ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.

4 September 22, 1988

SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS

TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSITION OF CASES

The flow of cases in the trial courts from the time of filing until their final disposition has been the subject of constant
public criticism. The trial period is exceedingly long. It usually takes more than two or three years to finish. The slow
grind of the trial court machinery has made the legal maxim "justice delayed is justice denied" aptly descriptive of the
dismal situation obtaining in that level of jurisdiction. Indeed the ultimate victims are always the ordinary litigants. The
real culprit is the common practice of piecemeal trial of cases that sets cases for trial one day at a time and thereafter
continued or postponed to another date until all the parties have finished their presentation of evidence.

A. General Guidelines for All Trial Courts

In order to minimize the aforesaid delay in the processing of cases in the trial courts, the following guidelines are
hereby issued for strict compliance by all the trial judges in the management of their calendar:

1. During the pre-trial of all civil cases-including special proceedings and special civil actions
whenever practicable-which does not result in an amicable settlement, the following matters, aside
from those already mentioned in Rule 20, Rules of Court, must be agreed upon by the parties
before the pre-trial is terminated:

(a) the number of witnesses to be presented;

(b) the approximate number of hours that will be required by them for the
presentation of their respective evidence; and

(c) the specific trial dates needed to complete evidence presentation by all the
parties which must be within a period of three (3) months from the first day of
trial.

1.1 Where cases passed the pre-trial stage but not yet tried at the time of the issuance of
this Circular, the parties shall be called to a conference for the purpose of making the
agreements referred to above.

1.2 Cases already being tried at the time of the issuance of this Circular, shall be
immediately set for conference in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section 6,
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court with the end in view of eventually setting them for
completion of the trial phase within three (3) months. The older cases shall be given
priority in the trial calendar.

1.3 In criminal cases, the parties must also agree on the matters stated in paragraph 1
above, immediately after arraignment if there is still a need for trial thereafter.

1.4 These agreements must be made in open court before the parties are dismissed from
the courtroom. The agreed dates shall be written on the record of the case and the parties
and their counsel shall be required to affix their signatures below the dates inscribed on
the record of the case in open court. They shall be advised by the court that they are all
deemed notified of these agreed trial dates in open court and that no further notice will be
sent to them. The parties shall be further advised that they will be responsible for bringing
their respective witnesses on the dates they are scheduled to testify.
 1.5 The names and addresses of witnesses that need to be summoned by subpoenas
shall be given at the same time when the foregoing matters are agreed upon, so that the
necessary subpoenas may be issued on time for the dates of their appearance in court.
Counsel or their representatives may be allowed to serve the subpoenas to insure service
thereof and the submission of the returns on time.

2. Each party is bound to complete the presentation of his evidence within the trial dates assigned to him.
After the lapse of said dates, the party is deemed to have completed his evidence presentation. However,
upon verified motion based on serious reasons, the judge may allow a party additional trial dates in the
afternoon; provided that said extension will not go beyond the three-month limit computed from the first trial
date.

3. Except in those cases where the law gives them preferential attention, priority in calendaring of cases
shall be according to the dates they become ready for trial. A case is deemed ready for trial after completion
of the pre-trial conference and factual issues still remain.

4. Cases which shall be given preferential attention-such as habeas corpus, tourist cases, election cases,
criminal cases, where the accused is detained, special civil actions, or cases tried under the Ruleon
Summary Procedure- if not accommodated in the regular calendar, shall be tried in the afternoons in
addition, but without prejudice, to those cases already scheduled for the day.

B. Pilot Project for Test Efficiency of Continuous Trial

To find out whether continuous trial of one or at most three (3) cases at a time would expedite disposition of cases, a
pilot project will be established in selected courts where this method of trial will be adopted.

1. Within three months from issuance of this Circular, the Court Administrator shall submit to the
Court a list of branches of the trial courts where on the bases of existing dockets, court facilities
support resources and in consultation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, continuous trial of
cases may be conducted. In such pilot courts, all cases shall be tried continuously until the cases
are finally decided, and in no case shall the entire trial period exceed three (3) months from the first
day of trial unless otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the
Rules of Court.

The Following guidelines shall be observed in the selection of the court for inclusion in this pilot project:

(a) The average docket should not exceed 200 for RTC and 300 for MTC;

(b) The courts are situated in areas where the local governments are financially able to extend support for immediate
services of summons and subpoenas;

(c) There are sufficient number of practicing lawyers in proportion to the number of cases in the docket.

Upon submission of the list, the selected judges shall undergo a two week orientation seminar, and thereafter on a
date to be fixed by the Court, the continuous trial program shall be implemented.

2. Within a period of six months from operation of the continuous trial program in pilot areas, the
Court Administrator shall submit to the Court a study on the feasibility of applying the program to all
trial courts in the Philippines, together with the implementing Circulars and proposed Amendments
to the Rules of Court necessary for a continuous trial program.
G.R. No. L-47069 March 29, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE ORSAL, ET AL., accused, VICENTE ORSAL defendant-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

Vicente Orsal is one of four (4) accused in four (4) separate cases filed in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga City: (1) Criminal Case No. 471 (1183) for Arson; (2) Criminal Case No. 472 (1184)
for Arson; (3) Criminal Case No. 473 (1185) for Robbery in Band with Multiple Homicide and (4)
Criminal Case No. 432 (1157) for Robbery in Band with Homicide. The three (3) other accused are
Ramon Gutierrez, Generoso Abapo and Romeo Flores, but the two (2) last named accused having
gone at large, only appellant Vicente Orsal and Ramon Gutierrez stood trial, after which they were
sentenced as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused, Vicente Orsal and Ramon
Gutierrez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes above-
mentioned, attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, that the crimes
committed at nighttime and by a band without any mitigating circumstances to offset
the same, and pursuant to law, hereby sentences the accused Vicente Orsal the
following penalties:

In Criminal Case No. 432 (1157), for Robbery In Band with Homicide, the Court
hereby sentences said accused Vicente Orsal to suffer the supreme penalty of
'DEATH', to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jesus Limen the amount of
P12,000.00, and to pay one fourth () of the costs in each of these four cases.

In Criminal Case No. 473 (1185), for Multiple Homicide, the Court hereby sentences
the said accused to suffer four separate and distinct imprisonment's of Ten (10) years
and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17) years and Five
(5) months of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Cristino Bejic, Eduarda Bejic, Roberto Bejic and Atanasia Legazpi the total
amount of P48,000.00 and to pay one fourth () of the costs of this suit in each of
these four cases.

In Criminal Case No. 472 (1184), for Arson, the Court hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of Four (4) years, Two (2) months and One (1) day of
Prision Correccional as the minimum to Ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as the maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Cristino Bejic the sum of
P5,000.00, and to pay one fourth () of the costs of this suit.

In Criminal Case No. 471 (1183), for Arson, the Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer
the penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17)
years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify
Francisco Limen the amount of P8,000.00, and to pay one fourth () of the costs of this suit.

The accused being under detention, he is entitled to a full deduction of the preventive period of his
imprisonment.
 In the case of the accused Ramon Gutierrez, were if not for the fact that he is a
youthful offender, as he is only 18 years old, the court would have imposed upon him
the same penalties which this court has imposed on the accused Vicente Orsal in
these four cases, but in view of the provision of Article 192, Presidential Decree No.
603, this Court is constrained to order, as it hereby orders, his commitment to the
Department of Social Services and Development, Region IX, Zamboanga City, until
he reaches the age of majority, or for a shorter period as the Court may deem proper,
upon report and recommendation of the said Department. 1

The sentence of death having been imposed in Criminal Case No. 432 (1157), which was heard
jointly with the other three (3) cases, the single decision rendered for all the four (4) cases is now
before Us for automatic review.

Conviction resulted from the facts established by the prosecution, synthesized in the People's brief
as follows:

On April 13, 1974 at about 4:00 in the afternoon, appellant, together with Generoso
Abapo Ramon Gutierrez and Romeo Flores, passed by the house of Andrea Bejic
located in Latuan. Upper Curuan Zamboanga City and asked for water to drink. Upon
the invitation of Andrea, appellant and his companions went up her house. Thereat,
Romeo Flores pulled his revolver and offered to sell it for P150.00 but Andrea offered
only P50.00. Likewise, appellant pulled out his revolver and offered it to Andrea for
P80.00 to which the latter bargained for P50.00. Before appellant and his
companions left, they advised Andrea that they will close the deal upon their return
from her father's house in Sapa Moro, Upper Curuan Zamboanga City. Andrea in turn
informed appellant that she will prepare supper for them, but appellant adviser not to
prepare anything as they will take their supper in her father's house (pp. 10-12, t.s.n.,
August 11, 1975).

At about 6:00 in the evening of same day, Jesus Limen and Ramon Jimenez were
boiling cassava for their merienda at the kitchen of the house of Jesus's father,
Francisco Limen located in Sapa Moro, Upper Curuan Zamboanga City. While
waiting for the cassava to be cooked, they heard persons talking as the latter
approached the house. Peeping through the window, they recognized the persons to
be the appellant, who is Ramon Jimenez' cousin, and his afore-named companions.
Appellant greeted the occupants of the house and in response, Jesus Limen and
Ramon Jimenez invited appellant and his companions to come up the house and
offered them boiled cassava. Ramon Jimenez noticed that appellant was armed with
a revolver and a knife and his companions were each armed with a knife. After
appellant and his companions finished eating they left informing Jesus and Ramon
that they are going to the house of Cristino Bejic and requesting them to prepare
something to eat as they would come back later that evening (pp. 5-9, t.s.n., August
28, 1975).

Staying with Cristino Bejic (Andrea's father) at his house (referred to as "big house")
located in Sapa Moro were his wife Eduarda and his grandchildren Atanacia Legazpi,
Roberto Bejic and Antonio Bejic Because of the reported feud (p. 5, t.s.n., August 13,
1975) between the Christians and Muslims in Upper Curuan Cristino Bejic
constructed a small hut some 500 meters away from his house where he, his wife
and grandchildren sleep at night (pp. 3-4, t.s.n., August 12, 197 5).
At about 8:00 in the evening of April 13, 1974 while Cristino Bejic his wife and
aforenamed grandchildren were inside the small hut they heard from the direction of
their big house the barking of their dogs (p. 5, supra). In between said barkings
Antonio Bejic heard the voice of appellant shouting and calling "Hoy!" He recognized
the voice to be that appellant as the latter oftentimes slept in his (Antonio's)
grandfather's house (p. 4, t.s.n., August 13, 1975). Cristino Bejic armed with a
shotgun and his grandson Roberto Bejic with a bolo, went to the big house to find
out who is calling (p. 7, t.s.n., August 12, 197 5). Eduarda Bejic Atanacia Legazpi and
Antonio Bejic stayed at the hut and waited for the return of Cristino and Roberto.
While waiting, they heard the sound of a pistol shot. At the instance of Antonio, he,
his grandmother and his sister Atanacia hid themselves in the bushes.

Worried because Cristino and Roberto have not yet returned, Eduarda, Antonio and
Atanacia came out from their hiding and returned to the hut where they got a bolo
and proceeded to the big house to see what happened. On the way, they heard
sound of "breaking twigs caused by footsteps. They stopped and then saw appellant
and his companions. Appellant then was holding Roberto Bejic (pp. 7-8, supra).
Appellant and Roberto Bejic informed Eduarda that her husband fainted in the big
house. Because of this information Eduarda, Atanacia and Antonio, followed by
appellant and his companions proceeded to the big house. Eduarda with a lighted
lamp, together with Antonio and Atanacia, went around the big house looking for
Cristino. Roberto who was also looking for his grandfather told his grandmother that
his grandfather jumped from the house. While Roberto was demonstrating the
position of his grandfather (Cristino) when the latter reached the ground, appellant
pulled and stabbed Roberto with a knife. Thereafter Romeo Flores (one of appellant's
companions) shot Antonio with a revolver but missed (pp. 9-10, supra). Antonio ran
and escaped towards the creek followed by Roberto who, while on the way, however,
collapsed. Antonio continued running until he reached an elevated portion of the
creek's bank and from there he saw at a distance their house in flames. Antonio
continued running towards the road until he reached the house of Santos Licaros
where he slept that night.

The following morning, April 14, 1974, Antonio went to the house of his mother,
Andrea Bejic and reported to her that appellant and his companions killed his
grandfather and grandmother, as well as Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic and
burned his grandfather's house (pp. 11-12, supra).

Andrea Bejic together with two of her laborers, proceeded to Sapa Moro to verify the
report of her son. Arriving thereat, she saw her father's house already in ashes. She
went around and saw only the dead bodies of her father and mother. She continued
scanning the area and called for Roberto and Atanacia. Receiving no answer, she
went home to Latuan and requested her husband to report the matter to the Curuan
Police Precinct (p. 13, t.s.n., August 11, 1975).

Acting on the report made by Bonifacio Yap, common-law husband of Andrea Bejic
Pat. Cesar Lago of the Zamboanga City Police Force, then assigned at the Curuan
Police Precinct, together with two other policemen proceeded to Sapa Moro. Upon
arriving thereat they saw the house of Cristino Bejic in ashes. Pat. Lago and his
companions also found the dead bodies of Cristino, Eduarda, Atanacia and Roberto
(pp. 5-7, t.s.n., September 15, 1975).
At about 10:00 in the evening of April 13, 1974 Jesus Limen and Ramon Jimenez
were awakened from their sleep by appellant who shouted "Ramon." Jesus Limen
with the lighted lamp went towards the kitchen where appellant was calling. On
seeing appellant and his companions, Jesus Limen invited them to come up the
house.

Appellant together with Generoso Abapo and Ramon Gutierrez were he called up the
house, while Romeo Flores stayed downstairs where he called for and ordered
Ramon Jimenez to go down. 'The moment Ramon came down he was held on the
left wrist by Romeo Flores who pointed a gun at him and said "don't shout and don't
run if you don't want to die." (pp. 9-11, t.s.n., August 26, 1975). While Romeo Flores
was holding Ramon the latter heard Jesus limen who was up in the house, groaning
in pain. Immediately thereafter Ramon Flores brought Ramon Jimenez up the house
and ordered the latter to show where the belongings of Jesus Limen were placed.

Appellant and his companions ransacked the house and found Jesus Limens shoes
and clothing's, one paltik revolver, two paltik shotguns and a hand grenade all of
which they placed inside a sack. Thereafter upon being ordered by appellant, Ramon
Jimenez showed the place where they kept the kerosene. Appellant poured the
kerosene on the walls of the house while Generoso Abapo lit the same (pp. 11-
12, supra). Appellant and his companions then looked for Jesus Limen downstairs to
verify whether he is dead (p. 16, t.s.n., June 11, 1975). When the house was in
flame, appellant and his companions left bringing along within them the sack
containing the aforementioned articles. They also took along with them Ramon
Jimenez (p. 12, t.s.n., August 26, 1975).

That same evening, appellant, his companions and Ramon Jimenez proceeded to
appellant's house located in Basagan, Zamboanga City where they opened the sack
(p. 13, supra). The following day the group proceeded to the house of their
companion, Generoso Abapo in Daboi, Zamboanga City, where they repaired the two
shotguns. While thereat, appellant and his companions took turns in watching
Ramon Jimenez for fear that he (Ramon Jimenez) might escape (pp. 13-14, supra).

On April 15, 1974 appellant brought Ramon Jimenez to Surabay, Zamboanga City
and stayed in the house of appellant's uncle. A day after their arrival in Surabay,
appellant and Ramon Jimenez were arrested by policemen of Ipil, Zamboanga del
Sur. After eight (8) days of confinement at the Ipil Police Station, appellant and
Ramon Jimenez were taken by policemen of Zamboanga City and brought to the
Zamboanga City Police station for investigation (pp. 14-6, supra).

At about 6:00 in the morning of April 22, 1974 Alfredo Limen informed his uncle
Francisco Limen that the latter's house in Sapa Moro was burned (p. 4, t.s.n.,
December 18, 1975). Francisco Limen together with Pats. Rollano and Abdani of the
Zamboanga City Police Force went to Sapa Moro to verify the report of Alfredo Limen
Arriving thereat, Francisco Limen found his house in ashes. He went around the
vicinity of his house looking for his son Jesus Limen He found the already
decomposing dead body of his son near a creek some forty meters away from the
site of his burned house (p. 5, t.s.n., October 13, 1975).

In the investigation conducted on April 25, 1974 inside Lt.

Pedro Francisco's office, Antonio Bejic pointed to appellant as one of the four persons who killed
Cristino Bejic Eduarda Bejic and Atanacia Legazpi and burned the house of Cristino Bene at Sapa
Moro, Upper Curuan Zamboanga City on the evening of April 13, 1975 (p. 13, t.s.n., September 13,
1975; p. 6, t.s.n., October 6, 1975).

Dr. Rogelio Silapan, Medico Legal of Zamboanga City Health Office conducted a post-mortem
examination on the cadavers of Iristino Bejic Eduarda Bejic Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic the
findings thereon are reflected in his necropsy report (Exhs. "M" and "M-11") as follows:

Postmortem Findings: Roberto Bejic (Exh. M-3)

1. Wound, stabbed, forearm, proximal third, thru and thru 2" x 31 with stabbed
wounds entrance, lateral aspect toward the medial aspect forearm, right.

2. Wound, stabbed, abdomen, anterior aspect, lumbar, right, transverse in position,

2" x 3" in diameter.

3. Wound, incised, superficial one inch in length, perpendicular in position, scalp,

forehead, right.

4. Wound, stabbed, axillary region 2" x 3" in diameter, axillary fossa perpendicular to
the axillary fold at the level of the second and third rib, lateral aspect, chest, left.

According to Dr. Silapan the injuries sustained by Roberto Bejic could have been caused by a sharp
pointed bladed weapon; that the cause of the death of Roberto was shock, hemothorax, secondary
to ab wound, axillary left (p. 26, t.s.n., October 1, 1975); that he issued Death Certificate (Exh. "Q")
for the said Roberto Bejic "Postmortem Findings: (Cristino Bejic Exh. M-4)

1. Wound, stabbed, axillary region, right, lateral aspect, anterior axillary line, chest 2"
x 3" in diameter perpendicular in position at the level of the third and fourth rib.

According to Dr. Silapan the injury sustained by Cristino Bejic could have been
caused by a sharp pointed bladed weapon; that the cause of the death of Cristino
was shock, hemothorax, chest, due to stab wound (p. 26, supra); that he issued
Death Certificate, Exhibit "N", for Cristino Bejic.

Postmortem Findings: (Eduarda Bejic Exh. M-5)

Wound, stabbed, hypochodiac region, left 2" x 4" in diameter just beneath the 10th
rib, transverse in position with protrusion of the momentum, portion of the stomach
and pancreas.

According to Dr. Silapan the injuries sustained by Eduarda Bejic could have been
caused by a sharp pointed bladed weapon; that the cause of the death of Eduarda
Bejic is shock, internal hemorrhage secondary to stabbed wound, hypogastric, left (p.
27, supra); that he issued Death Certificate, Exhibit "P", for Eduarda Bejic

Postmortem Findings: (Atanacia Legazpi, Exh. "M-6")

 1. Wound, stabbed, anterior aspect, abdomen, " below the umbilicus, transverse in
position, " latero-inferior aspect, umbilicus measuring 2 inches by 4 inches in
diameter.

2. Wound, stabbed, left, perpendicular in position, 2" x 4" in diameter with protrusion
of the large intestine, descending portion, along the anterior axillary line, lumbar, left.

3. Wound, stabbed, lateral aspect, thorax, along the anterior axillary the 2" x 3" in
diameter, left.

4. Wound, stabbed, lateral aspect, I inch below the axillary region, left, 3 inches
lateral to the nipple, measuring 2" x 4 " in diameter perpendicular in position.

5. Wound, incised, anterior aspect mammary gland, 1 inch above the nipple, right,
2 inches in length in oblique position and wound incised, antero-supero-medial
aspect, oblique in position, mammary gland right with 1 inches in length.

According to Dr. Silapan the injuries sustained by Atanacia Legazpi could have been
caused by a sharp bladed instrument; that the cause of the death of Atanacia
Legazpi was shock, hemorrhage profuse, intestinal protrusion secondary to stabbed
wound, multiple (p. 29, supra); and that he issued Death Certificate, Exhibit "O", for
Atanacia Legazpi.

Said Dr. Rogelio Silapan also conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadaver
of Jesus Limen and his findings were reflected in his necropsy report (Exh. "A-4") as
follows:

PERTINENT FINDINGS

After complete lay off of the detached skull and other bones in their respective
anatomical position in the human body, there is a well delineated stabbed wound in
between the fifth and sixth rib, one (1) inch below the nipple, chest, left, midclavicular
line measuring two (2) inches in length by one (1) inch in width.

According to Dr. Silapan the injuries sustained by Jesus Limen could have been
caused by a sharp pointed instrument,; that the cause of the death of Jesus Limen
was hemorrhage, profuse, secondary to stab wound (p. 5, June 11, 1975); and that
he issued Death Certificate, Exhibit "B", for Jesus Limen. 2

Appellant first contends that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy trial because the
information was filed only about nine (9) months after his arrest and investigation.

There was no such denial. As correctly set forth by the Solicitor General, the test of violation of the
right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is
filed, not before the filing. 3 The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not
been without reasonable cause, is, therefore, not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has
been a denial of the right to speedy trial.

In the main, appellant's contention in this appeal is that the evidence of the prosecution is weak and
insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in the manner he was
Identified as one of the alleged perpetrators of the four (4) crimes herein charged. He would then
argue that such weakness of the state evidence would commensurately strengthen his defense of
alibi which, as he claims, the trial court erroneously rejected.

The weakness of the evidence of the prosecution is, among others, alleged to reveal itself in the lack
of motive on the part of appellant to commit so heinous and dastardly a crime as those charged,
considering his being a Christian and a missionary. The senselessness of the burning and the killing
with manifest cruelty should therefore, according to appellant, exclude him as the author or one of
the authors, thereof. He suggests as strong the possibility of a Muslim group being the culprits who
are known to be in deep-seated feud with Christians in the region, both engaged in mercilessly killing
each other and committing vast destruction of properties over wide areas.

There would have been some plausibility in the foregoing speculation had not appellant been
positively Identified as one of the offenders. 4 But here again, appellant Identification by the state
witnesses was not that positive, reliable or spontaneous that would necessarily make his alibi devoid of
credence. What is indubitably clear is that the state witnesses who pointed to appellant as among the
culprits are the ones with no motive sufficient to urge them to testify falsely against appellant who would
be punished with no less than death in consequence of their perjured testimony.

First to Identify appellant was Antonio Bejic the lone survivor in the carnage against the Bejic family
and household. He Categorically stated that he recognized the voice that shouted: "Hoy", to be that
of appellant whom he had known very well because appellant used to sleep in Antonio's grandfather
with whom he was residing. 5The distance from where appellant shouted must have been such that he
knew he could be heard for otherwise, he would not have shouted at all to attract attention of the inmates
and make them go to the house as was his evident purpose; and so, he shouted "Hoy", more than once,
the better to achieve his evident purpose of drawing the Bejic household members to the big house.

Moreover, Antonio also testified having seen appellant stab his cousin, Roberto Bejic He was
however candid enough to admit that he did not see who actually killed the rest of his relatives, nor
who actually burned the house. This fact would tend to negate appellant's claims that the testimony
of the state witnesses were scripted and merely rehearsed.

Andrea Bejic Testified that appellant and his companion dropped at her house at about 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of April 13, 1974 and told her that they were going to her father's house; and when
Andrea offered to prepare supper for them on their return, appellant told her not to bother because
they would take supper in her father's house. From this testimony, there could hardly be any doubt
that those who liquidated almost the entire household of Cristino Bejic and burned down his house
on the night of April 13, 1974 are appellant and his co-accused, not other persons.

Later in the same evening, Jesus Limen was slain and his house also burned. The same pattern of
killing and burning strikingly characterized the commission of these later offenses that followed
closely the killing of the Bejic kins and burning of their house. This would leave no room for doubt
that both sets of crimes were the handiwork of the same group of malefactors who are none other
than appellant and his three (3) companions.

That the appellant and his companions were the perpetrators of the killing of Jesus Limen and also
the burning of his house was positively established by the testimony of Ramon Jimenez. Ramon was
with Jesus Limen when the latter was killed and his house burned. That he was taken along by
appellant apparently as a hostage to prevent him from reporting to the authorities, and so he was
arrested with appellant together is, undeniably, one circumstance strongly lending credence to all
that Ramon Jimenez testified to, particularly on appellant's complicity in the commission of the four
(4) crimes.
But appellant would impugn Ramon's credibility by ascribing to the latter the motive of wanting to
pass on to him (appellant) the guilt for what happened in the house of Jesus Limen because Ramon
could be a primary suspect having been admittedly with Jesus Limen in the latter's house. This
theory is far-fetched and utterly finds no basis. There is not a scintilla of evidence why Ramon should
kin a person who appears, as the evidence would show, to be very close and intimate to him. He and
Jesus Limen even slept together that night. Earlier, at about 6:00 p.m. they were together boiling
cassava for merienda at Limens house. 6 If Ramon had committed the crime, appellant would have
known so, as Ramon could not have gone to appellant and stay with him until their arrest, as is appellants
version of how he and Ramon got to be together, without the latter having known, as he must have
endeavored to know, the reason for what would appear to be a flight of Ramon for having committed a
crime. The appellant would have then reported the matter to the authorities instead of harboring a
criminal. If he did harbor Ramon with protective intent, Ramon could not have been that ingrate as to
have passed on to his protector his own guilt. What is conspicuously absent is a credible explanation of
why and how Ramon got to be with appellant from the time of the commission of the crimes until they
were arrested together, to dispute Ramon's testimony particularly on how said testimony provided positive
Identification of appellant as one of the malefactors.

The testimony of Ramon Jimenez of course did not escape the very keenly scrutinizing examination
to which appellant's counsel subjected the testimonies of all the other state witnesses, in an zealous
effort to show their want of credibility with the inconsistencies, improbabilities and contradictions they
supposedly contained. Suffice it to say that the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies were on
minor and inconsequential details that would not in any way affect Ramon's credibility. Thus, if he
gave different dates of his arrest and by this appellant would brand this witness as unreliable
no reason was intimated why this witness would give changing dates of his arrest with appellant
other than that he merely committed an honest, innocent mistake, certainly not to lie on a fact which
was a matter of official record. This holds true in his not being able to remember the exact date of his
birth and also in giving different names of the bus he and appellant rode in going to Surabay These
are matters that do not impress themselves deeply in one's memory, nor do they draw keen attention
as to be literally seared in the mind, as the commission of violent crimes does.

Other supposed improbabilities in the version of the prosecution are sought to be shown with the
following questions posed by counsel in appellant's brief:

1. Why did they not use Cristino Bejics shotgun which he brought to the big house in
shooting Antonio Bejic instead of a pistol (p. 35, Appellant's Brief)

2. Why is it that not one of the members of Cristino Bejics household suffered any
gunshot wound notwithstanding prosecution's evidence that appellant and his
companions were armed? (p. 36, Appellant's Brief)

3. Why is it that no one bothered to run after the fleeing Antonio Bejic who was
supposed to be the sole survivor of the massacre? (p. 35, Appellant's Brief)

4. Why is it that Cristino Bejic who was then armed with a shotgun while at the big
house, did not use his shotgun to shoot back at his killer considering that as per the
necropsy report, Cristino Bejic died of stab wounds only? (pp. 35-36, Appellant's
Brief)

5. Why is it that appellant and his companions had to accompany Eduarda Bejic
Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic from the small hut to the big house and there kill
them when appellant and his companions could have easily killed the victims in the
small hut? (p. 38, Appellant's Brief)
 6. Why is it that in the report to the Police Department made by Andrea Bejics
common-law-husband, Bonifacio Yap, appellant's name was never mentioned as
suspect in said killings, if indeed Antonio Bejic informed his mother Andrea that
appellant killed his (Antonio) relatives? (p. 40, Appellant's Brief) 7

To the above questions, the Solicitor General gives the following answers which We find sufficient to
dispel whatever doubt counsel would like to create in his bid to gain acquittal for appellant:

IRE Contention No. 1

Considering that Antonio Bejic was shot by Romeo Flores immediately after appellant
stabbed Roberto Bejic the use of the pistol which as testified to by Antonio Bejic was
in Flores' hip (p. 9, t.s.n., August 12, 1975) was handier. To use a shotgun at that
moment, which requires some degree of manipulation before it is fired, would have
afforded Antonio Bejic an opportunity to escape.

RE: Contention No. 2

Considering that the killing was committed at nighttime, the sound of successive and
repeated gunshots would have alerted the neighbors and exposed the presence of
appellant and his companions, hence, the preference for knives or bladed weapons
in killing the victims.

RE: Contention No. 3

When Antonio Bejic ran towards the creek, followed by his cousin Roberto, who,
however, along the way, fen to the ground, Romeo Flores did not give chase
consoled by the mistaken thought that Antonio Bejic whom he earlier shot but
missed, was wounded and that sooner or later he will die just the same.

RE: Contention No. 4

Antonio Bejic testified that while he, his grandmother and Atanacia Legazpi were
waiting for the return of Cristino Bejic from the big house to the small hut, they heard
a sound of a pistol shot. Undoubtedly, the shot could not have been fired by Cristino
Bejic as his weapon then was a shotgun. As the necropsy report clearly states that
Cristino Bejic did not suffer any gunshot wound, it could be reasonably inferred that
his killer's pistol shot missed him. Accordingly, it is logical to assume that he was
overpowered and stabbed to death by appellant and the latter's companions.

RE: Contention No. 5.

Appellant's contention is misleading for it erroneously assumes that he and his

companions were able to reach the small hut where the rest of the Bejic household
were waiting for the return of Cristino Bejic Antonio Bejic testified that after he,
Andrea Bejic and Atanacia Legazpi heard a pistol shot from the big house they hid in
the bushes near the small hut. Worried because Cristino Bejic has not yet returned to
the hut, they decided to proceed to the big house. On the way, they heard footsteps
and saw appellant holding Roberto Bene Appellant informed Eduarda Bejic that her
husband fainted in the big house (p. 9, t.s.n., August 13, 1975). The information
given by appellant was merely a ruse for the other members of the Bejic household
 to proceed to the big house and look for Cristino Bejic Killing the victims in a place
near the hut would have readily revealed that the perpetrators thereof knew
intimately the Bejic family as the small hut was supposed to be a hiding place, the
location of which could have been known only to the intimates of the Bejic family. As
appellant was known to the Bejic household (p. 4, t.s.n., August 13, 1975) and in
order not to be linked with the crime intended to be committed the rest of the Bejic
household had to be killed in the big house to make it appear that persons, like the
members of the feuding Muslim Ilaga group, as appellant would want them to
appear, committed the killings and the burning.

RE: Contention No. 6

Pat. Cesar Lago of the Zamboanga City Police Force testified that he interviewed
Bonifacio Yap on his complaint of an alleged killing in Sapa Moro. After getting the
names of the victims, Pat. Lago also asked Bonifacio Yap who were the assailants
(p. 4, t.s.n., September 15, 1975).

Granting arguendo, that appellant was not initially named as a suspect, such
omission is understandable. Andrea Bejic shocked as she was upon seeing the
lifeless bodies of her parents then concentrated her warning efforts and disturb mind
in locating her daughter Atanacia and nephew Roberto. In such an emotional state,
Andrea Bejic may have failed to relate to her husband the information given by her
son Antonio, that appellant participated in the killing of the Bejic family and the
burning of Cristino's house. At any rate such omission was cured when Pat. Lago
immediately investigated Antonio Bejic the lone survivor of the Bejic massacre (p. 8,
t.s.n., September 13, 1975), who accordingly named appellant as one of the persons
who committed the foregoing crimes. 8

As earlier stated, no sufficient motive was shown why the two (2) eyewitnesses, Antonio Bejic and
Ramon Jimenez, would perjure themselves in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators of very
grave and heinous crimes. That appellant's mother may have accused Ramon Jimenez of theft
would, therefore, not serve as motive to induce the two (2) aforenamed witnesses to give the
testimony that named and pointed to not only appellant but three (3) other persons including Ramon
Gutierrez who stood trial with appellant, as the malefactors. Even as to Ramon Jimenez alone, the
alleged motive is assuredly not enough for him to charge falsely appellant, who is his cousin, with
such grievous offenses as the killing of four (4) persons, burning down of two (2) houses and
stealing of valuable personal belongings.

From how appellant's Identity as one of the perpetrators of the four (4) crimes just mentioned has
been established, his defense of alibi is futile. The barrio captain of New Sagay, where appellant
claimed to be with the crimes were being committed, Jesus Agabon was presented to corroborate
appellant's alibi by testifying that in accordance with the regulation in his place, he registered
appellant's name in a notebook as a transient therein. His testimony became worthless when despite
sufficient opportunity given him to produce the notebook in Court, by postponing the hearing not just
once but twice, the defense witness never again appeared in Court. If his salvation hanged on the
credibility of this witness, appellant should have done everything and resorted to even the coercive
process of the Court to make said witness go to Court and present the desired document, or explain
his inability to do so.

With a display of not only zealous and diligent study but also of a keen intellect and imagination in
the preparation of his well-written brief, it is to be regretted that appellant's counsel cannot be
rewarded with an acquittal as he had won for a client in a previous case he handled on appeal also
as counsel de oficio, as he mentioned in his brief. 9 However, for his patient and earnest efforts and
resourcefulness in discharging his duties not very often seen in de oficio counsels, he deserves as he is
hereby given, commendation by the Court.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision under review, We affirm it in toto, with
costs.

G.R. No. L-45647 August 21, 1987

MANUEL, Q. CABALLERO and LELITA A. CABALLERO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., as Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, HON. CONRADO ESTRELLA, as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
FERNANDO ESCONDE, GREGORIO BAKEREL, CESAR NAVARRO, AND FRANK
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside
the Order issued by the respondent judge on 10 January 1977 in Special Civil Case No. 386-M, of
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, insofar as it ordered the suspension of the
proceedings in said case, pending the comment and/or certification thereon by the respondent
Secretary of Agrarian Reform in accordance with PD 1038.

The facts of the case which led to the filing of the instant petition are as follows:

On 19 November 1976, petitioners, spouses Manuel and Lelita Caballero, claiming to be the
absolute owners of several contiguous parcels of land planted with coconut trees, situated in
Salubsub, San Isidro, Gingoog City, filed a petition for injunction with restraining order and damages
against the herein private respondents Fernando Esconde, Cesar Navarro, Gregorio Bakerel, and
Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez, together with William Abatayo, Elmer Almonte, Teodorico Amoncio,
and Pedro Amper, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, docketed therein as Special
Civil Case No. 386-M, for having allegedly entered the aforementioned parcels of land and illegally
harvested the fruits of the coconut trees planted therein without petitioners' knowledge and consent,
to the prejudice of said petitioners, for which they claimed damages in the sum of P7,000.00. 1

Answering, the private respondents admitted that the petitioners are the lawful owners of the parcels
of land described in the petition. They claimed, however, that the respondents Fernando Esconde,
Cesar Navarro, and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the land, while the rest, except Francisco
(Frank) Rodriguez who is allegedly an investigator designated by the Land Reform Farmers'
Association to organize the tenants into an association to put up a solid front in a program to help
the New Society and to secure the success of the land reform program, are the harvesters of the
coconut lands. They also contended that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, which is purely
agrarian in nature and cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. As counterclaim, said
respondents alleged that they suffered moral damages for mental anguish, mental torture, wounded
feelings, moral shock, serious anxiety and other inconveniences as a result of the filing of the case,
for which they asked to be paid the sum of P17,000.00. 2

After hearing, or on 13 December 1976, the respondent judge found that the issuance of a
temporary restraining order would be proper in the interest of justice and, consequently, ordered the
respondents to cease and desist from gathering fruits from the coconut trees in the land until the
petition for injunction shall have been heard and resolved. 3

The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, 4 and on 10 January 1977, the
respondent judge issued the controversial order suspending hearings on the case pending the comment
and or certification thereon by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in accordance with PD 1038. 5 The
petitioners moved for reconsideration of this order, but their motion was denied. 6

Hence, the present recourse.

Pertinent provisions of the Decree (PD 1038) requiring referral of cases involving landlord and tenant
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform read as follows:

SEC. 2. No judge of the courts of agrarian relations, courts of first instance, city or
municipal courts, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any
ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or remove a tenant of an
agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn, unless certified by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge
or other officer of competent jurisdiction and, if any such case is filed, the case shall
first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative
in the locality for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the
contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized
representative in the locality finds that the case is a proper case to hear, he shall so
certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute or controversy.

The preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties by

the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, is not binding
upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the case is certified as a proper
case for trial. Said court, judge or hearing officer may, after due hearing, confirm,
reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial
merits of the case may warrant.

SEC. 3. All cases still pending before any court, fiscal or other investigating body
which are not yet submitted for decision or resolution shall likewise be referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as provided in the preceding section.

As may be noted, the law requires that an ejectment case or any case designed to harass or remove
a tenant should first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination
of the relationship between the parties. The Solicitor General, in his Memorandum for the public
respondents, 7explains that the referral of ejectment cases against a tenant to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform is intended to prevent the filing of suits designed to harass the tenant who can M afford to engage
in such suits. He says:

The requirement of preliminary determination by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is

intended to protect tenants in agricultural lands from vexatious and oppressive
litigations and save them the expense and the anxiety of such trials. Courts can be
 trusted to protect tenants from malicious and oppressive lawsuits, but because of the
nature of the adversary system they cannot act at the beginning so as to save
tenants the expense and trouble of having to defend themselves against such cases.
Under the adversary system tenants will have to defend themselves, which means
that they have to hire counsel, pay for transportation of witnesses, and incur other
expenses incident to trial before they may finally get vindication. The system thus
compels them to go to trial and thereby go into expense.

Petitioners claim, however, that the decree, ordering the referral of cases to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, is unconstitutional as it is an undue encroachment on the independence of the
judiciary and places courts of justice under the "control and supervision" of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.

The contention is devoid of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous assumption that the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not an ejectment case (or a case
designed to harass or remove a tenant) filed against a tenant, may be tried by the courts. A close
look at the law in question will show that no such power has been granted the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. In the first paragraph of Section 2 of the law in question, it is stated that a case which seeks
the ejectment, harassment or ouster of a tenant from the landholding should be referred to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform "for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the
contending parties." However, the second paragraph of the same section provides that "the
preliminary determination of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing
officer to whom the case is certified, " and that "said court, judge or hearing officer may, after due
hearing, confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial
merits of the case may warrant." Since the referral of ejectment and other cases against a tenant to
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is only for the preliminary determination of the relationship
between the contending parties and the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform are not binding
on the courts, there is no diminution of judicial power involved in the operation of the law nor an
encroachment on the independence of the judiciary by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

But, suppose, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, after such preliminary determination of the
relationship of the parties, refuses to certify the case to the court as proper for hearing? Then, resort
to the courts may still be made. This Court has categorically declared that there is an underlying
power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative powers
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of judicial review is expressly given by
statute. 8

Petitioners contend that the law in question is not a valid exercise of police power by the state,
mainly because it is not directed to produce the greatest benefit to all the members of society. They
contend further that the actual operation of the challenged decree has caused hardship and injustice
to many, hampered instead of hastened the social and economic progress of the community and
wrought havoc and chaos in the orderly administration of justice, 9 because it ties the hands of the
courts, while a case is pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification. To underscore
their claim, petitioners cite the "run-around" they have experienced in pursuing their cause. They state:

. . . they have exhausted all the legal remedies available in the inferior courts such as
the Courts of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, City Court of Gingoog City, including
the Office of the City Fiscal of Gingoog City and the Civil Affairs Office of the
Philippine Constabulary of Misamis Oriental as well as the Court of Agrarian
Relations. All the parties herein have been at a "dead-end," occasioned by the
"referral provisions" in some of the agrarian laws, more specifically the pertinent
 Presidential Decrees. The first legal action taken by petitioners in the government
offices below were the criminal charges of thefts against herein private respondents
directly filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Gingoog City but which the City
Fiscal had to refer to the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform at
Cagayan de Oro City as required by Presidential Decrees and which criminal cases
up to now have not been "preliminarily determined" by the said Regional Office.

Another case a special civil action was instituted by petitioners against private
respondents herein in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch II, at
Medina, Misamis Oriental, but which Court of First Instance, after having taken
cognizance of the case, had to "refer" the same to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
Quezon City, "for his comment and/or certification." Later on private respondents filed
a civil case against one of petitioners herein before the Court of Agrarian Relations at
Cagayan de Oro City, but the Agrarian Court held in abeyance the hearing of the
case due to the pendency of that prior case in the Court of First Instance as well as
the pendency of the present action before this Honorable Supreme Court. Even the
Civil Affairs Office of the Provincial Command of the Philippines Constabulary in
Misamis Oriental could not entertain the complaints and counter-complaints of the
parties herein, because the PC authorities have to abide with the "referral provisions"
which empower the Department of Agrarian Reform to exercise the authority of
"certifying" to the "propriety" or "impropriety" of the subject-matter. 10

The above allegations, however, eloquently show that the "run-around" which petitioners have gone
through is more a product of their own doing rather than a flaw in the operation of the questioned
law. Instead of moving from one forum to another, while their cases were pending before the
Department of Agrarian Reform for certification, petitioners could have seasonably instituted an
action to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to issue said certification, one way or the other,
after an unreasonable period of inaction.

Petitioners assert that the operation of the challenged law violates the constitutional provision on the
right to a "speedy disposition of cases." Corollary to this, they submit that the challenged law
complicates the prescriptive period of offenses and the criminal and civil liabilities provided in the
Revised Penal Code and other penal laws. To nourish their argument, petitioners call attention to the
fact that even prior to 30 November 1976, they had filed directly with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Gingoog City, two (2) criminal complaints, one, for theft of bamboo poles and the other, for theft of
coconuts, against private respondents. And as mandated by the challenged law, the City Fiscal
forwarded both case, on 1 February 1977 and I July 1977, respectively, to the Office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in Misamis Oriental, for referral purposes. As a result, months have
passed, and yet, no advice or resolution has been received by the City Fiscal from the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Petitioners then conclude: "As to why as of July 1, 1977 no action has been
taken by the Regional DAR on the referral cases (and this is so until now) is beyond comprehension.
This obtaining actual situation is this not a violation of Sec. 16 of the Bill of Rights (sic)? Justice
delayed is justice denied. 11

The guarantee of the right to "a speedy disposition of cases," which the Constitution expressly
provides, 12recognizes the truism that justice delayed can mean justice denied. Likewise, the broad sweep that the guarantee
comprehends, when it provides that the right is available before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies, confirms that the
application of the immunity from arbitrary and oppressive delays is not limited to an accused in a criminal proceeding but extends to all
parties and in all cases. Hence, under the constitutional provision, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on the part of all who
are officially tasked with the proper administration of justice.

However, "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy trial" 13accorded an accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. 14 It is consistent
with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which
render rights nugatory.

In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain factors
may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay,
assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. 15 The same factors may also
be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the
"speedy disposition of cases" guarantee.

To strike down a law on the ground that it violates the guarantee of "speedy disposition of cases"
requires more than a citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public officer whose
duty and responsibility it is to apply and administer the law. The challenge must be based on a clear
showing that it is the law, or its operation, and not merely its administration, which invades and
impairs constitutionally protected personal or property rights. In the case at bar, it is true that the
referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform opens the door to more bureaucratic red tape
and, perhaps, more opportunities for corrupt practices. The defects in the bureaucratic system do
not, however, constitute valid arguments against the merits of legislative policy intended to protect
the legitimate tenant-tiller. Besides, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD 1038. This
is a matter left for Congress to re-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority.

Contrary to the petitioners' argument, the challenged law does not complicate the prescriptive
periods of offenses and criminal and civil liabilities as provided in the Revised Penal Code and other
penal laws. Under Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code, a period of prescription which has run before it
is interrupted, commences to run again only in two instances: (1) when a proceeding based upon a
complaint or an information terminates without the accused being convicted or acquitted or (2) when
such a proceeding is unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to an accused.

Applying these rules, once a complaint is filed with the fiscal and the latter refers the case to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his representative in the locality for preliminary determination, as a
consequence of an allegation by the respondent of a tenant-landlord relationship between him and
the complainant, and harassment by the latter, such a referral does not operate to resume the
running of prescription. This is so because, under the challenged law, the referral of a case to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not "terminate," but merely suspends, a proceeding. To
"terminate" means to put an end to, to make to cease or to end. 16 It connotes finality. On the other hand, the
referral of a case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely discontinues temporarily a proceeding, or stops it with an expectation of
resumption. Likewise, when a proceeding before a fiscal is temporarily stopped by virtue of a faithful compliance with the challenged law,
neither can the suspension be considered unjustifiable, and thus it is not a legal ground for the resumption of the running of the period of
prescription.

Considering, therefore, that the referral of a case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not
permit the resumption of the running of the period of prescription, the argument that the challenged
Decree provides a means by which offenses may prescribe during the pendency of cases involving
such offenses before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his representative for preliminary
determination, cannot be accepted seriously.

However, while we hold that the assailed Decree is constitutional, it is nonetheless clear that the
order directing referral of the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was issued on 10 January
1977. Ten (10) years have elapsed since then and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has had more
than sufficient time to conduct the required preliminary determination of the relationship of the
parties, but he has evidently not done so. It is now time for said court to settle and decide the issues
between the contending parties in this case, without waiting for the certification of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. That portion of the Order issued on 10 January 1977 in
Special Civil Case No. 386-M of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, entitled: "Manuel Q.
Caballero, et al., petitionersversus Fernando Esconde, et al., respondents," which directed the
suspension of the proceedings in said case, pending the comment and/or certification thereon by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, is hereby set aside. The respondent judge is directed to hear and
decide said case as expeditiously as possible. Without costs.

Roquero vs Chancellor of UP Manila

Petitioner is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the PGH Security Division as Special

Police Captain.Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security
Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH.

Private respondent Abutal filed a complaint with then Chancellor of UP-Manila Perla D.
Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. Roquero.

The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden
Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the instant case.The Prosecution
presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the completion of the cross-
examination on the prosecutions only witness, the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal
Offer of Evidence on or before16 July 1999.

The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period
agreed upon. Thereafter, on10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner and
his counsel appeared. The prosecution repeatedly failed to appear.

On22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant
(private respondent herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her
exhibits since complainant was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of
fifteen (15) days from1 July 1999or up to16 July 1999.

The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years.Due to the
unreasonable delay, petitioner, on19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking for the dismissal
of the administrative case against him based on the following reasons: that the prosecution
had not formally offered its evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed on 22
October 1999; that the unfounded charges in the administrative complaint were filed just to
harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the case.

On26 May 2004, the prosecution alleged that a Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits had
been filed on24 January 2004, of which a copy thereof was received by Atty. Lee,
petitioners counsel, on 30 January 2004, per registry return receipt.However, petitioner has
not filed his comment to the said Formal Offer.

In its petition for certiorari, the CA denied the petition with prayer for TRO of Roquero
reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
orders. Roquero moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the same was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution promulgated on1 February 2008.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero's Motion which he seasonably
filed and order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of Exhibit of
complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the
constitutional right of the petitioner to a speedy disposition of cases?

HELD:

The petition is granted.

POLITICAL LAW: speedy disposition of cases

Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service
statesthat the failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall be
considered as waiver thereof,the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal
offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004.Starting on that date, petitioner was
presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to
dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion.

While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to
the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, the same
however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of
cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all person shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a
case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a
flexible concept.

Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows:
(1) the length of delay;
(2) the reasons for the delay;
(3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal rulings in the case at bar, the violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of
almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which
resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2)
the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to
an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss.Over and above this, the
delay was prejudicial to petitioners cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation
against him remained stagnant at the prosecution stage.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of
justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.The adjudication of cases must not only be
done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must
also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.Excessive delay in the
disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by
various legislations inutile.

The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside.

G.R. No. 162206 November 17, 2010

MONICO V. JACOB and CELSO L. LEGARDA, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
Resolutions dated February 4, 20021 of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and December
12, 20032 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. In its Resolution dated February 4, 2002, the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division set aside the order to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 25922-
25939, among other cases, verbally issued by Associate Justice Narciso S. Nario (Justice Nario),
Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, during the court session held on August 20,
2001;3 while in its Resolution dated December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division denied
the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and other accused.

The following facts are duly established from the pleadings of the parties:
From 1993 to 1997, Petron Corporation (Petron), a corporation engaged in the business of refining,
marketing and distribution of petroleum products, received Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) by
assignment from 18 private firms4 registered with the Board of Investments (BOI). The TCCs were
issued by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty Drawback Center (OSS), an office
under the Department of Finance (DOF), created by virtue of Administrative Order No. 266 dated
February 7, 1992. Petron used the assigned TCCs to pay its excise tax liabilities.

The practice was for the BOI-registered firms to sign the Deeds of Assignment upon delivery of the
TCCs to Petron. Petron then forwarded said documents to the OSS, with a request for authorization
to use said TCCs to pay for its excise tax liabilities. DOF Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena
(Belicena) approved the request of Petron through the issuance of Tax Debit Memoranda (TDM)
addressed to the Collection Program Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The BIR
Collection Program Division accepted the TCCs as payment for the excise tax liabilities of Petron by
issuing its own TDM.5 The control numbers of the BIR-TDM were indicated on the back of the TCCs,
marking the final utilization of the tax credits.6

However, the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman
eventually found that the aforementioned transactions involving the TCCs were irregular and
violative of the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 29, 1989 between the BOI and the DOF,
which implemented Article 21 of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.7

After the termination of the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution dated March 27, 2000 finding probable cause against several public officers and private
individuals, including petitioners Monico V. Jacob (Jacob), President, and Celso L. Legarda
(Legarda), Vice-President and General Manager for Marketing, both of Petron, for perpetrating the
so-called "tax credit scam." On April 10, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a total of 62
Informations, 18 of which, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, were against DOF
Undersecretary Belicena, OSS Deputy Executive Director Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., petitioners and
other Petron officials, and officers of the BOI-registered firms which assigned the TCCs to Petron,
charging them with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Petitioners provided an undisputed account of the events that subsequently took place before the
Sandiganbayan:

On April 14, 2000, petitioners and the four other Petron officers who were similarly charged filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation [with the Office of the Ombudsman].

On 17 April 2000, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued an Order giving the prosecution a
period of sixty (60) days within which

to re-assess its evidence in these cases and to take appropriate action on the said motion for
reconsideration of accused movants and to inform the Court within the same period as to its findings
and recommendations including the action thereon of the Honorable Ombudsman.

Sixty (60) days passed but the Office of the Ombudsman did not even bother to submit a report on
the status of the motions for reconsideration. Months passed, and then, AN ENTIRE YEAR
PASSED. There was still nothing from the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.

In the meantime, petitioner Jacob was arraigned on 1 June 2000 while petitioner Legarda was
arraigned on 18 May 2001.
On March 20, 2001, in view of a significant development in the Shell cases (then pending with the
5th Division of [the Sandiganbayan]), petitioners and other accused Petron officials filed a Motion to
Resolve with the Office of the Ombudsman. In the said motion, petitioners cited the Memorandum
dated 30 January 2001 issued by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo upholding the dropping of
the charges against Shell official Pacifico Cruz on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to
prove that he was part of the conspiracy. Petitioners asserted that since their situation/alleged
participation is similar to that of Mr. Pacifico Cruz, they should similarly be dropped from the criminal
cases. Despite this, the respondent Office of the Ombudsman took no action.

Considering the time that had lapsed, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division], at the hearing on 1 June
2001, expressly warned the prosecution that should it fail to resolve the
reconsideration/investigation, it would order the dismissal of the cases or require the prosecution to
show cause why it should not be cited for contempt.

In its Resolution dated 26 June 2001, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] in fact denied the motion
of the prosecution for the resetting of the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial on 2 July 2001 "it
appearing that the Reinvestigation of these cases has been pending for more than one (1) year now
and the court cannot countenance the unreasonable delay attributable to the plaintiff."

In spite of the denial of their motion, the prosecution still failed to submit its report to the
[Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] during the 2 July 2001 hearing. Instead they asked for a period of
seven (7) more days to resolve the motions for reconsideration. The arraignment (of the other
accused) and pre-trial therefore had to be reset again to 17 July 2001.

One day before the schedule hearing, the prosecution filed a Manifestation requesting the
cancellation of the arraignment and pre-trial scheduled the next day on the ground that the motions
for reconsideration/reinvestigation were still pending resolution.

Once again, [the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] gave the prosecution another chance. During the
hearing on 17 July 2001, the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] directed the prosecution, through
Prosecutor Orlando Ines, to terminate the reinvestigation within a period of one (1) more month. The
arraignment and pre-trial were then reset to 20 August 2001.

At the scheduled hearing on August 20, 2001, Prosecutor Orlando Ines, however, again requested
for the deferment of the arraignment and pre-trial on the ground that the resolution on the various
motions for reconsideration/reinvestigation were still pending approval by the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In all the hearings conducted in the cases the defense verbally and consistently invoked their right to
speedy trial and moved for the dismissal of the cases. In the course of more than one year, however,
the [Sandiganbayan 4th Division] kept affording the prosecution one chance after another. The sixty
days granted to the prosecution became more than four hundred days still, there was no resolution
in sight.

Thus on 20 August 2001, compelled by its duty to uphold the fundamental law, the [Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division, through its Chairman, Justice Nario] issued a verbal order dismissing the cases. The
dismissal was duly recorded in the minutes of the hearing of the said date which was attested to by
the Clerk of Court and signed by the parties.

On 24 August 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the following prayer:
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutors prayed (sic) that the Order issued by the
Honorable Court for the summary dismissal of all the graft and estafa charges aforecited be SET
ASIDE."

On August 31, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan Fourth Division] issued an Order taking cognizance of the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the prosecution and requiring the accused to file their respective
comments thereon within five (5) days.

On 4 February 2002, OR SIX (6) MONTHS after [Justice Nario] issued the verbal order of dismissal,
the [Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division] issued an Order setting aside said verbal order.

xxxx

In the 4 February 2002 Resolution, this time a Division of five justices (two of whom dissented)
rendered a Resolution stating:

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of these cases orally ordered in open court by the Chairman of the
Fourth Division during its court session held on August 20, 2001, and reiterated in his subsequent
ponencia, is hereby set aside.8(Citations omitted.)

The Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division gave the following reasons for overruling Justice Narios
verbal order dismissing the criminal cases against the accused in the alleged tax credit scam:

In the present case, (1) there is already a delay of the trial for more than one year now; (2) but it is
not shown that the delay is vexatious, capricious and oppressive; (3) it may be that, as stated in the
herein dissented Resolution, "at the hearings conducted in these cases, the defense orally, openly
and consistently asked for the dismissal of these cases"; however, these oral manifestations were
more of "knee-jerk reactions" of the defense counsel in those hearings everytime the prosecution
requested for postponement than anything else as said defense counsel did not seriously pursue the
dismissal of these cases, such as by reducing their "request" in a formal written motion to dismiss
and/or insisting that the court formally rule on their request for dismissal and go oncertiorari if
denied; and (4) considering the nature and importance of the cases, if there is any prejudice that
may have resulted as a consequence of the series of postponements, it would be more against the
government than against any of the accused; however, be that as it may, none of the herein accused
has come out to claim having been thus prejudiced. 9

On February 26, 2002, petitioners, together with four other co-accused Petron officials, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration10 of the February 4, 2002 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth
Division. Other accused also filed their motions for reconsideration and motions to quash/dismiss.
The prosecution expectedly opposed all such motions of the accused.

In an Omnibus Resolution dated December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division ruled in
the prosecutions favor and denied all the motions filed by the accused, to wit:

Wherefore, premises considered, this court issues an Omnibus Resolution denying all the above-
described Motion to Quash for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners come before us via the instant Petition for Certiorari averring grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division, specifically:

I
 THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
SPEEDY TRIAL.

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NOT
BEEN PUT IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE GLARING LACK
OF EVIDENCE AGAINST PETITIONERS.11

To recall, Justice Nario, as the Chairman of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, ordered the
dismissal of all criminal cases arising from the purported tax credit scam on the ground that the
accused, including petitioners, had already been deprived of their right to a speedy trial and
disposition of the cases against them. Petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in reversing Justice Narios order of dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939
because such reversal violated petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy.

An accuseds right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14(2), Article III12 of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating historical perspective
on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is
justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more
so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. 13

Hence, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also include provisions that ensure the protection
of such right. As we presented in Uy v. Hon. Adriano14:

Section 1(h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the accused is
entitled to a speedy, impartial and public trial. Section 2, Rule 119 of the said Rules provides that
trial, once commenced, shall be continuous until terminated:

Sec. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. Trial, once commenced, shall continue
from day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of
time for good cause.

The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for
continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to
ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
However, any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court motu proprio, or on
motion of either the accused or his counsel, or the prosecution, if the court granted the continuance
on the basis of its findings set forth in the order that the ends of justice is served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused on a speedy trial, shall be deducted.

The trial court may grant continuance, taking into account the following factors:

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would likely make a
continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the
number of accused or the nature of the prosecution, or that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation within the periods of time established therein.

In addition, no continuance under section 3(f) of this Rule shall be granted because of congestion of
the courts calendar or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part
of the prosecutor.15

We further emphasized in Uy that "speedy trial" is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.
In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy trial was violated, the delay should be
considered, in view of the entirety of the proceedings. Indeed, mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial
proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum. 16

Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan17 is a case originating from exactly the same factual background as the
case at bar. Therein petitioners Marialen C. Corpuz and Antonio H. Roman, Sr. were officers of
FILSYN Corporation, one of the BOI-registered firms that assigned TCCs to Petron; and were
among the accused in Criminal Case No. 25922. They filed a separate Petition for Certiorari before
us assailing the Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division
and December 12, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division.

We expounded more extensively in Corpuz on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and
disposition of the case against him, thus:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed
to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent. 18 (Emphases ours.)
We went on to lay down in Corpuz the test for determining whether an accused was indeed deprived
of his right to a speedy trial and disposition of the case against him:

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should
be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect,
namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the
accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the
fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still
disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often,
hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to
public obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary
efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. As held in Williams v.
United States, for the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show
two things: (a) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the
ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to
the ordinary processes of justice.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. For
instance, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be
weighted heavily against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to
gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand,
the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against
the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates
the factors for granting a continuance.19

In the Petition at bar, Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 were filed on April 10, 2000. Petitioner Jacob
was arraigned on June 1, 2000, while petitioner Legarda was arraigned on May 18, 2001; with both
petitioners pleading not guilty. Since then, there had been no other significant development in the
cases since the prosecution repeatedly requested for deferment or postponement of the scheduled
hearings as it awaits the result of the reinvestigation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Judge Nario
verbally ordered the dismissal of said cases during the hearing on August 20, 2001. Thus, the
criminal cases had been pending for about a year and four months by the time they were dismissed
by Justice Nario.

The accused, including petitioners, had consistently asked in open court that the criminal cases be
dismissed every time the prosecution moved for a deferment or postponement of the hearings.

The prosecution attributed the delay in the criminal proceedings to: 1) the 23 motions for
reinvestigation or reconsideration filed by the accused, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in
its April 17, 2000 Order; and 2) the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to terminate its
reinvestigation and submit its report within the 60-day period fixed by the said graft court.
Irrefragably, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of the
60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and even more than a year thereafter. That there were 23
Motions for Reinvestigation filed is insignificant. It should be stressed that reinvestigation, as the
word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of the case. It is simply a chance for the Office of
the Ombudsman to review and re-evaluate its findings based on the evidence previously submitted
by the parties. The Office of the Ombudsman should have expedited the reinvestigation, not only
because it was ordered by the Sandiganbayan to submit a report within a period of 60 days, but also
because said Office is bound by the Constitution20 and Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989,21 to act promptly on complaints and cases pending before it.

Nevertheless, while the re-investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman delayed the proceedings in
Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, the said process could not have been dispensed with as it was
undertaken for the protection of the rights of petitioners themselves (and their co-accused) and their
rights should not be compromised at the expense of expediency.

In Corpuz, we warned against the overzealous or precipitate dismissal of a case that may enable the
defendant, who may be guilty, to go free without having been tried, thereby infringing the societal
interest in trying people accused of crimes rather than granting them immunization because of legal
error.22 Earlier, in People v. Leviste,23 we already stressed that:

[T]he State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to
present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has
actually increased the workload of the justice system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays in
the final resolution of this and other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent court,
instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough,
unnecessarily delayed the case in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid.
Such action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice. 24

Thus, even though we acknowledge the delay in the criminal proceedings, as well as the prejudice
suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason thereof, the weighing of interests militate
against a finding that petitioners right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases involving them
would have justified the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939. We agree with the
Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division that Justice Narios dismissal of the criminal cases was
unwarranted under the circumstances, since the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its
right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of
the Ombudsman. We reiterate our observations in Corpuz that:

There can be no denying the fact that the petitioners, as well as the other accused, was prejudiced
by the delay in the reinvestigation of the cases and the submission by the Ombudsman/Special
Prosecutor of his report thereon. So was the State. We have balanced the societal interest involved
in the cases and the need to give substance to the petitioners constitutional rights and their quest for
justice, and we are convinced that the dismissal of the cases is too drastic a remedy to be accorded
to the petitioners. The cloud of suspicion may still linger over the heads of the petitioners by the
precipitate dismissal of the cases. We repeat -- the cases involve the so-called tax credit certificates
scam and hundreds of millions of pesos allegedly perpetrated by government officials in connivance
with private individuals. The People has yet to prove the guilt of the petitioners of the crimes charged
beyond reasonable doubt. We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that before resorting to
the extreme sanction of depriving the petitioner a chance to prove its case by dismissing the cases,
the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor should be ordered by the Sandiganbayan under pain of
contempt, to explain the delay in the submission of his report on his reinvestigation. 25
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not abuse its discretion in setting aside
Justice Narios verbal order, which dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939, for not only was
such order baseless, as we had previously discussed herein; but more importantly, because it is an
utter nullity, as we had ruled in Corpuz.

We held in Corpuz that:

In the unanimous Resolution of December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:

In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by the Chairman, which was not reduced in
writing, is not a valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because the Chairman cannot
unilaterally dismiss the same without the approval or consent of the other members of the Division.
The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and under its internal rules prevailing at the time (Rule
XVIII, Section 1(b) of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, which is now Section 1(b),
Rule VIII of the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan), an order, resolution or
judgment, in order to be valid - that is to say, in order to be considered as an official action of the
Court itself - must bear the unanimous approval of the members of the division, or in case of lack
thereof, by the majority vote of the members of a special division of five.

We agree with the foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, mandates that a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case
grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A verbal judgment or order of
dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in esse,
therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal cases
for failure of the prosecution to submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases within the sixty-
day period fixed by the graft court. Moreover, the verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the
members of the Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective order
of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot then be faulted for issuing the assailed
resolutions.

Neither are the petitioners entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the Sandiganbayan to reinstate
the cases, considering that the verbal order of Justice Nario as aforestated does not exist at all in
contemplation of law.26(Emphases ours.)

Given that Justice Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 is null and void,
and does not exist at all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invoke the
constitutional right against double jeopardy.1avvphi1

To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be demonstrated:

(1) [A] first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to
commit the same or is a frustration thereof.

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. 27
In the instant Petition, legal jeopardy has not yet attached since there is so far no valid dismissal or
termination of the criminal cases against petitioners.

Finally, the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division did not commit grave abuse of discretion nor
erred in not considering the glaring lack of evidence against petitioners.

As we pointed out in Rizon v. Desierto28:

Time and again, we have held that a prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. He merely determines whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause,
therefore, does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction. It is enough that the prosecutor believes that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. A trial is intended precisely for the reception of prosecution
evidence in support of the charge. It is the court that is tasked to determine guilt beyond reasonable
doubt based on the evidence presented by the parties at the trial on the merits. 29

Here, there has been no trial yet. Therefore, there has been no occasion yet for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature that shall be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, there being no showing that the impugned Resolutions dated February 4, 2002 of
the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division and December 12, 2003 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 165776 April 30, 2008

GENEVIEVE O. GAAS and ADELINA P. GOMERA, petitioners,

vs.
RASOL L. MITMUG, Regional Director, Region XII, Commission on Audit, respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of
the Decision1dated February 9, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated September 9, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56275. The appellate court affirmed the Decision 3 dated October 23,
1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-94-042 finding
petitioners Genevieve O. Gaas and Adelina P. Gomera guilty of gross neglect of duty and dismissing
them from government service.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioners Genevieve O. Gaas and Adelina P. Gomera were the bookkeeper and senior clerk,
respectively, of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Bacolod, Lanao del Norte.

On May 15, 1990, in accordance with Regional Office Order No. 90-27-A dated May 7, 1990, the
State Auditors and Technical Audit Specialist of the Provincial Auditor's Office and the City Auditor's
Office conducted a cash examination as part of a comprehensive audit on the cash and accounts of
Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Assistant Municipal Treasurer Saturnino L. Burgos of Bacolod, Lanao del
Norte. They discovered that there was a shortage of cash in the possession of petitioners as follows:
(1) P19,483.20 in the possession of petitioner Gaas, representing disallowed vales or chits; and
(2) P29,956.28 in the possession of petitioner Gomera, also representing disallowed vales or chits.
Gaas explained to the auditors that she was tasked to receive liquidations of collections from the
Revenue Collection Clerks and was instructed by Burgos to advance P25,648.80 from the
collections in her possession for the payment of various expenses to be incurred by the General
Fund; and thatP19,483.20 was disallowed for reimbursement. Gomera, on the other hand, explained
that she was made to draw a cash advance out of the liquidated collections in the amount
of P25,648.80; and that the shortage consisted of chits of municipal officers and employees, which
were submitted to her for deduction from their respective monthly salaries; but the said chits were
disallowed. Both petitioners settled the missing cash upon demand.

Based on the comprehensive audit report submitted by the auditors, the Commission on Audit (COA)
sent a Letter4 dated October 29, 1991 to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, recommending
the filing of appropriate disciplinary actions against petitioners. The Office of the Ombudsman
administratively charged petitioners, Revenue Collection Clerk Nelson L. Gonzales and Municipal
Mayor Warlino M. Relova for dishonesty. They were required to submit counter-affidavits.

On October 23, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a Decision finding
petitioners and Gonzales guilty of gross neglect of duty and ordered their dismissal. The complaint
against Mayor Relova was dismissed without prejudice to the result of the investigation of the
criminal aspect of the same acts.

The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found substantial evidence against petitioners for
violating government accounting and auditing rules since petitioners made disbursements without
proper documentation. It stressed that chits, vales and IOU's5 are not valid means of disbursing
funds and are not considered valid cash items, citing the Manual on Cash Examination of the COA
which states: "Vales, chits or IOU's are not allowable under any circumstances." It ruled that by the
nature of petitioners' sensitive duties as custodians of government funds, it is their primary duty to
ensure that public funds are properly disbursed and the long practice of allowing local officials to
obtain cash through vales is wrong.6 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents Genevieve O. [G]aas, Adelina P.

Gomera and Nelson L. Gonzales are hereby found GUILTY of Gross Neglect of Duty.
Pursuant to the provision of Sec. 23 (c), Rule XIV, Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
91-1631 dated December 27, 1991, Rules Implementing Book V, of the Executive Order No.
292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, they are dismissed from the service, without
prejudice to their right to appeal as provided under Sec. 27, R.A. [No.] 6770.

The Municipal Mayor shall implement this decision within ten (10) days from the date that it
shall have become final and executory.

The complaint against Mayor Warlino M. Relova is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to
the result of the investigation of the criminal aspect of these same acts.
 SO DECREED.7

Petitioners filed respective motions for reconsideration which were denied. Thereafter, they filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
October 23, 1997 and Order dated February 24, 1998, of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-94-042 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.8

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, ruled that
the evidence presented was substantial, sufficient to cause the dismissal of petitioners:

. . . The comprehensive audit report submitted by public respondent Commission on Audit,

Region [XII], Cotabato City, reported that the shortages of cash by the petitioners was due to
the disallowed cash advances (vales or chits) made by the municipal employees; that such
cash advances were made through the petitioners per instructions of Saturnino Burgos, the
Assistant Municipal Treasurer-OIC, who at that time appointed the petitioners as special
disbursing officers; that appointing the petitioners as special disbursing officers was strictly
prohibited since such [positions were] incompatible to the petitioners' positions as municipal
bookkeeper and unbonded senior clerk. The petitioners themselves admitted such findings
but raised as a defense the alleged scheme by Burgos under the guise of designating them
as special disbursement officers and made them to perform tasks incompatible to their
positions.

It is true that their immediate superior, Burgos, in his capacity as Assistant Municipal
Treasurer-OIC, was unauthorized to appoint them as special disbursing officers, hence,
tasked to handle public funds. However, by accepting such additional and incompatible task,
the petitioners likewise accepted the duty to be accountable [for] the public funds and to
make sure that the disbursement thereof are properly documented according to the rules
and regulations. The petitioners should have kept in mind the constitutional mandates that a
public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees are held accountable to
the people; and that they should serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency. Between their duty as public employees and their duty to their immediate
superior, who in many cases would order them to do tasks in violation of the rules and
regulations, the petitioners should have considered their duty as public employees, burdened
with accountability to the people, as their primary responsibility.9

Thus, this petition.

Petitioners argue that there was a misapprehension of facts by the Ombudsman and the Court of
Appeals since the shortage happened when the funds were still in the possession of the collectors
and not petitioners. They also lament that although the complaint was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao as early as November 18, 1991, the order for them to file their counter-
affidavits was made only on June 16, 1995 or more than three years after and the case was resolved
only on October 23, 1997. According to them, the delay violated their constitutional rights to due
process and to a speedy disposition of the case.

On the other hand, respondent counters that questions of facts, particularly as to who disbursed the
funds as argued by petitioners, is not the proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court. Respondent also argues that petitioners cannot raise the issue on the alleged
violation of their right to a speedy trial for the first time on appeal.

The issues raised by petitioners for our resolution are:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY BOTH THE

OMBUDSMAN AND THE COURT OF APPEALS; and

II.

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE OMBUDSMAN VIOLATED ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE,

CONSTITUTING DEPRIVATION OF APPELLANT[S']/PETITIONERS' RIGHTS TO SPEEDY
TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS.10

On the other hand, respondent posits the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION RAISES REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF FACT

OR OF LAW AS TO JUSTIFY A REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY RAISE BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT
FOR REVIEW AN ISSUE WHICH WAS NEVER RAISED BELOW.11

The primordial issues of the case are: (1) Did the Ombudsman commit an error of fact in concluding
that petitioners are guilty of gross neglect of duty? and (2) Were petitioners' rights to a speedy trial
and to a speedy disposition of the case violated?

As to the first issue, this Court has held that any appeal or application for remedy against a decision
or finding of the Office of the Ombudsman may only be entertained by the Supreme Court on a pure
question of law. Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that
"[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on a pure question of law." Moreover, Section 27 of the
said Act provides further that "[f]indings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive."12

Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence and are accorded due respect and weight especially when they are affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman that a review of
factual findings may aptly be made.13

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman and uphold its finding which
was upheld by the Court of Appeals that there is substantial evidence against petitioners for violating
government accounting and auditing rules and making disbursements without proper documentation.

As to the second issue, we rule that there was no violation of petitioners' rights to a speedy trial and
to a speedy disposition of the case.
The right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the determination of
whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant, the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and
the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance. A mere mathematical
reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient.14

In this case, although it is true that the Complaint was filed on November 18, 1991 and petitioners
received an Order15 directing them to submit their counter-affidavits only three years after or on June
16, 1995, they failed to raise the issue of speedy disposition of the case at that time. Instead, they
submitted their counter-affidavits. It was only in this petition that they first raised the issue. Neither
have they moved for a speedy resolution of the case. It was only when they lost and pursued their
appeal that they first raised the issue. It cannot therefore be said that the proceedings are attended
by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Petitioners cannot now seek the protection of the
law to benefit from the adverse effects of their failure to raise the issue at the first instance. In effect,
they are deemed to have waived their rights when they filed their counter-affidavits after they
received the Order dated June 16, 1995 without immediately questioning the alleged violations of
their rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 9, 2004 and the
Resolution dated September 9, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56275
are AFFIRMED.

People vs Tampal
Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario
Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding
judge. However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon,
and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained at large.

The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo
Guantero moved for postponement due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The
case was reset without any objection from the defense counsel. The case was called on
September 20, 1991 but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered the
absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to
prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that his absence was
because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the Provincial prosecutor was closed
on that day. The motion was denied by respondent judge.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of their cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement of the case.

Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition of their case, courts should
do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case. What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy trial are
unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts
above, there was no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the prosecution, hence,
the respondent judge should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.

The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several cases it
was held that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this does not apply,
considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State.
Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings

G.R. No. 104386 March 28, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
97, and ARNULFO C. TALISIC, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

In deciding the case at bench, the Court reminds members of the bench and the bar alike that the
right of an accused to a speedy trial is not violated by well-grounded motions for postponement, and
that courts should not be too hasty in denying reasonable continuance so as not to deprive
the prosecution of its day in court. In the end, precipitate dismissals, instead of unclogging court
dockets and easing the burden of the accused, unnecessarily delay cases and, ironically enough,
cause the very evil sought to be avoided.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by the Solicitor General to set
aside the order of the respondent Judge dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-91-17782, on the ground
that the prosecution was not prepared for the first scheduled hearing of the case due to the non-
availability of its witness who was out of town on official business.

The Antecedent Facts

The following Information 1 for libel was filed against private respondent Arnulfo C. Talisic in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City:
 That on or about the 10th day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with malicious
intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of one DEMOCRITO T.
MENDOZA, a well-known labor leader in Cebu and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Democrito T. Mendoza to public hatred, contempt and
ridicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously caused (sic) to be
published in Sun Star Daily, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
based in Cebu City an article with the following statements:

. . . Meanwhile, Liloan Councilor Arnulfo Talisic has called the

attention of the National Government, especially the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to speed up the
resolution of the Silot Bay problem.

Silot Bay, according to Talisic, had been allegedly "grabbed" by an

influential labor leader resulting in the deprivation of livelihood of
small fishermen in the area.

Silot Bay, Talisic alleged, had been titled in the name of a former
Marcos man in connivance with corrupt DENR officials.

Talisic said the government has already ruled in favor of the

protesting residents, but its reopening until now has been deferred for
unknown reasons. (emphasis supplied)

wherein the offended party was portrayed to be a landgrabber having grabbed Silot
Bay and caused the same to be titled in his name and of his children; accused
knowing fully well that the same is not true, thereby causing dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon the person of said Democrito T. Mendoza, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On May 3, 1991, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of Criminal Case No. Q-91-
17782 was scheduled for July 29, 1991. 2

Three days before said scheduled hearing or on July 26, 1991, private prosecutor Amado A.
Caballero filed an urgent motion for postponement, 3 citing as ground therefor, the fact that the
complainant, Atty. Democrito T. Mendoza, "would still be out of town during said date for the reason that
he would be in Cebu City to attend to the strike of some workers in some firms in Cebu City and his
personal presence thereat is very necessary." Since said witness "would be out of the country during the
month of August 1991 to attend to some official transaction relative to the International Labor Movement"
and would be back during the first week of September 1991, private prosecutor prayed that the scheduled
hearing be reset to a later day, preferably on September 9 or 13, 1991 at 8:30 a.m. Only the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City was furnished a copy of this motion.

Also on July 26, 1991, private respondent, through Atty. Lorenda Estrella-Amion of the Public
Attorney's Office, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the facts charged in the
Information do not constitute an offense. 4 Invoking Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and
Lyons 5 holding it not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed but that a third person must be able to identify the complainant as the object of the libelous
publication, private respondent claimed that the Information did not identify the person allegedly alluded to
in the article and neither did it state that a third person could identify said Democrito T. Mendoza as the
object thereof. Private respondent stressed that he did not write the article nor cause its publication, and
never had the intention to publish the same. The Office of the City Prosecutor was duly served a copy of
this motion.

On July 29, 1991, the day of the scheduled hearing, private prosecutor manifested in open court that
he had filed an urgent motion for postponement, and moved for the cancellation of hearing for that
day due to the unavailability of the prosecution witness. The public prosecutor did not object to the
postponement. On the other hand, the defense manifested that it had filed a motion to dismiss. The
respondent Judge then issued in open court the following Order 6 now being assailed:

There being no showing that the prosecution is ready for this morning (sic) scheduled
hearing, in view of the manifestation of counsel for the accused, that they have filed a
Motion to Dismiss dated July 25, 1991, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

The Cash Bond of accused Arnulfo G. Talisic in the amount of P4,200.00 covered by
Official Receipt No. 0498706 S dated March 8, 1991 is hereby ordered returned to
him.

Furthermore, upon motion of the private prosecutor, he is hereby allowed to file a

motion for reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

The private prosecutor filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of said Order, stating that the
prosecution had no opportunity to file an objection to the motion to dismiss as it was served a copy
thereof only on the day of hearing itself. He insisted that the court should have considered as valid
the reason for the absence of the prosecution's principal witness, as his presence in Cebu City was
duly certified to by the Officer-in-Charge of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. 7

On August 7, 1991, the trial court gave the defense five (5) days from notice within which "to file a
comment to the motion for reconsideration furnishing copy to the opposing counsel who shall have
five (5) days to file a reply, after which the matter shall be deemed submitted." 8

On August 14, 1991, Atty. Estrella-Amion withdrew her appearance as counsel for accused (private
respondent), which the court duly approved. 9 On the same day, Atty. Gregorio Tanaka Viterbo, Jr. of the
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) entered his appearance as counsel. for private respondent. In
compliance with the August 7, 1991 order of the trial court, he also filed an opposition to the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution. 10

On November 5, 1991, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order which reads:

For the reasons stated by the Complaining Witness through his Private Prosecutor in
his Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 31, 1991, and considering the
opposition interposed by the accused through his counsel, the Court finds said
Motion to he untenable and hereby denies the same for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 11

Hence, the present recourse.

 The Parties' Submissions

Petitioner claims that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal
Case No. Q-91-17782 because the absence of the complaining witness during the scheduled
hearing was neither capricious nor designed to delay the proceedings in the case 12 He adds the
motion for the reconsideration of the dismissal order on the strength of private respondent's opposition
thereto, notwithstanding that the same was filed by a "stranger" to the case as the FLAG lawyer who filed
it was not the counsel so directed by the court. 13

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that since he was not served a copy of the motion for
postponement, it was nothing but a scrap of paper which the clerk of court should not even have
received for filing. He contends that the dismissal of the case was based on the right of the accused
to speedy trial as the prosecution was not ready and could not present any other witness on the day
set for hearing. He further avers that a reopening of the case will place him in double jeopardy as the
dismissal was without his express consent.14

The Issues

From the foregoing submissions and assertions of the parties, the issues may be simply stated as
follows:

(1) Was the order of dismissal tainted with grave abuse of discretion? Put differently,
would the grant of the prosecution's motion for postponement have violated the
accused's right to a speedy trial? and

(2) Would the reversal of the trial court's assailed Orders place the accused in double
jeopardy?

We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, and in the process effectively
deprived the State of due process.

The First Issue: Speedy Trial

To be perfectly clear, we restate the general rule: motions for postponement are granted only upon
meritorious grounds and no party has the right to assume that his motion will be granted. The grant
or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to "the sound discretion of the court, (which)
should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the
court's or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. After
all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our procedural system of dispensing
justice." 15 Thus, when no substantial rights are affected and the intention to delay is not manifest, the
corresponding motion to transfer the hearing having been filed accordingly, it is sound judicial discretion
to allow the same to the end that the merits of the case may be fully ventilated. Unless grave abuse of
discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal. 16

While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15 should not be
accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, 17 this Court has likewise held that
where a
rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities may be
disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the
merits and not on technicalities. 18 As this Court held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, 19 "an order of the
court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings
. . . (which) cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case."

In the case at bench, the postponement of the July 29, 1991 hearing was the very first one ever
requested by the private prosecutor. And it was for a valid reason: the principal prosecution witness,
a labor lawyer, had to be in Cebu City to attend a conciliation meeting concerning a strike/picket.
Such reason is likewise easily verifiable, and as already mentioned, was in fact certified to in writing
by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board's officer-in-charge in Cebu City. There being no
showing that any substantial right of the accused would have been unduly prejudiced by the
postponement, respondent Judge should have granted the motion to afford the prosecution a fair
opportunity to prosecute its case. As it is, his precipitate dismissal of the case is tantamount to
denying the State due process. In People vs. Navarro 20 this Court held that:

A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the
prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such
arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court
and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent
miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be
prejudiced thereby.

The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement of scheduled
hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length
of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to speedy trial
allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the prosecution its day in court. 21 As held
in Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan:

. . . (T)he right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the
delay, reason for the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered. 22

The Second Issue: Double Jeopardy

Anent private respondent's claim that a reopening of the case would place him in double jeopardy,
this Court has previously ruled in Tampal that:

. . . The three (3) requisites of double jeopardy are: (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated,
and (3) a second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal
jeopardy attached only: (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3)
after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5)when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the termination of the case was precisely sought by accused (private
respondent) through his motion to dismiss.

In any event, private respondent's right to speedy trial not having been violated, he cannot invoke
the right against double jeopardy:

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases
on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar
further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed,
however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clearright of the accused to
speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that
the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy. 23(emphasis supplied)

In sum, it must be emphasized that the State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one
in question, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice
system as a whole and caused uncalled-for delays in the final resolution of this and other
cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent court, instead of easing the
burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation and ironically enough, unnecessarily
delayed the case in the process, causing the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Such
action does not inspire public confidence in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of July 29, 1991 as
well as the Order of November 5, 1991 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-91-17782 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is ordered to proceed with the trial and
resolution of the case with judicious and deliberate dispatch, with a stern warning to avoid similar
unjustified and unwarranted dismissals in the future.

G.R. No. 140188 August 3, 2000

SPO1 PORFERIO SUMBANG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
GEN. COURT MARTIAL PRO-REGION 6, ILOILO CITY, POLICE NATIONAL COMMISSION,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and EUSTAQUIO BEDIA, respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition, injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction, petitioner assails the resolution of the respondent general court-
martial denying petitioner's motion to dismiss dictated in open session on September 29, 1999. 1

Petitioner, then a constable 2nd class (C2C) in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and his brother
Vicente Sumbang, a civilian, were accused with the killing of Joemarie Bedia and Joey Panes
committed on May 29, 1988 in Bo. Obrero, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City. The case against petitioner,
being a member of the Philippine Constabulary, was referred to the PC Constabulary Judge
Advocate (CJA) while the case against Vicente was tried in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.

On March 15, 1989, Captain Domingo J. Laurea, Jr., who was tasked to conduct the pre-trial
investigation of the petitioner's double murder case, submitted its report to the Chief of Constabulary
thru the CJA with the recommendation that the charge for violation of Articles of War 94 (double
murder) against petitioner be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. 2 However, Captain Laurea's
recommendation was not approved and petitioner was subsequently charged with double murder
under Article 94 of the Articles of War before the general court-martial of the PC Regional Command
(RECOM) 6.

Upon his arraignment on November 20, 1989, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". The
prosecution started presenting its witnesses on January 21, 22, and 23, 1991. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer to Evidence on February 27, 1991. On the other hand, Vicente
Sumbang was convicted of Homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City on March 27, 1991.

On January 14, 1992, Republic Act No. 6975 otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police
(PNP) Law" took effect. The PNP law provides among others for the integration of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) into the PNP including its functions, officers and
other enlisted personnel3 and also provides for the continuation of court-martial proceedings against
PC-INP criminal offenders already arraigned prior to its effectivity. 4 The composition of the general
court-martial RECOM 6 was also subjected to changes and petitioner's criminal case remained
pending and unresolved.

On February 17, 1999 and August 4, 1999, respectively, Letter Order Nos. 80 and 436 of the
National Headquarters, Philippine National Police (NHQ-PNP) were issued by the PNP Director
General constituting general court-martial PRO 6, Iloilo City which took over petitioner's criminal
case. The respondent general court-martial then scheduled the dates for the continuation of the
hearing of petitioner's case.

On September 29, 1999 hearing, petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case alleging among
others that there was inordinate delay in the trial of his case which is in violation of his constitutional
right to a speedy trial and disposition of his case and that petitioner's case should be dismissed as it
was already barred under Article 38 of the Articles of War. The respondent general court-martial in
open session of the same date denied the motion.

On October 15,1999, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of temporary restraining order invoking the following grounds in support of his petition:

I. That there is inordinate delay in the trial of the case in violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines on speedy disposition of the case.

II. The General Court-Martial loses its jurisdiction when it failed to terminate the case within a period
of three (3) years after it assumed jurisdiction.

III. On the motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.

IV. The petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a restraining order and later on by injunction and the
dismissal of the case.
On November 8, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent
general court-martial from proceeding with the trial of petitioner's criminal case until further orders
from this Court.5

Petitioner invokes his constitutional right to a speedy trial and contends that the delay of almost eight
to nine years in the trial of his case was not attributable to him; thus he is entitled to the dismissal of
his murder case.

We are not persuaded.

The determination of whether an accused has been denied the right to a speedy trial must have to
depend on the surrounding circumstances of each case. There can be no hard and fast rule
measured mathematically in terms of years, months or days.6 As held in a case:7

"It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which
the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of
delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, are considered."

Although it is unfortunate that it took about eight years from 1991 before the trial of this case was
resumed, in 1999, we do not find such delay as amounting to a violation of petitioner's right to
speedy trial considering that such delay could not be attributable to the prosecution. The cases cited
by petitioner upholding the right of the accused to a speedy trial are not in point since the delay
therein complained of was due to the vacillation and procrastination of the prosecuting officers and
their lack of conscientiousness in the discharge of their duties, which circumstances do not obtain in
the case at bar. The prosecution in the instant case had already presented its four witnesses, all of
whom, except for the fourth witness, were cross-examined by petitioner's counsel on January 21, 22,
and 23, 1991, respectively.

Petitioner in his reply explicitly stated that the delay in the termination of the case was due to the
changes in the composition of the respondent general court-martial, thus: 8

"Under the present circumstances the delay for almost eight (8) to nine (9) years was due to several
changes of the membership of the General Court-Martial. Some if them did not even hear the
evidence, testimonial or physical, specially the present membership of the General Court Martial."

It appears that from 1991 up to the present, the membership of the general court-martial had
undergone changes four times and none of the original members of the court-martial which heard
the prosecution witnesses were re-appointed in the succeeding courts-martial, thus delay was
inevitable and was not the fault of the prosecution. Notably, from the time petitioner's motion to
dismiss or demurrer to evidence was filed in 1991, he did not take action to assert his right to a
speedy trial or manifest his objection to the delay in the trial of his criminal case. Petitioner appears
to have been insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by not taking any step
whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception
that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection hence impliedly with his
acquiescence.9 In fact it was only after the respondent court-martial resumed the hearing of his case
in 1999 that petitioner filed his motion to dismiss dated September 23, 1999 and invoked his
constitutional right to speedy trial. We agree with the Solicitor General's observation in this wise: 10

"It bears stressing that petitioner raised the violation of his speedy trial right only when respondent
General Court-Martial heard the case anew. It is thus fair to assume that he would have just
continued to sleep on his right had respondents not taken the initiative to proceed with his case. It
would have been different if petitioner asserted his right to have his motion to dismiss resolved prior
to the enactment of RA 6975 from 1991 to 1992 and thereafter from 1992 to 1999. As it is, his
silence should be interpreted as a waiver of such right. (Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA
703, 716 [1996])."

The right to a speedy trial as any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, except when
otherwise expressly so provided by law, may be waived. 11 It must therefore be asserted.12 Thus, if
there was a delay in the trial of the case, petitioner is not entirely without blame.

The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the same shall
not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. 13 While
accused persons do have rights, many of them choose to forget that the aggrieved also have the
same rights. It secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. 14 As
held in the case of Guerrero vs. CA:15

"While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy
trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and
vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public
justice. In the instant case, three people died as result of the crash of the airplane that the accused
was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right
seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on
the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair
opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises."

In the instant case, two teenagers, namely Joemarie Bedia and Joey Panes, were killed allegedly by
petitioner. We find that petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and since the membership of
the court-martial had undergone changes which could not be attributable to the machination and
control of the respondent, we hold that substantial justice will be best served if the trial of this case
will be allowed to continue until its resolution.

Petitioner next claims that the alleged crime he committed has already prescribed. He contends that
since his arraignment in 1989, his case has not yet been disposed within the three (3) year period
provided in Article 38 16of the Articles of War in relation to Art. 9417 , thus the general court-martial had
already lost jurisdiction to hear his case.

We find the argument untenable. The periods provided in Article 38 of the Articles of War do not refer
to the time within which the court-martial is expected to resolve the case but rather to the time from
the commission of the offense to the arraignment of the accused. The case of Domingo vs.
Minister of National Defense,18 is instructive on this point:

"He points out the fact that he was arrested on August 7, 1979 and has been detained since then.
He maintains that from August 7, 1979 up to August 30, 1982, the date of his Compliance filed in the
General Court-Martial in connection with his Motion To Quash, more than three years have already
elapsed. He argues that under the above-quoted provision of the Articles of War, the "trial and
punishment" of the crimes imputed to him, which are for desertion in time of peace and violations of
Articles 94 and 95 of the Articles of War, must be completed within the three years from the
commission of the offense; and That said period of three years had already been surpassed in all the
three charges against him. xxx xxx xxx.

The respondents disagree with the petitioner's interpretation of Article 38 of the Articles of War. They
contend that the period of prescription of a military offense commences from the commission of the
offense and is interrupted upon the receipt of the sworn charges by the accused. xxx xxx xxx.

Neither the interpretation advocated by the petitioner nor that upheld by the respondents meets with
our acquiescence. Article 38 of the Articles of War is quite explicit in prescribing the period of
limitation for the prosecution of military offenses. There is no question that the period of prescription
of the three charges against the petitioner is three years, all of the said charges being covered by
the proviso in Article 38, they being for desertion in time of peace or for violation of Articles 94 and
95 of the Articles of War. This period of three years is to be reckoned from the date that the crime or
offense had been committed up to the arraignment of the accused. Stated differently, the offenses
filed against the petitioner may no longer be tried by the General Court-Martial if a period of three
years had lapsed from the time the offenses had been committed up to the time he was arraigned on
the same.

The view expressed by the respondents that the three-year period should be counted from the time
of receipt of the sworn charges is apparently induced by a belief that the rule applied in the United
States should be followed inasmuch as our Articles of War is of American origin. The adherence to
the American rule is erroneous inasmuch as the provision in the U.S. Articles of War expressly
prescribes that the three-year, prescriptive period should be counted from receipt of sworn charges
and specifications.

"Except as otherwise provided in this article, a person charged with desertion in time of peace or any
of the offenses punishable under sections 919-932 of this title (articles 119-132) is not liable to be
tried by court-martial if the offense was committed more than three years before the receipt of sworn
charges and specifications by an officer exercising summary martial jurisdiction over the command."
(Art. 43, Code of Military Justice, 10 USCA, Sec. 843 (b)).

As may be noted, Article 38 of our Articles of War provides differently. The period of prescription
1wphi1

therein decreed is the time that supervenes from the commission of the offense up to the time of
arraignment. Contrary to the petitioner's submittal, the period is not interrupted by the
commencement of trial, but by the arraignment of the accused."

The killing of Joey Panes and Joemarie Bedia happened on May 29, 1988 and petitioner was
arraigned on November 20, 1989, thus, petitioner was arraigned within the three (3) year prescriptive
period provided in Article 38 of the Articles of War.

Petitioner next contends that there was no iota of evidence presented by the prosecution that would
establish his guilt in the killing of Joey Panes considering that there was no allegation in the criminal
complaint filed against his brother Vicente Sumbang who was subsequently convicted that petitioner
conspired with Vicente in killing Joey Panes.

Such argument deserves scant consideration. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction
of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction19 which does not include the review of facts and evidence. 20 Moreover, the proceeding
before the respondent court-martial is independent of, and not controlled by, that in the homicide
case decided by the Regional Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order is LIFTED and the
respondent General Court-Martial is hereby ordered to proceed with judicious dispatch in the hearing
of the case up to its conclusion.

G.R. Nos. 136757-58 November 27, 2000

CONSUELO S. BLANCO, MILAGROS V. CABUAG and ROMUALDO P. CABUAG, petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari1 and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to annul and
set aside the Resolutions2 dated September 14, 1998 and November 19, 1998 of respondent
Sandiganbayan3 denying petitioners Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively,
for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and to restrain respondent court from proceeding with petitioners arraignment and trial
in Criminal Cases Nos. 23339 and 23341 for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 141,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On September 13, 1988, the Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous letter-complaint
charging petitioner Consuelo S. Blanco, former President of the Mariano Marcos State University
(MMSU) in Batac, Ilocos Norte, with allegedly malversing the amount of eleven (11) million pesos in
connection with undelivered materials from Jacinto Steel Mill.4 The case was docketed as OMB
Case No. 88-2267.

On October 11, 1988, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to Director Antonio M. Carpio
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, for fact-finding investigation and report. 5 The
case was assigned to Agents Villar and Rigodon of the Anti-Graft Section (AGS) of the NBI. In the
Report dated February 1, 1989, the said NBI agents recommended that the case be forwarded to
NBI Laoag sub-office, Ilocos Norte for further investigation and report inasmuch as the general
vouchers and other pertinent documents are on file with the MMSU and with the provincial office of
the Commission on Audit in Batac, Ilocos, Norte.6 The case was then assigned to Agent Hector
Geologo.

After investigation, Agent Geologo, in his Report dated August 31, 1989, recommended the filing of
charges, for violation of R.A. 3019, against petitioners and other officials of MMSU. The report was
forwarded to the Legal and Evaluation Division (LED) of the NBI, Manila. 7

In his report dated November 6, 1989, Gerarda G. Galang, Officer-in-Charge of LED of the NBI
requested that the case be returned to the NBI Laoag sub-office to further investigate certain
specified matters. NBI Agent Villar concurred with the said request. Thus, on January 3, 1990, the
same case was forwarded anew to the NBI Laoag sub-office. 8

On November 23, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman received a copy of the NBIs Evaluation
Comment dated November 17, 1994; and the Agents Report dated October 4, 1994 with its
annexes. In its Evaluation Comment, the NBI recommended that Consuelo Blanco, Abelardo
Velasco, Milagros Cabuag, Romualdo Cabuag, Prisca Tayag and Bienvenido Magno be charged and
prosecuted for falsification of official documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code. It was also recommended that Consuelo Blanco be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(a)
and (e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) while Bienvenido Magno, Romualdo Cabuag, Abelardo
Velasco, Milagros Cabuag and Prisca Tayag be charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the same
law.9

In his Indorsement dated March 20, 1995, Abelardo L. Aportadera, Assistant Ombudsman and head
of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), directed that a preliminary
investigation be conducted in these cases. Consequently, in an Order dated April 18, 1995,
Consuelo Blanco, Abelardo Velasco, Romualdo Cabuag, Milagros Cabuag, Prisca Tayag and
Bienvenido Magno were required to file their counter-affidavits. Instead of filing their counter-
affidavits, all the said persons except Consuelo Blanco, filed five (5) motions for extension of time to
file their counter-affidavits. Thus the deadline for submission of their counter-affidavits was moved to
June 8, 1995, then to June 23, July 8, July 28 and lastly to August 12, 1995, up to which date no
counter-affidavits were filed. As for Consuelo Blanco, the notice for her to file her counter-affidavit
was returned undelivered with a notation that she can no longer be located. 10

Graft Investigation Officer Maria Linda L. Llagas-Vicente submitted a Resolution dated December
28, 1995, recommending the prosecution of Blanco, Velasco, Milagros Cabuag, Romualdo Cabuag,
Tayag and Magno for violation of Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Said recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman on April 26, 1996. 11

On May 2, 1996, four (4) Informations, one (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 12 and
three (3) for violation of Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code13 were filed before the
Sandiganbayan and raffled to the Third Division.

On July 23, 1996, herein petitioners Milagros V. Cabuag and Romualdo P. Cabuag, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated July 26, 1996 gave
petitioners fifteen (15) days to file their motion for reconsideration directly with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.14

Meanwhile, an alias warrant of arrest15 was issued against petitioner Blanco, who on August 22,
1997 filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration/ Reinvestigation, Reduction of Bail and a Grant of
Authority to Travel to the United States.16

The Sandiganbayan allowed petitioner Blanco to travel to the United States from August 25, 1997 to
September 24, 1997 and to file her counter-affidavit with the Office of the Special Prosecutor within
fifteen (15) days from her return to enable the said Office to conduct a reinvestigation. Blanco
returned to the Philippines on September 16, 1997 and filed her Counter-Affidavit with the Office of
the Special Prosecutor on October 9, 1997.17

On December 2, 1997, Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer subpoenaed all the accused and Atty.
Villanueva, counsel for Cabuag, for a clarificatory hearing. 18

On February 2, 1998, Prosecutor Ferrer filed a Preliminary Report with the Sandiganbayan alleging
that he has already completed the reinvestigation of the said cases but his Memorandum is still
awaiting the action thereon of his superior.

On April 17, 1998, Prosecutor Ferrer filed a Motion19 with the Sandiganbayan praying:
1. That the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 23340 and 23342 be withdrawn;

2. That Abelardo D. Velasco, Prisca Tayag and Bienvenido B. Magno be dropped from the
Information in Criminal Case No. 23339; and

3. That Abelardo D. Velasco, Romualdo P. Cabuag, Prisca Tayag and Bienvenido B. Magno be
dropped from the Information in Criminal Case No. 23341.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated May 28, 1998 granted said motion. 20

On July 28, 1988, petitioners Blanco, Milagros and Romualdo Cabuag filed with the Sandiganbayan
a Motion to Quash the Informations on the ground that the Ombudsmans long delay in resolving the
preliminary investigation resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights to due process and
speedy disposition of cases.21

The respondent court, in its Resolutions dated September 14, 1998 and November 19, 1998,
respectively, denied the Motion to Quash and the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. 22

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners raise a lone assignment of error, to wit:

RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT DISMISSING THE REMAINING CASES
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS DESPITE THE LONG DELAY IN THE TERMINATION BY THE
OMBUDSMAN OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST THEM IN VIOLATION OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASES
AGAINST THEM.

Invoking the ruling enunciated in the case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 23 petitioners assert that their
constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases were violated when the
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan after almost ten (10) years from the time the
complaint was lodged with the Office of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman).

Petitioners likewise allege that some of their evidence, which may be material in establishing their
innocence, have already been lost, and that the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation cannot be attributed to them considering that it is within the discretion of the
Ombudsman to terminate the same after the expiration of the period granted to file their respective
counter-affidavits.

The petition is not meritorious.

Settled is the rule that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay.24 In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. 25

In the Tatad case relied upon by petitioners, this Court held that a long delay of close to three (3)
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan constitutes a
violation not only of the constitutional right of the accused under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but also of the constitutional guarantee to "speedy disposition" of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions). In so
ruling, the Court took into consideration the following attendant circumstances: that political
motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; that there was a
blatant departure from the established procedure prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary
investigation; and that the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation cannot be justified on
the basis of the facts on record.26

In the present case, after evaluating the undated anonymous letter- complaint 27 against Blanco and
co-petitioners, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the said letter-complaint to the NBI, an
independent investigating body for fact-finding investigation.28 It took more than (5) years for the NBI
to render a report which recommended that Blanco, Velasco, Romualdo Cabuag, Milagros Cabuag,
Tayag and Magno be prosecuted for falsification of official documents under Article 171, paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code.

The Office of the Ombudsman received a copy of the NBIs Evaluation Comment, the Agents Report
and its annexes only on November 23, 1994. Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera, in his
Indorsement dated March 20, 1995, directed that a preliminary investigation be conducted in these
cases. Thus, in the Order dated April 18, 1995, all the accused were required to file their counter-
affidavits, but, instead of filing their counter-affidavits, all the accused, except petitioner
Blanco,29 filed five (5) Motions for Extensions of Time to file the same. As of August 12, 1995, the last
extension date, no counter-affidavits were ever filed. Consequently, on May 2, 1996, four (4)
Informations, one (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and three (3) for violation of
Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, were filed before the Sandiganbayan.

However, on July 23, 1996, all the accused, except petitioner Blanco, filed a Motion to Defer
Arraignment. In its Order dated July 26, 1996, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioners fifteen (15) days
within which to file their motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor. In the
meantime, petitioner Blanco was served with an alias warrant of arrest. On August 22, 1997, Blanco
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and subsequently her counter-affidavit on October 9, 1997.

From the foregoing facts, it appears that the preliminary investigation begun not on September 13,
1988, when the Office of the Ombudsman received the anonymous letter-complaint, but rather
actually on March 20, 1995, when Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera directed that a preliminary
investigation be conducted in the said cases. The preliminary investigation was only deemed
submitted for resolution on August 18, 1995, expiry date of the last extension given to petitioners to
file their counter-affidavits. Before the cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan, it took the
Ombudsman one (1) year and one (1) month from March 20, 1995 when an Order was issued
directing the conduct of a preliminary investigation and nine (9) months from the date the case was
submitted for resolution.1wphi1

A perusal of the records shows that the delay cannot be attributed to the Ombudsman but rather to
the accused themselves including petitioners Milagros and Romualdo Cabuag who filed five (5)
motions for extensions of time to file their counter-affidavits, the last of which was filed on August 18,
1995. Likewise, with regards to their Motion for Reconsideration, the same was duly resolved within
three (3) months from the date the last counter-affidavit was filed on January 8, 1998. Petitioners
Blanco, Milagros Cabuag and Romualdo Cabuag filed their counter-affidavits on October 9, 1997,
January 8, 1998 and January 8, 1998, respectively. Hence, the Informations in these two cases,
were filed in due time, and the Tatad case may not properly be invoked in these cases at bar.

Lastly, petitioners allege that there is no sufficient ground to hold them for trial for the crimes
charged. As consistently held in a number of cases, this Court will refrain from interfering with the
exercise by the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory power. It
is not for this Court to review the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before his Office. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman
who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the
public service.30

WHEREFORE, there being no showing that the impugned resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan
are tainted by grave abuse of discretion or jurisdictional defect, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

G.R. No. 173637 April 21, 2009

DANTE T. TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated 22 February 2006 and
Resolution2 dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled,
"People of the Philippines v. Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
153, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan."

The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by the trial court due
to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tans right to speedy trial. The assailed Resolution
lawphil.net

denied his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Inhibit.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the
People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No.
119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."

Criminal Case No. 1198303 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in
the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal Cases
No. 1198314 and No. 1198325 involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G.
Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.

On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion
for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 be
consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court granted.
On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 were raffled off to
the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and
No. 119829 also went to the same court.

Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges. 6

On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things, the
first date of trial on 27 February 2001.7

Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the direct control and
supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her appearance for the People; Atty. Agnes
Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf Brittanico
for Jimmy Juan. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on took over as
lawyers for the People.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the parties
agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No.
119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial
court disapprove it.

Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On 18
September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the
RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days.

After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was able to
file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003. 8

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the Peoples
alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People
for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or
justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy
trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have been
substantially prejudiced by this delay.

The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement
to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832,
as the presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done
separately. The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, however, were
done simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial
ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-19 in relation to Sections 32(a)-110 and 5611 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise known as the "Revised Securities Act." Criminal Case No. 119830
pertains to alleged violation of Section 27 (b),12 in relation to Section 56 of said act.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled that the delays
which attended the proceedings of petitioners case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were vexatious,
capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioners right to speedy trial. The RTC
ordered13 the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be
meritorious, the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No. 119830 DISMISSED. 1avvphi1
On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate trials
of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and
No. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

The RTCs order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, with
the People contending that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PEOPLE
VIOLATED DANTE TANS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT
JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830
PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED CASES.

Setting aside the trial courts order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court
reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22, 2003 and
January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered
to conduct further proceedings in said case immediately. 14

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the Justices
who decided the case.

On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.

Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE THE
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL
ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TANS RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL
COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TANS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

We first resolve the preliminary issues.

In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner contends that the certificate of non-
forum shopping attached to the Peoples appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been
signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary
Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

Petitioners argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of Acting
DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari before said court. It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is
required to be executed by the plaintiff.15 Although the complaint-affidavit was signed by the
Prosecution and Enforcement Department of the SEC, the petition before the Court of Appeals
originated from Criminal Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was
the People of the Philippines. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt
and establishes that criminal cases are prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines, the
offended party in criminal cases. Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the DOJ is the executive arm of the government mandated to investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. It is
the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the
People of the Philippines.16 Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses,
including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice.
Since it is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked to prosecute criminal cases before the
trial court, the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed or is
pending in another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head
of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal
Case No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines.

The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed to discuss the main issues.

At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tans
right to speedy trial.

Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
83068. The appellate court determined that he "impliedly agreed" that Case No. 119830 would not
be tried until after termination of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, which finding was grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures.

Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that factual issues are beyond the
province of this Court in a petition for review, for it is not our function to review evidence all over
again.17 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari.18 The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts.19 However,
the rule is subject to several exceptions.20 Under these exceptions, the Court may delve into and
resolve factual issues, such as in cases where the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are absurd, contrary to the evidence on record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a
misappreciation of facts.

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of Appeals on the substantial
matters at hand, while conflicting with those of the RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence
on record. We, therefore, find no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the
instant case differently.
An accuseds right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free
from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its "salutary objective" being to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. 21Intimating historical perspective
on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, "justice delayed is
justice denied." This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more
so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. 22

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial
period to 180 days from the first day of trial.23 Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court
dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has
been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119. 24

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,25 the Court had occasion to state

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the
courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial
and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied
such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed
to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in
mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x
x.26

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to speedy trial is deemed

violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay.27
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of
evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and
defense admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of
almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal
Case No. 119830.

The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay. To this, we apply the four-factor test previously mentioned.

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings
of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, 28 and
particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 29

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,30 the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial
and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing
prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of
personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court
also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by
the delay to the accused.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,31 the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused
to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the
constitutional guarantee.

In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations Administrator,32 the Court,

considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the
right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.

Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial
of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his
defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. 33 Petitioners conformity
thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution
manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832.
His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his
case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes
would result in serious injustice.34 In fact, petitioners acquiescence is evident from the transcript of
stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the Peoples evidence in the five BW cases on
27 February 2001, herein quoted below:

COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some manifestation first, your Honor,
before we continue presenting our witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to two (2)
of the charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of Dante Tan x x x.

xxxx

COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, your Honor. We are presenting this witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of
beneficial ownership case

COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear your purpose in presenting
your first witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?

COURT: Show it to counsel.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation
to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised Securities Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership
amounting to more than 10% which requires disclosure of such fact. 35

During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the
separate trials of the BW Cases:

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

May we be allowed to speak, your Honor?

Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a separate trial x x x so as
manifested by the SEC lawyer, the witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as
against Dante Tan only x x x.36

The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further clarifies that only the
two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted:

ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:

Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors regarding the purpose of the
testimony of the witness in the stand. While the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the
testimony of the witness. . .

xxxx

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript of this case, well, I believe
the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a
clarification made by the parties and counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these
cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges, involving different documents, your
Honor. That is why the witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made by
Atty. Fortun, because at that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor,
then I understand that the testimony of this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other
accused, your Honor.

ATTY. MARANAN:
We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already cross, it is clear that the
direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan.

PROS. LAZARO:

Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.37

Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not absolute. Where
periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by law.38 After all, this Court and the law
recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend
with the realities of everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to
adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of speedy trial is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. 39

As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has
prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time,
suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. 40 Should the
prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the
prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. 41

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke
said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the
constitutional guarantee.42 More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the
prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one
after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is
guilty of violating petitioners right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition,
but generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case.

There is also no merit to petitioners claim that a reversal of the RTCs Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal
was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution
for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
found it apt to stipulate:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused.43

Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or acquittal,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. This
element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal,
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in
double jeopardy.44 This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence
and denial of the right to speedy trial.45 While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the
Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation
of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same
charges be revived. Petitioners situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering
that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial
was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason
to support the initial order of dismissal.

Following this Courts ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals, 46 as petitioners right to speedy trial was
not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy that the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious,
certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition
challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching. 47

As this Court ruled in People v. Tampal,48 reiterated in People v. Leviste,49 where we overturned an
order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear
right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench
considering that the right of the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. x x x.
From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said
RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case,
considering that there is no violation of petitioners right to speedy trial.

The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our
jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even
decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy trial and disposition of cases.50 Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.51

Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society
under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice
are afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals,
Criminal Case No. 119830 is just one of the many controversial cases involving the BW shares scam
where public interest is undoubtedly at stake. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of unclogging
dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the
litigation.52

Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. There being no
capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably
sought, we concur in the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July
2006 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City for further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 119830 with reasonable dispatch.

G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner,

vs.
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no
less than five informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses
and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed,
has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of
more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a
definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons,
has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of
that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance
attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is
palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence,
the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the
formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays.

Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We
thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and
finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice. On the
one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately assisted by a
persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The
Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and
that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.

We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as
in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding
in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334;
U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First
Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236. 1

The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further
attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in
previous informations, and the charges now pending before the justice of the peace of Lucena,
Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the
observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will
take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character
may not recur. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-46576 November 6, 1978

ALFREDO VENTURA y YLARDE, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and DIRECTOR VICENTE RAVAL, Bureau of Prisons.
Muntinlupa, Rizal,respondents.

E.B. Garcia & Associates and Angela Valenzuela for petitioner.

Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan and
Solicitor Celso P. Ylagan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The crucial question in this application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Alfredo Ventura y Ylarde
arose from his continued confinement dating from May 27, 1968 after the filing of an information
against him for double homicide with physical injuries with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan. 1 Though admittedly he was subsequently convicted in a decision rendered on April 2, 1970,
an appeal was duly perfected to the Court of Appeals. 2 The grievance set forth in his petition is that the
pendency of such appeal all these years amounts to a denial of his constitutional right to the speedy
disposition of the case against him, as his appeal could not be decided because the whereabouts of the
stenographer, Mr. Jaime T. Cortez, who took down the stenographic notes of the proceedings, could not,
until now, be located. 3 Further on this point, he alleged that a resolution of the Court of Appeals ordering
the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses, who had previously testified, with such stenographer
Cortez taking down the notes, and directing the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court of Pangasinan to give
a new stenographer thirty (30) days within which to submit the transcript of stenographic notes after such
retaking, had not reached the stage of compliance. 4 It is petitioner's submission: "The continuous
detention of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the fact that he has perfected his appeal since April 12,
1970 is in wanton violation of his constitutional right as provided for under the Old and New Constitution,
Sec. 16, Art. IV of the New Constitution, [being] reproduced hereunder for convenience and ready
reference: 'All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies." 5 His plea is that his release from detention be ordered by the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus. 6

The application was filed on July 28, 1977. On August 3, 1977, there was a resolution from this
Court reading as follows: "The Court [issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court and
required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ, not later than Tuesday, August 9, 1977. The
hearing of this case is hereby [set] for Wednesday, August 10, 1977 at 10:30 a.m." 7 In view of an
urgent motion for two days' extension of time to file a return, it was not until August 11 that it was
submitted. The then Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza 8 narrated the steps taken by the Court of
Appeals from September 1, 1971 up to July 28, 1977 when counsel for petitioner filed a motion to hold in
abeyance the retaking of proceedings by such tribunal until this petition was resolved and alleged as a
special defense that there was no denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. He referred to the test
set forth in Acevedo v. Sarmiento,9 stating that such a right "means one free from vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays. "

It was not until the following Friday, August 12, 1977, that the hearing took place. On the same day,
this resolution was issued by this Court: "When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attys.
Herenio Martinez and Angela Valenzuela appeared and argued for the petitioner while Solicitor
Celso P. Ylagan appeared and argued for the respondents. Thereafter the Court Resolved to require
the petitioner to file an amended petition within ten (10) days from today." 10 An amended petition was
duly filed on September 27, 1977. It did not by any means lend added strength to the petition with the
commendable admission that in at least four orders, dating from June 28, 1974 to March 18, 1976, the
Court of Appeals had taken the necessary steps, including an order for the arrest of the missing
stenographer. 11There was an insistence on the plea, however, that the circumstances disclosed the
denial of the right to the speedy disposition of his case. 12

It was not unexpected, therefore, that in the return of respondents, filed on November 9, 1977, it was
stressed that the alleged denial of petitioner's right to the speedy disposition of his case was devoid
of "basis in law or in fact, ... ." 13 After noting that respondents could in no way be held liable "for the
failure of stenographer Cortez to submit" his transcription, 14 it stated: "Neither has the Court of Appeals
been remiss in its duty to speedily dispose of the appeal; on the contrary, as adverted to in paragraph 6 of
the petition, it issued a series of orders and resolutions for the purpose of completing the stenographic
notes, and thus, promptly disposing of the case, " citing fourteen resolutions of the Court of Appeals from
September 1, 1971 to July 28, 1977 to expedite the disposition of the appeal and the order of arrest of
such stenographer as well as his transfer to the PC Stockade at Camp Crame. 15 The special defense that
he was confined by virtue of a valid order or judgment was reiterated as he had been admittedly convicted
of double homicide with serious physical injuries. 16 It was likewise set forth that he could have obtained
his provisional liberty by posting the required bail fixed by the Court of Appeals. 17

The weakness of the petition is thus apparent. His release cannot be ordered.

1. For all its broad, latitudinarian even, scope, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus application is
considerably narrowed, where the detention complained of may be traced to judicial action. For if
"the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ does not
lie." 18 There is, though, this exception. As set forth in Gumabon v. Director of Prisons: "Once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is -the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention." 19 That doctrine goes back to Conde v. Rivera, 20 decided in 1924, a case involving the right to
speedy trial the denial of which, according to Justice Malcolm, would entitle a person "restrained of his
liberty [to sue out] a writ of 'habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." 21 The latest case in point is Flores v.
People. 22

2. There is plausiblity in the view submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General that the
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of one's case, 23 a new provision in the Constitution, can
be viewed in the same light as the traditional right to a speedy trial. In the pleadings filed by it, reference
was made to the standard set forth in Acevedo v. Sarmiento 24 as to its signifying "one free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays." 25 The Acevedo opinion traced its origin to the same case of Conde v.
Rivera, where Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with what was ordained
by the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays." 26 Even a cursory reading of the steps taken by the Court of Appeals to assure that
petitioner's appeal could be resolved in accordance with the evidence submitted before the lower court
would indicate that all the necessary steps had been taken to assure that a definitive judgment could be
reached. Admittedly, there is delay, but it is not that kind of a delay that could be considered either
capricious or oppressive. Again, there is an element of vexation that must be suffered by petitioner, but
certainly it does not amount to that degree of annoyance, provocation, or distress that would justify a
nullification of the appropriate and regular steps that must be taken to assure that while the innocent
should go unpunished, those found guilty must expiate for their offenses. Clearly then, there is no
justification for the granting of petitioner's plea for liberty.

3. In the course of the hearing of this application, reference was made to the aforecited case
of Flores v. Peoplewhere this Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by Francisco Flores and
nullified an order of the Court of Appeals 27 denying a motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a
failure to comply with the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial. It is not applicable. It could be
distinguished. In that case, petitioner Flores was accused of robbery on December 31, 1951 and was
found guilty on November 25, 1955. An appeal was taken in December of that year. There was at first a
resolution on February 10, 1958 by the Court of Appeals, remanding the records of the case to the lower
court for the rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the
appeal. Thereafter, on August 5, 1959, another resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals granting
petitioner's motion to set aside the decision. The case was therefore returned to the lower court. There
the matter appeared to have rested. No further progress in the proceeding was discernible. Accordingly,
on May 10, 1965, there was a motion in the Court of Appeals for the dismissal of the case. It was based
on the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. When the Court of Appeals failed to grant such
motion to dismiss, the matter was taken to this Tribunal. Our decision granting the petition for certiorari is
based on the following consideration: "Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the
trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. In
this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could
validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances
permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It
is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits
elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution
of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional
safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us-considering the controlling doctrine
announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again." 28 There is a decisive difference
therefore. In Flores, to all intents and purposes, after the resolution of the Court of Appeals setting aside
the decision, no trial was held. The information, it must be remembered, was filed as far back as
December 31, 1951. When the dismissal of the case was sought in a motion of May 10, 1965, a period of
fourteen years had elapsed. In this application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is the pendency of appeal
from a decision, which on its face carries a presumption of validity, after a trial duly held, that is made the
basis for petitioner's plea for liberty. There is thus a crucial difference. It is our ruling that at this stage,
considering further all the circumstances previously set forth, there is in law no transgression of the
asserted constitutional right to the speedy disposition of a criminal case.

4. At any rate, the return of the Office of the Solicitor General to the amended petition pointed out
that while such appeal is pending, petitioner could secure his liberty by posting the required bail. If
petitioner is of the view that the amount fixed should be reduced, there is no obstacle to his
presenting a motion to that effect to the Court of Appeals which could act on the matter.

WHEREFORE, this petition for habeas corpus is dismissed