Sultan Osop Camid vs.
id vs. The office of the President despite the petitioners allegation that Andong has thrived into a full-blown
G.R. No. 161414 January 14, 2005
Facts:
The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not supposed to
exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and thriving. The creation of the
putative municipality was declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court four
decades ago, but the present petition insists that Andong thrives on and,
hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation.
xxx
The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor General in
1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders
creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.
President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his
powers under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP Emmanuel
Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs
were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders
constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.
After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and
void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch.
Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of
Andong.
Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that
Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete
set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and
its constituents, despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected
or qualified to serve any of the local government offices of Andong since
1968.
Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not
classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said
municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by
supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence,
particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendezwherein the
court affirmed the unique status of the Municipality of San Andres as a de
facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned
municipality.
Issue:
Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues
municipality
Held:
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the
community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for
period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a
factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation
of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by
instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual
administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first
with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make
the necessary factual determinations. Petitioners seeming ignorance of the
principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as
well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be
countenanced.
The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme
Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative/reimplementing
statute has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in
1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
(1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the
beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly
affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent
ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation
has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given these
facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a
duly constituted municipality.
Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create
municipalities yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities
challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC
in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by
executive order but not judicially annulled Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed
curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under.
There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as
San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO
creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions
cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially
dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential
issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those
municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis,
yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other
hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated
through specific legislative enactments.
The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the
constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.
If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality
nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial
confirmation of void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and for
the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.
Cawaling vs COMELEC
Facts:
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law
R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The
Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor.[1]
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, [2] the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for
ratification.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC)
proclaimed[3] the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. [4]
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality
of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present
petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the
plebiscite on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the
required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in
violation of Section 54 thereof; and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement
of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner
instituted another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition, seeking
to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being
unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities
violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
(in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which
requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be converted into a component city; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation
of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities
of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the one subject-one
bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the
May 14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election
of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been
regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter,
R.A. No. 8806.
We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against R.A.
No. 8806 in G.R. No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. [6] This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming
courtesy for each others acts.[7] The theory is that every law, being the joint
act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure
that it is in accord with the fundamental law. [8] This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has
shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one.[9] In other words, the grounds for nullity must
be beyond reasonable doubt,[10] for to doubt is to sustain.[11]
Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty
million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created
is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing
to the general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income. (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City
through R.A. No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income,
population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He
contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be
created only by converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by
merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
This contention is devoid of merit.
First argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion,
there is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation
of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of
the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the
Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to
exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be
considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this
consequence.
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein.[15] The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect,[16] and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation.[17] Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity
of the plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation
of Sorsogon City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should
be conducted within 120 days from the approval of said Act per express
provision of its Section 54
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite
on December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section
65 of the Act states:
Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation.
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a
newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was
published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of
Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1,
2000, which date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point
in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not
from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been
published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for
the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it
could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the
COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the
120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall
be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not
from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix
another date for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from
the date of the effectivity of the law.
Central Barrio vs. Treasurer of Davao
Facts:
On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732
declaring as officially and legally existing, pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the
several barrios of the city. Among these were
barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.
Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was
created under Section 27 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked
from Davao City for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on
real property located within the barrio, as provided in Section 23 of Republic
Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release the share for
said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation
to those of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined, because the
respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law.
Stated otherwise, Davao City's stand was that the amount covering the 10%
share of these three barrios combined has been allocated, but it cannot be
determined how much thereof pertains to each of said barrios, because their
boundaries not having been fixed as regards each other, it could not be
determined how much of the taxes were collected from real properties located
in each of the three aforesaid barrios, taken separately.
On September 3, 1964, however, the Secretary of Finance, acting on the
request of the same barrio Central or Poblacion for release of its 10% share
in real property taxes, stated that barrios Agdao and Bucana were created
only in 1963 in violation of Republic Act 2370 that prohibited creation of barrios
out of chartered cities, so that said barrios are not recognized under Republic
Act 3590 providing for the abovementioned share of 10% in realty taxes.
Accordingly, he ruled that the allocated 10% share of taxes for
barrios Agdao, Bucana and Central should accrue and be given to Barrio
Central only, after all conditions therefor are met.
On December 2, 1964, barrio Central filed in the Court of First Instance
of Davao, thru its barrio captain, a petition for declaratory relief with
mandamus, against Davao City's Treasurer, Council, Auditor and Mayor,
alleging the facts mentioned earlier in this decision. Among others, the
petition questioned the legality of Resolution No. 732 of Davao City's Council
creating barrios Agdao and Bucana; the actuations of the Auditor in passing
in audit an alleged expenditure of P50,000 out of the 10% fund; and the failure
of the council to delimit the territorial boundaries of the three barrios
concerned. And it prayed that the court order payment to petitioner by
respondents of its 10% share in realty taxes as provided by Republic
Act 3590, declare illegal the creation of barrios Agdao and Bucana, and
prohibit the Auditor from approving expenditures out of its 10% share.
Respondents moved to dismiss but their motion was denied. On January
29, 1965, respondents answered, stating among other averments, that barrio
Central is inexistent or not a part of Davao City; that there are other
barrios claiming the 10% share in real property taxes corresponding to the
territory claimed by petitioner; that Republic Act 3590 providing for the 10%
share applies only to barrios in municipalities and municipal districts, not to
those in cities; and that the alleged expenditure in question was legal and not
taken from the 10% share allocated for barrios.
After issues were thus joined the case was set for trial. On August 2, 1965,
however, the Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without
prejudice, on the ground that the issues were rendered academic by the
passage of Republic Act 4354, on June 19, 1965, amending the Charter
of Davao City. Petitioner, having failed in its motion for reconsideration, took
the present appeal.
At issue is the legal question or the propriety or correctness of
the dismissal order.
Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City
of Davao. Petitioner barrio Cenral or Poblacion was not mentioned
therein. Accordingly, there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law
abolished barrio Central as part
of Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo had
sufficient and tenable reason to dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for
being academic. A non-existent barrio, or a barrio not situated in Davao City,
cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under
Republic Act 3570. Said law must be presumed, until squarely challenged
and declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional, especially
because the power to create or abolish municipal corporations resides in Con-
gress (Mendenilla v. Onandia, L-17803, June 30, 1962). Petitioner may of
course assail the constitutionality of said new law. The present suit, however,
is not for that purpose. Nothing in the pleadings questions said law's
validity, for the reason that said law came after the pleadings were
joined. Neither was there amendment to said pleadings. The court a quo
therefore, rightly dismissed the present suit, without prejudice, that is, not
thereby precluding the filing of a suit to assail the validity of Republic
Act 4354.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DAR vs. Sarangani Agricultural Co. Inc.,
Facts:
Respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's Decision
of January 24, 2007, invoking this Court's ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court
of Appeals[1] and asking that they be served separate Notices of Coverage
and Notices of Acquisition vis--vis the subject lands, apart from and in
addition to the Notice of Deferment that this Court's Decision deemed
sufficient and amounting to said Notices. To remove any and all doubts as to
compliance with due process requirements in the projected acquisition of
subject lands for agrarian reform, the Court RESOLVES to amend the
dispositive portion of its aforesaid Decision to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Subject to the
compliance with all requirements in connection with the giving of the Notices
of Coverage and Notices of Acquisition as provided by law, the denial by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of respondents' application for
conversion with regard to 154.622 [or 154.1622] hectares, the deferment
period of which has already expired, is AFFIRMED. The Decision and
Resolution, dated July 19, 2004 and September 24, 2004, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79899, are
hereby MODIFIED accordingly. The case is REMANDED to the Department
of Agrarian Reform for further proceedings to properly effect the acquisition of
the subject lands for distribution to the intended beneficiaries.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
League of Cities vs. COMELEC
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion
of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Navarro vs. Ermita
Facts: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly
part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being
in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local
Government Code under Sec. 461. Previous decisions relating to this case
declared the creation of the province as unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province
constitutional?
Held: YES. SC now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation
of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of
municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area
requirement in cases of non-contiguity as provided for under Sections 442 and
450 of the LGC.SC concluded that it must have been the intent of the
legislators to extend such exception to provinces especially considering the
physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago. In fact, while such
exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC (provision relating to
creation of provinces), such was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus
correcting the congressional oversight in said provision and reflecting the true
legislative intent. Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive
construction which could trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually
defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in
the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement should be read together
with territorial contiguity.
Cagas vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of
Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.
The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of
the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner
was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering
159,527 votes. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and
violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed
an electoralprotest on May 24, 2010. The Comelec issues orders stating that
the protestant paid the cash deposit for filing of the case, and his petition set
out specific acts complained of. Petitioner moved to reconsider, which was
denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari directly with the SC.

Issue: Whether the Comelec erred in no dismissing the petition for
insufficiency of form.
Held: A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly
assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course. The court may have the power to review
any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final
decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated,
the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Where the
Commission in division committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without
or in excess ofjurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances
mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the
Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to
elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Jadewell Parking System vs. Lidua
Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator
duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City
pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13
of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its
wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San
Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are
the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General
Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato
B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the
respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John
Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin
Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell
which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The
fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were
also not paid by the respondents herein.
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan,
Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that
on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents
Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed
the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933,
belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally parked for
failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier rendered
immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing the
clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its
use and value which is P26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine
of P500.00 and the declamping fee of P500.00 were not paid by the
respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against
each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery
under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-
Complaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three
(3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent Ramon
Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Baguio City on May 23, 2003.3 A preliminary investigation took place on
May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case charging
Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of
his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was
parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel
of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not
to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family
could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the Complaint
he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando
City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable
cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.
Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez
stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for
the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain
and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the
wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their
failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of
the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the law
into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged
into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-
2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations against
them in Court.6
Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of action and
concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted
design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took
[sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi
Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin Ang which was
earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell Personnel's for
violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and
prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation
(Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other consequential
damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto
Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2, 2004.
The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two
Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or
liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that charged
an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one
offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1.
x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed
[sic] after two months."
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was
committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand
corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable
Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the
accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription
when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua,
Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3,
granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding
to the February 10, 2004 Order11 to argue among other points that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law,
the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in these
cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the
prescribed period.12
Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a
Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding
the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:
For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on
one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action
has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being
alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and
not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails
over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO
ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED
BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE
WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the
ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled
erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged
against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities,
the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the
institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of
prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws."17
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action
in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered
by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on
Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for violations
of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the
petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure,
these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These
criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the
assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in
Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint
should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old
Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated,
"shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive
period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not
gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings
mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial
proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The
prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of
the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July 7, 2003. Since
the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 2003,
the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the
two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the
respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled
in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judges Order dated
February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
Hence, this Petition.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period
of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang,
"John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326,
as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were
charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance.
In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two
months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the
prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint shall
be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their
charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did
not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise
that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash,
namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that respondents
were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan
Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no legal personality to
assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the civil liability of the case
but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to the ruling in
People v. Judge Santiago23 which held that the private complainant may only
appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004
only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but
did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner
also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326
must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the National
Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition
for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition" 26 before the
court.
The Petition is denied.
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive
law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With
regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only
statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws
and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other
prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of
prescription:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following
should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is
two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the
attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively
commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling
within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall
be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section
451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall
not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent
component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component
cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly
urbanized cities or component cities. An independent component city has a
charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as
early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of
the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the
charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved
in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule
in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the
offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May
30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow
that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct
a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on
any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which
says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that
we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it
does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the
effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v.
Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far
as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld
this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations
of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file
the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information
with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation,
the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of
the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information.
Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months
from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within
which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge
Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against
respondents. According to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors
Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I,
Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court.
The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the
same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and
 d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information
is sufficient if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential
element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the
Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling
place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile
in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial
Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it
is merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot
try the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the
same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be
interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices
Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These
Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular
regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area
of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union
includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province,
Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was
designated to file the Information within the two-month period provided for in
Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate
as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It
stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in
court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the
effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording
thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO
Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative
districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative
districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law
and he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from
enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that
the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was required
by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely
increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of
Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and
R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two
legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by
the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council
members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two
legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys
population. This easily means better access to their congressman since each
one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the
City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1,
2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4
legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162
(later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a
population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to
Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of
NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year
2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the
minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative
in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the
City of Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the
City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city
must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director
Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections,
was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis
and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos,
which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are
declared official by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was
not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central
Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this
case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
to It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will
grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the
aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power
among districts.
Aquino III V. Comelec
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took
effect on 31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts. Following the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative
district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The
provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for
the creation of a new legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase
or each province point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Umali vs. COMELEC
Facts:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into
a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code
of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed
Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that
for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of
Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City
in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu,
where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed to
vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a
Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion
in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva
Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted
in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the
conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution
of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people
of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The
phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the
conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded.
Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse
effects of the Cabanatuan Citys conversion and how it will cause material
change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents
but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar
Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground
that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the
matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as
couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the
plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was
converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city
pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the
registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012, 3 the COMELEC En Banc
on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-24 ruled in
favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.
The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels
including the Reply-memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor
Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from component city into highly-urbanized city with
registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said
plebiscite.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as
G.R. No. 203974, on substantially the same arguments earlier taken by
petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other hand, public respondent
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component
city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion
will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that
no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the
powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political
units probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance
with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the
voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the
COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of activities and periods of
prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an
HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1, 2012.
Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in
Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan prayed that Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree that all
qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite,
and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public
respondent from implementing the questioned resolution. On October 19,
2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-
0989 suspended the preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by
the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was once again rescheduled
to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM regional elections
as per Resolution No. 9563.
After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a
case before this Court for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying
that public respondent be ordered to schedule the plebiscite either on
December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the TRO
issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to
hold the plebiscite has become mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista
also alleged that the delay in holding the plebiscite is inexcusable given the
requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days form the date of
the Presidents declaration.
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position
by arguing that mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts surrounding the case, it cannot
be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautistas entitlement to the
relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus
Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that
ensued in the locality during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued
Resolution No. 1353 scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However,
a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to
suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan Citys conversion. Given
the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases
were consolidated on March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the
qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those
in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.
Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be
the basis for determining the qualified voters who will participate in the
plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected"
necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of
Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified to
cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their
claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the
voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of
the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after
it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as
referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in
the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions,
it is but proper that we ascertain first the relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is
subject to certain exceptions allowed in the Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
 other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President
"to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy" in times of war and other national emergency under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries
of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case
at bar, is essentially legislative in nature.5 The framers of the Constitution
have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and
(2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the
boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to
Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government
unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance
passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code."
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined
by the various LGC provisions detailing the requirements for the creation of
barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and provinces9. Moreover, compliance
with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also been directed
by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected." (emphasis supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to
LGUs of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of
the LGC quoted earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty of
the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after
it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a
plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a
determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 45210 of the
LGC are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President,
upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized once
the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable
indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in
the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a
plebiscite for purposes of conversions once the requirements are met. No
further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be converted
becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the
delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source
of the delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the
President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the
ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion of
a component city to an HUC is not "creation, division, merge, abolition or
substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said constitutional
provision.
This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Courts pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre 11 is apropos and may
be applied by analogy. While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of
upgrading, as here, of an independent component city into a component city,
its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in ascertaining the
proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city comes
within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and
its application to cases of conversion were discussed thusly:
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change
in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly
affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional
requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was
borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10,
Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of
the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent
of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to
serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating,
dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government
units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide
on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed
to democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is
also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy
to local government units.12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the
conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of those
that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the
constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given
the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that
the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally
apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528 13 was declared unconstitutional
in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela
without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and
necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local
government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be
limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the
LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the
demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise of
corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the
alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional
provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGCs Implementing Rules and Regulations,
which reads:
Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City.
xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion The conversion of a component city into a highly-
urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where it is
geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan
City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-
cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in
territory brought about by Cabanatuan Citys gain of independence. With the
citys newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What
once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by
the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq.
km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan Citys severance from its
mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecijas
5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the
alteration be "substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow
Cabanatuan Citys conversion in the same way that creations, divisions,
mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing the
alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and
more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration
of LGUs.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an
HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and
resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the
LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision
should be interpreted with the other relevant provisions in the law The Court
finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is undeniably the applicable
provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision itself,
"Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. On the other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to
Declare Highly Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a city as highly
urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the declaration
after the city has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper
application and ratification in a plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then
a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus, the Court finds that
Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite
requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of
the LGC trenches on Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the
judiciary has the power to act beyond the Constitutions mandate. The
Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond what is circumscribed
by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:14
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be
contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it:
"When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is
not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. x x
x consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and
not in violation of the Constitution.15 In a long line of cases, the cardinal
principle of construction established is that a statute should be interpreted to
assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to
the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the
enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though
it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent
import of the language used.17
Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict
with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation
to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the
LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters
in the "political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such
construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the Constitution.
Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453
to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to
an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such
conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a
vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all residents in the "political
units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the
conversion of Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where
the ratification was made by the registered voters in said cities alone. It is
clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said plebiscites
was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on
who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel
issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve the question.
As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality
or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said
cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any
manner following the operative fact doctrinethat the actual existence of a
statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have
declaration.18
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly
affected by Cabanatuan Citys conversion
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the
meaning of the phrase "political units directly affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.
a. "Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the
plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or
units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. To
interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are
worth revisiting.
We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose
boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are
entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is
thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of
Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that
two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.21
xxxx
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and
eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros
Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square
kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will
be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the
consequent effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect
all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province
as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political
groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in
Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the
plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
(emphasis added)
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X,
we affirmed our ruling in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal
of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the earlier finding that what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the
journal of the Constitutional Commission:23
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I
would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present
Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units."
However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there
will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about
this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no
objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit
or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units
affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It
would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 155the predecessor of the LGCthus:
Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume
that a province has municipalities and there is a merger of two municipalities.
Would this therefore mean that the plebiscite will be conducted within the two
merged municipalities and not in the eight other municipalities?
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and
that is the reason we probably have to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two
municipalities which are being merged, but the entire province will now have
to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire
municipality have to vote? There are two barangays being merged, say, out
of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to participate in the
plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected
directly by the merger of two of its barangay.
Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged,
abolished, whatever, would the rest of the municipality not participate in the
plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr.
President, belong to one municipality?
Senator Guingona. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51
barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo
a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two
municipalities, let us say, in a province with 10 municipalities the entire
province will the other municipalities although not affected also have to
participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the
territorial boundaries of the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result
of the two municipalities that the Gentleman mentioned. 24
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was
modified to include not only changes in economic but also political rights in
the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall be considered "directly
affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be participated in
by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the
downgrading of an LGU from an independent component city to a component
city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby necessitating the conduct
of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner Umali
itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan Citys conversion to the province
of Nueva Ecija to justify the provinces participation in the plebiscite to be
conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan Citys conversion into an HUC and its
severance from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC. The law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local
government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the
following manner:
(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality
shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC
carries the accessory of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the
province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a reduction in territory
because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city will
cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the
latters population. Taking this decrease in territory and population in
connection with the above formula, it is conceded that Nueva Ecija will indeed
suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers values. As
assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for Region III:25
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial
reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view
of the economic impact of Cabanatuan Citys conversion, petitioner Umalis
contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also adverse,
deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes
imposed in Cabanatuan City is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the
LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise provided in
this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province
or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component
cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions
of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to
this, the province enjoys the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as
those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, 26 professional taxes,27 and
amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be argued that this
is not a derogation of the provinces taxing power because it is in no way
deprived of its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory,
the conversion will still reduce the provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary
to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local tax
collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a
material and substantial change to the provinces economic rights, warranting
its participation in the plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a)
and 461(a) of the LGC is in order, viz:
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand
(200,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office,
and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the
city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from
the province is a threat to the latters economic viability. Noteworthy is that the
income criterion for a component city to be converted into an HUC is higher
than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The ensuing
reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on
the provinces operations as there would be less funding to finance
infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of
services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in
the provinces economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to
experience once its most progressive city of Cabanatuan attains
independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija
and those of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuans conversion
into an HUC. Notably, the administrative supervision of the province over the
city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the
Constitution read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of
component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to
Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be
outside the general supervision of the province and be under the direct
supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight
because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger
population and greater economic activity require greater autonomy.29 The
provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local
government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor,
and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.31 The
province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning
the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for
administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be
modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer
be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials. 33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of
Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the
province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will no longer be
responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents benefit.
Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer
cover the city. Projects queued by the provincial government to be executed
in the city will also be suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU from
performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, and from
expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1wphi1
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province
of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly stands to be
directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following
the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of Nueva
Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that
purpose.
Respondents apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in
the plebiscite will set a dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to
convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces will always be expected to
oppose the conversion in order to retain the citys dependence is speculative
at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected
by the conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our
democratic processes are designed to uphold the decision of the majority,
regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province
can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter
that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the
rights of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas
to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as
allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority
rule.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 203974, is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated
October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public respondent
COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions.
Additionally, COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the
purpose of converting Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be
participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a within 120
days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for Mandamus, docketed
as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Laceda vs Limena
Facts:
From this Court's June 10, 2008 Resolution[1] dismissing his petition for
certiorari, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr. filed the instant motion for
reconsideration,[2] insisting that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolutions dated
January 15, 2008[3] and May 7, 2008[4] in SPA No. 07-028 (BRGY).
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private respondent Randy L. Limena
were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West
District, Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay
and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007, Limena filed a
petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible
candidate[5] against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda
had already served as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three
consecutive terms since 1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the
fourth time under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164[6] which provides:
SEC. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang
kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall
be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Limena likewise attached the following certification from the Department of
the Interior and Local Government:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this office HON. ROBERTO
LACEDA, SR., incumbent Punong Barangay of Panlayaan, West District,
Sorsogon City. ...was elected as Punong Barangay during the May 9, 1994,
May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay Elections. He resigned from office
on March 20, 1995 to run as Municipal Councilor. Hence, he is covered by
the three-term rule of paragraph 2, Section 2 of RA 9164 which provides that:
"No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position: Provided, however, that the term of office shall be
reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation of office
[for] any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected."[7]
xxxx
In his Answer,[8] Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of
Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he
was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that
when he served his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already
been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the
City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.[9] Thus, he argued that
his third term was actually just his first in the new political unit and that he
was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served three
consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes the three-term limit,
cannot be made to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to
office. He alleged that when he was elected in 1994 the prohibition did not
exist. Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for the
fourth time, he would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking
forward to the election in 2007.[10]
On January 15, 2008, the COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and
cancelled his certificate of candidacy:
WHEREFORE, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVED, to
declare Respondent Roberto Laceda, Sr. DISQUALIFIED from running as
Punong Barangay of Panlayaan, West District, Sorsogon City and
consequently denies due course and cancels his Certificate of Candidacy.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, Laceda filed a
petition for certiorari before this Court.
On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently
show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in
rendering the assailed Resolutions of January 15, 2008 and May 7,
2008. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
basing its decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. Commission
on Elections[12] for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section
43[13] of the Local Government Code.[14] Laceda argues that said case is
inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant
case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he
served his third term in a new political unit and therefore he should not be
deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for
purposes of applying the three-term limit.[15]
For reasons hereafter discussed, the motion for reconsideration cannot
prosper.
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government Code
from which it was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the
electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in
the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office
after a term of nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to apply,
two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he
or she has fully served three consecutive terms. [16]
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of
Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it
cannot be said that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the
inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters
who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms
and over whom Laceda held power and authority as
their Punong Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt
Laceda's term.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,[17] which involved a similar question,
this Court held that where a person has been elected for three consecutive
terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-
year term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the
city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the
prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor
thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms.
Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164 and this
Court's ruling in Latasa v. Commission on Elections, we hold that the
prohibition in Section 2 of said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did
not err nor commit any abuse of discretion when it declared him disqualified
and cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr.'s Motion for
Reconsideration[18] dated July 25, 2008 assailing this Court's Resolution dated
June 10, 2008 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Sarangani vs. COMELEC
Facts:
Way back in the 1950s and during the martial law era, it has been said that
even the dead, the birds and the bees voted in Lanao. This petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the
Order issued by the Commission on Elections [COMELEC, for brevity] dated
June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as "ghost
precinct," is an illustrative case.
The facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and
annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the
COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib
D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be
annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition
for certiorari.[1]
On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission
sent telegrams to the respective Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of the
questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan,
to file their answer to the petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of
book of voters.[2]
On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur,
Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who
were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty- three (23) barangays the
"Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and
abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in Opposition" [3] which included the
affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the
fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned
election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the
incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.[4]
After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by
the parties, the COMELEC issued an Order[5] dated February 11, 1998,
referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation. The
COMELEC - Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April
29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation on the
alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation
conducted."[6] Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE
INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998
directing Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar
Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost
barangays in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."[7]
On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost
precincts yielding the following results
"At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team from the
COMELEC accompanied by traditional leaders, political
leaders, many concerned residents of this town, a
representative from the Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics
Office, Mr. Lacson Abdullah, and a Team from the DILG-
ARMM, Lanao del Sur, arrived in the area supposedly
Barangay Padian Torogan with these comments and
observations:
"It appears that in this area there are only two structures:
One is a concrete house with no roof, and the other is a
wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously
mean that no single human being could possibly reside in
these two structures.
"Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a
cemetery not a residential place. So this contradicts the
records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the
Census saying that the area has 45 households with a total
population of 285. (Ref. Municipal census Report as of
September 1, 1995).
"Besides, no less than the Chairman of the COMELEC
Investigating Team asked the people around who among
them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-called
Barangay Padian-Torogan, and no one answered
affirmatively.
"Then at 12:50 PM, the COMELEC Investigating Team still
with the people mentioned above are in Barangay Lumbac
to look for the other supposed Barangay named Rakutan,
and found this observations.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"By the way, unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular
inspection, the Madalum Municipal Chief of Police Mahdi
Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun, arrived
at the scene at exactly 12:55 pm boarding an orange
Mitsubishi car with four armed bodyguards, the (sic)
confronted the Team Leader of the COMELEC
Investigating Group and angrily insisted to stop the ocular
inspection.
"This STACOM Mindalano, in warning a photographer not
to take a shot on him, pointed his pistolized Rifle to this man
when the photographer positioned his camera to take a
picture of him while he is arguing with the investigating
leader, Mr. CASAN MACADATO.
"Moving camera film and several pictures are added hereto
for further information and as exhibits. Also attached hereof
are the names and signatures of among the more-or-less
one hundred people who observed the conduct of this
ocular inspection.
(NOTE: This writer, Mr. Khalil Y. Alawi, is a member of the
five (5) man Committee from the DILG-ARMM, Lanao del
Sur created in respect to the Memo/Invitation from the
COMELEC Provincial Office of Lanao del Sur dated June
15, 1998 signed by Mr. CASAN MACADATO, EO II, Chief
Investigation Team. Mr. Macadato designated verbally and
in public Mr. ALAWI to be his Secretary during this
investigation, and of course, the (sic) with the consent of the
DILG Team).
 "I hereby certify that the foregoing are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge.
Prepared by: (sgd) Khalil Y. Alawi
Member, DILG Team
Submitted by: (sgd) Casan Macadato
Election Officer II
[8]
Chairman, Task Force Investigation Team"
On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to
the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st
Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection
that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited. [9]
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian
Torogan as ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order
reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc:
(1) resolves to GRANT the request and hereby:
(a).....DIRECTS the Task Force Investigating Team created
pursuant to the Order of the Commission en banc dated
February 11, 1998, to continue the conduct of ocular
inspection and investigation as contained in the original
directive of the Law Department dated April 29, 1998;
(b).....RECOMMENDS to the PNP Director and the
Regional Director of the Philippine National police, (1) to
immediately relieve and transfer Chief of Police Mahdi
Mindalano of Madalum, Lanao del Sur and transfer him to
an area where it will be extremely difficult for him to return
to Mandalum and do further damage to effort of the
Commission to investigate ghost precincts in said area
considering the urgency of said investigation. (2) to look into
the possibility of involvement of other policement (sic) in
Madalum in the aforestated criminal mischief of the Police
Station Commander or their possible partisanship.
(c).....RECOMMENDS to AFP Regional Command, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to immediately assign sufficient
number of men to maintain peace and order in the
Municipality of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, and to escort and
secure the safety of the COMELEC Investigating Team
during the conduct of ocular inspections and investigations.
(2) finds Padian Torogan as ghost precinct and shall be
excluded from the special election to be conducted in
Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Macadatu, to
immediately resume the investigation, the remaining ghost
precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings to the
Commission with dispatch, allowing it to submit partial
findings if necessary.
The Law Department of this Commission is hereby directed
to implement this order.
SO ORDERED." (emphasis supplied)[10]
On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and
Hadji Nor Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor,
incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued by the
COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Likewise,
petitioners moved to consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456 entitled
"Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs. COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456
also involves a COMELEC decision declaring the precinct corresponding to
eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as ghosts precincts.
In a resolution[11] issued by this Court on January 19, 1999, we denied the
motion to consolidate, considering that G.R. No. 134456 had already been
dismissed in our resolutions of August 4, 1998 and August 18, 1998.
The basic issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan
as ghost precinct.[12]
On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records that
Padian Torogan is a barangay in Madalum, Lanao del Sur and it was
erroneous for the COMELEC to consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost precinct.
In any case, the court is not tasked to determine whether the so-called Padian
Torogan is a barangay or a mere election precinct. The petition states that
precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one declared
as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not
mention any specific precinct but simply declared "Padian Torogan as ghost
precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed
Order would be the election precinct in the said place.
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at
least one precinct per barangay.[13] In designating election precincts, the
COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the determination
of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the
voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such
issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC
based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are
conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack
on the validity of the same.[14] Upon review of the records, the Court finds that
the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that
there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion
that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there
can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place.
It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants
considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and
the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic
cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code
of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision.[15] In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area
and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory
requirement of a plebiscite[16] conducted for the purpose in the political units
affected.
The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal
or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would
have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has
broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available
to it.[17] The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELECs
administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of
discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand.
Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. [18] No voter is
disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage
guaranteed by the Constitution[19] is not tampered when a list of fictitious
voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the
Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise
disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all
the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as
the right of suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered
nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect
to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed Order
dated June 29, 1998 of the Commission on Elections is UPHELD. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Salva vs. Makalintal
Facts:
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San
Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas,
and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as Civil Case No.
3442, before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987, series of 1998, with prayer for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order. Ordinance No. 05[3] declared the
abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC
to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991.[4] On the other hand, Resolution No. 345[5] affirmed the effectivity of
Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto[6] exercised by the governor of
Batangas.[7] Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for
being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential
requirements under Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No.
7160, referring to the attestations or certifications of the Department of
Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution, on
February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987,
providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas.[8] Simultaneous with the filing of the action before the trial court,
petitioners also filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 05,
Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
for lack of jurisdiction. According to the trial court, the temporary restraining
order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed only to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987. The trial court ruled that any petition or action
questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought
before the Supreme Court.[9]
On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the
trial courts Order dated February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or immediate
necessity to enjoin the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on February 28,
1998.[10]
In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition.[11]
On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion
in lieu of Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners cause and
recommending that the instant petition be given due course. [12] Consequently,
the Court further resolved on September 29, 1998 to require the COMELEC
and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas to submit their own
Comment on the petition.
In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and require the parties to submit their respective memoranda. [13]
In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the
following issue for the resolution of this Court:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO
ENJOIN THE COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO.
2987, SERIES OF 1998, WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED
ON FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION
OF BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER
WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA, BATANGAS, PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE ANNULMENT OF
ORDINANCE NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 2987.[14]
First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages
multiplicity of suit[s] and splitting a single cause of action, contrary to Section
3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court.[15] Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 was only issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, the
propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent
upon the validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.[16] And
considering that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the
validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is not disputed, the
assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek the
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before this Court,
advances multiplicity of suits and splitting a single cause of action.
Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-
judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court;
but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject
to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court,[17] citing Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law
on the Commission on Elections may either be classifi1ed as those pertaining
to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in character." [18]
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that [t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite,
pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory [or
quasi-judicial] in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature [and
only] in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution, citing Garces
vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
"xxx To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative
questions that are best ventilated before the RTC [Regional Trial Court], a
court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over
all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."[19]
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has
already been conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from
being moot and academic, claiming that the actual holding of the said
plebiscite could not validate an otherwise invalid ordinance and
resolution;[20] that there are still substantial matters to be
resolved;[21] assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and
academic, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review;[22] and finally, petitioners maintain
that this Court has resolved to require the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that is, a day before the
plebiscite was scheduled to be conducted.[23]
Concurring with petitioners arguments, the Solicitor General, in his
Memorandum filed on September 7, 1999, asserts that xxx. [i]t is already
settled in this jurisdiction that what is contemplated by the terms any decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC reviewable bycertiorari to this Honorable
Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987] Constitution,
are those that relate to the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.
(Citations omitted.)[24] 24 The Solicitor General further argues that the
issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions, hence, it is submitted
that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.
Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand,
submits that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
solely belongs to this Court, citing the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs.
Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-541 [1968] );Luison vs. Garcia (L-10916, May
20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968] ); and Aratuc vs.
COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272 [1979]);[25] thus:
"xxx. For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this
Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on
Elections, it is easy to understand why no interference whatsoever with the
performance of the Commission on Elections of its functions should be
allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of Acting Chief
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in point, indicates
the proper approach. Thus: It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue
if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto
itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the
Commission on Elections; that constitutional body would be speedily reduced
to impotence."[26]
The COMELEC further argues that if a Regional Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government like the
ones cited above [referring to the former Court of Industrial Relations,
Philippine Patent Office, Public Service Commission, Social Security
Commission, National Electrification Administration and Presidential
Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such
jurisdiction over the Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent
body expressly clothed by the 1987 Constitution with, among others, quasi-
judicial functions and tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a
democratic government. xxx.[27] Finally, the COMELEC contends that the
temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot and
academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined. [28]
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
"SEC. 7. xxx. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof."
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996] ) and Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found
occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:
"xxx. What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of
the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by
law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers."[29]
In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that the powers vested by the
Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be
classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or
those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in
character.[30]
As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the
COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution
declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the affected
barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
7160. We agree with the Solicitor General that xxx. [t]he issuance of
[COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC
that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of
its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority
on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights
and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public
officers and the enforcement of the election laws. (Citation omitted.)[31] Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to requested the COMELEC to have the province subdivided into two provincial
the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election Supervisor
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all
this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be political parties, and other interested parties. A consensus was reached in
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the
the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs Memo Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance
to this Court are simply not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo[32] speaks of the of the Department of Finance.
power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang
conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In the present case, Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)=
petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and Sibunag)= 5 seats.
enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia[33] refers to this
Courts power to review administrative decisions, particularly referring to a The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:
COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and void, 1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution. In Macud vs. 2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of
COMELEC,[34] we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an the province.
election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, 3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate 4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member
relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved represents.
party may appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed
COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of final orders, rulings and Issue:
decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
In view of the foregoing, public respondents other contentions deserve scant issuing Resolution No. 2950?
consideration.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.
Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional
Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with Ratio:
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the
plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the 1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and
outcome of Civil Case No. 3442. adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having
a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for
SO ORDERED. considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the
municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor. As required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all
Herrera vs COMELEC
interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang
Facts:
Panlalawigan members. Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1
legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes of electing the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being
a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2 districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis
for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not
the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of the Province of
Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by
the National Statistics Office.
Mariano v COMELEC
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos,
Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino
Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano,
Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the
constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law
are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay
will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected
in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in
the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
Kananga vs. Madrona
Facts:
FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga
and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to
amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the
boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied
the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that
Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied
with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out
their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via
Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence,
the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement
of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component
city.
HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF;
PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN
A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED
CITY; ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as
much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or
municipality shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b)Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same
province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the
provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one
hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly
urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within
sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from
the date of the certification referred to above.
Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand
and a highly urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly
urbanized cities shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the local government units involved. There is no question that
Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue
of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued to exist and operate as such.
However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component,
city created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city,
not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred
to in Section 118 does not apply to them.
SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED
AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN CASE AT BAR. Under Section
451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc
is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the
province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of
Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a
plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions representatives
to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the
President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly
urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that
Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO
ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY
WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. As
previously stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties. It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred
by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with
venue. Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant
case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The
applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known
as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court
or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality
and an independent component city of the same province, respondent court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only
to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first
time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed,
the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
Mun. of Sta. Fe vs Mun. of Aritao
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the September 30, 1999 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming in toto the August 27, 1992 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28, which dismissed Civil Case No.
2821 for lack of jurisdiction.
On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in
the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch 28, Civil Case No. 2821 for the Determination of Boundary
Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties
failed to amicably settle during the pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial was almost over, with petitioners rebuttal witness already
under cross-examination, when the court, realizing its oversight under existing
law, ordered on December 9, 1988, the suspension of the proceedings and
the referral of the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva
Vizcaya.[3] In turn, the Sanggunianconcerned passed on the matter to its
Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinances and Resolutions, which
recommended adopting Resolution No. 64 dated September 14, 1979 of the
former members of its Provincial Board.[4] Said resolution previously resolved
to adjudicate the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of
respondents territorial jurisdiction and enjoin petitioner from exercising its
governmental functions within the same. Subsequently, as per Resolution No.
357 dated November 13, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the
Committees recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC
for further proceedings and preservation of the status quo pending finality of
the case.
Back in the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution No. 64
as final and executory. In its Order dated February 12, 1991,[5] the trial court,
however, resolved to deny the motion ruling that since there was no amicable
settlement reached at the time the Provincial Board had exceeded its authority
in issuing a decision favoring a party. The court held that, under the law in
force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity
to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board
and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall
be resumed.
Subsequently, respondent again filed a motion on June 23,
1992,[6] this time praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The ground relied upon was that under the prevailing law at the time of the
filing of the motion, the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes
already belonged to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer with the
trial court, primarily citing the doctrine laid down by this Court in Municipality
of Sogod v. Rosal.[7]
On August 27, 1992, the trial court resolved to grant the motion, thus:
A close study of the decision of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the Municipality of Sogod case in relation
to this case palpably shows that, contrary to the claim of
respondent Municipality of Sta. Fe, through counsel, it
involves boundary dispute as in this case.
As to the applicable law on the question of which
agency of the Government can take cognizance of this case
or whether or not this Court should proceed in exercising
jurisdiction over this case, the same [had] been squarely
resolved by the [Honorable] Supreme Court in the
Municipality of Sogod case in this wise: It is worthy to note,
however, that up to this time, the controversy between
these two Municipalities has not been settled. However, the
dispute has already been overtaken by events, namely, the
enactment of the 1987 Constitution and the New Local
Government Code x x x which imposed new mandatory
requirements and procedures on the fixing of boundaries
between municipalities. The 1987 Constitution now
mandates that []no province, city, municipality or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.[] x x x Hence, any alteration
or modification of the boundaries of the municipalities shall
only be by a law to be enacted by Congress subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government Code).
Thus, under present laws, the function of the provincial
board to fix the municipal boundaries are now strictly limited
to the factual determination of the boundary lines between
municipalities, to be specified by natural boundaries or by
metes and bounds in accordance with laws creating said
municipalities.
In view of the above ruling, this Court can do no
less but to declare that this case has been overtaken by
events, namely, the enactment of the 1987 Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991. The Constitution
requires a plebiscite, whereas the Local Government Code
of 1991 provides, as follows: Sec. 6. Authority to Create
Local Government Units. A local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in
the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other
political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the
[s]angguniang [p]anlalawigan, or sangguniang
panglungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located
within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations
and requirements prescribed in this Code.[8]
The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been
denied,[9] an appeal was elevated by petitioner to the CA. The CA, however,
affirmed in totothe assailed Order, holding that:
We are not unmindful of the rule that where a court
has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the case is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another
tribunal or body. This rule, however, is not without
exception. It is not applicable when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character. As far as boundary
disputes are concerned, the 1987 Constitution is the latest
will of the people, therefore, the same should be given
retroactive effect on cases pending before courts after its
ratification. It mandates that no province, city, municipality
or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code of
1991 provides that [a] local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in
the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other
political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the
[s]angguniang [p]anlalawigan or [s]angguniang
[p]anglungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located
within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations
and requirements prescribed in this Code (Book I, Title One,
Chapter 2, Section 6, Local Government Code).
Section 118, Title Nine, Book I of the same Code
likewise provides:
SEC 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for
Settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary disputes
between and among local government units shall, as much
as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
xxx
a.) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned;
xxx
Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the
latest will of the people expressed through Congress on
how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must
prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the
laws on the creation of local government units as well as
settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence,
can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the
people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is
nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial Courts no
longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.[10]
Before this Court, petitioner submits that the CA erred when it
affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction by upholding the
RTCs application of the doctrine enunciated in
the Municipality of Sogod, namely, that being political in character, this case
has been overtaken by different laws which should now prevail. Petitioner also
claims that the CA erred in relying on the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
and the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 on the creation, division,
merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries of political units instead of the
specific provisions on the settlement of boundary disputes.[11]
The petition fails.
As early as October 1, 1917, the procedure for the settlement of
municipal boundary disputes was already set forth when Act No. 2711 or the
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) took into effect.[12] At that time, Section
2167 of the law provided:
SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes How
settled. Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal
governments over places or barrios shall be decided by
the provincial boards of the provinces in which such
municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which
the municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the
decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by the
municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior,
whose decision shall be final x x x.[13]
On June 17, 1970,[14] Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6128[15] was approved
amending the afore-quoted section of the RAC, Sec. 1 thereof stated:
SECTION 1. Section Two thousand one hundred
sixty-seven of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2167. Municipal Boundary Disputes. How
Settled. Disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal
 governments over places, or barrios shall be heard and
decided by the Court of First Instance of the Province where
the municipalities concerned are situated x x x: Provided,
That after joinder of issues, the Court shall suspend
proceedings and shall refer the dispute to the Provincial
Board x x x concerned for the purpose of affording the
parties an opportunity to reach an amicable settlement with
the intervention and assistance of the said Provincial Board
x x x; Provided, further, That in case no amicable
settlement is reached within sixty days from the date the
dispute was referred to the Provincial Board x x x
concerned, the court proceedings shall be resumed. The
case shall be decided by the said Court of First Instance
within one year from resumption of the court proceedings,
and appeal may be taken from the said decision within the
time and in the manner prescribed in Rule 41 or Rule 42, as
the case may be, of the Rules of Court x x x
Subsequently, however, with the approval of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 337 (otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983)
on February 10, 1983,[16] Sec. 2167, as amended, was repealed.[17] In
particular, Sec. 79 of the Code read:
SEC. 79. Municipal Boundary Disputes. Disputes
as to the jurisdiction of municipal governments over areas
or barangays shall be heard and decided by
the sangguniang panlalawigan of the province where the
municipalities concerned are situated x x x in case no
settlement is reached within sixty days from the date the
dispute was referred to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned, said dispute shall be elevated to
the Regional Trial Court of the province which first took
cognizance of the dispute. The case shall be decided by the
said court within one year from the start of proceedings and
appeal may be taken from the decision within the time and
in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.[18]
Almost a decade passed and R.A. No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991 was
signed into law on October 10, 1991 and took effect on January 1, 1992.[19] As
the latest law governing jurisdiction over the settlement of boundary disputes,
Sections 118 and 119 of the Code now mandate:
SEC. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for
Settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary disputes
between and among local government units shall, as much
as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
xxx
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
xxx
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an
amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the
dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to
that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by
the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue
within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
SEC. 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the
decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in
dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final
resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be
maintained and continued for all legal purposes.[20]
This Court agrees with petitioners contention that the trial court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when it was filed on October
16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the RAC, as
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6128, which granted the Court of First Instance
(now RTC) the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of municipal boundary
disputes. The antecedents of the Municipality of Sogod case reveal that it
dealt with the trial courts dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction
because at the time of the institution of the civil actions, the law in force was
the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the provincial
boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases.
The main point of inquiry, however, is whether the CA erred in
affirming the trial courts dismissal of the instant case for lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss the original
jurisdiction to hear and decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC.
 may be, as to territorial jurisdiction over
The Court rules that the appellate court did not err. The difference in the disputed area according records in
the factual setting notwithstanding, Municipality of Sogod still applies in the custody;
sense that similar thereto the pendency of the present case has also been (5) Written declarations or sworn
overtaken by events the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the statements of the people residing in the
enactment of the LGC of 1991. disputed area; and
(6) Such other documents or information
As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, as may be required by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the sanggunian hearing the dispute.
the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more
municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however, (d.) Answer of adverse party Upon receipt by
a major change has been introduced that in the event the Sanggunian fails to the sanggunian concerned of the petition together
effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification with the required documents, the LGU or LGUs
complained against shall be furnished copies
to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the thereof and shall be given fifteen (15) working
reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the days within which to file their answers.
LGC of 1991[21] outlines the procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes
as follows: (e.) Hearing Within five (5) working days after
receipt of the answer of the adverse party,
ART. 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary the sanggunian shall hear the case and allow the
Disputes. - The following procedures shall govern the parties concerned to present their respective
settlement of boundary disputes: evidences.

(a.) Filing of petition The sanggunian concerned (f.) Joint hearing When two or more
may initiate action by filing a petition, in the form sanggunians jointly hear a case, they may sit en
of a resolution, with the sanggunian having banc or designate their respective
jurisdiction over the dispute. representatives. Where representatives are
designated, there shall be an equal number of
(b.) Contents of petition The petition shall state the representatives from each sanggunian. They shall
grounds, reasons or justifications therefore. elect from among themselves a presiding officer
and a secretary. In case of disagreement,
(c.) Documents attached to petition The petition selection shall be by drawing lot.
shall be accompanied by:
(g.) Failure to settle In the event
(1) Duly authenticated copy of the law or the sanggunian fails to amicably settle the dispute
statute creating the LGU or any other within sixty (60) days from the date such dispute
documents showing proof of creation of was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to
the LGU; that effect and copies thereof shall be furnished
(2) Provincial, city, municipal or barangay the parties concerned.
map, as the case may be, duly certified
by the LMB; (h.) Decision Within sixty (60) days from the date
(3) Technical description of the the certification was issued, the dispute shall be
boundaries of the LGUs concerned; formally tried and decided by
(4) Written certification of the provincial, the sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision
city, or municipal assessor, as the case shall, within fifteen (15) days from the
 promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties
concerned, DILG, local assessor, Comelec, NSO,
and other NGAs concerned.
(i.) Appeal Within the time and manner prescribed
by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the
decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the dispute by filing therewith the appropriate
pleading, stating among others, the nature of the
dispute, the decision of
the sanggunian concerned and the reasons for
appealing therefrom. The Regional Trial Court
shall decide the case within one (1) year from the
filing thereof. Decisions on boundary disputes
promulgated jointly by two (2) or
more sangguniang panlalawigan shall be heard
by the Regional Trial Court of the province which
first took cognizance of the dispute.
ART. 18. Maintenance of Status Quo. Pending
final resolution of the dispute, the status of the affected area
prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued for
all purposes.
ART. 19. Official Custodian. The DILG shall be the
official custodian of copies of all documents on boundary
disputes of the LGUs.
Notably, unlike R.A. No. 6128 and B.P. 337, the LGC of 1991 grants
an expanded role on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned in resolving
cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of
bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the
amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now
specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the
dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its
implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old
rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which the
provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and
eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the
LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases
of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal,
should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan elevate the same.
Considering the foregoing, the RTC correctly dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to
dismiss an action whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.[22] Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of
the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was
duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the
choice of the proper forum was crucial for the decision of a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this
Court as it would never become final and executory.[23] Likewise, the standing
rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action;[24] otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make
the courts decision a lawless thing.[25] As correctly pointed out by the RTC:
x x x It will be a futile act for the Court to rule on
the case concerning a boundary dispute if its decision will
not after all be followed by the people concerned because
the decision is totally unacceptable to them. How then can
the Court enforce its decision? x x x.[26]
Petitioner, however, contends that the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal boundary
disputes should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful of the
rule that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over
a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case
is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal.[27] An exception to this rule, however, lies where the statute
either expressly provides or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending before its enactment. [28] Hence, this Court has
held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so provided expressly or if
retroactivity is necessarily implied therefrom and no vested right or obligation
of contract is impaired and it does not deprive a person of property without
due process of law.[29]
It is readily apparent from the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and
the LGC of 1991 that their new provisions and requirements regarding
changes in the constitution of political units are intended to apply to all existing
political subsidiaries immediately, i.e., including those with pending cases
filed under the previous regime, since the overarching consideration of these
new provisions is the need to empower the local government units without
further delay.
 Furthermore, the RTC can still review the decision of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan under the new set-up, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
so no substantial prejudice is caused by allowing retroactivity.
The Court, therefore, sees no error, much less grave abuse of
discretion, on the part of the CA in affirming the trial courts dismissal of
petitioners complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mun of Nueva Era vs. Mun of Marcos
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary
disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law
that created them.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law
creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its
amendment, which only the Congress can do.[1]
For Our review on certiorari is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversing to a certain extent that[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute
between the Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary
extended up to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and
Kalinga-Apayao.[4] By this extension of Marcos eastern boundary, the CA
allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Eras territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of
Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each
of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial
government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township
of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 [5] dated September
30, 1916.
The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June
22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled An Act Creating
the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte. Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda,
Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are
hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted
into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay
boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon
boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the
Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common
boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by
the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the
West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of
government in the barrio of Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753,
it is clear that Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras,
namely: Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and
Agunit. The Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not
mentioned. Hence, if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era
may not be considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which
named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem,
however, lies in the description of Marcos boundaries as stated in the second
paragraph, particularly in the phrase: on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-
Mt. Province boundary.
It must be noted that the term Mt. Province stated in the above
phrase refers to the present adjoining provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a
single province.
 Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A.
No. 4695 which was enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14, 1995,
the province of Kalinga-Apayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of
Kalinga and Apayao, was further converted into the regular provinces of
Kalinga and Apayao pursuant to R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now
the province of Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the
second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-
Apayao boundary.
On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos eastern
boundary, Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins
its eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon
the fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos
Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained
by it.[6]
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until
after almost 30 years,[7] or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang
Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015.[8] Said resolution was entitled:
Resolution Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now
Separated Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos
Norte.
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its
consideration and approval. The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to
submit its position paper.[9]
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and
eastern boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and
the Ilocos Norte-Mountain Province boundary, respectively, its eastern
boundary should not be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary,
which was coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of
Dingras. According to Marcos, its eastern boundary should extend further to
the east or up to the Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the
description of its eastern boundary under R.A. No. 3753. [10]
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos
posited that Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the law required that
the land area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Eras
northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but that
of Marcos. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the middle
portion[11] of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Eras isolated northern
portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio,
Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No.
1, Series of 1993. It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area
was an ancestral domain of the tinguians, an indigenous cultural
community. It argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos
must be protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva
Era.[12]
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of
the territory of Dingras only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned
seven (7) barrios of Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should
comprise Marcos should not go beyond the territory of said barrios.[13]
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had
been considered to be aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of
the adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based on a re-survey in 1992,
supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No.
3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part of
Marcos.[14] This was the area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that Marcos
claimed in its position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva
Era. The fallo of its decision[15] reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this
Body has no alternative but to dismiss, as it hereby
DISMISSES said petition for lack of merit. The disputed
area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more or less, is hereby
declared as part and portion of the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent Nueva Era.[16]
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos,
but none of Nueva Eras barangays were mentioned. The SP thus construed,
applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of Nueva
Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos.[17]
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it
would encroach upon a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
 proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that common ancestral heritage which unfortunately is absent
the eastern boundary of Marcos is indeed Mountain with Marcos, let it not be disturbed.[19] (Emphasis ours and
Province, Marcos will then be claiming a portion of Abra citations omitted)
because the province, specifically Barangay Sto. Nio,
Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by RTC Decision
the Province of Abra. Abra is situated between and
separates the Provinces of Ilocos Norte On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its
and Mountain Province. decision[20] of March 19, 2001. The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:

This is precisely what this body would like to avoid.

Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the Sangguniang
they should be given such construction as will advance the Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits
intended.[18] (Citations omitted) No costs.

The SP further explained: SO ORDERED.[21]

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the The RTC reasoned out in this wise:
law and the intent of the legislature that is important. When
the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the
literal import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should provision of R.A. 3753 as regards its boundary on the East
be construed according to the spirit and reason, which is the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province should prevail.
disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed
that congress did not intend to have this absurd situation to On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the
be created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This theory that only the barrios of the Municipality of Dingras as
body, by the mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise stated in R.A. 3753 should be included in the territorial
known Local Government Code, so believes that jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang
respondent Nueva Era or any portion thereof has been Panlalawigan agreed with the position of Nueva Era.
excluded from the ambit of RA 3753. Under the principle
of espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius, by xxxx
expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town
of Marcos, those not mentioned are deemed excluded. In An examination of the Congressional Records during the
Republic Act 4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the deliberations of the R.A. 3753 (House Bill No. 3721) shows
barrios comprising the City of Davao excluding the the Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez,
petitioner Barrio Central as part of the said City, the court 2nd District, Ilocos Norte, to wit:
held that there arose a prima facie conclusion that the said
law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have
been known to be the home of our brothers and sisters This bill seeks to create in
belonging to peculiar groups of non-(C)hristian inhabitants the Province of Ilocos Norte a new
with their own rich customs and traditions and this body municipality to be known as
takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of Nueva Era have the Municipality of Marcos, to be
 comprised by the present barrios of
Capariaan, Biding Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in
the Municipality of Dingras of the same
province. The seat of government will be
in the sitio of San Magro in the present
barrio of Ragas.
xxxx
On the other
hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not
be adversely affected too much because
its finances will still be sound and
stable. Its capacity to comply with its
obligations, especially to its employees
and personnel, will not be diminished nor
its operations paralyzed. On the
contrary, economic development in both
the mother and the proposed
municipalities will be accelerated.
In view of the foregoing,
approval of this bill is earnestly
requested.
(Sgd.) SIMEON M. VALDEZ
Congressman, 2nd District
Ilocos Norte[22]
Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the
creation of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the
barrios (barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos
Norte only. Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add
any area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion
might have been different only if the area being claimed by
the Municipality of Marcos is within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Dingras and not
the Municipality of Nueva Era. In such case, the two
conflicting provisions may be harmonized by including such
area within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Dingras as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Marcos.[23] (Emphasis
ours)
CA Disposition
Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos
filed a petition for review[24] of the RTC decision before the CA. The issues
raised by Marcos before the CA were:
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc.
which is within a Government Forest Reservation
in Barangay Sto. Nio, formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the
newly created Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio
on the East which is separated from Nueva Era as a result
of the full implementation of the boundaries of the
new Municipality of Marcos belongs also to Marcos or to
Nueva Era.[25]
The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion,
where Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of
Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos, was isolated from Nueva Era in view
of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.
Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be
declared as part of its own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle
portion of Nueva Era in view of the description of Marcos eastern boundary
under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it was entitled to the
northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era
when Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was
contrary to law because the law required that a municipality must have a
compact and contiguous territory.[26]
In a Decision[27] dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed
the RTC decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition
treated as one for certiorari. The Decisions of both the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Regional Trial Court of
Ilocos Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
they made the eastern boundary of the municipality of
 Marcos co-terminous with the eastern boundary of Dingras
town, and another is rendered extending the said boundary
of Marcos to the boundary line between the province of
Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same
Decisions are AFFIRMED with respect to the denial of the
claim of Marcos to the detached northern portion
of barangay Sto. Nio which should, as it is hereby ordered
to, remain with the municipality of Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[28]
In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary
line between Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following
explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when
they ruled that the eastern boundary of Marcos is only
coterminous with the eastern boundary of the adjacent
municipality of Dingras and refused to extend it up to the
boundary line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao). R.A. No. 3753, the
law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves no room for
equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
On the Northwest by the barrios
Biding-Rangay boundary going down to
the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road;
on the Northeast, by the Burnay River
which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province
boundary; on the South by the Padsan
River, which is at the same time the
boundary between the municipalities of
Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras
as the eastern boundary also of Marcos and refusing to go
farther to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte
and MountainProvince (Kalinga-Apayao) is tantamount to
amending the law which Congress alone can do. Both the
SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of
Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend
to take away any part of Nueva Era and merge it with
Marcos for it is chargeable with conclusive knowledge that
when it provided that the eastern boundary of Marcos is the
boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province,
(by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision was already
Kalinga-Apayao), it would be cutting through a portion of
Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura
lex sed lex![29]
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between
Marcos and Kalinga-Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach upon a
portion of Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:
Nueva Eras contention that to lay out the eastern
jurisdiction of Marcos to the boundary line between Ilocos
Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would
mean annexing part of
the municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as
Abra is between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is
geographically erroneous. From Nueva Eras own map of
Region 1, which also depicts the locations of Kalinga-
Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and Nueva
Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into
the provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain
Province and Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far
to the south of Kalinga Apayao and is between the latter
and the present Mountain Province, which is farther south
of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern boundary of Ilocos Sur
while Kalinga-Apayao is the eastern boundary of Ilocos
Norte.Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary of
the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of
Abra.[30]
However, Marcos claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of
Nueva Era was denied. The CA ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the
portion of Sto. Nio that is separated from its mother town
Nueva Era and now lies east of the municipalities of
 Solsona and Dingras and north of Marcos, it bears stressing
that it is not included within the area of Marcos as defined
by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio,
Marcos is laying claim to it to be integrated into its territory
by the SP because it is contiguous to a portion of said
municipality.
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority
to act on the claim, for it will necessarily substantially alter
the north eastern and southern boundaries of Marcos from
that defined by law and unduly enlarge its area. Only
Congress can do that. True, the SP may substantially alter
the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction. But this
means the alteration of the boundary of a barangay in
relation to another barangay within the same
municipality for as long as that will not result in any change
in the boundary of that municipality. The area in dispute
therefore remains to be a part of Sto. Nio, a barangay of
Nueva Era although separated by the newly created
Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local
Government Code which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and
Conversion. As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its
conversion from one level to another
shall be based on verifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. It must be
contiguous, unless it comprises two or
more islands or is separated by a local
government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and
sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.[31]
The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong
mode of appeal in bringing the case to it. The case, according to the CA, was
appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite its pronouncement that the
case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating it as
one for certiorari, to wit:
A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the
dilemma of choosing between dismissing outright the
petition at bar or entertaining it. This is for the simple reason
that a petition for review is a mode of appeal and is not
appropriate as the Local Government Code provides for the
remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to the Regional
Trial Court but not any further appeal to this Court. Appeal
is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is
expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the
citation of supporting authority.
xxxx
By the same token, since the Local Government
Code does not explicitly grant the right of further appeal
from decisions of the RTCs in boundary disputes between
or among local government units, Marcos town cannot
exercise that right from the adverse decision of the RTC of
Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental
legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our
inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special
civil action for certiorari.[32]
Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues
Nueva Era now raises the following issues:
a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on
the Petition for Review on Appeal, since Sec. 119 of
the Local Government Code, which provides that An
appeal to the Decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional
Trial Court, without further Appeal to the Court of
Appeals;
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion, in treating the Petition for Review On
Appeal, filed under Rule 45, Revised Rules of Court,
 as a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its
appreciation of facts, in declaring that MARCOS East
is not coterminous with the Eastern boundary of its
mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual and legal
basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys.
Agunit (Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos,
and to go further East, by traversing and
disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing parallel
lines from Sto. Nio, there lies
Abra, not Mt. Province or Kalinga-Apayao.[33]
Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not
the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is
proper; and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over
and covers a portion of Nueva Era.
Our Ruling
Marcos correctly
appealed
the RTC judgment
via petition for
review under Rule
42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, (b)oundary disputes
involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The
dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing
municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.[34]
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the
parties. The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed
by Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether
the RTC judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.
The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute
was not appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision
may be made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code [35] which
provides:
SECTION 119. Appeal. Within the time and
manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area
in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal
within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending final
resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be
maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as
appellate court, the case may no longer be further appealed to it. The CA
stated that (a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it
is expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of
supporting authority.[36]
The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by
declaring that: because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues
involved, we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a
special civil action for certiorari.[37]
The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate
jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised
unless it is expressly granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the
petition for review precisely because the law allows it.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902,[38] vests in the CA the appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commissions, among others.[39] B.P. Blg. 129 has been further
supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the
CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by
Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg.
129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
At the time of
creation of Marcos,
approval in a
plebiscite of the
creation of a local
government unit is
not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.[40]
The purpose of the above constitutional provision was
acknowledged by the Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v.
Aguirre,[41] where it was held that:
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our
previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the
sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people
power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article
X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged
or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not
of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the
people of the local government unit directly affected was
required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local government
units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them direct
democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru
peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is
also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units.[42]
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory[43] plebiscite
requirement for the creation of a local government unit is applicable to this
case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to
lack of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Eras contention that Marcos claim over parts
of its territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of the required
plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government
Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.
At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law
to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without
conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in
Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.[44] It
is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given
prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive
application is so provided.[45]
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on
Elections[46] involving the City of Mandaue, the Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City
of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified
by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is
untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the
boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should
be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a
new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore
cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which
came into existence on June 21, 1969.[47] (Citations omitted
and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but
merely interpreting the law that created it. Its creation was already a fait
accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions
of the Constitution should be given only a prospective
application unless the contrary is clearly intended. Were
the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or vested might
be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence of
 an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope
of the Constitution.[48]
No part of Nueva
Eras territory was
taken for the creation
of Marcos under R.A.
No. 3753.
Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos
obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda,
Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are
hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted
into a new and separate municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos
source of territory, Nueva Eras territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention
of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute
enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.[49] This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the
rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.[50]
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to
become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise
language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not
by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. [51] The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. [52]
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in
the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be
set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This
conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. [53]
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is
bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the
creation of Marcos.Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may
resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the
purpose and intent of the statute.[54]
Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law
creating Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It
alleges that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era
is within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay
boundary going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon
boundary consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the
Northeast, by the Burnay River which is the common
boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by
the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by
the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the
West and Southwest, by the boundary between the
municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is bounded on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-
Mt. Province boundary, a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory
because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos Norte-
Mt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to reach
the Ilocos Norte-Mt.Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the middle
portion of Nueva Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion
of Nueva Era but also to its northern portion which, as a consequence, was
isolated from the major part of Nueva Era.
We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.
 Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of
Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive
only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.
Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos
under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of
the legislative intent.
The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application.[55] We thus uphold the legislative intent to create
Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.
Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be
discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order
to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision
thereof, should be considered.[56] Every section, provision or clause of the
statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislator must be
ascertained from the whole text of the law, and every part of the act is to be
taken into view.[57]
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation,
not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This
Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always
cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of
the legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe
statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and
that therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results.[58]
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute,
the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would
lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of
the lawmakers.[59]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Ilocos Norte is REINSTATED.
Sta Lucia Realty vs. Pasig
For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision[1] and the January 27, 2005
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which affirmed
with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision[3] and October 9, 1998
Order[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, in Civil
Case No. 65420.
Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the
registered owner of several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were
located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig[5] (Pasig).
The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with
that covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong
Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The two
combined lots were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were
issued.
TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos.
92869 and 92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a
commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a
separate corporation, was built on it.[6]
Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9,
1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect
to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.[7]
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition[8] for the settlement of its
land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City
(Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still
pending up to this date.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,[9] docketed as Civil
Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes,
including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements
thereon (the subject properties).
 Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying
its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did,
by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations
issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its
territorial jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate
taxes for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta. [10]
Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it
moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by
the outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting the real property
taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta
further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments would
show that the subject properties are within its metes and bounds. [11]
Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the
proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for
the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a
prejudicial question to the resolution of the case.[12]
The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of
merit. Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and
location,[13] the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of
Pasig:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:
1) P273,349.14 representing unpaid real
estate taxes and penalties as of 1996, plus
interest of 2% per month until fully paid;
2) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees;
and
3) The costs of suit.
Judgment is likewise rendered against the
intervenor Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to refund
to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the realty tax
payments improperly collected and received by the former
from the latter in the aggregate amount of P358, 403.68.[14]
After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig, on
September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTCs August
10, 1998 Decision.
The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasigs motion in an Order[15] and
modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes due on the
improvements on the subject lots:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. Accordingly,
the Decision, dated August 10, 1998 is hereby modified in
that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the
amount of P5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes
and penalties on the improvements on the subject parcels
of land whereon real estate taxes are adjudged as due for
the year 1996.[16]
Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include
the RTCs October 9, 1998 Order in its protest.
On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several oppositions, on the
assertion that there were no good reasons to warrant the execution pending
appeal.[17]
On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Execution against Sta. Lucia.
On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals to assail the RTCs order
granting the execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was
raffled to the First Division of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22,
2000, ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED by this
Court. The assailed Order dated April 15, 1999 in Civil Case
No. 65420 granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID.[18]
 The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case
presented a prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x Pasig
can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties. [19]
Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition
for Certiorari filed before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this was
denied on June 25, 2001 for being filed out of time.[20]
Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was raffled to
the (former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTCs judgment:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of P50,000.00 attorneys fees is DELETED.[21]
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was
no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings. [22] Elucidating on the legal
meaning of a prejudicial question, it held that there can be no prejudicial
question when the cases involved are both civil. [23] The Court of Appeals
further held that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as
alleged by Cainta to be present, were not met.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration,
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.
Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions
for Certiorari with this Court. Caintas petition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856
was denied on April 13, 2005 for Caintas failure to show any reversible
error. Sta. Lucias own petition is the one subject of this decision.[24]
In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of the Court
of Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING [WITH MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
SUSPENDING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY
OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH WILL FINALLY
DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA WAS VALID
PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE
BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY
RESOLVED, THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE
PAYING THE REALTY TAXES ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA
TO PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.[25]
Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts correctly
decided the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their faces that the
subject properties are situated in its territorial jurisdiction. Pasig contends that
the principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res judicata are all
inapplicable, due to the absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains
that the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the
complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed before the Pasig RTC. It
avers that the doctrine of prejudicial question, which has a definite meaning in
law, cannot be invoked where the two cases involved are both civil. Thus,
Pasig argues, since there is no legal ground to preclude the simultaneous
hearing of both cases, the suspension of the proceedings in the Pasig RTC is
baseless.
Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal authority over
the subject properties, which fall within its territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims
that while it has been collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties
since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property tax
purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that there is a
discrepancy between the locational entries and the technical descriptions in
the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the settlement of the
boundary dispute case it initiated.
The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down into
two basic issues:
1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding
Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the resolution of
the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta;
and
2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real
property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always
done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucias
TCTs.
We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and
Cainta would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect realty
taxes from Sta. Lucia.[26]
The Local Government Unit entitled
To Collect Real Property Taxes
The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the
resolution of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate
the assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and bounds of their
respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of
Appeals[27] wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of
both its ownership and location.[28] The Court of Appeals even referred to
specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to
support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on the
subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on their faces
that they are situated in Pasig.[29]
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code,
the authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the
property is situated:
Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. All real
property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at
the current and fair market value prevailing in the
locality where the property is situated.
xxxx
Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of
treasurers. The collection of the real property tax and all
penalties accruing thereto, and the enforcement of the
remedies provided for in this Code or any applicable laws,
shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province,
city or municipality where the property is
situated. (Emphases ours.)
This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known
as the 1991 the Local Government Code, to wit:
Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. All
real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in
the locality where the property is situated. The
Department of Finance shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations for the classification, appraisal, and
assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of
this Code.
Section 233. Rates of Levy. A province or city or
a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area shall fix
a uniform rate of basic real property tax applicable to their
respective localities as follows: x x x. (Emphases ours.)
The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government
unit is authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties
falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these
properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.
Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial boundaries,
this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[30] said:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes
the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear
for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of
a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its
territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil
 sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must
be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions.[31] (Emphasis ours.)
The significance of accurately defining a local government units
boundaries was stressed in City of Pasig v. Commission on
Elections,[32] which involved the consolidated petitions filed by the parties
herein, Pasig and Cainta, against two decisions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) with respect to the plebiscites scheduled by Pasig for
the ratification of its creation of two new Barangays. Ruling on the
contradictory reliefs sought by Pasig and Cainta, this Court affirmed the
COMELEC decision to hold in abeyance the plebiscite to ratify the creation
of Barangay Karangalan; but set aside the COMELECs other decision, and
nullified the plebiscite that ratified the creation of Barangay Napico in Pasig,
until the boundary dispute before the Antipolo RTC had been resolved. The
aforementioned case held as follows:
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No.
128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND
No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and
the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the
creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is
declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is
ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle
with finality the boundary dispute between the City of
Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No.
94-3006.[33]
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real
property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject
properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be
acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.
Certificates of Title as
Conclusive Evidence of Location
While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its
ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the
very purpose of attacking the statements therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation,[34] we proclaimed that:
We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a
certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters
contained therein and conclusive evidence of the ownership
of the land referred to therein. However, it bears stressing
that while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable
and binding against the whole world, including the
government itself, they do not create or vest title. They
merely confirm or record title already existing and vested.
They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission
of fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of other.[35]
In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente
Coronado,[36] we set aside the lower courts ruling that the property subject of
the case was not situated in the location stated and described in the TCT, for
lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the doctrine that the TCT
is conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However, we refused to
simply uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the
case back to the trial court for the determination of the exact location of the
property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.[37]
In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,[38] this Court
reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property that was
outside its territorial jurisdiction, viz:
In this case, it is basic that before the City of
Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its
territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know
such basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials
of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its
jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same
constitutes gross negligence.[39] (Emphasis ours.)
Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the TCTs of the
subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds
of the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they
are within Caintas boundaries.[40] This only means that there may be a conflict
between the location as stated and the location as technically described in the
TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they
can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both the
stated and described locations point to the same area.
The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case between
Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best determine once and for all
the precise metes and bounds of both Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial
jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the
extent and reach of each local governments authority, a prerequisite in the
proper exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation. This
was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v. Commission on
Elections,[41] and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we cannot adhere to the same
logic and reasoning in this case.
The Prejudicial Question Debate
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property
taxes it already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary
dispute with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the
boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the
suspension of its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its
argument in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,[42] when it sought to
nullify the COMELECs ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the
boundary dispute case), the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay
Karangalan. We agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary dispute
case presented a prejudicial question and explained our statement in this
wise:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the
COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and
the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which
must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of
the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial
question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal
action and does not come into play where both cases are
civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general
rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros
Oriental, Br. 42, that, in the interest of good order, we
can very well suspend action on one case pending the
final outcome of another case closely interrelated or
linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig
vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it
can not deny that portions of the same area are included in
the boundary dispute case pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig
has material bearing to the creation of the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for
the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to
be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or
less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because
territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the
proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility.
Not only that, we would be paving the way for
potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. x x
x.[43](Emphases ours.)
It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term prejudicial question, as
appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had been used loosely. Its
usage had been more in reference to its ordinary meaning, than to its strict
legal meaning under the Rules of Court.[44] Nevertheless, even without the
impact of the connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state
that a trial court may control its own proceedings according to its sound
discretion:
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL
OFFICERS
Rule 135
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. Every court shall have
power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to
make them comformable to law and justice.
 Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent
power in our own decisions, to wit:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper application for
a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide
the outcome of another pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
causes (sic) on its dockets with economy of time and effort
for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of
parties to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled the
second action should be stayed.
(Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before Branch 74 of the Regional Trial
Court in Antipolo City, to determine which local government unit is entitled to
exercise its powers, including the collection of real property taxes, on the
properties subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes
due on the lots and improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457 in an escrow account with the Land Bank
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the

power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, that
of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be
stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits
and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments,
confusion between litigants and courts. It bears stressing
that whether or not the RTC would suspend the
proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its
sound discretion.[45]

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held
in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that
the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will
undeniably affect both Pasigs and Caintas rights. In fact, the only reason
Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta.
Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another
local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the
contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then
there would be no controversy at all.

In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to

deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties, in
an escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2004

Decision and the January 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta are both directed to await the judgment in their boundary dispute case