Consti I Cases

POLITICAL LAW: CASE DIGEST 201
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.ISLANDS VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD

G.R. NO. 9959
DEC. 13, 1916
FACTS:
In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The

Spanish Government then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it
was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the said amount, $80,000.00
was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which
in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine
government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot
provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank
argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no
right to institute a complaint. The bank argues that the government was not
the intended beneficiary of the said amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a

complaint against the respondent bank.
HELD:
Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against

Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae.
The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the
inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public
interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as
parents of the people the government has the right to take back the
money intended for the people.
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CABANAS VS. PILAPIL

G.R. NO. L- 10-25843
JUL. 25, 1974
FACTS:
Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan
that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death
the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered
by his brother Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when
Florentino died and Francisco then took charge of Florentinos benefits for
the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money to be placed in favor
of her and for her to be the childs trustee and the childs benefits. Francisco
asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended
beneficiaries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae

to the terms of the insurance policy?
HELD:
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the

basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case
at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a
litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that
person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as
she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the
mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The
application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this countrys
tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the
parent (mother) is observed.
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PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CO.vs .REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-26386
1969 September 30
FACTS:
Providence Washington Insurance Co. filed, on October 21, 1966, its

brief as appellant against an order of the lower court dismissing its suit for
the non-delivery of thirty cases of steel files, which cargo was insured by it
against loss and damage, naming as defendants the Republic of the
Philippines and the Bureau of Customs as the operator of the arrastre
service, thus rendering unavoidable the invocation of the well-settled
doctrine of non-suability of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Government of the Philippines could be sued

without its consent?
RULING:
The doctrine of non-suability thus holds undisputed sway. Its primacy

appears to be undeniable. For a suit of this character to prosper, there must
be a showing of consent either in express terms or by implication through
the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. Its absence
being obvious, the lower court acted correctly.
At any rate, in case of a money claim arising from contract, express or

implied, which could serve as a basis for civil action between private,
parties, such a consent has been given by a statute enacted by the
Philippine legislature, even before the Constitution took effect and still
applicable at present.
The procedure provided for in such a statutewas made more expeditious by

a Commonwealth Act, enabling the party or entity, who feels aggrieved by
the final decision of the Auditor General required to decide the claim within
sixty days, having the right to go to this Court for final adjudication.It is
worthy of note likewise that in the pursuit of its activities affecting business,
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the government has increasingly relied on private corporations possessing

the power to sue and be sued.
AGUSTIN VS. EDU

G.R. No. L-49112
FEBRUARY 2, 1979
FACTS:
President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states
that all owners, users or drivers shall have at all times one pair of early
warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any source depending on
the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner
Leovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process
against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and
Regulation was ordered to be suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner
alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles already have hazard
lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner
contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power
because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists
and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.
HELD:
Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of
police power may interfere with personal liberty or property to ensure and
promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of
instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare
occurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble
purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual foundation that is
necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases where there is
absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that
constitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital
statistics that will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction.
As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and Signals, our
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country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution
that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International
Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention
also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an EDW.
They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the
specifications provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the
manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an unfounded
speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order
regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said
law immediately executory.
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THE ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM vs.ANGAT RIVER WORKERS'

UNION
G.R. Nos. L-10943 and L-10944
1957 December 28
FACTS:
On January 5, 1956, the Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial

Relations filed on behalf of the Angat River Irrigation System Workers' Union
(PLUM), whose members were actually employed in said project, a complaint
with said Court, docketed as Case No. 814-ULP, making the Angat River
Irrigation System and its supervising engineer as party respondents. The
complaint alleged, among other things, that respondents committed unfair
labor practices by interfering with, restraining or coercing the employees in
the exercise of the latter's right to self-organization; by practicing
discrimination in the hiring or tenure of employment of said employees in
order to discouragement of said employees in order to discourage
membership with the union, and by refusing to bargain collectively with the
representatives of the employees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not government employees may validly organize

themselves into a union and in the affirmative, whether it may demand that
the Government enter into collective bargaining agreements with said union;
and whether the Court of Industrial Relations acquired jurisdiction over the
person of defendants in Cases Nos. 814-ULP and 313-MC of that Court?
RULING:
It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the law does not
intend to curtail absolutely the right of government employees to self-
organization or be affiliated with any labor organization, subject only to the
limitation that such organization does not impose the obligation to strike or
to join in strike if said employees are engaged in governmental functions.
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It is a basic and fundamental principle of the law that the Government

cannot be sued before courts of justice without its consent, a principle that
springs from the theory that there can be no legal right against the authority
that makes the law on which that right depends. As only natural or juridical
persons may be parties in an action (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court) and as
the Angat River Irrigation System, as an agency of the Government, cannot
be sued without its consent much less over its objection, it is obvious that
the Court of Industrial Relations did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons
of herein petitioners and thus devoid cognizance of the cases at bar.
BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR vs. THE BUREAU OF

PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
G.R. NO. L-15751
JANUARY 28, 1961
FACTS:
The action in question was upon complaint of the respondents Bureau
of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein petitioner Bureau of
Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department
of General Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of
Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing
the employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the members of the
complaining association petition, in the exercise of their right to self-
organization an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities.
The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma
denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of
affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico
Advincula,Roberto Mendoza Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for
breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of
Printing has no juridical personality to sue.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.
RULING:
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No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate

or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. Any suit,
action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and
the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent,
much less over its objection. It is true that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on
regular working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the
conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime
work in the Bureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service
so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation
may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau
depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for
holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character.
Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing
jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business
concern. The additional work it executes for private parties is merely
incidental to its function, and although such work may be deemed
proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing
said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in
its general governmental functions.
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SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-1648
AUGUST 17, 1949
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated
in Manila. They executed three lease contracts one for each of the three
apartments. The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering
officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in Manila. Six months after when
Japan surrendered, plaintiffs approached the defendants and requested the
return of the apartment buildings. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate said
leases, to execute a lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable
rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. Respondents sent a letter
refusing to execute new leases but advised that the US Army will vacate the
apartments. Not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs formally
requested Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the apartments. Tillman refused
to comply with the request. Because of the assurance that the US
Government would vacate the premises, the plaintiffs took no further steps to
secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by
respondents. On February 17, 1947, plaintiffs served a formal notice to the
occupants demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals
to P300 a month; (c) execution of new leases (d) release of said apartment
buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of failure to comply with said
demands. The thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with
the demand. Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in
the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the real party
in interest was the US Government and not the individual defendants.
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Furthermore, the respondent argued that the war between the US and her
allies on one side and Germany and Japan on the other had not yet been terminated
and consequently the period of the three leases has not yet expired. Also, a foreign
government like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its
consent. That even though the US Government was not named as the
defendant in the complaint, it is nevertheless the real defendant as the
parties named are officers of the US Government. The Municipal Court
dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower court.
ISSUE:
(1)Who is the real party in interest?

(2)Does the court have jurisdiction to hear and try the case?
HELD:
(1)The Court is convinced that the real party in interest as defendant

in the original case is the US Government. The lessee in each of the three lease
agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement themselves
were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The considerations or
rentals were always paid by the US Government.
(2) It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction
over the present case for Unlawful Detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction
was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The US Government has
not given its consent to the filing of the suit which is essentially against her, though not
in name.
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GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. NO. 196231
SEPTEMBER 4, 2012
FACTS:
There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they
raise a common thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the
power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they
belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
1st case -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on
jurisdictional grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the
Office of the dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, upon a
finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which
gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
2nd case -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring
petitioner Wendell Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with
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respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in

relation to the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into with Major General
Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of Preliminary
Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President the administrative
case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise

administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.
RULING:
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an
obvious gap in the law. Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers
upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies,
viz: Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
Such appointments shall require no confirmation.
RUIZ vs. CABAHUG

GR No. L-9990
1957 September 30
FACTS:
The cause of action alleged that the Secretary of National Defense

accepted the bid of Allied Technologist to furnish the architectural and
engineering services in the construction of the Veterans Hospital.
The plans and specifications were submitted by Ruiz and company, as a

consequence the contract was sign. When the defendants-officials paid the
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Allied Technologist, fifteen percent (15%) was retained because defendant

Panlilio has asserted that he is the sole and only architect of the Veterans
Hospital to the exclusion of the petitioners.
The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the suit involved is
one against the Government, which may not be sued without its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint is against the government and cannot be

sued without its consent.
RULING:
No. The suit is properly directed against the officials and against them
alone, not against the Government, which does not have any interest in the
outcome of the controversy between plaintiffs on the one hand, and Panlilio
on the other. The suit is against the officials to compel them to act in
accordance with the rights be established by the contending architects have
established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in
the credit for the work done.
SAN FERNANDO V. FIRME

G.R. N. L-579
APRIL 8, 1991
FACTS:
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger

jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino
Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The heirs of Bania Sr. filed a complaint for damages against the
Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a
Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck
of petitioner. The case was transferred to branch presided by Judge Firme.
The heirs of Bania Sr. amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its
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regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its

decision rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig jointly and
severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral
damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was liable.
RULING:
The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of

the State. The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it
gives consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express
consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing
consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability
arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the
government enters into business contracts and also when the State files a
complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued.
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing
duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for
the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO

G.R. 70853
MAR. 12, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate

Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which
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dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery

of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-
suability of the State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with
the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP,
represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate
area of 1,364.4177hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality
of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in
question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31,
1952,followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that
Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of
Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an
informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual
possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and
caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the
Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.On November 1, 1954, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the
Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA
and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing
the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within
the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano
prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in
question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based
on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal
valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all
awards to the settlers.
ISSUE:
WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of
land.
RULING:
NO. A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not

permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued,
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too
plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
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any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of

sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of
strictest right).Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority.
Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative
body.
MERITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL ISLANDS

G.R. 11154
MAR. 21, 1916
FACTS:
E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day,
while he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped
by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to
have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and
he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could
never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at
least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the
government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue
of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring
suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then
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determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance.
HELD:
No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause
of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the
discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him.
-0In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability
from the government. The Government \does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.
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FROILAN V PAN SHIPPING

G.R. NO. L- 6060
SEPT. 30, 1954
FACTS:
Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan

Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the
vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance
in installments; that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase
price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission; that for various reasons, among them the non-payment of the
installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines; that he appealed the
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action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its
meeting on August 25, 1950,the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the
Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused
to do so. He, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his
complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its
equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the
rightful possession thereof On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of
replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was
divested of its possession of said vessel. On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co.
filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it
alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950, restoring Froilan to
his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void;
that, in any event, Froilan had not complied with the condition precedent imposed by
the Cabinet for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract;
that it suffered damages in the amount of P22, 764.59 for wrongful replevin in the
month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered
for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it is alleged that it has incurred necessary
and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to
retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had been reimbursed(Rec. on
App. pp. 8-53). In view, however, of the order of the order of the lower court dated
February 3, 1952, holding that the payment made by Froilan's obligation to the
Shipping Administration, which order had already become final, the counter claim of
the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no longer
feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and stated no cause of action.
It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in
connection with the counterclaim. This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4, 1952 .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is immune from suit.
HELD:
NO, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect

waived its right of non-suability. "The immunity of the state from the suits does not
deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may
avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking
the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
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automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and
other defense he might have against the state.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

G.R. NO. 101083
JULY 30, 1993
FACTS:
The defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then

Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that
the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
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treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn order was made with the
agents and defendants siting the cancellation of all existing timber license
agreements in the country, ceasing and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and
granting the plaintiffs " such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter
of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to
present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegation. Forests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass. Twenty-five (25) years
ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more
than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the
country's land area.
More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A". At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of
forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
The defendants shall create a great devastation over Mother earth
and people of the country for public safety and shall destroy our healthful
ecology.
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Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and

healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.
ISSUE:
Does the higher court affirm the petitioners pray concerning the right
of healthful ecology in the country?
RULING:
Yes, the court affirm the petition as conformably with the enunciated
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the rightto health, as well as
the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning theconservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and
proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically
forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation
and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for
the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3
thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3.Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality
of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources
Sec. 2.Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
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supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the

country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168).
USA VS. RUIZ

G.R. NO. L- 35645
MAY 22, 1985
FACTS:
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At times material to this case, the United States of America had a

naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and
Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the
invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the
letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co
indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a
repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station
in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E.
Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the
defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in
the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the
motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to
no avail. Hence the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise

governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
HELD:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is
a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
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sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts).
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. SAN DIEGO

G.R. NO. 89572
DECEMBER 21, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of

BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as
many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on
the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his
admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April16,
1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of
court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of
1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process
and equal protection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom,

due process and equal protection.
HELD:
No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to
limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they
are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in
a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a
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sense of satisfaction. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to
quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled
to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the
NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private
respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an
absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is
a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not
excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the
latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his
potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant
future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should
never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers
who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps
to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course
for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we
may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we
are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.
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AGLIPAY V. RUIZ
GR 45459
13 MARCH 1937
FACTS:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila

that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners
attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the

Constitution.
HELD:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of

profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized
here as elsewhere. Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
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when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the

Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the Government
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use
or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage
stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church
or religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale
of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps
was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to
give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to
the country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp
contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an
inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.
3-7, 1937.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDUARDO ERMITA
Nature of the Case: These are six consolidated cases docketed as

following:
G.R. No. 169777 = Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169659 = Bayan Muna vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169660 = Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169667 = Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 169834 = PDP Laban vs. Eduardo Ermita
G.R. No. 171246 = Jose Anselmo Cadiz v. Eduardo Ermita
FACTS OF THE CASE:
These consolidated cases are petitions for certiorari stating that the
President has abused her power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 dated
September 28, 2005. Petitioners herein pray that such order be declared as
null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines

through its various Committees conducts inquiries and investigations in aid
of legislation which call for attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in the
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
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In G.R. No. 169659 Bayan Muna v. Eduardo Ermita, partylist Bayan Muna
and HR members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza,
Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, COURAGE = organization of Govt
employees and CODAL (Counsels for Defense of Liberties) pray that E.O. 464
be declared unconstitutional and that Executive Sec. Eduardo Ermita be
prohibited from imposing sanctions on officials who appear before Congress
due to congressional summons. They also contend that E.O. 464 infringes on
their rights and impedes them to fulfil their respective obligations.
In G.R. No. 169660 Francisco Chavez vs. Eduardo Ermita, Francisco Chavez
claims that his constitutional rights as a citizen and taxpayer and law
practicioner are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464 thus he prays that
such order be declared null and unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667 Alternative Law Groups vs. Eduardo Ermita, ALG claims
that the group has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
On October 11, 2005, Senate of the Philippines alleging that it has a vital
interest in the resolution of the issue of validity in E.O. 464, claims that it
prohibits the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and
conceals information of great public interest and concern.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in

executing E.O. 464.
Whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the

Constitution: Art. II Sec. 28, Art. III Sec. 4, Art. III Sec. 7, Art. VI
Sec. I, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI Sec. 22, Article XI sec. 1 and Art. XIII
sec. 16.
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the

Congress.
Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on

matters of public concern.
RULING:
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E.O. 464 to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive

officials before the Congress, deprives the Congress of the information in the
possession of these officials. The power of inquiry, a power vested in the
Congress, is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 of Article VI because, according
to the Court, a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
intended to affect or change; thus, making it an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.
However, even when the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are

still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall
under the rubric of executive privilege.
The executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the

courts, or the public; is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. Executive privilege per se is not meant
to cover up embarrassing information. It is a relative concept, the validity of
its assertion to a great extent depends upon the political situation of the
country.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. L-44640
OCT. 12, 1976
FACTS:
In September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991

calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers. 20 days after, the President issued another
related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of
votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct
16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991.
On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on Oct
16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
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providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly
to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with

Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct 16; to declare without force
and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to
the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled
on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature
hence the court cannot take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally
maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise
constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a
justiciable one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Political
questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or
validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-
political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act of the
incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright
justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
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President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides

how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution,
can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was
valid or not.
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, ET. AL., vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 118295
1997 May 2
FACTS:
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly
agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits,
restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power.
That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it
gives foreign trading intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its
concurrence of the said WTO agreement?
RULING:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution

adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws.
Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good
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faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties.Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in
fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of
commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the
United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the
concept of sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid
exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The
act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO
allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a
member.
PHILIPPINES INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION VS CA

G.R. 100481
JAN. 22, 1997
FACTS:
It came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an

increase in pilotage rates was given by the then President Marcos through
the issuance of an E.O No. 1088 PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED
RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICESRENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE
VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLICPORTS. The executive order increased
substantially the rates of the existing pilotage fees previously fixed by the
PPA. During that time the President was exercising legislative power and
was authorized However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing
that it was issued hastily and it was just an Administrative Order whereby
PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No.
43-86, which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the
fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract..
Actually Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines is jus
an intervenor in the factual milieu that lead us to this issue. For Purposes of
Admin Law we should not care about it.
ISSUE:
Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of which PPA

has the power to modify the same.
HELD:
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EO 1088 is a law. The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.is

no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise
of administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the
rates previously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of E.O. No. 1088, the
PPA could in turn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did
in A.O. No. 43-86,which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely
left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a
contract. The orders previously issued by the PPA were in the nature of
subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the exercise of delegated
power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the
President did by E.O. No. 1088.It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088
should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal
of power from the PPA. What determines whether an act is a law or an
administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here, as we have
already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services, including
pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.(Note:
Bold letters are copied from the Original Supreme Court decision)
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION,

INC.
G.R. NO. 111097
JULY 20, 1994
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of

a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project. The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success
in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de
Oro City. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No.
3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance
No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,
where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner.
Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals
declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid.
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HELD:
No. Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to

prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games
of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are
not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary
to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.
ARANETA VS. DANGLISAN

G.R. NO. L- 2044
FACTS:
Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive

Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings.
Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed
seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case.
He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an
appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which
controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to
him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from

disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225.
L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was

appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
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They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE
OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES
AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers
Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had
likewise ceased.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD:
Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president,

became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session
on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226
were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of
Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of
expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of
the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.
Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of
adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to
rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue
the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.
LEONILA BATULANON VS.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 139857
SEPTEMBER 15, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Leonila Batulanon was employed as cashier/manager of Polomok

(Polomok) Credit Cooperative Inc. from May 1980 up to December 1982 (so
thats two years). She was in charge with the receiving of deposits and
releasing loans to members of the said cooperative (Polomok).
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During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities were

found out. Thereafter, four informations of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents were filed against herein petitioner.
1. Criminal case 3625 petitioner Batulanon falsified CASH/CHECK

VOUCHER of PCCI in the name of ERLINDA OMADLAO, making it appear that
latter was granted loan where in truth and in fact said person never
received, never granted a loan and never signed such document.
2. Criminal case 3626 same situation as above stated but this time in the
name of GONAFREDA ORACION.
3. Criminal case 3453 Batulanon falsified commercial documents namely

Individual deposits and ledger of FERLYN ARROYO making it appear that the
said person made a fixed deposit and was granted a loan where in truth and
in fact ARROYO never made such deposit and never received such loan.
4. Criminal case 3627 same situation as the next preceding case but this
time in the name of his son Dennis Batulanon.
In all cases, accused did then and there release to herself the same and
received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted them into
her own use and benefit. Also in all cases, she refused to bring back the
same despite demands.
These informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City. Petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Prosecution presented its witnesses:
Modallo (posting clerk) testified that Batulanon released 4 cash

vouchers. He also said that Omadlao, Oracion and Batulanon were not
eligible and not members of Polomok Cooperative. Moreover,
according to him, although Arroyo was a member but there was no
proof that she applied for a loan. He also said he witnessed Petitioner
Batulanon signed Oracion and Arroyo in cash vouchers.
Jayoma (Vice chairman of the PCCI Board of directors) testified that

laons to Omadlao and Oracion never passed through the PCCI board of
directors.
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Petitioner Batulanon denied charges against her. She contended that she did
not sigh vouchers of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo who according to her are
nonetheless members of the cooperative. Lastly, she said that its been an
accepted practice that she can release loan in the absence of Gopio Jr who is
in charge with such responsibility.
RTC convicted her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner brought it to
Court of Appeals (CA)but the latter affirmed with modifications the ruling of
RTC. CA modification is that petitioner is guilty of falsification of PRIVATE
documents.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but CA denied it.
ISSUE/S:
Petitioner brought it up to the Supreme Court (SC) and contended

that:
1. Best witness is person whose signature is forged
2. Requires prejudice to 3rd person
3. PCCI not prejudiced by loan transactions because loans are accounts
receivable by cooperative
HELD:
SC: Petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged is estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private
documents.
Elements of falsification of private document are present in this case:
1. She made it appear that Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo were granted
loans
2. She made it in private document
****(cash/check vouchers are not public documents because they
are not notarized and not documents used by merchants to promote trade
nor regulated by Code of commerce)
3. It caused damage to the cooperative.
Regarding best witness SC cites sec. 22 of Rule 132
according to this rule handwriting may be
proved by any person who believes it to be belonging to such person; or
who acquired knowledge of such handwriting
Regarding prejudice to Polomok such loans could have granted to other
members but werent because of illegal acts done by Batulanon such
constituted damage or prejudice to Polomok
Page 38
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On complex crime of estafa through falsification:

Falsification committed as means to commit estafa
Estafa may be carried out even without falsification
SC ruled that 1st, 2nd, and 3rd criminal cases herein fall within the purview
of falsification of private documents but the 4th criminal case (with Dennis
Batulanon) falls within the ambit of the crime of estafa. The latter having no
untruthful statements but there was conversion and misappropriation; hence
elements of estafa are present in the last criminal case.
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS VS. HON. FRANCISCO P.

BURGOS
G.R. NO. L-36706
MARCH 31, 1980
FACTS:
On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's

land for road-right-of-way purpose.
On 1959, Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to
recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the
alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled Victor
Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways and Republic of the Philippines).
Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was
either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any
case, the right of the owner to recover the value of said property was
already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-
suability of the government was invoked.
Page 39
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In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property
at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other
hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775.
The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed
the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property
taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is
applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private
respondent Amigable for the property taken.
HELD:
Not applicable. Article 1250 of the NCC provides that the value of
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis
of payment which would be the value of peso at the time of taking of the
property when the obligation of the government to pay arises. It is only
when there is an agreement that the inflation will make the value of
currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment, the
basis for payment.
The correct amount of compensation would be P14,615.79 at P2.37
per square meter, not P49,459.34, and the interest in the sum of
P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time respondent court
rendered its decision as was awarded by the said court should accordingly be
reduced.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C.

DACUYCUY
G.R. NO. L-45127
1989 MAY 5
FACTS:
This is an instant petition to review on certiorari seeking to set aside

the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte regarding issues on
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the
Page 40
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Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section
32 thereof.
A complaint was filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang against private

respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria,
public school officials of Leyte, for violation of Republic Act No. 4670 before
the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte. After the arraignment, the
respondents orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of
imprisonment prescribed for the offense and was subsequently reduced to
writing but the municipal court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.
Private respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
denial order on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering
that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional but such motion was denied.
Private respondents filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch VIII to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of
Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of the case on the
ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over
the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended petition alleged the
additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since
the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for
the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the
term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and
(2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration
of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court
as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
The respondent judge rendered the afore cited challenged decision

holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional
but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city
courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over
violations of Republic Act No. 4670;
Page 41
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(2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
HELD:
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable

period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration
having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given wide
latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the
benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range,
in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the
accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power
and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this
case, does violate the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-
delegability of legislative powers. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is
unconstitutional.
The imposable penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a

fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to
serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise
jurisdiction there over. When the complaint against private respondents was
filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as
amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine
of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former
municipal courts. Consequently, the case against herein private respondents
falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang,
Leyte.
SAYSON v. SINGSON
G.R. NO. L-30044
1973 DEC 19
FACTS:
"In January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer requisitioned

various items of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer which was
signed by the District Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning
Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. ... Itwas approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza. It is
noted in the approval of the said requisition that "This is an exception to the
telegram dated Feb. 21, 1967 of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications." ... So,a canvass or public bidding was conducted on May
Page 42
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5, 1967 ... . The committee on award accepted the bid of the Singkier Motor
Service for the sum of P43,530.00. ... Subsequently, it was approved by the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; and on May 16,1967 the
Secretary sent a letter-order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu
requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein for the lot price
of P43,530.00. ...It would appear that a purchase order signed by the
District Engineer, the Requisitioning Officer and the Procurement Officer, was
addressed to the Singkier Motor Service. ... In due course the Voucher No.
07806 reached the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit. He then
made inquiries about the reasonableness of the price. ... Thus, after finding
from the endorsements of the Division Engineer and the Commissioner of
Public Highways that the prices of the various spare parts are just and
reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no less than the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications with the verification of V.M.
Secarroa representative of the Bureau of Supply Coordination, Manila, he
approved it for payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of
20% equivalent to P8,706.00 to submit the voucher with the supporting
papers to the Supervising Auditor, which he did. ... The voucher was paid on
June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to Singson. On June 10,1967,
Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising Auditor
Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which
states: "In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and
equipment shown by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all
highway auditors refer General Office payment similar nature for appropriate
action." ... In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the
supporting papers reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts
among the suppliers in Manila, particularly, the USI(Phil.), which is the
exclusive dealer of the spare parts of the caterpillar tractors in the
Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at P2,529.64 only which
is P40,000.00 less than the price of the Singkier. ... In view of the
overpricing the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works in
a third endorsement of July 18, 1967. ... The Secretary then circularized a
telegram holding the district engineer responsible for overpricing." What is
more, charges for malversation were filed against the district engineer and
the civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor, one of
the petitioners before us, that led to the filing of the mandamus suit below,
with now respondent Singson as sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service,
being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,706.00, the contract
in question having been upheld. Hence this appeal by
Certiorari.
Page 43
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ISSUE:
WON the mandamus suit of the respondent (Singson) involving a

money claim against the government, predicated on a contract is valid
RULING:
No. The claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law,
morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the
collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action for specific
performance. The suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the
Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State,
which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent
of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with
the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 which
prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government
may be filed: "In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims,
other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and
decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after
their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other
persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall
be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is
received by him."
Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved

by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account
or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal
in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and
complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the
President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if
the appellant is a private person or entity. "Once consent is secured, an
action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such
statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had
and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved.
Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been such,
the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the
lower court could not legally act on the matter.
Page 44
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UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS.CITY OF MANILA

G.R. NO. L-7481
DECEMBER 23, 1954
FACTS:
On September 4, 1953, the University of the East, petitioner-appellee,

filed with the City Engineer of Manila an application for a permit to construct
a four-story high school building on its lot on Gastambide Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, submitting the plans and specifications prepared by its architect, in
conformity with the provisions of Zonification Ordinance No. 2830, as
amended by Ordinance No. 2906 of the City of Manila, but not in conformity
with the requirements of the Zoning Regulations adopted and promulgated
by the National Planning Commission on March 18, 1953. Section 43,
paragraph (c) of said Zoning Regulations provides that there shall be a
minimum depth of six meters for the front yard, five meters wide for side
yards, and a minimum depth of six meters for the rear yard. The City
Engineer notified the petitioner-appellee to prepare plans and specifications
in conformity with the Zoning Regulations. As the petitioner-appellee failed
to amend its plans and specifications as required, the City Engineer refused
to issue the permit. The petitioner-appellee brought an action for mandamus
in the Court of First Instance of Manila to compel him to do so. Honorable
Judge Rafael Amparo of said court rendered a decision declaring the
Zonification Regulations of the National Planning Board null and void, and
ordered the City Engineer to issue the permit.The City of Manila and the City
Engineer appealed from this decision to this Court.
ISSUES:
I. The lower court erred in declaring that the Zoning Regulations

adopted and promulgated by the National Planning Commission on
March 18, 1953, are null and void; and
II. The lower court erred in ordering the respondent-appellants to

issue the corresponding permit for the construction of a high school
building on Gastambide Street in accordance with the plans and
specifications submitted by the petitioner-appellee which are not in
conformity with the said Zoning Regulations.
RULING:
Page 45
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I. According to the lower court, "there can be no question that

Executive Order No. 98 series of 1946, was promulgated in
accordance with the emergency powers of the President." We
subscribe to this. As a matter of fact, it is our own contention,
for said Executive Order No. 98 was promulgated by the
President on March 11, 1946, that is more than two months
before the Congress convened in regular session for the first
time after the last war. We also subscribe to the opinion of the
lower court to effect that "when the President, acting under
Republic Act No. 422, merged into one single body the National
Urban Planning Commission, the Capital City Planning
Commission, and the Real Property Board, the power and
authority of the President were limited to consolidating the
powers, duties and functions of said bodies for purposes of
economy. . . . .
Section 7 of Executive Order No. 98 provides as follows:
Legal Status of Zoning Regulations. (a) Any resolution of the

Commission adopting zoning regulations for any urban area or any
part thereof, or amending or repealing any zoning regulation, shall be
filed with the President of the legislative body having jurisdiction over
the area affected by said resolution. Unless said legislative body shall
disapprove such resolution by a three-fourths vote within 30 days from
the date of filing it shall thereupon take effect and shall supersede any
similar regulations of said urban area or any part thereof effective at
the date such regulation takes effect. Disapproval of any such
resolution shall not be effective unless it is filed with the Chairman of
the Commission together with a statement in writing giving the
reasons for such disapproval.
And section 4, Executive Order No. 367 reads as follows:
Building Code. The National Planning Commission shall draft uniform

regulations for the construction, repair and alteration of buildings,
which shall be known and cited as the Building Code. Such regulations
shall set the minimum performance standards for building materials
and methods of construction for the purpose of preventing building
collapse and accidents, minimizing fire hazards, insuring sanitary and
healthful living conditions, and, in general promoting public safety and
welfare. The Building Code, or any proposed amendment thereof, shall
be submitted to the local legislative bodies concerned for adoption in
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the form of ordinances, and shall take effect in the same as zoning or
subdivision regulations. The Building Code shall be administered and
enforced by the local officials concerned.
II. The mentioned zoning regulations having been rejected by the

Municipal Board of the City of Manila are of no force and effect
as one of the essential requisites prescribed by Executive Orders
Nos. 98 and 367 has not been complied with.
Moreover, the issuance of such zoning regulations which affect very

important and valuable property rights throughout the whole country, cannot
be delegated to an administrative commission without specific standards and
limitations to guide the commission in the exercise of the wide discretion
granted to it.
ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO VS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES
DECEMBER 19, 1978
FACTS:
Page 47
4
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of

Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and
install lighting facilities on the said lot.
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot,
Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation
but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the
government and should not prosper without the consent of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity

from suit.
HELD:
Yes. The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the

terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of
the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the
donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the
donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the
government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to
proceed with the case.
LOIDA Q. SHAUF & JACOB SHAUF, PETITIONERS V. HON. CA

NOVEMBER 27, 1990
FACTS:
Page 48
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Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a

member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance
Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is
eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and
an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents,
Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education
Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant
Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy
occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no
vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill
a future vacancy if shes available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that
time, Mrs. Mary Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs.
Abalateos appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to
said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended indefinitely
to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed
against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of
the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf
prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants.
Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are
immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of
their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a
US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all
administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC
decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the
US Armed Forces
HELD:
No they are not immune. They state that the doctrine of immunity
from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is
Page 49
4
being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The
cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government are
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him.
MINERS ASSOCIATION VS FACTORAN

G.R. 98332
JAN. 16, 1995
FACTS:
The petition seeks a ruling from this court on the validity of

two Administrative Orders 57 and 82 issued by the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the
provisions of Executive Orders 279 and 211. This petition a r o s e
from the fact that the 1987 Constitution provided for a
d i f f e r e n t s y s t e m o f exploration, development and utilization of
the countrys natural resources. Unlike the1935 and 1973
Constitutions that allow the utilization of inalienable lands of public
domain through license, concession or lease, the 1987 Constitution
provides for the full control and supervision by the state of the exploration,
development and utilization of the countrys natural resources. Pres.
Cory Aquino promulgated EO 211, which prescribes the interim
procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the
exploration, d e v e l o p m e n t and utilization of minerals in
a c c o r d a n c e t o t h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n . I n addition, Pres. Aquino
also promulgated EO 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to
negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or production-sharing
agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of
mineral resources and prescribing the guidelines for such
agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial
assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration,
development, and u t i l i z a t i o n o f m i n e r a l s . I n l i n e w i t h E O
2 7 9 , t h e D E N R S e c r e t a r y i s s u e d A O 5 7 Guidelines of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under EO 279 and AO
8 2 Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) through negotiation. Petitioner, Miners Association
of the Philippines, mainly contend that the DENR Secretary issued both
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4
AOs 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power because these are

inconsistent with the provisions of EO 279.
ISSUE:
Whether AO Nos. 57 and 82, which are promulgated by the

DENR, are valid and constitutional
HELD:
AO Nos. 57 and 82 are both constitutional and valid. This is due to the
fact that EO279, in effect, gave the Secretary of Natural Resources
the authority to conclude joint v e n t u r e , c o - p r o d u c t i o n , o r
production sharing agreements for the exploration,
development and utilization of mineral resources. Furthermore, the
constitutionality of these administrative orders goes to show that the
utilization of inalienable lands of public domain is not merely done
through license, concession or lease since the options are now also
open to the State through direct undertaking or by entering into co-
production, joint venture, or production sharing agreements.
Page 51
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ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA VS.HON. TEODORO PEA

G.R. NO. L-57665
JULY 2, 1990
FACTS:
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or

encroachment between two mining claims.
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January,

1932. After Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived their rights and
interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza
Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.
The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February,

1932, and was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.
In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21

Mining Association, later converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation,
to which the members conveyed their respective mining claims, including the
"Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the
Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation.
On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case against Feliza

Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with
the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, Branch IX. Petitioners claimed that
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private respondents
derived their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously
falsified and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the
mining claims.
On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-
complaint against private respondents for alleged overlapping and
encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the
provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners.
Page 52
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On appeal to the Minister of Natural Resources, petitioners argued that

respondent Director was without jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction in
ruling that they have lost their rights over the "Ped" mining claim.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent
Minister. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon

the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining
claims; and
2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not

they committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that public respondents may

not validly and legally take cognizance of an issue not raised in the
complaint.
This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case

pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with
jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims. It is established in
jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies.Section 128, being a valid implementing
rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly
empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the
protest case, even if not raised in issue.
Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the Court shall next determine if
public respondents acted within their jurisdiction, or if they committed grave
abuse of discretion which would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.
Public respondents found that petitioners failed to comply with the

requirements set by law, and thus declared petitioners to have abandoned
and lost their rights over the "Ped" claim. Clearly, respondent
Minister gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded the rebuttal
evidence submitted by petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect
of reversing respondent Director's finding. As to petitioners' supposed failure
Page 53
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to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped" claim since 1952, the
conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations, consisting of
payment of assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the year
1975, although not by petitioners. The record shows that the payor was the
Baguio Gold Mining Company, to which the "Ped" claim, among others, had
been assigned by private respondents for operation.Respondent Minister
evidently knew of the existence of the amicable settlement, since he
discussed the terms thereof in his decision. Nevertheless, respondent
Minister overlooked the fact that from the terms of the settlement,
petitioners clearly were not liable to pay the assessment works for the years
in question and that consequently there was no basis for a finding of
abandonment of the "Ped" claim by petitioners.
RESTITUTO YNOT VS INTEMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. 74456
MAR. 20, 1987
FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of

carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which
not only banned the movement of carabaos from inter provinces but as well
as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting
6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by
EO 626-A to out rightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to
curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.
EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
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The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA

G.R. 57883
MAR. 12, 1982
FACTS:
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the

Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefore and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed
because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed

by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD:
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Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is

empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to
a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to
be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into
who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the
exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power
of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded.
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DEL MAR VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

G.R. NO. L-27299
JUNE27 1973
FACTS:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to del Mar)
filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil
case R-8465) against the Philippine Veterans Administration (herein after
referred to the PVA to compel the latter to continue paying him monthly life
pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950 to June 20,
1957, and thereafter, or from June 22 1957 his monthly life pension, as
increased by Republic Act 1920, of P100 and to pay to him as well the
monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his unmarried minor children
below eighteen years of age, pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920 which
took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral
and exemplary damages. In his petition below, del Mar averred that he
served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area
Command (a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank of major;
that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on
October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability; that
upon proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the
Philippine Veterans Board (the PVA's predecessor granted him a monthly life
pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that in March 1950, the said
Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that
his receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through
the United States Veterans Administration, by reason of military service
rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during World War II,
precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the
Philippine Government; that he wrote the said Board twice demanding that it
continue paying his monthly life pension, impugning the cancellation thereof
Page 57
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as illegal; and that his demands went unheeded. After due trial, the court a
quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can file a suit against a Government agency such
as the PVA without consent.
RULING:
As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the

immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all
actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether
in the disbursements of funds or loss of property."
Needless to state, in such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against
the Government, the court has no option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless,
the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant
institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his
statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already
appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.
As clearly discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls
under the exception.
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FRANCISCO MALONG v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

G.R. NO. L-49930
1985 AUG 7
FACTS:
The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that, on October 30,

1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell
from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy
occurred because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train was
overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All
Saints Day.
The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them
damages totaling P136,370.
Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed the
complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a
government instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State (Sec.
16, Art. XV of the Constitution).
The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to Republic Act
No. 5440
R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first
instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving
only questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or
the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary appeal i.e., by notice
of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41 to appeal by
certiorari, under Rule 45.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON PNR is immune from suit.
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2. WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or in a corporate capacity

when it organized the PNR for the purpose of engaging in
transportation.
3. WON the State acted differently when it organized the PNR as
successor of the Manila Railroad Company.
HELD:
No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of its sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its
predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become
immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate
or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined
by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat.
Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos
vs, Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593.)
Page 60
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SOLICITOR GENERAL VS. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY

G.R. NO. 102782
1991 DEC 11
FACTS:
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic
Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets.
Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed or allowed by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of
the decision was filed the judgment became final and executor. Withstanding
the Gonong decision still violations of the said decision transpired, wherein
there were several persons who sent complaint letters to the Court regarding
the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plate numbers. On
May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing
itself to detach license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On July 2, 1991, the Court
issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated that the Ordinance No.
11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court, and
that the Court has received several complaints against the enforcement of
such ordinance.
ISSUE:
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W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of

1998 are valid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government
acting only as agents of the national legislature?
HELD:
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11,

Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-
enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license
plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and
confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SSS vs. CA
G.R. NO. L-41299
1983 FEB 21
FACTS:
Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate
loan by the SSS with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral.
The spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments. When delayed
were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a petition for foreclosure
of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground
that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application
for foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for
spouses Cruz sent a letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up
to date in their payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should
discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure. This request
remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS
before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of
the government performing government function. The trial court and court
of appeal nevertheless awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was
affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
HELD:
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Negative. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued
for damages. The SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by express
statutory consent. It has corporate power separate and distinct from the
government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be
sued in court. These words sue and be sued embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function,
by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the
government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the
SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has
given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of
his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of
the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
RESTITUTO YNOT VS INTEMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. NO. 74457
MARCH 20, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of violation of EO 626 when he transported six

carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when
they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery,
and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
Petitioner raised the issue of EOs constituitonality and filed case in the lower
court. However, the court sustained the the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raised by the petitioner. Therefore, petitioner appealed the decsion
to IAC with the following contentions:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional?
RULING:
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The Supreme Court agreed with Ynot and declared the Executive Order
to be unconstitutional because it ordered the outright confiscation of the
carabaos without giving the accused a right to be heard before a competent
and impartial tribunal as required by due process. The Court also
commended Ynot for asserting his rights, and stated that: The strength of
democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the
people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but
weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress.
Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly

meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert
them.
EMANUEL PELAEZ VS AUDITOR

G.R. L-23825
DEC 24,1965
FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating

33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of

any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a

special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
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The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to

the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to

another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public

welfare may require which would mean that the President may exercise
such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not
replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the
text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the
President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is

essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not
executive).
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TEOXON VS.MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS

GR.NO. 25619
JUNE30,1970
FACTS:
Teoxon was a veteran who suffered from physical permanent

disability. He was permanently incapacitated from work and he was first
awarded only P25.00 monthly thereafter increased to P50.00 a month
contrary to the terms and conditions of Veterans Bill of Rights, RA no.65. He
claim for a pension effective May 10, 1995 at the rate of P50.00 a month up
to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month,
for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June
22,1957 up to June 30,1963;and the difference of P50.00 a month, plus
P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18
years of age from July 1,1963.The respondent limit the amount of pension
received by the petitioner in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by them. The court sees that there is no question that his
disability is not complete therefore he cannot be entitled to complete
disability allowance. Petitioner was denied and appealed to the Court of
appeals the later confirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this
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appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrative rules and regulation of the

respondent is valid?
HELD:
No. In People vs. Santos (1936), this court express its approval of an
administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power
vested in an administrative official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951
decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order
betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the act, the
mandate of the act must prevail and must be followed. Justice Barrera in
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs SSC citing Parker and Davis thus: a rule
is binding on the court so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is
followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature,
even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein of its
innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is
at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the
law means.
No lesser administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the
express language of the constitution, assert for itself a more extensive
prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate.
There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its term
must be followed. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Respondents can
be sustained therefore only if it can be shown that the rules and regulations
promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans Bill of
Rights provides.
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA

G.R. 127255
AUG. 14, 1997
FACTS:
Page 67
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The petitioners are challenging the validity of R.A. 8420 (amends

certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing Sin
Taxes) by filing a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition. They claim that
respondents violated the rules of the House which are "constitutionally
mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution when the Chair of the Committee(Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
allegedly ignored a privileged question raised by Rep. Arroyo during the
committee report for the approval of R.A. 8420.Petitioners claim that there
are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep.
Arroyo's interpellation:(1)the transcript of audio-sound recording of the
proceedings in the session hall(2) the transcript of the proceedings from
3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,1996, as certified by the Chief of
the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996(3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,1996 as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996(4) the
published version Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted
pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially
enforceable. This contention was invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative
branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts. In this case,
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial
review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse

of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 affects its validity?
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. According to the findings of the court, the
alleged violations are merely internal rules of procedures rather than what
petitioners claim to be constitutional requirements for enacting laws. In this
case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a
member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court.
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BENGSON III VS. HRET

G.R. 142840
MAY 7, 2001
FACTS:
Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in
nd
the 2 District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress. Cruz won by
a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal) alleging that Cruz is not a natural born citizen, as defined by law;
hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently
declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is
defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz however
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lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore
allegiance to the US without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other
hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of Republic
Act No. 2630 which provides that:
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly

states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.
HELD:
Yes. Bengsons contention that Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen

since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term natural-born
citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as
follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.
In Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service

in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Under said law,
repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a natural-born Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
US VS GUINTO
FEBRUARY 26, 1990
G.R. NO. 76607
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4
FACTS:
These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine
of state immunity.
1) US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in
Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain
Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner
because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included
in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
2} US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) Genove, employed as a cook in the Main

Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after it had been ascertained in an
investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove filed a
complaint for damages against the club manager who was also an officer of
USAF.
2) US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018)

Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnel, was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and
special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial ensued where petitioners
testified against respondent Bautista. As a result of the charge, Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against
petitioners claiming that because of the latters acts, he was removed from
his job.
3) US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)

Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual
petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing
dogs on them by the latter. The individual petitioners, US military officers,
deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for theft but
resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries. In all these cases, the individual
petitioners claimed they were just exercising their official functions. The USA
was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground that
they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar?
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HELD:
A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not
absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued without its
consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The
consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special
law. Consent is implied when the sate enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

G.R. NO. 115455
AUGUST 25, 1994
FACTS:
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716

otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino
averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution.
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Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3

readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for
after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630.
Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way
the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and
co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD:
No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding
that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR.
What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the
initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having
the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt
his over what has been done.
PNB v. CIR
G.R. No. L-32667
FACTS:
Petitioners motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for

lack of merit. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the
People's Home site and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch
in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become
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final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent

Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the
prevailing party, the United Home site Employees and Laborers Association.
The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to
serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds
subject of the garnishment "may be public in character. "The order of August
26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this
certiorari proceeding, reads as follows: "The Philippine National Bank moves
to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by
the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of
the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes
Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All
writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of
charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this
Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First
Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon
City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the
authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by
the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court finds
no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19,
1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is
now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. As
such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to
issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing
the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority
is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature... At
this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to the Supreme
Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of
attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed
and that the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is
no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this case.
[Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is
denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within
five days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970."
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a
resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence this certiorari
petition.
ISSUE:
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WON the funds mentioned may be garnished.
RULING:
No. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is

squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice,
later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of
the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such,
the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for,
as a government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It
has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23,
1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established 'all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may
sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other
corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended." In a 1941 decision,
Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company this Court,
through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when
the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign
capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank,
9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice
of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations." Both the Palacio and the
Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-
suability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an
entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct
corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds
may be levied upon or garnished.
BONDOC VS. PINEDA

G.R. 97710
SEPT. 26, 1991
FACTS:
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Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th

District of Pampanga. Bondoc is a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipno. While Pineda is a member of the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in
that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was subsequently
declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal (HRET). One member
of the Electoral Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP
confessed to Rep. jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader) that he voted for Bondoc.
This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they
withdraw Camasura from the HRET. Camasura was then removed by HRETs
chairwoman Justice Herrera.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the HRET acted in grave abuse of discretion?
HELD:
The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without

encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof,
HRET. In time, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and
validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private rights are
affected, came to be recognized. As the SC pointed out in the celebrated
Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident
exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Since a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted,
limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to
ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the
mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the
tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have
already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the
HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. And the tribunal was
not supposed to comply with the proposal of the LDP. But since the HRET did
then there is an abuse of discretion. The SC can take cognizance of the case.
JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG

G.R. 15905
AUG. 3, 1966
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FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of

Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In
November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter
addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such
strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of
Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the
president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they
are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have
been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a
case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang
alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for
the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower
house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication

endowed to members of Congress.
HELD:
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators

and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. The publication of the said letter is
not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the
same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same
is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge
of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees
duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the
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letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the
publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELEC
G.R. 119976
SEPT. 18, 1995
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her

domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in
the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and
Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also
a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an
honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became
a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
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ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be

eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.

The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas

domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of

domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile
of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important
milestones.
MONTEJO VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 118702
Page 79
4
16 MARCH 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads

the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC,
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle
of equity of representation. Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality
of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province.
For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for
the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:
Census 1990 Census 1994

First District 303, 349 178, 688
Second District 272, 167 156, 462
Third District 214, 499 125, 763
Fourth District 269, 347 155, 995
Fifth District 309, 148 181, 242
ISSUES:
Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No.

2736
RULING:
The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article
IX of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor

adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the

Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a
district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a
substantive one. Minor adjustments do not allow the change in allocations
per district.
It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its
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Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to
the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied.
PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS

G.R. 132875-76
FEB. 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of

Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge

mandate as member of House of Representatives?
RULING:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.

However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity
from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement
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of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more

than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC

G.R. 136781
FACTS:
Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering

the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the
52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the
1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent
congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers

is mandatory.
HELD:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same
declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them.
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It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and

coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list
seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than

three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).
ABUNDO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 201716
2013 JAN 8
FACTS:
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo

Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012
Resolution of the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in
EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc affirming that divisions disposition. The assailed
issuances, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No.
55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in
the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly
ruling that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus,
barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current
2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former
dealt with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the
continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be

interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional
three-term limitation;
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3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr.

by its reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified
logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida

and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no
interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an
"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started;
and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation

was adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant
(Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner was not so
interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive

terms.
HELD:
No. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos

three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office

pursuant to the constitutional and statutory provisions, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
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DEMETRIA VS. ALBA

G.R. NO. 71977
FACTS:
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan

Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from
disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph
1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for
the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973

Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing

any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the

privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of
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any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act

or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one
item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to
another here.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 115455
1994August 25
FACTS:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing

the petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press
from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even
nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional."
ISSUE:
Whether or not sales tax on bible sales violative of religious freedom?
RULING:
No. The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike
an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
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Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid,
its application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's
Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of religious books and
pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one
thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the
exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the
sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise
of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
FABIAN VS. DESIERTO

G.R. 129742
SEPT. 16, 1998
FACTS:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT

Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the
incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District
(FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and

Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative
case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but
the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later
referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently
provides that:
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In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the

Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD:
No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That
constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control
over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the SC.
NICOLAS-LEWIS, ET AL VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 162759
AUGUST 4, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought

to avail their right of suffrage under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow petitioners to vote in
the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the
requirement of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under
Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not petitioners may participate in the election sans the

compliance of the 1 year residency.
RULING:
The Court held that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship
under RA 9225 may exercise their right to vote under the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, RA 9189.
Article 5, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the exception to the

residency requirement in Section 1 of the same article. The voting
mechanism in RA 9189 was practically set forth to provide a system wherein
Filipinos of dual citizenship and are, at the same time, not residing in the
Philippines are empowered to vote.
The Court held that present day duals may now exercise their right of
suffrage provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189.
BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103504
APR. 15, 1992
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act
No. 1797) that were repealed during the time of former President
Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not
give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out
that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was
one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Taada v.
Tuvera
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Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General

Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for
pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the
following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund
Adjustment. However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which
provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices
to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The
President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was
never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the
decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in
the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the
others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its
entirety or not at all.
VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS. VEGA

G.R. 105364
JUN. 28, 2001
FACTS:
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance

in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila
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Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim
for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was
signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB
to reopen despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening,
respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the
bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992
or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after
15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless
otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any
event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process
in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it.
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SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169777
2006 April 20
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a

whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security likewise issued invitations 2 dated September 22, 2005
to the officials of the AFP, for an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-
Tapping of the President of the Philippines.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring

Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule
on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution,
and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect
immediately
ISSUE:
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1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in

Congress?
2. Whether or not E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern?
3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion

when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation?
RULING:
Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive

branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on
executive operations. Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain
types of information of a sensitive character. The infirm provisions of E.O.
464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of

Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the
Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however,
VALID.
SABIO VS. GORDON

G.R. 174340
OCT. 17, 2006
FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced

Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
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(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the

alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio
to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more
solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such
power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be

recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
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MITRA versus COMELEC

G.R. No. 191938
2010 Jul 2
FACTS:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared
cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of
Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality
of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a
domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district
for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as
Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a "highly urbanized
city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto
Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial
officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of
Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record
from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a
resident of Aborlan. Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course
or to cancel Mitras COC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
HELD:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan.

The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he
met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10,
2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able
to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of
effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his
representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not
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4
present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his
COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V PURISIMA

G.R. NO. 166715
AUGUST 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from

implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335(Attrition Act of
2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and
BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status
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2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition

challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation.
They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best
only in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the
creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of

J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
Implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and
(d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest. The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the
grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government With this backdrop, it is
clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of
powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive
branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment
"beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and
related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees
or its members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it
exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution
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including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any
post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads
of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such
regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of
a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct
role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
JEAN L. ARNAULT VS.LEON NAZARENO

G.R. NO. L-3820
JULY 18, 1950
FACTS:
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the
Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime
in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special
committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who
delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to
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the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have

purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions
in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.
ISSUE:
Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD:
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out

their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein
established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee
may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but
the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due
process of law.
BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

G.R. 89914
NOV. 20, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the

government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of
Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa,
a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the

Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the
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Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were

subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they
know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his

testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the
inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention.
The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE:
W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation.
RULING:
NO. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose

of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that
"the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights
must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.
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DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,

G.R. NO. 196271
OCTOBER 18, 2011
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the
organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM
Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the
second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first
regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third
time the ARMM regional elections to the 2 nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should

have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for
these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide
with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court,

the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections

[including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
constitutional?
RULING:
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of

elections.
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101
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While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission
exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to
hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday
of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections,
should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local
election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the
Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate
days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the
necessity of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only

of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
"except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions
before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
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4
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs
in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options
open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain
in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013]
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to
appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the
2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
PIMENTEL VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. 158088
JUL. 6, 2005
FACTS:
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103
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While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then

president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as
secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an
acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other
senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel
averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the
Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter
2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the
respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not
anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the
president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary
designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting
capacity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself

provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the
provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this
case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and
when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments
this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the
president. The choice is the presidents to make and the president normally
appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to choose
the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
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Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot

impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is

in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents
confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but
practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292
also provides that the president may temporarily designate an officer
already in the government service or any other competent person to perform
the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may
even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
NOTE: Ad Interim Appointments vs Appointments in an Acting Capacity
Appointments in an Acting
Ad Interim Appointments
Capacity
It is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect Acting appointments are a
immediately and can no longer way of temporarily filling
be withdrawn by the President important offices but, if
once the appointee has abused, they can also be a
Description
qualified into office. The fact way of circumventing the
that it is subject to confirmation need for confirmation by the
by the COA does not alter its Commission on
permanent character (Matibag Appointments.
vs Benipayo)
When Upon Acceptance by

Upon Acceptance by Appointee
Effective Appointee
Any time when there is

When Made When Congress is in recess
vacancy
Submitted to Yes No
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the COA
FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

GR 160261
10 NOVEMBER 2003
FACTS:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives

adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation,
in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2
June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was
endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that
the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss
the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and
three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House
of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
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provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
ISSUE:
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from

impeachment proceedings.
HELD:
The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of

the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution.
The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of
the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the
judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara
v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it
serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the
law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
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BERMUDEZ VS TORRES
GR NO. 131429
AUGUST 4, 1999
FACTS:
The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac

impelled the main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and
respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper
interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.
Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona,
Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had
the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President
Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified
xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office
before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65)
of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately
informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil
Service Commission, of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against
herein respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After
hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution and,
in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The
subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a
denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary

of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of
respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD:
The petition is denied. An appointment to a public office is the
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unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority

therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of
an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its
acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is
an integral part thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to
appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as
necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It
should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of
government whose authority includes the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation
of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the
Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere advise,
exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and
not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President,
being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the
exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as
having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
BLAQUERA VS. ALCALA

G.R. NO. 109406
SEPTEMBER 11, 1998
FACTS:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted
each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive
benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one
month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO
provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the
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year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards

of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions,
are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the
year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study
being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government

departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992.
Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the
grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum
amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268,
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval
of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and
agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the
year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the
excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries
or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of

presidential control over the executive departments
HELD:
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and

authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes
the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can,
by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or
decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices
under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits
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without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for
the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising
his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government
agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the
uneven distribution of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is
his control of executive departments.
GUDANI VS. SENGA

GR NO. 170165
15AUGUST2006
FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify
allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci
tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before
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the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the
Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command.
Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to

the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative
inquiry.
RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do

so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President
has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military
official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do
so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However,
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members
of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
PDAF
G.R. NO. 208566
FACTS:
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The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines
since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several
legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or
concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
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government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is

constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is

unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of

funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements
the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated
to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the
Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators
only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The

Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
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legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate

further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting
which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with
the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass
or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy.
Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but
worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
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II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is
that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Belgica et al
emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD
910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;(ii) PD
1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to
be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
BELGICA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

(G.R. NOS. 208566, 208493 AND 209251, 2013)
NOVEMBER 11, 2013
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Congressional Pork Barrel
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WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on
1.) separation of powers
2.) non-delegability of legislative power
3.) checks and balances
4.) accountability
5.) political dynasties
6.) local autonomy
B. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
WON the phrases:
(a) and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to

finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating
to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of

legislative power
HELD AND RATIO:
A. Congressional Pork Barrel
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be
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funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the
areas of fund release and realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one
form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects
of budgeting, violating the separation of powers principle. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability
since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion
only appears as a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate
appropriations of the PDAF only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside
of the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into
effect without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget
within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting
the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013

PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted
for multiple purposes of spending. This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of
item veto.
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as

said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
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effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also,

this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section
14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: [A Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. Allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. However, the
same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislators control of
his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a
matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-
case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity between

legislators and the Executive department, through the formers post-
enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern
the Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper
subject of judicial assessment.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase as may be defined by law.
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score
is largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of making equal the unequal. The
gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would
be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former. To add, what rouses
graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in
some years, even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
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Councils (LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared

towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies and resolutions of
LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who
are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
C. Presidential Pork Barrel
YES.Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as

amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used to finance the priority infrastructure development projects. This gives
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure
project he may so determine as a priority. The law does not supply a
definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note,
the delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility.
Thus, the phrase to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects must be stricken down as unconstitutional since similar
to Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law.
HUTCHISON PORTS PHIL LIMITED VS. SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN

AUTHORITY
G.R. 131367
AUG. 31, 2000
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FACTS:
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL)won a public

bidding made by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The project
was to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within the
Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA Board of Directors already declared
HPPL as the winner but later on, the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding however,
HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a
petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA from conducting the rebidding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case

against SBMA.
HELD:
No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the
winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all
projects undertaken by the SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of
the President. Hence, the Board of SBMA is under the control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration
made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign corporation

registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did not register
here in the Philippines.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated transaction. The
conduct of bidding is not an isolated transaction. It is doing business here
in the Philippines. The Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule,
doing or engaging in or transacting business in the Philippines is a case
to case basis. It has often been held that a single act or transaction may be
considered as doing business when a corporation performs acts for which it
was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized.
The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular
act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign
corporations intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes doing business because it

shows the foreign corporations intention to engage in business here. The
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bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporations

reason for creation or existence. Therefore, HPPL has done business here
without license. It cannot now sue in the Philippines without license because
its participation in the bidding is not merely an isolated transaction.
MARCOS VS.MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211
SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
FACTS:
While in exile in Hawaii, as a result of EDSA Revolution, the Marcos

family requested the permission of the government to allow them to return
to the Philippines. Then President Corazon Aquino refused to grant them
permission for the reason that the return of the Marcoses is threat to
national security and peace. The Marcoses claim that to prohibit them from
entering the country is to impair their liberty of abode and right to travel.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the President has the power to prohibit the Marcoses from
entering the country.
2. Whether or not the issue is non-justifiable (not the within the jurisdiction
of court) as contended by the solicitor general.
RULING:
Petitioners contention that the presidents power is limited to those

enumerated in the constitution (which does not include the power to bar the
Marcoses entry into the country) is exclusive. The president has residual
powers, meaning, powers which are not enumerated in the constitution.
Furthermore, as commander-in-chief, the president has the power and duty
to keep the peace and maintain public order and security even in the
absence of an emergency. The case at bar, is within the jurisdiction of the
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court. The court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The issue at hand is
not a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court. However, in the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the function of the court is simply to
check and not to supplant the executive. It is not for the court to determine
the wisdom of the executives action. Its only power is to determine if the
chief executive has gone beyond the constitutional limits of her jurisdiction.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. 156982
SEPT. 8, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government

agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through
Proclamation No. 347.The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members
appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and
Interior and Local Government as ex officio members. It appears that after
personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned
over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria
beginning December 12, 1994.However, on October15, 1997, NAC resident
auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27,
1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO
upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued.
ISSUE:
COA Memo No. 97-038 was not published, valid?
RULING:
Contrary to petitioners claim, COA Memorandum No.97-038 does not

need, for validity and effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the
Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the
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Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication. We clarified this publication requirement in
Tanada vs. Tuvera:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not
be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation
or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be effective and
valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute but a directive
issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition
imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and
his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from
holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation.
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AQUILINO PIMENTEL VS. AGUIRRE

G.R. NO. 132988
JULY 19, 2000
FACTS:
On December, 1997, the President issued AO 372 (Adoption of

Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998). The AO provided that (a)
10% of the Internal Revenue allotment to LGUs is withheld. Further it (b)
"directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent. Subsequently, on
December 10, 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4of
AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that by
issuing AO 372, the President exercised the power of control over LGUs in
contravention of law. Moreover, withholding 10% of the IRA is in
contravention of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the
national internal revenue. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues
that the aforesaid AO was purportedly i n o r d e r t o c o p e w i t h t h e
nations economic difficulties brought about by the peso
depreciation on that said period. Further, he claims that AO 372 was
issued merely as an exercise of the Presidents power of supervision over
LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely
directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory
prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares,
because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation."
ISSUES:
WON Section 4 of AO 372, which withholds 10 percent of their

internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of
general supervision over local governments.
HELD:
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There are several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2 )consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and
the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in
no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
MMDA VS. JANCOM

JAN 30, 2002
FACTS:
This case is all about the Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of
the SC dated January 30, 2002 affirming the judgment of the CA, which in
turn affirmed that of the RTC, declaring that there is valid and perfected
waste management contract between the government of the Philippines and
the respondent corporation and dismissing the petition filed by the petitioner
for lack of merit.
In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterates its arguments

that: (1) resort to a petition for certiorari was proper; (2) that the waste
management contract never got through the negotiation stage; (3) that the
signature of the President is necessary for the perfection of the contract in
question; and (4) that the contract could be unilaterally cancelled by the
Government since incineration is prohibited by the Clean Air Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petition for certiorari is the proper remedy for the
Petitioner instead of appealing the decision of the RTC?
RULING:
The existence and availability of the right to appeal proscribes a resort

to certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter
remedy is precisely that there should be no appeal. The special civil action
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for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Well-settled is the rule
that the special civil action for certiorari may not be invoked as a substitute
for the remedy of appeal.
Petitioners failure to appeal the decision of the trial court is a fatal defect
which, standing by itself, already fully justifies the dismissal of its petition.
Petitioner has failed to bring out any matter which could justify a reversal.
NITAFAN VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R NO. L- 78780
JUL. 23, 1987
FACTS:
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional
Trial Court seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or
compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary,
which is unconstitutional. Earlier however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en
banc had already reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Justice which directs
the continued withholding of taxes of the justices and the judges of the
judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless to settle the
issue once and for all.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the
payment of income tax.
HELD:
No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation.
Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the
government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the
whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be
subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
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Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of
the judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the
incumbent members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law
increasing their salary) shall benefit immediately.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which
were appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.
CRUZ VS. DENR

G.R. 135385
DEC. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or

the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation
of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz
et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the
rights of private landowners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the
IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public
domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.
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GEORGE YAO VS.HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 132428
2000 OCTOBER 24
FACTS:
Petitioner assails the Resolution of the Court of Appeals which

dismissed his appeal and ordered the remand of the records of the case to
the MeTC for execution.
Petitioners legal dilemma commenced when the Philippine Electric

Manufacturing Company (PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General
Electric GE) lamp starters. As the only local subsidiary of GE-USA, PEMCO
knew that it was a highly unlikely market situation considering that no GE
starter was locally manufactured or imported. A market survey was
conducted by the PEMCO through its trademark specialist, it was discovered
that thirty (3) establishments all Tradeway Commercial Corporation (TCC)
sold GE starters.Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50)
pieces of fluorescent lamp starters with GE logo and design. Assessing that
these products were counterfeit, PEMCO applied of the issuance of search
warrant. Eight boxes were seized from the TCC warehouse. Petitioner, Yao,
being TCCs President and Manager was indicted and charged for unfair
competition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Yao was denied due process?
RULING:
Petitioner Yao was denied due process but not on the grounds he
ardently invoked. While he indeed resorted to the wrong mode of appeal and
his right to appeal is statutory, it is still an essential part of the judicial
system that courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the prerogative, but instead afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the
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constraints of technicalities. If strict adherence to the letter of the law would

result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a partys
cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with
certain formal requirements, procedural rules should definitely be liberally
construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty,
honor or property on mere technicalities. We therefore withhold legal
approbation on the RTC decision at bar fir its palpable failure to comply with
the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in
court.
All magistrate should heed to the demand of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the
Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the
nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS VS. CA

G.R. 110263
JUL. 20, 2001
FACTS:
In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine National

Construction Corporation (PNCC) to pay $5.1 million to Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result of a recovery suit filed by Asiavest
against PNCC in Malaysia for PNCCs failure to complete a construction
project there despite due payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC
failed to comply with the judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavest filed a
complaint for the enforcement of the Malaysian ruling against PNCC in the
Philippines. The case was filed with the Pasig RTC which eventually denied
the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the foreign judgment
cannot be enforced here because of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
PNCC, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.
Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC on the ground that PNCCs counsel
participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should be enforced

against PNCC in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations of want
of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On
the contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence as to the validity of the
proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented the certified and
authenticated copies of the judgment and the order issued by the Malaysian
Court. It also presented correspondences between Asiavests lawyers and
PNCCs lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCCs allegation that the
Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCCs allegation of fraud
is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked the same in the Malaysian
Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party must
present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the judgment
enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified and
authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.
TICHANGCO VS. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. NO. 150629
JUNE 30, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a land title verification request with the LRA. The
request prompted by an alleged claim of ownership of a certain Manotok
over the land which petitioners occupy, and which they perceive as public
land.LRA-Task Force issued a report stating, among others that appearing on
the survey plan, Lots 62 and 69 were bounded by Estero Maypajo. The Task
Force also found a patent was issued in favor of some private persons.
Petitioners sought the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor for legal action
on OCTs Nos. 820 and 7477. The OSG wrote a letter to public respondent for
a review and evaluation of the records on the issuance of the said titles. In
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its reply, public respondent contend that the parcels of land described in the
said titles were originally registered in the Manila Registry of Deeds.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA complied with Section 14 of Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution?
RULING:
Under Sec. 14, Art. VIII, it mandates that no decision shall be

rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. Petitioner attack the validity of the
assailed CA Decision for its failure to mention that a magnetic survey was
completed only on No. 15, 1906, a fact that they perceived to be crucial to
the determination of the case. The Decision of the CA affirmed the resolution
of the LRA. The CA deliberated on the law and the reasons it relied upon in
its determination of the issues presented only after giving detailed and
assessment of the factual antecedents found by respondent administrator.
The Decision of the CA contains necessary antecedents to warrant its

conclusions, the appellate court cannot be said to have withheld any specific
finding of facts. What the law insists on is that decisions state the essential
ultimate facts. The mere failure to specify the contentions of the petitioner
and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirements of the provision of law and the
Constitution.
The Constitutional provision deals with the disposition of petitions for

review and of motions for reconsideration. In appellate courts, the rule does
not require any comprehensive statement of facts but merely a statement of
the legal basis for denying due course.
The CA complied sufficiently with the constitutional requirement, after

deliberation, when it denied a motion and states that the questions raised
are factual or have already been passed upon or cites some other legal
basis.
REV. FR. DANTE MARTINEZ VS.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 123547
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2001 MAY 21
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutions

of the Court of Appeal, affirming the decisions of the RTC, finding private
respondents owners of the land in dispute, subject to petitioners rights as a
builder in good faith.
Private respondents entered into an oral contract with the petitioner

for the sum of P15, 000.00 over a certain parcel of land subject of the
controversy. Upon payment of the down payment, petitioner started the
construction of a house. Petitioner completed the payment and an
acknowledgment receipt was executed stipulating that the private
respondents will deliver the Deed of Sale which did not happen. Petitioner
discovered later that the lot he was occupying was sold to Spouses
Veneracion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Appeals denying

petitioners motion for reconsideration is contrary to the constitutional
requirement that a denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the
legal reasons on which it is based.
RULING:
Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution provides that No petition for

review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor. This
requirement was fully complied with when the Court of Appeals, in denying
reconsideration its decision, stated in its resolution that it found no reason to
change its ruling because petitioner had not raised anything new. The
resolution states among others that the Motion for Reconsideration poses
nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been
considered and passed upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
CAOIBES VS.OMBUDSMAN.
G.R. 132177
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JUL. 19, 2001
FACTS:
This is a petitioner for certiorari to review the orders of the Office of

the Ombudsman.Petitioner Caoibes, seek the review of the following orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997
denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-
affidavit and other controverting evidences.Respondent Alumbres, filed a
Criminal Complaint for physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer section on

Case No.OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.?
RULING:
The ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and a
court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. It
appears that the case involves two members of the judiciary who were
entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case
before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to
deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
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PEOPLE VS. SOLA

G.R NO. L- 56158-64
MAR. 17, 1981
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari from the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan. The prolonged thrusts of the petition: 1. The setting aside, by
certiorari of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by
Judge Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases and 2.
The petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal
cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
A search warrant is issued to search seven (7) dead bodies which are
believed to be buried in the hacienda of Sola, which turned out to be true.
After due preliminary examination of the complainants witnesses and his
other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the
accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. However, without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their
temporary release.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of venue is valid?
RULING:
The Supreme Court has the power to order a change of venue to avoid
a miscarriage of justice. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the
question of transferring the place of trial, in this case, from Himamaylan to
Bacolod City. The Constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could
order a change of venue or place or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 wisely incorporated the
ruling in the landmark decision of People vs. Gutierrez, where Justice J.B.L.
Reyes as ponente vigorously and categorically affirmed: In the particular
case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality
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where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for
which courts have been established.
Why a change of venue is imperative was made clear in the Comment of the
Solicitor General. Thus: The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above
constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The witnesses in this
case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their
way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this
fear, they may either to refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
ZALDIVAR VS. GONZALEZ.

G.R NO. L- 79690-707
OCT. 7, 1988
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan. The

following are the subjects of the Resolution: 1) a Motion, dated February 9,
1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Zadivar against public
respondent Special Prosecutor Gonzalez, in connection with GR Nos. 79690-
707 and GR No. 80578, and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated May 2, 1988
requiring respondent Hon Gonzalez to0 show cause why he should not be
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punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for

making certain public statements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Gonzalez should be charged of

contempt of court?
RULING:
The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession,

has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Courts constitutional mandate to regulate admission
to the practice itself of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the
practice itself of law. The Supreme Court is compelled to hold that the
statements made by respondent Gonzales clearly constitute contempt and
call for its exercise of disciplinary authority. Respondents statements,
especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and
unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the
justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect
for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration
of justice in the country.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS
G.R. 180643
MAR. 25, 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and

Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
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U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be

financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high
executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs
and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him
with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.However, when probed
further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter
to the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions

covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The
revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow
and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive privilege is highly
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recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually

committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository
of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating
to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
RENATO CAYETANO VS.CHRISTIAN MONSOD

G.R. NO. 100113
1991 SEPTEMBER 3
FACTS:
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This is a petition to review the decision of the Commission on

Appointments. Respondent Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years. The
Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner challenged the confirmation of the
Commission of Appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Monsod engaged in the practice of law?
RULING:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires

the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Interpreted in threw light of the various definitions of the term practice of
law, particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor-verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years. The Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsods confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law.
MANUEL M. LEYSON JR.VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 134990
April 27, 2000
FACTS:
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International Towage and Transport Corporation (ITCC) entered into a

contract with Legaspi Oil Company, Inc (Legaspi Oil), Granexport
Manufacturing Corporation and United Coconut Chemicals Inc, (UNITED
COCONUT), comprising the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
companies. The majority share holdings of these CIIF companies are owned
by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) as administrator of the CIIF. It
was agreed on the contract that either party could terminate the contract
provided that a 3-month advance notice be given to the other party.
However, the new president of CIIF, Oscar A. Torralba, terminated the
contract without the requisite of advance notice.
Petitioner, Manuel m. Leyson, as Executive Vice President of ITTC, filed

with public respondent Office of the Ombudsman a grievance case against
respondent Oscar A. Torralba. He also charged respondent Tirso Antiporda,
chairman of UPCB and CIIF Oil Mills, and respondent Oscar A. Torralba with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices also before the
Ombudsman.
The case was dismissed by the respondent finding that the case is a
simple breach of contract which should have been filed in a regular court.
Respondent stated that it has no jurisdiction to determine the legality or
validity of the contract because the entities involved are private
corporations.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent acted with grave abuse of

discretion in dismissing his complaint. He supported his allegation by citing
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. PCGG and
Republic v Sandiganbayan which declared that coconut levy funds are public
funds. He asserted that respondents Antiporda and Torralba are public
officers subject to the jurisdiction of the ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the companies comprising CIIF are government owned

and or controlled corporations.
RULING:
The jurisprudential rules invoked by petitioner in support of his claim

that the CIIF companies are government owned or controlled corporations
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are incomplete without resorting to the definition of government owned or

controlled corporation contained in par.(13), Sec.2 introductory provisions
of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that any agency organized
as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public
needs whether governmental or propriety in nature, and owned by the
Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where
applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least 51%
of its capital stock. The definition mentions three requisites, namely any
agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporations, vested with function
relating to public needs whether governmental or propriety in nature, and
owned by the government directly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least 51% of its capital.
In the present case, all three corporations comprising the CIIF were
organized as stock corporations. The UPCB-CIIF owns 44.10% of the shares
of LEGASPI OIL, 91.42 % of the shares of GRANEXPORT, and 92.85 % of the
shares of UNITED COCONUT. Obviously, the below 51% share of the stock of
LEGASPI OIL removes this firm from the definition of a government owned
or controlled corporation. Our concern has thus been limited to
GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT as we go back to the second requisite.
Unfortunately, it is in this regard that petitioner failed to substantiate his
contentions. There is no showing that GRANEXPORT and UNITED COCONUT
was vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
propriety in nature. The Court concludes that the CIIF companies are, as
found by public respondent, private corporations not within the scope of its
jurisdiction.
GENERAL VS.ROCO.
G.R. 143366
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JAN. 29, 2001
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.

Respondent was appointed as Regional Director of the LTO, a position
equivalent to CES rank level V. He was re-appointed after the change of the
administration. At the time of respondents appointment in 1996 and 1999,
he was not a CES eligible. However, during his incumbency, he was
conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Service Board. Petitioner
was later on appointed as Regional Director of LTO, the same position
occupied by respondent. Respondent filed before the CA a petition for quo
warranto. The CA issued a TRO enabling respondent to reassume the
disputed office.
ISSUE:
Whether CES eligibility is all that an employee needs to acquire

security of tenure in the service; and that appointment to a CES rank is not
necessary for the acquisition of such security of tenure.
RULING:
Two requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career

executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit; CES eligibility and
appointment to the appropriate CES rank. There is no question that
respondent Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate
CES rank, which is CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director
of LTO. Failing short of one of the qualifications that would complete his
membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation
of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other
positions in the career executive service. The law allows appointment of
those who are not subject to obtain said eligibility, in the same manner that
the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank
for the position of Regional Director, is permitted in a temporary capacity.
BENGZON VS. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
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G.R. NO. 89914

NOVEMBER 20, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the

government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of
Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa,
a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the

Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they
know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his

testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the
inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention.
The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE:
W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
RULING:
NO. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose

of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the
relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
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Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that
"the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights
must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against one's self.
PAGCOR VS. CARLOS P. RILLORAZA

G.R. NO. 141141
JUNE 25, 2001
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversal of the
Decision dated August 31, 1999as well as the Resolution dated November
29, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals.
On November 5, 1997, administrative charges for dishonesty, grave

misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss
of confidence, were brought against respondent Carlos P. Rilloraza, a casino
operations manager of petitioner PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR).
Respondent appealed to the Civil Service Commission. On November 20,
1998, the Commission issued Resolution No. 983033,the dispositive portion
of which provides, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Carlos P. Rilloraza is hereby

dismissed. However, the Commission finds appellant guilty only of Simple
Neglect of Duty and metes out upon him the penalty of one month and one
day suspension. The assailed Resolution of PAGCOR Board of Directors is
thus modified.
ISSUES:
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a) Did the respondent commit grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and loss of confidence?
b) Is there sufficient cause to warrant the dismissal of the respondent for
occupying a primarily confidential position?
RULING:
1) No, he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file in that his appointment

to the position entails faith and confidence in his competence to perform his
assigned tasks. In the first place, there is no evidence to sustain the charge
of dishonesty.
In the case at bar, respondents explanation fails to evince an inclination

to lie or deceive, or that he is entirely lacking the trait of
straightforwardness. We concur with the appellate courts finding, thus:
Available proof unmistakably demonstrate that upon seeing BM Syhongpan

playing at Table No. 3BB, respondent Rilloraza at once, told him to
stop. However, Syhongpan explained that he was merely playing for a
customer, Ms. Corazon Castillo who was seated also at the table. After
observing the large number of chips in front of Ms. Castillo estimated at
around P7M, respondent became convinced of the clarification given by
Branch Manager Syhongpan and he must have relied also on the word of
said top ranking PAGCOR official whose representation must ordinarily be
accepted and accorded respect and credence by a subordinate like him.
More importantly, the PAGCOR Adjudication Committee concluded that

respondent actually attempted to stop the game where Syhongpan was
playing which was even utilized as basis by the PAGCOR Board in dismissing
respondent.
Lastly, if only to consummate respondents alleged dishonesty and grave

misconduct by corruptly profiting from said incident, he could have easily
pocketed the balato given by Syhongpan, but he never did, and in fact,
returned the money.
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2) No, the respondent did not merely occupy a confidential position but
rather complete his duties and responsibilities for a great measure of both
ability and dependability.
Section 1 of the general rules in the implementing rules of Presidential
Decree No. 807 states that appointments in the Civil Service except as to
those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined a far as practicable by competitive examination.
The Civil Service Commission, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly

attributed good faith on the part of respondent. Accordingly, the modified
penalty imposed by the Civil Service Commission on the respondent which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, was proper under the premises.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 159940
2005 FEBRUARY 16
FACTS:
By letter[1] dated March 7, 1994 addressed to then Ombudsman

Conrado M. Vasquez, the CSC approved the Qualification Standards for
several positions in the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) including that
for Graft Investigation Officer III. The Qualification Standards for said
position are:
EDUCATION: Bachelor of Laws
EXPERIENCE: 5 years of experience in the practice of law, counseling,

investigation/ prosecution of cases, hearings of administrative/ criminal
cases, legal research or other related work.
TRAINING: 24 hours of relevant training
ELIGIBILITY: RA 1080 (Bar)
The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) subsequently advised the

Ombudsman, by letter of May 29, 1996,[2]that pursuant to CSC
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Memorandum Circular No. 21, s.1994, the position of Graft Investigation

Officer III, among other positions in petitioner therein mentioned, was
classified as a Career Executive Service (CES) position, hence, governed by
the rules of the CES pertaining to eligibility, appointment to CES ranks, and
performance evaluation, among other things.
ISSUE:
Petitioner further contends that the CES Eligibility, as administered by

the respondent CESB, cannot be validly made a requisite for the attainment
of security of tenure on qualified career officials of petitioner who are not
legally part of the CES.
RULING:
It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De
Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III,
as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification Standards. Such being the
case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the
Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective December 18,
2002.
To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the discretion

vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority. It goes without
saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who
were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated
June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December 18,
2002.
As the Court takes note of the information of the CSC in its

Supplemental Memorandum, it holds that third level eligibility is not required
for third level officials of petitioner appointed by the Ombudsman in light of
the provisions of the Constitution vis a vis the Administrative Code of 1987
as discussed above.
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REMEDIOS PASTOR VS. CITY OF PASIG

G.R. NO. 146873
2002 MAY 9
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Budget Officer of Pasig. In 1992 she was reassigned to

the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports
against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995,
after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement
to her former position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of the
City government. However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of
Appeals set aside the decision of the CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the CA should be set aside and that of
the CSC reinstated?
RULING:
The decision of the CSC held that, while petitioners reassignment was
originally made in the exigency of the service without reduction in her rank,
status, or salary, respondent City Mayor failed to advance sufficient reason
to warrant petitioners continuous reassignment for more than three years
which appears too long for one to conduct the study assigned to her.
Petitioners reassignment to various offices should be considered more than
merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment,
lasting nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of
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the City of Pasig. The petitioner should now be returned to her original
position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her
removal without cause from the position to which she has been permanently
appointed.
DOMINGO VS. ZAMORA

G.R. NO. 142283
FEBRUARY 6, 2003
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with prayer for temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and
Memoranda Nos. 01592 and 01594.
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 81[3] (EO 81 for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports
Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS in
School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales
(Secretary Gonzales for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on
January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the
exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or
bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No.
01594 reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various
offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among
the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with
their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional
for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain
that the Presidents issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation of
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powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating their
right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners
pray that this Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to
school sports development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the
petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining order against respondents
to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for
brevity), otherwise known as the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the
BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS
relating to sports competition to the PSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda valid.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and
academic.
The enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case
moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred
the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners
now admit that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption
by the PSC of the functions of the BPESS. Moreover, since RA 9155
provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained
by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law explicitly protects and
preserves their right to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the
Court to point out that Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the
President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize
the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
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On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result
in the employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist
although in another department, agency or office. In the instant case, the
BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily,
then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring
their continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that
these employees shall be retained by the Department.
BAYTAN VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 153945
FEBRUARY 4, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioners, Reynato Baytan, Reynaldo Baytan and Adrian

Baytan were on their way to register for the May 1998 elections when they
met the newly elected Barangay Captain, Roberto Ignacio, in Barangay 18,
Zone II of Cavite City, who led them to register in Precinct No. 83-A of
Barangay 18.U p o n r e a l i z i n g t h a t t h e i r r e s i d e n c e i s s i t u a t e d
w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f Barangay 28 not Barangay 18,
petitioners proceeded to Precinct 129-A of Barangay 28 and registered
anew. S u b s e q u e n t l y , p e t i t i o n e r s s e n t a l e t t e r t o f o r m e r
C O M E L E C A s s i s t a n t Executive Director Jose Pio O. Joson
requesting for advice on how to cancel their previous registration.
Petitioners Voters Registration Records were forwarded to the
Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V.
R a v a n z o , f o r e v a l u a t i o n , w h o , subsequently, recommended
filing information for double registration against petitioners. The
COMELEC affirmed Ravanzos resolution. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, which, was denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it

recommended the prosecution of petitioners for double registration despite
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lack of intent and substantial compliance with the requirement of

cancellation of previous registration.
HELD:
No. There is no question that petitioners registered twice on different

days and in different precincts without canceling their previous registration.
Since "double registration" is malum prohibitum, petitioners claim of lack
of intent to violate the law is inconsequential. Neither is the letter to
Joson an application to cancel their previous registration. This letter
was sent after their second registration was accomplished and after
the election officer of Cavite City had already reported their act of double
registration to a higher official. Moreover, petitioners claims of honest
mistake, good faith and substantial compliance with the Election Codes
requirement of cancellation of previous registration are matters of defense
best ventilated in the trial proper rather t h a n a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y
investigation. The established rule is that a
p r e l i m i n a r y investigation is not the occasion for the full
a n d e x h a u s t i v e display of the parties evidence. It is for the
presentation of such evidence o n l y a s m a y e n g e n d e r a w e l l -
g r o u n d e d b e l i e f t h a t a n o f f e n s e h a s b e e n committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.
ALBERTO JARAMILLA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 155717
2003 OCTOBER 23
FACTS:
Petitioner Jaramilla and private respondent Suyat both ran for the
position of Member of the Sangunniang Bayan in Ilocos Sur in the 2001
elections. After the election the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
the winners and the Certificate of Canvass shows that respondent Suyat was
ranked No. 9 and petitioner Jaramilla was ranked No. 7. Respondent, upon
review, discovered that petitioner was credited with only twenty three (23)
votes and not seventy three (73) votes. Respondent Suyat filed before the
COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene,
which is treated as Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. Petitioner, in his
answer contend that said petition should be dismissed for having been filed
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out of time and for lack of required certification of non-forum shopping. On

2002, the COMELEC granted the petition of respondent Suyat.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
Under Art. IX-C of the Constitution it provides that all election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
However, said provision applies only in cases where the COMELEC exercises
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises
purely administrative functions. Such an error in the tabulation of the
results, which merely requires a clerical correction without the necessity of
opening ballot boxes or examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission en banc
properly assumed original jurisdiction over the aforesaid petition.
THE NACIONALISTA PARTY VS. VICENTE DE VERA

G.R. NO. L-3474
DECEMBER 7, 1949
FACTS:
The petitioners, members of the Nacionalista Party, sought to

disqualify COMELEC chairman Vicente de Vera from taking part in the
COMELEC deliberations concerning the November 1949 elections on two
grounds:
1. De Veras son, Teodoro de Vera was a Liberal Party senatorial candidate

during said elections. Following Rules of Courts, the older de Vera should be
disqualified.
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2. De Veras appointment as Chairman is void ab initio, because he had

already served as member of COMELEC prior to his term as Chairman. Under
the Constitution, he was not entitled to any reappointment.
ISSUES:
a. Whether or Not the Rules of Court applies to COMELEC

b. Whether or Not a person who has not served the full term of nine
years in the COMELEC may be reappointed.
RULING:
1) No. The Rules of Court, promulgated by the Supreme Court, applies only
to judicial bodies under its general power of supervision. The COMELEC is an
independent, administrative body over which the SC has jurisdiction only to
the extent that it may review the COMELECs decisions, ordinances or rulings
on certiorari. Assuming the COMELEC adopted the ROC suppletorily, it does
not have the power to adopt rules on the disqualification of its members
because the Constitution provides that its members may only be removed
through impeachment. The older de Vera should be able to inhibit himself
solely on the basis of ethics.
2) Yes. The phrase may not be reappointed is a continuation of the phrase

who shall serve office for a term of nine years. This does not warrant the
interpretation that members may not be reappointed when they have not
served the full term. In such cases, they may be reappointed provided that:
1) the appointment does not preclude the appointment of a new member
and 2) a term does not exceed nine years in all.
Petition dismissed.
PEOPLE VS. INTING

GR 88919
25 JULY 1990
FACTS:
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On 6 February 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against

OIC-Mayor Dominador S. Regalado Jr. of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a
permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor
to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or
clearance from COMELEC as required by law. Acting on the complaint,
COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervision of
Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case;
(2) to prepare and file the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the
prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima facie case and (3) to
issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be. After a
preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima
facie case. Hence, on 26 September 1988, he filed with the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 38. Dumaguete City) a criminal case for violation of section
261, Paragraph (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an
Order dated 30 September 1988, the court issued a warrant of arrest
against the OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at P5,000.00 as recommended
by the Provincial Election Supervisor. However, in an order dated 3 October
1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its
30 September 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not
authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the
information filed in this case if the same has the written approval of the
Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the
supervision and control of the latter." In another order dated 22 November
1988, the court gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days from receipt to file another
information charging the same offense with the written approval of the
Provincial Fiscal. Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an
order dated 8 December 1988, the trial court quashed the information. A
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is necessary before the

information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor may be given due
course by the trial court.
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HELD:
As to the constitutional mandate that "xx no search warrant or

warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge xx," (Article III, Section 2, Constitution) the
determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is neither for
the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. On
the other hand, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind
the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable
cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to
him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual.
It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any),
and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification
which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. Thus,
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are
conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no
confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper
- whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not be should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the
function of the Prosecutor. Preliminary investigation should be distinguished
as to whether it is an investigation for the determination of a sufficient
ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of
the prosecution's job. The second kind of preliminary investigation which is
more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge.
The 1987 Constitution (Article IX C, Section 2) mandates the COMELEC

not only to investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election
laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
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investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping

the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This
power is exclusive with COMELEC. It is only after a preliminary examination
conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section
2.
Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when
the application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed
with the court, the judge will then determine whether or not a probable
cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information
filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. The order to get the approval of
the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD

G.R. NO. 100113
SEPTEMBER 3, 1991
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President

Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5,
1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his
oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the c o n s e q u e n t
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appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on

Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates

Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that

there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a C h a i r m a n a n d
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
P h i l i p p i n e s a n d , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i r appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%.
He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. At this point, it
might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services. Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates". Hence, the
Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly d e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e p o s s e s s e d t h e
necessary qualifications as required by law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL VS.IMPERIAL.

G.R NO. L-8584
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MAR. 31, 1955
FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further
subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the
subjects of herein petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner
Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to judicially
declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private
respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on which the
OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an
investigation conducted by the DENR. Respondents, on the other hand
contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land to be "definitely
outside of the foreshore area." Within the time for pleading, private
respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed
their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial,
Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to
dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral court is
binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral
proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of
Lands instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant
therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an
objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the judgment
rendered by the cadastral court was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief
within the extended period granted to petitioner. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD:
Yes. At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in

question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of
the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.
It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a
strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and, is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide." The classification
of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government,
specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management
Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this
ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and
must therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however,
when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with
that of, the DENR Secretary.
JUNE GENEVIEVE R. SEBASTIAN VS. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. NOS. 139573-75
2000 MARCH 7
FACTS:
Petitioner Sebastian was the mayoralty candidate of the Reporma

Party during the 1998 elections. While respondent Royo was her opponent
from the other party. The Municipal Board of Canvassers was preparing to
canvass the election returns, petitioners sought the exclusion from canvass
of several election returns. Petitioners claimed that the election returns were
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prepared under extreme duress, threat, intimidation and political pressure

and influence and further contend that four (4) election returns were
missing. The Municipal Board of Canvassers denied the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the
appealed decision of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
RULING:
The petition originates from a pre-proclamation controversy. A pre-

proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns
on their face. As a general rule, COMELEC need not go beyond the face of
the returns and investigate alleged election irregularities.Petitioners have not
demonstrated precisely how the preparation and appreciation of election
returns were adversely affected by the allegations of petitioners. The public
respondents could not be faulted for grave abuse of discretion in refusing
petitioners call to exclude election returns they claim as the product of
coercion and falsification, even if they appear clean on their face. The
COMELEC had conducted hearings on the matter, where petitioners and
other parties concerned had submitted affidavits and presented witnesses.
However, the evidence presented failed to prove that the election returns
were tainted by duress. By such factual circumstances, which could not be
deemed evidently self-serving on its part, respondent COMELEC could not
have prudently and fairly excluded the assailed returns.
JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

G.R. NO. 136191
NOVEMBER 29, 1999
FACTS:
Jesus O. Typoco, (TYPOCO) and Jesus Emmanuel Pimentel

(PIMENTEL) were both candidates for theposition of Governor in Camarines
Norte during the May 11, 1998 elections. On June 10, 1998, TYPOCO filed
apetition alleging that massive fraud and irregularities attended the
preparation of the election returns considering thatupon technical
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examination, 305 election returns were found to have been prepared in

group by one person. A reportby the COMELECs ERSD Voters Identification
Division disclosed, among others, that the handwritten entries on278
COMELEC copies of election returns particularly under the columns
Congressman/Governor/Vice-Governor/Nickname or Stage Name, were
written by one and the same person in groups.The COMELEC En
Bancpromulgated a resolution dismissing TYPOCOs petition for the
Declaration of Failure of Elections and/or Annulment of Elections in
Camarines Norte for lack of merit, claiming that the groundscited by TYPOCO
do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the findings of the ERSD Voters Identification Division

can warrant the declaration of a Failure of Elections and/or Annulment of
Elections?
RULING:
No. Petition was DISMISSED .

First, the Court pointed to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise
known as The Synchronized ElectionsLaw of 1991, from which the
COMELEC derives its authority to declare a failure of elections. Second, the
courtquoted Section 6 of the same law, which enumerates the causes for a
declaration of a Failure of Election. These areexplained in the case
of Mitmug v. Commission on Elections, wherein the Court held that
two conditions mustconcur: first, no voting has taken place in the
precincts concerned on the date fixed by law, or even if there
wasvoting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to election; and
second the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In
Loong v. Commission on Elections, the Court added that the cause of such
failure of election shouldhave been any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud of other analogous cases. Further in Borja,jr. v.
Commission on Elections, the Court stated that The COMELEC can call for
the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only
when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure toelect. The
latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is
nobody was elected.Clearly then, the Court held that there are only three
instances where a failure of election may be declared,namely: (a) the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on
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account of force majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous

cases; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended beforethe
hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and
during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
thecustody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence,terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes. In all instances there must have been failure to elect; this
is obvious inthe first scenario whre the election was not held and the
second where the election was suspend. As to the third scenario, the
preparation and transmission of the election returns, which gave rise to the
consequence of a failure toelect must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to
mean that nobody emerged as a winner.While fraud is a ground to
declare a failure of election, the commission of fraud must be such
that itprevented or suspended the holding of an election including the
preparation and transmission of the election returns.The ground invoked
by TYPOCO is not proper in a declaration of failure of election.
TYPOCOs relief was for COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, on
account of the falsified election returns, which is properly thesubject of an
election contest. The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to
dismiss TYPOCOs petition inaccordance with clear provisions of the law
and jurisprudence.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMMISSION ON

AUDIT
G.R. NO. 88435
2002 JANUARY 16
FACTS:
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The Philippine government obtained from the World Bank an Economic

Recovery Loan (ERL) in the amount of US$310 million. The ERL was
intended to support the recovery of the Philippine economy, at that time
suffering severely from the financial crisis that hit the country during the
latter part of the Marcos regime. Resolution No. 1079 was adopted by the
Monetary Board in line with the governments commitment to the World
Bank to require a private external auditor for DBP. The Board of Directors of
the DBP approved the hiring of Joaquin Cunanan & Co., as the DBPs private
external auditor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA has the constitutional power to audit?
RULING:
Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-D of the 1987 Constitution provides that: first
paragraph: the COA shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit and settle all accounts of the government; second paragraph: the
Commission shall have the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination. The Constitutional Commission placed the word
exclusive to qualify the authority of the COA. Thus, the COA has the
exclusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary government
expenditures. Government agencies and officials however, remain bound by
the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the
first or second paragraph of Sec., unless of course such findings and
conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts. The power of the COA to
examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive, cannot be
taken away from the COA as provided under Section 3, Art. IX-D of the
Constitution.
CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO ACOP VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. NO. 120422
1995 SEPTEMBER 27
FACTS:
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On May 18, 1995, eleven suspected members of the notorious robbery gang,
"Kuratong Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with composite
teams from the PNP.
On May 22, 1995, Senior Police Officer 2 Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central
Intelligence Command made an expose', stating that there was no shootout.
De los Reyes stated that the eleven suspected members of the "Kuratong
Baleleng" gang were victims of summary execution.
On May 26, 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa, in a handwritten

note, directed public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to monitor
the investigations being conducted by the Commission on Human Rights, the
Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the Philippine National
Police Director for Investigation regarding the alleged shootout
On June 7, 1995, respondent Casaclang issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad

testificandum addressed to PNP Director General Recaredo Sarmiento,
directing him or his duly authorized representative to appear before the
Panel of Investigators and to submit the "After Operations Report" of the
PNP relative to the operations which resulted in the May 18, 1995, incident.
ISSUE:
1. Whether it is the Office of the Ombudsman or the Office of the Special

Prosecutor which has jurisdiction over the complaint in question; and
2. Whether or not public respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Military Manuel
Casaclang committed grave abuse of discretion when he set the case for
preliminary investigation and required the petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits before any preliminary evaluation of the complaint as
required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of
the Ombudsman?
RULING
It is evident that the petitioners have not borne out any distinction between
"the duty to investigate" and "the power to conduct preliminary
investigations"; neither have the petitioners established that the latter
remains with the Special Prosecutor. Thus, this Court can only reject the
petitioners' first proposition.
The Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for

investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench,
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therefore, no irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of

the Kuratong Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a
panel of investigators.
It cannot be denied that the evaluation required is merely preliminary in

nature and scope, not a detailed inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of such
evaluation involves the exercise of discretion which has not been shown to
be abused in the instant case. Thus petition and the motion to cite Acting
Ombudsman Francisco Villa in contempt of court are DENIED for want of
merit. This decision is immediately executory.
AZARCON VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 116033
FEBRUARY 26, 1997
FACTS:
Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. Occasionally,

he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose
trucks were left at the formers premises A Warrant of Distraint of
Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the
Regional Director or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,
Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the goods, chattels
or effects and other personal property of Ancla, a sub-contractor of
accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer,
surrender, t r a n s m i t a n d / o r r e m i t t o B I R t h e p r o p e r t y i n h i s
p o s s e s s i o n o w n e d b y t a x p a y e r A n c l a . Azarcon, in signing the
Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized under Authority of t h e
National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings
s p e c i f i e d i n t h e r e c e i p t . Subsequently, however, Ancla took out the
distrained truck from Azarcons custody. For this reason, Azarcon was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public
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funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the

Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Can Azarcon be considered a public officer by reason of his being

designated by the BIR as a depositary of distrained property?
HELD:
Article 223 of the RPC defines a public officer as

a n y p e r s o n w h o , b y direct p r o v i s i o n o f t h e l a w , popular
election, or appointment by competent authority , shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands,
or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public
duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or
classes. Azarcon obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular
election. Neither can his designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority. While it is true that Sec. 206 of the
N I R C , a s p o i n t e d o u t b y t h e prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect
a constructive distraint by requiring any person to preserve a distrained
property there is no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a p u b l i c
officer by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power
a u t h o r i z i n g a p r i v a t e individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. The charge
against Azarcon should forthwith be dismissed.
BALMADRID VS.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. L-58327
1991 MARCH 22
FACTS:
Maximo S. Binos and Teodulo B. Alcantara being then the

Superintendent and Cashier, respectively, of the Catanduanes Agricultural
and Industrial College, a Government-owned institution of learning, falsified
documents by conspiring with a common purpose, unlawfully, and
feloniously cause the preparation, issuance and encashment of four (4)
checks of the CAIC payable to Mila C. Balmadrid, in payment of ghost
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deliveries of supplies purportedly for the use of said institution, when in fact
no such deliveries of supplies were ever made, to the damage and prejudice
of said college in the amount of P9,200.00 and the accused Mila C.
Balmadrid, Jesus C. Balmadrid, Jose P. Concepcion and Juan G. Atencia, are
private persons and in their desire to conceal such fictitious transactions,
between ECBAL ENTERPRISES and CAIC for the purchase of supplies falsified
public documents which are grossly disadvantageous to the aforesaid college
in the amount of P9,200.00.
Judgment was rendered finding accused Maximo Binos, Teodulo Alcantara,

Jose Concepcion, Jesus Balmadrid and Mila C. Balmadrid GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioners, being private persons, were improperly

charged and convicted without authority of law and in clear violation of their
constitutional right to due process?
2. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of

its discretion when it made inferences and conclusions not borne out by the
evidence on record, including inferences and unwarranted conclusions from
documentary evidences of petitioners not formally offered in evidence by the
prosecution?
RULING:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases

involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees, including those in government owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by
law. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accesories with the public officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees.
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence. Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient if it shows a concerted plan, scheme or design to
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further a common objective, in this case, the defraudation of government

funds thru the execution of falsified public and commercial documents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

appealed decision of respondent Sandiganbayan with respect to petitioners
is hereby AFFIRMED.
CASCANTE VS.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 88831
NOVEMBER 8, 1990
FACTS:
Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified for the position of

municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local
elections of January 18, 1988, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, and on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of USA, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds a green card
issued to him by the US Immigration Services, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the US. He allegedly obtained the green card for
convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987. The
COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr. held that
the possession of green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that
he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent

resident of the U.S.
RULING:
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Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an

abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not
go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he
entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrants visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the US government the requisite green
card or authority to reside there permanently. To be qualified to run for
elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is
a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not itself constitute a
waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the US. The
waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts
independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this
country. Without such prior waiver, he was disqualified to run for any
elective office. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of
that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate US
authorities before he ran for Mayor of Bolinao in local elections on January
18, 1988, he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election
thereto was null and void.
EMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL

G.R. L-23825
DEC 24,1965
FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating

33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of

any municipality and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a

special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
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appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only
barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are
exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has
delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to

the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to

another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case,
Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the
delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
ABAKADA GURO VS. ERMITA

G.R. NO. 168056
JULY 5, 2005
FACTS:
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Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party

List Officer and et al.,insist that the bicameral conference committee should
not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no
disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and
Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision
for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the
House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such service
shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision
for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that
the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the
absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a
House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates
the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under
Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced
amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also
reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to
increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the
Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events
using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and
inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a
property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to
credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved
into a vested right that the State cannot remove.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is
constitutional?
HELD:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution

provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. The Court reiterates that in making his
recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
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conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

GR 1488334
(01/21/04)
FACTS:
Pres. GMA, after her succession to the presidency in 2001, nominated

Senator Guingona as Vice-President, thus, leaving a vacancy in the Senate.
The Senate passed Res. 84 calling on COMELEC to fill the said vacancy
through a special election to be held SIMULTANEOUSLY with the regular
elections on May the same year. 12 senators each with a 6-yr term were to
be elected. Res. 84 provided that the candidate with the 13 highest number
of votes shall serve for the unexpired term of former Sen.Guingona (3
years).
Gregorio Honasan ranked 13 in the polls. COMELEC issued Res. 01-005

provisionally proclaiming the 12 senators (with 6-yr terms) and the 13
senator (for the unexpired term).
Petitioners (Tolentino and Mojica) filed a petition for prohibition against

COMELEC, enjoining them from the final proclamation the 13 senator, and
prayed for the nullification of Res. 01-005.
ISSUES:
1. Procedural: WON petition is actually for quo warranto to be decided by

the Senate Electoral tribunal (and not the SC)
2. On the merits: WON the special election was held validly:
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a. WON Comelecs failure to give notice as to the time of the special

election negate the calling of said election.
b. WON Comelecs failure to give notice of office to be filled and the
manner of determining the winner misled voters.
c. WON separate canvassing and documentation for the special election
was required.
HELD:
1. No. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasans right in the
exercise of his office in the Senate. What the petitioners allege is
COMELECs failure to comply with certain requirements pertaining to
the conduct of the special election. Hence, the court has jurisdiction.2.
Yes. Special election was held validly. Hence, petition has no merit.
a. No. Sec. 2 of RA 6645 (which was passed to implement art 6, sec. 9 of

the constitution), EXPRESSLY PROVIDES that in case of a vacancy in
the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election. In a special election, the rule is that
if a statute expressly provides that an election to fill the vacancy shall
be held at the next regular election, the statute FIXES the date, hence,
the election is NOT INVALIDATED by the fact that the body charged by
law with the duty (in this case, COMELEC) failed to do so. (as opposed
to if the law does not fix the time and place but empowers some
authority to fix those, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is
considered mandatory and failure to do so will make election void) The
law then charges the voters with knowledge of the statutory notice and
COMELECs failure to give additional notice does not negate the
election.
b. No. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation

to the failure to give notice is whether the lack of notice resulted in
misleading a sufficient number of voters. The petitioners were not able
to prove that COMELECs failure to give the notice misled a
sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the vote.
c. No. No such requirements exist. What is mandatory under RA 6645 is

for COMELEC to fix the date if necessary and state the office/s to be
voted for. The method adopted by COMELEC merely implemented RA
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No.84 that the senatorial candidate garnering the 13 highest number

of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen.
Guingona (an amendment introduced by Sen. Roco).
SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA JR.

18 SEPTEMBER 1998
FACTS:
27 June 1998 Senate convened first reg. session, 11 th Congress Sen.

Fernan elected as Senate President (20 to2); Sen. Tatad had also been
nominated, by Sen. Santiago, Sen. Ople, Senate President ProTempore, Sen.
Drilon, Majority Leader. By the end of the session, no consensus/decision on
who would be Minority Leader, Sen. Tatad manifested that he would be
assuming the position of minority leader. The contention: those who had
voted for Fernan constituted the majority; those who didnt (Tatad
andSantiago), the minority
Sen. Flavier: Lakas-NUCD-UMDP (7members, thus, a minority) had chosen

Sen. Guingona as the Minority Leader.
30 July 1998 Majority Leader said he had received a letter signed by the 7
Lakas Senators, stating that they had selected Guingona as the Minority
Leader. Senate President formally recognized Sen. Guingona as Minority
Leader.
31 July 1998 Sen. Santiago and Tatad filed petition for quo warranto
pertinent laws/provisions/concepts:
Sec 16(1), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution, The Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may
deem necessary.
Sec. 16(3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution, Each House may determine the rules
of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Sec 1, Par. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
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law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Definition: political question (Tanada v. Cuenco [1957]) Those questions

which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the]legality, of a
particular measure.
Quo warranto proceedings Legal remedy to determine the right to a

contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. (Lota v.
CA [1961]) In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the
person suing must show that he/she has a clear right to the contested office
or to use/exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully
held by the respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition? (YES)
2. Was Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate Minority Leader? (NO)
3. Did Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona
as the Minority Leader? (NO)
RULING:
1. Within the jurisdiction of the court to inquire if Senate (or its

officials) violated the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion
in the exercise of their functions.
Doctrine: jurisdiction over subject matter of a case, determined by the

allegations of the complaint, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled
to the relief asserted.
(Alleje v CA [1995], Sarmiento v. CA [1995], Times Broadcasting Network v.
CA [1997], Chicov. CA [1998])
Petitioners allegation: Sec 16(1),
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Art. VI not observed in selection of Senate Minority Leader: invoke SCs

judicial power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion.
To intrude on the jurisdiction of the legislature (in the case) would amount
to Judicial Legislation a clear breach of separation-of-powers.
In the absence of Constitutional provision, laws, or specific rules SC devoid

of any basis upon which to determine the legality of acts of the Senate.
2. Petitioners argument: Majority must take its definition from Sec.

16(1), Art. VI: Majority= those who voted for Senate President;
thus,Minority = those who did not vote for Senate President.
Thus, Guingona cannot be Senate Minority Leader because (1) he voted for
Fernan and (2) the bloc of Senators who voted for him also voted for
Fernan.
SC: argument has no clear support from Constitution. Judicial definition of

majority: number greater than half or more than half of any total. (Perez
v. De la Cruz [1969], Perfecto concurring opinion in Avelino v. Cuenca)
Constitutional requirement: Senate President must get votes of more than

one half of all the Senators do not provide that members who will not vote
for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority. Precedent cited by
Guingona: in 8 the Congress, nomination of Sen. Salonga as Senate
President was seconded by a member of the minority Sen. Joseph Estrada.
SC: unlike with selection of Senate President, Consti. is not explicit in the
manner of selecting the Minority Leader must be prescribed by the Senate.
(Consti. vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of
its proceedings. [Sec. 16(3),Art. VI])
SC: neither has argument have clear support of Rules: the Rules of the
Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Petitioners were unable to prove clearly and sufficiently their entitlement to
the office of the Senate minority leader. Absent any clear-cut guidelines, no
way to establish that illegality or irregularity tainted Guingonas assumption
of the office of the Senate minority leader.
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1. NO. Fernan is not guilty of capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment, or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.
Guingona belongs to Lakas, a minority party recognition came after at least

two Senate sessions and a caucus, where both sides allowed to articulate
their stand points. Centered on whether the SC had jurisdiction over the
case: Mendoza disagreed with the majority and opined that the SC did not
have jurisdiction.
Political question: SC must respect internal affairs of its co-equal branches
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal org. of a house of
Congress, except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a
specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason, the SC had, in the past, declined to assume jurisdiction over
cases involving the discipline of members of the Legislative (Alejandrino
v.Quezon [1924] suspension of a Senator for assaulting a fellow Senator;
Osmena v. Pendatun [1960] suspension of a Senator for imputing bribery to
Pres. Garcia) and the interpretation of rules of procedure of a house (Arroyo
v. De Venecia). Principles: Congress Organizations and Sessions Election of
Officers.
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GROUP BANAT PARTY LIST VS. COMELEC

G.R 177508
AUG 7, 2009
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No.
179295).
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list
election which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC

considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts,
while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-
list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list
elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it

garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-
4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation
Party vs COMELEC.
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4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners
more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule,
same case).
The (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as

the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify
for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the
party-list election is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory.

BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the
HELD portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another
party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of
RA 7941).
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower
house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives

mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the

party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats
allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-
list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
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representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the

number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create
additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for
party-list representatives.
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling

meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of
the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no

constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the
votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2%
are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the
votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows
those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats.
In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast
(called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two- percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the
tabulation).
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major

political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the
party-list elections.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one
party shall dominate the party-list system.
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GUERRERO VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 137004
JULY 26, 2000
FACTS:
Guillermo Ruiz file a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Farias

as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos
Norte. Ruiz alleged that Farias had been campaigning as a candidate for
Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a
certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before the
election, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate
Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz.
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a
motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly
substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate
of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took
his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. Comelec
dismissed the MR on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUES:
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Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent
Farias is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives?
HELD:
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC

when it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the
assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first
district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare
valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power
following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELECs decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to
the HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE VS.

HON. JOSE B. MAJADUCON
G.R. NO. 138378
JULY 29, 2003
FACTS:
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.
157 directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary
Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were
organizing a coup detat to prevent the administration of then President
Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces
of the Philippine.
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On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.
160, directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and
investment portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS)
The Senate President referred the two resolutions to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee)
and the Committee on National Defense and Security.
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee (hereafter called the Committee), it appeared that the AFP-RSBS
purchased a lot in General Santos City, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for
P10,500.00 per square meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J.
Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds
indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square
meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to
respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before
it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition
for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.
On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order directing the Committee to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with
the inquiry in P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere
in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of
Lot X, MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS, and from issuing subpoenas to witnesses
from Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing
of the petition for prohibition and injunction.
On November 5, 1998, the Committee filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of (a) lack of jurisdiction, and (b) failure to state a
valid cause of action. It further argued that the issuance of the Temporary
Restraining Order was invalid for violating the rule against ex-parte issuance
thereof; and that the same was not enforceable beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court. On November 11, 1998, the trial court denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and granted the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not respondent judge Jose Madajucon committed grave

abuse of discretion in granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
RULING:
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation
belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal
controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain
of the others.When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on
respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS
funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. This is clearly provided in Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution, thus:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for
that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent to appear and testify before it.
GARCILLANO VS. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 170338
DECEMBER 23, 2008
FACTS:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly

between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously
referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in
her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to
become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress. Intervenor Sagge alleges violation
of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the
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Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through
the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even
on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never
been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through the Senates website, satisfies the due
process requirement of law.
HELD:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate,
or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the
Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure
even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a
persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could
be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, to

support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for
evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
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NEGROS ORIENTAL ELECTIC COOP VS. SP OF DUMAGETE

G.R 72492
NOV 5, 1987
FACTS:
In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete sought to

conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the
operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of
NORECO II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) Paterio Torres
and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power
lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and
they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of,
alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively
with the National Electrification Administration (NEA); and neither the
Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) grants the SP such power. The SP averred that
inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the
power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to
punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt.
HELD:
No. There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in

the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena
witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a
constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only
possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment
of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be
deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But,
the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature.
They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they
exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow
local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers
without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local
legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to
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punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the

petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad Hoc Committee of said
legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these
powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the
power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances
would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the
subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the
subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body.
GOZALES VS. GENOVA

G.R L-21897
OCT 22, 1963
FACTS:
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two

executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice
without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred
that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because
Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements

entered into by Macapagal.
HELD:
Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to

enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which
is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to
are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement

may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of
the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the
SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act
of Congress.
ESTRADA VS. DISSIERTO

G.R 146710-15
MARCH 2, 2001
FACTS:
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Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of
Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.
Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The
expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell
from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the
day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath,
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in
clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD:
The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It

was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing
his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent
as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2)
he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he
was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;
(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to
serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join
him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
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successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is

merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR

G.R 82585
NOV14, 1988
FACTS:
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with
others, was charged with libel by the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory
herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred
that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a
president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the
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president would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to
be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person

other than the president.
HELD:
No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in
a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from
waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed
by any other person.
ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP VS.HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA

G.R 166052
AUG 29, 2007
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive
relief asked for by the petitioners Anak Mindanao Party List Group (AMIN)
and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDO) that assailed the
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constitutionality of EO Nos.364 and 379, both issued in 2004 by president

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
EO No 364 transformed the Department of Agrarian Reform into the

Department of Land Reform and placed PCUP under the supervision and
control of the Department of Land Reform. EO 379, on the other hand, made
the National Commission on Indigenous People an attached agency of the
department of Land Reform.
The petitioners, as members of Congress, contend that the two
presidential issuances are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
principles of separation of powers and of the rue of law.
AMIN contends that since DAR, PCUP, and NCIP were created by
statutes, they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes
exclusively created by the legislative body, not by mere executive orders
issued by the executive branch.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be
clearly an extension of the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an
independent agency under the Office of the President. It thus argues that
since the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate times
and with distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative
disposition.
ISSUE:
Is EO 364 and 379 issued by Gloria Arroyo unconstitutional?
RULING:
No, the presidential issuances namely EO Nos. 364 and 379 are not
unconstitutional. Section 31 under the administrative Code of 1987 states
that the president, subject to policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the office of the President thereby
allowing him to transfer any agency under the office of the president from
other departments or agencies. Since the PCUP and NCIP were formed as
agencies under the office of the president, they can be controlled by the
president. The NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed
by Congress under the office of the President and such, is still subject to
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the Presidents power of control and supervision granted under Section 17,
article VII of the Constitution with respect to its performance of
administrative functions.
PHILLIPS SEAFOOD CORPORATION VS. THE BOARD OF

INVESTMENTS
G.R. No. 175787
FEB 4, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the export of processed crabmeat and other seafood
products. Petitioner was incorporated on 20 October 1992 and registered
under its previous corporate name of Phillips Seafood Masbate, Inc.
On 08 January 1993, petitioner registered with respondent Bureau of

Investments (BOI) as an existing and expansion producer of soft shell crabs
and other seafood products, on a non-pioneer status under Certificate of
Registration No. EP 93-219. Petitioners plant was situated in Pia, Masbate,
while its administrative office was then located in Cebu City before it was
subsequently relocated to Calong-Calong, Airport Subdivision, Bacolod City.
In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI informed
petitioner that the ITH previously granted would be applicable only to the
period from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioners
transfer to a not less-developed area. Petitioner wrote respondent BOI
requesting for a reconsideration of its decision.
On 03 May 2004, petitioner received by fax BOIs letter denying its

motion for reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of the
President, which dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22 September 2004.The Office of the
President likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in an Order
dated 14 March 2005. Petitioner received a copy of the order on 01 April
2005.
On 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed

resolution denying petitioners omnibus motion and dismissing its petition for
review. The appellate court denied petitioners omnibus motion on the
ground that the same was filed with intent to delay the case.
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Simultaneously, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review for
having been filed out of time as petitioner opted to appeal to the Office of
the President instead of filing a Rule 43 petition to the Court of Appeals
within the reglementary period. On 24 November 2006, the Court of Appeals
issued the second assailed resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the petition for review for
having files out of time?
RULING:
No. E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from an
action or decision of the BOI, depending on the nature of the controversy.
One mode is to elevate an appeal to the Office of the President when the
action or decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the
decisions of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation of
the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise between registered
enterprises or investors and government agencies under Article 7,and
second, in an action of the BOI over applications for registration under the
investment priorities plan under Article 36.
Another mode of review is to elevate the matter directly to judicial

tribunals. For instance, under Article 50, E.O. No. 226, a party adversely
affected by the issuance of a license to do business in favor of an alien or a
foreign firm may file with the proper Regional Trial Court an action to cancel
said license. Then, there is Article 82, E.O. No. 226, which, in its broad
phraseology, authorizes the direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any
order or decision of respondent BOI involving the provisions of E.O. No.
226.
E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the remedy

of a party whose application for an ITH has been denied by the BOI in the
same manner that Articles 7 and 36 thereof allow recourse to the Office of
the President in certain instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is
the catch-all provision allowing the appeal to the courts from all other
decisions of respondent BOI involving the other provisions of E.O. No. 226.
The intendment of the law is undoubtedly to afford immediate judicial relief
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from the decision of respondent BOI, save in cases mentioned under Articles
7 and 36.
In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes respondent BOI as one of the
quasi-judicial agencies whose judgments or final orders are appealable to
the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies.
Thus, petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of

Appeals the denial by respondent BOI of its application for an ITH. From the
letter dated 09 October 2003 of respondent BOI, which informed petitioner
that its ITH would be extended only from 13 August 1999 to 21 October
1999, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a recourse that is
not sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal
to the Office of the President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows
recourse to the Office of the President, applies to specific instances, namely,
controversies between a registered enterprise and a government agency and
decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise, respectively. Expresio
unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other
controversies outside of its purview, including petitioners entitlement to an
ITH, can invoke only the appellate judicial relief provided under Article 82. In
the instant case, the denial of petitioners application for an ITH is not within
the cases where the law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the
Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated
its appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
SANLAKAS VS.EXEC. SEC. AGLOREYES

G.R 159085
FEB 3, 2004
Page
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The President's Commander-in-Chief Powers: (1) the calling out

power, (2) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and (3) the power to declare martial law
The Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the

main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws
strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
Legal significance of declaration of state of rebellion: Such a

declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the
declaration is deemed not written.
Declaration of a State of Rebellion vis-a-vis Declaration of Martial Law
FACTS:
In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427
and G.O. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to
suppress the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood
occupation ended and the president lifted the declaration of a state of
rebellion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is constitutional.
RULING:
Presidents Commander-in-Chief Powers

The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated power[s]. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise
of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety
requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in IBP v.
Zamora, [t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling
out power.
Declaration of State of Rebellion is Superfluity
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The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a

declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only
gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces
may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak
emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the
entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal
consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is
devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is
deemed not written.
But Declaration of State of Rebellion is not Declaration of Martial Law;

Exercise of Emergency Powers by President does not necessarily follow
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a

declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals
have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities
have taken over the functions of civil government. In short, there is no
illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised
martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an

indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant
of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) .
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions
as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive
or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion
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and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23
(2), Article VI.
VILLAROSA VS.HRET
G.R. NO. 143351 & 144129
SEPTEMBER 14, 2000
FACTS:
VILLAROSA and Private respondent QUINTOS were the only candidates

for the office of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of Occidental
Mindoro in the 11 May1998 synchronized national and local elections. The
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA as the winning
candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes. QUINTOS filed an election protest
against VILLAROSA contesting the results of the election in all the 882
precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro.
Petitioner is the wife of JOSE T. VILLAROSA, who was Representative of
the District in question for two terms, the last of which ended on June 30,
1998; in his certificate of candidacy for the election of May 8, 1995,JOSE T.
VILLAROSA wrote as his nickname or stage name: JOE-JTV. In her
certificate of candidacy, Protestee wrote JTV as her nickname/stage
name. HRET promulgated a resolution stating that with QUINTOS
withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts. HRET issued
Resolution informing the parties that the Tribunal ruled, by [a] vote of 5-4
of its members, not to count JTV and its variations as valid votes for
Protestee Amelita C. Villarosa, the same being considered stray ballots.
VILLAROSA filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. She alleged
therein that the HRET gravely abused its discretion in (a) issuing the
above-mentioned resolutions that it violated her right to due
process when it disposed by a 5-4 ruling a vital election incident
without stating therein the findings of fact and law on which the
resolutions were based; and (b) treating JTV v o t e s a s s t r a y a n d
invalid, resulting in the disenfranchisement of the voters of
O c c i d e n t a l Mindoro. She argued that JTV was her designated
nickname in the official list of candidates submitted by the provincial
election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila; it was the nickname she used
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in her posters, handbills and other election propaganda throughout

the campaign period. In her speeches during the rallies, she urged
the voters who might have found her full n a m e d i f f i c u l t t o w r i t e
to simply vote JTV, as she had decided to use that
n i c k n a m e a s a shortcut of her name as a married woman under Article
370 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
WON the JTV votes should be counted in favor of protestee

AMELITA C. VILLAROSA.
RULING:
We hold that VILLAROSA was not denied due process in

t h i s r e g a r d . A s t o t h e limitation of the issue, VILLAROSA has herself to
blame. First, she sought no reconsideration of t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t o f
the HRET in its 7 October 1999 Resolution that [w]ith
P r o t e s t a n t s withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts,
Protestant impliedly limited the issue to whether or not JTV votes should be
counted in favor of protestee Amelita C. Villarosa. Second, at the oral
argument before the HRET on 9 December 1999, VILLAROSAs counsel did
not object to, but instead concurred with, QUINTOS submission that the
case would rise or fall on how the Tribunal would rule on the JTV votes. A s
applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down
w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely; (1) there must be a court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before
it;(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon the lawful hearing. The
essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit evidence in support of ones defense. To be heard does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one maybe heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.
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LEO ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL

JANUARY 19, 1999
G.R. NO. 132601
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of

petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite
the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which
is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the
life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that
there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
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FELIPE V LEUTERIO
G.R. NO. L-4606
MAY 30, 1952
FACTS:
March 12, 1950: Benefit inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga with
8 contestants and 5 judges (Felipe chairman) where 1stprize was awarded to Nestor
Nosce and 2ndto Emma Imperial. Four days after, Imperial addressed a letter to the
Board of Judges protesting the verdict, and alleging that one of the Judges had
committed a mathematical mistake which was refused. She then filed a complaint in
CFI. The grades given by judges were tallied and the contestant receiving the lowest
number (1 was highest) got 1stprize.Nosce and Imperial both got the lowest number of
10.
The chairman, with the consent of the board, broke the tie awarding 1sthonors to
Nosce and 2ndto Imperial.
For the convenience of the judges the typewritten forms contained blank spaces in
which, after the names of the rival orators and their respective orations, the judge
could not jot down the grades he thought the contestants deserved according to
"Originality", "
Timeliness", "English", "Stage Personality", "Pronunciation and Enunciation" and
"Voice". From such data he made up his vote. Imperial asserts that her total should be
95 instead of 94 and therefore should rank 3rdplace in Rodriguez' vote. And if she got 3
from Rodriguez, her total vote should have been 9 instead of ten, with the result that
she copped first place in the speaking joust.
ISSUE:
WON courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of
an oratorical competition
HELD:
NO. The important thing is Rodriguez'vote during and immediately after the
affair. His vote in Exhibit 3 definitely gave General place No. 3 and Imperial place No. 4.
His calculations recorded on Exhibit 3 were not material. In fact the Chairman did not
bother to fill out the blank spaces in his own form, and merely set down his conclusions
giving one to Imperial, 2 to Benavides etc. without specifying the ratings for "Voice",
"English", "Stage Personality" etc. In other words what counted was the vote. Like the
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ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest
tenets of sportsmanship: finally of the referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of
protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its
success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.
No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs

was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not
ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners
of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.
Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords
some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially
where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before
allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the
generally accepted views thereon.
We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge
reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first
instance are courts of general jurisdiction. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the
assumption that Imperial suffered somewrongat the hands of the board of judges. If at
all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean
the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or
violation of a right. As stated before, a contestanthas no right to the prize unless and
until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges.
Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of
"damnum absque injuria".
This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different
proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or
judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.
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AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE (AIWA) VS. ROMULO

G.R. NO. 157509
JANUARY 18, 2005
FACTS:
The Automotive Industry Workers Alliance (AIWA) and its

Affiliated Unions filed a petition for Supreme Court to exercise its power
of judicial review to declare Executive Order No. 185 unconstitutional. The
petitioners contended that EO 185 violated their rights and interests as labor
unions and as taxpayers. By the said EO, the administrative supervision over the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its
personnel including the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was
transferred from the NLRC Chairpers onto the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Claiming that the issues does not pose an actual case or
controversy, respondents contend that the petitioners have not specifically cited
how EO No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their rights and
existence as labor unions and as taxpayers. Furthermore, they
argued that the petitioners lacked legal standing to challenge the
validity of said EO, not even in their capacity as taxpayers, considering that
labor unions are exempt from paying taxes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of EO 185.
RULING:
Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial

interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged." Since petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or
are in danger of sustaining any personal injury due to EO No. 185, it cannot
be said that the aforementioned EO will prejudice their rights and interests.
Only NLRC personnel, the subject of the Secretary of Labors disciplinary
authority, have a direct and specific interest in this issue. In their capacity as
taxpayers, petitioners also do not have legal standing on this issue s i n c e
there is no mention of an established disbursement of
p u b l i c f u n d s i n contravention of law or the Constitution. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The challenging of EO
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185sconstitutionality have to wait for the proper party in a proper case

before the court may intervene and entertain.
VERA VS. HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA

G.R. NO. L-25721
MAY 26, 1969
FACTS:
Petitioners file special civil action for prohibition and injunction in the
sala of respondent Judge, seeking to declare the Tax Census Act as
unconstitutional, illegal and invalid since it transgress freedom of liberty and
protection from unreasonable search and seizures.
Petitioners in this special civil action seek the setting aside of the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge and would restrain him
perpetually from further hearing the suit for prohibition and injunction
pending before him. Petitioners predicate their plea on the allegation that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction as the Tax Census Act is valid and constitutional,
there being neither any self-incrimination feature nor unreasonable search
and seizure taint, there being moreover a presumption of its conformity with
the fundamental law and no grave and irreparable injury being suffered by
the other respondents, petitioners before respondent Judge. Petitioners
likewise justify their contention that there was a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Judge in the issuance of such writ of preliminary
injunction due to his failure to consider the serious injury it would cause the
paramount public interest, to realize that the enforcement of penal laws
cannot thus be restrained.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Judge ought to have issued the writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act.
RULING:
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Issuance of an injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the

court, the exercise of which is controlled not so much by the then applicable
section of the Code of Civil Procedure, now the Rules of Court, but by the
accepted doctrines, one of which is that it should not be granted while the
rights between the parties are undetermined except in extraordinary cases
where material and irreparable injury will be done. For it is an action in
equity appropriate only when there can be no compensation in damages for
the injury thus sustained and where no adequate remedy in law exists. Such
a holding reflected the prevailing American doctrine that there is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution,
deliberation and sound \discretion or more dangerous in a doubtful case,
being the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended, except
where the injury is great and irreparable.
Presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. It would appear
clear, therefore, that the force of such a presumption would preclude the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, unless there be facts disclosed which
would serve to weaken if not to defeat the presumption of validity. No such
facts have been alleged.
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND

DIVISION)
G.R. NO. L-18128
DECEMBER 26, 1961
---------------------------------
G.R. No. L-18672 December 26, 1961
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Land Tenure

Administration), petitioner,
vs.
J. M. TUAZON & CO., ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
A judgment was rendered by the CFI of Rizal, in its ejectment cases

Q-1401 and Q-1402, upon regular appeal, subsequently affirmed in toto by
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the Court of Appeals in its cases CA-G.R. Nos. 16265-66-R, Tuason &
Co.Inc vs Bruna Rosete and Buenaventura Dizon. The CFI, after the
appellate writ of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as
prayed for by the landowner Tuason and Company. Subsequently, on
November 19, 1960, the CFI issued orders of demolition of the houses of the
evictees or judgment debtors.
The land-owner J.M. Tuason & Co. had also applied a writ of
prohibition in the CFI of Quezon City against the Land Tenure administration,
the Auditor General, and the Solicitor General, to restrain them from
instituting expropriation proceedings of the petitioner Companys land in
Quezon City, as expressed and specifically authorized by RA No. 2616, that
became law, without executive; the Company claiming mainly that the RA
was unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its
property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the property had
been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold to the public; and that
respondent officers threatened to enforce said law by initiating expropriation
proceedings.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals have jurisdiction to lift,

quash, and dissolve the preliminary writ of injunction pending in the court.
2) Did Judge Caluag act without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the preliminary injunction in the prohibition case.
RULING:
As to the first issue, we are satisfied that the writ of injunction issued
by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 28842-R is null and void for want of
jurisdiction. The authority of said Court to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, injunction, certiorari and habeas corpus is expressly limited by
statute to their issuance in aid of its appellate jurisdiction (Judiciary Act,
sec.3) and it has been repeatedly ruled by us that the jurisdiction of the CA
to issue such writs must be based on the existence of a right to it from the
judgment on the merits in the main case.
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On the second issue, the preliminary injunction issued by Judge Caluag

was merely an incident to the main case, and evidently had for its object to
prevent that the principal case and any remedy to be granted therein should
be rendered moot and nugatory by the filing of the condemnation
proceedings sought to be prohibited. Issuance of the injunction was
authorized by section 7 of rule 67 of the Rules of Court, dealing with writs,
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for
it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both
provisions together, it is readily discerned that two-third votes of the
Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. MATEO

G.R 147678-87
JULY7 2004
FACTS:
The MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1 found Mateo guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of 10 counts of rape and to indemnify the complainant for
actual and moral damages. Mateo appealed to the CA. Solicitor General
assailed the factual findings of the TC and recommends an acquittal of
appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be directly be forwarded to the

Supreme Court by virtue of express provision in the constitution on
automatic appeal where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or death.
RULING:
Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate
review over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death,
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reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving offenses

committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that
gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed). The practice finds
justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:
x xxxxxxxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.
It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not
preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or
review in favour of the accused.
In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there
has been a marked absence of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or
innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the evidence would
appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation
of acquittal from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the occasion best demonstrates the
typical dilemma, i.e., the determination and appreciation of primarily factual
matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review
cases; yet, it is the Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct
mandate to review factual issues.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. VS. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN

G.R 132177
JULY 19 2001
FACTS:
On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief
for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in
authority. It was alleged that he requested Caoibes to return the executive
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table he borrowed from respondent; that Caoibes did not answer so

respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking,
petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at his right eyebrow
and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away,
rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had the
incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal
charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another administrative case

with the Supreme Court, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the
judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a
judicial officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit.

But instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and
Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court, praying that
the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-
0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court .Petitioner
contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has
the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective
culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of
the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal

complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from
their administrative duties, and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.
HELD:
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary
who were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office
furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme
Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against
a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court
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personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as
to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should
hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the
Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and
recognition of the administrative authority of the Court, because in
determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a
case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is
to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of

administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial
court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and
court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO VS. WINAI PERMSKUL

G.R. NO. 81006
MAY 12, 1989
FACTS:
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the
private respondent for a period of one year for the stipulated rental of
P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private respondent
deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by
reasonable wear and tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated
the property. He thereafter requested the refund of his deposit minus the
sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
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occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this
request. He said the lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00 for repainting of the
leased premises to restore them to their original condition.
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati.

After the submission of position papers by the parties, a summary judgment
was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining the complainant and holding
that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was ordered to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the
deposit after deducting the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was
also awarded the sum of P1,250.00 as attorney's fees, plus the Costs.
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for
review was denied on September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for
reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. He is now before us to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14
of the Constitution which states no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a memorandum decision is a violation of Art.VIII

section 14 of the Constitution.
RULING:
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually

reproduces the findings of fact or the conclusions of law of the court below,
it is not a memorandum.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the

presumption in favor of its constitutionality. As we said inPeralta v.
Commission of Elections, "to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication." Courts will bend over backward to sustain that
presumption. In case of doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary to exert every
effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the nullification of the will of
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the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it. This norm
is based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the
political departments of the government which, it must be assumed in
fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under challenge and assured
themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against

the memorandum decision as now authorized by law. Taking into account
the salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and bearing in mind the above-
discussed restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before us, we
have come to the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall
interpret it here, is not unconstitutional.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 174153
OCT. 25 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an

initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M
individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their
petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6
and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will
shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-
parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling
that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.
ISSUES:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a peoples initiative.
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Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions
to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.
HELD:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People . The petitioners failed
to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of
the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives. The framers of the constitution
intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative
and the executive is a radical change, therefore constitutes a revision.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary. Even assuming
that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with
the constitution before complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. NO. 122846
JANUARY 20, 2009
FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An
Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to
have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
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private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that
the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by
the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid
exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled
in favor of the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause
which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance
is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates
that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Solid Homes Inc. vs. Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe
FACTS:
On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe,

represented by their attorney-in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered
into a Contract to sell with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a corporation
engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The
subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land. The total contract
price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land was
P172,260.00, to be paid in the following manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down
payment should be paid upon the signing of the contract; and (2) the
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remaining balance of P166,421.881[4] was payable for a period of three

years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83 beginning 1 April 1977. The
respondents made the down payment and several monthly installments.
When the respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they
demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of
the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the
respondents.
The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint
for Delivery of Title and Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages. In their
Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only
P5, 928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the
Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the
said amount. The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, together with
its Answer, asserting that the respondents have no cause of action against it
because the respondents failed to show that they had complied with their
obligations under the Contract to sell, since the respondents had not yet
paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the
said non-payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to sell abandoned
by the respondents and rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the
same contract.
On 7 October 1992, HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a
Decision denying respondents prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale
and the delivery of the TCT.
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the aforesaid Decision to
the HLURB Board of Commissioners. Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus, it appealed the same
before the Office of the President.
In rendering its Decision, the Office of the President merely adopted by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but, it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 10 November 2004.Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE:
WON THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE DECISION

OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPLAINT
OF THE RESPONDENTS LACKS CAUSE OF ACTION.
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RULING:
The Petition is unmeritorious. At bar, the Office of the President

apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and
said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the
product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases,
the assailed Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision,
and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in
order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari
under Rule 65.
However, it bears observation that while decisions of the Office of the
President need not comply with the constitutional requirement imposed on
courts under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Rules of Court
may still find application, although suppletory only in character and apply
only whenever practicable and convenient. There is no mandate that
requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.
The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process
when it rendered its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to
conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as to
how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the
facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the
President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision
of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference.
Petitioners assertion that respondents complaint filed with the HLURB
lacked a cause of action deserves scant consideration.
The HLURB Arbiter has the discretion of whether to dismiss
immediately the complaint or opposition filed before him for lack of
jurisdiction or cause of action, or to still proceed with the hearing of the case
for presentation of evidence.
Given the fact that the respondents have not yet paid in full the
purchase price of the subject property so they have yet no right to demand
the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT, nevertheless, it
was still within the HLURB Arbiters discretion to proceed hearing the
respondents complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the parties claims and defenses.
If the creditor refuses the tender of payment without just
cause, the debtors are discharged from the obligation by the
consignation of the sum due. Consignation is made by depositing the
proper amount with the judicial authority, before whom the tender of
payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All
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interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with

these requisites is mandatory.
Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to sell it executed with
the respondents by a notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties
must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As ruled by the
HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the President
and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subject property, after which, the petitioner must
execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of said property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
PEOPLE VS LAGUA
JANUARY 31, 2006
FACTS:
Accused Isidro Flores y Lagua was charged with 181 counts of rape
committed against his minor ward. On august 27, 2004 the trial court
rendered judgment finding accused guilty as charged and imposed the death
penalty on him for each count of rape.
Accused filed a motion for new trial but same was denied and the
records of the case were ordered transmitted to the CA for its review
pursuant to this courts decision in People vs. Mateo.
For accuseds failure to file his appellants brief despite notice to his
counsel, the CA declared his appeal as abandoned and dismissed.
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ISSUE:
Does the appellate court committed serious error in dismissing the

case?
RULING:
Yes. Review by the CA of the trial courts judgment imposing the death
penalty is automatic and mandatory. It is mandatory and leaves the
reviewing court without any option.
In recognition of the value of human life and as a way of ensuring

utmost circumspection before imposing death or life imprisonment, the court
provided an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.
CAETE vs. GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC

G.R. No. 154080
January 22, 2008
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 and its Resolution dated June
26, 2002, dismissing petitioners Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint

for cancellation of title to property. Petitioners alleged that said titles are
spurious, fictitious and were issued under mysterious circumstances,
considering that the holders thereof including their predecessors-in-
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interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the

property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under
the Friar Lands Act. Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of
Title from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or
were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the

ground that the complaint states no cause of action because petitioners are
not real parties-in-interest; that no relief may be granted as a matter of law;
and that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it was
denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second Amended

Complaint which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in
the original complaint.
On January 3, 2001 the trial court denied respondents motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari and

dismissed petitioners Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
A. THAT THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-99-36483 DOES NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF
ACTION;
B. THAT THE CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE

PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE CA ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND,
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D. THAT THE CA ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND

DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DISMISSED
THEIR COMPLAINT.
RULING:
Petitioners Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than an

incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other exhibits;
the allegations therein partake of conclusions of law unsupported by a
particular averment of circumstances that will show why or how such
inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with sweeping
generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are not found therein.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide
occupants of the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar
Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long and since
when.
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning
of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal
and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice it to
state that since petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to
prosecute the case for cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they have
the right to pursue administrative remedies outside thereof. They are not
the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It has not been shown
by their complaint that they have previously taken steps to avail of the
benefits under the Friar Lands Act, since all they seek, should the questioned
titles be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property
covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any indication that they
possess the qualifications necessary to enable them to avail of the
preference granted under the Act.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent
belatedly filed the petition for certiorari with the CA, and that the appellate
court gravely abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the
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same. The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying
respondents motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was
received by the respondent on January 16, 2001. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was denied on February 28,
2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion for reconsideration
on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice to File Petition for
Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari was filed with the
Court of Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence the appellate
court correctly entertained the same.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs.DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND

MANAGEMENT
G.R. NO. 158791
JULY 22, 2005
FACTS:
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for
mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management
(respondent) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the
same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the
constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for
its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the
total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered,
amount to P285,660,790.44.1 It complains, however, that the total fund
releases by respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was
only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of
P5,807,392.30.
To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the
basis of its "no report, no release" policy whereby allocations for agencies
are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in
Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on
Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the policy of DBM No Report, No Release Policy is

constitutional.
RULING:
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such

reduction of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress
is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional
Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussions,
GRANTED. Respondents act of withholding the subject funds from
petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount of
Five Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand, Three hundred Ninety Two
Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P5,807,392.30) representing the unreleased
balance of petitioners appropriation for its Central Office by the General
Appropriations Act for FY 2002.
ROMEO M. ESTRELLA VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 160465
MAY 27, 2004
FACTS:
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In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante

Order, five (5) of the then incumbent seven (7) members of the COMELEC
participated: Commissioners Benjamin Abalos, Sr., LuzvimindaTangcangco,
Rufino S.B. Javier, Ressureccion Z. Borra and Ralph C. Lantion.
Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion voted for the
issuance of said order, while Commissioner Borra dissented.
ISSUE:
How many votes are needed for the Commission on Election En Banc
to reach a decision. Whether or not 3 is the majority vote of all its members.
RULING:
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons the
doctrine laid down in Cuaand holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide
a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of "all its
members," and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and
voted thereon.
WHEREFORE, private respondents motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED.
YENKO VS GUNGON
G.R. NO. 165450
AUGUST 13, 2009
FACTS:
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These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari, under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court, of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51093 dated September 28, 2004, reinstating Raul Nestor C.
Gungon to his former position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III in
the Assessors Office of the Municipal Government of San Juan, Metro
Manila, without loss of seniority rights, at the discretion of the appointing
authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations; and
ordering the payment to Gungon of back salaries equivalent to five years
from the date he was dropped from the rolls.
On February 28, 1987, Raul Nestor C. Gungon, who holds professional
career service eligibility, was extended a permanent appointment as Local
Assessment Operations Officer III in the Assessors Office of the Municipality
of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On January 7, 1998, San Juan Municipal Administrator Francisco F.
Yenko issued a Memorandum temporarily reassigning Gungon to the Public
Order and Safety Office (POSO) of the said municipality effective January 8,
1998 in the exigency of the service. Gungon was directed to report to Mr.
Felesmeno Oliquino for further instruction. When Gungon received the
Memorandum, Mr. Oliquino was confined at the San Juan Medical Center and
he passed away on January 9, 1998.
On January 8, 1998, Gungon, in compliance with the reassignment
Memorandum, reported to the POSO. The officer-in-charge (OIC) of the
POSO, Arnulfo Aguilar, issued a Memorandum dated January 8, 1998
requiring Gungon to report as Duty Agent, whose responsibility was "to
conduct inspections within the municipal compound, apprehend any
suspicious characters roaming within the vicinity of the municipal hall and
compound," and setting his tour of duty at 12:01 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from
Monday to Friday.
In a letter dated January 9, 1998 to the OIC of the POSO, Gungon
protested his reassignment for being violative of the Administrative Code of
1987, which prohibits reassignment that results in reduction in rank, status
or salary of an employee. Gungon went on sick leave from January 8 to 21,
1998 after filing the proper application with supporting medical certificate.
On January 20, 1998, Gungon, through counsel, wrote a letter to
Municipal Administrator Yenko, objecting to his reassignment because it
amounted to a demotion in rank; it was arbitrary, unwarranted and illegal;
and it violated his constitutional right to security of tenure. Gungon
requested the recall of the Memorandum dated January 7, 1998 and his
reinstatement to his position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III.
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On January 22, 1998, Gungon, whose leave of absence had by then

expired, reported back to his office at the Municipal Assessors Office and
continued to do so even if he was not given work there.
On February 13, 1998, Gungon received from Municipal Administrator
Yenko a Memorandum, which called his attention to his failure to report for
duty at the POSO since the date of his reassignment. Gungon was informed
that his action was a violation of Civil Service Rules which might constitute a
ground for dismissal from the service.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the appellate court was correct in declaring

the reassignment of petitioner and the dropping of petitioner
from the rolls as void ab initio and in setting aside the
questioned CSC Resolutions;
2) Whether or not the petitioner, who was illegally dismissed,
has the vested right to his former position; hence, the right to
be reinstated.
RULING:
As regards the first issue raised by petitioner Gungon in G.R. No.

165452, the Court agrees with the decision of the Court of Appeals that the
reassignment of Gungon from the Municipal Assessors Office, where his
primary function was that of land appraiser, to the POSO, where he was
required to work as a security guard/duty agent, was void ab initio because
it clearly involved a reduction in rank and status.
Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate
an employees security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without
cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which
are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court of Appeals misconstrued CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12,
series of 1994 when it cited the Circular as the basis for holding Gungons
reappointment as subject to the discretion of the appointing authority and
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
As regards the award of Gungons back salaries, it is settled
jurisprudence that an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to
back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full
back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement.
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In G.R. No. 165450, petitioners Municipal Administrator Yenko and

Mayor Estrada contend that an application for commutation of vacation and
sick leaves under Section 6 of the original Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations is similar to an application for terminal leave
under Section 35 of the amended Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, because in both provisions the application for the
respective leaves requires prior severance of employment.
When Gungon applied for terminal leave on October 13, 1998 and
received his terminal leave pay on November 10, 1998, there was no specific
provision on terminal leave.
Section 6 of the original Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules
and Regulations, which is applicable to this case, provides two options for an
employee like Gungon whose leave credits have been commuted after
separation from the service through no fault of his, and who is
subsequently reinstated. These options are: (1) He may refund the money
value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted; or (2) he may not
refund the money value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted, but
insofar as his leave credits is concerned, he shall start from zero balance.
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Gungon may start from zero
balance of his leave upon re-employment in the government.
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BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITYVS.COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 169637
June 8, 2007
FACTS:
On 6 July 1997, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An

Act Providing for the Uniform Composition and Powers of the Governing
Boards, the Manner of Appointment and Term of Office of the President of
Chartered State Universities and Colleges, and for Other Purposes,
commonly known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997.
Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of BSU
passed and approved Board Resolution No. 794 on 31 October 1997,
granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSU's employees. The
sums were taken from the income derived from the operations of BSU and
were given to the employees at different periods in 1998.
On October 20, 1999, the grant of this rice subsidy and health care
allowance in the total amount of P4,350,000.00 was disallowed in audit
under Notice of Disallowance No. 99-001-STF (98), stating that R.A. No.
8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees and
officials of the university.
BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the COA Regional
Office but it was denied in COA-CAR Decision No. 2000-3 dated 26 January
2000. Citing Section 55 (2) of R.A. No. 8522 or the General Appropriation
Act of 1998, it held that a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose, or
object of expenditure cannot be funded by augmentation from savings or by
the use of appropriations. It further held that the grant of said allowances
lacked statutory basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription on
additional, double, or indirect compensation and ran counter to the
provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.
BSU thereafter filed a Petition for Review of Decision No. 2000-3 with
the COA, which petition was denied in Decision No. 2003-1125 dated 17 July
2003. The Commission ratiocinated:
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Concededly, the provision in Section 8, Article IX-B, 1987 Constitution

that, "No elective or appointive public officers or employee shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by
law" allows the payment of additional compensation when specifically
authorized by law. In the instant case, BSU alleges that the grant of Rice
Subsidy and Health Care allowance to its employees in 1998 is authorized by
law, specifically Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, otherwise known as the Higher
Education Modernization Act of 1997.
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in the assailed
Decision No. 2005-019 dated March 17, 2005. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is Benguet State University authorized to grant health care allowance and

rice subsidy to its employees?
2. Should the BSU employees reimburse the amounts received by

them?
RULING:
No, BSU is not authorized to grant health care allowance and rice
subsidy to its employees. The granting of health care allowance and rice
subsidy to its employees is a clear violation of Section 8, Article IX-B of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. This provision states that:
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any
present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double or indirect compensation. The allowances given by BSU to its
employees are considered double compensation because these are beyond
the benefits and allowances provided by the Salary Standardization Law.
Furthermore, COA correctly ruled that the "other programs/projects" under
R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be of the same nature as
instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were
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for rice subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way, intended
for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section
4 (d) of this law cannot, therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis
for the grant of the allowances.
No, the employees of BSU should not reimburse the amounts that they
have received from the university. The ruling in Philippine Ports Authority
applies to this case. The BSU employees received the rice subsidy and health
care allowances in good faith since the benefits were authorized by Board
Resolution No. 794, series of 1997. They had no knowledge that the grant of
said benefits lacked statutory basis. Therefore, a refund is unnecessary.
PLANAS VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 167594
MARCH 10, 2006
FACTS:
On January 5, 2004, Planas filed his certificate of candidacy for

representative of the Third Congressional District of Quezon City under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang PilipinoLaban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
Also on January 5, 2004, Cabochan filed her certificate of candidacy
for the same position under the Liberal Party. Her certificate of candidacy
dated January 5, 2004 appears to have been notarized on even date by one
Atty. Fernandez of Quezon City and recorded.
On January 12, 2004, Cortiguerra, a registered voter of Quezon City,
filed before the COMELEC National Capital Region (NCR) a Petition to Deny
Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of
Congressional Candidate Cabochan, alleging that Cabochans certificate
suffered from a serious and material defect as it was notarized by a Notary
Public whose commission had already expired..
By Memorandum dated April 15, 2004 addressed to the COMELEC En
Banc, Atty. Amora-Ladra, Acting Director IV of the COMELEC NCR Office,
forwarded to the COMELEC her RECOMMENDATION that the certificate of
Cabochan be denied due course and ordered cancelled and that the
substitution of Defensor for Cabochan be accordingly denied due course and
declared invalid.
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On May 13, 2004, Planas filed before the Quezon City Board of
Canvassers a Petition for the Suspension of the Canvassing of Votes in favor
of Defensor who appeared to be leading the congressional race, citing the
above-stated April 15, 2004 memorandum-recommendation of the NCR
Acting Director.
On May 14, 2004, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution of May
14, 2004, granted Cortiguerras petition and accordingly denied due course
and cancelled Cabochans Certificate of Candidacy and declared invalid
Defensors substitution for her.
On May 15, 2004, Planas counsel submitted to the Quezon City Board
of Canvassers a copy of the above-said May 14, 2004 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division on Cortiguerrass petition and moved that the votes
in favor of Defensor be no longer read. His motion was, however, denied on
the ground that there was yet no order from the COMELEC Central Office
disqualifying Defensor.
Planas thereupon filed on May 17, 2004 with the COMELEC First
Division a Petition for Intervention, and a Most Urgent Petition/ Motion to
Suspend Canvass and Proclamation, invoking said Divisions May 14, 2004
Resolution granting Cortiguerras petition and accordingly denying due
course to Defensors substitution for Cabochan.
Also on May 17, 2004, Defensor was proclaimed as the winning
candidate for the congressional seat of the Third District of Quezon City.
On May 18, 2004, Cabochan filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On
even date, Defensor filed a Motion to Intervene and Motion for
Reconsideration-in-Intervention before the same Division. Both Cabochans
and Defensors motions alleged that, among other things, the First Division
cannot nullify the En Banc Resolution firstly because it has no authority or
jurisdiction to do so, for it is the COMELEC En Banc that has jurisdiction to
set aside a decision of a COMELEC Division; and secondly, because
Commissioners Javier, Borra and Garcillano, who signed the COMELEC First
Division resolution also signed the COMELEC En Banc Resolution of April 20,
2004.
On March 11, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc issued the challenged
Resolution reversing the May 14, 2004 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Hence, the present petition of Planas (hereinafter referred to as
petitioner), he arguing that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
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1) whether the COMELEC was divested of its jurisdiction by virtue of

Defensors proclamation and assumption of office as member of the House
of Representatives, and
2) if in the negative, whether Cabochan was disqualified as a
candidate and, therefore, Defensors substitution for her was invalid.
RULING:
Petitioner argues that since the COMELEC First Division May 14, 2004
Resolution invalidating the Certificates of Candidacy of Cabochan and
Defensor did not attain finality before the May 10, 2004 elections because
[said Resolution] was rendered subsequent to the day of the elections, the
COMELEC was never divested of jurisdiction over the case by the mere fact
of the proclamation of Defensor as winner.
Respecting the second issue, petitioner invokes the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically Section 250 which requires
notaries public to affix to all acknowledgements taken and certified by
them, according to law, a statement of the date on which their commissions
expire.
The general rule is that the proclamation of a congressional
candidate divests COMELEC of jurisdiction in favor of the HRET. This rule,
however, is not without exception.
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor who
garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating
his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had at that point in
time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation was valid or legal.
Following Mutuc then, as at the time of Defensors proclamation the
denial of his COC due course was not yet final, his proclamation was valid or
legal and as he in fact had taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as
representative, the COMELEC had been effectively divested of jurisdiction
over the case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
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ROMMEL G. MUOZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. NO. 170678
JULY 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for mayor of

Camalig, Albay in the May 10, 2004 election. In the evening of May 10,
2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened and
canvassed the election returns (ER). The lawyers of private respondent
objected to the inclusion of the 26 ERs from various precincts based on
the following grounds: 1) eight ERs lack inner seal; 2) seven ERs lack
material data; 3) one ER lack signatures; 4) four ERs lack signatures
and thumbmarks of the members of the Board of Election Inspectors on
the envelope containing them; 5) one ER lack the name and signature
of the poll clerk on the second page thereof; 6) one ER lack the number
of votes in words and figures; and 7) four ERs were allegedly prepared
under intimidation. The MBC denied the objections and ruled to include
the objected ERs in the canvass. Private respondent appealed the said
ruling to the COMELEC on May 18, 2004 and was docketed as SPC No.
04-087 and raffled to the COMELEC First Division. Despite the pendency
of the appeal, petitioner was proclaimed on May 19, 2004 by the MBC
as the winning candidate for mayor of Camalig, Albay.
On May 21, 2004, private respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition
to annul the proclamation of the petitioner for being premature and
illegal. The case was docketed as SPC No. 04-124 and raffled to the
COMELEC First Division.
On October 25, 2004, the COMELEC First Division rendered a
Resolution in SPC No. 04-124 granting the petition to annul the
proclamation. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for
lack of merit by the COMELEC En Banc and affirmed the annulment and
setting aside, by the First Division, of the proclamation of ROMMEL
MUOZ as the duly elected Mayor of Camalig, Albay. The Regional
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Election Director of Region V, Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., is directed

to constitute a new Municipal Board of Canvassers from among the
Election Officers in the Region. Accordingly, the new Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Camalig, Albay is directed to:
a) Reconvene, and after due notice to all parties/candidates
concerned,
b) Re-canvass all the election returns of Camalig, Albay, and on the
basis thereof,
c) Prepare a new Certificate of Canvass, and forthwith
d) Proclaim the winning candidates for Mayoralty position.
Hence, petitioner files the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not the COMELEC First Division committed grave

abuse of discretion when it decided only the Petition to Annul
Proclamation despite the agreement of the parties to consolidate private
respondent's appeal from the ruling of the MBC since both cases were
raffled to the same Division and the issue in the latter case was
connected to, if not determinative of, the merits of the former case; and
2) whether or not the COMELEC En Banc correctly ordered the
new MBC to re-canvass all the ERs and to proclaim the winner on the
basis thereof despite the pendency of the appeal with the First Division.
RULING:
The petition is partly granted.

In the case at bar, the consolidation of SPC No. 04-087 with
SPC No. 04-124 is inappropriate as they do not involve similar questions
of law and fact. SPC No. 04-087 assails the inclusion of the 26 ERs by
the MBC on the ground that these were incomplete, contained material
defects and were prepared under intimidation, issues which are proper
for a pre-proclamation controversy under paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, SPC No.
04-124 is a petition for the annulment of petitioner's proclamation for
allegedly being prematurely done, in violation of Section 36(i) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6669which instructs the board of canvassers
"not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the
Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on
appeal by the losing party; [a]ny proclamation made in violation hereof
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shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns/certificates will not

affect the results of the elections." In fine, SPC No. 04-087 pertains to
the preparation of the ERs which is a pre-proclamation controversy,
while SPC No. 04-124 refers to the conduct of the MBC in proclaiming
the petitioner without authority of the COMELEC.
Mere pendency of the two cases before the same division of
the COMELEC is not a ground for their outright consolidation. The
discretion to consolidate cases may be exercised only when the
conditions are present. In any event, the records are bereft of evidence
that the parties agreed to consolidate the two cases or that the
COMELEC First Division had granted the same.
Further, we find that the COMELEC First Division correctly
annulled the proclamation of the petitioner. Time and again, this Court
has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority
to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. At the
time the proclamation was made, the COMELEC First Division had not
yet resolved SPC No. 04-087. Pursuant to Section 36(i) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6669, which finds basis in Section 20(i) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7166,the MBC should not have proclaimed petitioner as the
winning candidate absent the authorization from the COMELEC. Any
proclamation made under such circumstances is void ab initio.
While the COMELEC En Banc correctly affirmed the October
25, 2004 Resolution of its First Division in SPC 04-124 insofar as it
annulled petitioner's proclamation, however, we find that it exceeded its
authority and thus gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the
new MBC to re-canvass all ERs even before its First Division could
decide on SPC No. 04-087 filed by private respondent assailing the
ruling of the MBC to include the 26 contested ERs in the canvass.
PARREO VS COA
G.R. NO. 162224
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari assailing the January 9, 2003 decision and

January 13, 2004 resolution of the COA filed by 2lt Salvador Parreno (ret)
represented by his daughter.
Salvador Parreno served in the AFP for 32 years and was retired on January
1982. He received payment of his lump sum pension and started receiving
his monthly pension in 1985. Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a
naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners
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monthly pension in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 which provides that
a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired
list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner requested for reconsideration but AFP JAGO denied his request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly
pension but on January 9, 2003, COA denied his claim for lack of jurisdiction.
COA ruled that the issue at hand requires the courts as mandated by the
constitution to determine the validity of the law re: P.D. 1638 sec. 27.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but on January 13, 2004, in its
resolution COA denied the motion further ruling that even if assumed
jurisdiction over the claim, petitioners entitlement to the retirement benefits
he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his
Filipino citizenship in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 as amended.
Petitioner argued that P.D. 1638, as amended applies prospectively and
should apply only to those who joined the military service after its
effectivity.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner correct in maintaining that P.D. 1638, as amended

applies prospectively and should apply only to those who joined the military
service after its effectivity?
HELD:
Yes, petitioner is correct in saying that P.D. 1638 applies

prospectively. There is no question that P.D. 1638 as amended applies
prospectively and it does not provide for its retroactive application. But in
petitioners contention that it should only apply to those who joined the
military service after its effectivity, he is wrong because P.D. 1638 as
amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from
service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the
service at the time of its approval. Sec. 2 of P.D. 1638, as amended provides
that, the decree shall apply to all military personnel in the service of the
AFP. P.D. 1638 as amended was signed into law on September 10, 1979
while petitioner retired in 1982, which is long after the approval of P.D.
1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of P.D. 1638, as amended, apply
to petitioner.
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STRATEGIC ALLIANCE VS. RADSTOCK SECURITIES

GR NO. 178158
DECEMBER 4, 2009
FACTS:
The case is about a bidder of Government PNCC shares and securities,

Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) who has alleged its
claim against PNCC (formerly Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP)), a GOCC that has issued guarantee letters for a loan
obtained from Radstock Securities Limited. The said loan was originally
made against Marubeni Corporation which was later assigned to Radstock.
ISSUE:
Whether or not GOCCs are included in the audit jurisdiction of COA.
HELD:
GOCCs are included in the audit jurisdiction of COA as its jurisdiction

extends not only to government "agencies or instrumentalities," but also to
"government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as
well as "other government-owned or controlled corporations" without original
charters.
QUEZON CITY vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 166408
October 6, 2008
FACTS:
ABS-CBN was granted a franchise which provides that it shall pay a
3% franchise tax and the said percentage tax shall be in lieu of all taxes on
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this franchise or earnings thereof. It thus filed a complaint against the

imposition of local franchise tax.
ISSUE:
Does the in lieu of all taxes provision in ABS-CBNs franchise exempt
it from payment of the local franchise tax?
HELD:
NO. The right to exemption from local franchise tax must be clearly
established beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be made out of inference
or implications.
The uncertainty over whether the in lieu of all taxes provision pertains to
exemption from local or national taxes, or both, should be construed against
Respondent who has the burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the
exemption claimed. Furthermore, the in lieu of all taxes clause in
Respondents franchise has become ineffective with the abolition of the
franchise tax on broadcasting companies with yearly gross receipts
exceeding P10 million as they are now subject to the VAT.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. VS. THE CITY OF DAVAO

G.R. NO. 155491
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
FACTS:
On February 18, 2002, Smart filed a special civil action for declaratory
relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, for the ascertainment of its rights
and obligations under the Tax Code of the City of Davao. Smart contends
that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to
the City, on the following grounds: (a) the issuance of its franchise under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7294 subsequent to R.A. No. 7160 shows the clear
legislative intent to exempt it from the provisions of R.A. 7160; (b) Section
137 of R.A. No. 7160 can only apply to exemptions already existing at the
time of its effectivity and not to future exemptions; (c) the power of the City
of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to statutory limitations such as
the "in lieu of all taxes" clause found in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294; and (d)
the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao would amount to a
violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts.
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On July 19, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The
trial court noted that the ambiguity of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in
R.A. No. 7294, on whether it covers both national and local taxes, must be
resolved against the taxpayer. The RTC ratiocinated that tax exemptions are
construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority and, thus, those who assert a tax exemption must
justify it with words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical not to be
misinterpreted. On the issue of violation of the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution, the trial court cited Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Marcos, and declared that the citys power to tax is based not merely on a
valid delegation of legislative power but on the direct authority granted to it
by the fundamental law. It added that while such power may be subject to
restrictions or conditions imposed by Congress, any such legislated limitation
must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.Smart filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Thus, the
instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of
Davao.
RULING:
Yes.
I. Prospective Effect of R.A. No. 7160
On March 27, 1992, Smarts legislative franchise (R.A. No. 7294) took effect.
Section 9 thereof, quoted hereunder, is at the heart of the present
controversy.
The grantee shall file the return with and pay the tax due thereon to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative in
accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code and the return shall be
subject to audit by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Smart argues that it is not covered by Section 137, in relation to Section 151
of R.A. No. 7160, because its franchise was granted after the effectivity of
the said law. We agree with Smarts contention on this matter. The
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withdrawal of tax exemptions or incentives provided in R.A. No. 7160 can

only affect those franchises granted prior to the effectivity of the law. The
intention of the legislature to remove all tax exemptions or incentives
granted prior to the said law is evident in the language of Section 193 of
R.A. No. 7160. No interpretation is necessary.
II. The "in lieu of all taxes" Clause in R.A. No. 7294
The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smarts franchise is put in issue before the
Court. In order to ascertain its meaning, consistent with fundamentals of
statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be considered. The
grant of tax exemption by R.A. No. 7294 is not to be interpreted from a
consideration of a single portion or of isolated words or clauses, but from a
general view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be
construed with reference to the context.
Tax exemptions are never presumed and are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. They can only be
given force when the grant is clear and categorical. However, Congress did
not expressly exempt Smart from local taxes. Congress used the "in lieu of
all taxes" clause only in reference to national internal revenue taxes. The
only interpretation, under the rule on strict construction of tax exemptions,
is that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only to
national and not to local taxes.
It should be noted that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in R.A. No. 7294 has
become functus officio with the abolition of the franchise tax on
telecommunications companies.
III. Opinion of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF)
In support of its argument that the "in lieu of all taxes" clause is to be
construed as an exemption from local franchise taxes, Smart submits the
opinion of the Department of Finance, through the BLGF, dated August 13,
1998 and February 24, 1998, regarding the franchises of Smart and Globe,
respectively. Smart presents the same arguments as the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company in the previous cases already decided by this
Court.
Petitioner likewise argues that the BLGF enjoys the presumption of regularity
in the performance of its duty. It does enjoy this presumption, but this has
nothing to do with the question in this case. This case does not concern the
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regularity of performance of the BLGF in the exercise of its duties, but the
correctness of its interpretation of a provision of law.
IV. Tax Exclusion/Tax Exemption
Smart gives another perspective of the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Section
9 of R.A. No. 7294 in order to avoid the payment of local franchise tax. It
says that, viewed from another angle, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause
partakes of the nature of a tax exclusion and not a tax exemption. A tax
exemption means that the taxpayer does not pay any tax at all. Smart pays
VAT, income tax, and real property tax. Thus, what it enjoys is more
accurately a tax exclusion.
However, as previously held by the Court, both in their nature and effect,
there is no essential difference between a tax exemption and a tax
exclusion. An exemption is an immunity or a privilege; it is the freedom from
a charge or burden to which others are subjected. An exclusion, on the other
hand, is the removal of otherwise taxable items from the reach of taxation,
e.g., exclusions from gross income and allowable deductions. Consequently,
the rule that a tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the government applies equally to tax
exclusions.
V. Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925
To further its claim, Smart invokes Section 23 of the Public

Telecommunications Policy Act (R.A. No. 7925). In sum, Smart wants us to
interpret anew Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, in connection with the franchise
of Globe (R.A. No. 7227), which was enacted on March 19, 1992.
Allegedly, by virtue of Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, otherwise known as the

"most favored treatment clause" or the "equality clause," the provision in
the franchise of Globe exempting it from local taxes is automatically
incorporated in the franchise of Smart. Smart posits that, since the franchise
of Globe contains a provision exempting it from municipal or local franchise
tax, this provision should also benefit Smart by virtue of Section 23 of R.A.
No. 7925.
We find no reason to disturb the previous pronouncements of this Court

regarding the interpretation of Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925. The language of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress
are bereft of anything that would signify the grant of tax exemptions to all
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telecommunications entities, including those whose exemptions had been

withdrawn by R.A. No. 7160. The term "exemption" in Section 23 of R.A. No.
7925 does not mean tax exemption. The term refers to exemption from
certain regulations and requirements imposed by the National
Telecommunications Commission.
VI. Non-impairment Clause of the Constitution
Another argument of Smart is that the imposition of the local franchise tax
by the City of Davao would violate the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts. The franchise, according to petitioner, is in the
nature of a contract between the government and Smart.
However, we find that there is no violation of Article III, Section 10 of the

1987 Philippine Constitution. Absent the express provision on such
exemption under the franchise, we are constrained to rule against it. The "in
lieu of all taxes" clause in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294 leaves much room for
interpretation. Due to this ambiguity in the law, the doubt must be resolved
against the grant of tax exemption.
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the
exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption
has been granted for a valid consideration.
OMBUDSMAN VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 162215
JULY 30, 2007
FACTS:
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo wrote a letter dated July 28, 2003 to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), requesting the approval of the amendment
of qualification standards for Director II positions in the Central
Administrative Service and Finance and Management Service of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 disapproving the
request on the ground that Director II position, being third level eligibility, is
covered by the Career Executive Service. The Office of the Ombudsman,
thus, filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify CSC
Opinion No. 44, s. 2004.
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The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that its specific, exclusive and
discretionary constitutional and statutory power as an independent
constitutional body to administer and supervise its own officials and
personnel, including the authority to administer competitive examinations
and prescribe reasonable qualification standards for its own officials, cannot
be curtailed by the general power of the CSC to administer the civil service
system. Any unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary
authority, such as what the CSC did when it issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004,
is constitutionally and legally infirm.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Director II positions in the Central Administrative

Service and the Finance and Management Service of the Office of the
Ombudsman are covered by the CES
HELD:
1. No. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7 of EO 292, otherwise

known as The Administrative Code of 1987, provides:
SECTION 7. Career Service. The Career Service shall be characterized by

(1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions;
and (3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an

appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature;
these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and
universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional
Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive
Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;
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4
xxx xxx x x x (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the CES covers presidential appointees only.
2. Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for

all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the
Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person occupying the position of Director II in
the Central Administrative Service or Finance and Management Service of
the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by the
President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he need to
possess CES eligibility.
To classify the positions of Director II in the Central Administrative Service

and the Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman
as covered by the CES and require appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE
eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to unconstitutional and
unlawful consequences. It will result either in (1) vesting the appointing
power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution or (2)
including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary
to the Administrative Code.
Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other
than the Deputies, shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the
Civil Service Law.
This is complemented by Sec. 11 of RA 6770, otherwise known as The

Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent
body. As a guaranty of this independence, the Ombudsman has the power to
appoint all officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except
his deputies.This power necessarily includes the power of setting, prescribing
and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the Office.
To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been vested with
the power of administrative control and supervision of the Office. This
includes the authority to organize such directorates for administration and
allied services as may be necessary for the effective discharge of the
functions of the Office, as well as to prescribe and approve its position
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4
structure and staffing pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to

determine and establish the qualifications, duties, functions and
responsibilities of the various directorates and allied services of the Office.
This must be so if the constitutional intent to establish an independent Office
of the Ombudsman is to remain meaningful and significant.
Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and other

personnel actions, in determining training needs and as aid in the inspection
and audit of the personnel work programs. They are intimately connected to
the power to appoint as well as to the power of administrative supervision.
Thus, as a corollary to the Ombudsmans appointing and supervisory
powers, he possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification
standards for the personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Since the responsibility for the establishment, administration and

maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned department
or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting the department or
agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving them.
The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the department or
agency, especially in a case like this in which an independent constitutional
body is involved.
PANDI VS. CA
G.R. NO. 116850
APRIL 11, 2002
FACTS:
August 9, 1993: Dr. Macacua, Regional Director & Sec. of Health of the
DOH-ARMM issued a Memorandum designatingDr. Pandi (then DOH-ARMM
Assistant Regional Secretary), as OIC of the IPHO-APGH in Lanao del Sur. Dr.
Macacua also designatedDr. Sani (then the Provincial health officer of the
IPHO-APGH) to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office.- September 15, 1993: Lanao del Sur
Provincial Governor issued Office Order NO. 07 designatingDr.Saberas the OIC of the
IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.-Dr. Sanichallenged the Memorandum transferring him in
a complaint filed with the RTC claiming therein that he was appointed as provincial
health officer of the IPHO-APGH in a permanent capacity.-Dr. Saberfiled a petitioner
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246
4
for quo warranto with a prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming that he is lawfully
designated OIC of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. The CA issued a TRO enjoining Pandi
from further discharging his functions as OIC of the IPHO-APGH.-Dr. Sanifiled a
Motion for Intervention.- November 6, 1993: After President Ramos issued E.O. 133
transferring the powers & functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional
Government of ARMM, Dr. Macacua (as DOH-ARMM Sec.-Designate) issued a2nd
Memorandumreiterating the designation of Dr. Pandi as OIC of the
IPHO-APGH and thedetail of Dr. Sani to the Regional office in
Cotabato City.-Drs. Pandi & Macacua sought the dismissal of Dr. Sabers petitioner
on the ground that the issues therein had become moot & academic because of the
enactment of the ARMM Local Government Code, as well as the execution of the Memo
of agreement between the DOH-National Government and the ARMM Regional
Government.
-CA:designation of Dr. Saber as OIC of IPHO-APGH upheld; the Provincial Governor
has the power to appoint the provincial health officer under the LGC of 1991; Dr. Sani
cannot claim to have permanent designation as provincial health officer because he
was not appointed by the Provincial Governor.
ISSUE:
WON the Provincial Governor can designate the OIC of the IPHO-APGH (WON
the appointment of Saber is valid) at that time.
HELD:
No. When Saber was appointed by the provincial governor on September 15,
1993, the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government
official paid entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still
appointed by the national Secretary of Health to a region and not to a
province. The Secretary of Health exercised supervision and control over the provincial
health officer. The Secretary of Health was also the official authorized by law to assign
the provincial health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on
September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to designate Saber as
Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, the designation of
Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void.- The provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur
became a provincial government official only after the effectivity of the ARMM Local
Code, which was enacted by the Regional Assembly on January 25, 1994 and
approved by the Regional Governor on March 3, 1994. Prior to the ARMM Local Code
but after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133, the Regional Governor appointed
the provincial health officer while the Regional Secretary of Health could assign the
provincial health officer to any province within the ARMM. The Provincial Governor
Page
247
4
had no power to appoint or even designate the Officer-in-Charge of the

provincial health office.
-on reliance on Section 478, LGC:
misplaced; not a grant of powers to governors and mayors to appoint local health
officers but simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health officers are
mandated to do so; LGC did not amend the Organic Act of 1989
-with regards to SANI:his first appointment was void. When he was detailed in
Cotabato City, the powers and functions of the DOH were not yet transferred to the
Regional Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still
exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM. Thus, the
regional Director/ARMM Secretary of Healths directive assigning Sani to
Regional Office in Cotabato City is void. As regards the November 6, 1993
Memorandum reiterating Sanis detail, since it was issued after the issuance of EO 133
which expressly transferred supervision and control over all functions and activities of
the Regional Department of Health to the Head of the Regional Department of Health,
and since it is within the authority of the ARMM Secretary of Health, it is valid.-as
regards Pandi: August 9, 1993 designation by the ARMM Secretary of Health
is VOID since at that time, the latter did not exercise yet supervision and control
over the provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, November 6, 1993
designation is valid. The designation of Pandi as OIC, however, while valid is only
temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent appointment is
made.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EMMANUEL ROCHA

G.R. NO. 173797
AUGUST 31, 2007
FACTS:
On 12 May 1994, an Information was filed against herein accused-

appellants Emmanuel Rocha y Yeban alias Nopoy (Rocha) and Ruel Ramos y
Alcober alias Aweng (Ramos), along with Romeo Trumpeta y Aguaviva
(Trumpeta), in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
215. Another accused, Eustaquio Cenita y Omas-As (Cenita), was impleaded
Page
248
4
in the Amended Information. The Amended Information alleged a crime

committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 1993, in

Quezon City, Philippines, the accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and with
intent to kill, opened fire at S/G ROGER TARROQUIN and S/G
TITO HOMERES, thereby inflicting upon them serious and mortal
wounds which were the immediate cause of their death.
On 6 February 1996, the RTC promulgated its Decision in Criminal

Case No. Q-93-49474 finding Trumpeta, Cenita and herein accused-
appellants Rocha and Ramos guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On 31 March 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed with clarification the

Decision of the RTC.
On 18 April 2006, accused-appellants Rocha and Ramos, through the

Public Attorneys Office (PAO), appealed the Decision of the Court of Appeals
to this Court.
On 14 November 2006, accused-appellant Rocha, having been

detained for more than seventeen years, filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal,
stating that he intends to apply for parole. He also manifested that his co-
accused on this case, Romeo Trumpeta and Estaquio Cenita, had already
withdrawn their appeal.
On 14 February 2007, plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines,

through the Solicitor General, filed a Comment opposing accused-appellant
Rochas Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
On 28 February 2007, accused-appellant Ramos followed suit and filed

his own Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal. He likewise
manifested that he had already served fourteen years in prison and that all
his other co-accused had already withdrawn their appeal, and applied for
executive clemency to avail himself of parole.
ISSUE:
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249
4
Whether or not the Motions to Withdraw Appeal of accused-appellants

Rocha and Ramos contravenes paragraph 2 (d), Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?
HELD:
The mandatory review by this Court is only required for cases where
the penalty imposed is death. Where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a review of the trial court
decision is conducted only when the accused files a notice of appeal. Neither
the Decision of this Court in Mateo nor the abolition of the death penalty has
changed this. As the penalty imposed by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals in the case at bar is reclusion perpetua, the review by this Court is
not mandatory and, therefore, the accused-appellants can validly withdraw
their appeal.
The granting of a Motion to Withdraw Appeal is addressed to the

sound discretion of the Court. In the case at bar, we see no reason to deny
accused-appellants Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Plaintiff-appellees
allegation that the Motion was for the purpose of evading the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and trifling with our judicial system is unsubstantiated,
as the Court of Appeals imposition of reclusion perpetua, unlike an
imposition of the death penalty, may be entered by said appellate court even
without another review by this Court. Neither should we deny the Motions
just because of accused-appellants intention to apply for executive
clemency, since the granting of such executive clemency is within the
prerogative of the Executive Department, and not of this Court.
Page
250

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POLITICAL LAW: CASE DIGEST 201

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL.ISLANDS VS. MONTE DE PIEDAD

In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The

Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a

Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against

CABANAS VS. PILAPIL

Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the

PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CO.vs .REPUBLIC OF THE

Providence Washington Insurance Co. filed, on October 21, 1966, its

Whether or not the Government of the Philippines could be sued

The doctrine of non-suability thus holds undisputed sway. Its primacy

At any rate, in case of a money claim arising from contract, express or

The procedure provided for in such a statutewas made more expeditious by

the government has increasingly relied on private corporations possessing

AGUSTIN VS. EDU

Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.

THE ANGAT RIVER IRRIGATION SYSTEM vs.ANGAT RIVER WORKERS'

On January 5, 1956, the Acting Prosecutor of the Court of Industrial

Whether or not government employees may validly organize

It is a basic and fundamental principle of the law that the Government

BUREAU OF PRINTING, SERAFIN SALVADOR vs. THE BUREAU OF

Whether or not Bureau of Printing can be sued.

No. Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate

SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL.

(1)Who is the real party in interest?

(1)The Court is convinced that the real party in interest as defendant

GONZALES III VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in

Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise

RUIZ vs. CABAHUG

The cause of action alleged that the Secretary of National Defense

The plans and specifications were submitted by Ruiz and company, as a

Allied Technologist, fifteen percent (15%) was retained because defendant

Whether or not the complaint is against the government and cannot be

SAN FERNANDO V. FIRME

On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger

regular employee Bislig were impleaded as defendants. Judge Firme in its

Whether or not petitioner was liable.

The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO

Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate

dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery

NO. A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not

any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of

MERITT VS. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL ISLANDS

FROILAN V PAN SHIPPING

Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is immune from suit.

NO, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

The defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then

Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and

supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the

USA VS. RUIZ

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. SAN DIEGO

Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of

Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom,

In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila

Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the