The Ethics and Socioeconomic Issues

Associated with Civil Forfeiture

by

Adam Herbert

Advisor: Dr. Jason Ridge

An Honors Thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of
Science in Business Administration in Finance.

Sam M. Walton College of Business

University of Arkansas
Fayetteville, Arkansas

May 12, 2017

1
Abstract
Through this research we hope to highlight the socioeconomic effects and the ethical
issues surrounding civil forfeiture. Civil forfeiture is the seizing of assets by a law enforcement
agency due to suspected illegal activity directly associated with the assets. Generally, civil
forfeiture does not require any form of criminal conviction or any actual criminal charges to be
filed. Civil forfeiture abuse is a rising issues in the US today. Most law enforcement agencies
that seize assets are allowed to keep a majority of their profits. This creates an incentive to
seize more and more property. With medical and recreational marijuana becoming legal in some
states and illegal in others, there arises some legal gray areas about asset seizures done by the
federal government. As of now there are no checks and balances regarding civil forfeiture in
every. Some states have improved their methods, whereas others have not.
This paper will primarily focus on California asset forfeitures. They have a very diverse
population that allows us to test theories and compare data that is associated with civil forfeiture.
Civil forfeiture does appear to have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income
Americans in the state of California. However, there does not appear to be any racial motivation
associated with asset seizures. The current civil forfeiture laws are flawed in their lack of
oversight by different levels of government and the hardship the accused must endure to recover
their property.
There are positive effects, however, that the laws do achieve. There are programs that use
the money seized to help victims of crimes. These laws also allow law enforcement agencies to
strike a large blow to any large crime organization without having to get bogged down in the
legal system. Overall, there are many improvements that need to be made about how civil
forfeiture is carried out, but the main ideology behind the law is still valid and necessary to fight
large-scale criminal activity and terrorism.

2
 Table of Contents

I. An Overview of Civil Forfeiture pg. 4

II. Current Issues: Abuse of Forfeiture pg. 4

III. Current Issues: Legal Marijuana pg. 5

IV. Civil Forfeiture in California pg. 6

V. Does Civil Forfeiture have a Disparate Impact on Low-Income Americans? Pg. 6

VI. Is this a Civil Rights Issue? Pg. 8

VII. Are the Laws Working? Pg. 9

VIII. Conclusions pg. 10

IX. Bibliography pg. 11

X. Data pg. 13

3
An Overview of Civil Forfeiture

Civil judicial forfeiture, as defined by the US Department of Justice, is an in rem

(against the property) action brought in court against the property. The property is the defendant
and no criminal charge against the owner is necessary.(DOJ, 1994) This is not to be confused
with criminal forfeiture in which one must be convicted of a crime for property to be seized or
with administrative forfeiture (DOJ, 1994). Administrative forfeiture is when a law enforcement
agency pursuant to federal law seizes non-real property valued up to $500,000 and notifies the
owner(s) of this (Dery, 2012). If the administrative forfeiture is not contested, the law
enforcement agency completes the process and seizes the property (Dery, 2012). However, if the
claim is contested, the agency must either proceed with criminal or civil forfeiture to continue
the process (Dery, 2012).
The first record of civil forfeiture dates back to the middle of the seventeenth century
(Mellor, 2011). It came out of the British Navigation Acts, which required ships that traded
through British ports to sail under the British flag (Mellor, 2011). Ships that violated this could
be taken by the British government (Mellor, 2011). The first Congress of the United States used
similar forfeiture laws to help collect duties on imports and exports (Mellor, 2011).
Fast forward to the era of Prohibition. During this period, the US Government used the
same forfeiture laws from the late eighteenth century to seize vehicles, boats, and equipment of
bootleggers (Finder, 1999). Jump to the 1980s, and the instances of civil forfeiture being used in
court had skyrocketed (Mellor, 2011). This was due to the growing War on Drugs and the ease of
which civil forfeiture laws allowed government agencies at all levels to seize the assets of
criminals (Mellor, 2011).

Current Issues: Abuse of Forfeiture

Civil forfeiture has made headlines in the last five years as news outlets have been taking
notice of instances of abuse. This has led many Americans to take notice and educate themselves
on the issue. There are now numerous websites on the internet that are calling for civil forfeiture
law reforms. Most legal experts and journalists have a consensus that there are three factors that
work together to create a situation where abuse is possible (Mellor, 2011).
First off is the motive for government agencies to profit from civil forfeiture. According
to a Forbes article by Chip Mellor from 2011, Most states and the federal government allow law
enforcement agencies to keep 90 percent or more of the profits from assets they forfeit. This
money may be used for better equipment, nicer offices, newer vehicles, trips to law enforcement
conventions andin states like Texaseven police salaries. This creates a high incentive for
agencies and their officers/agents to profit from seizures that they themselves took part in. This
can turn a local police department into a business who, instead of profiting from sales of a
product or service, profits from seizing the assets of citizens who may or may not have broken
the law. There is also the incentive for agencies to target the property of people who may have
done nothing wrong, but many do not have the means or the ability to fight the seizure. This is a
major issue that will be addressed later in the paper.
Next is the standard of proof required in civil forfeiture (Mellor, 2011). The key word
here is civil. This means that this is not a criminal issue. The standard of proof in criminal
courts is beyond a reasonable doubt, but in all states but three, civil forfeiture only requires
proof by a preponderance of the evidence (Mellor, 2011). In criminal court, the accused only is

4
charged with a crime if there is a large amount of proof that they are guilty. In civil court,
however, the judge or jury only needs to be slightly against or for the defendant for them to lose
or win their case. This creates a situation where the accused has less protection than if this were a
criminal issue (Mellor, 2011).
Last, is the Innocent Owner Burden (Mellor, 2011). Many states shift the burden of
proof from the state to the owner to prove that he or she is innocent of the crime in forfeiture
cases. In other words, with civil forfeiture, property owners are effectively guilty until proven
innocent. (Mellor, 2011). Its as if the property has already been convicted and sent to jail
without a trial. Since civil forfeiture is an action by the government against the property itself it
makes the argument that the owners rights are being violated difficult because they are not the
ones that are in trouble, the property is. The costs and the difficulty to fight to prove innocence
often results in property owners just giving up and letting the government keep the disputed
property (Mellor, 2011).
These three elements of civil forfeiture create a scenario where the agency seizing the
property has a large and seemingly unfair advantage before the owner of the property even has a
chance to set foot in the ring. Take for instance this case from the Institute for Justice from April
of 2016 out of Oklahoma where Eh Wah, the tour manager for a Christian rock band, was
stopped for a broken taillight. The sheriffs department searched his car after a drug dog alerted
them and found nothing to indicate any illegal activity. They did, however, find $53,234 in cash
in his car. This was made up of proceeds from their bands recent tour and donations to an
orphanage in Thailand. At the end of the day, they kept the money, claimed it was drug
proceeds, and let Eh Wah go freely without ever charging him with a crime. In the end, after a
lengthy legal battle involving Mr. Wah and the Institute for Justice against the Muskogee
Sherriffs Department, the money was returned. It is worth noting, however, that the case was
not going in Eh Wahs favor until the large legal assistance group, Institute for Justice, got
involved in the case.

Current Issues: Legalized Marijuana

Another current issue involving civil forfeiture is marijuana. Many states have, over the
last quarter of a century, passed laws that legalize medical marijuana. California was the first to
pass a medical marijuana law in 1996 that was in direct conflict with federal law concerning the
drug (Gurman, 2017). In the last five years, more and more states have legalized recreational use
of marijuana: once again, in direct violation of federal law. Therefore, in states like California
where recreational and medical marijuana are both perfectly legal, users are technically breaking
federal law and are subject to criminal charges via the Federal Controlled Substances Act
(Bricken, 2014). Before this legalization, however, local and state law enforcement was bringing
in large amounts of money from asset seizures associated marijuana (Sibilla, 2014). Between
2002 and 2012 $36 million of property and cash related to illegal marijuana was forfeited
criminally and civilly to the federal government in Colorado and Washington (Sibilla, 2014).
States with any form of legalized marijuana have seen a large drop in asset seizures related to
marijuana (Sibilla, 2014). Sadly for legal marijuana users and entrepreneurs, many state
governments and the federal government have teamed up to exploit a legal loophole of sorts,
commonly referred to as equitable sharing (Sibilla, 2014). Equitable sharing is a federal
program that lets local and state law enforcement do an end run around state law and profit from
civil forfeiture, simply by collaborating with a federal agency (Sibilla, 2014). Through this

5
loophole to state marijuana laws, state law enforcement agencies are allowed to seize the assets
of a perfectly legal business. This is what has been happening in states with some form of legal
marijuana (Yakowicz, 2016). In January of 2016 cannabis extraction business was raided by law
enforcement in San Diego California (Yakowicz, 2016). No criminal charges were filed, but the
police did seize $1.4 million of cash, funds, and product (Yakowicz, 2016). The police also
seized his wifes bank accounts and his daughters college savings accounts (Yakowicz, 2016).
Now it is up to the owner of the company to fight this in court (Yakowicz, 2016).
This does not seem fair or just in todays society. It is issues and cases like this that create
a need for civil forfeiture reform on the state and national levels. With the current presidential
administration calling for a crackdown on marijuana in all forms, now is the time for changes to
how these laws work (Gurman, 2017). This is not just a marijuana issue; it is a states rights
issue.

Civil Forfeiture in California

Civil forfeiture laws vary state to state, so in order to keep the laws and regulations
constant, we will examine the issue in the state of California. California has a large diverse
population due to its geography and favorable economic conditions. It also has varying levels of
income throughout the state which is a key characteristic being examined. California has a
population of 37.2 million according to the 2010 Census (US Census, 2010). The mean
household income was just under $74,000 for 2009 through 2013 (US Census). The average
demographics of each county in California is displayed below.

White Black American Indian Asian Pacific Islander Hispanic Multi-Race

57.31% 3.09% 1.74% 6.57% 0.26% 28.47% 2.56%

The Institute for Justice (IJ) is an organization that provides legal help to Americans who
may have been wronged by the law. According to this organization, California receives a C+
in regards to its civil forfeiture laws. In California, the standard of proof is the same as it is for
criminal convictions so it higher than most states for civil forfeiture to occur (IJ). The standard of
proof is lower for drug cases when an agency seizes over $25,000 (IJ). The agency must only
provide clear and convincing evidence that the assets were associated with illegal drug activity
(IJ). A conviction of a crime is required for asset forfeiture, but it can be for someone other than
the owner (IJ). Law enforcement agencies in California are allowed to keep 66.25% of revenue
from assets seized/forfeited (IJ). The average total dollar amount of civil forfeitures annually in
California is around $23 million (IJ). The amount seized in 2013, however, was almost $40
million (CA DOJ, 2013).

Does Civil Forfeiture have a Disparate Impact on Low-Income Americans?

This is a tough question to answer. To examine this, Dr. Jason Ridge and myself have
gathered and analyzed data on the counties in the state of California. The table below shows us,
with statistical significance, that as average household income decreases the number of asset
forfeiture cases initiated increases. The table also shows that the property crime rate and the rate
of cases initiated are inversely related when controlling for the violent crime rate. This seems
backward: less crime means more asset seizures? So, in geographies with less crime and lower

6
incomes, there are more asset seizures. From this analysis, it appears that there is a disparate
impact on low-income citizens.

(1) (2) (3)

Rate Initiated1
Constant 3.24** 3.13** 3.27**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Property Crime Rate2 -0.00 *
-0.00
(0.02) (0.07)
Violent Crime Rate2 -0.00 -0.00
(0.15) (0.92)
White Population Percentage3 2.29*
1.91 2.31*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
Average Household Income4 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 58 58 58
R2 .18 .12 .18
F 3.84* 2.50 2.83*
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

To further support this claim let us look at a few California counties from the data table.
If we compare Santa Clara county to Solano county (shown in the table below) we see that each
county shares a similar property crime rate, so ideally we would see similar stats for the total
cases initiated and the rate of cases initiated regarding asset seizures. This is not the case,
however. The main difference to note between these two counties is their large differences in
mean household income. Santa Clara has a much higher mean household income than Solano.
These two counties share similar property crime rates, but due to differences in income, Santa
Clara has a much lower rate of cases initiated than Solano.

Number of Property Rate Of

Mean Household Property Crime Rate Total Cases Cases
County Income 2009-2013 Crimes 2013 2013 Initiated Initiated
SANTA CLARA 120718.00 1490.00 83.63 26.00 1.46
SOLANO 82971.00 404.00 97.74 115.00 27.82

This holds true even at high crime rates. We previously examined two counties with
relatively low property crime rates, but now we will look at some on the other end of the
spectrum. In the table below, Sacramento has a higher mean household income but a lower rate
of cases initiated than Humboldt. Sacramento has a higher number of a total cases initiated due
to its very large population compared to Humboldt. The county with the lower income has more
asset seizures initiated even though it has

7
 Number of Property Rate Of
Mean Household Property Crime Rate Total Cases Cases
County Income 2009-2013 Crimes 2013 2013 Initiated Initiated
SACRAMENTO 722000.00 12011.00 846.57 316.00 22.27
HUMBOLDT 56127.00 1149.00 853.49 59.00 43.83

There is one main reason that we see this negative correlation between income and rate of
civil forfeitures, and it is the right to legal counsel. In criminal cases, you have the right to an
attorney, and if you cannot afford one, one will be appointed to you (NCC Staff, 2016). In a civil
case, the defendant does not have the right to have a lawyer appointed if they cannot afford one.
This makes civil forfeiture very expensive to fight because the defendant has to pay for all the
costs associated with fighting the asset seizure. This puts low-income Americans at a
disadvantage to their better-off neighbors because they often times do not have the funds or
resources to fight a law enforcement agency in and out of court. There is an ethical issue arising
out of this. Are law enforcement agencies specifically targeting people of lower income, so that
they are unable to fight the civil forfeiture? This is not necessarily what is happening, but it is a
possibility. With the large monetary incentive for agencies to participate in asset forfeiture
activities, one could see how this could occur.
Overall, there does seem to be a link between the rate of cases initiated and the mean
household income. Poorer counties in California tend to have higher rates of asset forfeiture than
wealthier ones. This can be especially seen in counties with similar crime rates.

Is Civil Forfeiture a Civil Rights Issue?

Another issue that we are going to look at is whether or not there appears to be any racial
bias when looking at civil forfeiture. Currently, there are major social issues associated with
racial profiling by police and the incarceration rates of minorities. Through our analysis, we hope
to show if there is a racial bias when law enforcement agencies seize assets.

(1) (2) (3)

Rate Initiated1
Constant 3.24** 3.13** 3.27**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Property Crime Rate2 -0.00* -0.00
(0.02) (0.07)
Violent Crime Rate2 -0.00 -0.00
(0.15) (0.92)
White Population Percentage3 2.29* 1.91 2.31*
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
Average Household Income4 -0.00 *
-0.00* -0.00*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 58 58 58
R2 .18 .12 .18
F 3.84 *
2.50 2.83*
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

8
 In the table above, we can see that there is a positive, statistically significant relationship
between the white population percentage and the rate of cases initiated when taking into account
the property crime rate and the violent crime rate. This means that in counties with larger white
populations there is a larger rate of asset seizures. We can see this in the table below. Fresno,
Colusa, and Glenn counties all have similar incomes but have different percentages of their
population identifying as white. Glenn has the highest rate of cases initiated and also has the
highest white percentage. Civil forfeiture increase with the increase in the white population,
therefore civil forfeiture cases will decrease in populations with higher numbers of minorities.

Total Rate Of
Mean Household Cases Cases
County Income 2009-2013 Initiated Initiated White
FRESNO 63079.00 19.00 2.04 32.91%
COLUSA 63743.00 3.00 14.01 39.97%
GLENN 62856.00 9.00 32.00 56.05%

Are the Laws Working?

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

1 1
Rate Initiated Value Seized
Constant 3.24** 3.13** 3.27** 15.25*** 15.37*** 15.87***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property Crime Rate2 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*
(0.02) (0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
Violent Crime Rate2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00
(0.15) (0.92) (0.03) (0.52)
White Population Percentage3 2.29 *
1.91 2.31* -0.50 -1.45 -0.01
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.88) (0.67) (1.00)
Average Household Income4 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.46) (0.47) (0.36)
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
R2 .18 .12 .18 .19 .13 .20
F 3.84* 2.50 2.83* 4.30** 2.80* 3.30*
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The answer is yes and no. The laws often achieve their intended goals of stopping drug
trafficking and terrorism, but there are aspects of the current policies that need to change. There
is too much free reign and abuse in the current system. This is displayed in the table above.
The property crime rate is negatively related to the rate of asset seizures initiated. This
seems counterintuitive, as you would expect the two to both increase and decrease together. This
table shows that crime does not have a positive relationship with civil forfeiture. This shows that
there is some abuse of the laws going on because the crime rates should move in tandem with the
rates of asset seizure. We can further see this when we look at the value seized. With statistical
significance and controlling for the property crime rate, we can see that as the violent crime rate
decreases the value seized during civil forfeiture actually increases. This is the case with the

9
property crime rate and the value seized when controlling for the violent crime rate. As the crime
rates decrease the value seized increases. If the laws were working properly, all these variables
would have positive relationships with each other.
There is, however, a positive aspect to the current state of civil forfeiture in the United
States, and it is the Victim Asset Recovery Program. This program was created through the Civil
Asset Reform Act of 2000 (Dery, 2012). This program helps the victims of fraud recover the
money they were swindled out of (Dery, 2012). Without this program and civil forfeiture,
victims of fraud and other crimes would have a much more difficult time recovery any of their
lost money or assets.

Conclusions

Civil Forfeiture abuse in the United States is a growing issue, and we are starting to see it
make headline news more and more often with the increase in legal forms of marijuana. While
there does not appear to be any racial bias associated with civil forfeiture there is definitely a
disparate impact on low-income Americans. These are the people who have the smallest ability
to fight asset seizures, so it makes them an easier target. We also saw that crime and civil
forfeiture were not tied positively related as they should have been. Higher crime rates should
result in more civil forfeiture, not less. The only way to account for this is the abuse of the
current system of laws and regulations.
There are changes that need to be made to correct the flaws in the system, and states like
New Mexico have begun to do this with extensive civil forfeiture reform (Snead, 2016). There
are several steps, in my opinion, that the state and federal governments can take to decrease the
abuse of the current system. First is to remove the financial incentive for police to seize assets.
Too much of the money seized goes right back to the agency that seized it in the first place. This
creates too much of an incentive to seize property in unethical ways. Next is establishing policies
that protect citizens who are following state laws from the dangers of equitable sharing. We
primarily see this with legalized marijuana, but it can occur in other areas. Lastly, governments
at all levels should give property owners the right to have an attorney appointed if they cannot
afford one when fighting their asset seizure. This would greatly increase the fairness of asset
seizures and possibly lead to a decrease in the disparate impact on low-income Americans.
Through reform, civil forfeiture can remain a powerful tool for law enforcement in
stopping dangerous criminals and organization. With proper laws and oversight citizens and
business owners in U.S. will be able to rest easy knowing that they are protected from the abuse
of civil forfeiture.

10
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12
 Mean Violent
Household Crime Property Total Rate Of Amount Seized
Population Income Rate Crime Rate Cases Cases Estimated Value of per 100,000 American Pacific Multi-
County 2010 2009-2013 2013 2013 Initiated Initiated Assets Seized People White Black Indian Asian Islander Hispanic Race

ALAMEDA 1510271.00 96982.00 42.91 159.51 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 34.27% 12.27% 0.28% 26.09% 0.82% 22.51% 3.76%

ALPINE 1175.00 69097.00 510.64 2808.51 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 72.60% 0.00% 17.87% 0.60% 0.00% 7.15% 1.79%

AMADOR 38091.00 69891.00 175.89 1155.13 5.00 13.13 $ 11,607.59 $ 30,473.31 79.96% 2.51% 1.44% 1.05% 0.17% 12.49% 2.37%

BUTTE 220000.00 59081.00 43.64 550.00 123.00 55.91 $ 1,219,147.33 $ 554,157.88 75.38% 1.43% 1.55% 4.09% 0.19% 14.14% 3.21%

CALAVERAS 45578.00 70161.00 265.48 1849.58 3.00 6.58 $ 30,723.00 $ 67,407.52 83.72% 0.79% 1.17% 1.18% 0.16% 10.32% 2.66%

COLUSA 21419.00 63743.00 112.05 1437.98 3.00 14.01 $ 84,980.00 $ 396,750.55 39.97% 0.78% 1.39% 1.29% 0.28% 55.11% 1.18%

CONTRA COSTA 1049025.00 106018.00 40.90 203.81 138.00 13.16 $ 580,986.75 $ 55,383.50 48.00% 9.01% 0.29% 14.34% 0.43% 24.36% 3.56%

DEL NORTE 28610.00 53185.00 283.12 950.72 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 65.05% 3.68% 6.81% 3.30% 0.09% 17.80% 3.26%

EL DORADO 181058.00 90247.00 115.98 1141.07 27.00 14.91 $ 167,197.12 $ 92,344.51 80.12% 0.72% 0.86% 3.43% 0.15% 12.08% 2.64%

FRESNO 930450.00 63079.00 91.25 452.68 19.00 2.04 $ 60,556.53 $ 6,508.31 32.91% 4.88% 0.65% 9.47% 0.12% 50.31% 1.66%

GLENN 28122.00 62856.00 380.49 1155.68 9.00 32.00 $ 88,119.00 $ 313,345.42 56.05% 0.69% 1.71% 2.42% 0.08% 37.48% 1.58%

HUMBOLDT 134623.00 56127.00 113.65 853.49 59.00 43.83 $ 928,202.85 $ 689,483.11 77.53% 1.05% 5.19% 2.14% 0.25% 9.81% 4.03%

IMPERIAL 174528.00 57847.00 114.02 409.10 5.00 2.86 $ 128,207.00 $ 73,459.27 13.81% 2.96% 0.94% 1.29% 0.05% 80.37% 0.57%

INYO 18546.00 61137.00 253.42 986.74 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 66.48% 0.55% 10.22% 1.23% 0.08% 19.39% 2.04%

KERN 839631.00 64677.00 256.90 1267.34 106.00 12.62 $ 569,889.16 $ 67,873.76 38.73% 5.45% 0.71% 4.01% 0.12% 49.19% 1.78%

KINGS 152982.00 63130.00 111.78 387.63 2.00 1.31 $ 4,728.00 $ 3,090.56 35.62% 6.84% 0.86% 3.57% 0.15% 50.90% 2.06%

LAKE 64665.00 51573.00 334.03 1173.74 72.00 111.34 $ 414,145.53 $ 640,447.74 74.32% 1.84% 2.38% 1.09% 0.15% 17.15% 3.07%

LASSEN 34895.00 63149.00 123.23 484.31 4.00 11.46 $ 24,688.74 $ 70,751.51 67.27% 8.45% 2.88% 0.98% 0.47% 17.53% 2.43%

LOS ANGELES 9818605.00 81416.00 54.21 163.00 493.00 5.02 $ 9,543,008.77 $ 97,193.12 27.97% 8.41% 0.20% 13.61% 0.24% 47.74% 1.84%

MADERA 150865.00 60240.00 243.26 904.78 26.00 17.23 $ 157,470.30 $ 104,378.29 38.36% 3.47% 1.21% 1.72% 0.07% 53.69% 1.48%

MARIN 252409.00 137795.00 39.22 281.29 4.00 1.58 $ 55,071.00 $ 21,818.16 73.22% 2.69% 0.22% 5.48% 0.18% 15.48% 2.74%

MARIPOSA 18251.00 62748.00 460.25 1594.43 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 83.38% 0.71% 2.58% 1.11% 0.14% 9.18% 2.90%

MENDOCINO 87841.00 57774.00 301.68 777.54 204.00 232.24 $ 3,095,615.84 $ 3,524,112.70 68.77% 0.63% 4.00% 1.62% 0.10% 22.21% 2.68%

MERCED 255793.00 59420.00 213.06 716.60 13.00 5.08 $ 107,771.00 $ 42,132.11 32.07% 3.46% 0.45% 7.26% 0.19% 54.92% 1.65%

MODOC 9686.00 48765.00 423.29 877.56 1.00 10.32 $ 13,360.00 $ 137,931.03 79.13% 0.79% 3.03% 0.74% 0.22% 13.86% 2.24%

MONO 14202.00 68616.00 70.41 478.81 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 68.45% 0.30% 1.68% 1.34% 0.08% 26.49% 1.66%

MONTEREY 415057.00 79378.00 49.39 340.19 110.00 26.50 $ 333,314.73 $ 80,305.77 33.05% 2.75% 0.33% 5.79% 0.46% 55.41% 2.20%

NAPA 136484.00 94451.00 28.57 272.56 33.00 24.18 $ 97,515.15 $ 71,448.05 56.58% 1.81% 0.40% 6.65% 0.24% 32.25% 2.08%

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NEVADA 98764.00 75824.00 277.43 638.90 7.00 7.09 $ 79,943.00 $ 80,943.46 86.72% 0.35% 0.81% 1.15% 0.10% 8.54% 2.33%

ORANGE 3010232.00 101134.00 8.01 41.23 184.00 6.11 $ 828,516.78 $ 27,523.35 44.31% 1.48% 0.21% 17.80% 0.28% 33.65% 2.26%

PLACER 348432.00 91628.00 75.19 505.98 102.00 29.27 $ 389,707.68 $ 111,846.12 76.33% 1.29% 0.60% 5.80% 0.21% 12.83% 2.94%

PLUMAS 20007.00 62345.00 449.84 1849.35 2.00 10.00 $ 3,265.00 $ 16,319.29 85.18% 0.91% 2.30% 0.63% 0.09% 8.02% 2.86%

RIVERSIDE 2189641.00 73752.00 31.60 355.58 118.00 5.39 $ 6,417,764.00 $ 293,096.63 39.85% 6.03% 0.51% 5.81% 0.27% 45.45% 2.07%

SACRAMENTO 1418788.00 72200.00 213.77 846.57 316.00 22.27 $ 3,357,758.79 $ 236,663.88 48.64% 9.94% 0.56% 14.16% 0.98% 21.58% 4.13%

SAN BENITO 55269.00 80980.00 90.47 370.91 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 38.41% 0.65% 0.44% 2.41% 0.12% 56.43% 1.55%

SAN BERNARDINO 2035210.00 69091.00 48.15 296.23 142.00 6.98 $ 1,472,289.46 $ 72,340.91 33.46% 8.47% 0.43% 6.16% 0.29% 49.19% 2.00%

SAN DIEGO 3095313.00 84889.00 48.62 181.14 12.00 0.39 $ 683,215.96 $ 22,072.60 48.67% 4.78% 0.46% 10.68% 0.44% 32.03% 2.94%

SAN FRANCISCO 805235.00 110208.00 0.00 0.00 34.00 4.22 $ 95,873.00 $ 11,906.21 42.16% 5.85% 0.23% 33.18% 0.39% 15.12% 3.06%

SAN JOAQUIN 685306.00 70435.00 93.39 631.98 91.00 13.28 $ 429,205.43 $ 62,629.75 36.06% 7.14% 0.47% 13.97% 0.49% 38.86% 3.01%

SAN LUIS OBISPO 269637.00 77043.00 110.52 492.14 13.00 4.82 $ 27,822.00 $ 10,318.32 71.33% 2.00% 0.51% 3.04% 0.13% 20.76% 2.22%

SAN MATEO 718451.00 126129.00 43.15 388.61 75.00 10.44 $ 453,652.91 $ 63,143.19 42.55% 2.65% 0.16% 24.69% 1.42% 25.40% 3.13%

SANTA BARBARA 423895.00 88230.00 63.22 418.26 38.00 8.96 $ 158,680.69 $ 37,433.96 48.13% 1.73% 0.44% 4.67% 0.16% 42.86% 2.01%

SANTA CLARA 1781642.00 120718.00 10.61 83.63 26.00 1.46 $ 100,671.81 $ 5,650.51 35.36% 2.40% 0.23% 31.97% 0.36% 26.90% 2.78%

SANTA CRUZ 262382.00 88776.00 112.81 714.23 14.00 5.34 $ 11,089.38 $ 4,226.43 59.88% 0.89% 0.38% 4.11% 0.12% 32.05% 2.57%

SHASTA 177223.00 59066.00 282.69 542.25 72.00 40.63 $ 723,230.39 $ 408,090.59 82.55% 0.82% 2.35% 2.46% 0.13% 8.40% 3.29%

SIERRA 3240.00 55972.00 216.05 2376.54 0.00 0.00 $ - $ - 88.18% 0.15% 1.30% 0.37% 0.06% 8.30% 1.64%

SISKIYOU 44900.00 50428.00 51.22 396.44 20.00 44.54 $ 796,677.00 $ 1,774,336.30 79.65% 1.23% 3.48% 1.21% 0.16% 10.28% 4.00%

SOLANO 413344.00 82971.00 29.27 97.74 115.00 27.82 $ 868,660.30 $ 210,154.33 41.01% 14.38% 0.46% 14.41% 0.80% 24.04% 4.90%

SONOMA 483878.00 83823.00 122.34 280.44 101.00 20.87 $ 1,668,219.17 $ 344,760.28 66.36% 1.41% 0.75% 3.72% 0.30% 24.89% 2.57%

STANISLAUS 514453.00 65123.00 70.95 476.43 37.00 7.19 $ 249,725.58 $ 48,541.96 46.93% 2.56% 0.57% 4.89% 0.63% 41.92% 2.50%

SUTTER 94737.00 68744.00 73.89 954.22 16.00 16.89 $ 151,015.00 $ 159,404.46 50.60% 1.83% 0.98% 14.59% 0.29% 28.76% 2.94%

TEHAMA 63463.00 54024.00 248.96 431.75 62.00 97.69 $ 1,454,308.31 $ 2,291,584.56 72.01% 0.56% 1.92% 1.00% 0.10% 21.91% 2.50%

TRINITY 13786.00 51299.00 217.61 768.90 9.00 65.28 $ 205,038.54 $ 1,487,295.37 83.74% 0.34% 4.06% 0.70% 0.12% 6.95% 4.09%

TULARE 442179.00 58700.00 144.96 631.64 38.00 8.59 $ 500,450.87 $ 113,178.34 32.73% 1.26% 0.76% 3.26% 0.09% 60.62% 1.29%

TUOLUMNE 55365.00 62918.00 162.56 1392.58 5.00 9.03 $ 12,537.00 $ 22,644.27 82.22% 2.12% 1.51% 0.99% 0.11% 10.69% 2.35%

VENTURA 823318.00 98869.00 14.94 124.74 124.00 15.06 $ 869,903.36 $ 105,658.25 48.86% 1.61% 0.29% 6.65% 0.17% 40.27% 2.15%

YOLO 200849.00 77162.00 21.41 203.64 25.00 12.45 $ 155,263.09 $ 77,303.39 50.15% 2.40% 0.55% 12.89% 0.44% 30.35% 3.23%

YUBA 72155.00 55847.00 256.39 1805.83 12.00 16.63 $ 53,446.00 $ 74,071.10 58.98% 2.96% 1.76% 6.57% 0.37% 25.02% 4.33%

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 Total/Average 37253956.00 73981.22 152.46 726.41 56.36 20.28 $ 39,934,235.89 $ 264,033.35 57.31% 3.09% 1.74% 6.57% 0.26% 28.47% 2.56%

SUM AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE AVERAGE SUM AVERAGE AVG AVG AVG AVG AVG AVG AVG

Table Data Sources:

1,2,3,4,5 from Bibliography

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Rate Initiated1 Value Seized1
Constant 3.24** 3.13** 3.27** 15.25*** 15.37*** 15.87***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Property Crime Rate2 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 **
-0.00*
(0.02) (0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
Violent Crime Rate2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00
(0.15) (0.92) (0.03) (0.52)
White Population Percentage3 2.29* 1.91 2.31* -0.50 -1.45 -0.01
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.88) (0.67) (1.00)
Average Household Income4 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.46) (0.47) (0.36)
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58
r2 .18 .12 .18 .19 .13 .20
F 3.84* 2.50 2.83* 4.30** 2.80* 3.30*
p-values in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

15