GABRIEL L. DUERO vs.CA, and BERNARDO A.

ERADEL
G.R. No. 131282; January 4, 2002; QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private Eradelentered and
occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302,
located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax
declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Petitioner informed
respondent that the land was his, and requested the latter to vacate the
land. However, despite repeated demands, private respondent remained
steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery
of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against
private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and
InocencioRuena.

Petitioner and the Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which

became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January
12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves
to respect the ownership and possession of Duero. Herein private
respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared
in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May

8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was
ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the lot.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging
that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of ArtemioLaurente, Sr.,
since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons
to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better
right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it.
However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Private respondent then filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. The
RTC again denied the Petition.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration in which he alleged
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the value of the land is
only P5,240, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, the RTC
denied the MR.
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari
which the latter granted.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2) WON the private respondent Eradel is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of RTC after he has successfully sought affirmative relief
therefrom

HELD:
1) None. The case falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC based on Republic
Act 7691amending BP 129.

2) No. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be
unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a
tool of injustice.

Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since

he was merely a tenant of the late ArtemioLaurente Sr., his landlord, gave
the summons to a HipolitoLaurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio
Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the
complaint, private respondent was declared in default.

He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court, but such was
denied. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again,
the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of
the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time
the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied.

Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not
when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before
the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as
for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for
reconsideration
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an
action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even by their express consent. Further, a party may assail
the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings
and even on appeal.The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC
should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action

Citing Javier v CA, the Court reiterated: Under the rules, it is the duty of
the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Thus, the ruling of the CA is affirmed. The decision of the RTC and its
Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner,
and the Writ of Execution it issued, are annulled and set aside.

Antonio T. Donato, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals, Filomeno ARCEPE,

Timoteo Barcelona, Ignacio Bendol, Thelma P. Bulicano, Rosalinda
Caparas, Rosita De Costo, Feliza De Guzman, Leticia De Los Reyes,
Rogelio Gaddi, PaulinoGajardo, Geronimo Imperial, Homer Imperial,
Elvira Leslie, CeferinoLugana, Hector Pimentel, Nimfa Pimentel, AureliO
G. Rocero, Iluminada Tara, JuanitoVallespin, and NarcisoYabut,
respondents.
G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003

Petitioner appealed to the RTC. It sustained the decision of the MeTC.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was
signed by petitioners counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of
Revised Circular No. 28-91; and, (b) the only annex to the petition is a
certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of
the petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property
located in Manila, covered by a TCT. On June 7, 1994, petitioner filed a
complaint before the MeTC of Manila for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of the
subject property.
Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that
expired at the end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the
same terms by mere acquiescence or tolerance; sometime in 1992, they
stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a written
demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained
him to file the ejectment case against them.

Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents) filed a

consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-
payment of rentals. They contend that they cannot be evicted because the
Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security of tenure and priority right to
purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for the
purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a
passive stage, they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered
payment to petitioners counsel and thereafter initiated a petition for
consignation of the rentals in a civil case while they await the outcome of
the negotiation to purchase.

On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a MR attaching thereto a photocopy of

the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself
and the relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC. Five days later, or on
April 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Supplement to his MR submitting the duly
authenticated original of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by
petitioner.
On June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners MR and its supplement, ruling
that petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure the defect in the
instant petition.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the present petition (petition for review on certiorari)
principally assails the dismissal of the petition (petition for review with the
CA) on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a
quo to entertain the petition falls within the ambit of a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. YES
2) Whether or not the petitioner has adequately explained his failure to
personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule. YES
3) Whether or not the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3,
paragraph b, Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies
of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would
support the petition, justifies the outright dismissal of the petition. NO
4) Whether or not the instant case should be remanded to the CA. YES

In a Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on September 19,

1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate
the premises occupied by each of them and to pay. As to the 20 private
respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment on the same day
sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners
cause of action as not duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of
the case and dismissing the case without prejudice.

Ruling:
1) YES. The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the
CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error, subject of the recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the
act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the said Rules. As enunciated by the Court in Fortich vs. Corona: or its
requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of

petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error
of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is
one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against
forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In
submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself
in his motion for reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Courts
attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident
of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to
personally accomplish and sign the certification.

Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the

petition on ground of procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court
a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within the ambit of a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At the time the
instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing
rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However,
considering that the CA Resolution being assailed was rendered on March
21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-month reglementary period,
established by jurisprudence. Petitioner received notice of the assailed CA
Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his
motion reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of
the 90-day period. Petitioner received the CA Resolution denying his
motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on July 17, 1997, he
filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review
which was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August
15, 1997, which is well-within the period of extension granted to him.

2) YES. The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-

forum shopping in cases filed before the CA and the corresponding
sanction for noncompliance thereto are found in the then prevailing
Revised Circular No. 2891. It provides that the petitioner himself must
make the certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall
be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint.
The rationale for the rule of personal execution of the certification by the
petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other
courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact.
The Court has ruled that with respect to the contents of the certification,
the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so because
the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the
certification of non-forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory
nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with

We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the
petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United
States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine
Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification
before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the
Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that
petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the
certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.

We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice,
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
own ultimate and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and
penalize the evils of forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the
certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed
substantial compliance, pro hac vice.

3) NO. The failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b,

Rule 6 of the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the
petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be
emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to
require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the
interest of substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of
the RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the
court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may
require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for
under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner
attached copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records
below with his motion for reconsideration. In Jaro vs. Court of Appeals, the
Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz and
Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission that subsequent
submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration
amounts to substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the
rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason to depart from this doctrine.
Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium
on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.

4) YES. Petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits
without need of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the
elements of unlawful detainer are present in the case. He further argues
that the alleged
priority right to buy the lot they occupy does not apply where the
landowner
does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that
respondents
cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government
has no intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the subject
property
located within a zonal improvement area; and, that assuming that there is
a
negotiation for the sale of the subject property or a pending case for
consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of respondents.
We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues
in the present petition for certiorari. The issues involved are factual issues
which inevitably require the weighing of evidence. These are matters that
are beyond the province of this Court in a special civil action for
certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for
review filed before it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require
parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary, or to
receive evidence, to promote the ends of justice, pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

March 21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 41394 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-G.R. No. 41394, entitled,
Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, FilomenoArcepe, et al.

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIOGONZAGA

vs.
CA, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, and LUCKY HOMES, INC.

G.R. No. 144025; December 27, 2002; CORONA, J.:

FACTS:
Sometime in 1970, Sps. Gonzaga purchased a parcel of land from private
respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of
240 square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19
under a TCT and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan.

Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19
but on Lot No. 18, as Lucky Homes Inc mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as
Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error, private respondent informed petitioners
of such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen
their premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their
house.

However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan from

SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners
certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
SSS.
Sps. Gonzaga then offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded
from Lucky Homes that their contract of sale be reformed and another
deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their
house was built therein. However, private respondent refused. This
prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for reformation of
contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
36.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that when Lot
No. 19 was foreclosed and sold at public auction, the reformation, or the
swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19, was no longer feasible considering that
Sps. Gonzaga were no longer the owners of Lot 19. Thus, Lucky Homes
would be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore. Furthermore,
the RTC ruled:
"The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the
defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant
is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly
indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The
contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of
the parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual
mistake, hence the same need no longer be reformed.
A writ of execution was issued. The petitioners filed a motion to recall said
writ on the ground that the RTC lack jurisdiction as pursuant to PD
957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), it was
vested in theHousing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Consequently, Sps.
Gonzaga filed a new complaint with the HLURB, and also a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The CA dismissed the petition, relying on the doctrine of estoppel laid

down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

ISSUE:
WON the Sps Gonzaga are estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case

HELD:
Yes. The SC held that the doctrine in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, as reiterated in
numerous cases, is still controlling. In explaining the concept of jurisdiction
by estoppel, the Court quoted its decision in said case, to wit:
"It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x xxx
[T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject
matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of
public policy."
Furthermore, the Court said that it was petitioners themselves who invoked
the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It must be noted that in the
proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their
cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the
issue of the courts jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted
for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its decision and
issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise
the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was
unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to
question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Petition for review is denied.

ARNEL ESCOBAL
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA,Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
xxx, Hon. David C. Naval, RTC Judge

(jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis--vis of the RTC)

G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the
Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine
National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting
surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a caf bar and restaurant in
Naga City when he somehow got involved with a shooting incident that
resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca.

Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he

pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal
cases involving PNP members and officers. RTC denied the motion.

Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented
his evidence. On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
case. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that
since he committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed
the motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine
whether or not the crime charged was committed by the petitioner in
relation to his office as a member of the PNP.

On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the
petitioner committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his
official function. The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the
enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic
since the amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense
charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The petitioner did not have a
salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof.

The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the

Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No.
7975, and to include therein an allegation that the offense charged was not
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor
in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his
testimony and those of his witnesses, the offense charged was committed
by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975,
which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.

The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information

and to allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in
the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,
conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same to the
Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC,

contending that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the
RTC
HELD:
The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the
following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prisioncorreccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .

For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law
over crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is
essential that the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of
the offender and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the
crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed
with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation
showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on
November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to
include therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in
relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the
records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975
amending P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.

Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged
in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary
grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court,
as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this
case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23."
He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence,
the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied
retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a
substantive procedural law, which may be applied retroactively.

Agan v PIATCO G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003

Facts: In August 1989, the DOTC engaged the services of Aeroport de

Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can
cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010.

On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the
proposal of Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (unsolicited proposal dated Oct.
5, 1994) to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A
revised proposal, however, was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on
December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA Investment
Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) Technical Board favorably endorsed
the project to the ICC Cabinet Committee which approved the same,
subject to certain conditions, on January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996,
the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III
Project.

On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where
certain clarifications were made. Upon the request of prospective bidder
People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC
warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed
Payment submitted by the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and
that the challengers' technical and financial proposals would remain
confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources
contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and
that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent, subject to
approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those
fees and charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be subject to
regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public
Utility Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's
query on the matter with the Department of Justice.

On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its

reservations as regards the Paircargo Consortium, which include:
a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of
PAIRCARGO;
b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS;
c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General
Banking Act) on the amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the
project;
d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint
Venture, for prequalification purposes; and
e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of
the Philippine requirement in the operation of a public utility.

The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had
considered the issues raised by the latter, and that based on the
documents submitted by Paircargo and the established prequalification
criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had
prequalified to undertake the project. The Secretary of the DOTC approved
the finding of the PBAC.

On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the third envelope submitted
by AEDC and the Paircargo Consortium containing their respective financial
proposals. Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal
III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government and to pay the
government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of
operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten years of
operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for the last ten years of
operation, in accordance with the Bid Documents.

As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then
DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a notice
to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDC's failure to match the proposal.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to
PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of
PIATCO.

On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary

Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed
the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal
III" (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession
period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with
the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The
Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five
(25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at
the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.

During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002
Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacaang Palace, stated that she will not
"honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch's legal offices have
concluded (as) null and void."

Issue: Whether the petitioners and the petitioners-in-intervention have

standing;
Whether this Court has jurisdiction; and
Whether the BOT and contracts therein are unconstitutional.

Held: YES.
Ratio: Messrs. Lopez et al. are employees of the MIAA. These petitioners
(Messrs. Agan et al. and Messrs. Lopez et al.) are confronted with the
prospect of being laid off from their jobs and losing their means of
livelihood when their employer-companies are forced to shut down or
otherwise retrench and cut back on manpower. Such development would
result from the imminent implementation of certain provisions in the
contracts that tend toward the creation of a monopoly in favor of Piatco, its
subsidiaries and related companies.

Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in the business of

furnishing airport-related services to international airlines and passengers
in the NAIA and are therefore competitors of Piatco as far as that line of
business is concerned. On account of provisions in the Piatco contracts,
petitioners-in-intervention have to enter into a written contract with Piatco
so as not to be shut out of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing
business there. Since there is no provision to ensure or safeguard free and
fair competition, they are literally at its mercy. They claim injury on
account of their deprivation of property (business) and of the liberty to
contract, without due process of law.

By way of background, two monopolies were actually created by the

Piatco contracts. The first and more obvious one refers to the business of
operating an international passenger terminal in Luzon, the business end of
which involves providing international airlines with parking space for their
aircraft, and airline passengers with the use of departure and arrival areas,
check-in counters, information systems, conveyor systems, security
equipment and paraphernalia, immigrations and customs processing areas;
and amenities such as comfort rooms, restaurants and shops.

In furtherance of the first monopoly, the Piatco Contracts stipulate that

the NAIA Terminal III will be the only facility to be operated as an
international passenger terminal; that NAIA Terminals I and II will no
longer be operated as such; and that no one (including the government)
will be allowed to compete with Piatco in the operation of an international
passenger terminal in the NAIA Complex. Given that, at this time, the
government and Piatco are the only ones engaged in the business of
operating an international passenger terminal, I am not acutely concerned
with this particular monopolistic situation.

There was however another monopoly within the NAIA created by the
subject contracts for Piatco in the business of providing international
airlines with the following: groundhandling, in-flight catering, cargo
handling, and aircraft repair and maintenance services. These are lines of
business activity in which are engaged many service providers (including
the petitioners-in-intervention), who will be adversely affected upon full
implementation of the Piatco Contracts, particularly Sections 3.01(d) and
(e) of both the ARCA and the CA.

Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the

construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should, otherwise it will be unjustly
enriching itself at the expense of Piatco and, in particular, its funders,
contractors and investors both local and foreign. After all, there is no
question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being
part and parcel of the critical infrastructure and transportation-related
programs of government.

The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from
assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed
when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary
jurisdiction. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the
Court, procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy
disposition of the instant cases.

In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite
financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent
PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.

Is PIATCO a qualified bidder?

Public respondents argue that the Paircargo Consortium, PIATCO's
predecessor, was not a duly pre-qualified bidder on the unsolicited
proposal submitted by AEDC as the Paircargo Consortium failed to meet
the financial capability required under the BOT Law and the Bid
Documents. They allege that in computing the ability of the Paircargo
Consortium to meet the minimum equity requirements for the project, the
entire net worth of Security Bank, a member of the consortium, should not
be considered. R.A. No. 337, as amended or the General Banking Act that a
commercial bank cannot invest in any single enterprise in an amount more
than 15% of its net worth.

We agree with public respondents that with respect to Security Bank,

the entire amount of its net worth could not be invested in a single
undertaking or enterprise, whether allied or non-allied in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 337
The PBAC should not be allowed to speculate on the future financial
ability of the bidder to undertake the project on the basis of documents
submitted. This would open doors to abuse and defeat the very purpose of
a public bidding.

Is the 1997 Concession Agreement valid?

Petitioners and public respondents contend that the 1997 Concession
Agreement is invalid as it contains provisions that substantially depart from
the draft Concession Agreement included in the Bid Documents. They
maintain that a substantial departure from the draft Concession Agreement
is a violation of public policy and renders the 1997 Concession Agreement
null and void.

If the winning bidder is allowed to later include or modify certain

provisions in the contract awarded such that the contract is altered in any
material respect, then the essence of fair competition in the public bidding
is destroyed. A public bidding would indeed be a farce if after the contract
is awarded; the winning bidder may modify the contract and include
provisions which are favorable to it that were not previously made available
to the other bidders.

With respect to terminal fees that may be charged by PIATCO, as

shown earlier, this was included within the category of "Public Utility
Revenues" under the 1997 Concession Agreement. This classification is
significant because under the 1997 Concession Agreement, "Public Utility
Revenues" are subject to an "Interim Adjustment" of fees upon the
occurrence of certain extraordinary events specified in the agreement.
However, under the draft Concession Agreement, terminal fees are not
included in the types of fees that may be subject to "Interim Adjustment."

Finally, under the 1997 Concession Agreement, "Public Utility

Revenues," except terminal fees, are denominated in US Dollars while
payments to the Government are in Philippine Pesos. In the draft
Concession Agreement, no such stipulation was included. By stipulating
that "Public Utility Revenues" will be paid to PIATCO in US Dollars while
payments by PIATCO to the Government are in Philippine currency under
the 1997 Concession Agreement, PIATCO is able to enjoy the benefits of
depreciations of the Philippine Peso, while being effectively insulated from
the detrimental effects of exchange rate fluctuations.

Under the draft Concession Agreement, default by PIATCO of any of its

obligations to creditors who have provided, loaned or advanced funds for
the NAIA IPT III project does not result in the assumption by the
Government of these liabilities. In fact, nowhere in the said contract does
default of PIATCO's loans figure in the agreement. Such default does not
directly result in any concomitant right or obligation in favor of the
Government.

It is clear from the above-quoted provisions that Government, in the

event that PIATCO defaults in its loan obligations, is obligated to pay "all
amounts recorded and from time to time outstanding from the books" of
PIATCO which the latter owes to its creditors. These amounts include "all
interests, penalties, associated fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities,
reimbursements and other related expenses." This obligation of the
Government to pay PIATCO's creditors upon PIATCO's default would arise
if the Government opts to take over NAIA IPT III. It should be noted,
however, that even if the Government chooses the second option, which is
to allow PIATCO's unpaid creditors operate NAIA IPT III, the Government
is still at a risk of being liable to PIATCO's creditors should the latter be
unable to designate a qualified operator within the prescribed period. In
effect, whatever option the Government chooses to take in the event of
PIATCO's failure to fulfill its loan obligations, the Government is still at a
risk of assuming PIATCO's outstanding loans.

As such the Government is virtually at the mercy of PIATCO (that it

would not default on its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders), the Senior
Lenders (that they would appoint a qualified nominee or transferee or
agree to some other arrangement with the Government) and the existence
of a qualified nominee or transferee who is able and willing to take the
place of PIATCO in NAIA IPT III.

In view of regulation of monopolies

The operation of an international passenger airport terminal is no doubt
an undertaking imbued with public interest. In entering into a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer contract for the construction, operation and
maintenance of NAIA IPT III, the government has determined that public
interest would be served better if private sector resources were used in its
construction and an exclusive right to operate be granted to the private
entity undertaking the said project, in this case PIATCO. Nonetheless, the
privilege given to PIATCO is subject to reasonable regulation and
supervision by the Government through the MIAA, which is the government
agency authorized to operate the NAIA complex, as well as DOTC, the
department to which MIAA is attached.

While it is the declared policy of the BOT Law to encourage private

sector participation by "providing a climate of minimum government
regulations," the same does not mean that Government must completely
surrender its sovereign power to protect public interest in the operation of
a public utility as a monopoly. The operation of said public utility cannot be
done in an arbitrary manner to the detriment of the public which it seeks to
serve.

In contrast to the arrastre and stevedoring service providers in the case

of Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro whose contracts consist of
temporary hold-over permits, the affected service providers in the cases at
bar, have a valid and binding contract with the Government, through MIAA,
whose period of effectivity, as well as the other terms and conditions
thereof cannot be violated.

Should the dispute be referred to arbitration prior to judicial

recourse?
Respondent Piatco claims that Section 10.02 of the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) provides for arbitration under the
auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce to settle any dispute
or controversy or claim arising in connection with the Concession
Agreement, its amendments and supplements. The government disagrees;
however, insisting that there can be no arbitration based on Section 10.02
of the ARCA, since all the Piatco contracts are void ab initio.

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL

vs.
THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY
COUNCIL OF MANILA

G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines which pursuant to the Local Govt Code, constitutes the duly
elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, Metro
Manila chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters. On March
2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws.
Pursuant to its Constitution, it also adopted and ratified its own Election
Code. Thereafter, it came out with its calendar of activities and guidelines
for the implementation of its election code. The synchronized elections for
highly-urbanized city chapters was also set on Oct. 21, 2002.

On June 28, 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance

providing among other things, for the election of representatives of the
District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for
both chapters 30 days after the barangay elections.

Upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to Mayor
Atienza for his approval, the Liga sent him a letter requesting that said
ordinance be vetoed considering that it encroached upon or even assumed
the functions of the Liga through legislation. However, Atienza
stillapproved and signed the ordinance, and issued an executive order for
its implementation.

This prompted the Liga to file a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and executive
order and prays for the dismissal of the petition on the ff grounds: 1)
certiorari under Rule 65 is unavailing; 2) two actions were pending before
the RTC Manila questioning the ordinance and executive order; 3)
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping; 4) act sought to be enjoined is fait
accompli; and 5) the city council does not fall within the ambit of tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

ISSUE:
WON the City Council of Manila and Atienza committed grave abuse of
discretion when they enacted and approved the ordinance purposely to
govern the elections of the Manila Chapter of the Liga, and which provides
a different manner of electing its officers, despite the fact that the law
mandates such elections to be governed by the Liga Constitution and By-
laws

HELD:
The SC ruled that the action, in its essence, seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality/illegality of the ordinance. Thus it partakes of an action
for declaratory relief of which the SC has only appellate and not original
jurisdiction.

Rule on Hierarchy of Courts.The concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be

taken, as according to parties seeking any of the writs, an absolute
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which the application
therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. The
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for issuance of extraordinary writs against
the first level (inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against
the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SCs original jurisdiction to
issue the writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention, which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prvent further
overcrowding of the Courts docket.

Forum Shopping; Exists if elements of LititsPendentia are present. Forum

shopping exists where the elements of litispendentia are present or when a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For
litispendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present: 1) identity
of the parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest
in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts; 3) identity with respect to the @
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Requisites for filing of a Writ of Certiorari. For the Writ of Certiorari to

issue, the following requisites must concur: 1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; 2)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and 3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORP. vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI

FACTS:

Eddy Ng Kok Wei (respondent)is a Singaporean businessman who

ventured into investing in the Philippines.
 November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to
Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his
intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of
P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit
(Unit 703) valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent
paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum of P729,830.00.
petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a
Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent
The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall
substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within
fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and
that (S)hould there be no substantial completion and fail(ure) to
deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total
amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).
respondent returned to the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President,
Mr. Mario G. Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial
completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various
uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etatattempts, typhoon and
steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31,
1990.
July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May
31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit
still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building
administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to
move in on August 22, 1990.
October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find
that his condominium unit was still unlivable. he was constrained to
send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding
payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such
demand,
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against
the former for specific performance and damages,
during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the
condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus,
respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for
 damages.
December 18, 1992, the trial court found the petitioner liable for
payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its
obligation to the respondent.

CA - affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the

respondent.
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA

ISSUE : WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the instant case; and
that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts finding that
petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of the
condominium unit to respondent.

HELD :

On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended,
provides:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][ shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of the following nature:
x xx
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
x xx.
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction
over the instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for
specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer
against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the
case, petitioners active participation in the proceedings estopped it from
assailing such lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a
party participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse.

petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before

the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner
confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this
case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer
question the trial courts jurisdiction.

2ND ISSUE :

On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a
factual issue. Time and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of
the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence
and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of AppealsWhether
or not petition. er incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages
as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.
The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being
assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. These exceptions are not
present here.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated

March 26, 1999 and Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

GEORGE KATON vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR.

G.R. No. 151149, 9/7/2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action
clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may
be dismissed motuproprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has
been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such
cases appropriately ends useless litigations.

Facts:

On August 2, 1963, a parcel of land located in Sombrero Island, Puerto

Princessa, Palawan was reclassified from forest to agricultural land upon
the request by the above-named petitioner. The names of
FelicisimoCorpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan
Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the
petitioner.

Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927
and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of
Sombrero Island.

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original

certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in
favor of Manuel Palanca and the other respondents on the ground that the
same were obtained through fraud.

Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

On the other hand, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead
application for the island and insisted that they already had their respective
occupancy and improvements on the island. Respondents aver that they
are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and
have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been
faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years.

Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue

insofar as the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can
only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and
that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his
right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
In the instant case, petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file
an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he
who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land.

The assailed Resolution by the CA, denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs dismissal of his Complaint in Civil
Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but
because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: 1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for

Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the
Petition?

2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual

prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?

Ruling:

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits.

1.Yes.This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the
propriety of the CAs ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate
court when he moved for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000
Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution,
as follows:

"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed
have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming
importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the
apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the
volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on
incidental matters. We stand corrected.

That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CAs
Resolution on this point has rendered petitioners issue moot. Hence, there
is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court
indeed acted ultra jurisdiction in ruling on the merits of the case when the
only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged
grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole
office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such
writ does not include a review of the evidence,more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this
case.

Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction

2. No. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in

which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case
or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon
the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the
records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CAs motuproprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have

been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably,
such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.

What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual

powers of the courts to dismiss an action motuproprio upon the grounds
mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority
of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed

the Complaint motuproprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing
on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action.
Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only
power it has is to dismiss the action.
Nonetheless, In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the
plaintiffs own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such
action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been
invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,we also explained thus:

"x xx Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the
ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record
show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954;
Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova
v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA
529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of
a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which
sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if
the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has
not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the
pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission
House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where
a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270).
What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse
of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily
apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint,
or otherwise established by the evidence."45 (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if
and when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire
controversies before them to prevent future litigations.

FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

JULY 14, 2008

NACHURA, J.

SUBJECT AREA: Estoppel by laches

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide. The RTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the
CA, the petitioner, for the first time, questioned RTCs jurisdiction on the
case.

The CA in affirming the decision of the RTC, ruled that the principle of
estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner
actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional
infirmity.

The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court
over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time
on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches
will not be applicable.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was
immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the CA

HELD: No.

RATIO: Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a
general rule, the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of

jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous
to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to

be applicable, that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had abandoned or declined to assert it.

In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after

fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been
elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches.

In the case at bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of
Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion
for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the
appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be
considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to
take the case within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural
fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to dire
consequences that impelled her to comply.

The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction

of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before
the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is

dismissed.