G.R. No.

167324 July 17, 2007 TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL ORTHOPEDIC WORKERS UNION, DR. JOSE R. REYES MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES UNION, SAN LAZARO HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
ALLIANCE OF HEALTH WORKERS, INC., HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY, COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH DEVELOPMENT, NETWORK OPPOSED TO PRIVATIZATION, COMMUNITY
MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION INC., PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY
ENGINEERS INC., KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS, KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYAN NG MGA MARALITA, ELSA O. GUEVARRA, ARCADIO B.
GONZALES, JOSE G. GALANG, DOMINGO P. MANAY, TITO P. ESTEVES, EDUARDO P.
GALOPE, REMEDIOS M. YSMAEL, ALFREDO BACU ATA, EDGARDO J. DAMICOG,
REMEDIOS M. MALTU AND REMEGIO S. MERCADO, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Respondents. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision,1promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
26 November 2004, denying a petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102,
"Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which was issued by then
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on 24 May 1999. Prior hereto, petitioners originally filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Supreme Court on 15 August 2001. However, the Supreme Court, in a
Resolution dated 29 August 2001, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
FACT: HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA) In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a
reform agenda developed by the HSRA Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and
analyses with inputs from several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the
adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five general areas of reform:
(1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority public health
programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective
performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the
coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP). However, some provisions of the Health
Sector Reform Agenda are challenged on the ground that they violate 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1
of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987
Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the
people s right to health and well-being. However, these provisions are not self-executory.
Petitioners challenged: First reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government
hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of
government hospitals. Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued
by the DOH, dated 5 January 2001, entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation of the
Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial
Flexibility to Start by January 2001;" and Administrative Order No. 172 of the DOH, entitled
"Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals in
Government Health Facilities," dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent
Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services. They also alleged that the
implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and free
medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
102 On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for
the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to
being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of
basic services to local government units. There are certain provisions for the streamlining of the
DOH and the deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals. Executive Order No.
102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160),
which provided for the devolution to the local government units of basic services and facilities, as
well as specific health-related functions and responsibilities.7 Petitioners contended that:
Executive Order No. 102, which effects the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by
Congress in the exercise of its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is
void, having been issued in excess of the President s authority. Implementation of the
Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) was not in accordance with law. The RSP was
allegedly implemented even before the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved it.
They also maintained that the Office of the President should have issued an administrative order to
carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 will
be the reason of losing their jobs, and that some of them were suffering from the inconvenience of
having to travel a longer distance to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had
to relocate to far-flung areas. The Court of Appeals denied the petition due to a number of
procedural defects, which proved fatal: 1) Petitioners failed to show capacity or authority to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping and the verification; 2) Petitioners failed to show any
particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or personal injury sustained or were in the
immediate danger of sustaining; 3) the Petition, brought before the Supreme Court on 15 August
1999, was filed out of time, or beyond 60 days from the time the reorganization methods were
implemented in 2000; and 4) certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus will not lie where the President, in
issuing the assailed Executive Order, was not acting as a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. Court of Appeals also ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for
violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or
indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people s right to health and
well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing;
they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision rendered on
26 November 2004, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 7 March 2005. ISSUE: Whether
or not EO102 is constitutional?

RULING: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the
aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the
HSRA s policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article
XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is
unfounded. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and
do not require future legislation for their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non-self-executing. In
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12,
and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987 Constitution
are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to
Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to
legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a general
principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non-self-executing and, therefore,
cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions
of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-executing in the aforecited case of Taada v.
Angara. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated
the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process
in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this
provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. In the remaining provisions,
Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition
to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and healthful working conditions; to
the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to
the right of children to assistance and special protection, including proper care and nutrition. Like
the provisions that were declared as non-self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, they are mere
statements of principles and policies. As such, they are mere directives addressed to the
executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but
rather, the electorate s displeasure may be manifested in their votes DISPOSITIVE: IN VIEW OF
THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive
Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.

tation. Pierce v. Socy of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 1925 U.S.
LEXIS 589, 39 A.L.R. 468 (U.S. June 1, 1925)

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary
restraining order prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required
parents and guardians to send their children to public school. Appellants appealed the
order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parents
or guardians right to decide the mode in which their children are educated. States may
not usurp this right when the questioned legislation does not reasonably relate to a viable
state interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and
maintain academies or schools and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private
organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school,
obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children
between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty
interests and has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the
state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction
of the appellees schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents
and guardians have the right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their
children.

Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper
education, the 14th Amendment provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in
their choice in the mode in which their children are educated.

Black Letter Law: to view the black letter law, scroll down to the LexisNexis Headnotes
of this case. Whats a headnote?
 Imbong vs Ochoa
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech;
Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi;
Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the Constitution
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones
freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title
of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The
one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It
simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence.
But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s),
usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of conception
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of fertilization and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law
is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to ones dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section
3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family
in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right
of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only
in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State
to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to
that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a public health service provider. The private health care institution cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children
and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14
is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them
to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are
in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived
 or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of
a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on
the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is
an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and responsible parenthood are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities
and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage
access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

 2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30,
1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from
impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development
and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially
re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No.
4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is
a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
at 9:00 AM
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Labels: case digest, GR No. 120865, Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA, Natural Resources and
Environmental Laws, Statutory Construction
Laguna Lake Development Authority
vs. Court of Appeals
Posted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and
towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the
lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the
towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters
since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the
consternation of the LLDA.
The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna
Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared
illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-
A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issues:
1.Which agency of the government the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927,
specifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA
7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal
waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and
granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand,
the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is
for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for
lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases
with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.

Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

RODRIGUEZ, ALPHIA MAY R. Assignment 1 Case Digest 1: Garcia vs BOI (G.R. No. 88637
September 7, 1989)
Facts: Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) formed by Taiwanese investors applied with the
Board of Investments (BOI) an application for registration as a new export producer of
petrochemicals. Its application specified Limay, Bataan as the plant site and the use of "naphtha
cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. On February 24, 1988, BOI
issued a Certificate of Registration to BPC and together with incentives, such as exemptions from

tax on raw materials, repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation of investments and remittance
of earnings on investments. On April 11, 1989, BPC filed a request for an approval of an amendment
of its investment application in the BOI, concerning the increase of the investment amount from
US$220 million to US$320 million, increase of the production capacity of its naphtha cracker,
polyetheylene plant and polypropylene plant, change of the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha
and/or liquefied petroleum gas and the transfer the job site from Bataan to Batangas. Vigorously
opposing the transfer of the proposed petrochemical plant to Batangas, the petitioner sent a letter to
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), through BOI, requesting for a copy together with
attachments of the amendment and the original application. The Taiwanese investors declined to
give their consent to the release of the documents requested. On May 25, 1989, the BOI approved
the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical project Issues: Whether or not the
respondents violated due process and extra limitation of power and discretion on the part of the
public respondents in approving the transfer of the project to Batangas without giving due notice and
an opportunity to be heard to the vocal opponents of that move.
Ruling: The petition for certiorari was granted. The BOI's failure to publish such notice and to hold
a hearing on the amended application deprived the oppositors, like the petitioner, of due process
and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOI. According to the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 226) there shall be a publication of applications for
registration and a holding of consultations with affected communities whenever necessary. Since the
BPC's amended application (particularly the change of location from Bataan to Batangas) was in
effect a new application, it should have been published so that whoever may have any objection to
the transfer may be heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC's application to establish its
petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of that province, particularly the affected
community in Limay, and the petitioner herein as the duly elected representative of the Second
District of Bataan acquired an interest in the project which they have a right to protect. Their interest
in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst is actual, real, and vital because it win
affect not only their economic life but even the air they will breathe. Hence, they have a right to be
heard or "be consulted" on the proposal to transfer it to another site for the Investments Code does
require that the "affected communities" should be consulted. The Board of Investments is ordered
comply with the law and its own rules and regulations: (1) to publish the amended application for
registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow petitioner to have access to its
records on the original and amended applications for registration, excluding trade secrets; and (3) to
set for hearing petitioner's opposition to the amended application.

CASE DIGEST
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of
government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an
enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be
entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are
susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate
of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the
burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the
State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention
the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus
more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the
Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of
the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day
of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
Posted by radar at 10:20 PM
Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

GR No. 161872

April 13, 2004

FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy

for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its

due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC

again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other

people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The

COMELEC noted that such candidates could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or

are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered political

party with national constituency.

Pamatong argued that this was against his right to equal access to opportunities

for public service, citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the

COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also

stated that he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates and

supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage

national and international campaigns, and his government platform.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not COMELECs refusal of Pamatongs request for

presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right

to equal access to opportunities for public service.

HELD

1. Whether or not COMELECs refusal of Pamatongs request for presidential

candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal

access to opportunities for public service. NO

The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered not-

self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the

article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 merely specifies a

guideline for legislative or executive action by presenting ideals/standards through the

policies presented.

Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is

subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without
discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court justified the

COMELECs need for limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring

rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election

process becomes a mockery if anyone, including those who are clearly unqualified to

hold a government position, is allowed to run.

Note:

Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for

candidacy. The Court however stated that it is not within their power to make such

assessments.

GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC

Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]

FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall
election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the
most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to
the political minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By
this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of
recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation
by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the
difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that
the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members
of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political
party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory
recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of
the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public
place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no
valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

Bea Maria Giselle

B. Flauta
LLB 1CWMSU
EASTERN
SHIPPING
LINES, INC., vs.
PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATI
ON (POEA)166
SCRA 533, G.R.
No. 76633,
October 18,
1988Petitioner:
Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc.
Respondents:
1.
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration
(POEA)2.

Minister of Labor
and Employment3.
Abdul Basar
(Hearing Officer)4.

Kathleen D. Saco
Ponente:
Cruz, J.
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was
Chief Officer of the
M/V Eastern
Polaris when he
was killed in an
accidentin Tokyo,
Japan on March 15,
1985.His widow
sued for damages
under Executive
Order No. 797 and
Memorandum
Circular No. 2of
the POEA.The
petitioner, as owner
of the vessel,
argued that the
complaint was
cognizable not by
thePOEA but by
the Social Security
System and should
have been filed
against the State
FundInsurance.The
POEA nevertheless
assumed
jurisdiction and
after considering
the position papers
of theparties ruled
in favour of the
complainant.The
petition is
DISMISSED, with
costs against the
petitioner. The
temporary
restraining
orderdated
December 10, 1986
is hereby LIFTED.
It is so ordered.
Issue:
1. Whether or not
the POEA had
jurisdiction over
the case as the
husband was not an
overseasworker.2.
Whether or not the
validity of
Memorandum
Circular No. 2
itself as violative of
the principleof
non-delegation of
legislative power
Held:
1. Yes. The
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration was
created under
Executive
OrderNo. 797,
promulgated on
May 1, 1982, to
promote and
monitor the
overseas
employment
of Filipinos and to
protect their rights.
It replaced the
National Seamen
Board created
earlier underArticle
20 of the Labor
Code in 1974.
Under Section 4(a)
of the said
executive order, the
POEAis vested
with "original and
exclusive
jurisdiction over all
cases, including
money
claims,involving
employee-
employer relations
arising out of or by
virtue of any law or
contractinvolving
Filipino contract
workers, including
seamen." These
cases, according to
the 1985Rules and
Regulations on
Over
seas Employment
issued by the
POEA, include,
claims for
death,disability
and other benefits
arising out of such
employment.
The award of
P180,000.00 for
death benefits and
P12,000.00 for
burial expenses
was made bythe
POEA pursuant to
its Memorandum
Circular No. 2,
which became
effective on
February 1,1984.
This circular
prescribed a
standard contract to
be adopted by both
foreign and
domesticshipping
companies in the
hiring of Filipino
seamen for
overseas
employment.2. No.
Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is an
administrative
regulation. The
model
contractprescribed
thereby has been
applied in a
significant number
of the cases
without challenge
by theemployer.
The power of the
POEA (and before
it the National
Seamen Board) in
requiring themodel
contract is not
unlimited as there
is a sufficient
standard guiding
the delegate in
theexercise of the
said authority. That
standard is
discoverable in the
executive order
itself which,
increating the
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration,
mandated it to
protect the rightsof
overseas Filipino
workers to "fair
and equitable
employment
practices."GENER
AL RULE: Non-
delegation of
powers;
exceptionIt is true
that legislative
discretion as to the
substantive
contents of the law
cannot be
delegated.What can
be delegated is the
discretion to
determine how the
law may be
enforced, not what
thelaw shall be.
The ascertainment
of the latter subject
is a prerogative of
the legislature.
Thisprerogative
cannot be
abdicated or
surrendered by the
legislature to the
delegate.Two Tests
of Valid
Delegation of
Legislative
PowerThere are
two accepted tests
to determine
whether or not
there is a valid
delegation of
legislativepower,
viz
, the completeness
test and the
sufficient standard
test. Under the first
test, the lawmust
be complete in all
its terms and
conditions when it
leaves the
legislature such
that when itreaches
the delegate the
only thing he will
have to do is to
enforce it. Under
the
sufficientstandard
test, there must be
adequate
guidelines or
stations in the law
to map out the
boundaries
of the delegates
authority and
prevent the
delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are
intended to prevent
a total transference
of legislative
authority to the
delegate, whois not
allowed to step into
the shoes of the
legislature and
exercise a power
essentially
legislative.The
delegation of
legislative power
has become the
rule and its non-
delegation the
exception.
Rationale for
Delegation of
Legislative
PowerThe reason is
the increasing
complexity of the
task of government
and the growing
inability of the
legislature to cope
directly with the
myriad problems
demanding its
attention. The
growth of society
has ramified its
activities and
created peculiar
and sophisticated
problems that
thelegislature
cannot be expected
to reasonably
comprehend.
Specialization even
in legislation
hasbecome
necessary. Too
many of the
problems attendant
upon present-day
undertakings,
thelegislature may
not have the
competence to
provide the
required direct and
efficacious, not
tosay, specific
solutions. These
solutions may,
however, be
expected from its
delegates, who
aresupposed to be
experts in the
particular
fields.Power of
Subordinate
LegislationThe
reasons given
above for the
delegation of
legislative powers
in general are
particularlyapplica
ble to
administrative
bodies. With the
proliferation of
specialized
activities and
theirattendant
peculiar problems,
the national
legislature has
found it more and
more necessary
toentrust to
administrative
agencies the
authority to issue
rules to carry out
the general
provisions
of the statute. This
is called the
power of
subordinate
legislation.
With this power,
administrative
bodies may
implement the
broad policies laid
down in statute by
filling in the
details which the
Congress may not
have
the opportunity or
competence to
provide.
Memorandum
Circular No. 2 is
one such
administrative
regulation.Adminis
trative agencies are
vested with two
basic powers, the
quasi-legislative
and quasi- judicial.
The first enables
them to promulgate
implementing rules
and regulations,
and thesecond
enables them to
interpret and apply
such regulations

Cebu Oxygen &

Acetylene Co
vs.
Secretary Drilon,
176 SCRA 24
(1989)

Main Point: A
regulation cannot
expand a law

FACTS:
Petitioner and the
union of its rank
and file
employees, Cebu
Oxygen,
Acetylene
entered into a
collective
bargaining
agreement (CBA)
which stipulates,
among others that:
If
The Wage
Adjustment of
Allowance
Increases
Decreed By Law
, Legislation or
PresidentialEdict
in any Particular
Year Shall Be
Higher Than The
Foregoing
Increases In That
ParticularYear,
Then The
Company Shall
Pay The
Difference
notwithstanding
that in the first
three(3)
years of the
effectively of the
CBA,The
Secretary of Labor
issued the
pertinent rules
implementing the
provisions of
Republic Act No.
6640.Section 8.
Wage Increase
Under
Individual/Collecti
ve Agreements.

No wageincrease
shall be credited as
compliance with
the increase
prescribed herein
unlessexpressly
provided under
valid individual
written/collective
agreements;
and, provided furt
her, that such wag
e increase was gra
nted in anticipatio
n of thelegislated
wage increase
under the act. Such
increases shall not
includeanniversary
wage increases
provided on
collective
agreements. petitio
ner contended that
inasmuch as it had
credited the
first year
increase negotiate
d under theCBA, it
was liable only for
a salary
differential of P
62.00 and a 13th
month pay
differential
ofP31.00.
Petitioner argued
that the payment
of the differentials
constitutes full
compliance
withRepublic Act
No. 6640.
The thrust of the
argument of
petitioner is that
Section 8 of the
rulesimplementing
the provisions of
Republic Act No.
6640 particularly
the provision
excludingannivers
ary wage increases
from being
credited to the
wage increase
provided by said
lawis null and void
on the ground that
the same unduly
expands the
provisions of the
said law.ISSUE:
Whether an
Implementing
Order of the
Secretary of Labor
and Employment
(DOLE)can
provide for a
prohibition not
contemplated by
the law it seeks to
implement?
HELD:
 No. As to
the issue of the
validity of Section
8 of the rules
implementing Rep
ublic Act No.
6640,
which prohibits
the employer
from crediting
the anniversary
wage increases
providedin
collective
bargaining
agreements, it is a
fundamental rule
that implementing
rules cannot addor
detract from the
provisions of law
it is designed
to implement.

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary

of Energy
November 15, 2010
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ADVERTISEMENTS

Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law

Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others,
that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective investors
in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined crude products and
7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is
contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated
and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as
the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian
league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet,
this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart
of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that
intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their
own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable
because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse.
The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with
heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter.
PEOPLE v. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, GR No. L-45127, 1989-05-05
Facts:
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555... thereof for violation of
Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the
arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to
the... charge.
the facts charged do not constitute an... offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act
No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional.
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petition[6] for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal
Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial
of said Criminal Case No.
555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged.
On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said
amended petition... respondent judge denied the same in his... resolution of April 20,
1976.[10] On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in
answer to the amended... petition.
Issues:
It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and
may run to... reclusion perpetua; and
(2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative... department of the Government.
Ruling:
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare
the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual.
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not... make it cruel or
unsual.
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to
the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear,
however, that when the courts are said to exercise a... discretion, it must be a mere legal
discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when
discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow.
criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents... herein is hereby ordered
to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte
Principles:
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created.
whether the constitutional prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not
to the proportion between the penalty and the crime.
the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative
power.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILAAUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF
MANDALUYONG

G.R. No. 102782; December 11, 1991

CRUZ, J

Facts:

On July 13, 1990, the Court held th t the con!"#c t"on o! the l"cen#e $l te# o! motor %eh"cle#
!or tr !!"c %"ol t"on#

was n t a! n" the sanct# ns thatc $%d &e #!' sed &( the Met) Man#%a C !!#ss# n $nde) PD *+,-

nd& # $erm"tted

only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the
ublic streets

. 't & # there l#o ob#er%ed th te%en the con!"#c t"on o! dr"%er(# l"cen#e# !or tr !!"c %"ol t"on#
& # not d"rectly$re#cr"bed by the decree nor & # "t llo&ed by the decree to be "m$o#ed
bythe Comm"##"on. No mot"on !or recon#"der t"on o! th t dec"#"on & ##ubm"tted

(
Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong).

'n letter d ted October 17, 1990, Rodol!o ). * l $"r com$l "ned to theCourt th t &hen he & #
#to$$ed !or n lle+ed tr !!"c %"ol t"on, h"# dr"%er(#l"cen#e & # con!"#c ted by r !!"c -n!orcer
)n+el de lo# Reye# "n ue/onC"ty. " e&"#e, #e%er l letter com$l "nt# &ere rece"%ed re+ rd"n+
remo% l o! !ront l"cen#e $l te by -. R mo# o! the *etro$ol"t n * n"l )uthor"ty r !!"cO$er t"on#
Center nd the con!"#c t"on o! h"# dr"%er(# l"cen#e by t. ).4.-mm nuel o! the *etro$ol"t n ol"ce
Comm nd 5e#tern ol"ce D"#tr"ct.On * y 1990, the *etro$ol"t n * n"l )uthor"ty "##ued

O)d#nance N . **

,6er"e# o! 1991, uthor"/"n+ "t#el! to det ch the l"cen#e $l te to& nd"m$ound ttended
un ttended b ndoned motor %eh"cle# "lle+ lly $ r ed or ob#truct"n+ the !lo& o! tr !!"c "n *etro
* n"l . On July 2, 1991, the Court "##ued the !ollo&"n+ re#olut"on

#t t"n+ th t the uthor"ty to det ch $l te to& nd "m$ound ttended un ttended b ndonedmotor

%eh"cle# "lle+ lly $ r ed or ob#truct"n+ the !lo& o! tr !!"c "n *etro* n"l by the **) $$e r# to be "n
con!l"ct &"th the dec"#"on o! the Court "nthe c #e bo%ement"oned &here "t & # held th t the
l"cen#e $l te# o! motor %eh"cle# m y not be det ched e ce$t only under the cond"t"on# $re#cr"bed
"n O' :3.

MMA de ended

the # "d ord"n nce on the +round th t "t & # do$ted$ur#u nt to the $o&er# con!erred u$on "t by -O
392. 't $ rt"cul rly c"ted6ect"on 2 thereo! %e#t"n+ "n the Counc"l "t# +o%ern"n+ body<
the re#$on#"b"l"ty mon+ other# o!=1. >ormul t"on o! $ol"c"e# on the del"%ery o! b #"c
#er%"ce#re?u"r"n+ coord"n t"on or con#ol"d t"on !or the )uthor"ty;
nd2. romul+ t"on o! re#olut"on# nd other

issuances of !etro olitan wide a lication

, $$ro% l o! code o! b #"c#er%"ce# re?u"r"n+ coord"n t"on, nd

e"ercise of its rule#!a$ing owers

MMA a)"$ed

th t there & # no con!l"ct bet&een the dec"#"on nd theord"n nce bec u#e the l tter & # me nt to
#u$$lement nd not #u$$l nt thel tter. 't #tre##ed th t the dec"#"on "t#el! # "d th t the con!"#c t"on
o! l"cen#e$l te# & # "n% l"d "n the b#ence o! % l"d l & or ord"n nce, &h"ch & # &hyOrd"n nce
No. 11 & # en cted. **) #u#t "n# Ord"n nce No. 11, 6er"e# o! 1991, under the #$ec"!"c uthor"ty
con!erred u$on "t by -O 392, nd &h"leOrd"n nce No. 7, 6er"e# o! 1988, "# @u#t"!"ed on the b #"# o!
the Gener l5el! re Cl u#e embod"ed "n the oc l Go%ernment Code.
S %#c#t ) Gene)a% e/')essed the v#ew

th t the ord"n nce & # null nd %o"dbec u#e "t re$re#ented n "n% l"d e erc"#e o! dele+ ted
le+"#l t"%e $o&er. he !l & "n the me #ure & # th t "t %"ol ted e "#t"n+ l &, #$ec"!"c lly
D1A0B, &h"ch doe# not $erm"t, nd #o "m$l"edly $roh"b"t#, the remo% l o! l"cen#e $l te# nd the
con!"#c t"on o! dr"%er(# l"cen#e# !or tr !!"c %"ol t"on# "n*etro$ol"t n * n"l .

Iss$e: 0ON ORDINANCE 1** IS 2ALID3R$%#n":

No. he Court hold# th t there "# % l"d dele+ t"on o! le+"#l t"%e$o&er to $romul+ te #uch
me #ure#, "t $$e r"n+ th t the re?u"#"te# o! #uchdele+ t"on re $re#ent. he#e re?u"#"te# re. 1<
the com$letene## o! the#t tute m "n+ the dele+ t"on; nd 2< the $re#ence o! #u!!"c"ent
#t nd rd. nder the !"r#t re?u"rement, the #t tute mu#t le %e the le+"#l ture com$lete "n ll "t# term#
nd $ro%"#"on# #uch th t ll the dele+ te &"ll h %e to do &hen
the#t tute re che# "t "# to "m$lement "t. )# #econd re?u"rement, theen!orcement m y be e!!ected
only "n ccord nce &"th #u!!"c"ent #t nd rd,the !unct"on o! &h"ch "# to m $ out the bound r"e# o!
the dele+ te(# uthor"ty nd thu# $re%ent the dele+ t"on !rom runn"n+ r"ot. he me #ure# "n
?ue#t"on re en ctment# o! loc l +o%ernment# ct"n+ only # +ent# o! the n t"on l le+"#l ture.
Nece## r"ly, the ct# o! the#e +ent#mu#t re!lect nd con!orm to the &"ll o! the"r $r"nc"$ l. o te#t
the % l"d"ty o! #uch ct# "n the #$ec"!"c c #e no& be!ore u#, &e $$ly the $ rt"cul r