grand jury
investigation.
Verily, while the Court should guard against the abuse of executive
privilege, it should also give full recognition to the validity of the
privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of executive
power, as in this case. Otherwise, the Court would undermine its own
credibility, for it would be perceived as no longer aiming to strike a balance,
but seeking merely to water down executive privilege to the point of
irrelevance.
Conclusion
That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents Comment to
the present petition, and not during the hearings of the House Special
Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it cannot be interpreted
as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive branch.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to
aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the constitution limits
agrarian reform only to agriculture lands.
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the raising of fish in the definition
of Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity. (Underscoring
Supplied)
(d) Section 16 (d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the comprehensive Agrarian reform Law.
x x x (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of
such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days at the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above
the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or
entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the
DAR, upon proper application, determines a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten
percent (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and
other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year. x x x
While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when
confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the
Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or
clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act. On February 20, 1995,
Republic Act No. 7881[6] was approved by Congress. Provisions of said Act
pertinent to the assailed provisions of CARL are the following:
Sec. 3. Definitions. -- For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates
otherwise:
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and
fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided, That said
prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or
commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and
absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the
exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the
workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms
shall be distributed collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall
form a cooperative or association to manage the same.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm workers shall no
longer be necessary, however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on
incentives shall apply.
Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 a
section to read as follows:
In order to safeguard the right of the regular fishpond or prawn farm workers
under the incentive plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn owners shall be
subject to periodic audit or inspection by certified public accountants chosen by
the workers.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief
of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the
rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was
issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and pursuant
to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and
quell the rebellion;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion.
(PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the
[3]
President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue, however, that the
[11]
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of
Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to
exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate
moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination
of actual controversies. Nevertheless, courts will decide a question,
[18]
Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after
such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness
of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases precluded[21]
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the
resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it
cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its
leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest
and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the
name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose
legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little
comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over
such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original
jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. [25]
The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent
peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the
democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations
through peaceful and lawful means, that their right to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
shall not be abridged. (Art. XIII, 15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII,
5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what
differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any
party.[27]
disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional
question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again, no
[29]
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need
of a call.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released. [Emphasis supplied.]
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion,
and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, [31]
conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The
only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may
call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion.Note that the Constitution vests the President not only
with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The
executive power shall be vested in the President. As if by exposition,
Section 17 of the same Article provides: He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. The provisions trace their history to the
Constitution of the United States.
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S.
President executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in
their original simple form since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776,
Article II of which states in part:
....
....
Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article II
Executive Power]
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State,
as the protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson.Coming
to office by virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only
kept faith with the people by driving the patricians from power. Old
Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the
indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolinas nullification
effort.
[34]
The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did
not pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State Legislature
ordered an election for a convention, whose members quickly passed
an Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts
unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them
after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal
Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then
implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any
who sought to pay or collect customs duties. [35]
In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed
forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpuswithout
prior legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion
came to be recognized and accepted. The United States introduced the
expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The use of the power was put to judicial test and this Court
[44]
held that the case raised a political question and said that it is beyond its
province to inquire into the exercise of the power. Later, the grant of
[45]
then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter
has restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-Chief. The
same, however, cannot be said of the Presidents powers as Chief
Executive.
In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her
thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld
the Presidents power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The
rationale for the majoritys ruling rested on the Presidents
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power
and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of
the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for
the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general
grant of executive power. [Underscoring supplied.Italics in the original.]
[57]
most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that
the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the
[59]
of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any [62]
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.:
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the April 23, 20122 and July 31, 20123 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92(RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. Q-07-
60778, denying petitioners motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on the
following grounds: (a) that the Court had yet to pass upon the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9372,4 otherwise known as the "Human Security Act of 2007," in the
consolidated cases of Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council5 (Southern Hemisphere); and (b) that private respondents petition for declaratory
relief was proper.
The Facts
On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition6 for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,7 for being
void for vagueness;8 (b) Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication and due
process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships;10 (c)Section 18,11 for
violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 12512 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;13 (d) Section 26,14 for violating the right to travel;15 and (e) Section 27,16 for
violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.17
Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,18 averring that certain petitions (SC petitions)
raising the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court.19 The said
motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.20
On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision21 in the Southern Hemisphere cases
and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.
On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss,22 contending that
private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief. Likewise, they
averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the
Southern Hemisphere cases.
In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not
resolve the issue of RA 9372s constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions
were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory
relief were met.
On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss,
finding that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private
respondents petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order
dated July 31, 2012.26The RTC observed that private respondents have personal and
substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse
consequences of the aforesaid laws implementation considering that the case is of
paramount impact to the Filipino people.27
The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely
abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the
requirements for declaratory relief and that the Court had already sustained with finality the
constitutionality of RA 9372.
On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief
have been satisfied and that the Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372,
negating any grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs part.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.28 It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be
so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.29 In this relation, case law states that not
every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.30The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be met.
Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could
be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents petition had met all the requisites for an
action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was
altogether improper.
To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive
ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases
were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari
was improper;31 (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;32and (c) petitioners therein failed to
present an actual case or controversy.33 Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.
The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTCs ruling on the
sufficiency of private respondents petition for declaratory relief.
Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:
first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said
documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there
must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual
justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are
adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is
not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.34
Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the
first,35 second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and
sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.
As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the
"ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.
A perusal of private respondents petition for declaratory relief would show that they have
failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far
removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only
assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government
could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As
their petition would disclose, private respondents fear of prosecution was solely based on
remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to the general public.40 They,
however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or
governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other
words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern
Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief,
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. 1wphi1
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar
to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.41 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern
Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or
the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents petition for
declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA
9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case.42 While it has
been previously held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement
that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury,43 it must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.44 Towards this end,
compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a
closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi,45 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by
the general public.46
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the
controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the
above-discussed allegations in private respondents petition, remain highly-speculative and
merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
1wphi1
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.47 This private
respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the
private respondents exists in the first place.
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory
relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents petition for
declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it
cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April23, 2012 and July 31, 2012
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
- versus -
HONORABLE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA AND
HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO C. LOMIBAO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 171485
x-------------------------------------------------
x
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO,
JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A.
CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO,
MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C.
OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN,
JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA,
TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA,
LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS,
RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN
MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ,
DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO,
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL
G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO,
GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO
G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA
C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY
AMADO GAT INCIONG,
Petitioners,
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN
HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO
LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid
formula are necessary.[1] Superior strength the use of force cannot
make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in
safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their
liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus
most relevant. He said: In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice
should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Laws and
actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy
presumption against their constitutional validity.[2]
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that
respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend
and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such
issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern
problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree
of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law,
without which, liberty becomes license?[3]
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief
of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights
of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in
these petitions.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the
parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as
follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the
petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et
al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.), 171489(Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal
standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual
bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent,
hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days
that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners,
committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These
are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be
stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it
imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,
inoperative.[30]
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution;[31] second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public;[33] and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.[34]
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is
no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest,
involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present
petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given
by constitutional guarantees.[35] And lastly, respondents contested actions
are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to
judicial review.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have
failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of transcendental importance. Pertinent are the following
cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[52] where the
Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to
information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources
are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the
petitioner with locus standi;
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule
in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,[61] Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[62] Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[63] and Taada v.
Tuvera,[64] that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it
legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the
rights of their members.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement
by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits
for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as
respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency,[67] may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if
he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore,
it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official
duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness
in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him
by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to
the people[68]but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided
by law and that is by impeachment.[69]
B. SUBSTANTIVE
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the
Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its
distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker[70] and Montenegro v. Castaneda[71] to the volatile era
of Lansang v. Garcia,[72] Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,[73] and Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile.[74] The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining
political questions, particularly those questions in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.[75] Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in
declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen
belongs to the Presidentand his decision is final and conclusive on the
courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court
were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire
into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional
sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the
focus to the system of checks and balances, under which the President
is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to
him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in
this respect, is, in turn,
[76]
constitutionally supreme. In 1973, the unanimous Court
[77]
of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile. There, the Court
was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity
of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable
[78]
question. Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly
diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter
case, ratiocinating that in times of war or national emergency, the
President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation
and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is
answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God.[79]
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are
an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme
lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the
sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general
will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not
perish.[86]
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the
fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in
drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the
concept of Justice Jacksons balanced power structure.[102] Executive,
legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress,
and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own
sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of
emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check
upon the other. This system does not weaken the
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In
other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands
that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of
the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within
carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. Facial Challenge
First provision:
Second provision:
Third provision:
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed
forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and
rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes
beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra
vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his
powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a
lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the
power, the greater are the limitations.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures
without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of
Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law
or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
\
Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017
operative clause shows that it was lifted[120] from Former President Marcos
Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
PP 1017 states in
part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x
x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision
refers not only to war but also to other national emergency. If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant
to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like
the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could
have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a state of national
emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
x x x x x
x
x x x
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes
invalid although they may be abused and misabused[135] and may afford
an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.[136] The validity
of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a
particular case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress
all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the
end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is
nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct
illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions
of PP 1017. General orders are acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates
precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules
and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues
them and the official who receives them.[139] They are based on and are the
product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience,
their object.[140] For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be
valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
So far, the word terrorism appears only once in our criminal laws,
i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos
during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled Codifying The
Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for
Membership in Subversive Organizations. The word terrorism is
mentioned in the following provision: That one who conspires with any
other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the
Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished
by reclusion temporal x x x.
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the
Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino
on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define acts of
terrorism. Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to
determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is
absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate
arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the
media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings
unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of
G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the
President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the acts of terrorism portion
of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military
or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to
suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in
pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
x x x.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested
while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not
committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present
danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral
argument, failed to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v.
Oregon,[148] it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime,
thus:
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al.(G.R. No. 171483)
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local
government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all
permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of
a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right
to prevent.[149] Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only
upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the
State may deny the citizens right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed
to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of
permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was
eliminated.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed
like the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers in the above
case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their
enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and
the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain
censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who
tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and
no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be
so rash as to disobey.[153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government
sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a
constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our
citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of
a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.[154]
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
constitutional in every aspect and should result in no constitutional or
statutory breaches if applied according to their letter.
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its
ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to
reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the
military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights
under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional
and illegal.
SUMMATION
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order
issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to
subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly,
it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should
take only the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. But the words acts of
terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said
G.O. While terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law
has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of
G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any
civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers
concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in
court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal
Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due
process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who
studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to
grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the
two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to
arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the
governed.[158]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that
PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated
by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.