(Republic v. Cagandahan) GR No.

166676 Sept 12 2008

Under Rep. Act No. 9048 - a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

(Republic v. Albios)
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together
or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites,are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Judge Occiano

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is

limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance
of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage.

Navarro v. Domagtoy

Navarro vs. Domagtoy, respondent judge held office and had

1

jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-

Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at
his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which
did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of
Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance
to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who
are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability." (Emphasis
2

supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months
on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his
jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held
that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts,
are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more
than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent
in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make
mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the
respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons."Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing
a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara,3

4
we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of
such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such
authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law. 1wphi1.nt

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of

Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a
catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not
necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration
of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be
undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
5

purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to

depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one
reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound
by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise,
that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character
of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court
as a disciplining authority.
6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding

Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is
fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Ninal v. Bayadog
After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo

City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage
of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so
when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the
validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their
father's death. 1

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior

to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is
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a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the 6

absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to

Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and
7 8

issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its

involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. This 9

interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State

recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to
the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10

Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable

social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. This is why the Family Code considers
11

marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" and case

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law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime

commitment." 13

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to

respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we
now desire to marry each other." The only issue that needs to be
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resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated

under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the
five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared
or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should
not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should
be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It
should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the
public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
registrar. The Civil Code provides:
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Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is

necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void
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marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties

to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should
be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the
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effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of

legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any
civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will
be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not
like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked
except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the
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Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial

declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
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absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that

effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
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defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would
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extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the
same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action
is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
1wphi1

purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship,

legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even
if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

(Manzano v. Sanchez)

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting

previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make
the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment,
he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
he would have discouraged him from contracting another
marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of
Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article
63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but
in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much
less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more
when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person
for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge
to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment
of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the
law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The
maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special
application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the
law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is
hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine
to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased
to P20,000.