Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito
Ochoa
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local
Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of
Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493
and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in
the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent
several legal designations from Congressional Pork
Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance
Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations
Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done
in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;
broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down
to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for
soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide
for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds
into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit
not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential
pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the
Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged
by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle
blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the
last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork
barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-
government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to ghost
projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system
is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse).
The executive, on the other hand, implements the
laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a
part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, whats happening was
that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects
their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older
case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning
the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the
concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the
people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned).
That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government
units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the
individual legislator to identify the projects to which
his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule
on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to
appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can
delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is
the power of the president to veto items in the GAA
which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this
power is already being undermined because of the
fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can
now identify the project to which he will appropriate
his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president
veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the
appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given
power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part
of the members of the house of representatives,
whats happening is that a congressman can either
bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government and this is contrary to the State policy
embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a
personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork
comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and
PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD
1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the
appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees,
among others, collected from certain energy-related
ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other
purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to
a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which
shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement
of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.