1.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Prosecution in the present case, State of Maharashtra, hereby most respectfully submits that
this Honble Court of Sessions at Pune, has applicable jurisdiction in C No. 123 of 2014, under
177 read with 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

By:

Counsels for the Prosecution.

Place: Pune, Maharashtra.

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 2. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Statements of facts:

1) Mr. Shashwat Prakash was the Editor-in-chief of the magazine The Haunting Truth. He
got in close terms with a junior editor, Mr Vilas (herein referred as R1) and decided to marry his
daughter to him. The marriage was solemnized on 29 th December, 2007. No dowry was given
except some customary gifts.

2) Although Vilas was a sincere journalist, he was not a punctual person and was in habit of
arriving late to the office. At one such event on 9 th January, 2010, Mr. Prakash scolded Vilas in
front of the whole office. Vilas could not handle the humiliation and went to his Father-in-laws
office and threatened him about his daughter in front of his secretary, Mr. Tabrez.

3) The same evening, when vilas returned home he started shouting on Sarada for not
bringing a car from her paternal home. For months to come, this became a routine affair that the
two would quarrel over sarada not bringing adequate dowry and was occasionally joined by
Shantadevi (R2), his mother and Rohan (R3), his brother. This became a routine affair to which
even neighbors were privy to.

4) On 5th July, 2014, all the members went out to attend the wedding leaving behind Sarada
and Vilas. The same night Vilas and his two friends returned home in drunken state and got
involved in a fight with security guard. Later, Sarada scolded her husband for reckless behavior
in front of his friends. Vilas took it as humiliation and was willing to take revenge. All three of
them again started drinking and started talking about raping sarada to teach her a lesson.

5) Next day in the morning when Vilas went to saradas room, he found her lying
unconscious on the floor. He took her to the nearest hospital where after gaining consciousness
she told the doctors that she was raped three times while she was sleeping but she cannot
recognize the persons as her face was covered using a piece of cloth. By now, Vilas and his two
friends were absconding.

6) Meanwhile, Shantadevi and Rohan came to visit Sarada in hospital where doctor

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informed them that sharda will not survive for more than hour and a half on account of internal
bleeding in stomach. When they both entered the ICU, shantadevi started abusing her for falsely
accusing his son and his friends and kicked saradas stomach for several times.

7) In her statement to Judicial First class magistrate she gave the statement about being
raped thrice and that her mother-in-law hitting her in the stomach twice. Sarada succumbed to
her injuries and died at 12:49 PM. On 30 th march 2015 the polic got hold of Rahul who accepted
his role in rape and subsequently vilas and Rakesh were also arrested. Now the Case is before the
Sessions Court, Pune for trial.

3. STATEMENT OF CHARGES

1. Vilas, Rahul and Rakesh has been charged with 376(2)(g) read with 34, 299, 302, 322,
326, 504 for the offence of Rape amounting to Murder.

2. Vilas along with his Mother, Shanta Devi and Brother, Rohan have been charged with 304B
and 498A of Indian Penal Code for the crime of Dowry Death, and subjecting a married woman
to cruelty and harassment.

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 4. ISSUES RAISED

[I] ISSUE [I]

WHETHER THE DYING DECLARATION BY MRS. SARDHA IS ADMISSIBLE OR
NOT.

[II] ISSUE[II]
WHETHER AN OFFENCE UNDER SEC. 376(2)(G) HAS BEEN COMMITTED BY MR.
VILLAS , MR. RAKESH AND MR. RAHUL OR NOT.

[III] ISSUE [III]

WHETHER THE ACCUSED, MR.VILLAS, MR.RAHUL AND MR.RAKESH CAN BE

CHARGED UNDER 299 AND 300 OF IPC OR NOT.

[IV] ISSUE [IV]

WHETHER MR.VILAS, MRS.SHANTABAI AND MR.ROHAN CAN BE HELD GUILTY
FOR DOWRY DEATH AS MENTIONED U/S 304B OF INDIAN PENAL CODE.

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 5. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

[I] WHETHER THE DYING DECLARATION BY MRS. SARDHA IS ADMISSIBLE OR

NOT.
It is humbly contented before this Honble Court, that the statement made by deceased before the
judicial first class magistrate is admissible as substantive evidence under 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 as it was as to circumstances of the transaction which resulted into her death.

[V] WHETHER AN OFFENCE UNDER 376(2)(G) HAS BEEN COMMITTED BY MR.

VILLAS , MR. RAKESH AND MR. RAHUL OR NOT.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court, that the chain of circumstantial events is
complete without any reasonable doubt proving the guilt of the accused. The evidences produced
the testimony of witnesses, medical report under 164 A of Criminal Procedural Court, the
confession and admissions made by the accused are all corroborative of the facts established by
the prosecution. Hence, the offence of gang rape has been committed by the three accused.

[VI]WHETHER THE ACCUSED, MR.VILLAS, MR.RAHUL AND MR.RAKESH CAN

BE CHARGED UNDER 299 AND 300 OF IPC OR NOT.
It is humbly contended that the accused is guilty for committing the offence of culpable homicide
amounting to murder under Sec 299 and Sec 300 IPC, which elucidates the essentials of murder.
The Prosecution humbly contends that, the accused have the intent and knowledge for
constituting this grievous offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder . Both, the actus
reus and the mens rea of the crime are established in the instant case.

[VII] [IV]WHETHER MR.VILAS, MRS.SHANTABAI AND MR.ROHAN CAN BE

HELD GUILTY FOR DOWRY DEATH AS MENTIONED U/S 304B OF INDIAN
PENAL CODE.
It is most humbly submitted that Respondents are guilty for the crime of Dowry death as the
deceased died under unnatural and suspicious circumstances within seven years of marriage on
account of cruelty and harassment meted out to her in demand of dowry by her husband and his
relative

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 6. THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

[I] WHETHER THE DYING DECLARATION IS ADMISSIBLE OR NOT?

It is humbly contented before this Honble Court, that the statement made by deceased before the
judicial first class magistrate is admissible as substantive evidence under 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates to the statement made by a
person before his death.

There are two kinds of statement which are made admissible in substantive evidence, firstly, the
statements as to cause of the death and secondly, the statement as to any of the circumstances of
the transaction which resulted in the death.

[A.] Statement As To Cause Of The Death

Sharda in her statement before police officials and judicial magistrate first class mentioned that
her mother in law, Santhadevi, attacked her when she was in intensive care unit and even kicked
her stomach. Santhadevi had knowledge about the medical condition of Sharda as doctor had
already told her that she has only few hours of life left on the account of internal bleeding in her
stomach. Also, in the medical examination report, the cause of her death given is internal
bleeding in her stomach.1

Even though Sharda was about to die of the injuries sustained in the earlier incident, Santhadevi
kicked her stomach while she was aware of the fact that there is severe internal bleeding in her
stomach2, it was the direct cause of her death and statement made by deceased regarding direct
cause of her death would be admissible under 32 of Indian Evidence Act 18723.

[B.] Circumstances of transaction resulting into the death

The expression any of the circumstances of the transactions which resulted in his death is
wider in scopes than the words the cause of his death. The word caused his death does not
mean resulted in his death and cannot be construed as synonyms. 4 Dying declaration may be
held admissible not regarding the cause of his death but as one regarding a circumstance of the
1 Case Study, 6.
2 Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273.
3 Surendra Nath Mahton v State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1497.
4 Sarkar, Law of Evidence, p 163 (13th Ed,1990).

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transaction which resulted in his death.5 In the present instance, statement made by Sharda, may
not be regarding the cause of her death but concerning the circumstances of the transaction
which resulted in her death.6

In the instant case, the statement made by Sharda, just prior to her death, in the presence of first
class judicial magistrate, consists of two different statements:

[1.]Sharda was raped thrice at around 3 AM and her face was covered with a thick
piece of cloth
Sharda in her statement mentioned that she was raped three times at around 3 AM by some
people and her face was covered using a thick piece of cloth. Although, it cannot be said that
rape was the direct cause of the death of deceased, however, it was regarding the circumstances
of transaction resulting into death of Sharda. In Sharad v State of Maharashtra,7 Honble
Supreme Court ruled that, the test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically
reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait-jacket.
For example, where death is a logical consequence of a continuous drama long in process and is
figuratively speaking, a finale of the story, the statement in regards to every step
straightforwardly associated with the end of the dramatization would be acceptable on the
grounds that the whole explanation would need to be perused as a natural entire and not torn
from the connection.8 Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may
also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death.9

Moreover a two judge bench of Honble Supreme Court has explained that:

"The collocation of the words in 32(1) 'circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his
death' is apparently of wider amplitude than saying 'circumstances which caused his death'.
There need not necessarily be a direct nexus between 'circumstances' and death. It is enough if
the words spoken by the deceased have reference to any circumstance, which has connection

5 In re: Kalusingh Motisingh, AIR 1964 MP 30.

6 Ismail Ali v State of Assam 1987(3)Crimes 115.
7 Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622; See also, Pratima Dutta v State, 81 CWN 713; Padmabi v
State of Madhya Pradesh, 1987 Cr LJ 1573; State of Haryana v Anil Kumar, 1984 Cr LJ 118.
8 State of M.P. v. Dayanand Dohar, AIR 2006 SC 754. ; See also Munnu Raja v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1976
SC 2199.
9 Kanhei v.State 1967 CrLJ 1583

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with any of the transactions, which ended up in the death of the deceased."10

[C.] Reliability of a Dying Declaration

Three Parameters have been laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Khushal Rao v. State of
Bombay11 to test the reliability of a dying declaration:

In order to test the reliability of a dying declaration the court has to keep in view the
circumstances; whether the capacity of man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired
at the time he was making the statement by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement
has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration
apart from the official record of it; 12 & that the statement had been made at the earliest
opportunity & was not the result of tutoring by interested party.13

[1.]Whether the capacity of a person to remember the facts stated had not been
impaired at the time the statement was made:
Concentrating on the phrase where after gaining back her consciousness she told the doctors
ascertains that Sharda was in her conscious at the time she told doctors that her face was covered
using a thick piece of cloth and she was raped three times at around 3 AM. Thus, it can be said
that when the statement was made Shardas remembering capacity was not impaired. Also, it is
not necessary that there should be due certification by the doctor as a condition precedent to
recording of the dying declaration.14

[2.]The statement has been consistent throughout or not if he had several opportunities
of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it:
Sharda had two opportunity of making a dying declaration, firstly, after gaining her
consciousness she told doctors that she was raped thrice and her face was covered using a thick
piece of cloth and she was not able to recognize the culprits. Secondly, in front of police officials
in the presence of Judicial Magistrate First Class, she told that she was raped thrice and she was
not able to recognize the rapists and Santhadevi, her mother in law kicked her stomach.15

10 Rattan Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 4 SCC 161.

11 Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1958 AIR 22
12 Kamal Kishore v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2000 SC 1920.
13 Rv Wollock(1789) 1 Leach 500;See also R v Perry(1909)2 KB 697; Phipson on Evidence.p 496(13th Edn. 2001)
14Laxman v. State of Maharashtra. (2002) 6 SCC 710.
15 Page 5 , Case Study.

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The statements made by Sharda are similar to each other, both of them mentions that she was
raped and she couldnt recognize the rapists and there was a gap of around 35 minutes between
her two statements.

[3.]That the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity & was not the result
of tutoring by interested party:
When Vilas went to Shardas room he saw her lying on floor unconscious subsequently he took
her to hospital where she gave statement to doctors which was similar to the one given before the
Magistrate, as soon as she gained her consciousness. Also, it has been held that dying declaration
cannot be said to be tainted merely because the deceased was carried to the hospital by his
relations or friends.16 Hence, there was no point of time when Sharda could have been tutored by
any interested party.17

[VIII] WHETHER OR NOT AN OFFENCE UNDER SEC. 376(2)(G) HAS BEEN

COMMITTED BY MR. VILLAS , MR. RAKESH AND MR. RAHUL ?
It is humbly submitted that, Mr. Villas, Mr. Rakesh and Mr. Rahul are guilty of the heinous crime
of gang rape of Mrs. Shardhha on the fateful night of 5 th of April.. The chain of circumstantial
events is complete without any reasonable doubt proving the guilt of the accused. The evidences
produced are, the dying declaration of the deceased, the testimony of witnesses, the confession
and admissions made by the accused are all corroborative of the facts established by the
prosecution. Hence, the offence of dehumanizing act of gang rape has been committed by the
three accused.

[A.] THE CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS SATISFACTORY.

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that, referring to the case of State of UP v.
Babulnath 18, in which the apex court held that in absence of direct evidence and no eye witness
i.e. cases based on circumstantial evidence only the following should be considered.

(a) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved
and these circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime. All
the links in the chain of events must be established beyond reasonable doubt and the established

16 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sewak, AIR 2003 SC 2141.

17 Suresh v State of Madhya Pradesh 1987(1) Crimes 385(SC)
18 State of U.P. v. Babulnath 1994 SCC 1585

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circumstances should be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally
inconsistent with his innocence.19

Further referring to the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh,20 where the Honble court held that there must be a chain of evidence so far complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.21

Hence, it is humbly submitted that the chain of Circumstantial Evidence, in the instant case, is
proved beyond reasonable doubt in light of the following contentions: Lack of victims consent ,
The dying declaration, Medical Report under 164 of Criminal Procedural Court is in
corroboration with the prosecutions story, the testimony of Independent witnesses corroborates
the prosecution case and moreover the confession statement made by one of the accused i.e.
Rahul further strengthens the corroboration.

[D.] MEDICAL REPORT UNDER 164 OF CRPC IS IN CORROBORATION

WITH THE PROSECUTIONS STORY.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that, the report of the medical jurist
corroborated with the circumstantial evidence together conclude to prove the guilt on the part of
the accused22 in the instant case, because evidence given by Medical Jurist is admissible 23,
medical evidence proves the guilt of the accused.24

[1.]Presence of Nail Wound on back and neck indicates resistance to rape :

It is contended that, even though there was absence of injuries near the vagina but if we consider
the medical report, there was presence of nail wound on back and neck. If a girl had struggled
and put up resistance at the time when she was raped, she would have received some injuries on
her buttocks, hips, back, elbow and thigh. 25 The examination of the females for marks of injuries

19 Sakshi v. Union of India 2004CriLJ2881

20 Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343.
21 Balwant Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1987 SC 1080
22 Hari Ram v State AIR 1960 MP 59.
23 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, 45.
24 Parikh, C. K, Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence, Forensic Medicine & Toxicology, p 409 (6th Ed. 2002)
25 JAI SINGH P MODI, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY, 926(23rd ED. 2008)

10 | P a g e
elsewhere on the body forms a crucial piece of evidence.26

[4.]Absence of semen in the Medical Report is immaterial

The explanation to 375, IPC makes it abundantly clear that in order to constitute sexual
intercourse which is necessary for the offence of rape, penetration is sufficient. 27 "To penetrate"
28
means "to enter or pass through or force a way into or through". That is the reason why Courts
have taken the view that in order to constitute the offence of rape it is not at all necessary that
there should be complete penetration of the male genital organ into the vagina of a woman
attended with emission of semen.29 Even vulvar penetration with or without the emission of
semen would be sufficient to constitute the offence.3031

[5.]Non-existence of vaginal injury in the Medical Report is immaterial.

It is humbly submitted that, the non-existence of any injury on the victim is immaterial for the
offence to constitute rape.32 It could not be said that mere absence of the injury either on the
person or private parts of the girl would be an indication of innocence of the accused. 33 As to
gang rape, the absence of injury on any part of the prosecutrix does not falsify the case of rape 34
as she is not expected to offer such resistance as would cause injuries on her. 35 The fact that there
were no injuries on private parts of the victim does not prove that there was no rape or the girl
was a consenting party.36

There is no universal rule that in a case of successive rape by persons more than one there must
necessarily be injuries to the female and that absence of such injuries to the private parts would
exclude possibility of rape. Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, Thirteenth

26 Dr. S.P. Kohli, Civil Surgeon, Ferozepur v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana thr. Registrar, 1978 CrLJ 1804.
27 Mohammed Kunju vs State Of Kerala 2007 CriLJ 3929
28 Re Karchiappa AIR 1942 Mad 285.
29 Bhonri v State AIR 1955 NUC 473.
30 Rahim Beg v State AIR 1973 SC 343; See also Parikhs Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and
Toxicology,369(8th ED. 2010); Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice,1356 (Vol. 4).
31 Jalal v Emperor AIR 1930 Lah 193.
32 Rafiq v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 559.
33 Uttam v. State of Maharashtra, 1991 CrL.J 1644 (Mah); See also Rakesh v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 CrL.J 1434.
34 Avtar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 552; See also Chairman and Managing Director VSP v. Goparaju
Sri Prabhakara Hri Babu, (2008) 5 SCC 569; Suman Balkrishna Zodge v. Alaka Suresh Zodge, AIR 2008 Bom
2481; Harender Nath Chakraborty v. State of W.B., (2009) 2 SCC 758; Bhuvan Singh v. Oriental Insurance
Company Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 136.
35 Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1080.
36 Gulam Hussain v King Emperor AIR 1925 Lah 94; See also Adam Tirky v The State of Orissa 1993(I)OLR265.

11 | P a g e
Edition also reaffirms that, it is possible to have absence of injury in case of married woman
rape37

[6.]Habitual to sex in case of a married woman cant negate the fact that she is raped:
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that, in case of a married woman if it is found in
the medical examination that she is habitual to sex, it cant negate the fact that she is raped. In
this regard , the Counsel would like to refer to the case of State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan
Maharaj38 , it was held that in the case of rape of a married woman habituated to sexual
intercourse, injury on private parts is not likely as in the instant case. On the other hand what is
relevant is the deposition of deceased who has admitted that in the instant case, there could have
been penetration without ejaculation. This evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused. The sole testimony of the victim cannot be disbelieved merely because the doctor who
examined, her did not find sign of rape.39

[E.] THERE EXISTS A COMMON INTENTION OF THE ACCUSED TO

COMMIT GANG RAPE.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court, that the Common intention is dealt with in
34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and provides that when a criminal act is done by several persons
in furtherance of the common intention of all,40 each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it was done by him alone. 41 Common intention denotes action in concert and
necessarily postulates a pre- arranged plan, a prior meeting of minds and an element of
participation in action.42

It is submitted that Explanation 1 of 376 43 reads, Where a woman is raped by one or more in a
group of persons acting in furtherance of their common intention, each of the persons shall be
deemed to have committed gang rape within the meaning of this sub- section.44

37 Santosh Kumar Vs. State of M.P. AIR2006SC3098

38 State of Maharashtra v. Priya Sharan Maharaj AIR 1997 SC 2041
39 Gurdip v State 1975 Cut LR 20; See also State of Karnataka v. Mehboob 1987bCrLJ 849;Rafiq v State of Uttar
Pradesh; Ali khan v. State AIR 1962 Cal 641.
40 Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King Emperor (1924) L.R. 52 I.A. 40; See also Chitramal and Moti v. State of
Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 796; Mahabir Gope vs State Of Bihar 1963 AIR 118
41 Nandji Rastogi and anr v. State of Bihar AIR 2002 SC 3443.
42 Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana (1999) 3 SCC 102
43 Indian Penal Code, 1860, 376.
44 State of Rajasthan v. Hemraj and Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2644

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Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Honble court that all the accused are liable for the
offence of gang rape independently. The accused raped Mrs. Sharadha one by one in furtherance
of common intention to commit the offence 45 and the accused should be punished sternly and
severly.46

[IX] WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED, MR.VILLAS, MR.RAHUL AND

MR.RAKESH CAN BE CHARGED UNDER 299 AND 300 OF IPC?
It is humbly contended that the accused is guilty for committing the offence of culpable homicide
amounting to murder under Sec 299 and Sec 300 IPC, which elucidates the essentials of murder.
The Prosecution humbly contends that, the accused have the intent and knowledge for
constituting this grievous offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder 47 Both, the actus
reus and the mens rea of the crime are established in the instant case.

[A.] ACTUS REUS OF MURDER IS PROVEN

Actus reus is any wrongful act.48 Thus, in a case of murder, actus reus would be the physical
conduct of the accused that causes death of the victim. In the instant case, the actus reus is
established by way of witness statements Medical report confession of Rahul.

[1.]Witness Statement:
It is humbly submitted before this Honble Court that the circumstantial evidence in the instant
matter shows that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.49

On the night of 5th July 2014, Mr. Villas along with Mr.Rakesh and Mr.Rahul came heavily
drunk. They were shouting and also abused the PW1. After that, Mrs. Shardha came down and
scolded the accused for this misbehavior with PW1. The accused were deeply hurt by the
scolding and decided to take revenge of it.50All, this incident took place in front of the
PW1.Which confirms the presence of the three accused on the crime scene. He has also seen,
two men fleeing at 4am. If we go by the dying declaration of Mrs.Shardha , the incident occurred
around 3am And, as per the facts of the case on that fateful night. No one else have entered into

45 Krishnan v. State AIR 2003 SC 2978.

46 Chet ram v. State of H.P., 1971 CrL.J 1246 (1250).
47 Jogi Raut v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 98; See also Ganpathi Aiyar v. Sakarayappa Mudliar, AIR 1929 Mad 187
48 Shivaji Alias Dadya Shankar Alhat v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 SC 56.
49 Chakru Sattiah v. State of AP AIR 1960 AP 153
50 Page 2, Case Study.

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the apartment after midnight except the accused. Thus, from the statement of PW1, it strengthen
the fact that, the accused were present in the apartment when the incident took place.

[7.] Medical Report

[a.] Evidence given by Medical Jurist is admissible.

It is submitted that a Medical Jurist is an expert under Sec. 45 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 51 A
Medical jurists evidence has to be appreciated like that of any other witness and even he is
considered as a witness in evidence.52The evidence of medical jurist is an opinion which lends
corroboration to the direct evidence in the case. 53It is also, often direct evidence of the facts
found upon the victim body.54

Referring to the case of Mayur v. State of Gujrat,55 in which the Honble Apex Court held that
our courts have always taken doctors evidence as witness of truth. Hence, it is contended that
medical report given by the medical jurist in the instant case shall be admissible.

Referring to the Case of Virsa Singh v State Of Punjab,56 in which the Honble apex court held
that for culpable homicide amounting to murder. Following criterias must be satisfied:

1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.

2) The nature of the injury must be proved.

3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particularly bodily injury, that
is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or some other kind of injury was intended.

The followings have been observed in the medical report, as the cause of death of Mrs.
Shardha:57

Internal Bleeding, Dyspnea and Hypovolemia

51 S.D.Soni v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 917 ; See also Mohinder Singh v State AIR 1953 SC 415;Santa Singh
v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 526; Anant Chintaman Lagu v State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 500.
52 Duriapandil v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1973 SC 659.See also Queen v Ahmed Ally 11 Suth WR Cr 25.
53 Chimanbhai Ukabhai v State of Gujrat AIR 1983 SC 484.
54 Mejindra Bala Mehra v. Sunil Chandra Ray AIR 1960 SC 706; See also Khusal Singh v State of Rajasthan 1977
Raj Cr C 203.
55 Mayur v. State of Gujrat AIR 1983SC 66.
56 Virsa Singh v State Of Punjab
57 Page 6, Case Study

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As, it has been established earlier that Mrs. Shardha was gang raped by the three accused, which
has been corroborated by the medical evidences and confession of the accused Mr. Rahul. It is
contended that internal bleeding is caused due to the gang rape.58

Further coming to Hypovolemia, Hypovolemic shock results from significant blood and/or
fluid losses in body. Blood loss of this magnitude can occur because of:59

bleeding from cuts or wounds

bleeding from blunt traumatic injuries due to accidents or seizure activity

internal bleeding from the gastrointestinal tract60

Now, coming to Dyspnea which is defined as shortness of breath. This might have been caused
of strangulation.61And it is quite evident from other medical evidences like presence of nail
wound in the neck62 that Mrs. Shardha was subjected to strangulation by the accused which
resulted in her death.63

[8.]CONFESSION AND ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE ACCUSED SIGNIFY THE

COMMISSION OF ASSAULT RESULTING IN MURDER.
It is humbly submitted before the Honble court that the confession and admission made by
accused is admissible. A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with
a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.6465

Further it is contended that, confession is an admission of guilt and is used against the maker. 66
The Court observed in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar67 that each and every admission of

58 Bhurji and Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 2007CriLJ2645; See also Malkhansingh and Ors. v. State of M.P
2003CriLJ3535
59 Peter White, Crime Scene to Court: The Essentials of Forensic Science. 115(3rd Edition , 2009); See also
Sheikh Hafeez v. State of Bihar, (1970) 3 SCC 790; Ashok Somalal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, 2007 CrLJ 3579
(Guj).
60 Sharma, B.R., Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation & Trials, p 511 (4th Ed. 2003)
61 JAI SINGH P MODI, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY, 584(23rd ED. 2008)
62 King Emperor v Dhani Ram Chief Court Of Oudh,Crim App No 650/1927
63 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass AIR 1972 ,SC 677.
64 STEPHENS DIGEST ON CRIMINAL LAW, 119 (12th ED. 2012); See also Superintendent and Remembrancer
of Legal Affairs Bengal v. Bhaju Majhi, AIR 1930 Cal 291.
65 Om Prakash vs State Of U. P AIR 1960 SC 409.
66 Ayyub v. State of U.P. AIR 2002 SC 1192.
67 Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119

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incriminating fact contained in the confessional statement is part of a confession.68

It is humbly submitted before the Honble Court that, as per 30 of Indian Evidence Act ,
When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence 69, and a confession
made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, 70 the
Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against
the person who makes such confession.71

In the present case, the accused, Rahul confessed guilty of the offence of rape. Also, he admitted
that he along with Vilas and Rakesh have brutally raped Shardha one by one. It is pertinent
thatthe confession made by Rahul is in corroboration with the prosecutions case and therefore
the confession of Rahul proves his guilt.

[F.] MENS REA OF MURDER IS ESTABLISHED

It is submitted that, mens rea is considered as guilty intention, which is proved or inferred from
the acts of the accused.72 According to second clause of 300 of Indian Penal Code. Intentional
causing bodily injury with the knowledge that such bodily harm will cause death of the person
injured, then it will be culpable homicide amounting to murder. 73 Thus, the mens rea or the
mental attitude contemplated under cl. 2 of 300 are twofold:74

(A) There must be intention to cause bodily harm.

(B) There must be knowledge that death is the likely result or consequence of such bodily
injury.75

It is presumed that every sane person intends the result that his action normally produces and if a
person hits another on a vulnerable part of the body, and death occurs as a result, the intention of
the accused can be no other than to take the life of the victim and the offence committed amounts

68 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, p 892 (33rd Ed. (2011)
69 Hari Charan Kurmi And Jogia Hajam vs State Of Bihar1964 AIR 1184
70 Emperor vs William Cooper (1930) 32 BOMLR 747.
71 Shivaji v. State of Maharastra AIR 1973 SC 2622
72 Glanville Williams , Textbook of Criminal Law, 30 (2 nd Edition); See also P SA Pillai , Criminal Law ,37 (12 TH
Edition ,2014); RATANLAL & DHEERAJLAL, INDIAN PENAL CODE, p 111 (32nd ed. 2010)
73 Gudar Dusadh v State of Bihar (1972)3SCC 118.
74 Ram Singh vs State AIR 1959 All 518.
75 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874; See also State of UP v Virendra Prasad AIR 2004 SC 1517.

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to murder.76The intention to kill can be inferred from the murder and nature of the injuries caused
to the victim.77 As per the Confessional Statement of Mr. Rahul they have hit Mrs. Shardha into
her private parts and other parts causing a serious injury which resulted in her death. It must
necessarily lead to the inference that the accused intended to cause death or bodily injury
sufficient to cause death of the victim, and it answers to 300. It is logical concluded that he
intended to cause the death of the victim.

Further, referring to the case of BN Srikantiah v State of Mysore, in which the Honble apex court
held that since most of the injuries were on vital parts, it establishes that accused have the
intention and knowledge. Thus, bringing it under the cover of 300.78

[X] WHETHER VILAS, SHANTABAI AND ROHAN CAN BE HELD GUILTY FOR DOWRY DEATH AS
MENTIONED U/S 304B OF INDIAN PENAL CODE?
It is most humbly submitted that respondents are guilty for the offence of dowry death as against
the deceased. The necessary ingredients to attract sec 304 B are as follows:79

1) Death of a woman is either by bodily injury or otherwise than under normal

circumstances

2) It should be within seven years of marriage

3) It should be also be shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by husband or relative of husband

4) Such harassment should pertain to demand of dowry.

On recounting the above mentioned ingredients, the guilt of the accused can be easily proved in
a threefold manner.80

76 State of Maharashtra v Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722

77 Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803
78Indian Penal Code 1860.
79 Ravi Kumar v State of Delhi, 1991CrLJ 2579
80 80State of Orissa v. Kabasi, 1978 CrL.J (NOC) 259 (Ori); See also State of Orissa v. MatukaBarik, 1978 CrLJ
(NOC) 260; Mobeni Mini v. Union Territory, 1982 CrL.J (NOC) 39 (Gau).

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[A.] The death of the deceased was otherwise than under natural circumstances within
seven years of marriage:
Under sec 304 B, the offence of dowry death is substantiated wherein it is mentioned that the
death of the woman should be caused otherwise than under normal circumstances and within
seven years of marriage81.

[1.]Death of the deceased was under unnatural and suspicious circumstances:

The Supreme Court has observed otherwise than in normal circumstances to mean that the
death was not in the normal circumstances if it was not caused by burn or bodily injury.82

The Honble court further observed that unnatural circumstances cover death caused by
strangulation, hanging, drowning, poisoning, stomachache without any history of any dreadful
disease of stomach, etc.8384

In the present case, according to the medical report submitted, the cause of death was internal
bleeding in stomach, hypervolemia and Dyspnea.85 It is humbly submitted that the deceased had
no such medical history of any dreadful disease that might have resulted in the above symptoms.
Confession of the accused further strengthens this.86

[9.]Death was within seven years of the marriage:

The unfortunate incident of unnatural death of the deceased took place on 5 th July, 2014 and the
date of marriage was 29th December, 2007 proves, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the death of
the deceased was within seven years of her marriage.

In the light of the above mentioned facts, it is humbly submitted that deceased died under
unnatural and suspicious circumstances and that such death has occurred within seven years of
marriage, proving the applicability of 304 B.87

81Sec 304b, indian penal code, 1860

82Rajayyan v State of kerala, AIR 1998 SC 1211
83 Krishan Lal and others v Union Of India, 1994 CrLJ, 3472
84 Indian Evidence Act
85 Exhibit 3
86 Page 8, Case Study.
87 Indian Penal code, 1860

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 [G.] The deceased has been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband and his
relatives and such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of
dowry:
The very essential element of dowry death is cruelty or harassment meted out to the married
woman by her husband and in-laws. There should be a perceptible nexus between her death and
the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her.88

[10.] The deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and
her in-laws:
In the case of Kaushalaya v Wisakhiram89 the court observed that according to the standards of
all civilized world, these acts would constitute cruelty 90, even though injury might not be serious
so as to require the medical treatment.

In the case of Mohm Hoshan and others v State of A.P 91 court held that continuous taunting and
teasing the wife by husband and mother-in-law on one ground or other amounts to mental
cruelty.

It is humbly submitted that there are circumstantial evidence to show distinct offences of
physical cruelty as well as mental cruelty being inflicted on the deceased.

[11.] The deceased was subjected to harassment by in laws and husband:

The first incident of harassment on part of the husband was witnessed on 9 th January, 2010.
Earlier that day, Mr. Vilas had an argument with his father-in-law wherein he threatened him
regarding his daughter and said that if he will be insulted again by Mr. Prakash, the consequences
will be borne by his daughter (deceased). That very day, when he returned home he shouted on
Sharda for not bringing a car from her paternal home.92

These quarrel became a routine affair where Mr. Vilas was joined by his mother, Shantabai and
his brother Rohan to harass Sharda for not bringing adequate dowry. On 19 th October, 2010 when
Sharda accidently broke a glass, Shantabai slapped her. Her anger and frustration was the result

88 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Indian Penal Code, 32nd edition, pg 1720

89Kaushalaya v Wisakhiram, AIR 1961 Punj 520
90 State v Satish Shetty 2008 CrlJ 2490
91 Mohm Hoshan and others v State of A.P, AIR 2002 SC 3270
92 Page 1, Case Study.

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 of a distant relative informing her about great amounts of dowry received by her son which her
(Shantabais) son did not get. This information was so frustrating for Shantabai that she hit
Sharda for something as trivial as breaking a glass.93

That these tortures and harassments meted out to Sharda were a regular affair and were a known
fact to the neighbours as well. Mrs Sharma had (hereinafter referred as PW4) confronted Mrs.
Shantabai on this matter and even warned her not to torture Sharda as everyone in the building
was aware of the acts and cruelty meted out to Sharda by Shantabai and her family for dowry and
car.94

[H.] The accused harassed the deceased soon before her death:
Another essential element which is needed to prove dowry-death is that soon before her death,
the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. 95 The expression soon before is a relative
term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case.96

[1.]Test of Proximity:
The expression soon before her death used in the substantive 304-B IPC and 113-B of the
Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and
the expression soon before is not defined.97

It is for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case whether the said interval
in that particular case was sufficient to keep away from the concept soon before death.98

The Supreme Court has explained the expression soon before death, and have stated that there
should have been continuous cruelty connected with the demand of dowry and the same should
be shown to be in existence till the date of the event.99

It is humbly submitted that both, PW4 and PW5, in their statements have agreed that the
deceased was tortured and harassed on a regular basis for a car and adequate dowry.

93 Ibid.
94 Page 2, Case Study.
95 Keshab Chandra Pande v State, 1995 CrLJ 174 Ori
96 Kans Raj v State of Punjab, 2000 CrLJ SC 2993
97 Tummala venketeswar Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2014 SC 889
98 Satvir Singh v State of Punjab, 2001 CrLJ 4625 SC
99 Shri Satyawan Pagi v. Union of India, 2006 CrL.J 2181

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 7. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of the facts of the case, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
Counsels for the Prosecution humbly pray and implore before this Honble Court of

Sessions:-

That it may be pleased to Convict (u/s 235 of the CrPC):

1. The dying declaration of Mrs. Sharadha is admissible as evidence under 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872

2. Mr.Villas , Mr.Rahul and Mr.Rakesh should be held liable , for the offence of gang rape of
Mrs. Shardha under 376(2)(G) of Indian Penal Code.

3. Mr. Villas, Mr.Rahul and Mr. Rakesh should be held liable, for the offence of culpable
homicide amounting to murder under 300 of Indian Penal Code.

4. Mr. Vilas, Mrs.Shantabai and Mr.Rohan should be held liable for dowry death of
Mrs.Shardha u/s 304B of Indian Penal Code.

The Court may make any other such order as it may deem fit in terms of justice, equity and

good conscience.

And for this act of kindness the Prosecution shall as duty bound ever humbly pray.

Respectfully submitted,

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S/d ___________________

Place: Pune ,Maharashtra Counsel(s) for the Prosecution

Date: 3rd April 2015 (Public Prosecutor)

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