Abdurrahman Nur 18 December 2012

Marx, Lukacs and Gramsci on Ideology

In this essay, I examine and compare Marxs, Lukacs, and Gramscis views on the character
of ideology. In order to do so, I will state, first, Marxs conception of ideology, since it is on
the basis of this conception that Lukacs and Gramsci treat the subject. Then, I will examine
Lukacs and Gramscis views on the character of ideology, and discuss the extent to which
their reflections enriched Marxist conception of ideology.

Marx

Since Marx never undertook a systematic elaboration of the concept of ideology and his
writings on the subject are of a scattered and equivocal character, a reconstruction is required
for a coherent understanding of Marxs conception of ideology. Several endeavours for such a
reconstruction were already undertaken by different scholars (e.g. Larrain 1983, 6-45;
Eagleton 1991, 70-91; Giddens 1971, 40-45). That I cannot undertake such a reconstruction
within the scope of this paper is evident. Instead, I will try to explore Marxs conception of
ideology, as presented both by Marx and by his interpreters, with regard to two basic
questions. The first question is, how ideas are formed?. By posing this question, I seek to
understand the general context of idea formation, in which formation of ideologies occurs. I
seek also to understand the relationship between ideas and material reality. The second
question is, what is ideology?. In other terms, what is it that makes some ideas ideological?
By this question, I seek to understand the main features that determine the character of
ideology, or, the ideological character of ideas.

Marxs conception of the formation of ideas consists of two aspects, one negative and
another positive. The negative aspect, where he rejects idealistic and classical materialistic
standpoints, can be found in his critique of religion and German idealism on the one hand, and
of the materialism of Feuerbach on the other (Larrain 1983, 22). According to German
idealism, and especially to Hegel, history and social material reality are the manifestations of
the Idea. Thus, far from being determined by material reality, ideas are the very
determinants of material reality. As a severe critic of religion and German idealism, Marx
rejects that ideas or ideal beings are the determinants of history and social existence. When
opposing to idealism, Marx seems quite as a classical materialist, who defends that ideas are
mere reflections of material reality. Yet, his critique of Feuerbach proves he is not a classical

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materialist. Feuerbach argues, by simply reversing the premises of idealism, that the starting-
point of the humanity must be real man, living in the real, material world, and that
thought proceeds from being, not being from thought (in Giddens 1971, 3). Given that
being is material, Feuerbach argues that ideas are products of material reality, remaining thus
within the same dichotomist framework with idealism. Marx criticizes Feuerbachs
conception of reality and real man as abstract categories, isolated from their social character.
He also criticizes the one-sidedness of Feuerbachs materialism, which simply sees ideas as
mere reflections of material reality, and does not take into consideration the dialectical
relationship between the conscious activity of men and the objective world (Giddens 1971,
20-21).

Marx positively set forth his position with regard to formation of ideas within his
conception of historical materialism. In a nutshell, he argues that human consciousness or
ideas are formed within the social praxis. It means, there is not a unilateral relationship
between ideas and material reality, that one determines or reflects the other. Instead, there is a
dialectical relationship between objective material world and conscious human activity. Social
reality can be conceived neither as the embodiment of ideas nor as a mere material reality. It
can only be conceived as the product of human praxis, at the same time conscious and
material activity of men in society. Thus, it is also within this praxis that men come to know
social reality and form ideas of it (Larrain 1983, 19-23; Giddens 1971, 41-43). The
inseparability and reciprocity of the consciousness and material reality is concisely formulated
by Marx as follows:

(...) consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of
men is their actual life-process (...) men, developing their material production and their
material intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the
products of their thinking (Tucker 1978, 154-155).

Marxs conception of ideology should be understood in this general context of idea

formation. All ideas are not the same, according to Marx. The consciousness and ideas of men
on social reality are contingent upon their position in social-material practice. That Marx
pursues such a distinction between ideas is clearly seen in his following statement: ideas are
the conscious expression real or illusory of their real relations and activities, of their
production, of their intercourse (...) (quoted in Larrain 1983, 23). Here, Marx clearly makes a
distinction between real and illusory ideas. In this distinction, we can find an answer to our
second question, what is ideology?. One can roughly say that illusory ideas correspond to
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ideology. Yet, one should not understand the word illusory here as unrelated to or without
basis in reality. As we have seen, all ideas are formed within the social practice, according to
Marx. Ideologies are no exception to this. The illusory character of ideology is that it
conceals, distorts or misrepresents the reality on the level of consciousness. However, this
distortion is neither the result of a faulty cognitive process nor a deliberate and purposeful
action. It is due to the limitations of the practice itself. It is the alienated character of labour,
which represents for men the products of their labour as an objective and independent power,
that causes this distortion (Larrain 1983, 23-24, 28-29). Thus, first element of the character of
ideology appears in its relation to the contradictions of the material life. In Larrains words,
ideology is a particular form of consciousness which gives an inadequate and distorted
picture of contradictions, either by ignoring them, or by misrepresenting them (1983, 27).

The second element of the character of ideology appears in its social function. In other
words, the class interests that ideas serve determine whether ideas are ideological or not.
Marx famously states that the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e.
the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual
force (Tucker 1978, 172). That this is so is crucial for the domination of the ruling class. To
maintain its domination, i.e. existing relations of production, the ruling class needs the
contradictions of material life to be concealed. For this reason, the ruling class is compelled
(...) to represent its interests as the common interest of all the members of society, (...) it has
to give its ideas the form of universality (...) (Tucker 1978, 174). However, it is not only the
ideas of the ruling class that are ideological. As the dominated classes lack the means of
mental production, because of their dominated position in the relations of production, they
tend to produce ideas which are subject to the interests of the ruling class (Larrain 1983, 24).
However, I should note that, in Marxs conception, ideology is not formed and organized by
the ruling class in a deliberate way so as to conceal the contradictory nature of capitalism and
preserve its domination. Rather, it is the capitalist mode of production itself that creates
ideology.

In Marxs late work, especially in Capital, ideology seems more clearly to be an

immanent element of capitalist society, rather than a problem of the consciousness which
distorts or misrepresents the reality. Here, Marx makes a crucial distinction between two
levels of reality: the level of appearances or phenomenal forms, and the level of real
relations, or the essence (Larrain 1983, 31). In capitalist mode of production, the essence of
society projects itself as distorted in the level of appearance. It is most generally within the

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practice in the phenomenal level that consciousness of men takes shape. Workers think that
they are being paid for all of their work, mens own labour acquires in their eyes an objective
and dominant character, and so forth. Science appears as the only way to understand and
explain the essentially contradictory nature of capitalism, thus also the concealing and
distorting character of ideology. Yet, science cannot go beyond explaining. It cannot abolish
the contradictions by simply making them visible. More is required to end the contradictions;
the essence of society, the capitalist mode of production itself must be abolished. Once this
mode of production, which is the cause of ideology, is abolished, ideology will also disappear
(Eagleton 1991, 84-49; Larrain 1983, 31-37).

Marxs general conception of ideology is, as Larrain suggests, critical and negative. In
this model, ideology seems quite insurmountable for men in society, unless with science. Yet,
this latter is not enough to abolish it. Still, it is possible to say that, by recognizing the
possibility of revolution, thus the possibility of people getting conscious of the contradictory
nature of capitalism, especially in the periods of crisis, Marx leaves the door open for a more
positive conception of ideology. At this point, Marxs famous and ambiguous statement
comes to mind:

In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material
transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the
precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic in
short, ideological forms in which man becomes conscious of this conflict and fight it out
(Tucker 1978, 5).

Yet, Marx says little about how this can be achieved. This point will be more developed by
later Marxist thinkers. Before passing on Lukacs and Gramscis views, I should note that all
Marxist thinkers dealing with the problem of ideology does that on the grounds laid down by
Marx himself. Both Marxs questions and answers on ideology, that I tried to explore briefly,
is of decisive character for later discussions. The equivocal, versatile and complex character
of Marxs conception of ideology allowed the proliferation and enrichment of the concept in
later Marxist tradition. What Marxist thinkers do, while dealing with the question of ideology,
is, simply put, to emphasize and develop some aspects of Marxs conception, in order to
arrive at a more solid and well-elaborated conception of ideology. What I will try to do in the
rest of this paper is to concentrate on those aspects that Lukacs and Gramsci try to develop on
the basis of Marxs conception of ideology. Thus, I will not be repeating the basic tenets of

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their conception of ideology they share with Marx, because I have already explored them
above.

Lukacs

Lukacs seems to have entered from the door left open by Marx and developed a positive
conception of ideology, while preserving its negative and critical connotation. In Lukacs
treatment of ideology, in History and Class Consciousness, two concepts appears as central
themes: reification and class consciousness. One could arguably say that the former refers to
bourgeois ideology whereas the latter implies the ideology of the proletariat. Thus, one might
say that the concept ideology on its own has more a sociological character, as
Purvis&Hunt calls it, than a positive or negative one, in Lukacs conception (Purvis&Hunt
1993, 478). While being a neutral concept on its own, ideology seems to have a positive sense
when it relates to the proletariat, and a negative one when it relates to the bourgeoisie.

Lukacs conception of reification is essentially based upon Marxs chapter on the

fetichism of commodities in Capital. However, Lukacs extends considerably Marxs analysis
to whole aspects of capitalist society (Perkins 1993, 134-135). According to Lukacs,
commodity fetishism is the essential feature of capitalism and its direct result is the
phenomenon of reification. By reification, Lukacs means the process through which relations
between men take on the appearance of relations between things; human society and human
history, the products of man, appear not as the products of social activity, but as alien and
impersonal forces, laws of nature which impose themselves on humanity from without
(Jones 1971, 28-29). This process, along with the processes of rationalisation and division of
labour, leads to fragmentation in every aspect of society, thereby making impossible a
conception of the whole, of the totality. Thus, the phenomenon of reification, caused by
capitalist mode of production itself, results in an ideology that produces a partial, fragmentary
and deficient consciousness lacking to see the contradictory nature of capitalism. This
bourgeois ideology, this unified structure of consciousness embraces the whole society,
both ruling and ruled classes, and stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man
(Lukacs 1923, 100).

The bourgeois ideology conceals the reality by providing a fragmentary and thus
distorted picture of it. To overcome this ideology, and along with it the capitalist mode of
production, of which the former is an inseparable part, a viewpoint of totality is required.
Lukacs notion of totality refers to the whole social process of life as a historical period.

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According to Lukacs, the only one who can have the total view of the whole is the proletariat
as a class. Because, the proletariat is the identical subject-object of history (Jones 1971, 31).
It is the object of history, since it is created by the capitalist social formation, its labour is
reified into a commodity, exploited and dominated by the bourgeoisie. But it is also the
subject of history, since its labour produces and shapes the world. Thus, for the proletariat
represents the totality of history, its knowledge of itself, its self-consciousness is also the
knowledge of the reality and of the totality of historical-social process. Lukacs recognizes that
the proletariat does not empirically have a class consciousness yet. However, once the
proletariat had its ascribed class consicousness, and thus total knowledge of the social
reality, the reified and fragmentary consciousness of the bourgeoisie, which is projected upon
proletariat as ideology, will be shattered (Eagleton 1991, 95-99; Jones 1971, 30-32). Since an
adequate consciousness is already a practice that alters its object (Jones 1971, 32), and the
fate of the revolution (and with it the fate of mankind) will depend on the ideological maturity
of the proletariat, i.e., on its class consciousness (Lukacs 1923, 80).

I think, there are essentially two points where Lukacs contributed significantly to the
Marxist conception of ideology. One can say that he did this contribution by developing two
kinds of conception of ideology. First, he extended Marxs analysis of commodity fetichism
as to locate it at the basis of all capitalist society and bourgeois ideology. Analysing bourgeois
ideology deriving from reification, Lukacs develops a critical conception of ideology, which
goes almost in the same direction with the conception of Marx. In a nutshell, bourgeois
ideology, projected also upon the proletariat, prevents men living in society from seeing the
whole picture, thus from understanding the nature of capitalist society. In this sense,
bourgeois consciousness is more a fragmentary or partial consciousness than a false
consciousness. Second, he intoduced the concepts of totality and class consciousness to
develop more the point where Marx had remained silent: how it comes that the proletarait
makes the revolution, how the proletariat overcomes the bourgeois ideology and capitalist
society that dominates it so hard? To repeat it, he basically says, when the proletariat
actualizes its potential class consciousness and thereby acquires the viewpoint of totality, he
consequently overcomes the bourgeois ideology and capitalist society. On this last point,
Lukacs had been criticized hardly for having an idealistic standpoint (Eagleton 1991, 99-102;
Jones 1971, 44-46). Although there are some efforts to interpret Lukacs conception of class
consciousness as a materialistic conception, I think that, in the last analysis, Lukacs
conception of class consciousness and revolution is idealistic (see Perkins 1993). However, I

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think this critique was not followed to its logical result in the literature, as far as I could see it.
I will try to prolonge it and to show that the idealism of Lukacs is mainly due to his
conception of totality and that the roots of this idealism can be founded in Marx himself. The
main problem of the Lukacsian conception of totality is, I think, its reduction of Marxs
conception of dialectics into totality. However, Marxs conception of dialectics implies both
relationality and totality. While seeing the class antagonism as the engine of history or praxis
as the source of consciousness, Marx puts the relation between classes, or ideas and material
reality, at the center of social reality. Yet at the same time, this relation implies a totality of
the parts of the relation (not necessarily an integrative, but mostly conflictual totality), made
possible by this relationality itself. Marx, who rigorously takes into consideration this
relationality in almost all his social theory, seems to abandon it when it comes to the
revolution and the role of the proletariat. By arguing that the proletariat will end the class
antagonism and thus history, he implicitly says, I think, that the proletariat will establish
somehow a pure totality, by abolishing also itself which was a part of the relation that made
history. Lacking the establishment of the material dialectical basis of the revolution and the
role of the proletariat, Marx leaves an open door for idealism. Simply put, I would argue that
the utopian element in Marxs thought, which constitutes an inseparable part of it, does not
share the same ground with his social-historical analysis. What Lukacs does in his analysis of
ideology is basically to make more clear the distinction between these two grounds. On the
one hand, departing from the solid ground founded by Marx (analysis of commodity
fetichism), he develops a critical and negative conception of ideology for/by the analysis of
the capitalist society and bourgeois consciousness. On the other hand, entering from the door
left open by Marx, he founds the ground (the concept of totality) and develops a positive
conception of ideology for the hope or utopia of overcoming the capitalism.

Gramsci

Gramscis conception of ideology is more loyal to dialectical method, as compared to

Lukacs. Gramsci seriously takes into account the relationality of social reality along with the
totality it makes possible. He does so both in his analysis of social formations within a
historical bloc, and in his thinking of the possible ways or strategies for the revolution. In
Gramscis thought, the analysis of the social reality, conceived as a historical bloc, cannot be
discerned from seeking the ways to change it. In this sense, Gramscis analysis of ideology is
more practical and pragmatical than those of Marx and Lukacs.

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 Gramscis conception of ideology is essentially found in his Prison Notebooks. Yet,
Gramsci does not provide there any systematic treatment of ideology. One must reconstruct
his conception of ideology within the general context and conceptual pattern that he provides
in Notebooks. Although many different reconstructions are possible, I think, taking hegemony
as the central concept of Gramscis thought makes easier to understand his conception of
ideology. For the concept of hegemony provides a relational basis, as different from, say, the
concept of historical bloc. This relationality is indispensable to understand Gramscis
conception of ideology. Hegemony implies the ways or relations in and by which the ruling
bloc/elite provides the consent of people in civil society for its rule/domination. Whether
hegemony implies also the coercive means of domination is a matter of discussion, yet it is
mostly understood as based on consent (Eagleton 1991, 112-114). Ideology is one of the
means or levels, along with political or economic ones, through which hegemony is
established. Thus hegemony includes ideology, but cannot be reduced to it (Hall et al. 1985;
12-13).

Ideology is neither a false consciousness nor a system of ideas, according to Gramsci,

but conceived as a lived, habitual social practice (Eagleton 1991, 115; Mouffe 1979, 185).
It creates the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle,
etc. (Gramsci 1971, 377). One can say that this terrain is an amalgam of civil society and
common sense, two key concepts for Gramscis conception of ideology. Civil society means,
as formulated by Eagleton, the whole range of institutions intermediate between state and
economy (1991, 113). It is the main area where hegemony is to be constituted. In the
constitution of hegemony, ideologies (or world-views, as more frequently used by Gramsci)
play an indispensable role. For these are which organize the human masses and provides
them with the forms of consciousness they have (Gramsci 1971, 1492). However, all forms of
ideology are not equally effective in the organization of the masses and the constitution of the
hegemony. For an ideology to organize the masses and acquire an hegemonic character, at
least two things are required. First, ideology (be it Marxism or bourgeois ideology) should be
accompanied and supported by other means of hegemony, such as political or economic
power. This point explains why bourgeois ideology is far more hegemonic in civil society and
has more power to organize the masses. Since ruling bourgeois elite has in its hands the
means and institutions of political and economical power to organize civil society and
establish its hegemony. Second, ideology should not remain only in the level of systematic
philosophy limited to and circulating among the intellectuals. It should be formulated and

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expressed in the level of common sense, in order to be grasped and adopted by the people.
What is critically important and innovative in Gramscis conception of ideology is his
recognition of the importance of popular consciousness, of common sense, as an area where
ideological battle for hegemony is fought. Common sense is neither a mere reflection of
economic structure, nor totally shaped by bourgeois ideology as to serve its own interests.
Common sense has a complex and contradictory character, rather than a monolithic or
coherent one. The elements of bourgeois ideology are constitutive of common sense along
with the practical consciosness of people towards their own class interests. The process of the
constitution of common sense is not a once-finished process. To the contrary, common sense
is continually re-formed and reproduced within the social practice. It has a dynamic character,
rather than a static one. It is this process of the formation of common sense where ideological
battle must be fought, according to Gramsci. In this ideological battle, organic intellectuals
have an important role. They must fight this ideological battle for counter-hegemony and
revolution, not by bestowing upon people a consciosness brought from above, but by
entering into the area of common sense to expose the contradictions of the bourgeois
ideology permeated there and to reveal the practical and revolutionary consciousness, which
is already found in the common sense (Hall et al. 1985, 19-20; Eagleton 1991, 118-120).

Two essential points of Gramscian conception of ideology can be considered, I think,

as original contributions to the Marxist conception of ideology. First, by elaborating the
concept of hegemony, Gramsci makes possible a more coherent and comprehensive
understanding of how the domination of bourgeois ideology and the legitimization of
capitalist society are assured. Moreover, by introducing the concept of ideology within the
broader context of hegemony, Gramsci proposes a more specific and tangible conception of
ideology, as compared to Marx and Lukacs. These two conceive ideology in more general,
static and monolithic terms. In a nuthshell, for them, ideology is the form of consciousness
owned by a class or ascribed for a class. In Gramscis conception, however, ideology has a
more complex and dynamic character. It has different appearances, such as philosophy and
common sense. Not being a static entity, it is continually reproduced within social practice,
and is thus an area of ideological battle. The contradictions of social reality and people exist
also in ideologies. Moreover, by including the intellectuals in his analysis, Gramsci makes
more clear and intelligible the process of formation and diffusion of ideologies.

Secondly, I think what is essentially original in Gramscis conception of ideology is its

practical and pragmatic character. Unlike Marx, who says almost nothing clear on the quality

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of revolution but prophesying it, and Lukacs, who conceives revolution as an act of
consciousness by the proletariat, Gramsci reflects upon the concrete and practical ways by
which revolution can be achieved. By doing so, Gramsci also seems, I think, to transcend the
essential or categorical distinction, made by Marx and Lukacs, between the bourgeois and the
proletariat in terms of ideology. As we have seen, the term ideology has different
connotations for the bourgeois and the proletariat, in Marxs and Lukacs conceptions.
However, Gramsci has a more formal and thus neutral conception of ideology, and hegemony.
In other terms, Gramsci is not interested in the epistemological or moral value of ideologies in
his analysis. He does not seek to understand whether an ideology is right or false. Instead, I
think, he seeks to understand how and why an ideology (bourgeois ideology) is effective and
diffuse in society while another (Marxism or ideology of proletariat) is not, and how to make
the latter effective and diffuse in society. In order to do so that he explores what an ideology
is, how it is formed, how it functions, what it serves for and so on. Thus, as being ideologies,
bourgeois ideology is not different from that of the proletariat. Both follows, more or less, the
same logic of formation, diffusion and functioning. Nor the bourgeois hegemony is different
than that of the proletariat. What is necessary to gain hegemony in society is more or less the
same for the two classes. In this sense, I would argue that Gramscis thought on ideology and
hegemony is not intrinsically Marxist. Its Marxist character lies in the political and
ideological choice of Gramsci, rather than in the analysis itself. He provides a general
practical strategy to be followed in ideological battle for hegemony, which does not
necessarily require to be a Marxist to follow.

Epilogue

I may conclude that when Marxs, Lukacs, and Gramscis conceptions of ideology are
examined respectively, one can see a general line of continuation, and a general line of
differentiation. When analysing the bourgeois ideology and its role in capitalist society, they
are, in the last analysis, of one mind. They all ultimately argue that there is the domination of
bourgeois ideology in capitalist society, due to the dominant position of bourgeoisie in the
relations of production, and that this ideological domination prevents the proletariat from
being conscious of the contradictory nature of capitalism and from revolutionizing it.
However, when it comes to the ideology of the proletariat and the question of revolution (i.e.
how to achieve it) I would argue that there is a significant difference between Marx and
Lukacs on the one side, and Gramsci on the other. On this question, Lukacs has clearly an
idealistic standpoint. This idealistic standpoint is also implicitly present in Marxs conception

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of revolution, as I argued above. However, Gramsci treats the question from a materialistic
and practical standpoint.

References

Eagleton, Terry. 1991. Ideology: An Introduction. Verso.

Giddens, Anthony. 1971. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge University Press.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Lawrence & Wishart.

Hall, Stuart et al. 1985. Siyaset ve deoloji: Gramsci. Birey ve Toplum.

Jones, Gareth Stedman. The Marxism of the Early Lukacs: An Evaluation. New Left
Review, 1 (70): 27-64.

Larrain, Jorge. 1983. Marxism and Ideology. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lukacs, Georg. 1923 (1971). Reification and Consciousness of the Proletariat in History
and Class Consciousness, 83-121. Merlin Press.

Mouffe, Chantal. 1979. Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci in Gramsci and Marxist
Theory, 168-204. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Perkins Stephen. 1993. Marxism and the Proletariat: A Lukacsian Perspective. Pluto Press.

Purvis, Trevor and Hunt, Alan. 1993. Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse,
Ideology.... The British Journal of Sociology 44 (3): 473-499.

Tucker, Robert C. (ed.). 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader. W.W. Norton & Company.

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