G.R. No.

L-24561 June 30, 1970

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,

vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA
DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.

Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.

Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's
project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and
was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas
V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina
Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory
heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.

The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango
dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with
seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon,
Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.

In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued
at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.

Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last
will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee
Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond
and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.

After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga
was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his
report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963
upon joint petition of the parties.

The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised
value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to
P129,362.11.3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific
real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of
the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80

2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
 3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01

The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the
estate as follows:

(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee)
and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more
than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;

(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them
in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to
P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the
properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to
complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;

(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain
untouched. <re||an1w>

On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated
February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the
following basis:

(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-
half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting to
P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the
total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus
other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to
the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties
respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of
the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.

Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix
of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to
the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof
as follows:

1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56

2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
 5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80

T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78

while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the
executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of
P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.

The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that
"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired
or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to
fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code"
adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot
be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference
to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary
of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their
impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper
adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been
impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of
the testatrix."

From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise
anew the following issues: .

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises
imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;

2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely
to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and

3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime,
instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the
life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in
Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in
case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and
"(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for
violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and
wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative
to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless
it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments,
and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his
last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and
restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the
nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding
that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with
law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided"
in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each
real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code,
providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their
legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the
legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,

wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina
and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly
were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their
respective legitimes.

2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old
Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only
amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under
the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then
prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make
a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the
amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will,
duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of
partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition
or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half
of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would
amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to
Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil
Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him."

3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator
Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against
adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080
of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus
partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory
heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of
said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the
property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject
to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the
methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as
she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties,
especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her
co-heirs ..."

4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the
nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous
premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs
passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is,
the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all
testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to
be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole
context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small
properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to
partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to
be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix'
intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs
and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective
legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall
die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being
dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the
estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides
that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene
the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors'
own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of
the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate
in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided
its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the
decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix
constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be
respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed
subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case
remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the
legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the
present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call
for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime
of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.

5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues
are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime
under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of
partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as
bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.

Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the
estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not
available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her
heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention
of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real
properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report
of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was
approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any
question and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the
heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of
the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal
basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code)
and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never
be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the
currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25,
1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication
made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that
she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper
adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as
to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her
co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has
declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of
approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their
own decision of pursuing the present appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.

G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.

Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which
he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".

The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving
the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.

Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .

SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .

SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en

prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .

OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su
uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a
ser propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.

The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .

DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de
institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.

Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the
Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that
proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted
a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the
probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership
and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said
project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties
mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh.
"C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la
clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .

On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled
in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly
appointed and qualified judicial administrator.

The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the
widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the
late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely vested in the
widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.

We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of
his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described
in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was
meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is
evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva" (use and
possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the
full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause 6).
1wph1.t

SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y
a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y
legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words
"uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." .
 SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of
an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." .

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his
testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words,
which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had
intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion
mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own
lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following:
.

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense,
unless a clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely
by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26
Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted
by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).

La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo

voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha
menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los
interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .

The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases
where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the
testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had
been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting
and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administrator-appellee.

G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961

MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, LEONCIO GERVACIO BLAS and LODA
GERVACIO BLAS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased
MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
defendants-appellants. MARTA GERVACIO BLAS and DR. JOSE CHIVI, defendants-appellants.

Teofilo Sison and Nicanor Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.

De los Santos, Caluag, Pascal and Felizardo for defendants-appellees.

LABRADOR, J.:

This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos, to
secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, the
greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the project of partition presented in the
proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas, had been promised
by the deceased Maxima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and
requesting that the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The complaint also
prays for actual damages in the amount of P50,000. (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-65.) The alleged
promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document executed by Maxima Santos on
December 26, 1936 attached to the complaint as Annex "H" and introduced at the trial as Exhibit "A".
(Ibid., pp. 258-259.) The complaint also alleges that the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit certain
properties enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof, situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but
which properties have already been in included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased
Simeon Blas and evidently partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the proceedings for the
administration of his (Simeon Blas) estate.

Defendant, who is the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
filed an answer with a counterclaim, and later, an amended answer and a counterclaim. The said
amended answer admits the allegations of the complaint as to her capacity as administratrix the
death of Simeon Blas on January 3, 1937; the fact that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz begot three
children only one of whom, namely, Eulalio Blas, left legitimate descendants; that Simeon Blas
contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos on June 28, 1898. She denies for lack of
sufficient information and belief, knowledge edge of the first marriage of Simeon Blas to Marta Cruz,
the averment that Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz acquired properties situated in Obando, Bulacan,
that said properties were utilized as capital, etc. As special defenses, she alleges that the properties
of the spouses Blas and Santos had been settled and liquidated in the project of partition of the
estate of said Simeon Blas; that pursuant to the project of partition, plaintiffs and some defendants
had already received the respective properties adjudicated to them; that the plaintiffs and the
defendants Marta Geracio and Jose Chivi are estopped from impugning the validity of the project of
partition of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and from questioning the ownership in the
properties conveyed in the project of partition to Maxima Santos as her own exclusive property; that
the testament executed by Maxima Santos is valid, the plain plaintiffs having no right to recover any
portion of Maxima Santos' estate now under administration by the court. A counterclaim for the
amount of P50,000 as damages is also included in the complaint, as also a cross-claim against
Marta Gervacio Blas and Jose Chivi.

Trial of the case was Conducted and, thereafter, the court, Hon. Gustave Victoriano, presiding,
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiff, and dismissing also the
counterclaim and cross-claim decision ,the plaintiffs filed by the defendants. From this district have
appealed to this Court.

The facts essential to an understanding of the issues involved in the case may be briefly
summarized as follows: Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before
1898. They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely, Maria Gervacio Blas,
one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro
died in 1950, and is survived by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel
Gervacio Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the
following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this
second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was
made. Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does
not appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.

On December 26, 1936, only over a week before over a week before his death on January 9, 1937,
Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament. In the said testament Simeon Blas makes the
following declarations:

2. Sa panahon ng aking pangalawang asawa, MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, ay nagkaroon

ako at nakatipon ng mga kayamanan (bienes) at pag-aari (propriedades) na ang lahat ng
lupa, palaisdaan at iba pang pag-aari ay umaabot sa halagang ANIM NA RAAN PITONG
PU'T WALONG DAAN LIBO WALONG DAAN WALONG PUNG PISO (678,880-00) sang-
ayon sa mga halaga sa amillarimento (valor Amillarado.)

II

1. Ang kalahati ng lahat ng aming pag-aari, matapos mabayaran ang lahat ng aking o aming
pag-kakautang na mag-asawa, kung mayroon man, yayamang ang lahat ng ito ay kita sa
loob ng matrimonio (bienes ganaciales) ay bahagi ng para sa aking asawa, MAXIMA
SANTOS DE BLAS, sang-ayon sa batas. (Record on Appeal, pp. 250-251.)

The above testamentary provisions may be translated as follows:

2. During my second marriage with Maxima Santos de Blas, I possessed and acquired
wealth and properties, consisting of lands, fishponds and other kinds of properties, the total
assessed value of which reached the amount P678,880.00.

II

1. One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness, all these
properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal properties), constitutes the share
of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas, according to the law.
At the time of the execution of said will, Andres Pascual a son-in-law of the testator, and Avelina
Pascual and others, were present. Andres Pascual had married a descendant by the first marriage.
The will was prepared by Andres Pascual, with the help of his nephew Avelino Pascual. The testator
asked Andres Pascual to prepare a document which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", thus:

Q Was there anybody who asked you to prepare this document?

A Don Simeon Blas asked me to prepare this document (referring to Exhibit "A"), (t.s.n.,
Sarmiento to, P. 24).

The reason why the testator ordered the preparation of Exhibit "A" was because the properties that
the testator had acquired during his first marriage with Marta Cruz had not been liquidated and were
not separated from those acquired during the second marriage. Pascual's testimony is as follows:

Q To whom do you refer with the word "they"?

A Simeon Blas and his first wife, Marta Cruz. When Marta Cruz died they had not made a
liquidation of their conjugal properties and so all those properties were included all in the
assets of the second marriage, and that is the reason why this document was prepared.
(t.s.n., Sarmiento, p. 36.)

The above testimony is fully corroborated by that of Leoncio Gervacio, son-in-law of Simeon Blas.

Q Please state to the Court?

A My children were claiming from their grandfather Simeon Blas the properties left by their
grandmother Marta Cruz in the year 1936.

Q And what happened with that claim of your children against Simeon Blas regarding the
assets or properties of the first marriage that were left after the death of Marta Cruz in 1936?

A The claim was not pushed through because they reached into an agreement whereby
the parties Simeon Blas Maxima Santos, Maria Gervacio Bias, Marta Gervacio Blas and
Lazaro Gervacio Blas agreed that Simeon Blas and Maxima Blas will give one-half of the
estate of Simeon Blas. (t.s.n., Sarmiento, pp. 143-144).

The document which was thus prepared and which is marked as Exhibit "A" reads in Tagalog, thus:

MAUNAWA NG SINO MANG MAKABABASA:

Na akong si MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, nasa hustong gulang, kasal kay SIMEON BLAS,
taga bayan ng Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay malaya
kong ipinahahayag:

Na aking nabasa at naunawa ang testamento at huling kalooban na nilagdaan ng aking

asawa, SIMEON BLAS, at ipinahahayag ko sa ilalim ng aking karangalan at sa harap ng
aking asawa na igagalang at pagpipitaganan ang lahat at bawa't isang bahagi ng nabanggit
na testamento at ipinangangako ko pa sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito na ang lahat ng
maiiwang pag-aari at kayamanan naming mag-asawa, na nauukol at bahaging para sa akin
sa paggawa ko naman ng aking testamento ay ipagkakaloob ko ang kalahati () sa mga
herederos at legatarios o pinamamanahan ng aking nabanggit na asawa, SIMEON BLAS, sa
 kaniyang testamento, na ako'y makapipili o makahihirang na kahit kangino sa kanila ng
aking pagbibigyan at pamamanahan sang-ayon sa paggalang, paglilingkod, at pakikisama
ng gagawin sa akin.

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO ay nilagdaan ko ang kasulatang ito ngayon ika 26 ng

Diciembre ng taong 1936, dito sa San Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines.
(Exh. "A", pp. 29-30 Appellant's brief).

(Fdo.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS

and which, translated into English, reads as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS, of legal age, married to SIMEON BLAS, resident of
Malabon, Rizal, Philippines, voluntarily state:

That I have read and knew the contents of the will signed by my husband, SIMEON BLAS,
(2) and I promise on my word of honor in the presence of my husband that I will respect and
obey all and every disposition of said will (3) and furthermore, I promise in this document that
all the properties my husband and I will leave, the portion and share corresponding to me
when I make my will, I will give one-half () to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiaries
named in the will of my husband, (4) and that I can select or choose any of them, to whom I
will give depending upon the respect, service and treatment accorded to me.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I signed this document this 26th day of December, 1936 at San
Francisco del Monte, San Juan, Rizal, Philippines. (Exh. "A", pp. 30-31, Appellant's brief).

(Sgd.) MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS

The court below held that said Exhibit "A" has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which can
serve as basis for the complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable
contract for lack of consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The court also
declared that Exhibit "A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for the execution
of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation, etc.

Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief before us, argue vehemently that
the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated
conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage, because the same were already included in
the mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications
made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same has prescribed. This contention is
correct. The descendants of Marta Cruz can no longer claim the conjugal properties that she and her
husband may have required during their marriage although no liquidation of such properties and
delivery thereof to the heirs of Marta Cruz have been made, no action to recover said propertied
having been presented in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas.

But the principal basis for the plaintiffs' action in the case at bar is the document Exhibit "A". It is not
disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the
conjugal properties of me on Blas for the reason his first marriage had not been liquidated; that it
was prepared at the same time as the will of Simeon Blas on December 26, 1936, at the instance of
the latter himself. It is also not disputed that the document was signed by Maxima Santos and one
copy thereof, which was presented in court as Exhibit "A", was kept by plaintiffs' witness Andres
Pascual.

Plaintiffs-appellants argue before us that Exhibit "A" is both a trust agreement and a contract in the
nature of a compromise to avoid litigation. Defendants-appellees, in answer, claim that it is neither a
trust agreement nor a compromise a agreement. Considering that the properties of the first marriage
of Simeon Blas had not been liquidated when Simeon Blas executed his will on December 26, 1936',
and the further fact such properties where actually , and the further fact that included as conjugal
properties acquired during the second marriage, we find, as contended by plaintiffs-appellants that
the preparation and execution of Exhibit "A" was ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his
heirs by his first marriage from contesting his will and demanding liquidation of the conjugal
properties acquired during the first marriage, and an accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof
from the time of the death of his first wife.

Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as follows:

Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or

retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already the
provocation been instituted. (Emphasis supplied.)

Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and knew the contents of the will of her
husband read and knew the contents of the will Simeon Blas she was evidently referring to the
declaration in the will(of Simeon Blas) that his properties are conjugal properties and one-half
thereof belongs to her (Maxima Santos) as her share of the conjugal assets under the law. The
agreement or promise that Maxima Santos makes in Exhibit "A" is to hold one-half of her said share
in the conjugal assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation
of conveying the same to such of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last will and
testament. It is to be noted that the conjugal properties referred to are those that were actually
existing at that time, December 26, 1936. Simeon Blas died on January 9, 1937. On June 2, 1937,
an inventory of the properties left by him, all considered conjugal, was submitted by Maxima Santos
herself as administratrix of his estate. A list of said properties is found in Annex "E", the complete
inventory submitted by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, is administratrix of the estate of her husband,
dated March 10, 1939. The properties which were given to Maxima Santos as her share in the
conjugal properties are also specified in the project of partition submitted by said Maxima Santos
herself on March 14, 1939. (Record on Appeal, pp. 195-241.) Under Exhibit "A", therefore, Maxima
Santos contracted the obligation and promised to give one-half of the above indicated properties to
the heirs and legatees of Simeon Blas.

Counsel for the defendant-appellee claims Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper because it is not
a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. As we have in indicated above, it is a compromise
and at the same time a contract with a sufficient cause or consideration. It is also contended that it
deals with future inheritance. We do not think that Exhibit "A" is a contract on future inheritance. it is
an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal
properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal
properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the
execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima Santos included these
properties in her inventory of her husband's estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to
any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share in
the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under
Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has been decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of
October 8, 19154, thus:

Que si bien el art. 1271 del Codigo civil dispone que sobre la herenciafutura no se podra
celebrar otros contratos que aquellos cuyo objecto seapracticar entre vivos la division de un
caudal, conforme al articulo 1056, esta prohibicion noes aplicable al caso, porque la
obligacion que contrajoel recurr en contrato privado de otorgar testamento e instituir
heredera a su subrina de los bienes que adquirio en virtud de herencia, procedentes desu
finada consorte que le quedasen sobrantes despues de pagar las deudas, y del ganacial
que se expresa, asi como de reconocer, ademas, con alguna cosaa otros sobrinos, se
refiere a bienes conocidos y determinados existentes cuando tal compromisi se otorgo, y no
a la universalidad de una herencia que, sequn el art. 659 del citado Codigo civil, as
determina a muerte, constituyendola todos los bienes, derechos y obligaciones que por ella
no sehayan extinguido: ..." (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the
Civil Code is "future inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or
capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by
succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined properties, existing at
the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife as
her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may
not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit
"A" was executed.

The trial court held that the plaintiffs-appellants in the case at bar are concluded by the judgement
rendered in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Simeon Blas for the reason that the
properties left by him belonged to himself and his wife Maxima Santos; that the project of partition in
the said case, adjudicating to Maxima Santos one-half as her share in the conjugal properties, is a
bar to another action on the same subject matter, Maxima Santos having become absolute owner of
the said properties adjudicated in her favor. As already adverted to above, these contentions would
be correct if applied to the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants that said properties were acquired with
the first wife of Simeon Blas, Marta Cruz. But the main ground upon which plaintiffs base their
present action is the document Exhibit "A", already fully considered above. As this private document
contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey in her testament, upon her death,
one-half of the conjugal properties she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the
action to enforce the said promise did not arise until and after her death when it was found that she
did not comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code.) The argument that the
failure of the plaintiffs-appellants herein to oppose the project of partition in the settlement of the
estate of Simeon Blas, especially that portion of the project which assigned to Maxima Santos one-
half of all the conjugal properties bars their present action, is, therefore, devoid of merit. It may be
added that plaintiffs-appellants did not question the validity of the project of partition precisely
because of the promise made by Maxima Santos in the compromise Exhibit "A"; they acquised in the
approval of said project of partition because they were relying on the promise made by Maxima
Santos in Exhibit "A", that she would transmit one-half of the conjugal properties that she was going
to receive as her share in the conjugal partnership upon her death and in her will, to the heirs and
legatees of her husband Simeon Blas.

Neither can the claim of prescription be considered in favor of the defendants. The right of action
arose at the time of the death of Maxima Santos on October 5,1956, when she failed to comply with
the promise made by her in Exhibit "A". The plaintiffs-appellants immediately presented this action
on December 27, 1956, upon learning of such failure on the part of Maxima Santos to comply with
said promise. This defense is, therefore, also without merit.
It is next contended by the defendant-appellee that Maxima Santos complied with her above-
mentioned promise, that Andres Pascual, Tomasa Avelino, Justo Garcia, Ludovico Pimpin and
Marta Gervacio Blas were given substancial legacies in the will and testament of Maxima Santos. To
determine whether she had actually complied with the promise made in Exhibit "A", there is herein
set forth a list only of the fishponds and their respective areas as contained in the list of properties
she acquired as her share in the conjugal partnership, which list includes, besides many ricelands as
well as residential lots, thus:

31. Paco, Obando, Bulacan 5.8396 has.

32. Pangjolo, Obando 3.5857 "
34. Batang Pirasuan, Lubao, Pampanga 11.9515 "
35. Calangian, Lubao, Pampanga 30.2059 "
38. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 215.4325 "
39. Bakuling, Lubao, Pampanga 8.3763 "
40. Bangkal, Sinubli 23.0730 "
41. Tagulod, 6.8692 "
44. Bangkal Pugad (a) 34.2779 "
(b) 51.7919 "
(c) 2.5202 "
45. Magtapat Bangkal, Lubao, Pampanga (a) 18.0024 "
(b) 7.3265 "
(c) 53.5180 "
46. Pinanganakan, Lubao, Pampanga 159.0078 "
47. Emigdio Lingid, Lubao, Pampanga 34.5229 "
48. Propios, Lubao, Pampanga 80.5382 "
49. Batang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan,
Pampanga 43.3350 "
50. Binatang Mabuanbuan, Sexmoan,
Pampanga 3.5069 "
51. Sapang Magtua, Sexmoan, Pampanga 56,8242 "
52. Kay Limpin, Sexmoan, Pampanga 5.0130 "
53. Calise Mabalumbum, Sexmoan,
Pampanga 23.8935 "
54. Messapinit Kineke, Sexmoan,
Pampanga (a) 5.2972 "
(b) 5.9230 "
(c) 1.4638 "
(d) 1.4638 "
(e) 2.8316 "
(f) 10.4412 "
(g) 3.9033 "
(h) 11.9263 "
 (i) 6.0574 "
55. Dalang, Banga, Sexmoan, Pampanga 23.3989 "
62. Alaminos, Pangasinan 147.1242 "
80. Mangasu Sexmoan, Pampanga 10.000 "
81. Don Tomas, Sexmoan, Pampanga 21.6435 "
82. Matikling, Lubao, Pampanga 16.0000 "
Total area ............................... 1045.7863 "
(See Record on Record, pp.
195-241.)

In her will, Maxima Santos devised to Marta Gervacio Blas the 80-hectare fishpond situated in
Lubao, Pampanga. The fishpond devised is evidently that designated as "Propios" in Lubao,
Pampanga, item No. 8 in the list of properties adjudicated to her in the project of partition. (Record
on Appeal, p. 215.) Considering that the total area of the fishponds amount to 1045.7863 hectares,
the 80 hectares devised to Marta Gervacio Blas is not even one-tenth of the total area of the
fishponds. Add to this the fact that in the will she imposed upon Marta Gervacio Blas de Chivi an
existing obligation on said fishponds, namely, its lease in 1957 and the duty to pay out of the rentals
thereof an obligation to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation RFC (Ibid., pp. 262-263.) Angelina
Blas was given only a lot of 150 square meters in Hulong Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, and Leony Blas,
the sum of P300.00 (Ibid., p. 264.)

It is evident from a consideration of the above figures and facts that Maxima Santos did not comply
with her obligation to devise one-half of her conjugal properties to the heirs and legatees of her
husband. She does not state that she had complied with such obligation in her will. If she intended to
comply therewith by giving some of the heirs of Simeon Blas the properties mentioned above, the
most that can be considered in her favor is to deduct the value of said properties from the total
amount of properties which she had undertaken to convey upon her death.

All the issues in the pleadings of the parties and in their respective briefs, have now been fully
discussed and considered. Reiterating what we have stated above, we declare that by Exhibit "A", a
compromise to avoid litigation, Maxima Santos promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of her
husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the conjugal
partnership of herself and her husband, which share is specified in the project of partition submitted
by herself on March 14, 1939 in the settlement of the estate of her husband, and which is found on
pages 195 to 240 of the record on appeal and on pages 27 to 46 of the project of partition, submitted
by Maxima Santos herself before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 6707, entitled
"Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Bias, Administradora"; and
that she failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation. (Exhibit "A")

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee,
administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the
properties adjudicated o Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case
No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas,
Administradora", to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all said
heirs and legatees, designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit Exhibit
"A" had been executed, have not appeared in these proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to
the court below, with instructions that, after the conveyance of the properties hereinabove ordered
had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file adversary pleadings to
determine the participation of each and every one of them in said properties. Costs against the
defendant- appellee Rosalina Santos.
G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ,

DECEASED, AND PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION: FIDELA DE GUZMAN and
EMETERIO DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FRANCISCO BENITEZ,
DIONISIA VALENZUELA and MELQUIADES VALENZUELA respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco & Factoran for petitioners.

Tomas P. Anonuevo for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

The petitioners have appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings Nos. SC-347 and 352, disallowing the will of Francisco
Benitez, and appointing Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of his intestate estate.

On December 10, 1970, Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins
of the deceased Francisco Benitez, filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch IV,
(docketed as SC-347) a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of
letters of administration to Dionisia who, during the lifetime of the deceased, had been administering
the said estate as judicial guardian of his person and property duly appointed on January 22, 1957 in
Spl. Proc. No. SC-29 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child of the spouses Tiu Cuaco, alias Pascual Benitez, and
Camila Valenzuela whose brother was the father of private respondents, Dionisia Valenzuela and
Melquiades Valenzuela. He died single at the age of 61 years on November 6, 1970, without
descendants, nor ascendants, nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen (14)
parcels of coconut land in Laguna, with a total area of 34 hectares, a residential lot on S. Crisostomo
Street in the poblacion of Pagsanjan, Laguna, and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the
Philippine National Bank.

The petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the
deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him (De Guzman) and that a petition for its
probate was docketed as Spl. Proc. No. 352 in Branch II of the same court the two cases were later
consolidated and jointly heard in Branch IV of the court.

Emiterio de Guzman died on April 20, 1973 and was substituted by his heirs, Fidel, Cresencia and
Rosalie, all surnamed De Guzman, in both proceedings.

In support of the petition for probate (SC-352), the petitioner Fidel de Guzman and two attesting
witnesses of the will, Pelagio Lucena and Judge Damaso Tengco who prepared the will, gave
evidence.
The oppositors (petitioners for administration in SC-347) presented six (6) witnesses, namely,
Marcial Mendoza, Pedro Cabela, Porfirio Reyes, Dionisia Valenzuela, Honoria Recalde Leonardo
and Prudencio Leonardo, who identified the transcript of the testimony given on January 22, 1957 by
Dr. Jose A. Fernandez (since deceased) in the proceedings (SC-29) for the guardianship of
Francisco Benitez for incompetence on account of insanity. Various documentary exhibits were
presented by both sides.

On April 4, 1975, Judge Maximo Maceren rendered judgment disallowing the will and appointing
Dionisia Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The pertinent findings of
the trial court are quoted hereunder:

The pivotal issue hinges on the mental capacity of the supposed testator, Francisco
Benitez on August 18, 1945 when he allegedly executed his last will and testament.
Did Francisco Benitez possess a sound and disposing mind on August 18, 1945?

xxx xxx xxx

The evidence (Exhibit I and Exhibit H) shows that from January 18, 1929 up to March
12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying
periods of time as follows:

DATE OF ADMISSION DATE OF DISCHARGE

(a) January 18, 1929 March 12,1929

(b) March 7, 1931 June 6, 1931

(c) November 12,1936 November 29, 1937

(d) February 16, 1938 August 16, 1939

(e) July 9, 1940 March 12, 1941

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing premises leads this Court to the conclusion that [at] the time Francisco
Benitez executed his supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was not possessed of a
sound and disposing mind. Wherefore the same is not allowed probate.' (pp. 123,
124 and 126, Rollo.)

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed by that Court on March 3, 1982 (p.
135, Rollo).

The petitioners De Guzman assail the decision of the Court of Appeals on the ground that:

The finding that the deceased Francisco Benitez 'was not possessed of a sound and
disposing mind' when he executed his will on August 18, 1945, is grounded merely
on speculation, surmises and conjectures, as well as on hearsay and contradictory,
biased, and obviously incredible testimony. (p. 10, Rollo.)
Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to review because in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that that
Court carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity, or lack of it, of
the deceased Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling reason to disturb the lower court's
findings and conclusions." The resolution of that question hinged on the credibility of the witnesses.
The cardinal rule on that point is that the trial courts, assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing
their conduct and demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence,
shall not be disturbed on appeal (People vs. Dava, 149 SCRA 582)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners Fidel,
Crisencia and Rosalia de Guzman.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981

NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and
EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a will,
which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear
before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?

That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari case in the
Court of Appeals which reveal the following tangled strands of human relationship:

Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley,
married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816). They were childless. They
reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his
parents as shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.
08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married
Marcelina in 1923).

Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal
Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated some cash in two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went abroad.
Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his guardian
in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).

In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be his
guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from Agapito
and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-63, Record of
testate case).

Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita's
appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case). Agapito has been staying in a
veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).

On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child
named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girl
friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as
a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.SP-
08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted
by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.

Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years
old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to
the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig,
Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.

Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her
death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-
square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate
case).

On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo)
and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar,
Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for the
probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.

As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline S.
Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the hearing before
the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.

In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the
following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the Merchants Banking
Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the
savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the
custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.

Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a
deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza,
and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of
Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed on April 18 in the said
proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the
decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia, that
Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the decedent's
granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they questioned the probate court's
jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.

In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn, were
claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her supposed will wherein
Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).

On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that motion
reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not duly executed
and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by Marina and Marilyn and
that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.

Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of
Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).

To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of Marcelina, who
swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).

Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her omnibus
motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an
opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration. In that
opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of
Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware of
the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.

To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's niece, who
swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125, Record).

Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn was not
Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that Agapito
was not Marcelina's sonbut merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance of
letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She moved
for the reconsideration of that order.

In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V. Suroza
reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the
notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita (p. 284,
Record).

Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a case to annul"
the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje and
Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order of
February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).

Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had delivered
the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary proceeding.

About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita
charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant
reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her
thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the win was written.
(In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will was written in a
language known to the testatrix.)

Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son
named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in the
will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.

Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that the
testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy and
that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.

Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts to
withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina.

She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to the
record of the probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate since
Judge Honrado would not change his decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated that if
she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline allegedly
advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because she (Nenita) had no
rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from the Federal Government.

Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the complaint.
He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a
motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the house of the
testatrix.

Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the latter did not
mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.

Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita from having
access to the record of the testamentary proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of the
record. Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she (Evangeline)
said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get a favorable
decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from the Federal
Government.

The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in the Court
Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A.
Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a report
dated October 7, 1981.
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for
certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the
proceedings in the probate case be declared void.

Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore that
the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he notarized the
will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer would bring to the
notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his commitment.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her failure
to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs. Honrado, CA-
G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).

Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the
administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.

We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the
decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the
decedent's estate.

A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order or
rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).

Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious
misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful intent,
not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence
showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules" (In relmpeachment of Horrilleno, 43
Phil. 212, 214-215).

Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be

inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence
and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (In re Climaco, Adm.
Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).

In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in English, which was not
known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil. 660).

The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to
the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.

Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge
could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.

In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the
hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.

Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.

WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent
to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on
December 25, 1981).

The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no longer
employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao
City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-CFI
November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2862 April 21, 1952

TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES, petitioner-
administrator-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES ZUIGA VDA. DE VIDAL, oppositor-appellee.

Jose Sotelo Mati and Agustin Alvarez Salazar for appellant.

Jose Perez Cardenas for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of
Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29, 1945.

On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an
opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties
presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the
ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven
that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures
are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will.
From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.
While petitioner imputes nine errors to the lower court, we believe, however, that for purposes of this
appeal of discussion of some would be sufficient. Thus, the issues may be boiled down as follows: 1)
Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will (Exhibit "C") are genuine; 2)
whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was
written; and 3) whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the
will.

1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner presented as
witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia
Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. The first used to provide the
deceased with ice every day, and in one of those occasions she went to her house to bring ice, she
requested to act witness to the execution of the will. The second was a laborer whose job was is to
fix bed made of rattan, and in one of those days he went to the house of the deceased to work, he
was asked also to witness the signing of the will. And the third was a neighbor of the deceased for
many years who was also requested to act as an instrumental witness. These witnesses testified in
their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on her bed but over a
small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had signed it in the places where her
signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each other. This is
the substance of what they have testified and from an examination of their testimony to the court
entertains no doubt that they had told the truth. There is nothing in their testimony which may in any
way reflect against their credibility nor has the oppositor proven fact or circumstance which may give
rise to the suspicion that they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary consideration. They have
impressed the court as simple persons who had intervened in the execution of the will out merely of
deference to the testatrix whom they had served for sometime and had known to be a good and
respectable woman.

What evidence has the oppositor presented to contradict the testimony of these instrumental
witnesses? only one expert witness, Jose G. Villanueva, who made a comparative analysis of the
signatures appearing in the will in relation to some genuine signatures of the deceased, and in fact
testified on the analysis and study he has made of said signatures and submitted a memorandum on
the study and comparison he has made. And in his testimony as well as in his memorandum, this
witness has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote the signatures of the deceased
appearing in the will is not the same hand that wrote the genuine signatures he had examined and
which he used as basis of his analytical study, thereby concluding that said signatures are not
genuine. The lower court gave full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert witness, and decreed
as a result that the will cannot be admitted to probate.

There are, however, certain important facts and circumstances which make us differ from this
opinion of the lower court. In the first place, we find that the opinion of this expert witness has been
rebutted by another expert witness Jose C. Espinosa, whose opinion, to our mind, deserves more
weight and credence. And our reason for reaching this conclusion is the fact that the standards of
the comparison used by Espinosa are more reliable than those used by Villanueva in the
comparison are two signatures appearing in two documents executed on November 10, 1942, one
signature in an identification card affixed in April 1940, a half signature appearing in a letter written
on October 8, 1943, one signature appearing in a letter written on July 16, 1945, and one signature
appearing in a letter written on January, 1945, whereas the disputed signatures appearing in the will
were affixed on October 29, 1945. On the other hand, the standards used by Espinosa in making his
comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the disputed signatures. Thus, he examined
four genuine signatures that were affixed on October 16, 1945, other four signatures that were
affixed in October 1945, one on January 2, 1945, on January 24, 1945, and one on September 24
1945, He also examined one affixed on March 12, 1941, only for emphasis. The closeness or
proximity of the time in which the standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature
or document is very important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion. the selection of
the proper standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age
and the state of the health of the author of the questioned signatures. a signature affixed in 1941
may involved characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945. And this is
because the passing of time and the increase in age may have a decisive influence in the writing
characteristics of a person. It for this reasons that the authorities of the opinion that in order to bring
about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such was not followed in the study made by
Villanueva. But such was observed in the study made by Espinosa. He followed the standard
practice in handwriting analysis. It is for this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion deserves
more weight and consideration.

The standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as the suspected
document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of the origin of the
document, so that one part comes from the time after the origin. (Page 423 "Modern Criminal
Investigation" by Soderman and O' Connell, 1936, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York
and London.)

If possible less than five or six signatures should always be examined and preferably double
that number." (Page 139, Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation by Lucas,
1935, Edward Arnold & Co., London.)

2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of the
petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in question
appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be
written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been proven, the probate
of the will must fail. And the wall was disallowed.

There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would
indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in
question. But, in our opinion, this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important
requirement of the law has not been complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on
record which supplies this technical omission. In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the
deceased was a mestiza espaola, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several
trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor
written in Spanish by the deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be
allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the
language in which the testament has been written, which presumption should stand unless the
contrary is proven (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this
presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we have the very attestation clause of the will
which states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is
not required to be stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the
instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which
the will was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this
ground.

3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the fact that
the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it reached this
conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply because the deceased
signed the will in a somewhat varied form. On this point the lower court said:

El Juzgado es de opinion que aunque se admita que las firmas arriba indicadas feuran de
Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando, las mismas revelan que ella no estabe en el pleno de sus
 facultades mentales cuando la hicieron firmar el documento, Exhibit C, pues el hecho de que
en una sola ocasion la repetida Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando firmo dos veces, sin escribir su
verdadero nombre, demuestra que ella no se daba cuenta de sus actos por no hallarse
mentalmente sana. Si esto es asi, no se debe legalizar como testamento y ultima voluntad
de la finada Maria Zuiga Vda. de Pando el documento, Exhibit C, porque el Articulo 614 de
la Ley 190 y el Articulo 12, Reglamentos de los Tribunales, disponen que solamente pueden
otorgar testamento las personas que al tiempo de su otorgamiento estaban en el pleno goce
de sus facultades mentales.

The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental witnesses have said on this point.
Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased before the signing of the will,
and judging from the way she spoke she was of the impression that the deceased was of sound
mind at the time. To the same effect is the testimony of Consuelo B. de Catindig. She said that her
impression when the deceased signed the will was that she could still talk and read, only that she
was weak. In fact she read the will before signing it. These statements had not been contradicted.
They give an idea of the mental had not contradicted. They give an idea of mental condition of the
deceased in the will differ from each other in certain respects, this is only due to her age and state of
health rather than to a defective mental condition. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of
genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of old people and, far
from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the
writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression.

Abbreviated, distorted and illegible, forms, which are sufficiently free and rapid, often actually
indicate genuineness rather than forgery even though they are very unusual and not exactly
like those in the standard writing. Those who write of difficulty or hesitation through some
physical infirmity may sometimes produced broken and unfinished signatures and these
results, which in themselves are distinctly divergent as compared with signatures produced
under conditions of strength and health, may forcefully indicate genuineness . Under
conditions of weakness due to diseased or age, parts of a genuine signature may be clumsily
written over a second time not at just the same place and in a way when clearly shows that
the writer either could not see or was so week and inattentive as not to care what the result
might be. This careless, perfectly evident repetition (figure 184), unlike the painstaking and
delicate retouching of the forger, often indicates genuineness. (Page 365, Questioned
Documents by Osborne, 2nd Edition, 1927.)

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower court erred in disallowing the will Exhibit C.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The Court admits the will Exhibit C to
probate, and remands these case to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the
appellee.

G.R. No. L-15153 August 31, 1960

In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the deceased

ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants.
T. de los Santos for appellee.
Climaco and Climaco for appellants.

LABARADOR, J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City admitting to probate the will
of one Anacleta Abellana. The case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where the
following assignment of error is made:

The appellants respectfully submit that the Trial Court erred in holding that the supposed
testament, Exh. "A", was signed in accordance with law; and in admitting the will to probate.

In view of the fact that the appeal involves a question of law the said court has certified the case to
us.

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

It appears on record that the last Will and Testament (Exhibit "A"), which is sought to be
probated, is written in the Spanish language and consists of two (2) typewritten pages
(pages 4 and 5 of the record) double space. The first page is signed by Juan Bello and under
his name appears typewritten "Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-
1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga', and on the second page appears the
signature of three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino Macaso and Rafael
Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los Santos and below his
signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the said testament. On
the first page on the left margin of the said instrument also appear the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which is the last page of said last Will and
Testament, also appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that
second page on the left margin appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name
appears handwritten the following phrase, "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana'. The will is
duly acknowledged before Notary Public Attorney Timoteo de los Santos. (Emphasis
supplied)

The appeal squarely presents the following issue: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above
the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . ., Ciudad de Zamboanga," comply
with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed?

The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows:

Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witness in
the presence of the testator and of one another. (Emphasis supplied.)

The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction," is practically the same
as the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as follows:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
 direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Note that the old law as well as the new require that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot
do so, the testator's name must be written by some other person in his presence and by his express
direction. Applying this provision this Court said in the case of Ex Parte Pedro Arcenas, et al., Phil.,
700:

It will be noticed from the above-quoted section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure that
where the testator does not know how, or is unable, to sign, it will not be sufficient that one of
the attesting witnesses signs the will at the testator's request, the notary certifying thereto as
provided in Article 695 of the Civil Code, which, in this respect, was modified by section 618
above referred to, but it is necessary that the testator's name be written by the person
signing in his stead in the place where he could have signed if he knew how or was able to
do so, and this in the testator's presence and by his express direction; so that a will signed in
a manner different than that prescribed by law shall not be valid and will not be allowed to be
probated.

Where a testator does not know how, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will himself, it
shall be signed in the following manner:

John Doe by the testator, Richard Doe; or in this form: "By the testator, John Doe, Richard
Doe." All this must be written by the witness signing at the request of the testator.

Therefore, under the law now in force, the witness Naval A. Vidal should have written at the
bottom of the will the full name of the testator and his own name in one forms given above.
He did not do so, however, and this is failure to comply with the law is a substantial defect
which affects the validity of the will and precludes its allowance, notwithstanding the fact that
no one appeared to oppose it.

The same ruling was laid down in the case of Cuison vs. Concepcion, 5 Phil., 552. In the case
of Barut vs. Cabacungan, 21 Phil., 461, we held that the important thing is that it clearly appears that
the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction; it is unimportant whether the person
who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. Cases of the same import areas follows:
(Ex Parte Juan Ondevilla, 13 Phil., 479, Caluya vs.Domingo, 27 Phil., 330; Garcia vs. Lacuesta, 90
Phil., 489).

In the case at bar the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will
by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the
express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed
thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction.

It appearing that the above provision of the law has not been complied with, we are constrained to
declare that the said will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana may not be admitted to probate.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the petition for the probate of the
will denied. With costs against petitioner.