P.

TREAS, City Mayor, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, Respondents.
Facts:
On September 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain
against private Elpidio T. Javellana and Southern Negros Development Bank.
(as mortgagee). It sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in
Javellanas name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner
alleged that the Subject Property was declared to have a value of P60.00 per
square meter, or a total value of 43,560.00.
*Javellana admitted ownership of the Subject Property but denied the
petitioners public purposebecause there was already had an existing school
site for Lapaz High School. Javellana also claimed that the true fair market
value of his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter.
*Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it
had deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-
Iloilo Branch. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the immediate
possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1533,8 after it had deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the
amount of compensation.
*Javellana filed an Opposition to the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Possession citing the same grounds he raised in his Answer that the city
already had a vast tract of land where its existing school site was located, and
the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Propertys tax valuation was grossly
inadequate.
*On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an Order which granted petitioners
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and authorized the petitioner to
take immediate possession of the Subject Property. The subject Property was
used as the site for Lapaz National High school.
Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte
Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to
withdraw the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he
discovered that no such deposit was ever made. Private respondent thus
demanded his just compensation as well as interest.
Issue:
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public
use but only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically
motivated because petitioners voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-
mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the land sought to be
expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but
their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing the same.
Issue:
Whether the Municipal Government of Panay exercise the power of Eminent
Domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law under the
existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments.
Ruling:
While power of Eminent Domain may be validly delegated to local
government units (LGUs), other public entities and public utilities the
exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not absolute. In fact, the
scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the delegating
authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and
restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. Indeed, LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent
domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to
an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it must conform to the
limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in
eminent domain.
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local
governments, it is still the duty of the courts to determine whether the
power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the
delegating law.
A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private
property; and the reason for this is settled because a municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted
differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.

At what point should just compensation for the property taken be

determined? Is it as of the filing of the complaint for expropration or the
time the plaintiff takes possession of the property?

Ruling:

Hust compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which

usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
complaint.

When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with

the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.

G.R. No. 153974 August 7, 2006

MIGUEL BELUSO, NATIVIDAD BELUSO, PEDRO BELUSO, ANGELITA BELUSO,

RAMON BELUSO, and AMADA DANIEL, substituted by her heirs represented
by TERESITA ARROBANG, Petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), represented by its Mayor, VICENTE B.
BERMEJO, Respondent.

The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No.

95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed
on April 14, 1997 by the Municipality of Panay (respondent) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).