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purely administrative official to determine whether the defined crime

c. IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment
2.Even though it be conceded that Congress may, in some cases,
OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v STRANAHAN impose penalties for the violation of a statutory duty, and provide for
214 US 320; White; June 1, 1909 their enforcement by civil suit instead of by criminal prosecution,
nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant the conclusion that a
Facts: penalty may be authorized, and its collection committed to an
- Oceanic Steam Navigation Co sought the recovery of money paid to administrative officer without the necessity of resorting to the judicial
the collector of customs of the port of New York which was exacted by power. In all cases of penalty or punishment, enforcement must
that official under an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. depend upon the exertion of judicial power, either by civil or criminal
The findings of the court showed that the money was paid to the process, since the distinction between judicial and administrative
collector under protest, and involuntarily. It was established that the functions cannot be preserved consistently with the recognition of an
company was coerced by the certainty that, if it did not pay, the administrative power to enforce a penalty without resort to judicial
collector would refuse a clearance to its steamships plying between authority.
New York City and foreign ports at periodical and definite sailings. 3.The fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant to the 5 th
- Both the Secretary and collector were expressly authorized by law, Amendment, because amounting to a taking of property without due
entitled An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United process of law, since, as asserted, the fines were imposed, in some
States, enacted on March 3, 1903. Section 9 of said Act, under which cases, without any previous notice, and in all cases without any
the Secretary and collector acted, provides: adequate notice or opportunity to defend.
That it shall be unlawful for any person, including any
transportation company other than railway lines entering the United Issue: WON the power conferred upon the named officials is consistent
States from foreign contiguous territory, or the owner, master, with the Constitution
agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States any
alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious Held: YES
disease; and if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of - The exaction which the section authorizes the Secretary of Commerce
Treasury [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] that any alien so and Labor to impose, when considered in the light afforded by the
brought to the United States was afflicted with such a disease at context of the statute, is clearly but a power given as a sanction to the
the time of foreign embarkation, and that the existence of such duty which the statute places on the owners of all vessels, to subject
disease might have been detected by means of a competent all alien emigrants, prior to bringing them to the United States, to
medical examination at such time, such person or transportation medical examination at the point of embarkation, so as to exclude
company, or the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any such those afflicted with the prohibited diseases. In other words, the power
vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district to impose the exaction which the statute confers on the Secretary is
in which the port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred lodged in that officer only when it results from the official medical
dollars ($100) for each and every violation of the provisions of this examination at the point of arrival not only that an alien is afflicted with
section; and no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any one of the prohibited diseases, but that the stage of the malady, as
such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be disclosed by the examination, establishes that the alien was suffering
remitted. with the disease at the time of embarkation, and that such fact would
- Oceanic Steam argues that: have been then discovered had the medical examination been then
1.However complete may be the power of Congress to legislate made by the vessel or its owners, as the stature requires.
concerning the exclusion of aliens, and to entrust the enforcement of - The power thus lodged in the officers was intended to be exclusive and
legislation of that character to administrative officers, nevertheless that its exertion was authorized as the result of the probative force
the particular legislation here in question is repugnant to the attributed to the official medical examination for which the statute
Constitution because it defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a provides, and that the power to refuse clearance to vessels was lodged
for the express purpose of causing both the imposition of the exaction
and its collection to be acts of administrative competency, not requiring
a resort to judicial power for their enforcement. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v PHIL. AIRLINES INC.
- The report of the Senate committee on immigration is considered: 63 SCRA 524 ESGUERRA; APRIL 30, 1975
Section 10 [which became Section 9] therefore imposes a penalty of
$100, to be imposed by the [Secretary of Commerce and Labor] for Nature: Appeal from 2 resolutions of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
each case brought to an American port, provided, in his judgment, the
disease might have been detected by means of medical examination at Facts:
the port of embarkation. This sufficiently guards the transportation lines - On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of 20 passengers from Baguio to
from an unjust and hasty imposition of the penalty, insures a careful Manila who could not be accommodated in its regular flight. To
observance of the law, and leaves in their own hands the power to accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating
escape even a risk of the fine being imposed, since they can refuse to Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio on its way to Manila
take on board even the most doubtful case until certified by competent and pick up these passengers.
medical authority to be entirely cured. - Claiming that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB
- Courts discussion on Oceanic Steams arguments: before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of RA
1.The various sections of the Act accurately distinguish between those 776, the CAB, through the first questioned resolution, imposed a fine of
cases where it was intended that particular violations of the Act P5000 upon PAL. Upon PALs MFR, the CAB, through the second
should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and questioned resolution, reduced the fine to P2500. It also stated that
those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute Public Act 4271, as amended, requires the grantee (of a legislative
crime, but merely entail the infliction of penalty, enforceable in some franchise for air service), PAL Inc. to comply with the provisions of RA
cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. The 776, and regulations promulgated thereunder from time to time.
sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the - PAL claims that there is nothing in RA 776 which expressly empowers
medical examination for which the statute provided, thus tending, by the CAB to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in
the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the efficient this case. The power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a
performance by the steamship company of the duty required by the judicial function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that
statute, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress. such power and authority cannot be delegated to the CAB by mere
2.The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary implication or interpretation.
duties of the executive departments of the government would be
productive of nothing but mischief. Issue: WON the CAB has authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to
- The legislation of Congress from the beginning has proceeded on impose penalties
the conception that it was within the competency of Congress, when
legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose Held: YES.
appropriate obligations, and sanction their enforcement by Ratio The CAB is empowered to impose administrative penalties or
reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to those violations punishable by a fine or civil penalty for violations of its
enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial rules and regulations but no power to impose fines in the nature of a
power. criminal penalty.
3.Court did not think it necessary to entertain the controversy, as it is Reasoning RA 776 created the CAB and the CAA (Civil Aeronautics
evident that the statute unambiguously excludes the conception that Administration) so that in the exercise and performance of their powers
the steamship company was entitled to be heard, in the sense of and duties, they shall consider among other things, as being in the
raising an issue and tendering evidence concerning the condition of public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and
the alien immigrant upon arrival at the point of disembarkation, as necessity certain declared policies which include:
the plain purpose of the statute was to exclusively commit that the regulation of air transportation in such manner as 'to recognize
subject to the medical officers for which the statute provided. and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of
safety in, and foster sound economic condition in, such transportation, that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent
and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative
carriers; to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or
to promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines; compromise fines and civil penalties, a power which is expressly given
(Sec. 4, RA 776) to the CAA whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised,
the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and control reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the CAB
over, air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general
facilities, and franchise, in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with
carrying out the provisions of this Act (Sec. 10 RA 776) impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and
power to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or convenience in air transportation. If everytime the CAB would like to
revoke, in whole or in part, upon petition or complaint, or upon its own impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and
initiative, any temporary operating permit or Certificate of Public regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted
Convenience and Necessity (Sec. 10(c) (1) RA 776) litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent,
power to investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their
whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air
provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and transit.
shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may - However, PAL committed the violation of the CAB regulation against
be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision, or rules and flagstops without malice and with no deliberate intent to flout the same.
regulations so issued. (Section 10(D) RA 776) For this reason, the penalty imposed by the CAB may be mitigated and
power to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any reduced to a nominal sum.
administrative decision or order of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on Disposition Resolution appealed from is modified by reducing the
matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with administrative fine imposed on the appellant PAL to P100.
the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued
thereunder. It has the power also either on its own initiative or upon
review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics SCOTY'S DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER
Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, 99 Phil 762; BAUTISTA ANGELO; August 25, 1956
or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be. (Sec.
10(F) (G) RA 776) Nature: Petition for review
power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make compromise in
respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator Facts:
(Sec. 32(17) RA 776) - Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Dept Store
- The fine imposed on PAL by CAB is that fine or civil penalty - This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si
contemplated in the provisions of RA 776 and not a fine in the nature of a Kiao and Helen Yang. - Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial Peace
criminal penalty as contemplated in the RPC, because the fine in this Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her
case was imposed by CAB because of PALs violation of CAB rules on above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of
flagstops without previous authority. The CAB explained in its resolution her membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her
that the imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the separation, said employers had been questioning their employees
violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with their
from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of right to organize under the law.
the government regulating agency. - The employers denied the charge. They claim that the complainant was
- There exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.A.B. is dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious
fully authorized by law (RA 776) to impose fines in the nature of civil disrespect to the management and her co-employees so much so that
penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the CAB of several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of
Manila who, after investigation, filed the corresponding informations HELD NO.
against her and the same are now pending trial in court. Ratio The power to impose the penalties provided for in section 25 of RA
- the court found the following facts: Nena Micaller was earning P4.80 a 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial
day. After every New Year, she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word "Court" contained in
whereas the other employees were only given P60. For three section 2(a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the of the industrial court
consecutive years, she was given a first prize for being the best seller, in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal and
the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organized a union should be nullified.
among the employees of the store which was latter affiliated with the Reasoning
National Labor Union. Later, the National Labor Union sent a petition to SEC. 25. Penalties.- Any person who violates the provisions of section
the store containing ten demands and Nena was called by the three this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
management for questioning and, in the manager's office, she was asked pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of not less
who the members of the union were, but she pretended not to know than one month nor more than one year, or both by such free and
them. imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court.
- Richard Yang and Yu Si Kiao, together with a brother-in law, went to Any other violation of this Act which is declared unlawful shall be
Nenas house and questioned her regarding her union membership. punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos
- Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel, Atty. for each offense.
Joaquin Yuseco, and there she was again questioned regarding her - The above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the
union activities and was even made to sign a paper of withdrawal from court that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of
the union. the penalties therein provided. It merely states that they may be imposed
- the manager of the Store, Yu Ki Lam asked each the every employee "in the discretion of the court."
whether they were members of the union. - The word court cannot refer to the Court of Industrial Relations for to
- the union gave notice to strike to the management. Upon receipt of the give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to
notice, the management hired temporary employees equal in number to every accused by our Constitution. We refer to those which postulate that
the old. The new employees were affiliated with another labor union. "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
- an information for threats was filed against Nena Micaller before the process of law", and that "In all criminal prosecution the accused . . .
municipal court. This was dismissed. Another information was filed shall enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, against him,
against Nena Micaller for slander. A third information for slander was filed to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
against her before the same court. And on November 30, she was to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
dismissed for "insulting the owner of the store and for taking to the girls behalf".
inside the store during business hours." And on the strength of these - The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of
facts the court found respondents, now petitioners, guilty of unfair labor Industrial Relations in dealing with the unfair labor practice cases
practice and ordered them to pay a fine of P100. negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this is so
- Petitioners contend that section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 being penal because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of
in character should be strictly construed in favor of the accused and in evidence prevailing in court for the courts of law or equity cannot be
that sense their guilt can only be established by clear and positive controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this act that the Court (of
evidence and not merely be presumptions or inferences as was done by Industrial Relations) and its members and its Hearing Examiners shall
the industrial court. In other words, it is contended that the evidence as use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
regards unfair labor practice with reference to the three above-named speedily and objective and without regards to technicalities of law of
petitioners is not clear enough labor practice and the fine imposed upon procedure.
them is unjustified. - legislative record containing the deliberations made on the bill
eliminating the criminal jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relation show
Issue: WON petitioners can be legally punished by a fine of P100. that the real intent of congress was to place that court on the same
footing as the Public Service Commission and the Court of Industrial punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine
relations by confining their jurisdiction exclusively to civil matters. of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by
- on the issue of WON there was unfair labor practice, the court did not both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court;
rule on this as it involves questions of fact. The industrial court has made Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the
a careful analysis of the evidence and has found the petitioners have method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in
really subjected complaint and her co-employees to a series of this section or by both.
questioning regarding their membership in the union or their union - Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two
activities which in contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and,
unfair labor practice. This finding is binding upon this Court following second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission bear the
well-known precedents. interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they
Disposition decision appealed from is modified by eliminating the fine of are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
P100 imposed upon petitioners.
Issue: WON Act No. 1136 is valid (as far as Sections 5 and 8 are
concerned)
U.S. VS BARRIAS
11 Phil 327; Tracey; Sept 24 1908 Held: YES
- The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing,
Facts: and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the world,
- The defendant was charged in CFI Manila with violation of paragraphs as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute
70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs. After a than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when
demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not
directing her movement, when heavily laden, in the Pasig River, by involving an undue grant of legislative power.
bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority,
other external power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine
No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480.
to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make
other adequate power. suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not
- Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of exceeding a fine of P500.
the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine - This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.
of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power
- By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that
Collector of Customs is authorized to license craft engaged in the department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the
and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution
required to be so licensed. Sections 5 and 8 read as follows: itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby this high prerogative has been intrusted can not relieve itself of the
authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism
regulate the business herein licensed. and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit
SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th
any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs ed., p. 137.)
for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be - This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately - This involves 2 cases consolidated by the Court for decision.
upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of - In the first case, Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his
another. In the case of the United States vs. Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago,
402), an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales.
rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him.
the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to
constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to
misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by
Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So also was a grant respondent was transmitted from Santiago, Isabela to its Message
to him of power to prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S. vs. Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the
Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law authorizing him to require radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz,
alteration of any bridge and to impose penalties for violations of his rules Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI
was held invalid, as vesting in him upon a power exclusively lodged in to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered
Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep., 406.) The subject is considered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages.
and some cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, in - In the second case, Pacifico Innocencio claims that on July 13, 1975
re Kollock (165 U.S. 526), which upheld the law authorizing a Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the
commissioner of internal revenue to designate and stamps on facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna
oleomargarine packages, an improper use of which should thereafter for the purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The
constitute a crime or misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):The criminal telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-
offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the
the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a sender (Lources Innocencio) has not been notified about its non-delivery.
mere matter of detail. The regulation was in execution of, or As a consequence Pacifico Innocencio was not able to attend the
supplementary to, but not in conflict with the law itself. internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of
- In the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he
Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company (88 Cal. 491), it was ruled that learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown
harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues Moncada, Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish
authorizing them to do so, the court saying: Conceding that the and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages.
legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and - After hearing, the respondent Board in both cases held that the service
regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed
for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to
hands of the legislature. Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential
Disposition judgment of the CFI as convicts the defendant of a violation Decree No. 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1. Hence, this appeal
of Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is revoked, and is hereby convicted of a Issue: WON the Board can impose a disciplinary fine on RCPI
misdemeanor and punished by a fine of $25
Held: NO.
RATIO The Board exceeded its authority when it imposed a fine on RCPI
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), v since its enabling law does not authorize it to do so. Its power is limited
BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS only to management of the facilities and system of transmission of
G.R. No. L-43653; MARTIN; Nov 29, 1977 messages by radio companies.
REASONING The charge does not relate to the management of the
Nature: Petition for review by certiorari facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in
accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases
Facts: before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio allegedly
suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising 1st Offense Fine of P3,000 for each cylinder
from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances 2nd Offense Fine of P5,000 for each cylinder
for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the 3rd Offense Recommend business closure to
courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less the proper local government unit
can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. - It is alleged that Circular No. 2000-06-010 (the assailed Circular) listed
- In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand-new or which
Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice were not provided for by B.P. Blg. 33, as amended; and that B.P. Blg. 33
Enrique Fernando, ruled: "There can be no justification then for the enumerated and specifically defined the prohibited/punishable acts under
Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed Circular are not
successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law included in the law.
cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio
companies as noted was fix rates. It could not take to task a radio Issue: WON the circular is valid
company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with
such authority. What it did then in these two petition lacked the Held: Yes
impress of validity. - For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to
- In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Board have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative
lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2)
nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
that calls for a different conclusion. 1.The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended,
Disposition both decisions of Board of Communications reversed, set criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and
aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction overpricing of petroleum products. Under this general description of
what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products, the Circular
merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be
PEREZ V LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare
492 SCRA 638 weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no
QUISUMBING; Aug 28, 2007 trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no
distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder,
Facts: underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized
- Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and omissions are
hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the
petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 2.As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord
cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a with the law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for
minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4 any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a
- On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular,
implement B.P. Blg. 33, which provides among others (pls see original for the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount
list of offenses and penalties) within the range allowed by law. However, for the refillers, marketers,
SECTION 6. NO TARE WEIGHT OR INCORRECT TARE WEIGHT and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetarry penalty.
MARKINGS. (REQUIREMENT ON ENGRAVED TARE WEIGHT SHALL This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
TAKE EFFECT TWO (2) YEARS AFTER EFFECTIVITY OF THIS aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the
CIRCULAR) Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run
counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum
A. LPG Refiller/Marketer and the maximum limits of penalties.
- Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute request for re-sampling leading to a minimal damage to the
punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum environment. Respondent also contended that it is a responsible
and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular merely operator of malls and department stores and that it was the first
implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary time that the wastewater discharge of SM City Manila failed to
penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular meet the standards of law with respect to inland water
contravenes the law. denied MR also denied
6. Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
praying for the nullification of the Orders of the LLDA dated
October 2, 2002, January 10, 2003 and May 27, 2003.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA LAKE 7. On June 28, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting the
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V. SM PRIME HOLDINGS petition of herein respondent and reversing and setting aside the
J. PERALTA
assailed Orders of the LLDA. Ruling that an administrative
Facts::
agency's power to impose fines should be expressly
1. The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on
granted and may not be implied, the CA found that under its
February 4, 2002 by the Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of
charter, Republic Act No. 4850 (RA 4850), the LLDA is not
the wastewater collected from herein respondent's SM City
expressly granted any power or authority to impose fines
Manila branch. The results of the laboratory tests showed that
for violations of effluent standards set by law. Thus, the CA
the sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with
held that the assailed Orders of petitioner, which imposed a fine
the effluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance
on respondent, are issued without jurisdiction and with grave
with law
2. On March 12, 2002, the LLDA informed SM City Manila of its abuse of discretion MR also denied
8. Hence, this petition.
violation, directing the same to perform corrective measures to
abate or control the pollution caused by the said company and
Issue: WON THE LLDA HAS THE POWER TO IMPOSE FINES AND
ordering the latter to pay a penalty of "One Thousand Pesos
PENALTIES BASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF RA 4850 AND EO
(P1,000.00) per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be 927? YES.
computed from 4 February 2002, the date of inspection, until full
cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater 1. Respondent is already estopped from questioning the power of
3. Respondent's Pollution Control Officer requested the LLDA to the LLDA to impose fines as penalty owing to the fact that
conduct a re-sampling of their effluent, claiming that they already respondent actively participated during the hearing of its water
took measures to enable their sewage treatment plant to meet pollution case before the LLDA without impugning such power of
the standards set forth by the LLDA. the said agency. In fact, respondent even asked for a
4. Petitioner, however, required respondent to pay a fine of Fifty reconsideration of the Order of the LLDA which imposed a fine
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) which represents the upon it as evidenced by its letters dated July 2, 2002 and
accumulated daily penalty computed from February 4, 2002 until November 29, 2002, wherein respondent, through its pollution
March 25, 2002. control officer, as well as its counsel, requested for a waiver of
5. In two follow-up letters dated July 2, 2002 and November 29,
the fine(s) imposed by the LLDA. By asking for a reconsideration
2002, which were treated by the LLDA as a motion for
of the fine imposed by the LLDA, the Court arrives at no
reconsideration, respondent asked for a waiver of the fine
conclusion other than that respondent has impliedly admitted the
assessed by the LLDA in its March 12, 2002 Notice of Violation
authority of the latter to impose such penalty. Hence, contrary to
and Order of October 2, 2002 on the ground that they
respondent's claim in its Comment and Memorandum, it is
immediately undertook corrective measures and that the pH
levels of its effluent were already controlled even prior to their
already barred from assailing the LLDA's authority to impose Lake Region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
fines. from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
2. PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY INC. V. LLDA: the LLDA has the 4. The intendment of the law, as gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O.
power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA not only with the express powers
regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but,
in the Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the full and proper
Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally implementation of its purposes and functions.
pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where
a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
forum. Repeated in The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v.
LLDA.1
3. LLDA V. CA: It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA,
as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS
1. INTEREST OF LAW AND ORDER
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws [PD 813
and EO 927], to carry out and make effective the declared
RUBI, ET AL. v THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development 39 PHIL 661; MALCOLM, J.:March 7, 1919
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding Provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Nature:
Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard An application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes
and adequate provisions for environmental management and of the Province of Mindoro.
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, Facts:
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power - It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run
1
Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna away form the reservation.
de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and - Administration Code authorizes the establishment of settlement area for
effluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, non-Christians. A Resolution was passed by the Provincial Board of
private or public, juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded Mindoro providing a selected public Land in Tigbao as site for permanent
to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control management. sewttlement of the Mangyans.
-The resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior and it was
In addition, Section 4(d) of E.O. No. 927, which further defines certain functions and ordered that Mangyans who refuses to comply shall be imprisoned. Rubi
powers of the LLDA, provides that the LLDA has the power to "make, alter or modify and other Mangyans were arrested; thus, they applied for Habeas
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the Corpus.
time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished." Likewise, Section
4(i) of the same E.O. states that the LLDA is given authority to "exercise such powers
Issue
and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and
responsibilities under this Executive Order." Also, Section 4(c) authorizes the LLDA
WON there was invalid delegation of legislative power
to "issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this HELD
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice NO
and hearing." - There is distinction between delegation of power to make law which
necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be and conferring not afford equal protection before the law; and that it is vague and
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in ambiguous
pursuance of the law. The Legislature merely conferred upon the
Provincial Government with approval of the Provincial Board the power to Issue: WON the law is unconstitutional on any of the three grounds
execute the law. The Provincial Government and the Provincial Board
are best fitted to select the most favorable site for improving the lives of Held: NO
the Mangyans. The Government must guarantee peace and order to Ratio Act 2581 is not unconstitutional for not setting a standard for the
encourage immigrants to invest in Mindoro and to protect crops and exercise of discretion, violating equal protection of laws, nor for being
persons of settlers of Mindoro from predatory men. vague and ambiguous.
Disposition: Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of Reasoning
their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true On fixing no standard to guide issuance/ cancellation of permits:
ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. - The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in
reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate
or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite
2. PUBLIC INTEREST that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor
has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
PEOPLE V ROSENTHAL AND OSMEA construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a
68 Phil 328; LAUREL; June 12, 1939 certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the
provisions of Act 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand,
Nature:Appeal from judgment of the CFI the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is
expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the
Facts: public interest. In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to
- Rosenthal and Osmea (appellants) were charged and found guilty of protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more
violating Act 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law, in the CFI. basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-
They both appealed to the IAC, but since the appeal also questions the by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like
constitutionality of Act 2581, the case was referred to the SC fraudulent exploitations, we hold that public interest in this case is a
- the law essentially requires corporations who want to offer securities sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision
(shares of stocks) to obtain a certificate or license from the Insular on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or
Treasurer. The Treasurer is to issue the same if, upon his examination of permits.
documents, he deems it advisable and satisfactory that the stocks be - Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of
sold in the Philippines. The Act also gives the Treasurer the authority, Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that the Treasurer can act and
whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel the permit. decide without any restraining influence.
The decision of the Treasurer was appealable to the Sec. of Finance - The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to
- the acts complained of consisted in buying and selling of the stocks at secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which
high and speculative prices (they bought at P5/share and sold at P100- necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
P300/share). Also, they allegedly were not licensed to sell stocks. obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the rule of law was
- on appeal, the appellants contend that the law was unconstitutional on established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes
3 grounds: undue delegation of legislative power (for although it it subject to control by certain legal devices. As a corollary, we find the
empowers the treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or permits, no rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest
standard or rule was fixed which can guide said official in determining the time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that
cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. It is
his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the mass of
that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Treasurer); does judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion.
- the maxim delegatus non potest delegare or delegata potestas non - June 2, 1939 > the Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of Industrial
potest delegare has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of Relations that an industrial dispute existed between the HARDWOOD
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of and its employees who are members of PANGIL and that the controversy
the principle of subordinate legislation, in practically all modern [which involved 2) setting the minimum daily wages of common laborers
governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. at P1 because before P0.70 a day was paid regardless whether
While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest employed in a town or mountain camp; 3) devising a proper schedule of
is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in rate of wages for all laborers; and 4) rate of wages for the mountain
mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved. camps should be higher by 20% over those given in the town] was a
- Hall v Geiger-Jones: it is well-settled principle of law in this state that by proper one to be dealt with CIR in the public interest under Sec 4 of CA
legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain 103.
the existence of facts, upon the finding of which may depend the right to - September 19, 1939 > DECISION ADICIONAL of Leopoldo Rovira of
continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business. the CIR
On denial of equal protection of the law: "The agreement, the Court said in part justified claims under 2 and 4
- Another contention is that the Act denies equal protection of the laws that affect the type of day laborers, and in consequence ordered the
because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities company to appeal to pay wages to their workers as a fair and
in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and reasonable amount not lower P1 daily for work in the mountains, and
successive transactions. for those who conduct their work in the plains an amount not get off of
- Hall v Geiger-Jones: If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous P0.90 per day, based on eight (8) hours per day, excluding "overtime"
example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment no less than twenty-five (25) percent on the day laborers as shall be
allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not fixed... "
distinguishable from others not embraced in the law. - October 17, 1939 > MFR filed with CIR of the DECISION ADICIONAL
On vagueness and uncertainty of the law: - November 28, 1939 > while MFR pending, HARDWOOD filed a motion
People v Fernandez and Trinidad: An Act will be declared void and praying that CIR has no jurisdiction to decide the question relating to
inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a demands 2 and 4, alleging (1) that the CIR has no authority to determine
showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, minimum wages for an individual employer in connection with a particular
with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. and specific industrial dispute under Sec 4 of CA 103; (2) that such
- An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground authority would constitute an undue delegation of legislative power to the
that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is CIR and would deny HARDWOOD the equal protection of the laws, thus
passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the rendering said section unconstitutional and void.
means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within - December 23, 1939 > CIR by resolution in banc, denied the MFR as
the reach of those intrusted therewith. well as the motion of November 28
Disposition Decision affirmed with modifications (lower penalty).
ISSUES
3. JUSTICE, EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL MERITS OF THE CASE 1. WON the CIR has the power to determine minimum wages for an
individual employer in connection with an industrial dispute which said
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER CO v PANGIL court might take cognizance of under Sec 4 of CA 103
FEDERATION OF LABOR 2. If it has, WON such grant of power is unconstitutional and void
70 PHIL 602; LAUREL; November 25, 1940
HELD
Nature:Petition for a writ of certiorari to review the resolution of CIR 1. YES
Reasoning
Facts: - Sec 4 CA103 is designed to provide for compulsory arbitration in order
to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial and
agricultural disputes. "This bill," thus begins the explanatory statement of - The contention that Sec 4 CA 103 is unconstitutional as constituting an
Bill No. 700, "creating a Board of Industrial Relations... Provides undue delegation of legislative power to the court and depriving
compulsory arbitration... In accordance with Article 6, Title XIII of the HARDWOOD equal protection of the laws because the provision "does
Constitution, which provides that' The state may establish binding not indicate in what manner, by what standards, or in accordance with
arbitration." Incorporating the conclusion reached by a committee what rules, the Court of Industrial Relations shall determine minimum
appointed a year or so before, it was observed that "under the current wages under said section" is without merit.
legislation" evidently referring to Act no. 4055 "there is no suitable - Sec 20 CA103 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and
instrument to avoid strikes. The Department of Labor merely occupies determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties
the role of peacemaker between the parties in dispute and its decisions and power under this Act, the court shall act according to justice and
are not binding for either employers or workers. The people have equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
reached a level of industrial development, which makes it imperative that or legal forms. The National Assembly has by this section furnished a
the government's intervention in these conflicts to be more effective. . . " sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its
(Ang Tibay v CIR) And in order that this declaration of policy may not just discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it,
be an empty gesture, CA 103, in various sections thereof, has provided and we have already ruled that the discretionary power thus conferred is
the means towards its realization. Thus in Sec 4, the CIR is empowered judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation
to "take cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision, and of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function,
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Antamok Gold Fields
cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regard wages, Mining Company v CIR, June 28, 1940.)
shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or suspensions of Disposition Petition for certiorari is denied
employees or laborers, tenants or farm-laborers, hours of labor, or
conditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers." 4. WHAT IS MORAL, EDUCATIONAL OR AMUSING
- The petitioner suggests that if an industrial dispute between an
employer and its employees causes a strike or lockout arising from MUTUAL FILMS v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
differences as regards a minimum wage, CIR would be without authority 236 U.S. 230; McKenna, J.; February 23, 1915
to take cognizance of the dispute for arbitration and settlement unless
the President, under Sec 5 of CA103, directs it to investigate and study Nature:Appeal from an order
all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned, with a view to
determining the necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage which Facts:
shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in such industry. To - Complainant is engaged in the business of purchasing, selling, and
adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at naught the plenary leasing films, the films being produced in other states than Ohio, and in
powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to "settle all question, European and other foreign countries. Complainant has on hand at its
matters, controversies, or disputes arising between, and/or affecting Detroit exchange at least 2,500 reels of films which it intends to and will
employers and employees" and to frustrate the very objective of the law, exhibit in Ohio, and which it will be impossible to exhibit unless the same
namely, to create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the shall have been approved by the board of censors. The board has
Government could be made effective in order to prevent non-pacific demanded of complainant that it submit its films to censorship, and
methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes. It is threatens, unless complainant complies with the demand, to arrest any
fundamental that the intention and policy of the National Assembly, as and all persons who seek to place on exhibition any film not so censored
expressed in the enactment, should be effectuated, and the Act should or approved by the censor congress on and after November 4, 1913, the
receive a construction that will lead to this result. date to which the act was extended. It is physically impossible to comply
2. NO with such demand and physically impossible for the board to censor the
Reasoning films with such rapidity as to enable complainant to proceed with its
business, and the delay consequent upon such examination would cause leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of
great and irreparable injury to such business, and would involve a the pictures, permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 'in
multiplicity of suits. unjust discrimination against some propagandist film,' while others might
be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards
ISSUE/S against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other general terms,
1. WON the statute violates the freedom of speech and publication get precision from the sense and experience of men, and become certain
guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of
2. WON the statute is a permitted delegation of legislative power the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt
would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law
Held: 1. NO. properly relies.
It seems not to have occurred to anybody in the cited cases that freedom - The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute is a
of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the police power of the State. delegation of legislative power, and void for that if not for the other
The rights of property were only considered as involved. It cannot be put reasons charged against it, which we have discussed. While
out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which
simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best
be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the
think, as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion. policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given
They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to
published and known; vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles
we have said, capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the
their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. It was this capability and laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
power, and it may be in experience of them, that induced the state of sufficiency both in provision and execution.
Ohio, in addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions, as it The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is
does in its Criminal Code, to require censorship before exhibition, as it educational, moral, amusing, or harmless, and hence leaves decision to
does by the act under review. We cannot regard this as beyond the arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those extremes,
power of government. leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of
the pictures, permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 'in
2. YES. unjust discrimination against some propagandist film,' while others might
The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute is a be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards
delegation of legislative power, and void for that if not for the other against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other general terms,
reasons charged against it, which we have discussed. While get precision from the sense and experience of men, and become certain
administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of
separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt
recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law
policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given properly relies.
cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to Disposition Petition is denied.
ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles
apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the 5. WHAT IS SACRILEGIOUS
laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss
sufficiency both in provision and execution. JOSEPH BURSTYN, INC. v WILSON
The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is 343 U.S. 495
educational, moral, amusing, or harmless, and hence leaves decision to CLARK; May 26, 1952
arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those extremes,
Nature: Appeal from decision of CA of New York separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of
religion; and, (3) that the term "sacrilegious" is so vague and indefinite as
Facts: to offend due process.
- A statute makes it unlawful "to exhibit, or to sell, lease or lend for - The Appellate Division rejected all of appellant's contentions and upheld
exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any the Regents' determination. The New York Court of Appeals, two judges
business in the state of New York, any motion picture film or reel, unless dissenting, affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.
there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit
therefor of the education department . . . ." The statute further provides: Issue: WON a New York statute which permits the banning of motion
"The director of the [motion picture] division [of the education picture films on the ground that they are "sacrilegious" is constitutional.
department] or, when authorized by the regents, the officers of a local
office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion Held: NO.
picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or - To hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is
a part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, however, is not the
of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or end of our problem. It does not follow that the Constitution requires
incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times
authorized, such officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall and all places. But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the
furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those
refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make
toto." freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in this case for
- Appellant is a corporation engaged in the business of distributing making an exception to that rule.
motion pictures. It owns the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the - The statute involved here does not seek to punish, as a past offense,
United States a film produced in Italy entitled "The Miracle." speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subsequent
- After having examined the picture, the motion picture division of the punishment. On the contrary, New York requires that permission to
New York education department, acting under the statute, issued to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who judge
appellant a license authorizing exhibition of "The Miracle," with English the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. This
subtitles, as one part of a trilogy called "Ways of Love. Court recognized many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form
- For a period of approximately eight weeks, "Ways of Love" was of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned.
exhibited publicly in a motion picture theater in New York City under an - New York's highest court says there is "nothing mysterious" about the
agreement between appellant and the owner of the theater whereby statutory provision applied in this case: "It is simply this: that no religion,
appellant received a stated percentage of the admission price. as that word is understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be
- The New York State Board of Regents, which by statute is made the treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule . . . ." This is far from
head of the education department, received "hundreds of letters, the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may
telegrams, post cards, affidavits and other communications" both carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society.
protesting against and defending the public exhibition of "The Miracle." - In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of
- The Chancellor of the Board of Regents requested three members of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon
the Board to view the picture and to make a report to the entire Board. a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views,
After viewing the film, the committee reported that in its opinion there with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful
was basis for the claim that the picture was "sacrilegious." orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control
- Appellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a standard the most careful
the determination of the Regents. Among the claims advanced by and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one
appellant were (1) that the statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment as religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency
a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press; (2) that it is to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious
invalid under the same Amendment as a violation of the guaranty of minority.
- Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might of any basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the
raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or
separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. However, from factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to
the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point determine the 'efficiency of instruction.
out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all 3.
religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior PACU further argued that the permit requisite was only introduced to the
restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of Act 2706 on 1936 in Commonwealth Act 180.
government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a
particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, When a law has been long treated as constitutional and
speeches, or motion pictures. important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may
- Since the term "sacrilegious" is the sole standard under attack here, it is refuse to consider an attack on its validity
not necessary for us to decide, for example, whether a state may censor As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed
motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
prevent the showing of obscene films. That is a very different question involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
from the one now before us. protection of the rights of the parties concerned.
1. Does their first objection stand? No.
6. ADEQUATE AND EFFICIENT INSTRUCTION PACU has no standing in this case as all of them have permits to operate
and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They have suffered
PACU v SECRETARY no wrong under the terms of law and need no relief. Judicial power is
97 Phil 806 limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.
2. What was the value of adding the permit requisite to Act No.
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU), etc. v. 2706?
Secretary of Education A study done showed that no law prevented an incompetent person from
opening a school to teach the young. The study then provided
The case revolves around PACUs questioning of the constitutionality of recommendations one of which was that before granting a permit the
Act No. 2706 an act making the inspection and recognition of private secretary must assure himself that such school measures up to proper
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." standards in the following respects, and that the continued existence of
Under its provisions, the Department of Education has supervised and the school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to certain
regulated all private schools in this country without protest, and with the conditions including quality of location, library, teachers proper student-
general acquiescence of the public. PACU argues that the act is teacher ration, etc.
unconstitutional as: 3. Does the provision grant unlimited power and discretion to the
1. It deprives owner and teachers of schools and parents of liberty Secretary of Labor? No.
and property without due process of law. Requiring a permit The provisions are not vague and subject to unlimited discretion. There
before a person can exercise a right is censorship. Specifically, are fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as
they refer to Sec 3 of the Act which requires a permit in order to shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school
open a private school. calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation
2. It deprives parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their of students etc.; and the system of private education has been in
children for civic efficiency operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and
Provisions conferring on the Sec. of Education unlimited power and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate
delegation of legislative power. PACU alleges that sections 1 and 6 of Act minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of
2706 does not state general or specific description of what constitutes a government recognition of any private school.
general standard of efficiency. Nowhere in this Act is there any indication Furthermore, the abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a
statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such Atty. Generals reply: The power exercised by the Commissioner is
statute. administrative, and not legislative in nature. The legislature fixed the
Adequate and efficient instruction should be considered sufficient, in the standard of reasonableness and Commissioner finds only fact. The
same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order" standards prescribed by the rating law is sufficiently definite, and
"public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the legislative power is not delegated to the commissioner by reason of
case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying there being no enumeration or definition of factors which the
delegation of authority to regulate. commissioner may consider in finding the fact of whether a rate is
reasonable or otherwise.
Lower court: No legislative standard was prescribed, and the
commissioner was left to exercise his power of approval or approval
based on his own notions of public policy, the provisions delegation
7. REASONABLENESS AS AN IMPLIED STANDARD such power are unconstitutional. As to the other provisions, namely
those authorizing the bureau to establish uniform rates, prohibiting
WISCONSIN INSPECTION BUREAU v WHITMAN unreasonable or discriminatory rates, and vesting power in the
196 Wis 427 commissioner to regulate rates are not affected by the
unconstitutionality for commissioner approval.
WISCONSIN INSPECTION BUREAU ET AL. v. WHTMAN, STATE
COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCE (Reasonableness as an implied ISSUE/ HELD/ RATIO:
standard) W/N the order of the commissioner is valid. It is void as to the rates.
17 July 1928; Rosenberry, J. The statute itself provides that the orders fixing rates are to be based
upon evidence which is to be preserved, and since there was no hearing
Facts:: and finding by the commissioner that indeed the rates are unreasonable,
This case resolves the question of constitutionality of the Rating Law, then the presumption of validity which attaches to the rates must be
being chapter 61 of the Laws of 1917 and the question of the power sustained.
of the commissioner of insurance under such act.
An insurer is required to be a member of a rating bureau. Subject to W/N there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power. There was
certain supervisory powers of the commissioner of insurance, the none. The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law; to
bureau was charged with the management of its own affairs, determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix
including the publishing of its rates in the manner provided. All rates the limits within which the law shall operate is a power vested by the
were required to be reasonable. The commissioner was authorized Constitution in the Legislature, and may not be delegated. When,
to review any rate for the purpose of determining whether the same however, the Legislature has laid down these fundamentals of a law, it
is unreasonable or discriminatory. The checking power of the may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such
commissioner ensures protection for the insured, since the rating legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general
bureau is given the rule-making power over its member insurers. legislative purpose. (to fill up the details according to CJ Marshall; to
The Wisconsin Inspection Bureau filed its rule book on 01 August make public regulations interpreting the statute and directing the details
1922. On the same day, the commissioner issued an order approving of its execution, CJ Taft).
some and disapproving other rules and regulations. The bureau,
among others, petitioned for the review of the order. With one W/N the statute provides standards which limits the discretion of
exception as to the rates, the commissioner affirmed his order. the commissioner in the exercise of such power. It does. While the
Plaintiffs arguments: There is lacking a sufficiently definite statue does not in terms provide that the commissioner of insurance shall
standard, denial of due process and unlawful delegation of legislative exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in the disapproval of
power. proposed rules and regulations, that condition is necessarily implied.
Administrative officers, or bodies must act, not only within the field of
their statutory powers, but in a reasonable and orderly manner. The rule In the first place, every such agency must conform precisely to the
of reasonableness inheres in every law and the action of those charged statute which grants the power; secondly, such delegated powers must
with its enforcement must in the nature of things be subject to the test of be exercised in a spirit of judicial fairness and equity and not
reasonableness. oppressively and unreasonably.
Local Government Board v. Arlidge: judicial power could be delegated
to an administrative body; that it might be exercised in accordance with
the rules made by the administrative body and need not be exercised 8. TO PROMOTE SIMPLICITY, ECONOMY OR EFFICIENCY
according to the course of the common law
Elihu Root: As any community passes from simple to complex CERVANTES vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL
conditions, the only way in which government can deal with the 91 SCRA 359
increased burdens thrown upon it is by the delegation of power to be REYES; May 26, 1952
exercised in detail by subordinate agents, subject to the general
directions prescribed by superior authority. Nature:Petition to review a decision of the Auditor General.
The old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has
virtually retired from the field such agencies furnish protection to rights Facts:
and obstacles to wrongdoing which under our new social and industrial - Cervantes is the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a
conditions cannot be practically accomplished by the old and simple year. By a resolution of the Board of Directors, grant to him of quarters
procedure of Legislatures and courts as in the last generation. allowance of not exceeding P400 a month was approved. Submitted to
Hampton v. United States: Congress has found it frequently the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for
necessary to use officer of the executive branch within defined limits, to approval, the said resolution was disapproved by the said Committee on
secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting the strength of the recommendation of the NAFCO auditor, concurred in
discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statue by the Auditor General, (1) that quarters allowance constituted additional
and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing compensation prohibited by the charter of the NAFCO, which fixes the
for penalizing a breach of such regulation. salary of the general manager thereof at a sum not to exceed P15,000 a
In determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, year, and (2) that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did
the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to not warrant the granting of such allowance.
common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co- - NAFCO is a government controlled corporation, therefore subject to
ordination. the provisions of RA 51 and EO 93. RA 51 was approved authorizing the
Cincinnati, W. & Z & R. Co. v. Clinton County Commrs: The true President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms
distinction, *** is between the delegation of power to make the law, which and changes in government-owned and controlled corporations for the
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in operation. Pursuant to this authority, the President, promulgated EO 93
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid creating the Government Enterprises Council. The council was to advise
objection can be made. the President in the exercise of his power of supervision and control over
States ex rel. Buell v. Frear: No provision of the act, directly or indirectly these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures
by implication, authorizes any rule to be made that can add to or in any as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities.
way alter or amend the regulations made by the law. Only such rules are - The petitioner filed this petition for review after his motion for
authorized as serve to provide the details for the execution of the reconsideration was denied for the same reasons.
provisions of the law in its actual administration, to fix the way in the
requirements of the statute are to be met, and to secure obedience to its ISSUES
mandates. 1. WON EO 93 is null and void because it is based on a law that is
Dicey, Development of Administrative Law in England: There will unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislative power to the
remain two checks upon the abuse of power by administrative agencies. executive
2. WON quarters allowance is not compensation and so the granting of it Bank... and RA 265 which prescribes the penalty for the violation of
to the petitioner by the NAFCO board of directors does not contravene Circular 21. Joliffe was sentenced 1 year imprisonment, a fine of P2,000
the provisions of the NAFCO charter that the salary of the chairman of and the costs, as well as forfeiture of in favour of Govt the gold and
said board who is also to be general manager shall not exceed P15,000 travellers check. He now assails his conviction and the validity of the
per annum. said circular.

Held: 1. NO. Issue & Held:


Ratio So long as the Legislature lays down a policy and a standard is W/N Monetary Board in promulgating Circular 21 constitutes undue
established by the statute there is no undue delegation. delegation of legislative power? NO
Reasoning Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the
Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government- Ratio:
controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose It is a valid delegation because RA 265 furnished reasonable standard
shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the which sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act
free and independent Government of the Philippines and to promote so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with
simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was the legislative will. RA 265 provided the following standards:
set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he 1. Monetary Board and the President is given power to subject to
did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the licensing all transactions in gold & foreign currencies so as to
rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an
power. exchange crisis and to give the Board & the Govt time in which
2. Ratio Regardless of whether quarters allowance should be to take constructive measures to combat such crisis and
considered as compensation or not, the resolution of the board of 2. Board is authorize to take such appropriate remedial measures
directors authorizing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given as are appropriate to protect the international stability of the peso
effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise whenever the international reserve is falling as a result of
of the powers granted to it by Executive Order No. 93. payment or remittances abroad which in the opinion of the Board
DISPOSITION Petition dismissed. are contrary to the national welfare
These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the
delegated authority the character of administrative details in the
enforcement of law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the
category of a delegation of legislative powers.

9. MAINTAIN MONETARY STABILITY, PROMOTE RISING LEVEL OF


PRODUCTION AND REAL INCOME

PEOPLE v JOLIFFE

Facts:
Joliffe carried 4 bullions gold underneath his shirt; he was accosted at
the airport in violation of Circular 21 which requires that Any person
desiring to export gold in any form including jewellery, whether for
refining abroad or otherwise, must obtain a license from the Central
association, public or private organization of any character other
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE than an agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a
A. BOOK VII, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted
as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or
CHAPTER 1 agency as a party for limited purposes.
GENERAL PROVISIONS (8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final
Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative,
defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter,
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and
matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of privileges.
Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges. (9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation
of a final order.
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book: (10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration,
commission, authority or officer of the National Government charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of
authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege.
licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; (11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant,
research institutions with respect to licensing functions; renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal,
government corporations with respect to functions regulating limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.
private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in (12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition,
the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person;
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the
that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the
procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution,
its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or
concerning the internal administration or management of an suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or
agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the restrictive action.
public. (13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money,
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or
all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege,
tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the
commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates application or petition of any person.
which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and (14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with
followed by any person. respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, 1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every
amendment, or repeal of a rule. agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, equivalent or denial thereof.
in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific
parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be CHAPTER 2
determined after hearing. RULES AND REGULATIONS
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, Section 3. Filing. -
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library.
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to
filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or
the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. distribution costs.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the
pain of disciplinary action. certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing codified rules.
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
Section 9. Public Participation. -
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views
a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of prior to the adoption of any rule.
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
to persons who may be affected by them. the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines observed.
Law Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed CHAPTER 3
with it during the preceding quarter; and ADJUDICATION
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative
remaining in effect, together with a complete index and proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive
appropriate tables. litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable
settlement, comprise and arbitration.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. -
the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice
unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days
copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and
agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice place of the hearing.
stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new (2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence
copies thereof may be obtained. and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation,
pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty agreed settlement or default.
shall in all cases be published in full text. (3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.

Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:
the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every (1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence
issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct
of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies Section 17. Licensing Procedure. -
or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, (1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is
the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions
the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable.
officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted. (2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses regulations or when public security, health, or safety require
presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and annulled without notice and hearing.
of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its
specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made
an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with
reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall
Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the
the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of agency.
books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any
party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. CHAPTER 4
Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES
disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose Section 19. Appeal. - Unless otherwise provided by law or executive
jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the
contumacy or refusal as contempt. Department head.

Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. -
contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the (1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected
facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision
case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the
notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving
counsel of record, if any, or to them. copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate
agency, and paying the required fees.
Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become (2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall
final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the
the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the
reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
period. resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal.
(3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the
Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. - records of the case to the appellate agency.
(1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public
inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of Section 21. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall stay the decision
contested cases. appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or the appellate agency
(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just, considering the
equivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of nature and circumstances of the case.
those decisions or final orders for use by the public.
Section 22. Action on Appeal. - The appellate agency shall review the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
records of the proceedings and may, on its own initiative or upon motion, resolution to perfect his appeal.
receive additional evidence. (6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by
statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. - In any contested jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and Rules of Court.
executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the parties of a copy (7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a
thereof. whole. The findings of fact of the agency when supported by
substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically
Section 24. Hearing Officers. - provided otherwise by law.
(1) Each agency shall have such number of qualified and
competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be Section 26. Transmittal of Record. - Within fifteen (15) days from the
necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases. service of the petition for review, the agency shall transmit to the court
(2) No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of the original or a certified copy of the entire records of the proceeding
prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by
related case. agreement of all parties to the proceedings. The court may require or
permit subsequent correction or additions to the record.
Section 25. Judicial Review. -
(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in B. IN RULE-MAKING, PRICE, WAGE OR RATE FIXING
accordance with this chapter and applicable laws.
(2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency
decision may seek judicial review.
(3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the
agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary
parties as defined in the Rules of Court.
(4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing
with the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition
for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served
upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall
contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the
grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied
with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with copies
of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein
and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath
and shall how, by stating the specific material dates, that it was
filed within the period fixed in this chapter.
(5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1)
motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is
denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining
period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
C. IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality
1. RULES OF PROCEDURE here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure
2. DUE PROCESS from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
a. CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
ANG TIBAY v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
69 Phil 635; LAUREL; February 27, 1940 shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
Facts: such manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted
- The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The union decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary
avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing
ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the further industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative
members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose.
company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of
functions of which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
important documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents. administrative character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character:
Issue: WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
Held: NO. and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of
The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not play.
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from
functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. It means such
relations between them. It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the with the Respondent Board of Examiners for Surveyors. Allegedly,
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the Hernandez and Asprec entered into an agreement wherein Asprec would
parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the survey Hernandez lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a
evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right plan approved by the Director of Lands w/n 3 months after completion of
to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract the survey, and procure the issuance of a CTC to the lot w/n 6 months
from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that after the plans approval. However, even if Hernandez paid the agreed
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and amount, Asprec did not deliver the plan, and the alleged plan duly
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards delivered and approved was for one Damian Alhambra, and the plan
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. It should also be noted
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are that during the proceedings in the Board of Examiners, Asprec/his
only advisory. (6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on counsel had many times been absent, late, sickwhich caused the delay
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the of the proceedings.
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in -Respondent Board: For Hernandez: (1) no actual survey of the land
arriving at a decision. made; (2) money was paid; Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus
(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its violated the Code of Ethics for surveyors, his certificate of
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can registration as private land surveyor REVOKED and required to be
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision surrendered.
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority -Asprec filed petition with the CFI of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul
conferred upon it. the orders revoking his surveyors certificate of registration; mandamus
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the to compel the Board to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's him; and prohibition, to stop execution of the orders to surrender said
Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a certificate. The preliminary injunction prayed for was rejected below
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of -CFI: dismiss with costs
law.
- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new ISSUES
trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest 1. WON Asprec was denied due process in not being able to participate
of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to in the hearing
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such 2. WON the proceedings before the Board, being quasi-criminal in
other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The nature, was valid granted Asprec absented himself from it
legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the 3. WON the decision of the Board rendered upon a motion for judgment
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties on the pleadings valid
adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is (other issues were more on Civpro than Admin so not included)
granted, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.
Held: 1. NO
Ratio. Presence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due
ASPREC V ITCHON process. Really all that the law requires to satisfy adherence to this
15 SCRA 921; SANCHEZ, April 30, 1966 Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an
opportunity to be heard.
NATURE: Petition for review Reasoning. Petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend
himself before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last
Facts: and stipulated date of hearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial
-Private respondent Jacinto Hernandez (Hernandez) filed an tribunal to whipsaw the Board into giving him a new one. He cannot raise
administrative complaint against Cleto Asprec for unprofessional conduct his voice in protest against the act of the Board in proceeding in his and
his counsel's absence. And this because without cause or reason, Disposition. Upon the view we take of this case, the decision is hereby
without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy away affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
from the trial.
2. YES
Ratio. Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear VINTA MARITIME V NLRC (Basconcillo)
on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was 284 SCRA 656; PANGANIBAN; January 3, 1998
held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered
him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he Nature:Special civil action of certiorari
having been given an opportunity to be heard. Similarly, the defendant's
failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, Facts:
notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to - Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with the Philippine
so appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Workers Assistance and
his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc.
submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to and Elkano Ship Management, Inc.
proceed and render judgment upon evidence before it. - The employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence
3. YES and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.
Ratio. A rule so long respected, because it is buttressed upon reason They claim that he was given fair warning and enough opportunity to
and authority, is that technical rules of court practice, procedure and explain his side, not to mention all the chances given to him to improve
evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings. his substandard work performance before he was dismissed.
We should have in mind the nature of administrative bodies, the - The employee denied the allegations against him; contrary to his
character of the duties they are required to perform, the purposes for employers claim, he was actually surprised when he was told of his
which they are organized, the persons who compose them. Here, we are dismissal. This occurred after he had a verbal altercation with a British
concerned with members of a board of surveyors technical men but national, regarding the lack of discipline of the Filipino crew under the
not necessarily trained law men. In this posture, it is quite reasonable to engineers supervision. No inquiry or investigation, however,
assume that their proceedings may not be conducted with that degree of regarding his supposed incompetence or negligence was ever
exactness or with such scrupulous observance of the complex technical conducted; neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or
rules expected in a legal battle before a court of justice. Their acts should memorandum regarding the cause of his dismissal.
not be measured by the same yardstick exacted of a judge in a court of - POEA considered the case submitted for resolution by mutual
law. So much leeway is given an investigating administrative body. agreement of the parties after submission of their respective position
Reasoning. The plan allegedly made by Asprec was not the plan of an papers and supporting documents. POEA Administrator Achacoso
original survey but a mere copy from another plan. Both the plans were ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
submitted to the Board. So it is, that when counsel for Hernandez - On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA.
manifested that all the evidence against petitioner was submitted to the
Board and that for that reason he was resting his case, he evidently had ISSUE/S
in mind the admissions in the pleadings and the plans and decisions and 1. WON trial is indispensable in administrative proceedings
report here noted. And, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was a 2. WON the employee was illegally dismissed
mere follow-up of the manifestation just adverted to. As the trial court well
observed, counsel for respondent Hernandez did not present a motion Held: 1. NO
for judgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but "a Ratio Although bound by law and practice to observe due process,
motion which for lack of another expression, he called a motion for administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are nonetheless
judgment on the pleadings." Lack of observance of this technicality which free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements.
does not quarrel with a fair concept of justice should be overlooked. DUE PROCESS- Cardinal Primary Rights
- In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which resulted in the
right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have "total destruction of bus 170" of the company.
been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position -The Rural Transit Employees Association denied the charges and
papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus
arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. which was beyond the control of the driver Jacob
- These rules equally apply to cases filed with the Philippine Overseas -During the hearing of Bachrachs petition, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general
Employment Administration Adjudication Office. Proceedings before a manager of Rural Transit, was presented as the lone witness
POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to -After Mr. Kaplin concluded his direct testimony, the hearing was
the requirements of due process. scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-examination of the
Reasoning Petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to
answer, position paper and supporting documents had become parts of appear because he had left for abroad.
the records and were considered by the POEA and by the NLRC. -The employee's association filed a motion praying that:
2. YES (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records
Ratio Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the (b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob
termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal from the service be denied: and
dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the (c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with
termination was for a valid or authorized cause. backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the date of his actual reinstatement.
- Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires -The CIR dismissed the company's petition, lifted the suspension of
NOTICE and HEARING. The employer must furnish the worker with two driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages
written notices before termination can be legally effected: (1) notice -Bachrach's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the
which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which instant Petition for certiorari
his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. Issue: WON the CIR erred in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED. petition to discharge Maximo Jacob

Held: NO
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. V CIR (RURAL TRANSIT Ratio
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION) The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in
86 SCRA 27; MUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978 a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings
before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a
Nature:Petition for certiorari fundamental right which is part of due process.
Reasoning
Facts: -CIR did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to
-In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. was in the transportation business discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph
and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". Kaplin, to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed
-In that year, the Rural Transit Employees Association went on strike and however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination
the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived,
of Industrial Relations, which immediately ordered the strikers to return to without fault on its part, of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent
work and the management to take them back under the terms and association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness
conditions existing before the dispute arose. stricken off the record.
-While the labor dispute was pending with the CIR, Bachrach filed a -In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, this Court held inter
"Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service alia: Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete,
for alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law resulting in damage to that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse
party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for
such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be her oral defense. She was allowed to give an oral defense.
done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the After going over private respondents dissertation, Dr. Medina
witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. informed CSSP Dean Consuelo JoaquinPaz that there was a portion
-The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is in private respondents dissertation that was lifted, without proper
invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the acknowledgment, from Balfours Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern
accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyes article entitled
accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and
civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and
the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross- the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the Royal
examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal.
considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her
of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. dissertation. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private
-Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their
and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no signatures on the approval form.
other evidence which substantiates the charges against Maximo Jacob, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondents
the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation.
service is in order. The University Council met to approve the list of candidates for
Disposition Petition is dismissed. graduation for the second semester of school year 19921993. The
list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval,
included private respondents name.
UP BOARD OF REGENTS V. CA (AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for
MARGARET CELINE) Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondents
G.R. No. 134625; MENDOZA; August 31, 1999 name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification
of the problems regarding her dissertation.
Nature:Petition for review Dean Pazs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time,
because the next day, the Board approved the University Councils
Facts: recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen private respondent. Two days later, private respondent graduated
of India and holder of a Philippine visitors visa. she enrolled in the with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.
doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn.
Quezon City. Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism
After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to
program, private respondent went on a twoyear leave of absence to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree
work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.
Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges
Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines to work on against her.
her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the
the Philippines." recommendation to withdraw private respondents doctorate degree
Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The
Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same
Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.
Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably
summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and claim to have been denied due process.
asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges
her. against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to
During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent submit her written explanation, which she forwarded. Private respondent
of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the
submitted her written explanation in a letter. U.P. authorities explaining her position.
Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and private It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to
respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an
was scheduled but private respondent did not attend it, alleging administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to
that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
she could be fully heard. require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on
BOR withdrew degree the agenda of the Board of Regents.
TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by Arokiaswamy. CA
reversed ordering BOR to restore her doctoral degree. Disposition Petition for mandamus DISMISSED

Issue: WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process


ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. V. CA (SEC. OF AGRI AND
Held: NO. NATURAL RESOURCES)
Reasoning In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondents G.R. No. L-49711. AQUINO; November 7, 1979
petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of
Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due Nature: Petition for review
process. It said:
It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Facts:
Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for -This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second
the withdrawal of petitioners Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing its first decision and holding
chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was that it was improper for Benjamin M. Gozon, as Secretary of Agriculture
consummated. Petitioners subsequent letters to the U.P. President and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines.
proved unavailing. -The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court's judgment,
As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various confirming the Secretary's decision, should be set aside and that the
committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private Minister of Natural Resources should review anew the decision of the
respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, Director of Mines "and, thereafter, further proceedings will be taken in the
she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of trial court". The antecedental proceedings are as follows:
the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped (1) In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued
of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by
investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. or the
respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the
on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is located in Santa Cruz, Zambales.
simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance On the basis of petitioners' evidence (the private respondents did not
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion
to dismiss the protest), Director Gozon found that the petitioners did not
discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
with law. different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision
In that same order, Director Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the
groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloa, now the private same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
respondents-appellees, were duly located and registered (pp. 224-231, in his first view of the case.
Record on Appeal). That is the obvious, elementary reason behind the disqualification of a
(2) The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case
Agriculture and Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review (Sec. 1, Rule 137,
Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Rules of Court; secs. 9 and 27, Judiciary Law).
Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal, DANR A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should
Case No. 2151, on August 16, 1963 as if he was adjudicating the case have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as
for the first time. Thus, Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction Director of Mines. He should have asked his Undersecretary to
over a case which he had decided as Director of Mines. He acted as undertake the review.Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due
reviewing authority in the appeal from his own decision. Or, to use process, meaning fundamental fairness.
another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same Disposition Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
case. SET ASIDE

Issue: WON Gozun correctly reviewed his own decision


RIVERA V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Held: NO. 240 SCRA 43
Reasoning Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in VITUG; JAN 4, 1995
reviewing his decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant
anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing Nature:Petition for review on certiorari
his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative
justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137, provides: Facts:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations - Petitioner Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the
shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision: Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of
"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be Lao and Perez, petitioner was charged by the LBP President with having
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within committed the following offenses:
thirty days from the date of its receipt. "(1) Dishonesty;
"In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or "(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other valuable thing, in
order of the Director of Mines or of the Secretary of Agriculture and the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee, gift,
Natural Resources, the matter may be taken to the court of competent or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation
jurisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order; of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons;
otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the "(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws;
parties concerned." (As amended by Republic Act No. 746 approved on "(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession without the
June 18, 1952). permission required by Civil Service Rules and regulations;
Undoubtedly, the provision of section that the decision of the Director of "(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and
Mines may be appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."
Resources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different - Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which
from the Director of Mines. had a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten
turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently
received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of
proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.
Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of
approximately P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, Issue: WON petitioner was denied due process when Gaminde, who
as well as additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB
and pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration,
- Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of
and acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in Held: YES.
various companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received - In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, the
salaries and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set
by vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned
Trading Corporation. an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down
- Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the
suspension. After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said:
grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not
in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby turn out to be a farce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than
receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision
transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken
penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, in his first view of the case."
was thereupon imposed on Rivera. On appeal, the decision was - Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
modified by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which held Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in
Rivera guilty only of committing acts prejudicial to the best interest of the resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
service. The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument
decision. In its resolution, the MSPB denied the motion. that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29
- Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. The CSC dismissed the August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate,
appeal of Respondent George Rivera, finding him guilty of Grave indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying
Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.
service. Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied cdrep
in its Resolution No. 94-1276. Dispositive Resolution set aside, case remanded to CSC
- Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in
imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated
finding and conclusions. The SC Court resolved to dismiss the petition AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE
for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave PRESIDENT, GARMENTS & TEXTILE EXPORT BOARD & GLORIOUS
abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO. (PHILS.), INC.
motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now 187 SCRA 409; GUTIERREZ, JR.; May 23, 1991
strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Gaminde, who
earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB Nature: Appeal
when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration,
Facts:
- GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of 2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata on the ground that the
importations by the GTEB and, as a result of which, the export quotas final judgment in was a judgment on the merits.
allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB
decision, GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Held:
Court, contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and 1. NO. In finding that GTEB proceedings were irregular, the OP didnt
that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence. commit GAD as GTEB indeed violated the right to due process of
- Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court Glorious. GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the
issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the resolution against Glorious Sun. The decision penned by Deputy
administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS. Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and the resolution penned by
- However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted
the petition which the Court granted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in detail
- GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was why the private respondent was denied due process when its export
duly noted by the Court in a resolution. quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by the
- More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for records.
the restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a RATIO: Evidence on record must be fully disclosed to the parties.
reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. 2. NO. - The dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a
- GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against it were not technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. Hence, the
supported by evidence. dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot,
- Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision canceling its export quotas under the circumstances, constitute res judicata.
was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue Reasoning:
influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to - For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following
transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" requisites must concur:
corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA] and . . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had
AIFC. jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a
- GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity between the two
to withdraw its petition and to enter into joint venture agreements paving cases, as to the parties, subject matter and cause of action.
the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were allowed - The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one
to service GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished
machineries and equipment. from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical
- GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken to point." (Deang v. IAC).
the Office of the President. - The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had
- At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its been effectively remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the
opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has GTEB of its request for copies of the relevant documents.
long become final, and that a favorable action on the appeal would result - The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents
in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to it. by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the evidence in 1984 under the constitutional provision of due process
proceedings before the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other
to GTEB for further proceedings. subsequent cases.
- The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied. - The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to
in the 1987 decision as being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled
Issues: as Documents used by GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as
1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE earlier discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for being
ABUSE OF DISCRETION and privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence.
- At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of of discretion or act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Appellant's import prices drew a controverting statement from its own public respondent Office of the President in rendering its decision in OP
Raw Materials Importation Regulation Division, Case No. 3781 dated 7 September 1989.
- Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality,
and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. This general rule,
however, is not without exceptions. PEFIANCO V. MORAL
- As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, 322 SCRA 439; BELLOSILLO; Jan 19, 2000
manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the
findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its Nature:Petition for review of decision of CA
competence will not be disturbed by the courts.
- Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, Facts:
if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by - Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision.
these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their - Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National
jurisdiction. Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
- Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral
supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, with the pilferage of some historical documents.
imposition or collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual - DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative
findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when case. Moral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued
grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed.
(Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989]) - Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS
- In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied.
its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers - Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before regular
suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the
are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be
these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy
have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do of the said report.
these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with - Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for
assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he
workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families . elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. CA sustained
-Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the TC.
Malacaang decision. It was incorporated after the incidents in this case - Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec
happened. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas Pefianco.
arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely
because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from
an act of injustice inflicted on another private corporation. ISSUES
Dispositive: MFR is GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The 1. WON the order of the TC is proper
question decision and resolution of the Office of the President are hereby 2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report
AFFIRMED.
Held: 1. NO.
Separate Opinion - Section 3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily
FELICIANO-concurring: requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and
I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that petitioner distinctly state the reasons therefor.
American Inter-fashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse - The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of
the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the
general concept of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO BERNABE
rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis G.R. No. 129914; PARDO; May 12, 2000
why petitioners motion to dismiss was being denied.
- Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly Nature:Appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals
and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are
necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court Facts:
itself has not stated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a - A newspaper published an article saying that Bernabe headed a
prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on syndicate encashing treasury warrants of PC soldiers, policemen,
certiorari may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge firemen and jail personnel who were already dead, on awol, suspended
himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of and separated from the service.
liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was - President Ramos instructed the DILG Secretary to conduct an
justified. investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. The Secretary
2. NO. referred the directive to the PNP Director General, who ordered the
- Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a Criminal Investigation Service Command to investigate the charges.
ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require - Respondent was informed of the article and S/Supt. Romeo Acop
anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a ordered him to explain through affidavit.
writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the - Respondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against
thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to him were either dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution,
perform the act required. except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the
- In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to encashment of 7 treasury warrants. CICS Director Angel Quizon
demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation submitted to the Chief, PNP, a memorandum confirming respondents
Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS allegations.
Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. - By command of the Police Deputy Director General, respondent was
- Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission suspended from the police service for 90 days. Subsequently, he was
the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do given notice of complaint/charge and order to answer within 5 days from
so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final. receipt of the complaint.
- Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on - Respondent filed a motion for bill of particulars.
petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. - The CICS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical
On the contrary, it was held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applicable to
administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and administrative proceedings; hence, the allegations in the complaint are
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into sufficient to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer.
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative - The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer issued a resolution
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a recommending for respondent's dismissal from the PNP service. The
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented PNP Inspector General concurred with the recommendation of the
against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Summary Dismissal Officer.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. - The Chief PNP ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police
- More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes service because of heading a payroll syndicate, unexplained assets or
of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient wealth, and falsification of public documents (falsified his transcript of
findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal records with PUP)
from office was grounded. - Respondent appealed to the NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board,
Disposition Petition is granted. which sustained the summary dismissal of respondent from the PNP.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review accused EDILLO MONTEMAYOR, then OIC-Regional Director, Region
challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of III, of the DPWH, of accumulating unexplained wealth. Montemayor and
due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975. his wife purchased a house and lot in California, making a down payment
- After due proceedings, the CA promulgated its decision upholding the of US$100,000. His in-laws in California had a poor credit standing due
constitutionality of Section 42, R. A. 6975, but setting aside the decision to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an
of the National Appellate Board for failure to comply with the due process expensive property. It accused Montemayor of amassing wealth from
requirement of the Constitution. lahar funds and other public works projects.
- Montemayor submitted his counter-affidavit before the Philippine
Issue: WON the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the National Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) alleging that the real
Appellate Board, National Police Commission, on the ground that owner of the property was his sister-in-law Estela Fajardo. They were
respondent was denied due process in the conduct of the investigation of advised by an immigration lawyer (they wanted to emigrate) that it would
the charges filed against him be an advantage if they had real property in the US. He claimed that
Fajardo offered to buy the Burbank property and put the title in the
Held: YES, the requirements of due process were sufficiently complied names of Montemayor and his wife to support their emigration plans and
with. to enable her at the same time to circumvent a provision in her mortgage
Ratio Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full
situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a payment of a real estate she earlier acquired in Palmdale, Los Angeles.
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to He also attached a Consolidated Investigation Report of the Ombudsman
explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence.
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to - While Montemayor participated in the proceedings and submitted
explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the various pleadings and documents, Bundalian could not be located as his
action or ruling complained of. Philippine address could not be ascertained. PCAGC repeatedly required
Reasoning Montemayor to submit his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
- Record shows that respondent was given notice of the (he did not file his SALN from 1992-1994), Income Tax Returns (ITRs)
complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He and Personal Data Sheet. He ignored these directives and submitted
submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. only his Service Record.
He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him - The Office of the President, concurring with the findings and adopting
from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a the recommendation of the PCAGC, ordered Montemayors dismissal
memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. His MFR was
opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there was no violation of his right denied and his appeal to the CA was dismissed.
to procedural and substantive due process.
Disposition Petition GRANTED. ISSUES
1. WON Montemayor was denied due process in the investigation before
the PCAGC
MONTEMAYOR V BUNDALIAN
GR No. 149335 Held: 1. NO.
PUNO; July 1, 2003 Ratio The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action
Nature:Petition for review on certiorari or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity
to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process
Facts: are sufficiently met.
- An unverified letter-complaint, was received from LUIS BUNDALIAN by Reasoning The PCAGC exerted efforts to notify Bundalian of the
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California. It proceedings but his Philippine residence could not be located. Be that as
it may, Montemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of due process
because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. He Facts
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in The petitioner corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in
the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed garments manufacturing using the brand name "KAMISETA.
his counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the May 6, 1994 - Private Respondent Lorie Torino was hired as a
hearings, moved for a reconsideration of the Administrative Order issued trimmer with a salary of P80/day which was later increased to
by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the CA. His active P185/day (April 1997). The private respondent and a co-employee,
participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any Maricar Buan, were tasked to handle the inventory of finished
badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due products.
process requirement. Sometime later, the petitioner started to receive information from the
- The lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non- head of its production department that, according to other
appearance of the complainant did not divest the PCAGC of its authority. employees, the private respondent had been stealing "KAMISETA"
Under Section 3 of EO 151 creating the PCAGC, complaints involving items from the factory so an investigation was conducted on July 31,
graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against 1997 where two witnesses gave their account (one of finding
presidential appointees in the executive department. It is not uncommon numerous KAMISETA clothing in respondents home and the other
that a government agency is given wide latitude in the scope and of the respondent encouraging her to steal a belt from the stocks).
exercise of its investigative powers. The Ombudsman, under the On the same day, the respondent was made aware of the allegations
Constitution, is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form against her and she had her home inspected. During the course of
and manner concerning official acts or omissions. The Court the inspection, various KAMISETA clothing and wallpapers were
Administrator of this Court investigates and takes cognizance of, not only found in her home.
unverified, but even anonymous complaints filed against court On the basis of the said report, the petitioner issued a disciplinary
employees or officials for violation of the Code of Ethical Conduct. This action form suspending the private respondent indefinitely without
policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government pay.
to minimize, if not eradicate, graft and corruption in the service. On August 25, 1997, a notice of dismissal was addressed to the
- In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and private respondent specifying the charge against her, the factual
evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be basis thereof and the imposable penalties for the said charge if
fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough proven and was called to the Head Office in order to explain herself.
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against
The private respondent failed to appear during the scheduled
him is decided.
hearing.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioner decided to dismiss the private
respondent from her employment.
The private respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal.
SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC
The case was raffled to LA Tumanong, however despite various
419 SCRA 354
mandatory conferences they didnt reach an amicable settlement and
the petitioner filed for the conduct of a full blown hearing which was
SHOPPES MANILA, INC.
granted by LA Tumanong and set for hearing.
vs.
However, the hearing failed to materialize because of the absences
THE HON. NLRC, LABOR ARBITER ERMITA ABRASALDO-CUYUCA
of either the private respondent or her counsel.
and LORIE TORNO
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Meanwhile, LA Tumanong was replaced by LA Cuyuca who ordered
January 14, 2004 the case submitted for decision and redered a decision stating that
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 for the nullification of the resolution respondent was illegally dismissed awarding her with full
of the CA backwages and separation pay since reinstatement was not feasible
due to the strained relations between employer and employee.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the ruling of the LA. assistance of his representative, if he so desires; (b) if the employer
Dissatisfied the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the CA via decides to terminate the services of the employee, the employer must
Rule 65 of the RoC notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the
The CA likewise affirmed the NLRC ruling and denied the petitioners reason therefore. Thus, the SC affirms the CAs holding of an illegal
MR. dismissal.
Hence, the present petition. Further, the SC refused to entertain questions of fact because the SC is
not a trier of facts so these questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve
Issues/Held and in this respect, the findings of the NLRC and the CA are accorded
(1) Whether the CA erred in finding that the absence of a formal hearing with great respect.
did not amount to a denial of petitioners right to due process. NO
(2) Whether the CA erred in affirming the illegality of private respondents
dismissal in spite of the existence of just causes supporting it. NO
AUTENCIO V MANARA
Ratio 449 SCRA 46
1. Contrary to petitioners contention, the CA correctly held that it did not PANGANIBAN; January 19, 2005
have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because LA
Tumanong granted its motion and set the case for hearing. Pursuant to Nature:Petition for Review under Rule 45
Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor
arbiter has the authority to determine whether or not there is a necessity Facts:
to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for adjudication. - Manara lodged a complaint against Autencio for dishonesty and
The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor misconduct in office.
arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of - after hearing, the Office for Legal Services of the City of Cotobato
right. It is entirely within his authority to decide a labor case before him, declared Autencio guilty of misconudct in office for allowing irregularities
based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties, to happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals.
without a trial or formal hearing. The requirements of due process are - petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which modified the
satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position decision to grave misconduct, and imposed the penalty of dismissal for
papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would cause with all its accessories
prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be - petitioner, in her motion for reconsideration, alleged that she had
conducted or was necessary. waived her right to present her evidence at a formal hearing to submit the
The order of LA Tumanong granting the petitioners motion for a hearing case for resolution, only because of the manifestation of the
of the case was not conclusive and binding on LA Cuyuca who had the complainant and the hearing officer that she could be held liable only for
discretion either to hear the case before deciding it, or to forego with the the lesser offense of simple negligence.
hearing if, in her view, there was no longer a need therefor as the case - petitioner elevated the case to the CA, which affirmed the CSC
could be resolved on its merits based on the records. resolutions; CA denied reconsideration.

2. For a valid dismissal, the law requires that (a) there be just and valid ISSUE/S
cause as provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) that the 1. WON petitioner was deprived of substantial due process because she
employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. was made to believe that she would be liable for the lesser offense of
simple negligence.
In the case, as held by the CA, the petitioner had failed to show that it
had complied with the two-notice requirement: (a) a written notice Held: 1. NO
containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the Reasoning On the formal charge against her, petitioner had received
employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense.
She filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and - Petitioner was formerly an Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of
submitted Affidavits of personnel in the Assessors Office to support her Immigration and Deportation.
claim of innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal - In Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993, the City
officer, during which she -- assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Prosecutors office of Pasay City recommended that petitioner Samalio
Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the be prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of
CSC, and then to the CA In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable the Immigration Law before the Sandiganbayan under the following facts:
opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements of due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the "x x x that on 2 February 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin arrived at the NAIA
purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, from Saipan. While waiting for her turn at the arrival immigration counter,
during which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not her passport was examined by Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarillaga.
always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal Noting that Ms. Weng, a Chinese, was holding a Uruguayan passport,
or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in Ms. Pajarillaga suspected that the formers passport was fake. Ms. Weng
procedural due process may be cured. was taken out of the queue and brought to Respondent who was the duty
Settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an intelligence officer. Ms. Weng, who could only speak in Chinese, asked
administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported respondent by sign language that she wanted to meet a friend who was
by substantial evidence. It is not the task of this Court to weigh once waiting at the NAIA arrival area. Respondent approved the request and
more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to accompanied Ms. Weng to the arrival area. Thereafter, Respondent, with
substitute its own judgment for that of the latter in respect of the Ms. Weng and her male friend in tow, returned to the immigration area.
sufficiency of evidence. In any event, the Decisions of the CSC and the While inside the office of Respondent, Ms. Weng asked that her passport
Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge be returned. Sensing a demand for money in exchange for her passport,
prepared against her are supported by substantial evidence. Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of Respondent. The money was
Disposition Petition is denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution grabbed by Respondent. Shortly, her passport was returned ans [sic] she
affirmed. was allowed to leave. When Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she
discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp. Thereafter,
Ms. Weng complained against Respondent."
- Then BID Commissioner, Zafiro L. Respicio, issued Personnel Order
SAMALIO V CA (CSC, DOJ, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION)
No. 93-179-93 commencing an administrative case against petitioner
454 SCRA 462
Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of CSMC No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for
CORONA; March 31, 2005
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties,
Nature :Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct
Court assailing the May 24, 1999 decision, as well as the September 1,
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
1999 resolution, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723
which in turn affirmed the November 26, 1997 resolution of the Civil - During the pendency of the administrative case, petitioner was
Service Commission (CSC). The aforementioned CSC resolution upheld convicted of robbery before the Sandiganbayan regarding the same
the August 30, 1996 1st Indorsement of then Justice Secretary Teofisto T. incident.
Guingona confirming the penalty of dismissal from service imposed by - Petitioner filed motion to dismiss admin case. Denied. Indorsement
the Bureau of Immigration upon petitioner on the ground of dishonesty, mentioned (SEE NATURE) was issued.
oppression, misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service in connection with his act of extorting money from ISSUE/S
Ms. Weng Sai Qin, a foreign national. 1. WON petitioner was denied due process

Facts: Held: 1. NO.


Ratio Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Administrative not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in the
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of Sandiganbayan criminal case which sprang from the information filed
certain procedural requirements, subject to the observance of pursuant to Resolution No. 0-93-0224 of the City Prosecutors Office of
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable Pasay City, the very same resolution used by Commissioner Respicio as
cases presented before them. In administrative proceedings, technical basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified to
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and by Weng Sai Qin was the same issue in the administrative case, that is,
administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also
its strict judicial sense. had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai
Reasoning Due process in an administrative context does not require Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan.
trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule on former
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus,
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A the CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they
formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances applied it and took cognizance of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin
essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at convicted.
hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative Disposition ]petition is DENIED.
tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of
due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely MEDINA V. COA
on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the
parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct LORNA MEDINA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA),
testimony. represented by the Audit Team of EUFROCINIA MAWAK, SUSAN
The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the PALLERNA, and MA. DOLORES TEPORA, Respondents.
Secretary of Justice confirming the decision of the Commissioner of the
BID are supported by substantial evidence. The CSC, as well as the Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of the BID, decided the case Date: February 4, 2008
on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and Ponente: Tinga, J. (En Banc decision)
relied on the records of the proceedings taken. In particular, the decision
was based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin against Facts:
petitioner before the City Prosecutors Office of Pasay City, as well as a This petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent COA
resolution of the same office recommending the prosecution of petitioner on the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official
at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of robbery and violation of Section capacity as Municipal Treasurer of General Mariano Alvarez, Cavite.
46 of the Immigration Law. In the Joint affidavit executed by Mawak and her team members
The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took cognizance of Pallerna, Tepora and Alvarez, who were all state auditors of the
the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan Criminal Case and Provincial Auditors Office of Cavite, they stated that they had
the fact of petitioners conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample examined petitioners financial records from August 19, 1999 to
evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative September 26, 2000 and discovered a total cash shortage of
proceedings substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant P4,080,631. They directed petitioner to restitute shortage within 72
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a hours. They also sent a report asking for the relief of petitioner from
conclusion to support the decision of the CSC. her post as municipal treasurer and the filing of criminal charges
In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative against her.
proceedings before the BID because she left the country even before the COA filed an administrative case before the Office of the Deputy
administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does Ombudsman for Luzon charging petitioner with grave misconduct
and dishonesty. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit and Position paper that petitioners allegations as regards the incompetence of the audit
raising the following defenses: 1) audit team was not independent team and the errors of audit report were matters which may be
and competent; 2) computation of her accountabilities was properly ventilated during trial. He also said that petitioners failure to
overstated and erroneous; 3) audit team failed to verify documents produce the missing funds created a presumption that the same
such as bank statements etc; 4) documents in support of the audit were appropriated for personal use and such findings warranted the
report were not signed, hence, self-serving; 5) cash shortage in the filing of criminal charges against petitioner. He denied petitioners
amount of P379,646 unfer the SEF and Trust fund as well as amount request on the ground that petitioners request for re-audit could not
of P585,803 had no basis as the same pertained to previous audit be considered newly discovered evidence and that she was afforded
thus, should have been excluded from computation; 6) cash items due process.
amounting to P883,952 in the form of reimbursement expense Petitioner elevated matter to Court of Appeals via Petition for Review
receipts should not have been disallowed because they were questioning the denial of her request for a formal investigation. CA
received by individual payees; 7) petitioners cash on hand dismissed the petition and held that petitioner was not entitled to a
accountability was overstated because a collection was not formal investigation and it affirmed the deputy ombudsmans factual
immediately recorded; and 8) audit team erroneously credited finding that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
petitioners accounts to another cashier. CA also denied her MR.
November 8, 2004 Deputy Ombusman Victor Fernandez approved
the recommendation to dismiss petitioner from service based on the Issues/Held:
existence of substantial evidence of discrepancy on petitioners 1. Which is the applicable law, the Administrative Code of 1987 or
account totaling P4 M. Said decision noted petitioners supposed Administrative Order No. 07 as amended by Admin Order No.
failure to file a counter-affidavit and position paper despite due 17? ADMIN ORDER NO. 07
notice. 2. Whether petitioner was deprived of her right to due process. NO
November 29, 2004 petitioner filed urgent motion stating she Whether petitioners guilt for grave misconduct and dishonesty is
complied with the directive to file a counter-affidavit and position supported by substantial evidence. YES.
paper and praying the defenses therein be considered. This motion 3. Whether the penalty of dismissal is proper. YES
was treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Nov 8 decision.
January 31, 2005 Deputy Ombudsman Fernandez issued the first Ratio:
assailed Order denying petitioners urgent motion. The order
acknowledged the erroneous statement in the Nov 8 decision but 1. Petitioner insists that she is entitled to a formal investigation, citing
nevertheless affirmed the resolution and decision in said decision. Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 48(2)
Fernandez ruled that petitioners counter-affidavit and position paper and (3).2 Respondent COA, through the OSG, relies on
did not present exculpatory arguments that would negate allegation
2
of discrepancy. He also held that petitioners concerns relating to SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. xxx
conduct of the audit should have been raised at the time of the audit (2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit
sworn statements covering his testimony and those of witnesses together with his
or immediately thereafter and that petitioners failure to produce the documentary evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to
amount of cash shortage created a presumption that she exist, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall
appropriated public funds under her custody for personal use. notify the respondent in writing of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached
Petitioner sought reconsideration on grounds of newly discovered copies of the complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted, and the
respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint
and material evidence and grave errors of fact and/or law prejudicial to answer the charges in writing under oath, together with supporting sworn statements and
to her own interest. The new evidence consisted of petitioners documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his
request for reconsideration of audit report filed and still pending answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the disciplinary
before the office of the audit team head. authority shall dismiss the case.
SEC. 48. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. xxx (3)
March 22, 2005 (2nd assailed order) Deputy Ombudsman Although a respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be
Fernandez denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. He said conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent,
including the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously
Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law
No. 17, Rule III, Section 5, governing the procedure in administrative alone which should govern the case.
cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner argues
that the Admin. Order No.07 is inferior to the provision in the 2. The denial of petitioners request for a formal investigation is not
Administrative Code which entitles respondent to a formal tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. The essence of
investigation if he so desires. due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
Admin Order No. 07 particularly governs the procedure in complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombusman. The heard before the judgment is rendered, the demands of due process
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was issued are sufficiently met. Also, it appears that petitioner sought a
pursuant to the authority vested in the office under RA 6770 or the reinvestigation only as an afterthought, that is, after the deputy
Ombudsman Act of 1989. Rules and regulations when promulgated ombudsman had already rendered a decision. The findings of fact in
in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative decisions must be respected as long as they are
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute. supported by substantial evidence. It has been held that substantial
evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of
Provisions in the Administrative Code cited by petitioner apply only to fact which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. The might accept to support a conclusion. The SC is not a trier of facts.
administrative complaint filed against petitioner was filed before the
Office of the Ombusman, therefore, rules of procedure in Admin 3. The penalty of dismissal is proper. Petitioner argues that the
Order No 07 must be followed. The SC has ruled on the primacy of mitigating circumstances of this being her first offense and the
special laws and of their implementing regulations over the Admin unreasonable length of time in filing the administrative case should
Code of 1987 in settling controversies specifically subject of these be considered in her favor. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
special laws. declaring that a grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that
the accused is a first time offender or by the length of service of the
Hon. Joson vs Exec. Sec. Torres: Loc Gov Code of 1991, its IRR and accused.
Admin Order No. 23 govern administrative disciplinary proceedings
against elective local officials whereas the ROC and the Admin Code Civil Service Commission v Cortez: the gravity of the offense
of 1987 apply in a suppletory character to all matters not provided in committee is also the reason why we cannot consider the first
Admin Order No. 23. STATCON: Where there are two statutes offense circumstance as invoked by respondent. Even though the
applicable to a particular case, that which is specially intended for offense respondent was found guilty of was her first offense, the
said case must prevail. gravity outweighs the fact that it was her first offense.

Lapid vs Court of Appeals: The SC upheld the applicability of the Concerned Employees v Nuestro: a court employee charged and
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and its IRR to the exclusion of the Loc Gov found guilty of dishonesty for falsification was meted the penalty of
Code and Admin Code of 1987 on the issue of the execution of the dismissal notwithstanding the length of her service in view of the
Ombudsmans decision pending appeal. SC: There is nothing in the gravity of the offense.
Ombudsman Act which provides for the suppletory application of the
LocGov Code and the Admin Code of 1987. In the present case, the
acts attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of Dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain
administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on the fitness of a
President under the LocGov Code. Considering however, that the civil servant to continue in office. When an officer is disciplined, the
object sought is not the punishment of such officer but the improvement

without conducting such an investigation.


of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to
confidence in the government. include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
DOMINGO V. RAYALA counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend
ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
Date: February 18, 2008 constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable
Ponente: NACHURA, J.: guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
Facts: consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
Lourdes Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a known to the parties affected.
Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of AO 250, Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7877 Anti-Sexual Harassment Act The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these
against Rayala before DOLE Secretary. procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he
questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, he appeared,
DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the Office of the Pres, Rayala personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate Designation of the offense is also not controlling. Under AO 250, sexual
the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any
purpose. The Committee found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
250.

Secretary Laguesma submitted to the OP a copy of the Committee A. Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. represented by CARMEN Z.
Report and Recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for ARNAIZ, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; DEPARTMENT
six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250. OF AGRARIAN REFORM; REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DAR REGION V,
LEGASPI CITY; PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, DAR
OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO that concur with the PROVINCIAL OFFICE, MASBATE, MASBATE; MUNICIPAL
findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the Rayala and latter is AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, DAR MUNICIPAL OFFICE,
DISMISSED from the service. MASBATE, MASBATE, respondents.
GR No. 170623, July 9, 2010
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied. Petition Facts:: A. Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc., filed a petition for exclusion from the
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage dated April
was dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. The CA 25, 1994 before the Regional Director of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a parcel
dismissed petition and held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. of land situated at Brgy. Asid, Sinalugan, Masbate, Masbate since the
However in its Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision: the land has been devoted to cattle-ranching purposes since time
penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension immerorial, not tenanted and has more than 18% slopes. However the
from service for the maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY petition was denied and ordered to be still in the coverage of the
IMPOSED upon the petitioner. acquisition of the properties under the coverage of CARP. It was
established that a portion of land was leased to Monterey Farm for 10
ISSUE: W/N Rayala was accorded due process. years. Petitioner sold its entire herd of cattle to Monterey Farms
Corporation before the expiration of lease agreement. It was also
HELD/RATIO:
established that said land is not owned by the petitioner but rather by to be heard on hi motion for reconsideration. The court generally accord
Nuestra Senora del Carmen Marble, Inc with a new TCT number. great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in because of their special knowledge and expertise on matters within its
December 8, 1995. Petitioner appealed again the Order to the Sec. of specific and specialized jurisdiction.
Agrarian Reform for two separate motions for ocular inspection. The Sec.
of Agrarian Reform dismissed for lack of merit on Oct. 23, 1996. Ordering WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
CARP to identify portions and areas not suited for agriculture and be Decision dated August 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
excluded from the program and do the necessary notices. Petitioner filed No. 73687, and the Resolution dated November 24, 2005,
another motion for reconsideration but was denied on February 13, 1998. are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner then sought recourse before the Office of the President (OP)
on Sept. 19, 2001 but dismissed the appeal. Petitioner again filed for
motion for reconsideration on the argument that OP seriously erred but
CA rendered that petition for review is DENIED DUE COURSE and was
DISMISSED on August 11, 2005. CA ratiocinated that DAR were Gannapao v. CSC
supported that substantial evidence which the petitioner failed to
established.
On a petition for motion for reconsideration which was again VILLARAMA, JR.,J | G.R. No. 180141 | May 31, 2011
denied on Nov. 24, 2005, Petitioner argued and insists that they were not
given due process, and that subject lands are not suitable for agriculture Facts::
if they contain slope more than 18%. Petitioner also added that DAR In April 1995, UWTC started operating MMTCs buses. At about the same
should allow for the ocular inspection to be conducted invoking the Luz time, petitioner was allegedly employed by Atty. Gironella, the general
Farms v Secretary of Department of Agri and Department of Agri v Sutton manager appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal
that the petitioners property should be excluded from the coverage of bodyguard.
the CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property is excluded from the coverage of Respondents further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the
CARP buses regularly driven by them were confiscated by a group led by
Whether or not Petitioner was denied due process petitioner.Armed with deadly weapons petitioner and his group
HELD: No, CA held that the properties are not excluded from the intimidated and harassed respondents. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the
coverage of CARP since the petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and
to Monterey Farms as a lessor. The 433 hectares are devoted to marble, his termination.
gold and other mineral. The said land was also not for the exclusive use
for pasture neither it was for breeding cattle. The portion for used for The complaint passed an investigation with The Inspector General,
cattle was not even under the petitioners name. The court did not also Internal Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP. In his answer, petitioner
believed the contention of petitioner that the presence of the NPAs, bad denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that it was his twin
elements diminished the land area used by the petitioner. The more than brother, Reynaldo Gannapao, who worked as messenger at UWTC.In a
18% slope was also invalid in fact the said land is predominantly memorandum, it was recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
cultivated below 18% slope. Petitioner cannot also argue that the findings
of DAR and the OP were baslesess and unjustifiable. Subsequently,National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum
No, it was consistently established and held that the essence of due was issued, and a summary hearing on the complaint was conducted.
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, and opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The same was denied.
seek for reconsideration of the acting or ruling complained of. The denial
of due process cannot be invoked by someone who had the opportunity PNP Chief Sarmiento rendered his Decision finding petitioner guilty as
charged and suspending him for three months from the police service We hold that the CA did not err in affirming the CSC ruling which
without pay. modified the penalty imposed by the PNP Director General as affirmed
by the DILG Secretary, from three months suspension to dismissal.
Petitioners MR was likewise denied, thus, he elevated the case to the Under Memorandum Circular No. 93-024(Guidelines in the Application of
NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board.His appeal, however, was Penalties in Police Administrative Cases), the following acts of any
dismissed. member of the PNP are considered Grave Offenses:

Aggrieved, petitioner brought his case to the DILG but his appeal was x x x C.The following are Grave Offenses: x x x x Serious Irregularities in
denied. the Performance of Duties. This is incurred by any member of the PNP
who shall:
Petitioner then appealed to the CSC, it was dismissed but the penalty of
suspension was increased to dismissal from service. x x x x c.act as bodyguard or security guard for the person or property of
any public official, orprivate person unless approved by the proper
Petitioner thus filed with the CA a Petition for Review but it was later on authorities concerned. x x x x The CSC found that petitioner indeed
denied because petitioner cannot claim denial of due process since he worked for Atty. Gironella as the latters bodyguard-- at least during the
was given ample opportunity to present his side. relevant period, from April 1995 up to December 1995 when Barien, et al.
filed their verified complaint before the Inspectorate Division
CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v MORADAS


January 15, 2014 | Perlas-Bernabe, J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari |
(1) Whether petitioner was denied due process, Due Process

(2) Whether the CA correctly affirmed the CSCs decision modifying the PETITIONER: INC Shipmanagement, Inc., Captain Sigfredo Monterroyo
penalty from suspension to dismissal from service. and/or Interorient Navigation Limited
RESPONDENT: Alexander Moradas
HELD: The petition must fail. SUMMARY: Moradas was a seaman of the petitioners vessel. He
suffered deep burns while in the vessel. He claimed that it was due to an
DUE PROCESS AS OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD explosion rendering him permanently incapable of working. He
demanded payment of his full disability benefits. Petitioners claimed that
We have held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, his injury was self-inflicted and presented affidavits and statements by
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones vessel's officers and crew members to support their claim. SC
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling affirmed NLRC, ruling that there was substantial evidence to establish
complained of.As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his that the injury of respondent was self-inflicted.
interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Here, it is clear
that petitioner was afforded due process since he was given his fair DOCTRINE: One of the guidelines in Ang Tibay is that there be
opportunity to present his case. As a matter of fact, petitioner actively substantial evidence. In this case, petitioners were able to establish
participated in the proceedings thus negating his contention that he was substantial evidence that respondents injury was directly attributable to
unfairly deprived of his chance to present his case. him

MOONLIGHTING AS BODYGUARD, GRAVE OFFENSE, DISMISSAL Facts:


WAS PROPER Respondent Moradas was employed as a wiper for the vessel MV
Commander by petitioner INC Shipmanagement. Respondent suffered
deep burns when certain chemicals splashed all over his body because
of an explosion. Claiming that the burns rendered him permanently Also, petitioner had a motive as he was caught pilfering the vessel's
incapable of working again as a seaman, he demanded for the payment supplies for which he was told that he was to be relieved from his duties.
of his full disability benefits. It was natural for him to brood over feelings of resentment considering
his impending dismissal.
In their position paper, petitioners denied respondent's claim, contending
that his injury was self-inflicted as he burned himself by pouring paint
thinner on his overalls and set himself on fire. They presented affidavits Concurring opinion of Brion, J.
and statements by vessel's officers and crew members to support (Brion agrees that Morada is not entitled to the disability benefits but
their claim. disagrees with how the pieces of evidence were interpreted.)

In his reply to the position paper, respondent denied burning himself, As the CA did, I do not see any logical or causal connection between the
contending that such act was contrary to human nature and logic. LA charges of stealing and the acts of sabotage, on one hand, and the self-
decided in petitioners' favor, giving more credence to the corroborating inflicted burning that Moradas allegedly committed, on the other hand. It
testimonies of the petitioners' witnesses. NLRC affirmed LA. CA ruled in is simply contrary to human nature and experience for Moradas to set
favor of respondent because petitioners werent able to establish or himself ablaze because he was caught stealing the ship's supplies. It is
substantiate their claim that the respondent's injury was caused by his not true that Moradas failed to rebut the witness' claim that he saw
willful act. Moradas go to the paint room and soak his hands in a can full of thinner.
Moradas actually made a specific denial of that claim in his position
paper before the LA.
ISSUE/S: WON there was substantial evidence YES
The ponencia also explained that the corroborating affidavits of the other
RULING: Petition granted. Moradas is not entitled to total disability crew members and officers cannot be dismissed as self-serving in the
benefits. absence of any showing that they were lying when they made their
statements. The problem with this explanation is that the other crew
RATIO: members who executed their own affidavits have no personal
1. NLRC had cogent legal bases to conclude that petitioners have knowledge about the burning itself.
successfully discharged the burden of proving by substantial evidence
that respondents injury was directly attributable to him. Respondent Chief Officer Bejadas unnotarized written statement establishes the
failed to successfully controvert a witness' testimony that he soaked his following facts: (i) that he saw Moradas while burning; and (ii) that there
hands in a can full of thinner. Also, respondent's version that the burning was no fire in the incinerator whose steel plates were cool to the touch.
was caused by an accident is hardly supported by evidence on record. His bare statements, however, do not in any way prove that Moradas
Testimonies show that there was no fire in the incinerator room at the injury was self-inflicted.
time respondent got burned and there were no signs of explosion.
While Chief Officer Bejada stated that he ordered an ordinary seaman to
Respondent contended that the affidavits and statements of the vessels extinguish the fire in the incinerator, the petitioners did not even bother to
officers and his fellow crew members should not be given probative value present the crucial testimony of this supposed seaman to substantially
as they were biased, self-serving, and mere hearsay. However, he failed corroborate Chief Officer Bejadas claim.
to present any evidence to substantiate his own theory. Corroborating
affidavits and statements of the vessels officers and crew members
must be taken as a whole and cannot just be perfunctorily dismissed as
self-serving absent any showing that they were lying when they made the AGUILAR V. O'PALLICK
statements therein. G.R. NO. 182280, JULY 29, 2013
Yes. This Court's pronouncement in a former case [case decided by the
GATACELO DOCTRINE: The principle that a person cannot be SC involving Aguilar and PPGI wherein the Court ruled that the
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he foreclosure proceeding already vested ownership to Aguilar] can in no
was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due way constitute a final determination of O'Pallick's claim.
process of law.
Facts:: In his Amended Complaint, O'Pallick averred that Aguilar obtained her
Contract to Sell was executed between Primetown Property Group, title through unlawful means. Clearly, therefore, although captioned as
Inc. (PPGI) and Poblete & Villanueva over a unit in Makati Prime one for Quieting of Title, O'Pallick's suit is actually a suit for annulment of
Citadel Condominium. Poblete and Villanueva executed in favor of title. Basic is the rule that "[t]he cause of action in a [C]omplaint is not
O'Pallick a Deed of Assignment covering the unit. Later, PPGI issued determined by the designation given to it by the parties. The allegations
a Deed of Sale in favor of O'Pallick after the latter paid the purchase in the body of the [C]omplaint define or describe it. The designation or
price in full. Although O'Pallick took possession of the unit, the Deed caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the [C]omplaint. It is
of Sale in his favor was never registered nor annotated. not even an indispensable part of the [C]omplaint."
Meanwhile, in a case between PPGI and Aguilar before HLURB, the
latter was able to obtain a final and executory Decision in her favor, "The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
thus levying the subject condominium unit. The sale at public auction an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to
was scheduled to be held on March 30, 2000. But before the the constitutional guarantee of due process of law." Thus, we agree with
scheduled auction sale, O'Pallick filed an Affidavit of Third-Party the CA's pronouncement that since OPallick was not impleaded in the
Claim. Eventually, though, Aguilar was declared the highest bidder HLURB case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein.
and became the owner since PPGI failed to redeem the property. Because he was not impleaded in said case, he was not given the
Subsequently, O'Pallick instituted an action to quiet title and to set opportunity to present his case therein. But, more than the fact that
aside the levy on execution of the subject unit, to annul the certificate O'Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the right to
of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit. vindicate his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior
O'Pallick claimed that when PPGI executed a Deed of Sale in his purchaser of the very same condominium unit, he had the right to be
favor, all rights and interests over the unit were transferred to him, heard on his claim.
and the subsequent levy and sale thereof to Aguilar created a cloud
on his title.
Petitioners sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that PPGI RAY PETER O. VIVO vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME
remained the registered owner of the unit and the title covering the CORPORATION
same remained clean and free of annotations indicating claims by G.R. No. 187854 | November 12, 2013
third persons.
RTC: It had no jurisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution Facts:
ordered by the HLURB, an agency under the Office of the President, By petition for review on certiorari the petitioner seeks the review and
because said Office is a co-equal body. reversal of the decision, whereby the Court of Appeals CA) reversed
CA: It sustained O'Pallick's argument that since he was not a party to and set aside the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
the HLURB case, he could not be bound by its disposition as well as The petitioner was employed by respondent Philippine Amusement
the incidents and actions taken therein; thus, he had the right to file a and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and was PAGCORs Managing
separate action to protect and vindicate his claim. Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from
office .He received a letter from the Senior Managing Head of
ISSUE: PAGCORs Human Resources Department, advising that he was
WON OPallick can still assail Aguilars title of ownership over the unit. being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-
mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and
HELD: loss of trust and confidence;6 that he should submit a written
explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being 2. WON CAs decision was contrary to the Uniform Rules on
placed under preventive suspension.7 Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and settled jurisprudence.
Petitioners counsel assailed the propriety of the show-cause
memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under HELD:
preventive suspension. 1. No..
Petitioner received the summons to attend an administrative inquiry, The Court ruled that the petitioner was not denied due process of law, for
requiring him to appear before PAGCORs Corporate Investigation he was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side.
Unit (CIU).8 At the petitioners request, however, the inquiry was That was sufficient to meet the requirements of due process. 29 In
conducted at his residence. He was furnished the memorandum of Casimiro v. Tandog,30 the Court pronounced:
charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. The requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In
memorandum of charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due
personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the
him. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may
had already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
and answer the charges against him during the administrative through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
inquiry. procedural due process.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear in The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the
order to address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR. In contrast, the
for the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by
available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the PAGCOR as set forth herein. It is settled that there is no denial of
request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not procedural due process where the opportunity to be heard either through
necessary in the proceedings. oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.19
PAGCOR dismissed the petitioner from the service.11A motion for
reconsideration was filed, however, denied. Petitioner appealed his 2. No.
dismissal to the CSC which ruled that PAGCOR had violated the In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been
petitioners right to due process, and accordingly set aside his recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive
dismissal from the service. In fine, the Commission finds that the notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents
right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
his office without the corresponding Board Resolution that should assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor,
have set out the collegial decision of the PAGCOR Board of and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
Directors. jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
PAGCOR elevated the case to the CA. CA promulgated its decision administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. The substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
CA remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
appeal of the petitioner on the merits, specifically the issue of In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that P AGCOR
whether the dismissal had been for cause. had properly observed the requirements of due process in its
administrative proceedings against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Therefore, the petition for review on certiorari was denied.
1.. WON the petitioners right to due process was violated.
Ebdane v. Apurillo pointed out that aside from the fact that RMPB had firmly expressed
G.R. No. 204172 | December 9, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe in its duly sworn letter of intent that it was a registered contractor with
the DPWH, it was not their duty to determine whether a contractor is
Juanito R. Alama, DPWH Assistant Head of the BAC-Technical a registered contractor with the DPWH Notarial Registry of Civil
Working Group (BAC-TWG), received an anonymous complaint from Works Contractors. They prayed for the dismissal of the Formal
an alleged concerned employee of the DPWH, Tacloban City, Charge and the lifting of the preventive suspension order against
claiming that R.M. Padillo Builders (RMPB), a local contractor, won them. They expressly waived their rights to a formal hearing, and
the bidding for the construction of the Lirang Revetment Project, sought instead, that the case against them be decided based on the
despite its non-inclusion in the list of Registered Construction Firms records submitted.
(RCF) which were qualified to bid.
Responders were re-issued the same Formal Charge, to which they
Alama sent a 1st indorsement letter to petitioner Atty. Oliver T. filed their Answer with Manifestation reiterating their previous
Rodulfo, DPWH Head of Internal Affairs Office, stating that under statements, and further alleging that the DPWH Sub-District Office
Department Order No. 2, Series of 2001, only contractors duly never required them to submit a counter-affidavit/comment, as in
registered in the RCF and holding a valid Contractor's Registration fact, it was only Engr. Baldos who had been issued a Subpoena to
Certificate issued by the BAC-TWG shall be allowed to participate in submit an answer/explanation regarding the alleged irregularities in
any bidding, per the requirement in the Invitation to Apply for the bidding for the subject project. They averred that the Formal
Eligibility and to Bid. Charge served upon them did not state the nature and substance of
the charge/s hurled against them. For these reasons, respondents
Atty. Rodulfo issued a Subpoena which directed Engr. Gervasio T. demanded that a formal investigation be conducted.
Baldos, OIC District Engineer of the DPWH Tacloban City Sub-
District Engineering Office (DPWH Sub-District Office), to Without waiting for the DPWH's action, respondents filed on June 27,
answer/comment on the anonymous complaint and, accordingly, 2006 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC alleging
submit the documents in relation to the award of the subject project. that there was a violation of their right to due process since: (a) they
He proceeded to investigate on the matter and forwarded his were not made to comment on the anonymous complaint: and (b) no
Investigation Report to Acting Sec. Ebdane, finding that RMPB was preliminary investigation was conducted prior to the issuance of the
indeed not a duly registered contractor at the time of the bidding. Formal Charge.
Atty. Rodulfo, thus, recommended that the officials of the DPWH
Sub-District Office be administratively charged with Gross RTC issued a TRO against the implementation of the preventive
Misconduct and that they be placed on preventive suspension for a suspension order, which was later converted to a writ of preliminary
period of ninety (90) days. injunction. The petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of
Acting Sec. Ebdane issued the Formal Charge against respondents, action, but was denied.
who were then DPWH Officials and BAC Members, for Grave
Misconduct. In the said issuance, respondents were: (a) directed to RTC set aside the Formal Charge holding respondents' rights to
file their answer, together with supporting evidence; (b) given the administrative due process were violated when they were deprived of
option to elect or waive the conduct of a formal investigation; the opportunity to file their comment/memorandum prior to, or during
and (c) placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety the preliminary or fact-finding investigation conducted by Atty.
(90) days. Rodulfo, which violation was deemed to involve a purely legal
question, an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
In their Answer with Motion to Dismiss and to Lift Order of Preventive remedies. RTC, however, clarified that its ruling was not intended to
Suspension respondents argued that they were not in any position to prevent or avert the DPWH from pursuing any separate
answer the Formal Charge against them due to lack of basis. They
administrative action against respondents, pointing out that they you may desire to present in support of your
have not been absolved from any administrative liability. defense.
In your answer, you should state whether
CA affirmed the RTC Resolution holding that the issuance of the you elect to have a formal investigation of the charge
Formal Charge, without complying with the mandated preliminary against you or waive your right to such an
investigation, or at least giving respondents the opportunity to investigation.
comment or submit their counter-affidavits, violated their due process If you fail to submit your answer within the
rights. CA found that Section 11, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on period aforestated, you will be deemed in default
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires that and the case against you will be decided on the
respondents be given the opportunity to comment and explain their basis of the available records.
side during a preliminary investigation conducted prior to the
issuance of a Formal Charge and that such comment is different Respondents filed their answer wherein they had presented their
from the Answer that respondents may file thereafter. CA position before the agency, and more significantly, expressly
pronounced that a violation of the right to due process is an admitted waived their rights to a formal hearing, as they sought instead,
exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. that the case against them be decided based on the records
submitted Whatever procedural lapses the DPWH had committed,
Issue: the same had already been cured by the foregoing filing. HEITAD
Whether or not respondents' due process rights were violated. NO.
Having established that there was no violation of respondents' rights
Held: to administrative due process, the CA incorrectly exempted
The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic respondents from compliance with the rule on exhaustion of
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative remedies. They are therefore required to go through
administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due the full course of the administrative process where they are still left
process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or with remedies. As case law states, a party with an administrative
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate
in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to conclusion before seeking judicial intervention. If a remedy within
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
there is no denial of procedural due process. administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
The Court finds that while there were missteps in the proceedings exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
conducted before the DPWH, namely: (a) respondents were not
made to file their initial comment on the anonymous complaint; and
(b) no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the
Formal Charge against them, contrary to the sequential procedure GOSS V LOPEZ
under the URACCS, they were, nonetheless, accorded a fair 419 U.S. 565
opportunity to be heard when the Formal Charge directed them: WHITE; January 22, 1975

Wherefore, you are hereby directed to Facts::


submit within ten (10) days from receipt hereof your -for various reasons, 9 high school students were suspended by their
detailed answer to the above stated charge in writing respective school administrators. They mostly participated in
and under oath, together with whatever evidence demonstrations in their schools. Due to this, school administrators
suspended them for ten days.
-Ohio law provides for free education to all children between the ages of interest at stake. A 10 day educational suspension bears a lot of
six and 21. Section 3313.66 of the Code empowers the principal of an consequences for students.
Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days or -when it is determined that due process is applicable, what has to be
to expel him. In either case, he must notify the student's parents within known then is what process should be due.
24 hours and state the reasons for his action. A pupil who is expelled, or -in this case, to impose a standard process for suspension of 10 days
his parents, may appeal the decision to the Board of Education and in might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by
connection therewith shall be permitted to be heard at the board meeting. diverting resources, cost more than it would save in educational
No such procedure is available for cases of suspension. effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process and
-The nine named appellees, each of whom alleged that he or she had escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too
been suspended from public high school in Columbus for up to 10 days costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as
without a hearing pursuant to 3313.66, filed an action under 42 U. S. C. part of the teaching process.
1983 against the Columbus Board of Education and various -The Court held that a standard should be available only in cases
administrators of the CPSS. The complaint sought a declaration that exceeding 10 days.
3313.66 was unconstitutional in that it permitted public school
administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without a Dissenting, Powell
hearing of any kind, in violation of the procedural due process - The decision unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in
component of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sought to enjoin the the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality
public school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to of education. Moreover, to the extent that there may be some arguable
3313.66 and to require them to remove references to the past infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify
suspensions from the records of the students in question. imposition of a constitutional rule...

Issue: WON the Ohio Law is unconstitutional


MATTHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
HELD: YES. 424 U.S. 319 | POWELL: 1976
-It is true that 3313.66 of the Code permits school principals to suspend
students for up to 10 days; but suspensions may not be imposed without Facts::
any grounds whatsoever. All of the schools had their own rules specifying - Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are
the grounds for expulsion or suspension. completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program
-Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and created by the 1956 amendments to Title II of the Social Security Act.
maintain a public school system, it has nevertheless done so and has - Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968. In
required its children to attend. Those young people do not "shed their March 1972, he received a questionnaire from the state agency
constitutional rights" at the schoolhouse door. . "The Fourteenth charged with monitoring his medical condition. Eldridge completed the
Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against questionnaire, indicating that his condition had not improved and
the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not identifying the medical sources, including physicians, from whom he
excepted." had received treatment recently. The state agency then obtained
- Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. After
education protected by the Due Process Clause generally, the Clause considering these reports and other information in his file the agency
comes into play only when the State subjects a student to a "severe informed Eldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination
detriment or grievous loss." The loss of 10 days, it is said, is neither that his disability had ceased in May 1972. The letter included a
severe nor grievous and the Due Process Clause is therefore of no statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits, and
relevance. advised Eldridge that he might request reasonable time in which to
-in determining WON due process is applicable, the weight of the obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
deprivation is not the determinative factor but that of the nature of the
- In his written response, Eldridge disputed one characterization of his additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
evidence to establish his disability. [n2] The state agency then made its and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in May 1972. requirement would entail.
This determination was accepted by the Social Security Administration - Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process requires an
(SSA), which notified Eldridge in July that his benefits would terminate evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. It was emphasized
after that month. The notification also advised him of his right to seek there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of
reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within subsistence: "The crucial factor in this context a factor not present in
six months. the case of . . . virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements
- Instead of requesting reconsideration Eldridge commenced this action are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy
challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare for which to live while he waits."
assessing whether there exists a continuing disability. He sought an - Eligibility for disability benefits, in contrast, is not based upon financial
immediate reinstatement of benefits pending a hearing on the issue of need. Indeed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or support
his disability. from many other sources, such as earnings of other family members,
- The Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that Eldridge's workmen's compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private
benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative insurance, public or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps,
regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available public assistance, or the "many other important programs, both public
remedies. In support of his contention that due process requires a and private, which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a
pretermination hearing, Eldridge relied exclusively upon this Court's substantial portion of the work force . . . ." As Goldberg illustrates, the
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, which established a right to an degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular
"evidentiary hearing" prior to termination of welfare benefits. The decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any
Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility administrative decision-making process. The potential deprivation here
for disability benefits, unlike eligibility for welfare benefits, is not based is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg, although the degree of
on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not difference can be overstated. As the District Court emphasized, to
play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision, which turns remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be "unable to engage in
primarily on medical evidence. substantial gainful activity."
- The District Court concluded that the administrative procedures
pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated Eldridge's benefits b. NOTICE AND HEARING
abridged his right to procedural due process. 1. WHEN REQUIRED

ISSUE: WON the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. V COLLECTOR
that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments G.R. No. L-19180
the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing. BAUTISTA ANGELO; October 31, 1963

HELD: Nature:Special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction


NO, the present procedure in claiming benefits under the Social
Security is sufficient to meet the due process requirement Facts:
Reasoning - The Collector of Customs sent a notice to C. F. Sharp & Company
- The specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of informing it that a vessel it operates was apprehended and found to have
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations and that it
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
- C. F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely
referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded,
answered the notice stating, among other things, that the television set but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be
referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. The right
required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further: "If this to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. That this
explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well
investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case.
the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in Disposition The decision appealed from is affirmed.
its defense."
- The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha stating that the television set
in question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his BAUTISTA V WORKMENS COMPENSATION
explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for 88 SCRA 121; MAKASIAR; January 31, 1979
violating Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the
collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent
thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said Workmens Compensation Commission
vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the
fine is not paid. Facts:
- Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary - Petitioner Consolacion Bautista is the surviving spouse and the only
injunction before the Court of First Instance, which was granted. heir of the late Andres Bautista, who died while his disability
Respondent interposed present appeal. compensation claim was pending review by the respondent Workmens
Compensation Commission (WCC). In his lifetime, Andres Bautista was
Issue: WON the requirements of administrative due process have employed a switchman by respondent Philippine National Railways
already been complied with (PNR) since 1945. In August 1973, he filed his application for retirement
on the ground of disability, which was likewise pending action at the time
Held: NO of his death.
- Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set - In August 1974, Andres Bautista filed a notice of injury or sickness and
complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by claim for compensation dated July 29, 1974 with the Department of
Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said section, in Labor in Dagupan City all that he is sick of PTB and Rheumatism that the
order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo date of accident was August 10, 1973, that he stopped working on
that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for August 16, 1973 and that he orally named his employer of the fact of his
the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are sickness. He attached to the claim for compensation a physician's report
excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal dated July 28, 1974 with a diagnostic finding that claimant was suffering
effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was from PTB, far advanced; prognosis Poor, which required hospitalization.
claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does His employer filed its Employer's Report of Accident or Sickness.
not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the - Hearing officer dismissed the compensation claim of claimant for the
vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This reasons that: In view of the repeated non-appearance of the claimant
is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only and counsel during the scheduled hearings of this case despite due
was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately notice to the and it appearing that the evidence adduced was not enough
imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of to warrant an immediate award in favor of the claimant let this case be
the elementary rule of due process. dismissed and respondent PNR is absolved from any liability
- True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar - Counsel for claimant Bautista filed MFR saying that the hearing of the
as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation case was delayed by reason of the repeated non-appearance and
of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under motions for postponement on the part of counsels for employer PNR and
the consequent withdrawal of the original counsel; that his failure to
appear at the last 2 scheduled hearings was excusable for the reason
that he received the notice of hearing 2 days after the scheduled date of EQUITABLE BANKING CORP v. NLRC
hearing and he informed the clerk of the hearing officer of this fact; that 273 SCRA 352; Vitug ; June 13, 1997
the counsel of employer PNR was likewise not present at the last
scheduled hearing. Counsel also informed hearing officer of the fact that Nature: Special civil action of certiorari
claimant is already dead without however stating the date and cause of
death. Facts
- MFR was denied but hearing officer ordered the elevation of the entire -Sadac was appointed VP for the Legal Department of Equitable.
records of the case to the respondent Commission for review. -Nine lawyers 3 of the bank's Legal Department under Equitable,
Respondent Commission, on the basis of the evidence on record, addressed a "letter-petition" to the Chairman of the Board of Directors,
affirmed the order of dismissal. Hence, this petition, which the Court accusing Sadac of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement,
subsequently treated as a special civil action ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Private respondent was furnished
with a copy of the letter.
Issue: WON the late Andres Bautista, represented by his surviving -Morales, Chairman of the Board of Directors, called the contending
spouse herein, was denied due process in his claim for compensation lawyers to a conference in his office in an attempt to resolve their
differences, it failed. Board of Directors, apprised of the situation,
Held: YES (NOTE: On discussion on the merits, see Original case) adopted a resolution directing one of its directors, Banico, to look further
- Respondent WCC gravely abused its discretion in ignoring and in not into the matter and to "determine a course of action for the best interest
passing upon the issue of denial of due process squarely presented by of the bank." Banico met with the complaining nine lawyers, he was
claimant's counsel. warned that if private respondent were to be retained in his position, the
- The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable lawyers would resign en masse.
notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally -Mr. Banico submitted a report to the Board of Directors and said that
or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office there was abusive conduct and mismanagement and was inefficient and
address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter, so as to ineffective.The Board asked Sadac to voluntarily resign. They
ensure observance and protection of an interested party's right to a emphasized that they are just saying that the Board has lost its
hearing. Patent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe confidence on him and they are waiting for his voluntary resignation.
these rules. Sadac again made a request for a full hearing and cautioned that, under
- Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly deprived of his day in Section 31 of the Corporation Code, individual members of the Board
court. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and could be held accountable for voting or assenting to patently unlawful
his counsel's "repeated non-appearance" at the said hearings cannot acts of the corporation.
stand. -Sadac persisted in his request for a formal investigation. Unheeded he
- The hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of the employer and to filed a complaint in the NLRC for illegal dismissal and damages.
the prejudice of the laborer, the late claimant Andres Bautista, as -Board of Directors terminated Sadac and reiterated that it was one
demonstrated by his obdurate handling of claimant's excusable non- between client and lawyer. He also is disentitled from his compensation.
appearances at scheduled hearings, on one hand, and his mild treatment The Board instructed management to take the necessary steps to
of respondent employer's repeated failure to appear at scheduled "defend itself and all the members of the Board of Directors" from private
hearings and its motions for postponement, on the other. The records respondent's complaint.
clearly show that while respondent had asked for and was granted at -Labor-Arbited sided with Equitable, the involved lawyer was a "mere
least 5 postponements; claimant, on the other hand, only moved for legal assistant" tasked with certain duties not all that related to the
postponement once and that was even on a joint motion with respondent practice of law. The Labor Arbiter concluded that the complaint stated no
employer cause of action because a lawyer-client relationship should instead be
Disposition Petition is granted. governed by Section 26, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court. Also, there
were valid grounds and he was not denied due process, holding that -The act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties
private respondent was "heard exhaustively on the matter of the charge of the employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to continue
lodged against him" and that, "for valid practical reasons," petitioners working for the employer. Here, the grievances of the lawyers, in main,
"were not in a position to accede" to the demand for a formal hearing. refer to what are perceived to be certain objectionable character traits of
-NLRC concluded differently. The NLRC ruled that private respondent private respondent. Although petitioners have charged private
was denied the right to due process. respondent with allegedly mishandling two cases in his long service with
-Equitable filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. the bank, it is quite apparent that private respondent would not have
been asked to resign had it not been for the letter-complaint of his
Issues associates in the Legal Department.
1. WON there was an employer-employee relationship requiring the Confident that no employer-employee existed between the bank and
procedural requirements private respondent, petitioners have put aside the procedural
2. WON the corporation is solely liable requirements for terminating one's employment, i.e., (a) a notice
apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
Held: 1.Yes, there was. which his dismissal is sought, and (b) another notice informing the
"A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Failure to
private corporation or even of the government. It is not unusual for a big comply with these requirements taints the dismissal with illegality.
corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in-house counsel, pay them This procedure is mandatory, any judgment reached by
regular salaries, rank them in its table of organization, and otherwise management without that compliance can be considered void and
treat them like its other officers and employees. At the same time, it may inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due process is simply
also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative
The two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the
made up of employees while the other is not. A similar arrangement may nature of consultation and conferences such as the case here,
exist as to doctors, nurses, dentists, public relations practitioners, and however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observance of
other professionals." notice and hearing.
The existence of an employer-employee relationship, between the bank 2. Yes, a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate
and private respondent brings the case within the coverage of the Labor and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from
Code. Under the Code, an employee may be validly dismissed if these the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the
requisites are attendant: (1) the dismissal is grounded on any of the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its
causes stated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (2) the employee has sole liabilities. Nevertheless, being a mere fiction of law, peculiar
been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be heard and to situations or valid grounds can exist to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the
defend himself as so required by Section 2 and Section 5, Rule XIV, disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. As
Book V, of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. a rule, this situation might arise when a corporation is used to evade a
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that "willful breach by the just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud,
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the to carry out similar other unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a
termination of employment by an employer. Ordinary breach of trust will subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law.
not suffice, it must be willful and without justifiable excuse. This ground The case of petitioner is way off these exceptional instances. It is not
must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly even shown that petitioner has had a direct hand in the dismissal of
and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents private respondent enough to attribute to him (petitioner) a patently
upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to unlawful act while acting for the corporation. Neither can Article 289 of
rest; otherwise, the dismissal will be rendered illegal. the Labor Code be applied since this law specifically refers only to the
Petitioners' stated loss of trust and confidence on private respondent was imposition of penalties under the Code. . . .
spawned by the complaints leveled against him by the lawyers in his
department.
UY V COA - First, COA based its ruling on the MSRB decision. A careful perusal of
G.R. No. 130685 said Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical
PUNO; March 21, 2000 finding of fact that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and
hence, is personally liable for the payment of petitioners' back wages.
Nature:Special civil action for certiorari Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was lack of funds which would
have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural
Facts: infirmities in its implementation
- Petitioners were among the employees of the Provincial Engineering - (important according to the syllabus) Second, the fundamental
Office who were dismissed by Gov. Paredes, allegedly to scale down requirements of procedural due process were violated in proceedings
operations. before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never
- Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to the Merit Systems made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA.
Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB found that the reduction in work force While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not
was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and hide bound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to
ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. It held that while reduction in disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other
force due to lack of funds is a valid ground for termination, employees to party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
be terminated must be determined after being found to be the least trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable
qualified (in terms of relative fitness, efficiency and length of service) ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former
- MSPB later issued an order directing the Provincial Government of Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners
Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be
benefits. heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that
- At first, the Governor did not want to comply with said orders. The public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts
matter was brought up to the CSC, wherein indirect contempt done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in
proceedings were held. This prompted the Governor to finally comply their official and personal capacities
with the order of reinstatement. The provincial treasurer also partially - Third, the MSRB decision became final and executory. Final judgments
released some of the backwages. may no longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by
- But the problems did not stop there. Later, the Provincial Administrator, a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other
for and in behalf of Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent official, branch or department of Government
Commission on Audit. It claims that COA is the proper authority to Disposition Decision of COA set aside
determine disbursement as regards the backwages. In its decision, COA
ruled that the payment of backwages has become the personal liability of 2. WHEN NOT REQUIRED
former Governor Paredes, it appearing that the illegal dismissal was
done in bad faith. SUNTAY v PEOPLE
- Pursuant to the ruling of COA, the provincial treasurer stopped the G.R. No. L-9430
payment of backwages. PADILLA, J.; June 29, 1957

ISSUE/S Nature:Petition for a writ of certiorari


1. WON the COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the
payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Facts:
Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed - Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a
pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney
of Quezon City, as follows: The accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's
Held: 1. NO. Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere
Reasoning
near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to 1. WON the order of the respondent Court is beyond or in excess of its
have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. jurisdiction
- Petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the DFA. Petitioner 2. WON petitioner is entitled to hearing before his passport can be
left the Philippines for San Francisco where he is at present enrolled in cancelled
school. The offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging
the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the CFI of Quezon City Held: 1. NO
after preliminary investigation had been conducted. The private Ratio When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the NBI effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to
and the DFA, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed
Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." The out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
Court granted the motion. adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules.
- Respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States (Section 6, Rule 124.) Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to
the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against
Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The Embassy him. In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was
was likewise directed to make representation with the State Department convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and
that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is considered as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be
detrimental to the best interest of this Government, that his passport has enjoined from carrying it out.
been withdrawn, and that he is not considered under the protection of the 2. NO
Philippines while abroad. However, this order was not implemented or Ratio Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for
carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful.
that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our
petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary
taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport
praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order. The respondent already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously
Secretary denied counsel's request and the Court denied the motion for in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
reconsideration. necessarily mean or require a hearing.
- Petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court may be Disposition Petition is denied
carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said order
is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the DE BISSCHOP V GALANG
Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, 8 SCRA 244
take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a REYES; May 31, 1963
passport to be cancelled."
- Petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Nature:Appeal from an order of CFI.
has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot
be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay Facts:
abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the - American citizen George de Bisschop (petitioner-appellee) was allowed
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due to stay in the Philippines for 3 years as a prearranged employee of the
process of law. Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager.
- He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. This
ISSUES was denied when Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa discovered that
Bissmag Inc. was a gambling front, and that de Bisschop is suspect of Obiter
evading payment of his income tax. In a letter dated September 5, 1959, Prohibition is not favored by the Courts. It will issue only if there is no
the Board of Commissioners advised him to depart within 5 days. De other plain, speedy , and adequate remedy. The use of habeas corpus to
Bisschop requested for a copy of the decision, but the legal officer of test the legality of aliens confinement and proposed expulsion from the
Bureau of Immigration replied that no formal decision, order or resolution Philippines is now a settled practice. Habeas corpus affords prompt relief
is promulgated by the Board for reasons of practicability and expediency. from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under all circumstances.
- To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation The existence of habeas corpus will bar the issuance of a writ of
proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case. prohibition.
DISPOSITION The order appealed from is reversed. The petition for
ISSUES prohibition is dismissed.
1. WON Commissioners of immigration are required by law to conduct
formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens;
2. WON Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions. POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V CA
(Solar Textile Finishing Corp)
1. Held: NO 195 SCRA 112
Ratio Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of FELICIANO; March 11, 1991
immigration authority. Administration of immigration laws is the primary
and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Nature:Petition to review
Reasoning
- Courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice Facts:
of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases -22 Sept 1988: the Board issued an ex parte Order, signed by Board
as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and Chairman Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., directing Solar immediately to cease
expediency. and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
- This is not a violation of the due process clause; the letter advising which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal
Bisschop to depart in 5 days was a mere formality, and far from final, leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.
because the requirement to leave before the start of the deportation -Said order, issued pursuant to Sec7 of P.D. 984 and Sec38 of its IRR,
proceedings is only an advice to party unless he departs voluntarily, the was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:
State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986
- It is a settled rule that a day in court is not a matter of right in by the National Pollution Control Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor
administrative proceedings. As per Judge Cooley: due process of law of the Board; and
is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of
of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR").
maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much -A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 Sept 1988. A
due process of law, as is judicial process. Xxx In certain Writ of Execution issued by the Board was received by Solar on 31
proceedings of administrative character, it may be stated without March 1989. Meantime, Solar filed MFR appeal with prayer for stay of
fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not execution of the Order dated 22 Sept 1988.
essential to due process of law. -Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989
2. NO allowing Solar to operate temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct
Ratio Decision as employed in the law refers to the number of votes another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
necessary to constitute the decision of the said Board. facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive
Reasoning There is nothing in immigration law which provides that the Director of the DENR NCR to conduct the inspection and evaluation
Board of Commissioners must render decisions on petitioners for within thirty (30) days.
extension of stay.
-21 April 1989: Solar went to RTC QC on petition for certiorari with -Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 3 authorized the Board to issue ex parte
preliminary injunction against the Board. RTC dismissed Solar's petition cease and desist orders (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an
upon two (2) grounds: that appeal and not certiorari from the questioned establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or
remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and academic. -It is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life,
-Solar went on appeal to the CA. CA reversed the Order of dismissal of public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an
TC and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. CA also ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set
said that the decision was without prejudice to whatever action the Board by the [NPCC]."
may take relative to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of Solar's -Sec5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 sets out the max permissible
water treatment facilities. levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from
-CA, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants must not
Orders of the Board may result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; exceed when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C,
and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues" D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978 NPCC Rules and
demanded that the question of due process be settled. The Boards MFR Regulations. Tullahan-Tinejeros River is classified as inland waters Class
was dismissed. Hence, this petition for certiorari. D (for agriculture, irrigation, live stock watering, industrial cooling and
The Boards argues: processing)
-that its ex parte Order dated 22 Sept 1988 and the Writ of Execution -Note: the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing
were issued in accordance with law (PD984, Sec7(a)) and were not Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 Dec 1985 directing
violative of due process; and same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such
-that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The
subjects of a petition for certiorari. new owner Solar Textile Corporation, after informing the Commission of
Solar contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex the plant acquisition, was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October
parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water sampling
"immediate threat to life, public health; safety or welfare, or to animal and test conducted on 08 August 1986.
plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports -The inspection reports of November 1986 and September 1988 make
before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged clear that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that
posed such a threat. the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the max allowable
levels of physical and chemical substances set by the NPCC and that
Issue: WON the CA erred in reversing the RTC on the ground that Solar accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
had been denied due process by the Board. desist order issued by the Board.
-The Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order
Held: NO. until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were
conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. The
3
"P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:
(a) Public Hearing . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public
health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set
by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the
discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the
establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior
public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in
force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the
allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court.".
Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to substantiated by the evidence and recommending its dismissal. He also
enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other found that the dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause.
hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated, - The court approved the hearing examiner's recommendation and
pollutive effluents into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River, presumably loath to rendered the following order:
spend the money necessary to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends the dismissal of this
("WTP") in an operating condition. case on the ground that the evidence by the complainant did not
-In Technology Developers, Inc. v. CA, the SC upheld the summary support the charges of unfair labor practice. The facts are stated in
closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a the Hearing Examiner's dated May 16, 1955.
pollution-causing establishment. In the instant case, the ex parte cease After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient
and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government conclusions, and consequently, this case is hereby dismissed.
charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular SO ORDERED.
industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution - Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
statutory and regulatory provisions. court en banc.
-Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in - Hence this petition for review.
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the - It is contended that the aforequoted order runs counter to the
continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers Constitution which provides that "No decision shall be rendered by any
and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such and the law on which it is based" (Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals 35, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides that a court decision
such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
years. It is a constitutional common place that the ordinary requirements based." And the claim is made in view of the fact that the order does not
of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital contain either a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact based
public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police on said evidence, which counsel claims does not meet the requirements
power. of the law and the Constitution.

c. FORM OF AND PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT ISSUE


WON the Court of Industrial Relations can issue an order dismissing a
INDIAS v PHILIPPINE IRON MINES, INC. case without stating the facts and the law support thereof.
107 PHIL 297
BAUTISTA ANGELO; Apr 29, 1957 HELD
YES
NATURE - The order, it is true, does not make its own discussion of the evidence
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations or its own findings of fact, but such is not necessary if the court is
satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee which already contains
Facts: a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of fact based thereon.
- A complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has The situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it
engaged in unfair labor practice should state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is in full accord with
- Hearings were conducted by the hearing examiner, Atty. Emiliano the report, it is purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner has
Tabigne, at which both parties, represented by counsel, appeared. already found in it.
- After the presentation of the evidence, the hearing examiner rendered - Such is the present situation. The court approved the report of the
his report stating that the charge of unfair labor practice has not been hearing examiner "after a perusal of the record of the case." This
presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no justification
for modifying his findings and conclusions. This is a substantial
compliance with the law. Issue: WON the denial of the PSC of Serranos petition was correct
- When the Court of Industrial Relations refers a case to a commissioner
for investigation, report, and recommendation, and at such investigation Held: NO
the parties were duly represented by counsel, heard or at least given an Ratio Quasi-judicial tribunals, including the Public Service Commission,
opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process has been should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
satisfied, even if the court failed to set the report for hearing, and a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
decision on the basis of such report, with the other evidence of the case, involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
is a decision which meets the requirement of a fair and open hearing. Reasoning
Disposition The order appealed from was affirmed. - The obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which the decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. The Public
Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the
SERRANO v PSC above constitutional provision.
24 SCRA 867 - The PSC is not a judicial tribunal and its functions are limited and
FERNANDO; Aug 30, 1968 administrative in nature. The PSC is not a court (citing Dagdag vs. PSC
and Filipino Bus Co. vs Philippine Railway).
Nature:Petition for review of a decision of the Public Service - It does not mean, however, that the non-inclusion of the administrative
Commission. tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision justifies the
summary disposition of petitioner's application in the manner followed by
Facts: respondent Public Service Commission.
- Serrano filed an application with the Public Service Commission - In Ang Tibay v. Court, speaking of the Court of Industrial Relations,
requesting authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial
the City of Manila and from said city to any place in Luzon open to powers like the PSC, the Court made clear that while it (the CIR) is "free
motor vehicle traffic and vice versa. Fifty units of taxicabs were to from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements," it does not mean
be used. "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
- Serrano was a public service bus operator in the City of Manila disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process.
and was the holder of several certificates of public convenience. - The failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have
- His application was heard by Associate Commissioner his application decided in such a manner as to inform him not only of the
Panganiban. Serrano completed the presentation of his evidence, issues involved but the reasons for the decision, which necessarily would
but the oppositors and no evidence was presented to rebut his likewise require a finding of facts, cannot receive judicial approval.
claims as to his qualification and financial capacity. The Public - The denial of Serranos petition was plain and palpable error. There is a
Service Commission denied application need then to remand the matter to the Public Service Commission so
- A motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by the PSC. that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed
- Serrano alleged that the Public Service Commission erred in to it by law. Only after it has rendered its decision setting forth the facts
failing to make a statement of facts as to each case regarding the on which it is based does the power of review on the part of this Court
qualification and financial ability of the applicant and the other come into play.
factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the Disposition Decision set aside, case remanded to PSC.
application, in whole or in part, on the one hand, and dismissing or
denying the application on the other. He relies on the constitutional
provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court of record SOLID HOMES, INC. VS. LASERNA
without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on (2008)
which it is based.
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.
practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. In
Facts: Laserna and Cajipe, as buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell Francisco vs. Permskul, the Court laid down the conditions for
with Solid Homes over a parcel of land located in Loyola Grand Villas, the validity of memorandum decisions, to wit:
Quezon City. When the buyers had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase a. It cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote
the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the balance. Solid reference (i.e. the challenged decision is not easily and
Homes did not comply with such demands. immediately available to the person reading the
As a result, the buyers filed a Complaint for Delivery of Title and memorandum decision).
Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages before the Housing and Land b. It must provide for direct access to the facts and the
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Solid Homes, on the other hand, law being adopted, which must be contained in a
asserted that the buyers have no cause of action because they had not statement attached to the said decision (i.e. it should
yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In fact, in actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of
view of the said non-payment, Solid Homes considered the Contract to law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made
Sell abandoned and rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the an indispensable part of the decision).
same contract. c. The decision being adopted should, to begin with,
HLURB Arbiter: buyers prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and comply with Art. VIII, Sec. 14.
the delivery of the TCT DENIED. Solid Homes directed to execute and d. This kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases
deliver the same the moment that the purchase price is fully settled as where the facts are in the main accepted by both
well as to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees from the parties and easily determinable by the judge and
buyers other than those authorized by PD 957. there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
HLURB Board of Commissioners: modified HLURB Arbiters decision by require an extended discussion of the laws involved (i.e.
directing the buyers to pay the balance within 30 days from finality of its used sparingly).
decision. Moreover, Art. VIII, Sec. 14 need not apply to decisions
Office of the President: affirmed in toto the decision of the HLURB Board rendered in administrative proceedings. Said section applies
of Commissioners. Its decision merely adopted by reference the findings only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings as Art. VIII is in
of fact and conclusions of law contained in the appealed decision. fact titled Judiciary and all of its provisions have particular
CA: affirmed the decision of the Office of the President. concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government.
2. NO. The provision of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure used
Issues: the word may instead of shall, meaning that the dismissal of
1. W/N the decision of the Office of the President is in accordance a complaint or opposition filed before the HLURB Arbiter on
with the mandate of the Constitution that the decision should be the ground of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action is
based on the findings of facts and law to arrive at a decision simply permissive and not directive. The HLURB Arbiter has
(topical) the discretion of whether to dismiss immediately the complaint or
2. W/N the complaint filed with the HLURB should be dismissed for opposition filed before him for lack of jurisdiction or cause of
lack of cause of action action, or to still proceed with the hearing of the case for
3. W/N the buyers are already discharged from the obligation of presentation of evidence. More importantly, the complaint of the
paying the balance of the purchase price by reason of their buyers does not totally lack cause of action because of their right
tender of payment against the cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture
of their payments due to non-payment of their monthly
Held/Ratio: amortization. Lastly, notwithstanding such failure to pay the
1. YES. The constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity monthly amortization, Solid Homes cannot consider the contract
of memorandum decisions, a specie of succinctly written as cancelled and the payments made as forfeited in view of the
decisions by appellate courts, on the grounds of expediency, provisions of PD 957 in relation to RA 6552.
3. NO. If the creditor refuses the tender of payment without service and remanded records of case to Sec of Health for appropriate
just cause, the debtors are discharged from the obligation action.
by the consignation of the sum due. Consignation is made -Sec of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against
by depositing the proper amount with the judicial authority respondents and Cabrera. The dispositive portion said: pursuant to the
before whom the tender of payment and the announcement Resolution rendered by the PCAGC, respondents Camposano, Cabrera,
of the consignation shall be proved. All interested parties are Agustin, Perez are hereby dismissed from the service.
to be notified of the consignation. Since the buyers failed to -Respondents filed MFR of the said Order. Sec of Health denied. They
make any consignation of the sum due, they are not yet filed appeal w/ the CSC. CSC denied. Respondents went to the CA.
discharged from the obligation to pay the outstanding balance of -CA held that the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints
the purchase price of the subject property. pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no
power to investigate the charges against respondents. Moreover, in
- Eden Mopia - simply and completely relying on the PCAGCs findings, the secretary of
health failed to comply with administrative due process.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v CAMPOSANO, et al. Issue: WON the decision of Sec of Health was valid
G.R. No. 157684
PANGANIBAN; Apr 27, 2005 Held: NO
- Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary
Nature:Petition for Review sanctions,the disciplining authority must make an independent
assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing
Facts: administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While
-Camposano was the Finance and Mgt Officer, Agustin was an the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by
Accountant , and Perez was the Acting Supply Officer of Dept of Health another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must
NCR (DOH-NCR) nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable
- a complaint was filed before the DOH Resident Ombudsman against law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for
Dir. Majarais, Acting Admin Officer Cabrera, and respondents, for an the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such
alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.
Sulfate 250 mg. with Vit B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth -Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the
P330,000.00 following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing,
-the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Sec which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting
of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge. Sec evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co- presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4)
respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on
3019. the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
-Exec Sec Ruben Torres issued AO 298 creating an ad-hoc committee to and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the
investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of
Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner
-the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues
investigation, it issued a resolution finding Majarais, Camposano, involved.
Cabrera, Agustin, and Perez guilty as charged and recommended to -The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been
Pres Ramos that they be dismissed from government service. observed in the present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth
-Pres Ramos issued AO 390 finding Majarais guilty and dismissed from requisite is equally evident from the health secretarys Order dismissing
the respondents. The decision of Secretary Reodica should have proceedings. In the event that the Patent Office should be provided
contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to with an Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall have the
enable respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the
prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired. case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original
-To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision subject to
of Patents. However, this case merely authorized the delegation of the appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of
power to investigate, but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3,
requiring the disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment and 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
discretion in deciding a case, American Tobacco supports the present Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and
respondents cause. In that case, the petitioners objected to the the appeal fee shall be P25.00.
appointment of hearing officers and sought the personal hearing of their - The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and
case by the disciplining authority. The Court, however, sustained the right promulgated by the Director of Patents and approved by the then
to delegate the power to investigate, as long as the adjudication would Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.
be made by the deciding authority. - Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the
- (Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, amended the afore-quoted Rule
deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in 168 to read as follows:
this case is not the guilt of respondents, but solely due process. Guilt 168. Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. - The
cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes
observed. ) proceedings, [In the event that the Patent Office is provided with an
Disposition Petition is PARTLY GRANTED Examiner of Interferences, this Examiner shall then have the original
jurisdiction over these cases, instead of the Director. In the case that
the Examiner of Interferences takes over the original jurisdiction over
AMERICAN TOBACCO CO v THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be subject to
67 SCRA 287; ANTONIO; Oct. 14, 1975 appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of
notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4,
Facts:: 6, 7, 8,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
- petitioners are challenging the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate, and the
Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark appeal fee shall be [P25.00.] Such inter partes proceedings in the
Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the
ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official
likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case designated by the Director, but all judgments determining the merits
shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director
him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.)
registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted - In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents
for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and delegated the hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers,
use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez, Teofilo Velasco, Rustico Casia and
registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.
- Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166 ), the Director of - Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to
Patents is vested with jurisdiction over opposition, interference and hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and
cancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise, the Rules of Practice in void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide
Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus: inter partes cases. Said objections were overruled by the Director of
168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceeding. - The Director Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel The
of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes
Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the
the hearing officers. decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question
that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. 15 In
ISSUE: short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer
WON the amendment of the rule is illegal and void as it should be the concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said
Director who must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. officer. 16 It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing,
which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the
HELD: officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the
NO. evidence which justifies them."
- The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the - In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary
administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and rulings on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases,
orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions
purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to involved is left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance
delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or that the point involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners
by implication it has been withheld. have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced by the
- The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of proceedings.
Patents suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in Disposition Petition is dismissed
relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the
aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt
and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. ALBERT v GANGAN
As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question 353 SCRA 673; BUENA; March 06, 2001
of priority in patent interference proceedings, decide applications for
reinstatement of a lapsed patent, cancellations of patents under Republic Nature:Petition for certiorari
Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, claims of
interference, cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law and other Facts:
matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could - Petitioner Ramon Albert, president of the National Home Mortgage
hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to Finance Corp (NHMFC) approved loans taken out to finance several
require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. projects in pursuance of its Community Mortgage Program (CMP), a low-
This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. The remedy cost home financing scheme. One of the projects under this program was
is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. the AMAKO project for which P36,796,711.55 was released and
- Thus, while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative approved by petitioner.
agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power - Upon petitioners instruction, an inspection of the said project was
to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative conducted and it was found that the project was 3 months in arrears in
agency will be made. their amortization. Because of this finding, petitioner ordered other
- The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own investigations be conducted. After investigation, the CoA Resident
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter Auditor of NHMFC disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO proj. for
of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to the following reasons: (a) non-submission of documentary
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer requirements/non-complying or defective documents as required under
makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion NHMFC Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b) irregular/excessive
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does expenditures per COA Circular No. 85-55A
due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the - Months later, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the against his subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for
decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to the fraud with respect to the AMAKO loan transaction. Petitioner also
filed a civil case for sum of money, annulment, damages and attorneys Held: YES.
fees with preliminary attachment, against SHGCCI, AMAKO, Sapang Ratio The decision of a government agency must state the facts and the
Palay & Development Foundation, Inc., and other persons responsible law on which the decision is based.
for the misrepresentation, tortious and fraudulent acts in connection with Reasoning The assailed decision failed to mention petitioners direct
the loan granted to AMAKO project. participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely held that petitioner be
- The Commission on Audit (COA), after investigation, later found immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance, for the
petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount representing simple reason that, as the approving officer, any transaction presented to
payment of loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. The COA disallowed the him for approval is subject to his discretion. The COA decision merely
plan payment because it found the payment irregular and an excessive stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances (the whys, whats
expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to sec. 103 of and hows of the disallowance), were patently missing, inaccurate or
PD 1445, which states, expenditures of government funds or uses of incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of
government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal disallowing expenditures of govt funds at sheer discretion. There has to
liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why
therefor. there was a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong
- In his MFR, which was later denied, Alberts defense was that he committed and not solely by reason of being the head of govt agency.
cannot and should not be held personally liable for the amount of the The COA even mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes liability for a
loan as he acted only in the performance of his official duties and that grossly disadvantageous contract entered into by a govt functionary but
there was no clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence on as to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was
his part. considered disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts.
- The COA in dismissing said MFR stated thus: Albert himself was the Disposition Decision of COA REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
final approving authority of the transaction in question and that the
officers/employees who processed the same were directly under his
supervision. He could have conclusively determined the validity of a AROCHA VS VIVO
transaction involving such a large amount. Alberts claim of good faith GR No.24844; REYES, J.B.L; Oct 26, 1967
and exercise of due diligence are disputable presumptions, and these
presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts constituting an Facts:
offense, as where there exists the fact that loss of government funds - Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the Manila International Airport
resulted from official action. Lastly, it stated that Sec3. (9) of RA 3019 together with four other persons supposedly his father (Jose Gatchalian),
(Anti-Graft Law) declares to be unlawful the act of entering, in behalf of an aunt and two brothers, and sought entry as Filipino citizen. Not
the government, into a contract or transaction manifestly or grossly satisfied with his papers, the immigration officer referred the case of
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or Pedro to the Special Board of Inquiry. This body, after due hearing,
will profit thereby. rendered decision admitting Pedro and seven others, as Filipino citizens.
- Aggrieved, petitioner filed this case contending that he cant be held - Pedro Gatchalian was issued an identification certificate by the
personally liable for the amount of P36, 796,711.55 representing the loan immigration authorities, attesting to his admission as citizen of the
proceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COA decisions dont have Philippines
any findings that he has knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent - the Secretary of Justice, as department head, issued a memorandum
transaction. He claims that there is no clear showing that he acted in bad order directing the Immigration Commissioners to review all cases where
faith, with malice, or gross negligence when he approved the loan entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a citizen of the
transaction. Philippines.
- the Board of Commissioners reversed the decision of the Board of
Issue: WON COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it held Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian for being
petitioner personally liable for the subject disallowance. improperly documented. Pedro was accordingly. But, although the
warrant for his exclusion was issued in July, 1962, Pedro Gatchalian was Held: 1. YES.
taken into custody by the immigration authorities only June 6, 1965. Ratio The mere fact of a retyping of dates on the face of the documents,
- Macario Arocha, on behalf of Pedro, petitioned the CFI for a writ of without further evidence of record, does not suffice to convict the three
habeas corpus, claiming that the detention of Pedro, a Filipino by the members of the Board of Immigration Commissioners of maliciously
Immigration Commissioner is violative of said petitioner's constitutional antedating their decision, considering the presumption of regularity in
rights. Respondents immigration officials countered that the exclusion official actuations, and the serious implications of the charge, which
order was issued pursuant to the decision of the Board of Commissioner, amounts to no less than a falsification of official documents. Such an
finding Pedro to have failed in proving the allegation that he is a Filipino offense cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly proved beyond
citizen. reasonable doubt. The operative date of the Commissioners' action is
- In its decision, the court sustained petitioner's theory that the decision that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as
of reversal of the Board of Commissioners was antedated and issued a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was
beyond the prescribed one-year period. Holding that the decision of the prepared, written and signed.
Special Board of Inquiry, admitting the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Reasoning
Gatchalian had already become final, the Court ordered his immediate - the decision of the Board of Commissioners, the notification to
release from detention and enjoined respondents, permanently, from appellee's counsel that such decision was rendered, and the warrant of
arresting, deporting and otherwise depriving of his liberty. On the exclusion, bear the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from the
strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court, Pedro reviewed decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. It is contended,
Gatchalian was released from custody of the immigration authorities at 9 however, that in all of these documents, the date of promulgation of the
o'clock in the evening of August 3, 1965. decision appeared to have been originally written as July 20, 1962, but
- The cause of petitioner and appellant Commissioner of Immigration in the number "20" was erased and superimposed by "6".
this Court hinges on the issue of the correct date of promulgation of the - Vivo insists that these erasures and substitutions were corrections
decision of the Board of Commissioners reversing that of the Special made only to rectify clerical mistakes.
Board of Inquiry. For if, indeed, the reversal was made on July 20, 1962, - the accusation of Pedro is negatived by the official minutes of the
as asserted by Pedro, instead of July 6, 1962, as maintained by Vivo (the Board's proceedings, which clearly show that the resolution to exclude
Commissioner of Immigration), then the admission on July 6, 1961 by the was adopted on July 6, 1962. No alteration in dates appears in these. In
Special Board of Inquiry of the fact of Pedro's Philippine citizenship fact, the alterations observed are susceptible of the explanation that the
would have become final and, therefore his detention by the immigration date July 20 was originally placed by the stenographer or typist because
authorities would be unlawful. it was then that the reasoned and extended decision was typewritten in
- pursuant to Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by final form, but that it was corrected to July 6, the date it was voted,
RA 503, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry shall become final because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day the
unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners, or in the resolution to exclude was actually adopted.
absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners - the Court below erred in finding and declaring that the decision of the
after a review by it, motu proprio, of the entire proceedings within one Board of Special Inquiry in the case of petitioner-appellee had become
year from the promulgation of the said decision. final and unreviewable, and that its review and revocation by the
Commissioners of Immigration was null and void.
ISSUES 2. NO.
1.WON the decision of the Board of Commissioners reversing that of the Ratio Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory
Special Board of Inquiry was made within the one-year prescriptive the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the
period. Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate
2. WON the decision of the Inquiry Board had become non-reviewable collectively and in order that their views and ideas should be exchanged
since 1961 because of its confirmation by the majority of the preceding and examined before reaching a conclusion. The powers and duties of
Board of Commissioners. boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual
members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the
members convened in session, upon a concurrence of at least a majority same date rendered its decision, declaring Dolores Neria a Filipino
and with at least a quorum present. Where the action needed is not of citizen, and the petitioner a Filipino citizen as he is an illegitimate son of
the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the members Dolores, and allowing his admission into the Philippines. This written
must be together and act in their official capacity, and the action should decision was subsequently submitted to the members of the Board of
appear on the records of the board. Immigration Commissioners. The Immigration authorities issued
Reasoning It is pointed out by Pedro that two members of the board in Identification Certificate 16306 to the petitioner, attesting that he "was
reference to said decision had marked "Noted" over their own signatures, admitted as a citizen of the Philippines" per decision of the Board of
while only the third Commissioner made of record his adverse opinion. Special Inquiry No. 1 dated August 2, 1961.
The former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted - On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum
individually in this particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown by Order 9 (exh. 7), directing that
the different dates affixed to their signatures that they did not actually [i]t appearing that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners
meet to discuss and vote on the case. This was officially made to record of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the
by the Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9, on January cases coming before it, it is hereby ordered that all decisions
24, 1962, wherein he stated that for the past several years, the Board of purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on
Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and Appeal from, or on review motu proprio of, decisions of the Board of
deliberate in the cases coming before it. Special Inquiry are set aside. The Board of Commissioners is directed to
- Secondly, the aforementioned Memorandum Order, issued in the review, in accordance with Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Department Head, 613, as amended, all decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting
expressly declares that the public interest so requiring, it is ordered that entry of aliens into the country and give preference to all cases where
all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of entry has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the
Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu proprio of decisions of Philippines, following the principle laid down in Section 30 of
the Board of Special Inquiry, are set aside and this nullification included Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, that 'the burden of proof shall be
the alleged 1961 decision. upon such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion' and the
Dispostion decision and order of CFI reversed, nullified and set aside. ruling of this Department that "Citizenship is a status of privilege, power
and honor of inestimable value. When doubts exist concerning a grant of
it, they should be resolved in favor of the Government against the
NERIA v THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION claimant"
G.R. NO. 24800; CASTRO; May 27 1968 - In compliance with the above directive, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, proceeded to review motu proprio the entire
Facts: proceedings had before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to the
- On July 9, 1961 the petitioner, with three other persons, supposedly his petitioner's case and that of his supposed relatives. A hearing officer of
widowed mother (Dolores Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix and the Bureau of Immigration was directed to conduct an investigation of the
Manuel Neria), arrived at the Manila International Airport from Hongkong entire proceedings of and the evidence presented before the Board of
on board a Cathay Pacific Airways plane. The immigration inspector at Special Inquiry No. 1. On the basis of a memorandum of the hearing
the airport, not satisfied with the petitioner's travel documents and those officer, the new Board of Immigration Commissioners found that the
of his companions upon primary inspection thereof, referred the matter of petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a
their admission to the Board of Special Inquiry for investigation "to Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the decision of the Board of
determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen". Accordingly, the Special Inquiry No. 1, and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 conducted a hearing on July 14, 1961, at the Philippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and
which time the petitioner offered oral and documentary evidence to be returned to the port from whence he came or to the country of which
support his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen After the conclusion he is a national. The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said
of the investigation, the said board on August 2, 1961 deliberated on the decision. This motion was denied by the new Board.
case and unanimously voted for petitioner's admission. The board on the
- The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying the RATIO Comm. Act 613, as amended, provides in part that :[t]he decision
Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain the Commissioner of of any two members of the Board [of Special Inquiry] shall prevail and
Immigration and the Board of Immigration Commissioners from arresting shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners
and expelling him, and prohibit them from taking any further steps or as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by
actions contrary to the decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu propio of the entire
No. 1. This petition was given due course, and a writ of preliminary proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision....
injunction was issued as prayed for. But this petition was dismissed. - The resolution of this issue, in turn, depends upon the determination of
- On April 30, 1965 the present petition for habeas corpus was filed, the the date when the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 was
petitioner claiming that the respondent's agents picked him up at Rosario promulgated, August 2, 1961 when it was actually rendered, or
St., Manila, in the evening of the previous April 23 on the supposed claim September 4, 1961 when the petitioner was actually notified thereof and
that he was not properly documented for admission as a Filipino citizen a copy received by his counsel. The date of promulgation is important. It
when he entered the Philippines; and that since then he "has been is from that date that the one-year period commenced within which the
unlawfully and illegally confined, restrained and deprived of his liberty in Board of Immigration Commissioners could review motu proprio the
the Bureau of Immigration Detention Station in the Engineering Island, entire proceedings of Board of Special Inquiry No. 1.
Manila." On the same date, the lower court required the respondent to - According to the Solicitor General, the correct date of promulgation is
bring the petitioner before the court on May 3, 1965 at 8:30 O'clock in the September 4, 1961, because under the Immigration Rules and
morning. The clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas Regulations, the decision of a Board of Special Inquiry "shall be rendered
corpus directing the respondent to submit his return. The latter's written in writing",5 and under section 27 (b), supra, the written decision "shall be
return of May 6, 1965 states, among other things, that the petitioner was promulgated"; that the words "rendition" (from "rendered") and
under lawful custody on a valid process commanding his exclusion from "promulgation" (from "promulgated") connote two separate and distinct
the Philippines and ordering his return to the port where he came from or acts required to be accomplished by the Board of Special Inquiry, for
to the country of which he is a national. rendition is the date when a judge signs his decision and files it with the
- On June 18, 1965 the lower court dismissed the petition stating that the clerk of court, whereas promulgation is the date when such decision is
petitioner is legally detained on a warrant issued by the respondent published, officially announced, is made known to the public, or delivered
Commissioner of Immigration." On July 20, 1965 the lower court set to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or to their
aside its decision of June 17, 1965, and, on the same date, rendered an counsel; and that in this case, rendition was accomplished on August 2,
amended decision completely reversing its decision of June 17, granted 1961 when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing on
the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the the petitioner's case, deliberated thereon, voted for his admission into the
petitioner. The lower court held that "the decision rendered by the new Philippines and rendered its written decision, and promulgation was
Board of Commissioners is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and no accomplished on September 4, 1961 when the petitioner was actually
administrative action being possible because the question involved in this notified of the decision, copy of which was received by his counsel.
case is purely a legal question, the doctrine of exhaustion of - No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words "rendition" and
administrative remedies has no application in this case." On July 22 the "promulgation" would convey different meanings. This Court defined
clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus. promulgation as "the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for
filing and publication". The word "promulgate" was viewed by the majority
Issue: WON the decision of the new Board of Immigration Commissioner in People vs. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry made by the clerk of a
is null and void for having been rendered without or in excess of its judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments made by said clerk.
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in violation of section 27 - The petitioner's argument, at all events, is without merit. Section 27 (b),
(b), Comm. Act 613 supra, provides that proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry its
appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its deliberation, its
HELD decision and notice thereof to an alien, and the time when an appeal may
YES be brought therefrom "shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration."
- In this case, August 2, 1961 was the date when the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 had to be reversed, the new Board of Commissioners had
Inquiry No. 1 concluded its hearing of petitioner's case (I.C. 61-2312-C), to act not later than August 2, 1962.
deliberated on it, and voted for his admission as a citizen of the As it was on August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration
Philippines. August 2, 1961 was also the date when the decision in Commissioners as a body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of
extenso was rendered. That date and not September 4, 1961, therefore, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, the review motu
is the date of promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry proprio was effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by section
No. 1, which decision should "prevail and shall be final ... unless 27 (b), supra. The said decision of the Board of Immigration
reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of
proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation such decision, are therefore, as correctly found by the lower court, null
of said decision."10 Computing the one-year period from August 2, 1961, and void, for "lack of jurisdiction," since the decision of the Board of
the Board of Immigration Commissioners had until August 2, 1962 within Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already become "final."
which to review the proceedings motu proprio. - The respondent also contends that the petitioner's petition for habeas
- The case of the petitioner was included in the agenda of the Board of corpus was prematurely filed, because he did not first appeal the
Immigration Commissioners for review motu propio for July 24, 1962. decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners to the Secretary of
The case was referred to the Immigration hearing officer, who, on July Justice, who, by law, is vested with power of control and supervision over
30, 1962, submitted his memorandum to the said board. The case was the said Board. We have already held that the principle of exhaustion of
again included in the agenda of the said board for August 2, 1962, the administrative remedies is inapplicable "where the question in dispute is
date it was considered submitted for decision. The minutes of the purely a legal one", or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or
meeting of the Board of Immigration Commissioners presented by its was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and
Secretary Pio Noche and read into the records of this case, however, "nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done" thereon.
reveal that the petitioner's case was actually acted upon and decided, DISPOSITION Decision affirmed from affirmed
not on August 2, 1962, as the decision and the warrant of exclusion
would tend to show, but on August 8, 1962
- The minutes of the meeting of the new Board of Commissioners and, GO YU TAK WAI v VIVO
the testimony of its Secretary show that as late on August 8, 1962, the G.R. No. L-22257; AQUINO; May 25, 1977
new Board of Commissioners was, only deliberating on the case of the
petitioner. The admission of the Secretary of the new Board of NATURE
Commissioners that the case of the petitioner was not acted upon on Appeal from the decision of CFI/RTC.
August 2, 1962, shows that the alteration of the date of the decision of
the new Board of Commissioners from August 8, 1962 to August 2, 1962 Facts:
was deliberate. The fact that the case of the petitioner was submitted to - The controversy arose when Go Yu Tak Wai (Mrs. GO) applied with the
the new Board of Commissioners for its resolution on August 2, 1962, is Bureau of Immigration for admission as a returning resident. It appears
no excuse for ante-dating its decision which was actually rendered after that Mrs. GO arrived in the Philippines after 20 years of absence from the
that date. On August 2, 1962, it did not reverse the decision of the Board country. The Bureaus Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) concluded that Mrs.
of Special Inquiry No. 1, because having actually deliberated on the case GO satisfactorily proved her right to admission as a returning resident.
of the petitioner on August 8, 1962, it could not have on August 2 The decision of BSI was promulgated on March 27, 1962. It was
resolved to reverse the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. reviewed motu proprio on March 11, 1963 by the Board of
- The alteration of the true date of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners (BOC). On said March 11th, BOC resolved to reverse the
Commissioners, made upon instruction of the respondent Commissioner BSIs decision (and, thus, to exclude Mrs. GO).
of Immigration, is revealing: it shows that the respondent Commissioner - However, BOC's decision in extenso (extended opinion) was not
knew that the one-year period was to be computed from August 2, 1961; immediately rendered and promulgated. It appears that the draft of the
it shows also that he knew that if the decision of the Board of Special BOC decision was signed by the Commissioners during the period
August 13-26. The decision was mailed on August 27th to Mrs. GO,
who received the same the following day. Upon Mrs. GOs complaint, CFI - Section 27(b) specifies that the decision of BSI "shall be promulgated
held that BOCs decision was void because it was promulgated after the not later than two days from the date of the deliberation". The absence of
statutory one-year period. such a requirement with respect to the decision of BOC supports the
view that such decision need not be promulgated within the one-year
Issue: Whether or not a resolution of BOC which reversed the decision period. It suffices that BOC should review the decision of BSI and
of BSI and adopted within one year from the promulgation of BSIs deliberate upon it within one year from promulgation of BSI's
decision is sufficient decision and that the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the
action which they took within the said statutory period.
Held: YES. - Moreover, section 27(c) expressly requires that the decision of BOC in
REASONING BOC is empowered to reverse motu proprio the decision of case of an appeal from the decision of BSI should "be put in writing and
BSI within one year from promulgation of said decision. The Philippine promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is
Immigration Act of 1940, Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended submitted for decision". In contrast, no such requirement is provided for
provides: in section 27(b) with respect to the Commissioners' decision in case they
SEC. 27. motu proprio review the decision of BSI.
xxx Disposition for lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial court's
(b) A board of special inquiry shall have authority (1) to determine decision, the same is considered affirmed. [only 6 Justices (Fernando,
whether an alien seeking to enter or land in the Philippines shall be Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., Martin, JJ. and the writer) voted
allowed to enter or land or shall be excluded The decision of for reversal. J. Teehankee filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief
the [BSI] shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board Justice (Castro) and J. Antonio concurred. J. Barredo also dissented.]
of Commissioners or, in the absence of an appeal, unless
reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it,
motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from BARREDO, J., dissenting:
the promulgation of said decision The decision [of the BSI] The operative date of the decision of BOC is the date of promulgation, if
shall be promulgated not later than two days from the date of the not the date of notice to the party aggrieved.
deliberation [T]he Commissioner of Immigration may grant an
extension of time if he considers it necessary. TEEHANKEE, J, dissenting:
(c) An alien excluded by [BSI] or a dissenting member thereof may - The Act's provisions as well as public policy support a construction that
appeal to the [BOC], whose decision in the case shall be final. The requires that a resolution or decision of BOC on a review motu proprio
decision on appeal shall be put in writing and promulgated not less must be in writing and promulgated with due notice on the party affected
than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision. within the one-year period.
xxx - Section 27 (b) provides that "the decision [of BSI] shall be
- This Court had already held that the operative date of the promulgated not later than two days from the date of deliberation."
Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was Section 27 (c) likewise provides for a summary period of seven days
voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when from submittal for decision within which BOC shall put in writing and
the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed" because promulgate its decision on appeal. Read in context, it seems obvious that
"the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the the decision on a review motu proprio by BOC must be no less than
resolution to exclude was adopted (citing, inter alia, Arocha vs. Vivo a decision on appeal by either party; it must be duly put in writing and
and Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration). Consequently, the promulgated within the more than adequate one-year period fixed by the
Commissioners were justified in using March 11, 1963 as the date of Act.
their written decision although it was actually drafted on August 13th and - Where the alien has appealed from an adverse decision or a dissenting
mailed to Mrs. GO on August 27th. The decision related back to the date BSI member has appealed a favorable decision, the applicant for
when the Commissioners deliberated on the decision of BSI and admission knows as mandated by the law that a final decision must be
resolved to reverse it. handed down within seven days from submittal of the appeal for
decision. Where there has been no appeal and BOC conducts a preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the ground
review motu proprio of which the applicant is likely unaware, both that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines, following the principle laid
public policy and due process demand that where no adverse down in Section 30 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that 'the
decision is promulgated within the one-year period, the decision of burden of proof shall be upon such alien to establish that he is not
BSI shall have become final. (Otherwise, such one-year period subject to exclusion ..."
would be an elastic period and would have no meaning, as in this - Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, a committee examined the
case where the appellee would have been ordered excluded by a pretended right of the said minors as alleged children of petitioner to
decision of reversal promulgated 5 months after the lapse of the admission, and thereafter forwarded its findings to the Commissioner of
one-year period.) Immigration recommending the exclusion of said minors, the revocation
- Such a view is in consonance with law's policy of a definite date of fixed of the order declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco a Filipino citizen, and
finality of the BSI's decision and to reduce occasion for anomalies and the filing of deportation proceedings against him.A copy of this decision
irregularities in the admission or exclusion of aliens and applicants for was received by the minors on October 26,1962.
admission, under the procedures for appeal or review motu proprio - Benito Sichangco, in behalf of the minors Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna,
established by the Act. filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on November 20,
1962 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul the decision of
the Board of Commissioners of Immigration excluding the abovenamed
SICHANGCO v BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION minors from the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-23545; MAKASIAR; Nov 7, 1979 - CFI declared that the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated
September 4, 1962, reversing the decision of the previous Board of
Facts: Commissioners dated September 11, 1961, to have been rendered on
- Sy Te, whose name was changed to Benito Sichangco was recognized October 26, 1962, more than a year from the first decision, and therefore
by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order illegal and null and void, and the injunction earlier issued was made
dated February 19, 1960 .Sychangco is married to Cheng Yok Ha. Three permanent, with costs against respondent Board.
sons were born in China allegedly out of their marriage, namely, Si Beng,
Si Son and Si Luna. ISSUE:
- On August 28, 1961 arrived in the Philippines and sought admission WON the notice of the BOC decision must be received within the 1 year
claiming to be the children of Benito Sichangco. An investigation was period
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the Bureau of
Immigration. After hearing, the said Board rendered a decision on Held: NO
September 11, 1961 (Exh. C) admitting these minors into the Philippines - The Board of Commissioners rendered on September 4, 1962 its
as citizens thereof, being the children of the petitioner . said decision was decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No, 1 dated
submitted to the then members of the Board of Commissioners who September 11, 1961, well within the one-year period required by law.
"noted" the decision on different dates. - It is true that the copy of the decision of the Board of Commissioners
- On January 24, 1962, then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno issued dated September 4, 1962 was sent by mail to the petitioner's minor
Memorandum Order No. 9, wherein he found "that for the past several children herein only on October 26, 1962, and received by the said
years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met minors on the same date. This fact, however, does not work to vitiate
collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it," for said decision. All that the Immigration Law requires is that the decision of
which reason he set aside "all decisions purporting to have been reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated within one year
rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from, or on review from the rendition of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Notice
motu propio of, decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry," and directed of said decision of reversal may be sent even after the one-year period
the Board of Commissioners "to review in accordance with Section 27(b) has elapsed. In the case of Neria vs. Commissioner of Immigration (L-
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the Boards 24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 807, citing Arocha vs. Vivo, supra), the
of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give Supreme Court ruled that "the operative date of the Commissioners'
action is that when the resolution (of exclusion) was noted and adopted in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the
by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral
was prepared, written and signed," and with more reason, as in this damages, P5,000 as exemplary damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees
case, regardless of the date when such decision is mailed, "because the and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the
decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The
was actually adopted. Necessarily the extended opinion had to be decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the
posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to President, herein public respondent.
reverse the findings of the Board of Special Inquiry. The Secretary's - On January 7, 1993, the public respondent rendered its decision
certificate shows that the Board of Immigration Commissioners acted dismissing the petitioners' appeal. Motion for reconsideration of the
upon not less than eight Immigration cases (including that of the decision was denied by the public respondent on January 26, 1993.
Gatchalians) on July 6, 1962; and it was of course impracticable to Consequently petitioners come before this Court, in this petition.
prepare and sign fully reasoned decisions in all these cases."
Issue: WON the HLURB can act validly as a division composed of only 3
commissioners
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP v SENDINO
233 SCRA 665; KAPUNAN, J.: July 5, 1994 Held: Yes.
- Under section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the
Facts:: commission, the board is specifically mandated to adopt rules of
- Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation procedure for the conduct of its business and to perform such functions
agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square necessary for the accomplishment of its above mentioned functions.
meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque for Since nothing in the provisions of either E.O. 90 or E.O. 648 denies or
P307,800.00 as its purchase price. She paid P1,000.00 as partial withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a
reservation fee on January 15, 1989 and completed payment of this fee division, we cannot see how the Board, for the purpose of effectively
on January 20, 1989 by paying P4,000.00. carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers
- On July 18, 1989, private respondent paid REVI P16,600.00 as full as a regulatory body should be denied the power, as a matter of practical
downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by administrative procedure, to constitute its adjudicatory boards into
REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension various divisions.
of one month to do so. - After all, the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue
- For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held
appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, "to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function,
through its Vice-President for Marketing, informed respondent of the unless by express provision of the Act or by implication it has been
cancellation of the contract on the 31st of July 1989. withheld." The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby
- On April 20, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint for Specific cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes
Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only
Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners
(HLURB) asking that respondent be ordered: To comply and continue to deal with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise,
with the sale of the house and lot, Block 4, Lot 17 at the Raymondville entrusted to it.
Subdivision, Sucat Road, Paranaque, Metro Manila; - As the Office of the President noted in its February 26, 1993 Resolution
- This petition was amended on August 17, 1990 by impleading denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, "it is impossible and very
petitioners Magdiwang Realty Corporation (MRC) which appeared to be impractical to gather the four (4) full time and five (5) part time
the registered owner of the subject lot as per TCT No. 76023. commissioners (together) just to decide a case." Considering that its part
- On April 3, 1991 the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide the time commissioners act merely in an ex-officio capacity, requiring a
complaint was challenged by REVI in its answer, rendered its judgment
majority of the Board to sit en banc on each and every case brought
before it would result in an administrative nightmare.